Metaphors Cicero lived by : The Role of Metaphor and Simile in De senectute

Sjöblad, Aron

2009

[Link to publication](#)

Total number of authors:
1

Metaphors Cicero lived by

The Role of Metaphor and Simile in De senectute

Aron Sjöblad

i

To my parents

iv

Acknowledgements

Contents

3

5

1. Introduction

1.1. Presentation

This thesis sets out to investigate the role that metaphor and simile play in Cicero's dialogue *De senectute*. For this purpose, the theories of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson will be employed. In their book *Metaphors we live by* (first published in 1980[1]), Lakoff and Johnson introduce the idea that metaphors, rather than being simply a means for rhetorical effect, constitute a way of thinking. They put forward the idea that when we speak or write, a large number of *metaphorical concepts* are used. Some common such concepts are ARGUMENT IS WAR, LIFE IS A JOURNEY and GOOD IS UP.[2] In Lakoff's and Johnson's view, many common expressions and ways of speaking are formed by these concepts and, so to speak, imply them – as when we say 'I won the debate', 'He's at a crossroads' or 'She's got a high position in the state'. Further, the two authors argue that the metaphors (and metaphorical concepts)[3] that we use form 'coherent systems'.[4] Not being chosen ad hoc and at random, they are part of a 'conceptual system' in the human mind. The metaphors in a human being's conceptual system are partly culture-dependent, perhaps partly universal, and many of them are acquired early in life. E.g. the metaphorical concept IMPORTANT IS BIG, as Lakoff and Johnson see it, is rooted in children's experiences of their parents as being both physically big and important.[5]

When I studied *De senectute*, I noticed that Cicero uses such a metaphorical concept in the very beginning of the dialogue. He refers to the difficulty of old age as a 'burden' (*onus*) and returns to that description again and again. The metaphorical concept DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS is often brought up by the researchers in the *Metaphors we live by*-tradition[6], and it became obvious that the image of old age as a burden was just a variation of this idea. When I continued

---

[1] Lakoff & Johnson 1980.
[2] Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff & Turner 1989. The metaphorical concepts are usually written in capital letters.
[3] For a description of how these terms are used in this thesis, see section 1.7.
[4] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 3-45 (quotation from page 41).
[5] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 49-57.
[6] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 50; Lakoff & Turner 1989, 25, 149, Kövecses 2000, 45. For an explanation of what I mean by the *Metaphors we live by*-tradition, see section 1.7.

reading the text it struck me that many metaphorical concepts occurred repeatedly in it. Several of them were identical to the ones that Lakoff and Johnson had found in modern English, but there also seemed to be others that I did not recognize from modern languages.(These concepts later proved to be closely related, but not identical, to the ones found in Lakoff's, Johnsons's and Kövecses' studies of modern English.) Of course, one can discern an underlying idea behind many, perhaps most, metaphorical expressions, but in Lakoff's and Johnson's view, the issue here is rather whether they are interrelated, and if they are, in what manner, and how they can be varied to express different ideas. Lakoff and Johnson describe a human conceptual system, of which they claim metaphorical thinking is an imtegral part. Their investigations mainly concern the English language (although later, they started studying metaphors also in other languages) and it seemed an interesting question whether their ideas were applicable to classical Latin.

The theories brought forward in *Metaphors we live by* were further developed not only by Lakoff and Johnson themselves but also by many other researchers. The theoretical basis of my thesis will be the the book *Metaphors we live by* and the research that it inspired, especially that of the 1980's and 1990's, when the scholars Zoltan Kövecses, Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier (and also many others) developed the ideas of Lakoff and Johnson further in cooperation with George Lakoff in particular.

Since the Lakoff-Johnsonian model of metaphors has had great impact on metaphor theory from 1980 onwards, it seemed, as already mentioned, an important task to try their ideas on the Latin language. One way of doing this might have been to study the use of one or several central metaphorical concepts in the works of a large number of Latin authors. However, I decided to focus on a single Latin text because this would allow me to see the connection between the role of metaphor and the principal themes of that text. Since from the Lakoff-Johnsonian standpoint metaphors and metaphorical concepts are very common in written and spoken language, it was necessary to study a relatively short text. For those reasons, and because I intended to search for recurring metaphorical concepts, I presumed that a thematically coherent text would fit my type of survey best. Therefore, *De senectute,* a dialogue which strongly focuses on the difficulties of old age and how they ought to be overcome, seemed a good choice. Studying a single literary text in this way is not the fashion the scholars in the *Metaphors we live by*-tradition have usually worked. Rather, they have concentrated on spoken language and on the function of certain metaphorical concepts, or on how several

metaphors can be employed, e.g. to speak about an emotion such as love or anger.[7] Focusing on one of Cicero's philosophical dialogues would allow me to combine a study of the metaphorical concepts found in that text – which might lead to some very tentative and preliminary conclusions as to which metaphorical concepts are common in the ancient Latin language as a whole, as Lakoff and Johnson had done in the English language – with an investigation of the function of metaphors in that particular dialogue.

When metaphors are studied, a problem that often comes up is whether a metaphor is conventional or new. Answering this question often poses great problems in Latin, since the remaining sources are scarce. In many instances, one can find out when a metaphor is first used in the remaining sources, but this gives little information as to whether an ancient Roman would have considered the metaphor to be fresh or old. This problem, however, is made somewhat less embarassing if the researcher applies the Lakoff-Johnsonian theory, because this theory focuses on conventional metaphorical concepts, which, although conventional, are not considered to be 'dead' or obsolete, but rather as the most central and important ones in a conceptual system.[8] This issue will be further discussed in the section *Method and definitions* (1.8.).

It also became apparent during my close reading of *De senectute* that several of the metaphorical concepts that Lakoff and Johnson and their followers formulate also seemed valid for many of the similes in the dialogue. When, for example, Laelius adresses Cato in the following way:

> Volumus sane nisi molestum est, Cato, tamquam longam aliquam viam confeceris, quam nobis quoque ingrediundum sit, istuc quo pervenisti videre quale sit. (§6)

> (Unless it is too much trouble to you, Cato, since you have, as it were, travelled the long road upon which we must also set out, we really do wish to see what sort of place it is at which you have arrived.[9])

---

[7] See *e.g.* Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Kövecses 2000; Lakoff & Turner 1989; Johnson 1987.
[8] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 128-131.
[9] When *De senectute* is quoted in this thesis, the Latin text is followed by the English translation found in the Loeb edition of the text (Falconer 1923). In some instances, the translation is supplemented by a parenthesis added by me in order to clarify a certain metaphorical sense in the Latin original.

typical Lakoff-Johnsonian metaphorical concepts (LIFE IS A JOURNEY, STATES ARE LOCATIONS) are being used. The Lakoff-Johnsonian research explores the nature of metaphors and, to some degree, of metonymies, but not of similes. In spite of this, I decided to include similes in my investigation, and broadly speaking, explore which aspects of which source domains Cicero employs for speaking about which topic. This, as I see it, will give a deeper understanding of the different themes of the dialogue, since Cicero often employs metaphors and similes when he writes about old age, *natura*, time, human qualities and many other themes. This approach will also make it possible to analyze how the role of metaphors in the dialogue differs from that of similes. In short, focusing exclusively on the metaphors in *De senectute* and leaving the similes out would be an odd approach to the text.

1.2. Cicero's dialogue *De senectute*

Cicero's dialogue *De senectute* was, by all probability, written early in 44 BC. This we know from some references to it in his letters and the dialogue *De divinatione*, which was written shortly afterwards.[10] In the years 45-44, Cicero had left politics and wrote many of his philosophical works, including *De natura deorum, De finibus bonorum et malorum* and *Disputationes Tusculanae.*[11] Cicero was 62 years old when he composed *De senectute* and in the beginning of it he claims that he, now being a *senex* in Roman reckoning, felt compelled to write on the subject (§2).

The dialogue is dedicated to *Titus Pomponius Atticus* (110-32), Cicero's literary adviser and friend from childhood. Atticus, an *eques* of a rich family, was a student of Epicurean philosophy and spent a large part of his life in Athens. He also helped to spread Cicero's works and a large number of letters adressed to him from Cicero to has survived to our times.[12] Atticus was four years Cicero's senior, and in the first parapraphs of *De senectute* the latter states that they now both have to confront the problem of old age:

> hoc enim onere, quod mihi commune tecum est, aut iam urgentis aut certe adventantis senectutis, et te et me etiam ipsum levari volo (§2)

---

[10] Cicero, *De divinatione* 2.3; *e.g.* Cicero, *Epistulae ad Atticum* 14.21.3*,* 16.3.1.
[11] Conte 1994, 176.
[12] See D.R. Shackleton-Baileys introduction in *Cicero, Letters to Atticus,* vol. I, 17-20.

([…] for I fain would lighten both for you and for me the common burden of old age, which, if not already pressing hard upon us, is surely coming on apace […])

After the introductory words to Atticus, the interlocutors that will participate in the dialogue are introduced: Cato the Elder and the young patricians Scipio and Laelius.

Marcus Porcius Cato (Cato the Elder or the Censor, 234-149) was a famous Roman politician, who held the consulship in 195. He was also a speaker of good repute and often engaged in trials. He is considered to have been an important figure in the development of Latin prose. Only one prose work of his, *De agricultura*, has survived to our time. Cato was a defender of traditional Roman values and critical of Greek influence in Rome, but in *De senectute*, he is portrayed as an enthusiastic student of the Greek language. As censor, Cato imposed heavy taxes on luxury and lived, for his own part, a modest life. For later Romans, he stood forth as a virtuous man who dedicated his life to the state of Rome.[13]

Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus (Scipio the Younger, 185/4-129) was the adopted grandson to Scipio Africanus the Elder, who defeated Hannibal in the second Carthaginian war. Scipio the Younger became especially famous for the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC, for which he celebrated a triumph in Rome. He was admired for his military courage and personal *virtus,* but he also took a great interest in literature and philosophy.[14]

Gaius Laelius (c.190-after 129), the main character in Cicero's dialogue *Laelius de amicitia* (written in the same year as *De senectute*), was a famous Roman orator and politician and held the consulship in 140 BC. He was a close friend of Scipio the Younger, whom he assisted at the destruction of Carthage. He also had friends among the Greeks in Rome and helped to publish Panaetius' works.[15]

As we can see, Cicero has chosen well-known Romans as interlocutors in the dialogue, men who were admired for their virtue and great achievements for the Roman republic. It is also obvious that he puts Cato in the position of being a spokesman for his own views on old age:

> Iam enim ipsius Catonis sermo explicabit nostram omnem de senectute sententiam. (§3)

---

[13] Astin 1978; see especially 289-294.
[14] Astin 1967, 12-25.
[15] Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. 2003, 811.

(For from now on the words of Cato himself will completely unfold to you my own views of old age.)

and he explicitly states that he chooses Cato in order to lend authority to his text,

…quo maiorem auctoritatem haberet oratio. (§3)

(…that I might give it greater weight.)

After the introduction, where Cicero speaks about the burden of old age and his need of writing on the subject, Cato, Scipio and Laelius enter the scene (§3) . The young men ask Cato to explain how he has been able to cope with old age and to tell them of the insights he has made during his 'journey of life'(§6). Cato starts by praising Quintus Maximus (Cunctator) as an example of a virtuous old man whom he was personally acquainted with in his boyhood. In §15 he enumerates what he considers to be the four great difficulties of old age: (1) it makes a person inactive; (2) the body is weakened by ageing; (3) there are no or few pleasures in old age; (4) an old person approaches death. He then endeavours to meet and refute these disparaging statements one by one. The first point is treated in §§15-26 where Cato claims that intellectual feats can still be achieved by old men and that memory can be maintained with mental exercise. Refuting the second difficulty (§§26-38), Cato argues that young people also have their superiors in strength and that every age has its advantages. The intellectual power of Pythagoras is superior to the bodily strength of the athlete Milo. Cato also gives several examples of men who have retained their vigour into old age. As regards the third problem (§§ 38-66), Cato contends that when the appetite for *voluptas* is weakened, the mind is set free and able to dedicate itself to intellectual pleasures and a modest companionship with friends without being controlled by passions and desire. §§51-57 contain a typical *digressio* on the pleasures of agricultural life and is also a part of the discussion of the good aspects of old age. The defense against the fourth allegation, closeness to death, is divided in two parts. In the first (§§66-76), Cato argues that fear of death disappears after a long life. The second part (§§77-85) contains his reflections on the afterlife.

Because they have a bearing on the choice of metaphors, I will here also mention the rhetorical features of the dialogue. The *exordium* is in a way twofold. First, Cicero addresses Atticus and states the problem that they both share, i.e. old age. Then, again, Laelius and Scipio formulate their question to Cato. Since they are much younger than Cicero and Atticus, they have a different perspective. As I see it, the second part of the *exordium* is primarily a way of presenting Scipio and Laelius to the reader. They are conscient of their lack of knowledge and their humble way of addressing Cato indicates that they are good listeners and that they show show due respect to the old. §15 is a typical *partitio*, where the four reasons

12

for criticising old age are listed. As stated above, §§51-57 is a *digressio* on the pleasures of agricultural life. The *refutatio* of the criticism against old age is a dominant feature of the text. *Confirmatio* is performed through philosophical argumentation and *exempla*. Cato's reflections on death in §§77-85 constitute an effective *peroratio*, in a style which is less down-to-earth than the rest of the dialogue.[16]

1.3. Editions and manuscripts

Since this thesis is a study of metaphors, not of textual criticism and the transmission of *De senectute,* I will here only briefly sketch the manuscript tradition of the text. In the main chapters, different readings will be discussed only when they concern the use of metaphors.

While the edition of Simbeck (1912-1917) only gives a short introduction, which describes the most important manuscripts, Wuilleumier (1940) provides a deep and comprehensive presentation of the dialogue, including chapters on the philosophical and literary sources. Wuilleumier also characterizes the literary style of the work with its archaisms and rhetorical features. Venini (1959), in her introduction, focuses on the manuscript situation. I have chosen to base my investigation on the edition of J.G.F. Powell (1988). Like Wuilleumier, Powell gives a very elucidating and detailed background to the text. After a survey of the editions of Simbeck, Venini, Wuillemier and Powell the latter one seemed to be the natural choice, since it includes and sums up the results of the former works.

The oldest manuscripts of *De senectute* date from the ninth century. Powell uses eleven primary manuscripts, which date from the ninth to the twelfth century, for his edition. He identifies two groups of manuscripts, one of French origin and one of German origin. Perhaps the most important manuscript is Parisinus 6332 (P),[17] which was probably written in 'the area of the Loire' at the beginning of the ninth century.[18] Simbeck (1917) writes:

> Inter codices Ciceronis de senectute libelli facile principem locum obtinet P inter Parisinae bibliothecae nationalis libros manu scriptos latinos n° 6332.[19]

---

[16] Kennedy 1994, 5,100, 120-121; Kennedy 1972, 116.
[17] I here use the *sigla* of Powell (1988).
[18] Powell 1988, 30-41; Reynolds (ed.) 1983, 116-120.
[19] Simbeck 1917, iii.

(Among the *codices* to Cicero's treatise on old age the *codex* P in the manuscript 6332 in the national library in Paris is by far the most important [my translation].)

In Parisinus 6332, the end of the dialogue is missing; it ends at §78. Powell also attaches great importance to Laurentianus 50.45 (M), although it is significantly younger than P, dating from the 10th or 11th century.[20] From the Renaissance, about 350 manuscripts of *De senectute* remain, attesting to the great popularity of the dialogue in that period, but this large group adds little useful information for the reconstruction of the text.[21] In the manuscripts, *De senectute* is often found together with *De amicitia* and, in fact, these two works were considered to be related to each other already by Cicero.[22]

    De senectute has been edited many times, from the Renaissance onwards.[23] For a list of modern editions, see appendix 1. For a complete list of older editions, see Otto 1830.[24]

1.4. Influences and sources

The fact that we do not have a good picture of the writings on the subject of old age prior to *De senectute* makes it hard to clarify what authors and works influenced Cicero, but some of the predecessors can be fairly well pointed out. There is an influence from Plato, which concerns the dialogue form, although Cato's argumentation is less concerned with strict logic and search for truth than the Platonic dialogues. In the beginning of the *Republic*, Socrates has a discussion with Cephalus, an old man, about the advantages and disadvantages of old age.[25] This section of Plato's dialogue is quite closely copied by Cicero in *De senectute* §§6-8. Another source is Xenophon, who is also praised by Cato in § 59. Two passages in *De senectute* closely echo Xenophon, §59 (*Oeconomicus*[26]) and §§79-80 (*Cyropaedia*[27]).

---

[20] Powell 1988, 41.
[21] Reynolds (ed.) 1983, 116.
[22] Reynolds (ed.) 1983, 121; Powell 1988, 1-2.
[23] Wuilleumier 1940, 119-120.
[24] Otto 1830.
[25] Plato, *Republic* 1.328b-330a.
[26] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 4.20ff.
[27] Xenophon, *Cyropaideia* 8.7.17-22.

Aristotle also treated old age, especially in the *Rhetoric*[28], and Cicero can be said to continue a discussion on the subject which started long before his time. It is obvious that many motifs and statements which concern old age occur repeatedly among ancient authors. Several hellenistic authors wrote treatises on the subject, περὶ γήρως, *e.g.* Theofrastos and Demetrios of Falerum, but these books have not survived to our time.[29] In §3, Cicero mentions another name, *Aristo Ceus* or perhaps *Aristo Chius*,[30] who is said to have dealt with the theme as well, but this work has also been lost.

Parallels can also be drawn between *De senectute* and earlier consolatory literature[31] and perhaps to Cynic-Stoic diatribe,[32] but Powell denies the connection to the latter *genre*.[33]

The question whether Cicero was influenced by Varro (116-27 BC) is hard to answer, because the two authors are contemporary, and either one could have influenced the other. Varro's satire *Tithonus ἤ περὶ γήρως*, which has survived in fragments, is probably older than *De senecute*, but since only a few lines remain of Varro's work, it is difficult to discuss any possible influences.[34]

It needs also be mentioned that Cicero frequently quotes earlier Latin poets in the text. Thus, quotations from Livius Andronicus, Ennius, Naevius, and Caecilius are woven into the discussion. In § 31 a line from the *Iliad* is rendered in prose.[35]

1.5. Old age in the Roman world

When was a Roman old? In his book *Old Age in the Roman world,* Tim G. Parkin tries to find an answer to this question. [36] One of his results is that there was no consensus concerning the number of years at which a Roman was defined as old. Different testimonies show that old age could be said to begin at such different ages as 42, 60, 63, or 77. However, as Parkin concludes, most modern scholars

---

[28] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.12-14.
[29] Powell 1988, 15, 26.
[30] Powell discusses whether Cicero is referring to an Aristo Chius or an Aristo Ceus in an appendix to his edition (Powell 1988, 269-272).
[31] Powell 1988, 10-11.
[32] Wuilleumier 1940, 60, 64-65.
[33] Powell 1988, 12-14.
[34] Powell 1988, 26-27.
[35] *Iliad* 1. 249.
[36] Parkin 2003.

seem to agree that in the Roman world old age started around the age of 60.[37] This is well in accordance with Cicero's statements in the beginning of *De senectute*, where he writes that he himself and Atticus, being in their early and middle 60's, now have to confront the problem of old age. Parkin also attempts to evaluate the literary sources and their statements on old age and what conclusions can be drawn from them. However, a problem associated with this is that we cannot know whether the views brought forward by authors and philosophers were shared by people in general.[38] Another problem is that most of the remaining sources concern the upper classes, not the *plebs*.[39]

  Parkin finds two opposing attitudes towards old age in the Roman world: 'The wise old counselor or the garrulous old fool.'[40] So, on the one hand, there was a tradition of paying great respect to the old in Rome. The Spartan state, where a group of elder men held the supreme power, was admired and Roman authors repeatedly remark that the word *senatus* is related to *senectus*. The Roman senate had a *cursus honorum*, which meant that the offices *of quaestor, aedile, praetor,* and *consul* were not to not be held before a certain age, but there were exceptions to this.[41] Parkin's conclusion is that the elder had to fight for the *auctoritas* and *dignitas* which they felt they deserved.[42] Cicero's *De senectute* can also be seen as a defense of old age, where Cato the Elder is chosen as a representative of what the older Romans thought elder people should be like and how they ought to be treated, i.e. with respect for their knowledge and experience. While Seneca the younger's and Cicero's ideal seem to have been a respectable and gradual withdrawal from politics and public life, Plutarch insisted that an aristocratic Roman should keep serving the state as long as he could:

> The professed ideal for Seneca, as for Cicero and no doubt for many elderly aristocratic Roman males of the late republic or the empire, was a healthy old age enjoyed pursuing worthwhile and rewarding activities. This may be summed up as *otium honestum*, a difficult phrase to translate: "an honorable withdrawal to leisure" conveys some of the force in the context of *senectus*, although of course the Roman aristocratic ideal of *otium* did not relate solely to one's later years, and, as Cicero found, *otium* might be imposed on one at

---

[37] Parkin 2003, 15-19.
[38] Parkin 2003, 57-58
[39] Parkin 2003, 274.
[40] Parkin 2003, 59.
[41] Parkin 2003, 96-111.
[42] Parkin 2003, 66-67, 72-73, 106-109, 114-115, 240-41.

any time, however unwilling one may be to withdraw from public life. For Plutarch, as has been seen, any withdrawal from one's *officium*, service to the state, was dishonorable, but Seneca viewed things somewhat differently.[43]

On the other hand, and in contrast to the positive and respectful tradition, several ancient authors, e.g. Aristotle and Juvenal, rather dwell on the faults and weaknesses of old age.[44]

1.6. Metaphor theory

In this section, I will present some of the theories about metaphors from Aristotle onwards. It is not possible to give a full account of the subject. Especially from the 20th century, the debate is very extensive. From that period, I will discuss only the works which influenced George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, and their theories will be presented in a separate section (1.7.). For wider surveys on the theory of metaphor, see e.g. Miriam Taverniers' book *Metaphor and Metaphorology* (2002)[45] and Eckhart Rolf's *Metaphertheorien* (2005).[46]

We might begin by defining metaphor. In *Oxford English Dictionary* it is defined in the following way:

> The figure of speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to some object different from, but analogous to, that to which it is properly applicable; an instance of this, a metaphorical expression.[47]

'The ships of the desert' or 'the foot of the mountain' are typical metaphors according to this definition. So are everyday phrases such as 'He is a superficial person' and 'I feel empty inside'. The difference between the metaphor and the *simile*, defined in this way in OED:

> A comparison of one thing with another, esp. as an ornament in poetry or rhetoric.

---

[43] Parkin 2003, 72.
[44] Parkin 2003, 77-87.
[45] Taverniers 2002.
[46] Rolf 2005.
[47] OED, Second edition, Oxford 1989.

is that in the latter the comparison is manifested and marked by an 'as' or a similar expression. 'I wandered lonely as a cloud' and 'You are like a brother to me' are typical similes.

Another related concept, the *catachresis*, needs also be mentioned. A very daring metaphor can turn into a catachresis, which OED defines in this manner:

> Improper use of words; application of a term to a thing which it does not properly denote; abuse or perversion of a trope or metaphor.

'A blind mouth' would be a typical catachresis according to this definition, but the border between a bold metaphor and a catachresis is not always clear.[48]

Metonymy, which will also be discussed to some degree in this thesis, means:

> A figure of speech which consists in substituting for the name of a thing the name of an attribute of it or of something closely related.

So when we say 'I didn't like the blonde but the baldhead was very nice', referring to the guests at a party, we use metonymies.

Theorizing about metaphors can be said to have started with Aristotle, who in *Poetics*, chapter 21, writes:

> Μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορα ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον.
>
> (Metaphor is the application of a strange term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy.[49])

Aristotle argues that when four terms are related so that B is to A what D is to C, it is possible to create a metaphor by changing B for D or D for B. He gives the examples life (A) – old age (B) – day (C) – evening (D) and Ares (A) – shield (B)

---

[48] Max Black, who has taken part in the modern debate on the nature of metaphor, is critical of the definition of catachresis given in OED. In a living language, the signification of a word is often widened in order to fit a new meaning or nuance, Black writes. (Black 1962, 33.)

[49] Translation by Stephen Halliwell (Loeb edition).

– Dionysos (C) – cup (D).[50] In the *Rhetoric*, he treats the subject further, stressing that a metaphor must be fitting; placing two words not fitting together side by side will emphasize their inappropriateness. In connection to this he writes about simile, which he claims is a sort of metaphor, the difference being that the comparison is explicit. As we can see, the modern view of the difference between metaphor and simile goes back to Aristotle.[51]

The discussion is continued by Cicero himself. According to Cicero, the use of metaphors first sprang from a lack of appropriate words but later became a way of giving brilliance to a speech. There are three ways of embellishing a speech in the matter of vocabulary, he writes: the use of rare words, the use of new coinages and the use of metaphor. Sometimes a metaphor can be used for the sake of brevity, but the main reason is that if it is well chosen it gives people pleasure:

> Hoc in genere persaepe mihi admirandum videtur quid sit quod omnes translatis et alienis magis delectantur verbis quam propriis et suis. Nam si res suum nomen et proprium vocabulum non habet, ut 'pes' in navi, ut 'nexum' quod per libram agitur, ut in uxore 'divortium' necessitas cogit quod non habeas aliunde sumere; sed in suorum verborum maxima copia tamen homines aliena multo magis, si sunt ratione translata, delectant. Id ideo accidere credo vel quod ingenii specimen est quoddam transilire ante pedes posita et alia longe repetita sumere; vel quod is qui audit alio ducitur cogitatione neque tamen aberrat, quae maxima est delectatio […] [52]

> (Under this heading I very often feel it a curious point to inquire why it is that everybody derives more pleasure from words used metaphorically and not in their proper sense than from the proper names belonging to the objects. For if a thing has not got a proper name and designation of its own, for example a 'sheet' in a ship, a 'bond' in the sense of a contract made with a pair of scales, a 'separation' in the case of a wife, necessity compels one to borrow what one has not got from somewhere else; but even in cases where there are plenty of specific words available, metaphorical terms give people much more pleasure, if the metaphor is a good one. I suppose the cause of this is either that it is a mark of cleverness of a kind to jump over things that are obvious and choose other things that are far-fetched; or because the hearer's thoughts are led to something else and yet without going astray, which is a very great pleasure […] [53])

---

[50] Aristotle, *Poetics* 21.
[51] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.2-4.
[52] Cicero, *De oratore* 3. 155-160, 165, 167.
[53] Translation by H. Rackham (Loeb edition).

In the same passage we find a definition or explanation of metaphor, but it seems to be an interpolation.[54] Cicero also warns for the risk of obscurity and states that a metaphor can be softened by the addition of words such as '*ut ita dicam*' or similar phrases.[55]

Quintilian, writing in the first century, distinguishes four types of metaphors:

(i) A living thing is substituted by another (a charioteer is called a steersman).
(ii) An inanimate thing is substituted by another ('classique immittit habenas').
(iii) From the animate to the inanimate (the enemy is called a sword).
(iv) Animate for inanimate (the crown of a mountain).[56]

Quintilian prefers the fourth kind, where dead objects are given life and soul. A temperate use illuminates an oration but excesses lead to obscurity and enigmas. He also writes that when one employs metaphor, it is very important to be aware of the differences between poetry and prose:

> In illo vero plurimum erroris, quod ea, quae poetis, qui et omnia ad voluptatem referunt et plurima vertere etiam ipsa metri necessitate coguntur, permissa sunt, convenire quidam etiam prorsae putant.[57]

> (The biggest mistake however is made by those who believe that everything is appropriate in prose which is permitted to the poets, whose only standard is pleasure and who are often forced into Tropes by the necessities of metre.[58])

The *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, probably written around 70 BC by an unknown author, lists six different functions of metaphors in speech: creating a vivid mental picture, brevity, avoidance of obscenity, magnification ('*augendi causa*'), depreciation ('*minuendi causa*'), and embellishment.[59]

From the Middle Ages, it is harder to find the most representative theorists on metaphor than in antiquity. Geoffrey of Vinsauf, who wrote a treatise called the

---

[54] 'Similitudinis est ad verbum unum contracta brevitas, quod verbum in alieno loco tanquam in suo positum si agnoscitur, delectat, si simile nihil habet, repudiatur.'
[55] Cicero, *De oratore,* 3.165-167.
[56] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria,* 8.6.4-15.
[57] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 8.6.17.
[58] Translation by Donald A. Russell (Loeb edition).
[59] *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, 4. 45.

Poetria nova at the beginning of the 13th century, seems a central name. Geoffrey praises metaphors as rendering a speech more agreeable, comparing them to plants in a garden, but he cannot be said to have deepened or changed the definition of metaphors or to have given the term a new or different meaning.[60]

In the beginning of his *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas Aquinas treats the subject in a short chapter. He asks the question *utrum sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris*? Aquinas weighs pros and cons in the matter but concludes by praising the value of metaphor:

> […] radius divinae revelationis non destruitur propter figuras sensibiles quibus circumvelatur, ut dicit Dionysius, sed remanet in sua veritate […] [61]

> (The ray of divine revelation is not destroyed by the perceptible images which cover it, but remains in its truth, as Dionysius says. [my translation])

For many medieval Christians, the idea prevailed that God could only be understood and spoken about through metaphors, similes and analogies. The world was sometimes seen metaphorically as a book written by God for the humans to read.[62]

The Renaissance introduced new ideas into metaphor theory, such as those of Petrus Ramus (1515-1572). In his teachings he put a stronger focus on logical thinking concerning metaphors. A strict line was no longer drawn between poetry and logic. In her treatise *Elisabethan and Metaphysical Imagery* (1947), Rosemond Tuve claims that this caused Elisabethan poets to strive to integrate metaphors and imagery with logical arguments. The personal experience of the poets was played down and instead they sought to express general teachings about life. This was partially caused by the focus on logic analysis in the schools and universities of the time. A metaphor was seen as a statement about the nature of the world and of human life.[63]

Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) criticized Descartes and the French Enlightenment philosophers for putting too much emphasis on rational arguments and contended that humans act from probability rather than logical certitude. According to Vico, comparisons and metaphors have a better ability than strict

---

[60] Bizzell & Herzberg (ed.) 2001 (*The Rhetorical Tradition*), 510. (This book contains a large part of the *Poetria Nova*.)
[61] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* 1.9.
[62] Hawkes 1972, 16-18; Taverniers 2002, 11.
[63] Tuwe 1947, 251-381.

logical thinking to grasp the important aspects of life. People shape their own reality by their language and the philosophical 'truth' cannot be separated from them or placed outside them. Metaphors and images are the best way to acquire real knowledge of the world; they are created by humans but might nonetheless be true. Vico also studied children and old civilisations and claimed that fundamental truths about human life were to be found in the language of the former and in the myths of the latter. As Vico saw it, symbols form our view of the world, and they are the only truth humans are able to reach.[64]

Shelley and Wordsworth, like other Romantics, stressed the power of poets to tie things together and create unity by perceiving and directing our attention to new similarities and analogies. In contrast, they considered reason to create disruption and to strengthen the dissimilarities between things. Coleridge even maintained that the poet's 'Imagination', by creating images, was capable of changing and shaping the world.[65]

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), in his work *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne*, claimed that man, through his subjectivity, can only gain a metaphorical understanding of the world. Metaphorical statements about the world that were once new later become conventional and are considered true. Also science, Nietzsche writes, is a consensus concerning what concepts, metaphors and ephemeral 'truths' ought to be believed in. Art and myths, however, can challenge established 'truths', which, at bottom, are only conventional agreements at a point in time, and bring people back to a direct, true experience of life.[66]

Even though modernist poetry florished in the second half of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th century, there seems to have been a diminution of interest in the *theory* of metaphor between 1830 and 1930.[67] The modern debate about metaphor can be said to have started in the 1930's with the publication of *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* by of I. A. Richards. He stated that the two thoughts or ideas in a metaphor are equally important and together create its meaning. He also coined the terms 'tenor' and 'vehicle', tenor indicating 'the original idea' and vehicle 'the borrowed one'. Thus, in the phrase '*the flowers dance in the garden*', the flowers in the garden constitute the tenor and the word *dance*, borrowed from another domain, represents the vehicle.[68] Richards' ideas were further developed by Max Black, who introduced the concept of 'associated commonplaces' to refer

---

[64] Taverniers 2002, 13-16.
[65] Hawkes 1972, 36-56.
[66] Nietzsche 1873 (*Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne*).
[67] Taverniers 2002, 20.
[68] Richards 1936.

to the conventional ideas that are evoked by a word in a metaphorical context. Through what Black calls an *interaction view* of metaphor, two systems of ideas can be brought together and thus create new meaning.[69]

Lakoff's and Johnson's theories were originally inspired by Michael Reddy's article *The Conduit Metaphor*. In this article, Reddy describes how the transfer of information in the English language is expressed through a metaphor in which information is seen as a container moving from one person to another.[70] Lakoff (in Ortony (ed.) 1993) writes:

> With a single, thoroughly analyzed example, he [Reddy] allowed us to see, albeit in a restricted domain, that ordinary everyday English is largely metaphorical, dispelling once and for all the traditional view that metaphor is primarily in the realm of poetic or "figurative" language. Reddy showed, for a single, very significant case, that the locus of metaphor is thought, not language, that metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and that our everyday behaviour reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience.[71]

I hope that this short outline of metaphor theory serves as a good background for the presentation of the research that constitutes the theoretical basis of my investigation.

1.7. The Lakoff-Johnsonian theory

In *Metaphors we live by*, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson develop the central idea in Reddy's article. They claim that his 'conduit metaphor' is only one example of many conventional *metaphorical concepts,* which constitute a central part of the English language.[72] Metaphorical concepts consist of two phenomena or ideas that are tied together and recur in language and in thought. For example, the metaphorical concept BIGGER IS BETTER is a fundamental way of thinking in what Lakoff and Johnson, referring to the Western world, call 'our culture'. Because of this, we find expressions such as 'They are big people' and 'She has a

---

[69] Black 1962, 25-47.
[70] The article was first published in Ortony (ed.) 1979. Lakoff's article appears in the next edition (1993); See the following note.
[71] Ortony (ed.) 1993, 203-204.
[72] Lakoff & Johnson 1980.

big heart' in the English language. In the research that was inspired by *Metaphors we live by*, the metaphorical concepts are sometimes called 'conceptual metaphors' and sometimes (which might confuse the reader) simply 'metaphors'. In order to avoid obscurity regarding terminology, I will discuss how the terms will be used in this thesis in the next section, *Method and definitions*.

In some of their publications, Lakoff and Johnson formulate their metaphorical concepts in capital letters. They write e.g. ARGUMENT IS WAR in order to differentiate between the metaphorical concepts and 'metaphorical language'. This system, however, is not consistently employed, e.g. not in their book *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999). During my work with *De senectute*, I have found the system with capital letters practical and elucidating and it will thus be used in this thesis.

The authors do not present an entire list of metaphorical concepts, but claim that they have found the central ones in the English language. In order to illustrate this view of metaphors to the reader, I here present a number of metaphorical concepts.

GOOD IS UP, MORE IS UP. In our thinking, we often connect certain aspects of positive value to something that is above us or above something else. 'I am feeling up', 'high officials' and 'being highminded' are examples of this.[73]

LIFE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS A JOURNEY. We often tend to describe our lives as journeys because this makes it possible to describe the complex notion of 'life' in terms of another notion that is more concrete and easier to grasp. Other common metaphorical concepts such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, can be seen as a subgroup of LIFE IS A JOURNEY and two lovers can be seen as travelling together.[74]

The CONTAINER metaphor. It is common to speak of abstract entities such as groups, categories and memberships as 'containers' which we can metaphorically move into or move out of.[75]

LIFE IS A YEAR, PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, A LIFETIME IS A YEAR, LIFE IS PRESENCE HERE. A great number of source domains are conventionally used for describing the complex target domains human life and human beings. Some are connected to the year-cycle of plants and seasons. Others, such as LIFE IS PRESENCE HERE, use basic orientation in space as the source domain.[76]

DEATH IS DEPARTURE, DEATH IS A PERSON. Some metaphorical concepts that are conventionally used for death correspond to common metaphors for life, for example DEATH IS DEPARTURE and LIFE IS PRESENCE HERE.

---

[73] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 14-21.
[74] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 9-10, Lakoff in Ortony (ed.)1993, 207-212.
[75] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 29-32.
[76] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 8, 30.

In many expressions, death is viewed as the process of leaving a place or as a personification. This kind of metaphorical concepts are found in everyday English speech as well as in poetry. The ferryman Charon or the medieval Grim Reaper are examples of these concepts in myths and folklore.[77]

TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT (MOVING TIME), TIME IS A STATIONARY WHICH WE MOVE THROUGH (THE MOVING OBSERVER), TIME IS A RESOURCE, TIME IS SPACE. As Lakoff and Johnson see it, people conceive of time metaphorically in several ways. The two major ideas are that either people move forward (in time) or time itself moves. But time can also be quantified as a resource or as a substance as when we say 'He's wasting his time' or 'Use your time'.[78]

These examples are just a few of the great number of metaphorical concepts that Lakoff and Johnson and their followers have gathered,[79] but still, this short list might suffice to give a picture of how metaphorical concepts permeate the English language.

A key notion in Lakoff's and Johnson's theory is that many metaphors have an experiential basis. They are 'grounded in experience'. GOOD IS UP has its experiential basis in the idea that when a person is healthy and awake, we tend to think of him or her as standing up, while a person who is ill is most often thought of as lying down. The CONTAINER metaphor is grounded in the fact that people daily move in out of 'containers' such as houses, rooms, cars. As the two authors see it, the human body also functions as a container.[80] A metaphorical concept such as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS has its experiential basis in the fact that we often go or move to a place in order to achieve a purpose.[81]

In *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999), Lakoff and Johnson included the research of J. Grady in their theory. From him, they borrow the term *primary metaphors*, which means metaphorical concepts that are learnt in childhood. Examples of this type are DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS, IMPORTANT IS BIG and UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING.[82] When we are children, we unconsciously learn to connect these domains to each other. More complex metaphors often consist of elaborations and extensions of the primary metaphors.[83] People do not

---

[77] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 10-16.
[78] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 41-45; Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 137-169.
[79] For more examples, see e.g. Kövecses 2000, 216-223.
[80] Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 29-32.
[81] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 83-85.
[82] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 49-54.
[83] Lakoff, Afterword to *Metaphors we live by* 2003, 255.

25

have any choice in acquiring the latter type, which, according to Lakoff and Johnson, seems to appear in all cultures of the world[84], while, of course, many other metaphorical concepts are culturally and socially specific.

Another key notion is that many, if not all, metaphorical concepts are coherent. Because they our grounded in human experience, they form coherent systems.[85] Metaphorical concepts such as GOOD IS UP and DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS are related to each other and so are LIFE IS A FLAME and DEATH IS DARKNESS and so on. Sometimes the coherence is easy to discern, at other times very difficult.

Instead of Richards' terms *tenor* and *vehicle*, Lakoff and Johnson speak about *source domains* and *target domains*, source domains denoting what one employs as an object of comparison and target domains what one speaks about. [86]

Since the metaphorical concepts are grounded in human experience, our bodies and basic orientation in space become central source domains. Lakoff and Johnson stress that people usually employ the concrete to speak about the abstract:

> …the less clearly delineated (and usually less concrete) concepts are partially understood in terms of the more clearly delineated (and usually more concrete) concepts, which are directly grounded in our experience.[87]

and

> …we tend to structure the less concrete and inherently vaguer concepts (like those for the emotions) in terms of more concrete concepts, which are more clearly delineated in our experience.[88]

A metaphorical expression brings forward and highlights some characteristics of the target domain and plays down others. In a sentence such as *Achilles is a lion*, the strength and courage of Achilles are put into focus, while other characteristics are backgrounded. Therefore, Lakoff and Johnson do not agree with Max Black's interaction view of metaphors, which claims that both target domain and source domain project themselves onto each other. In the Lakoff-Johnsonian model, only the source domain is projected onto the target domain.

---

[84] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 56-59.
[85] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 41.
[86] Taverniers 2002, 105-107.
[87] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 109.
[88] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 112.

Lakoff distinguishes between metaphors that map 'one conceptual domain onto another' and *image metaphors*, which only map a 'one shot image' onto another image. In the image metaphors, the visual aspect, not the conceptual, is emphasized. 'The slender tree of the woman's body' would be an example of an image metaphor, expressing only the similarity in shape of the domains.[89]

Another term which is necessary to define when one discusses the Lakoff-Johnsonian view of metaphors is *mapping*. Mapping is the way in which different metaphorical (source- and target-) domains are connected by the analogies that exist between them.[90] The metaphorical concept LIFE IS A JOURNEY, for example, is possible to map in the following way:

Source domain	*Target domain*
Journey	Life
Beginning of journey	Birth
Impediments to travel	Problems in life
Crossroads	Choices to be made
Destination of journey	Goal(s) in life; Death

Many more correspondences can be listed. A mapping between domains is not always exactly identical; it can be altered if some aspects of the source domain are emphasized. For example, the LIFE IS A JOURNEY concept can be linguistically modified so that the final destination is either a successful life or death.

How the human mind processes linguistic information through mapping has been thoroughly analyzed by Gilles Fauconnier, another researcher in the *Metaphors we live by*-tradition,[91] and also by Mark Turner.[92] According to Fauconnier and Turner, the human mind creates *mental spaces* which connect to each other in intricate ways in order for the mind to understand spoken or written language. *Input spaces*, which correspond to source and target domains in the Lakoff-Johnsonian model, together form a *generic space,* which contains what the input spaces have in common. In a further step, a *blended space* can be created. In the *blended space*, or *blend*, new combinations of information are formed.[93] To

---

[89] Lakoff & Turner, 89-96; Lakoff in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 229-231.
[90] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 3-4.
[91] Fauconnier 1994, 1997; Fauconnier & Turner 2002.
[92] Fauconnier & Turner 2002; Turner 1996. In the latter work, Turner prefers the term 'projection' to mapping.
[93] Fauconnier & Turner 2002, 39-51.

illustrate this, I quote Fauconnier's and Turner's description of the medieval Grim Reaper, an example that they discuss in detail:

> The representation of "death" as "the Grim Reaper", a sinister, skeleton-like character holding a scythe and wearing a cowl, is an integration involving complex interactions of metaphor and metonymy. The Grim Reaper arises from many [mental] spaces: (1) a space with an individual human being dying; (2) a space with an abstract pattern of causal tautology in which an event of a certain kind is caused by an abstract causal element (e.g. Death causes dying; Sleep causes sleeping, Smell causes smell, Sloth causes laziness); (3) a space containing a stereotypical human killer; and (4) a space with reapers in the scenario of harvest. The Grim Reaper resides conceptually in none of the other input spaces. It resides instead in a blend to which we project structure from all these spaces.[94]

In this example, the *input spaces* are the listed ones. (Note that only the first of the causal tautologies is valid here; the others are given as examples.) The *generic space* contains what they have in common: aspects of death, including the 'death' of plants during harvest. The Grim Reaper, which is shaped from elements from the different input spaces, constitutes the *blend*.

I have felt it necessary to give an account of the theory about mental spaces, because it can be said to continue the project of understanding the nature of metaphor which started with *Metaphors we live by*. However, since the aim of this thesis is to analyze what metaphorical concepts are found in *De senectute* and how they are used, it has seemed more beneficial to my investigation to speak of metaphorical concepts being combined rather than searching for *input spaces, generic spaces,* and *blends*. This is how Lakoff and Turner proceed in *More than Cool Reason*.[95] This means that the type of mappings that is found in this investigation will be of the sort that was given for the metaphorical concept LIFE IS A JOURNEY above.

In *The Body in the Mind* (1987),[96] Mark Johnson explores an aspect of the theory of metaphors that was only touched upon in *Metaphors we live by*. He here concentrates on describing what he calls *image schemata*. An *image schema* forms part of a person's way of perceiving the world outside of him and has its roots in basic physical experiences:

---

[94] Fauconnier & Turner 2002, 291-295.
[95] Lakoff & Turner 1989.
[96] Johnson 1987.

The view I [Mark Johnson] am proposing is this: in order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions and conceptions. *A[n image] schema is a recurrent pattern, shape and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities*. These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our manipulations of objects, and our perceptual interactions.[97]

Johnson presents a list of about fifty *image schemata,* but his investigation focuses on those of *balance, container, path,* and *force*.[98] All these, he argues, are primarily experiences of concrete nature but later acquire a secondary, metaphorical and cognitive sense. The emergence of the *path* schema, central to our understanding of e.g. time and achievements, is described in the following way:

Our lives are filled with paths that connect up our spatial world. There is the path from your bed to the bathroom, from the stove to the kitchen table, from your house to the grocery store, from San Francisco to Los Angeles, and from the Earth to the moon. Some of these paths involve an actual physical surface that you traverse, such as the path from your house to your store. Others involve a projected path, such as the path of a bullet shot into the air. And certain paths exist, at present, only in your imagination, such as the path from the Earth to the nearest star outside a solar system.

In all of these cases there is a single, recurring image-schematic pattern with a definite internal structure. In every case of PATHS there are always the same parts: (1) a source, or starting-point; (2) a goal, or endpoint; and (3) a sequence of contiguous locations connecting the source with the goal. Paths are thus routes for moving from one path to another.[99]

To the image schema of the path, Johnson connects metaphorical concepts such as PURPOSES ARE PHYSICAL GOALS[100] and STATES ARE LOCATIONS.[101] In a similar fashion, he explains the metaphorical extensions of the force, balance and

---

[97] Johnson 1987, 29.
[98] Johnson 1987, 30-64, 74-100, 113-117.
[99] Johnson 1987, 113.
[100] This metaphorical concept is often phrased as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS.
[101] Johnson 1987, 114.

container *schemata*.

In 1989, George Lakoff and Mark Turner published *More than Cool Reason*, which also continue the project which was intiated by *Metaphors we live by*. Here, they argue that the metaphors used in poetry are not essentially different from the ones used in ordinary speech. Rather, poetic metaphors are bold and innovative extensions and elaborations of conventional metaphorical concepts. In an informative chapter named *Life, Death and Time* Lakoff and Turner list central source domains which are used for speaking about these themes, and show that many of them are found in poetry as well as in everyday (English) speech. [102] (They take their examples from Shakespeare and T.S. Eliot but also from German, Italian and Sanskrit poems.) In his article *The contemporary theory of metaphor*, which sums up the results of *More than cool reason*, Lakoff formulates it in this way:

> Poetic metaphor is, for the most part, an extension of our everyday conventional system of metaphorical thought.[103]

In the same book, Lakoff and Turner also propose the term *generic-level metaphors*. This name is given to certain metaphorical concepts because they organize a whole group of other, more specific metaphorical concepts. The generic-level metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, they contend, contains the basic structure of many other metaphorical concepts, such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY and DEATH IS DEPARTURE.[104]

In *More than Cool Reason*, the distinction is made between 'conceptual metaphors' (identical to metaphorical concepts, which is the term I will use in this thesis.) and 'linguistic metaphors'. The latter ones, also referred to as metaphorical language, is a 'surface manifestation' of conceptual metaphors.[105] Lakoff (1993) writes:

> Metaphor is fundamentally conceptual, not linguistic in nature. Metaphorical language is a surface manifestation of conceptual metaphor.[106]

---

[102] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 1-56.
[103] Lakoff in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 246.
[104] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 80-83.
[105] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 50-51, 55.
[106] Lakoff in Ortony 1993, 244.

30

More than Cool Reason also contains a discussion of 'dead' and conventional metaphors. As an example of a 'dead' metaphor, Lakoff and Turner suggest the English noun *pedigree*. This word means genealogical table in modern English, but it is no longer used in its original sense, 'a crane's foot'. Therefore, this metaphor can be said to be dead. But this kind of metaphors differs greatly from conventional metaphorical concepts such as DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS and GOOD IS UP, which are part of the conceptual system in a person's mind.[107]

Another scholar who has been deeply influenced by the research of Lakoff and Johnson is the Hungarian Zoltán Kövecses. A great deal of the work of Kövecses has dealt with the metaphorical concepts and with the metonymies that are conventionally used for speaking about emotions, especially in the English language. In *Emotion Concepts* (1990), he systematically organizes the metaphors that are used for different emotions under target domain headings such as *pride, anger*, and *fear*. Kövecses not only formulates central metaphorical concepts in the field of emotions, such as ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER[108] and FEAR IS A VICIOUS ENEMY[109], but he also lists a large group of metonymies that are used to describe emotions according to the principle that the perceivable physical consequences of an emotion metonymically stands for it. On the basis of this principle, he formulates *conceptual metonymies* such as CHEST OUT STANDS FOR PRIDE[110] and SWEATING STANDS FOR FEAR.[111] One of Kövecses' findings is that the CONTAINER concept, because of the ability of a container to grow or shrink and to keep things inside or let them out, is central to how we understand our emotions.[112] He argues that metaphorical and metonymical concepts, together with related concepts and emotional prototypes, contribute strongly to the way we experience our emotions.[113]

In *Metaphor and Emotion* (2000) Kövecses has widened his scope to include other languages than English. With the help of students, he investigates metaphors in Chinese, Japanese, and Hungarian that describe emotions, and finds striking similarities in the metaphors used for emotions in the different languages.[114] Again the CONTAINER metaphor is stressed as the most central, but the source domain

---

[107] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 129.
[108] Kövecses 1990, 53-59.
[109] Kövecses 1990, 75.
[110] Kövecses 1990, 90.
[111] Kövecses 1990, 72.
[112] Kövecses 1990, 145-159.
[113] Kövecses 1990, 49.
[114] Kövecses 2000, 139-163.

FORCE (physical force) is also found to be crucial for the human conceptualization of feelings in the languages investigated.[115]

In my work, the systematicity of Kövecses' research has been of great help. As I see it, he is more distinct than Lakoff and Johnson when he categorizes his material. The disposition of my thesis, outlined in the way that I discuss the source domains one by one in chapter 2 and the target domains in the same fashion in chapter 3, has been inspired by Kövecses.

1.8. Method and definitions

The method of this thesis consists in a close reading of *De senectute* in order to find, categorize and analyze the metaphors. In chapter 2, *The source domains*, I first categorize the metaphors that are found in the text according to the following plan: the metaphors having to do with orientation in space are gathered in one section, the metaphors that use the body as source domain are gathered in another, the ones where heat and fire constitute the source domain are collected in a third group, and so forth. Secondly, I analyze how the different source domains are employed, what aspects of them are used, what they function to express in the target domains and how the the meaning of the latter domains is restricted by the use of the source domains. Thirdly, I try to determine what is conventional speech and what is not, although this question is very difficult to answer. With references to OLD and TLL, I show when a word or expression was first used in a metaphorical sense in Latin. Some references are made to Greek precursors to Latin phrases, but it has not been possible to make a full investigation of those connections, which, of course, abound in Cicero's Latin.

In chapter 3, *The target domains*, I investigate what source domains are employed when Cicero speaks about such themes as old age, youth, death, life, emotions, and other subjects. Often, several metaphorical source domains are employed for speaking about a single target domain.

In the last chapter, *Conclusion*, the function and role of metaphor in *De senectute* are described. The focus is put on how the metaphors are related to the construction and the main themes of the text. Here, I also try to sketch a 'coherent system' of metaphorical concepts in Cicero's text.

The great majority of the metaphors in *De senectute* are gathered and analyzed, with focus on the ones that are connected to metaphorical concepts, but I do not

---

[115] Kövecses 2000, 61-86.

claim to have included all metaphors in the text in my investigation. In some cases, only typical examples will be brought up and discussed.

I use the term *metaphorical concepts* for Lakoff-Johnsonian 'metaphors' such as GOOD IS UP and DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS. For the sake of clarity, the concepts will be written in capital letters. Central source domains such as CONTAINER or FORCE will also be written in this way. 'Linguistic manifestations' of the metaphorical concepts are called *metaphorical expressions*, but when it is obvious from the context what is meant, both metaphorical concepts and metaphorical expressions will be called 'concepts' or 'metaphors'. This has been necessary in order to avoid a very overloaded style of writing, but I hope that it will be clear to the reader from the context what I intend to say.

Phrases and expressions which include the words *sicut(i), quasi, tamquam, ut – sic, similis,* and similar words are called similes. It seems that Cicero often employs especially *quasi* and *tamquam* to soften a metaphor, while *ut – sic* rather forms a typical simile, but since it is difficult to distinguish between metaphor and simile in any other way, all these markers will be considered to form similes.

The question whether (and when) a metaphorical expression is new or conventional depends, it must be remembered, on how one delimits the linguistic material that is investigated. A metaphor can be new, i.e. not used before, among one group of people, new in the works of an author or new in a newspaper. It can also be new in an entire language, but that is hardly possible to investigate. As Lakoff and Turner see it, some metaphorical concepts are deeply entrenched or embedded in a culture, others less so.[116] In my investigation, I trace the first metaphorical use of the central words that appear in metaphorical sense in *De senectute*. For this, I rely on OLD and TLL. Another question is that of elaborated metaphorical expressions and similes. Time has not allowed me to go deeply into this field, but I consider a great deal of work accomplished already through the mentioning of parallel passages among other ancient authors in the notes to most editions of *De senectute*. For metaphorical expressions which are not found earlier in Latin (according to OLD and TLL) the terms 'unconventional' or 'not conventional' will be used. It goes without saying that many metaphorical expressions in Cicero's oeuvre appear there for the first time in Latin because he is a voluminous and quite early source, and one can only make an attempt at answering the question whether these metaphors are conventional or not.

---

[116] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 55.

2. The source domains

2.1. Physical burdens as source domains

In the first few paragraphs of *De senectute*, one metaphorical concept stands out as by far the most salient one. In different ways, Cicero speaks of the 'burden' of old age, and, as will become clear, the concept can readily be formulated as OLD AGE IS A BURDEN. This concept functions as an underlying thought to which several words and expressions in *De senectute* connect. Lakoff and Turner propose the metaphor DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS[117], and OLD AGE IS A BURDEN can be said to be a more specific subgroup of this concept. Cicero returns to this idea again and again, and one reason for this is that it is a good way of speaking about several kinds of difficulties relating to old age at the same time.

It is obvious that the reason why this concept is so conspicuous in the beginning of the text is that Cato has not yet started praising and defending old age. Before being answered (and refuted), the problem – the difficulty of old age – is verbalized and exposed.

The central words that are related to the concept are *onus, gravis, levis, levare, ferre, tolerabilis,* and perhaps *molestia.*[118] The dialogue starts with a quotation from Ennius[119]:

> Cicero: 'O Tite, si quid ego adiuvero, **curamve levasso**
> quae nunc te coquit et versat in pectore fixa,
> ecquid erit praemi?' (§1)
>
> **(**O Titus, should some aid of mine dispel
> The cares that now within thy bosom dwell
> And wring thy heart and torture thee with pain,
> What then would be the measure of my gain?)

What Ennius describes is the worries of a military commander, but Cicero interprets the words in a different way, suited to his purposes. The *cura* that he and Atticus have is old age, and Cicero's aim in the dialogue is to confront and

---

[117] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 25, 149; Kövecses 2000, 45.
[118] Cf also *ingravesco* in §§ 6 and 36.
[119] Ennius, *Annalium fragmenta (in aliis scriptis servata)* 10. 334-336.

overcome this problem, or, metaphorically, to lighten the burden of it (*levasso* in the quotation). So in the very first line of the text, we meet the idea of old age as something that can be alleviated, i.e. a burden. This idea becomes central in Cicero's way of arguing about old age in *De senectute*. A few lines later, we find the following expression:

> Cicero: hoc enim **onere**, quod mihi commune tecum [sc. Attico] est, aut iam urgentis aut certe adventantis senectutis, et te et me etiam ipsum **levari** volo […] (§2)

> ([…] for I fain would lighten both for you and for me our common burden of old age, which, if not already pressing hard upon us, is surely coming on apace […])

Old age is referred to as an *onus*, which Cicero wants to alleviate. A few parapraphs later, we meet *onus* again, this time in a rhetorical hyperbole:

> Scipio: Saepenumero admirari soleo cum hoc Gaio Laelio, cum ceterarum rerum tuam excellentem, Marce Cato, perfectamque sapientiam, tum vel maxime quod numquam tibi senectutem grave esse senserim: quae plerisque senibus sic odiosa est ut **onus se Aetna gravius dicant sustinere**. (§4)

> (Scipio: When conversing with Gaius Laelius here present, I am frequently wont to marvel, Cato, both at your pre-eminent, nay, faultless, wisdom in matters generally, and especially at the fact that, so far as I have been able to see, old age is never burdensome to you, though it is so vexatious to most old men that they declare it to be a load heavier than Aetna.)

The vague idea of an *onus senectutis* can be elaborated and described in detail, and in this case, it is made by an intentional exaggeration. The comic or drastic effect is created by an extension of the conventional use.

Since the human body becomes weaker when it gets older, it is easy to understand that *onus* is employed in this way. With the help of *onus* and the other words related to the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN metaphor, Cicero can combine this difficulty with the philosophical problems of old age: the approach of death, the weakening of the human faculties and the possible afterlife of the soul. *Onus* helps him to concentrate all these target domains into a single word.

Cicero does not restrict his use of *onus* to the 'burden of old age' in *De senectute*. It is also used to refer to poverty:

> sed annos septuaginta natus, tot enim vixit Ennius, ita **ferebat duo quae maxima putantur onera**, **paupertatem et senectutem**, ut eis paene delectari videretur. (§14)

> (But he at seventy – for Ennius lived that long – was bearing the two

burdens which are considered the greatest – poverty and old age – and was bearing them in such a way that he seemed almost to take a pleasure in them.)

Lakoff and Johnson list DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS as a primary metaphor, i.e. a metaphor which we learn in childhood as part of our basic experience and cognition.[120] This undoubtedly helps to explain the naturalness with which it is used by Cicero. It needs hardly be mentioned that *onus* in the sense of 'a difficulty' appears in Latin long before Cicero's time. It is first attested in Plautus (*Amphitruo* 175 *ferundum hoc onus [sc. slavery] est cum labore* (OLD 5 on *onus*)).

In *De senectute*, there are also several examples of *gravis* and *levis* which adhere to the same metaphorical concept[121]:

> nec enim in summa inopia **levis** esse **senectus** potest ne sapienti quidem, nec insipienti etiam in summa copia non **gravis**. (§8)

> ([...] for amid utter want old age cannot be a light thing, not even to a wise man; nor to a fool, even amid utmost wealth, can it be otherwise than burdensome.)

Cicero prefers to speak about old age as *gravis* rather than e.g. *tristis* or *tarda*[122], and it is possible that he, by this choice of words, wants to maintain the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept as part of his argumentation. The word *gravis* and its compounds in Latin possess, long before Cicero's time[123], two types of metaphorical sense. The first is the one we have just discussed ('heavy' in the sense of 'difficult' (OLD 7, 10, 14)). The other one has positive connotations: *gravitas* was considered a positive quality by the Romans as opposed to *levitas*. *Gravitas* in this sense is also found in *De senectute*[124]:

---

[120] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 49-50.
[121] A metaphorical use of *gravis* in this sense is found in §§ 4 (three times) and 8. *Ingravesco* in § 6 functions in the same way.
[122] These epithets to *senectus* are used by Vergil (*Aeneis* 6.273 and 9. 609.).
[123] According to OLD, the first attested use of *gravis* for a problem is Plautus. *Epidicus.557 aerumnam gravem*. *Gravis* in the sense of *'respected, august'*, is also first attested in Plautus *(OLD 13)*.
[124] See also the use of *gravis* in § 61.

37

[…] erat enim in illo viro [sc.Quinto Maximo] comitate condita **gravitas** […] (§10)

[…] ferocitas iuvenum, et **gravitas** iam **constantis aetatis** […] (§33)

(For there was in him a dignity tempered with courtesy […]

[…] the impetuosity of youth, the seriousness of middle life […])

The opposite of *gravis, levis* – and the verb *levare* – also agrees naturally and easily with the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept. The words appear several times in this sense in the dialogue,[125] but are never elaborated or instantiated in detailed description. In § 26, e.g*., Cicero speaks about a *levis senectus*[126] in a positive sense*:

> ut enim adulescentibus bona indole praeditis sapientes senes delectantur, **leviorque fit senectus** eorum qui a iuventute coluntur et diliguntur, sic adulescentes senum praeceptis gaudent, quibus ad virtutum studia ducuntur […] (§26)
>
> (For just as wise men, when they are old, take delight in the society of youths endowed with sprightly wit, and the burdens of age are rendered lighter to those who are courted and highly esteemed by the young, so young men find pleasure in their elders, by whose precepts they are lead into virtue's paths […])

As with the other examples of the concept OLD AGE IS A BURDEN in the text (except for the passage about the mountain of Aetna), we are given no details about how the alleviation takes place in the source domain. We are not told that the alleged burden is cut in half, thrown off, or what is it made of. The metaphorical concept is strongly restricted and an overly detailed description of the nature of the source domain (the *onus*) would cause difficulties in mapping it on to the target domain – and confuse the reader.

A slightly different nuance is rendered by *levare* in § 36:

---

[125] The examples which are connected to the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept are in §§ 1, 2, 8, 26 and, conclusively, 85.

[126] Plautus, *Captivi* 196, '*decet id pati animo aequo: si id facietis levior labos erit'* is an early example of *levis* in this sense.

> et corpora quidem exercitationum defetigatione ingravescunt, **animi** autem
> **se exercendo levantur**. (§36)

> (Moreover, exercise causes the body to become heavy with fatigue, but
> intellectual activity gives buoyancy to [sc. 'lifts'] the mind.)

Here, the point of the metaphor seems to be that philosophical exercise makes a
mind harmonious and bright. The target domain is the soul (rising from a state of
languor) rather than the body.

Just like *gravis, levis* takes on a double metaphorical sense: 'light to carry', as
we just have seen, but also that of irresponsibility and thoughtlessness.[127] The best
example of the latter sense in *De senectute* is the following, which highlights the
inconstancy and fickleness of some elders:

> ut petulantia, ut libido magis est adulescentium quam senum, nec tamen
> omnium adulescentium sed non proborum, sic ista senilis stultitia quae
> deliratio appellari solet, **senum levium** est, non omnium. (§36)[128]

> (Just as waywardness and lust are more often found in the young man than in
> the old, yet not in all who are young, but only in those naturally base; so that
> senile debility, usually called 'dotage' is a characteristic, not of all old men,
> but only of those who are weak [sc. 'light'] in mind and will.)

Ferre also switches easily between an abstract and a concrete sense and, as we
have already seen, there are examples of it that are part of the OLD AGE IS A
BURDEN concept.[129] In the beginning of *De senectute*, Cato is praised by Cicero
for 'carrying' his old age so well:

> Cicero: omnem autem sermonem tribuimus non Tithono, ut Aristo Ceus […]
> sed Marco Catoni seni, quo maiorem auctoritatem haberet oratio; apud quem
> Laelium et Scipionem facimus admirantes quod is **tam facile senectutem
> ferat**, eisque eum respondentem. (§3)

> (But the entire discourse I have attributed, not to Tithonus, as Aristo of Ceos
> did, […] but, that I might give it greater weight, I have ascribed it to the

---

[127] An early example is Plautus, *Menaechmi* 488 '*homo levior quam pluma*'.
[128] See also the use of *levis* in § 63 and, perhaps, 50.
[129] The oldest example of *fero* in the sense of 'to endure' is Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus* 1343
'*fer aequo animo*'.

venerable Marcus Cato; and I represent Laelius and Scipio, while at his house, expressing wonder that he bears his age so well, and Cato replying to them.)

Ferre is not only used about the problems of old age but also about poverty (see the example from §14 above) and sorrow. Quintus Maximus (Cunctator) is commended by Cato for having endured the death of his son in a dignified manner:

> multa in eo viro praeclara cognovi, sed nihil admirabilius quam quomodo ille **mortem fili tulit**, clari viri et consularis […] (§12)[130]

> (Many are the remarkable things I have observed in that great man, but nothing more striking than the manner in which he bore the death of his distinguished son, a former consul.)

Urgeo is found once in the dialogue, in paragraph 2:

> Cicero: hoc enim onere, […] aut iam **urgentis**[131] aut certe adventantis **senectutis**, et te et me etiam ipsum levari volo […] (§2)

> ([…]for I fain would lighten both for you and for me our common burden of old age, which, if not already pressing hard upon us, is surely coming on apace […])

Occuring with *advento*, it suggests a military metaphor – old age as an advancing hostile army – but the context and the fact that *urgeo* can have a weight or load as subject (OLD 3) also makes it part of the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept. (This *locus* will be further investigated in the section *Weapons and warfare as source domain*.)

In *De senectute*, one of the most important tools that Cicero has to refer to old age is the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept. Since this metaphor is so pervasive in the dialogue, especially in the beginning, it is impossible to deny that the concept spills over, so to speak, to certain other expressions. I am thinking about the following instance:

---

[130] See also *fero* in the sense of 'enduring old age' in § 2,3, 6.
[131] OLD does not list any examples of *urgeo* in the sense of metaphorical 'pressure' that are older than Cicero (See *e.g.* OLD 3 b, 4, 7, 8).

[…] moderati enim et nec difficiles nec inhumani senes **tolerabilem senectutem** agunt, importunitas autem et inhumanitas omni aetati molesta est. (§7)

(For old men of self-control, who are neither churlish nor ungracious, find old age endurable [sc. bearable]; while on the other hand an unkindly disposition render irksome every period of life.)

Although *tolerabilis* does not have a concrete meaning ('possible to carry'), the verb related to it, *tolero*, has this sense (OLD 1). Considering the context – *tolerabilis* is used in the beginning of *De senectute*, in the middle of the discussion on the 'heavy burden' of old age – it is obvious that the word adheres to the metaphorical concept in question.

The context possibly has the same consequence for the word *molestia*. It is related to *moles*, which has a concrete sense ('a large mass', 'a thing of great size', 'a rock', etc. (OLD 1, 2). Therefore, one might argue that the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept is present in the following excerpt too:

Cicero: mihi quidem ita iucunda huius libri confectio fuit ut non modo omnes absterserit **senectutis molestias**, sed effecerit mollem etiam et iucundam senectutem. (§2)

(To me, at any rate, the composition of this book has been so delightful, that it has not only wiped away the annoyances [sc. burdens?] of old age, but has even made it an easy and a happy state.)

But since it is used in combination with *abstergeo*, 'to wipe away', a verb with very different connotations, this seems far-fetched. Interpreted this way, the sentence turns into a catachresis, which is clearly not what Cicero intended.

The focus right at the beginning of the dialogue on the concept in question has certain consequences. The great theme of *De senectute* is that Cato meets and refutes the four disparaging statements about old age (presented in § 15) and finally praises it as the best time of life. Considering the beginning of the text, Cato's different arguments have to be viewed as (metaphorical) ways of alleviating, and finally dissolving the burden of old age.

OLD AGE IS A BURDEN is closely related to two other basic metaphorical concepts. In the first one, a physical object functions as the source domain for an abstract entity or a state (condition) in the target domain (here: *senectus*). The metaphorical concept ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS is central in Latin as well as in English. I will continue the discussion on this theme in the section *Physical objects as source domains*. The other related concept I want to bring up is the use of the human body as a source domain for speaking about the human mind. This is one of the main themes in Mark Johnson's book *The Body in the Mind* and it is also investigated at length in Lakoff's and

41

Johnson's *Philosophy in the Flesh*.[132] The metaphorial concept THE MIND IS A BODY is a very pervasive metaphor in the dialogue. While still functioning on a physical/concrete level – old age is a burden in the sense that the body becomes weaker as it grows old – the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept also transposes the *onus* to the mental level. In the section *The human body as source domain* I show that the most frequently occuring way to refer to the mind – an abstract theme – in *De senectute* is by speaking about it as a physical body. The idea of an '*onus senectutis*' fits perfectly with this metaphorical concept. Since THE MIND IS A BODY theme is more thoroughly investigated in other parts of this thesis I will bring up only one example here, one that shows the connection between the concepts DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS and THE MIND IS A BODY:

> […] cum recorder […] legiones nostras [i.e. romanas][…] in eum locum saepe profectas alacri **animo** et **erecto,** unde se reditura numquam arbitrarentur. (§75)

> ([…] when I recall […] how our legions have often marched with cheerful and unwavering courage [sc. 'upright mind'] into situations whence they thought they would never return.)

Here, the courage of the soldiers is expressed by their upright bodily posture. This posture is then transferred to their souls: '*animo…erecto*'. We see that the disappearance of the burden – difficulty corresponds to a virtuous (which in this passage means courageous) way of life.

Although it might be a bit schematic, a mapping of the metaphorical concepts that have been discussed in this section may illustrate my point:

OLD AGE IS A BURDEN

Source domain	*Target domain*
Burden	Old age
Burden growing	Death approaching, body becoming weaker, philosophical difficulties increasing
Burden diminishing	Person gaining philosophical insight

---

[132] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 235-241.

Source domain	*Target domain*
Body	Mind
Body carrying burden	The mind being vexed by the philosophical problems of death and ageing

2.2. The human body and the senses as source domains

2.2.1. Introduction

One of the richest source domains in *De senectute* is the human body and the five senses. This, as Lakoff and Johnson would explain it, is due to the centrality of the body in human experience and to the immense possibilities available for using the five senses, the body and the body parts for different metaphorical purposes. Central in this context is also the metaphorical connection between the inner, mental world and the outer world, where the latter often functions as a source domain for speaking about the former.[133] In *De senectute*, a common way of speaking of the inner world of the mind is the use of expressions and phenomena from the outer world in a metaphorical way. This is often done with the help of the metaphorical concept THE MIND IS A BODY.

In this section, I will start by describing each sense with its metaphorical uses in turn, starting with the most important ones, and then continue with other usages of the body as a metaphorical source domain.

2.2.2. Sight

Lakoff and Johnson analyze the metaphorical use of vision in *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999). They especially stress the KNOWING IS SEEING and the

---

[133] See Johnson 1987.

UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphors as central.[134] Most of the metaphorical expressions that have to do with sight in *De senectute* can be said to be variations of these metaphorical concepts. By its very nature, seeing is also related to the metaphors having to do with light and darkness (See the separate section on light and lustre as source domains). KNOWING IS SEEING and UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING have been explored by the reseachers in the *Metaphors we live by*-tradition several times[135] and are found in many languages (e.g. in English and, to some degree, in Swedish). The reason why these concepts have developed is probably that seeing is so closely related to understanding: when we look at something, we also form an opinion of it, which involves at least some degree of understanding. When one person explains something, or simply speaks, to another person, sight is perhaps the most central sense in communicating attention. One can tell that somebody is attentive by their eyes but not by their ears. *De senectute* contains several examples of *videre*[136] in this most obvious metaphorical sense:

> Quorsum igitur haec tam multa de Maximo? quia profecto **videtis**, nefas esse dictu miseram fuisse talem senectutem. (§13)
>
> o miserum senem qui mortem contemnendam in tam longa aetate non **viderit**! ((§66)
>
> iam vero **videtis** nihil esse morti tam simile quam somnum […] (§80)
>
> (Why, then, have I said so much about Maximus? Because you surely realize [i.e. see] now that it would be monstrous to call unhappy such an old age as his.
>
> O wretched indeed is that old man who has not learned in the course of his long life that death should be held on no account!
>
> Again, you really see nothing resembling death so much as sleep;[…])

In some instances, the aspect of understanding and the concrete sense of seeing are combined:

---

[134] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 238-240, 370-372, 393-394.
[135] See *e.g.* Johnson 1987, 107-108.
[136] The oldest examples of *video* in the sense 'to note with understanding' (OLD 14 b) are from Plautus.

[…] tamen ut vos **videtis,** non plane me enervavit, non adflixit senectus […]
(§32)

([…] yet, as you see, old age has not quite unnerved or shattered me.)

Here, Cato's point is that Scipio and Laelius should look at him; he looks old, and he *is*, but he is still a strong man and a good speaker. The act of seeing is combined with the understanding of the point Cato is trying to make.

Concerning the passive *videtur* (and similar forms), it is possible to argue that it often combines metaphorical 'sight' with an another basic metaphor: ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS. If we look at the following examples:

(1) Cicero: qui [sc. Cato] si eruditius **videbitur** disputare quam consuevit ipse in suis libris, attribuito litteris Graecis, quarum constat eum perstudiosum fuisse in senectute. (§3)

(2) Laelius: Est ut dicis, Cato; sed fortasse dixerit quispiam, tibi propter opes et copias et dignitatem tuam tolerabiliorem senectutem **videri**, id autem non posse multis contingere. (§8)

(3) Curio ad focum sedenti magnum auri pondus Samnites cum attulissent, repudiati sunt; non enim aurum habere praeclarum sibi **videri** dixit, sed eis qui haberent aurum imperare. (§56)

(If it shall appear that he argues more learnedly than he was accustomed to do in his own books, give the credit to Greek literature, of which, as is well known, he was very studious in his later years.

What you say is true, Cato; but perhaps some one might reply that old age seems (i.e. looks) more tolerable to you because of your resources, means, and social position, and that these are advantages which cannot fall to the lot of many.

When the Samnites had brought him [sc. M. Curius] a great mass of gold as he sat before the fire, he declined their gift with scorn; "for", said he, " it seems to me that the glory is not in having the gold, but in ruling those who have it."

we discern a pattern where Cato's speech (1), old age (2) and the act of ruling gold-owners (3) can be replaced by the source domain 'physical object' because this corresponds to the source domain 'literal sight' in the passive *videri*. The coherence of the two domains respectively is maintained in a thought pattern which can be described with a small mapping:

45

Source domain	Target domain
Physical object	Abstract entity (speech, old age, ruling wealthy people)
Viewing the object	Considering the abstract phenomenon

We might formulate the metaphorical concept here as FORMING AN OPINION IS SEEING, which comes close in meaning to KNOWING IS SEEING and UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING. A handy way of speaking about an abstract phenomenon is by linguistically treating it as a physical object; by using the passive of *videre* it is possible to express opinions about the abstract phenomenon in question.[137]

The central UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING concept can then be elaborated and extended in different ways. Different aspects of seeing are employed to describe different aspects of understanding or, conversely, the lack of understanding. The most striking examples of this in *De senectute* are the *loci* where sight, and thus understanding, is described as blurred or obscured: in § 42, Cato describes the destructive force of *voluptas* in the following manner:

> impedit enim consilium voluptas, rationi inimica est**, mentis ut ita dicam praestringit oculos**, nec habet ullum cum virtute commercium. (§42)
>
> (For carnal pleasure hinders deliberation, is at war with reason, blindfolds the eyes of the mind, so to speak, and has no fellowship with virtue.)

Adding the reservation *ut ita dicam*, Cicero/Cato explicitly claims that the mind 'has eyes' which can be obscured by an emotion (here: *voluptas*). The metaphorical concept can be formulated as CLARITY OF MIND/THOUGHT IS CLARITY OF SIGHT. *Video* in the sense 'to see with the mind's eye' (with or without an added form of *mens* or *animus*) is not found in Latin before Cicero (OLD 7). It is especially towards the end of the dialogue, where Cato's speech takes on a more elevated tone, that several of these variations of the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor appear:

---

[137] The earliest instances of *video* in this sense is, according to OLD, Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus*. 1106 *ecquid fortis visast?* (OLD 20).

quid quod sapientissimus quisque aequissimo animo moritur, stultissimus iniquissimo? nonne vobis videtur is animus qui plus cernat et longius videre se ad meliora proficisci, ille autem cui **obtusior sit acies non videre?** (§83)

(And what of the fact that the wisest men die with the greatest equanimity, the most foolish with the least? Is it not apparent to you that it is because the soul of the one, having a keener and wider vision, sees that it is setting out for a better country, while the other, being of duller sight, sees not its path?)

In the discussion that precedes this instance (§§ 81-83), Cato argues that the wise man can see further into the future than the unwise man. Therefore, wise and virtuous men (all the examples concern males!) act while considering their future *gloria* – they are guided by *virtus* and courage – but the unwise live for the present and are dominated by cowardice and lust. So the meaning of *obtusior acies* in the quotation above is that the view of the mind's eye is blurred by a lack of wisdom. Since Cato argues that wise men can see into the future, he is also using the idea of life as movement forward in space. This theme will be further investigated in the sections *Time as target domain* and *Orientation in space as source domain*. In another expression in the same part of the dialogue, the visual sense is also employed to describe how sleeping souls can see into the future. Again, Cato is speaking of the 'mind's eye':

atqui dormientium animi maxime declarant divinitatem suam; multa enim cum remissi et liberi sunt **futura prospiciunt**[138] […] (§81)

([…] and yet it is when the body sleeps that the soul most clearly manifests its divine nature; for when it is unfettered and free it sees many things that are to come.)

In the next example,

sed nescio quo modo **animus erigens** se posteritatem ita semper **prospiciebat**, quasi cum excessisset e vita, tum denique victurus esset. (§82)

(But somehow, my soul was ever on the alert, looking forward to posterity, as if it realized that when it had departed from this life, then at last it would be alive.)

---

[138] Terence also uses *prospicio* in the sense 'to see into the future' (Terence, *Adelphoe* 388 *istuc est sapere…illa quae futura sunt prospicere* (OLD 3)).

the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor is combined with GOOD IS UP and THE MIND IS A BODY concepts: with the (metaphorical) body erect or lifted up in space (*erigens*) the spiritual eyes, due to their higher position, are able to see further into the future, the metaphorical land ahead.

The UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING concept is also present in another passage in the text:

> atque etiam cum hominis natura morte dissolvitur, ceterarum rerum **perspicuum** est quo quaeque discedat, abeunt enim illuc omnia unde orta sunt: animus autem solus nec cum adest nec cum discessit apparet. (§80)

> (And even when man is dissolved by death it is evident to the sight [i.e. transparent] whither each bodily element departs; for the corporeal returns to the visible constituents from which it came, but the soul alone remains unseen, both when it is present and when it departs.)

In the adjective *perspicuum,* physical transparency is transferred to a metaphorical level.[139]

The verb *cerno*, characteristically, appears four times in the last paragraphs of the text, (where Cato speaks about the after-life) but not in earlier parts of the dialogue. Besides its basic meaning, 'to sift', it can mean 'to discern with the eyes', as well as 'to perceive something' in general. Nevertheless, as it is used together with *videre* and with the adverb *longius*, it is clear that the visual sense (functioning as the source domain) is primarily in focus in the following example:

> quid quod sapientissimus quisque aequissimo animo moritur, stultissimus iniquissimo? nonne vobis videtur is animus qui plus **cernat** et longius videre se ad meliora proficisci, ille autem cui obtusior sit acies non videre? (§83)

> (And what of the fact that the wisest men die with the greatest equanimity, the most foolish with the least? Is it not apparent to you that it is because the soul of the one, having a keener and wider vision, sees that it is setting out for a better country, while the other, being of duller sight, sees not its path?)

---

[139] *Perspicuus* in this sense (OLD 3) is first found in Varro, *de Lingua Latina* 6.26 *perspicuo [vocabulo]*. Cf also Cicero's words *luce sunt clariora nobis tua consilia omnia* to Catilina in *Orationes in Catilinam* 1.6 and the verb *liquet*.

On the other hand, it is difficult to claim that *cerno* denotes this visual sense in §
82, where it rather seems to mean 'perceive' or 'apprehend' in general:

> nemo umquam mihi, Scipio, persuadebit aut patrem tuum Paulum, aut duos
> avos Paulum et Africanum, aut Africani patrem aut patruum, aut multos
> praestantes viros quos enumerare non est necesse, tanta esse conatos quae ad
> posteritatis memoriam pertinerent, nisi **animo cernerent** posteritatem ad se
> ipsos pertinere. (§82)

> (No one, my dear Scipio, will ever convince me that your father Paulus, or
> your two grandfathers, Paulus and Africanus, or the latter's father and uncle,
> or many other illustrious men, unnecessary now to name, would have
> attempted such mighty deeds, to be remembered by posterity, if they had not
> known that posterity belonged to them.)

Still, the numerous references to the vision of 'the mind's eye' in the last
paragraphs of the text make the reader associate with the visual sense when the
verb is used in §77 and 84 (note the use of *respecto*, with clear reference to the
visual sense, in § 84):

> non enim video cur quid ipse sentiam de morte non audeam vobis dicere,
> quod eo **cernere** mihi melius videor, quo ab ea propius absum. (§77)

> […] animus [sc. filii] vero non me deserens sed respectans, in ea profecto
> loca discessit quo mihi ipse **cernebat** esse veniendum. (§84)

> (Really I do not see why I should not venture to tell you what I, myself,
> think of death; for it seems to me that I apprehend it better as I draw nearer
> to it.

> …but his soul, not deserting me, but ever looking back, has surely departed
> for that realm where it knew that I, myself, must come.)

   The last item I want to discuss in this section is the verb *occurro*, which Cicero
uses in the beginning of the text when he describes how his friend Atticus (to
whom the work is also dedicated) came to his mind when he decided to write a
treatise on old age:

> Cicero: […] sed mihi cum de senectute vellem aliquid scribere, tu
> **occurrebas** dignus eo munere quo uterque nostrum communiter uteretur. (§
> 2)

> (But when I resolved to write something on this theme [sc. old age] you
> continually came before my mind as worthy of a gift which both of us might
> enjoy together.)

49

This is also an example of sight functioning as a source domain. What Cicero says is that Atticus came to his mind, and *occurrebas* seems to primarily denote that he was *seen* by Cicero, that he came forth in the his mind.[140]

2.2.3. Touch

Besides sight, touch is the sense that plays the most prominent metaphorical role in *De senectute*. With the help of the central metaphorical concept THE MIND IS A BODY, different mental states and abstract outer influences on a person correspond to the body moving or being shaken, caressed or touched in other ways – or performing different physical activities. I will start by discussing the adjective *mollis* and the noun *duritas* and continue with the verbs *commoveo, permulceo, contingo, accido, complector, fingo,* and *teneo*.

In the beginning of *De senectute*, Cicero tells Atticus how writing the dialogue has taken away the difficulties of old age for him and made it tender and pleasant:

> Cicero: mihi quidem ita iucunda huius libri confectio fuit ut non modo omnes absterserit senectutis molestias, sed effecerit **mollem** etiam et iucundam senectutem. (§2)

> (To me, at any rate, the composition of this book has been so delightful that it has not only wiped away all the annoyances of old age, but has even made it an easy |sc. 'soft'] and a happy state.)

Mollis is not used in exactly this sense before this instance (OLD 7). On one level, we are dealing with the ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS concept: *senectus* is linguistically treated as an object which can be handled and is presented as 'soft'. This concept is then combined with THE MIND IS A BODY, where focus is put on the aspect of touch.[141] At the same time, *mollis* bears upon the everyday life of the old person: as he is moving, sitting down, lying down, he does not experience the objects he comes into contact with as hard, i.e. causing pain to his body. Neither does his body, though ageing, cause him pain, nor does

---

[140] *Occurro* in this sense (OLD 8) is not found in Latin before Cicero.

[141] The other instances of *mollis* and its derivatives in *De senecte*, '*quod (i.e. tempus extremum vitae) ferundum est molliter sapienti*' (§5) and '*Hannibalem iuveniliter exsultantem patientia sua molliebat (Sc. Fabius Maximus Cunctator)*' (§10) function metaphorically in the same way as the example from § 2 quoted above. In § 51 *mollio* is used in a concrete sense.

the philosophical problem of death. This specific metaphorical concept might be formulated as PLEASANT IS PLEASANT TO THE TOUCH.

While *mollis* is used for feelings in a positive sense, its opposite *durus* has a clearly negative connotation. The adjective does not occur in the text but the noun *duritas* appears once:

> quae tamen [sc. difficultates senectutis] omnia dulciora fiunt et moribus bonis et artibus; idque cum in vita tum in scaena intellegi potest ex eis fratribus qui in Adelphis sunt: quanta in altero **duritas**[142], in altero comitas! (§65)

> (But nevertheless all these faults are much ameliorated by good habits and by education, as may be seen in real life, and particularly on the stage in the case of the two brothers in the play of that name. What a disagreeable [sc. 'hard'] nature one of them has, and what an affable disposition has the other!)

It is obvious that the metaphorical use of *duritas* has to do with the similarity between an attitude in a person and the characteristics of hard objects such as rocks or walls. The latter do not yield to touch or pressure, which, in a metaphorical way, also can be said of a '*homo durus*'.[143] On the other hand, an object, (or person) which is *mollis,* interacts with someone who touches it, or, as OLD (1) puts it, 'yields to touch'.

Another item that clearly has to do with touch is *permulceo*, 'to stroke' or 'to caress'. When Cato claims that no consolation can mitigate a foolish old age, the source domain is that of an old person being calmed by gentle stroking:

> praeterita enim aetas quamvis longa cum effluxisset, nulla consolatio **permulcere** posset stultam senectutem. (§4)

> (In fact, no lapse of time, however long, once it has slipped away, could solace or soothe [sc. 'caress to peace'] a foolish old age.)

---

[142] I follow Powell who chooses *duritas* instead of *diritas*, which is the reading of the manuscript P1.

[143] Quintilian discusses the metaphor *durus homo* in *Institutio oratoria* (8.6.6) and writes that there is no non-metaphorical word in Latin which can replace *durus*. Cicero also employs the word *duritas* for harsh language (*Orator*, 53). OLD (5) quotes Terence, *Heautontimorumenos* 439 *satis pater durus fui* as an early example of *durus* in the sense 'harsh, pitiless, hard'.

Here, we also notice an element of personification, both of *consolatio* and *senectus*, although *senectus* in this excerpt perhaps primarily is an instance of metonomy: old age stands for old people. This will be further discussed in the section about personification. According to OLD, the sentence quoted is the first instance of *permulceo* in this sense (OLD 2).

Further, we have a group of verbs which express sudden events and which are also related to touch:

> Laelius: Est, ut dicis, Cato; sed fortasse dixerit quispiam, tibi propter opes et copias et dignitatem tuam tolerabiliorem senectutem videri, id autem non posse multis **contingere.** (§8)

> What you say is true, Cato; but perhaps some one might reply that old age seems more tolerable to you because of your resources, means, and social position, and that these are advantages which cannot fall to the lot of [sc. 'touch'] many.

The meaning of *contingo* in this context, 'to fall on one's lot', has a metaphorical connection. The basic sense of *contingo* is 'to come into physical contact with'. The (in many ways) happy fate of Cato does not 'happen to touch' everyone. The metaphor has something of an accidental touch about it.[144]. An almost analogous case is found in the following sentence:

> […] et tamen dux ille Graeciae [sc. Agamemnon] nusquam optat ut Aiacis similes habeat decem, sed ut Nestoris; quod si sibi **acciderit**, non dubitat quin brevi sit Troia peritura. (§31**)**

> ([…]and yet the illustrious Grecian chief never prays for ten men like Ajax, but for ten like Nestor, and he doubts not that, if he had them, Troy would speedily be destroyed.)

Just like *contingo*, *accido* – partly due to the fast and often sudden movement inherent in *cado* – here activates the source domain 'accidental physical touch'.[145]

---

[144] According to OLD (8) *contingo* in this sense first appears in Ennius, *Scenica* 360 *quam mihi maxime hic hodie contigerit malum.*
[145] *Accido* in this sense (OLD 5) is first attested in Plautus, *Mostellaria* 197 *insperata accidunt magis saepe quam quae speres.*

Contingo and *accido* form a separate group of verbs in *De senectute* which metaphorically express random events.

In *Commoveo*[146], which is used by Cicero to describe how he and Atticus are strongly emotionally affected by the approaching of old age, the physical shaking of a body functions to describe its inner anxiety – an especially clear example of the metaphorical concept THE MIND IS A BODY:

> Cicero: et tamen te [sc. Atticum] suspicor eisdem rebus quibus me ipsum interdum gravius **commoveri**, quarum consolatio et maior est et in aliud tempus differenda […] (§1)

> (Nevertheless I suspect that you, at times, are quite seriously perturbed by the same circumstances which are troubling me, but to find comfort for them is too difficult a task to be undertaken now and must be deferred until another time.)

When Cicero writes about other aspects of the inner life of the mind, he avails himself of metaphors having to do with arms and hands:

> Etenim cum **complector animo**, quattuor reperio causas cur senectus misera videatur: unam quod avocet a rebus gerendis, alteram quod corpus faciat infirmius, tertiam quod privet fere omnibus voluptatibus, quartam quod haud procul absit a morte. (§15)

> (And indeed, when I reflect on [sc. 'embrace'] this subject I find for reasons why old age appears to be unhappy: first, that it withdraws us from active pursuits; second, that it makes the body weaker; third, that it deprives us of almost all physical pleasures; and, fourth, that it is not far removed from death.)

Complector animo metaphorically implies a stronger and deeper approach to a problem than viewing it from different perspectives (with sight as a source domain) – the closeness and touch increase the intensity in the target domain 'considering a problem'. *Complector* also adds the possibility of exerting lighter or stronger (metaphorical) pressure on the object/problem – the degree of engagement in the target domain (the very gesture of embracing means that it is high) – and the fact that it is taken in by the person who 'embraces' it. *Complector*

---

[146] *Commoveo* and *commotus* in this sense are first found in Terence (*e.g. Phormio* 101 *commorat omnis nos.*).

in this sense (with or without *mente* or *animo*) is not found in Latin before Cicero (OLD 4).

The expression *ius augurium pontificium civile tracto* must also be included here. The basic meaning of *tracto* is 'to drag about or handle'. Cato studies the documents of Roman law but expresses this by saying that he 'handles' it. Again, hands, together with the ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS metaphor, are used as a source domain[147]:

> septimus mihi liber Originum est in manibus, omnia antiquitatis monumenta colligo, causarum illustrium quascumque defendi nunc cum maxime conficio orationes, **ius augurium pontificium civile tracto** […] (§ 38)

> (I am now at work on the seventh volume of my Antiquities. I am collecting all the records of our ancient history, and at the present moment am revising all the speeches made by me in the notable causes which I conducted. I am investing the augural, pontifical, and secular law.)

In one remarkable example, the human hands function metaphorically not as a way of speaking about abstract notions but by being compared to the tendrils of the vine. The function of the metaphor seems to be to express Cato's love for and wonder at vegetable life:

> vitis quidem quae natura caduca est, et nisi fulta est fertur ad terram, eadem ut se erigat claviculis suis **quasi manibus** quidquid est nacta, **complectitur** […](§52)

> (The vine which droops by nature and falls to the ground unless it has support, raises itself by its finger-like [sc. hand-like] tendrils and enfolds in its embrace the props that hold it up.)

When Cato/Cicero describes how a feeling is conceptualized in the mind, he also uses a word which has to do with the hands shaping something. Again, the explanatory *animo* is added:

---

[147] There is also a literal meaning in the phrase since Cato handles the documents too. The first example of this use of *tracto* in OLD is Plautus, *Trinummus* 327 '*minus qui caute…suam rem tractavit'*.

quod quo magis intellegi posset, **fingere animo**[148] iubebat [sc. Quintus Maximus] tanta incitatum aliquem voluptate corporis quanta percipi posset maxima; nemini censebat fore dubium, quin tamdiu dum ita gauderet, nihil agitare mente, nihil ratione nihil cogitatione consequi posset. (§41)

("Imagine", he begged, to make his meaning clearer, "imagine [sc. 'form in the mind'] a person enjoying the most exquisite bodily pleasure to be had. No one will doubt, I think, that such a man, in the midst of his enjoyment, is capable of any mental action, and can accomplish nothing requiring reason and reflection.".

The main point of this metaphor is probably to stress the process of mentally *'building up a scene'* and making it come alive in the mind. *Fingo* in a concrete sense can be used with clay, wax or other mouldable materials. The process of forming the material in the source domain corresponds to the deliberate and extended effort of the mind in the target domain.

A difficult case in this context, due to the large number of various senses it may take on, is the verb *teneo*. At least a few expressions in *De senectute* use *teneo* in a metaphorical way. We notice a certain focus on the aspect of maintaining a (metaphorical) grip on something. In *De senectute*, *teneo* is often used together with *memoria*:

qui sermo, quae praecepta, quanta notitia antiquitatis, scientia iuris augurii! multae etiam ut in homine Romano litterae; **omnia memoria tenebat**, non domestica solum, sed etiam externa. (§12)

Hac igitur fortuna frui licet senibus nec aetas impedit quominus et ceterarum rerum et in primis agri colendi studia **teneamus** usque ad ultimum tempus senectutis. (§60)

nec vero clarorum virorum post mortem honores permanerent, si nihil eorum ipsorum animi efficerent, quo diutius **memoriam sui teneremus**. (§80)

(What conversation! What maxims! What knowledge of ancient history! What skill in augural law! He had also read much, for a Roman, and knew by heart the entire history, not only of our own nation, but of foreign countries as well [translation adapted by me].

---

[148] *Fingo* in the sense 'to form in the mind' (with or without *animo*) is first found in Plautus, *Curculio* 594 *mulierem peiorem…non vidi…neque pol dici nec fingi potest* (OLD 8).

And this good fortune, therefore, we old men may enjoy; nor does age offer any hindrance to our pursuit of other activities, and especially the cultivation of the soil, even to the very end of old age.

Nor, indeed, would the fame of illustrious men survive their death if the souls of those very men did not cause us to retain their memory longer.)

According to OLD, the phrase *memoria tenere* is not found in Latin before Cicero (OLD 2 on *memoria*).

In the majority of the examples above, we see how that the physical experiences of the human body are consistently tranferred to the mental level. The necessity of employing the metaphorical concept THE MIND IS A BODY for treating a number of abstract subjects linguistically is clear to every reader.

2.2.4. Taste, hunger and thirst

De senectute contains a few examples of taste used as a source domain.[149] The first appears when Cato describes the mixture of friendliness and seriousness that he meets in Quintus Maximus Cunctator:

ego Quintum Maximum, eum qui Tarentum recepit, senem adulescens ita dilexi ut aequalem; erat enim in illo viro **comitate condita gravitas**, nec senectus mores mutaverat […] (§ 10)

(I was as fond of Quintus Fabius Maximus, who recovered Tarentum, as if he had been of my own age, though he was old and I was young. For there was in him a dignity tempered with courtesy, and age had not altered his disposition.)

The metaphor works well to describe the combination of *gravitas* and *comitas* in Fabius' character. *Condio* in this sense is not found in Latin before Cicero (OLD 3). (We are clearly dealing with the verb *condio*, not *condo*.[150])

The next example is a quotation from Homer. In similarity with many other quotations of poetry in *De senectute*, it is more detailed and has a more incisive wording than the prose (I mean that it is typical that the exemple with *condio*

---

[149] Cato's use of wine as a source domain in § 65 will not be discussed here. The simile there has to do with the nature of wine, not with the taste of it.
[150] The example is quoted in the article on *condio* in TLL.

mentions the act of seasoning but not the spice in question, while the quotation from Homer explicitly names the honey). It needs also be added that here, Cicero does not translate the Greek into Latin verse but renders it in prose:

> etenim ut ait Homerus: 'ex eius [sc. Nestoris] lingua **melle dulcior fluebat oratio**[151]'; quam ad suavitatem nullis egebat corporis viribus […] (§ 31)

> (For as Homer says: "Speech sweeter than honey flowed from his tongue"; and this sweetness had no need of physical strength […])

The metaphor is somewhat paradoxical, since the speech/honey comes out of the speaker's mouth and, presumably, goes into the ears of the listeners. We are dealing with a synaesthesia here: 'the sweetness of sound'.

I have chosen to include a discussion of hunger and thirst under this heading, although it could have been placed elsewhere. The words *satietas* and *satio* appear quite frequently in the text, while *saturitas* occurs only once. *Saturitas* has a somewhat stronger meaning of 'having a full stomach' than *satietas,* and the relationship is the same between *saturo* and *satio*. Forcellini writes on the subject: (in *Nota* to *satietas* in *Forcellini* V, 344): 'Discrimen inter *satietatem* et *saturitatem* tradit Isid.1. Differ.503. «*Satietas* vario genere spectaculorum contingit: *saturitas* vero ciborum est.» Rectius autem in Append. n. 163: « *Saturitas* de cibo tantum, *satietas* de reliquis dicitur rebus.»' (Cf also the two words in OLD). This ought to mean that the following phrase:

> […] **saturitate** copiaque rerum omnium, quae ad victum hominum, ad cultum etiam deorum pertinent […] (§56)

> ([…] because of […] the plenty and abundance it gives of everything that tends to the nurture of man and even to the worship of the gods.)

has stronger metaphorical implications than expressions such as

> quid ego vitium ortus satus incrementa commemorem? **satiari** delectatione non possum – ut meae senectutis requiem oblectamumque noscatis […] (§52)

> Omnino ut mihi quidem videtur, studiorum omnium **satietas vitae** facit **satietatem**. (§76)

---

[151] *Iliad*.I.249.

> […] **satietas vitae** tempus maturum mortis adfert. (§76)
>
> (Why should I mention the origin, cultivation, and growth of the vine? But, that you may know what affords the recreation and delight of my old age, I will say that vine-culture gives me a joy of which I cannot get to much.
>
> Undoubtedly, as it seems to me at least, satiety of all pursuits causes satiety of life.
>
> […] man has his fill of life and the time is ripe for him to go.)

The example with *saturitas* is also quoted in OLD as the first instance of this word in a metaphorical sense (OLD 2), but Cato's preceding words (§56) are an appraisal of the farmer's life, and if *saturitas* also refers to the food and crop produced by a farmer, it notably weakens its metaphorical sense.

There is only one more instance in *De senectute* (except for the example quoted from §56) where we find a clear example of bodily hunger functioning as the source domain. The target domain is here physical lust or sexual appetite:

> cupidis enim rerum talium [sc. veneriarum] talium odiosum fortasse et molestum est carere, **satiatis** vero et **expletis** iucundius est carere quam frui […] (§47)
>
> (For to those who eagerly desire such things the want of them is perhaps an annoyance and a trouble; but to those who are sated and cloyed with them it is more pleasant to be in want of them than to possess them […])

Combined with *expleo, satio* evidently constitutes a metaphorical expression which is much more vivid and less conventionalized than e.g. *satietas vitae,* which was quoted above. The two perfect participles express different degrees of fullness: saturated and overfed respectively.

We notice a stress on fullness and saturation rather than hunger in the preceding phrases. This is no coincidence. It is due to Cato's contentedness as he looks back on his life. One reason why there is no use of hunger as a source domain in *De senectute* is that the metaphorical hunger of Cato (for *gloria, virtus, sapientia,* etc) has, according to himself, been satiated. The metaphorical concepts behind the expressions above are variations of THE MIND IS A BODY concept and can be formulated as SATIATION OF LIFE IS BODILY SATURATION or perhaps LIFE IS FOOD. When Cato describes a desire that has not been satiated he chooses a metaphor having to do with thirst rather than hunger. The 'thirst' is a craving for a knowledge of Greek language and culture:

> […] quas [scil. litteras graecas] quidem sic avide arripui, **quasi** diuturnam **sitim explere cupiens**, ut ea ipsa mihi nota essent quibus me nunc exemplis

58

uti videtis. (§26)

([…] Greek, which I have seized upon as eagerly as if I had been desirous
of satisfying a long-continued thirst, with the result that I have acquired first-
hand the information which you see me using in this discussion by way of
illustration.)

It is interesting to note that when Cato uses 'saturation' in a metaphorical way, he
does not add any markers such as *velut, quasi, ut ita dicam*, but when he employs
thirst in the same way, he adds *quasi*.[152]

2.2.5. Physical exercise and bodily strength

In this section, the words *exerceo, exercitatio, curriculum,* and *vires* will be
discussed. *Exercitatio* and *exerceo*, which altogether are found nine times in the
text,[153] can mean (the practice of) physical exercise as well as mental activity. In
De senectute both those senses of the words are used. From the Lakoff-Johnsonian
standpoint, which stresses that we usually employ concrete source domains in
order to say something about abstract target domains, it is possible to argue that
the verb functions in a metaphorical way (i.e. that we are dealing with THE MIND
IS A BODY concept) in the following and other similar instances:

At memoria minuitur. – credo, nisi **eam exerceas**, aut etiam si sis natura
tardior. (§21)

[…] multum etiam Graecis litteris utor, Pythagoreorumque more,
exercendae memoriae gratia, quid quoque die dixerim audierim egerim
commemoro vesperi. (§38)

(But, it is alleged, the memory is impaired. Of course, if you do not exercise
it, or if you are by nature somewhat dull.

---

[152] OLD lists Livius, *Ab urbe condita* 26.13.13 as the first example of metaphorical thirst
(OLD 2b), and leaves the passage from *De senectute* out, perhaps because it combines *sitis*
with *quasi*.
[153] *Exerceo* in §§ 21, 27 (participle), 36, 38, 50; *Exercitatio* in §§ 9, 34, 36, 38.

I also devote much of my time to Greek literature; and in order to exercise my memory, I follow the practice of the Pythagoreans and run over in my mind every evening all that I have said, heard or done during the day.)

Still, to make a clear case, a marker that the words are to be interpreted in a metaphorical way would have been necessary, and such a marker is found in one instance only in *De senectute*, in a phrase which follows closely after the last quotation and where *exercitatio* is used together with *curriculum*:

Septimus mihi liber Originum est in manibus; omnia antiquitatis monumenta colligo, causarum illustrium quascumque defendi nunc cum maxime conficio orationes, ius augurium pontificium civile tracto; multum etiam Graecis litteris utor, Pythagoreorumque more exercendae memoriae gratia, quid quoque die dixerim audierim egerim, commemoro vesperi. hae sunt **exercitationes ingeni**, haec **curricula mentis**; in his desudans atque elaborans corporis vires non magnopere desidero. (§38)

(I am now at work on the seventh volume of my Antiquities. I am collecting all the records of our ancient history, and at the present moment am revising all the speeches made by me in the notable causes which I conducted. I am investing the augural, pontifical, and secular law. I also devote much of my time to Greek literature; and in order to exercise my memory, I follow the practice of the Pythagoreans and run over in my mind every evening all that I have said, heard, or done during the day. These employments are my intellectual gymnastics; these the race-courses of my mind; and while I sweat and toil with them I do not greatly feel the loss of bodily strength.)

Here, we have metaphors for the 'race- or training track' of the mind (Cf §27: '*athletas…se exercentes in curriculo*'.), a clear instance of THE MIND IS A BODY concept with focus on the aspect of exercise, but this becomes clear only from the juxtaposition of the words.[154] The aspects of the source domain that are activated are primarily competition with others, the need for long-time and continuous practice and, to some degree, exhibition of physical strength and beauty, and these aspects are easily transferred to the target domain.

When Cato compares mental and physical strength, the word *vires* functions as a connecting link between the two domains. It primarily means vigour of the body

---

[154] OLD does not present any examples of *curriculum* in the sense in which it is used in the passage quoted.

(OLD 1, 20 on *vis*[155]), so Cato can use it in that sense without adding any words of explanation, as in the following cases[156]:

> Nec nunc quidem **vires** desidero adulescentis (is enim erat locus alter de vitiis senectutis), non plus quam adulescens tauri aut elephanti desiderabam. (§27)

> Non sunt in senectute **vires**? (§34)

> (I do not now feel the need of the strength of youth – for that was the second head under the faults of old age – any more than when a young man I felt the need of the strength of the bull or of the elephant.

> But, grant that old age is devoid of strength […])

By contrast, when he speaks about the strength of the mind, he adds the genitive *ingenii* or another explanation:

> Olympiae per stadium ingressus esse Milo dicitur cum humeris sustineret bovem: utrum igitur has corporis an Pythagorae tibi malis **vires ingeni** dari? (§33)

> an ne **tales** quidem **vires** senectuti relinquimus, **ut** adulescentes doceat, instituat, ad omne offici munus instruat? (§29)

> (It is said that Milo walked the length of the race-course in Olympia, carrying an ox on his shoulders. Which, therefore, should you prefer be given to you – the physical powers of Milo, or the mental powers of Pythagoras?

> Or do we not concede to old age even strength enough to instruct and train young men and equip them for every function and duty?)

---

[155] The earliest example of *vires* in the sense of 'mental strength', '*vires animi*', mentioned in OLD is Cicero, *Philippicae* 7.12 *animi vires corporis infirmitas non retardavit*.

[156] In the example from § 27, *adulescentis* of course describes whose strength is denoted but the type of strength need not be explained since it, being corporal, is inherent in the word *vires*.

When an explicative *corporis* or similar word is added to specify the strength as corporal, it seems to be done only to highlight the difference between the two kinds of strength (Cf also the quotation from §33 above) :

> adsum amicis, venio in senatum frequens; utroque adfero res multum et diu cogitatas, easque tueor **animi,** non **corporis viribus**. (§38)

> (I act as counsel for my friends; I frequently attend the senate, where, on my own motion, I propose subjects for discussion after having pondered over them seriously and long; and there I maintain my views in the debate, not with strength of body, but with force of mind.)

In *De senectute, vires* constitutes an interesting example of a noun which maintains its basic sense (physical strength) but seems to become more and more, but not fully, established in the sense of 'mental strength'. This tension in the word is central to Cato's argumentation in the dialogue, where he contrasts the physical strength of youth with the mental strength of old men.

2.2.6. *Other examples of the human body as source domain*[157]

A recurrent theme in *De senectute* is Cato's contempt for lust. In § 7 he praises old age because it liberates people from lust:

> […] nam si id culpa senectutis accideret, eadem mihi usu venirent, reliquisque omnibus maioribus natu; quorum ego multorum cognovi senectutem sine querela, qui se et **libidinum vinculis laxatos** esse non moleste ferrent, nec a suis despicerentur. (§7)

> (For if the ills of which they complained were the faults of old age, the same ills would befall me and all other old men: but I have known many who were of such nature that they bore their old age without complaint, who were not unhappy because they had been loosed from the chains of passion, and who were not scorned by their friends.)

---

[157] Cato's description of 'Mother Earth' and the comparison of the growing seed to a child (§51) will be brought up in the section *The earth and agriculture as target domains*.

Lust is said to be chains that fetter the human body. Here, lust is the central target domain (with the *vincula* as source domain). So can we talk about the human body as a source domain in this passage? One might argue that it is the mind of elder men that is released, i.e. that we have an instance of THE MIND IS A BODY concept, but this seems difficult since *vinculis* so strongly stresses that it is the bodies that are fettered. One can also say that the metaphor *libidinum vincula laxatos* refers to the bodies as well as the minds of elder men. Perhaps the young body corresponds to the chains, and, by ageing, the former disappears literally and the latter metaphorically. In any case, the central target domain here is lust, not the human body.

I would also like to bring up the description of the young, reckless Hannibal who was 'calmed' by Fabius Cunctator:

> hic et bella gerebat ut adulescens cum plane grandis esset, et **Hannibalem iuveniliter exsultantem** patientia sua molliebat […] (§10)

> (Though quite old he waged war like a young man, and by his patient endurance checked the boyish impetuosity of Hannibal [sc. 'Hannibal jumping around'].)

The bold, hot-blooded temper of the Carthaginian is rendered by the word *exsultantem. Exsulto* means 'to jump around' and it is obvious that this way of moving the body is metaphorically employed to describe Hannibal's savage ways of waging war. Cicero employs the word in a concrete as well as in an abstract sense (OLD 1-3 on *ex(s)ulto*).

2.3. Up and down as source domains

UP and DOWN often function as source domains in *De senectute*. Lakoff and Johnson especially stress the importance of the UP concept, which gathers a large group of related metaphors around itself. Most central in our text, due to its vagueness and broadness of sense, is the GOOD IS UP concept. To this concept, several aspects of positive value are associated.[158] The most obvious examples in *De senectute* are expressions which include the words *summus, excellens, despicio, erectus, rectus, supero,* and *apex.*

---

[158] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 14-21.

Summus is found eight times in the text and – with one exception – only in a transferred sense.[159] Some of the examples are clear instances of the GOOD IS UP concept:

> […] quae [sc. consilium, ratio, sententia] nisi essent in senibus, non **summum consilium** maiores nostri appellassent senatum. (§19)

> Quorsus igitur tam multa de voluptate? quia non modo vituperatio nulla sed etiam **summa laus** senectutis est, quod ea voluptates nullas magnopere desiderat. (§44)

> […] Lysander Lacedaimonius, vir **summae virtutis** […] (§59)

> nec me solum ratio ac disputatio impulit ut ita crederem, sed nobilitas etiam **summorum philosophorum** et auctoritas. (§77)

> (If these mental qualities were not characteristic of old men our fathers would not have called their highest deliberative body the "senate".

> Why then, do I dwell at such length on pleasure? Because the fact that old age feels little longing for sensual pleasures not only is no cause for reproach, but rather is ground for the highest praise.

> …Lysander the Spartan, a man of the highest virtue…

> Nor have I been driven to this belief solely by the force of reason and of argument, but also by the reputation and authority of philosophers of the highest rank.)

In these examples*, summus* accentuates a certain degree of dignity. In other places, it rather has the function of strengthening the meaning of another word. This means that it can stand together with 'negative' nouns such as *inopia*. Still, it is clear that the concept applies:

> […] nec enim in **summa inopia** levis esse senectus potest […] (§8)

> (…for amid utter [sc. highest] want old age cannot be a light thing […])

---

[159] The exception is in § 46, where it denotes a person's placement on a couch. The first attested instance of *summus* in the sense of 'greatest in degree' is Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus* 671 *summae sollicitudini* (OLD 9).

Summus is also used in a concrete sense by Cicero (though not in *De senectute*, but for example in *Pro Cluentio* 150[160]) but is quite rare. Just like in modern English and Swedish, many instances of the GOOD IS UP concept in Latin (including *summus*) are typical, conventional metaphorical language, i.e. part of an everyday conceptual system shared by people within a specific cultural community. This means that on the one hand it is present in many conventional phrases but on the other it still can influence how new expressions are shaped.[161]

Next, there is one example of *excellens* in the text:

> Scipio: Saepenumero admirari soleo cum hoc Gaio Laelio, cum ceterarum rerum tuam **excellentem**, Marce Cato, perfectamque **sapientiam**, tum vel maxime quod numquam tibi senectutem gravem esse senserim […] (§4)

> (Scipio: When conversing with Gaius Laelius here present, I am frequently wont to marvel, Cato, both at your pre-eminent, nay, faultless wisdom in matters generally, and especially at the fact that […] old age is never burdensome to you […])

Excellens has 'high', 'lofty' as its basic meaning (OLD 1[162]) and TLL gives '*eminens, altus*' as synonyms (TLL, V:2, p. 1215). I have not found any examples of this concrete use of the word in Cicero, who, as in the example above, usually has it in the sense of 'pre-eminent, outstanding' (The word is difficult to translate without the aid of words with a metaphorical sense.). The aspect of the target domain which is in focus in this example is a person's wisdom 'raising above' what is common. One might stipulate a source domain consisting of a flat surface with an elevation on it. This type of basic orientational source domains will be further discussed in the section *Orientation in space as source domain*.

Another word which is related to the up concept is *despicio*. We meet it twice in the text:

> nam si id culpa senectutis accideret, eadem mihi usu venirent, reliquisque omnibus maioribus natu; quorum ego multorum cognovi senectutem sine

---

[160] '*…qui summum locum civitatis…non potuerunt ascendere*'.

[161] In *More than cool reason* George Lakoff and Mark Turner claim that there is a group of conventional metaphors that are neither dead nor fresh but are part of our everyday conceptual system. Lakoff & Turner 1989, 49-56.

[162] OLD gives no earlier examples than Cicero of *excellens* and *excello* in the sense '(to be) pre-eminent', but quotes Cato, *Historia* 63 *in excelsissimam claritudinem* under *excelsus*.

querela, qui se et libidinum vinculis laxatos esse non moleste ferrent, nec a suis **despicerentur**.(§7)

[…] contemni se [sc. senes] putant, **despici**, inludi […] (§65)

(For if the ills of which they complained were the faults of old age, the same ills would befall me and all other old men: but I have known many who were of such nature that they bore their old age without complaint, who were not unhappy because they had been loosed from the chains of passion, and who were not scorned by their friends.)

[…] old men imagine themselves ignored, despised, and mocked at[…])

The basic sense of the word, 'to look down on' is used by Cicero in *de Republica*.3.14[163], so it is not obsolete for him. The implications of the expression are clear: if you despise someone you look down on them. What is accentuated in these *loci* is the notion of contempt, expressed by one person placing himself metaphorically higher than another.[164]

When Cicero speaks about courageous Roman soldiers, he describes their character by the words '*animo…erecto*':

[…] cum recorder […] legiones nostras [sc. Romanas][…] in eum locum saepe profectas alacri **animo** et **erecto** unde se redituras numquam arbitrarentur. (§75)

([…] when I recall […] how our legions have often marched with cheerful and unwavering courage [sc. 'upright mind'] into situations whence they thought they would never return.)

This is a complex metaphor. An erect posture works metonomically to denote the courage of the soldiers.[165] The description of this bodily deportment is then transferred to the soul. According to OLD, *erectus* is not found in Latin in this sense, 'confident, bold, assured', before Cicero.

In § 82, we find *erigo* in a slightly different sense:

---

[163] *'[…] si quis illo Pacuviano…multas et varias gentis et urbes despicere et oculis conlustrare possit […]'*
[164] No examples of *despicio* in the sense 'to disdain' which are earlier than Cicero are listed in OLD.
[165] See Kövecses 1990 on behaviour and outward appearance as metonymies for emotions.

sed nescio quo modo **animus erigens** se posteritatem ita semper prospiciebat, quasi cum excessisset e vita, tum denique victurus esset. (§82)

(But somehow, my soul was ever on the alert, looking forward to posterity, as if it realized that when it had departed from this life, then at last it would be alive.)

Here, Cato's point is that his soul sometimes has been able to 'rise above' his present conditions and acquire a 'higher perspective'. The elevation has permitted him to see further, to a life after death which he values higher than his earthly one. From Cato's Stoic point of view, I think that the expression can be said to connect to the RATIONAL IS UP concept[166]: He has risen from mental and philosohical obscurity to a higher place where the (metaphorical) sight is clearer.

The next word I want to bring up is the adjective *rectus*. *De senectute* §16 contains an interesting use of *rectus* in a quotation from Ennius[167]:

'quo vobis **mentes, rectae quae stare solebant**
antehac, dementes sese flexere viai?'(§16)

(Your minds which once did stand erect and strong,
What madness swerves them from their wanted course?)

Again, courage (and strength of character) is described with the help of the symbolic erect posture, transferred to the soul. The GOOD IS UP concept is combined with the body as a source domain (the metaphorical concept THE MIND IS A BODY) and they work together to create the image of courage.

Another, perhaps less obvious instance of the GOOD IS UP concept in *De senectute* is the following:

quodsi legere aut audire voletis externa, maximas **res publicas** ab adulescentibus **labefactatas**, a senibus **sustentatas et restitutas** reperietis. (§20)

---

[166] Lakoff &Johnson 1980;17-19. Cato's way of expressing himself indeed works excellently to denote also other aspects of the GOOD IS UP concept, e.g. HAPPY IS UP, VIRTUE IS UP (Lakoff & Johnsson 1980, 15-19.).
[167] Ennius, *Annalium fragmenta (in aliis scriptis servata)* 6.202.

(And indeed, if you care to read or hear foreign history, you will find that the greatest states have been overthrown by the young and sustained and restored by the old.)

The image is that of states or republics as built-up structures, apparently buildings, which are demolished by the young and reconstructed by the old. The focus is on the wise, experienced political work of old men in contrast to the (as Cato describes it) impulsive, ignorant and hot-blooded behaviour of the young. Probably, it is also implicated in Cato's/Cicero's words that in peaceful and prosperous times, construction work could continue in and around the *Forum romanum*. The metaphor makes it possible for Cato/Cicero to express all those nuances in a single phrase. See also the section *Buildings as source domains* where I actualize this sentence again.

De senectute contains only one example of the GOOD IS UP concept having to do with warfare. It is the word *supero*, which appears in the following instance:

haec cum Gaio Pontio Samnite, patre eius a quo Caudino proelio Sp. Postumius T. Veturius consules **superati sunt**, locutum Archytam […] accepisse dicebat [sc. Nearchus Tarentinus] […] (§41)

([…]Nearchus […] told me that, according to tradition, Archytas uttered these words while conversing with Pontius the Samnite, father of the man who defeated the consuls Spurius Postumius and Titus Veturius at the Caudine forks.)

The metaphorical thought here is that the victor gets on top of, and possibly tramples, the defeated.[168] The metaphor highlights the triumph, power and strength of the victor and the humiliation and possible death (by the implication that dead bodies lie on the ground) of the conquered.

The word *apex* is used by Cato to describe the authority of old people. It means 'top', 'crown' or 'mitre', but here denotes the highest possible *auctoritas*:

apex est autem senectutis auctoritas […] [169] (§60)

(But the crowning glory of old age is influence.)

---

[168] *Supero* in this sense is first attested in Plautus: Plautus, *Amphitruo* 656 *quos (scil. hostes) nemo posse superari ratust* (OLD 4).
[169] In our sources, this seems to be an early use of *apex* in this sense (OLD 1).

This passage in *De senectute* is perhaps the earliest instance of *apex* in the sense of 'honour, glory' (OLD 1; TLL).

At the end of the text, where Cato's speech becomes more speculative, and, in a way, more poetic, there is a passage where he speaks about the soul and the body:

> […] nam dum sumus inclusi in his compagibus corporis, munere quodam necessitatis et gravi opere perfungimur. **est enim animus caelestis, ex altissimo domicilio depressus et quasi demersus in terram, locum divinae naturae aeternatique contrarium.** (§77)

> (For while we are shut up within these frames of flesh we perform a sort of task imposed by necessity and endure grievous labour; for the soul is celestial, brought down from its most exalted home and buried, as it were, in earth, a place uncongenial to its divine and eternal nature.)

The idea is Platonic, inspired by *Timaios 41*. The GOOD IS UP concept adds a very basic aspect to the complex idea of gods and souls dwelling in heaven. At the same time, the words are a literal description of the Platonic thought. Consequently, the ancient idea of Hades as situated below the earth (and its Christian continuation) can partly be explained by the BAD IS DOWN concept.

In this section, I have demonstrated the pervasiveness of the source domains UP and DOWN, even in a short Latin text such as *De senectute*. The concepts add important nuances and aspects to other words and expressions. The most important ones are excellence, superiority, pride, power, courage, strength of character, and basic aspects of the notion of an afterlife.

The reasons why these concepts are so pervasive are several. One in particular is underlined by Lakoff and Johnson: the human body is central to our understanding of the world around us. We associate health and life with an erect, standing and moving body, and sickness and death with a body lying down. From these notions, the metaphorical concept GOOD IS UP, which is the most fundamental one in this context, has perhaps developed.[170]

The other reason for the frequence of the use of UP and DOWN is their vagueness. They form 'sceletal structures', which can be adjusted to fit many linguistic circumstances.

UP and DOWN are related to many other metaphorical concepts. As has been shown with the example '*erecto animo*', they are related to THE MIND IS A

---

[170] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 15-17.

BODY concept. Since a burden presses a body down and hinders it from standing straight, they are also related to the DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS metaphor.

2.4. Orientation in space as source domain

A very fundamental type of metaphorical source domain, in Latin as well as in English and Swedish, is physical orientation in space. According to Lakoff and Johnson, this is so because all humans have a basic experience of their bodies moving in space. As I have mentioned earlier, one of the major claims that the two authors make is that we usually avail ourselves of concrete experiences when we talk about abstract themes.[171] The human body and physical orientation perhaps constitute our most basic experience of the concrete. Therefore, they are ideal source domains for speaking about many abstract notions. In *Metaphors we live by*, Lakoff and Johnson stress the physical basis of orientational metaphors – they are related to basic physical experiences we all have: rising from a bed or lying down, walking, moving objects, etc.[172] In *Philosophy in the Flesh*, the analysis of this subject is deepened. The main theme of the book is that many philosophers have used metaphors in a way that have influenced their results. E.g. Descartes is criticized for having let the source domain *light* bias his description of reason.[173]

The idea that the human body and orientation in space are the most central source domains is confirmed by my investigation of *De senectute*, in which these domains stand forth in different ways, the body domain as the most elaborated one and the group of orientational metaphors as the most common type. An interesting feature of the orientational metaphors in *De senectute* is that they are very rarely accompanied by reservations such as *velut, ut ita dicam,* etc. Neither are they found in long similes or comparisons. This is a strong indication that they are too basic, and too self-evident to be used in that way. Another characteristic of this group is that they admit of little detail and elaboration. Lakoff and Johnson write: '...one can only do so much with orientation'[174], and this is very much to the point. The metaphors discussed in the section *Up and down as source domains* also belong to this group and so does, to some extent, the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, because it is closely related to the orientational source domain 'movement forward in space'. UP and DOWN were given a separate chapter due

---

[171] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 112.
[172] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 14-17.
[173] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 391-414.
[174] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 25.

to them forming such a distinct separate group and being less neutral than the other orientational metaphors (especially, as we saw in that section, the connection between UP and different aspects of positive value is strong in Cicero's Latin).

Since the orientational metaphors in *De senectute* are composed by very common Latin words and affixes such as *-fero, -cedo,-sum* and *ad-, ab-, pro-,* it has seemed pointless to try to ascertain when they first appear in different metaphorical senses, as I have done in the other sections of this chapter.

I will discuss the orientational metaphors which I have found in *De senectute* in nine groups. These groups are named as follows: (I) placing, being in front of, (II-V) centre and periphery, (VI) presence in a place, (VII) horizontal plane, (VIII) movement forward in space and, (IX) what I call the 'TALKING IS MOVING' metaphor.

The first group (I) that I would like to discuss includes metaphors that describe something that is being preferred, given higher status or being in some way superior to other entities by being positioned or placed in front of them. Expressions such as the following belong to this group:

> [...] non enim **rumores ponebat** [sc. Quintus Maximus] **ante salutem** [...]
> (§10; part of a quotation from Ennius.[175])

> (He [Quintus Maximus] valued safety more than [sc. 'put safety in front of']
> mob's applause [...])

In the hexameter line, three common metaphorical concepts are combined. The abstract entities (*rumores, salus*) are lingustically treated as physical objects (the ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS concept). Fabius's way of prioritizing is expressed by the orientational metaphor *ponebat ante*, 'placed in front of' (PREFERRED IS PLACED IN FRONT OF). Since the abstract preference is expressed in concrete terms, those two concepts also imply THE MIND IS THE BODY concept (with focus on the hands placing objects)[176].

A bit further on in the text, Fabius' excellence as a politician is described in the following manner:

> nec vero in armis **praestantior** quam in toga [...] (§11)

---

[175] Ennius, *Annalium fragmenta* (*in aliis scriptis servata*)12.371. *Antepono* in the sense 'to esteem more highly' is first found in Plautus (OLD 3).
[176] See also the use of *antepono* in a similar way in § 64.

(But, indeed, he was not more distinguished in war than in civil life.)

Praestans and *praesto* do not have a concrete sense in Latin, but simply mean 'surpassing/surpass others', 'excel'. Nevertheless, the hypothetical concrete sense of the words, 'to stand in front of', must have been evident to most Romans.[177] We also notice a slight attachment to the GOOD IS UP concept in *-stare/stans* and to the erect position of the body, which denotes determination and courage.[178] This kind of metaphor is also used to describe the holding of an office or a position, as in the following sentence:

> […] viginti et duos annos ei sacerdotio [sc. pontificis maximi] **praefuit**[179] [sc. Lucius Metellus.] (§30)
>
> ([…][Lucius Metellus] held that sacred office for twenty-two years […])

The adjective *praeclarus* combines an orientational metaphor with the FAME IS LIGHT and TALENT IS LIGHT concepts (see the section *Light and lustre as source domains*):

> **praeclarum responsum**[180] et docto homine dignum! (§13)
>
> multa in eo viro [Quinto Maximo] **praeclara** cognovi […] (§12)
>
> (A noble answer and worthy of a scholar!
>
> (Many are the remarkable things I have observed in that great man […])

To sum up, this kind of orientational metaphor describes preference, excellence, and the holding of a position.

Several groups of orientational metaphors (categories II-V in my investigation) deal with the concepts of *centre* and *periphery*. Something moves towards or away from a centre, or remains in a place or in a centre. It is not possible to discuss all

---

[177] Other examples of this type of metaphor are *sacerdotio praefuit (sc. Lucius Metellus)* (§30) with the holding of the office or position described as 'being in front of it', 'lead' and *praeclarum responsum* (§13), an orientational metaphor combined with light as the source domain.

[178] See the discussion of *erectus* in the section *Up and down as source domain*.

[179] *Praesum* is not used in a concrete sense in Latin (OLD).

[180] *Praeclarus* in an abstract sense is first found in Lucilius (OLD 3b).

the words that are related to these concepts in detail one by one, so I will present a number of examples of the different groups that are found: In one type of centre-periphery metaphors (group II:i), someone or something moves towards a centre:

(1) ad Appi Claudi senectutem **accedebat** etiam ut caecus esset […] (§16)

(2) 'edepol senectus, si nil quicquam aliud viti
apportes tecum cum **advenis** unum id sat est
quod diu vivendo multa quae non vult videt '(§25)

(3) […] atque in ea quae non vult saepe etiam adulescentia **incurrit**. (§25)

(4) […] ad paternam enim magnitudinem animi doctrina uberior **accesserat.** (§35)

(5) […] non intellegitur quando **obrepat** senectus […] (§38)

(6) […] quae [sc. voluptates agricolarum] nec ulla impediuntur senectute, et mihi ad sapientis vitam proxime videntur **accedere**.(§51)

(7) […] sed mihi ne diuturnum quidquam videtur in quo est aliquid extremum; cum enim id **advenit**, tum illud quod praeteriit effluxit […] (§69)

(8) **appropinquatio** mortis (§ 66)

(To the old age of Appius Claudius was also added blindness; […]

In truth, Old Age, if you did bring no bane
But this alone, 'twould me suffice, that one,
By living long, sees much he hates to see.

[…] and as for things one does not wish to see, even youth often encounters them.

[…] for to his fathers greatness of intellect he had added a mre abundant learning.

[The busy man] is not aware of the stealthy approach of old age.

[The pleasures of agriculture] is not one whit checked by old age, and are, it seems to me, in the highest degree suited to the life of the wise man.

[…] but to me, nothing whatever seems "lengthy" if it has an end; for when that end arrives, then that which was is gone;

[…] the nearness [sc. approach] of death […])

73

The act of approaching a centre is broadly used as a source domain in *De senectute* and may serve several purposes in the target domain. Old age can 'approach' a person, (2), (5) and so can death ((7) and, possibly, (8)). Young people can 'run into' trouble or difficulties (ex.(3)). Nobility of mind (*magnitudinem animi*) can be gradually 'approached' by a talented person (4). A physical trait (here: blindness) can be added to the other problems of old age (1). Different kinds of movement (*incurro, obrepo*) are used to describe how the approaching takes place. A way of life (farming) can, by its essence, 'approach' the life of a wise man (ex.(6)).

In another category (II:ii), something is carried or brought towards a centre (not moving by itself as in II:i). Here, we notice the crucial role of compounds with -*fero* and the prefix *ad*-:

(1) […] qui autem omnia bona a se ipsi petunt, eis nihil malum potest videri quod naturae necessitas **adferat**.(§4)

(2) Nihil igitur **adferunt** qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant […] (§17)

(3) adsum amicis, venio in senatum frequens; utroque **adfero** res multum et diu cogitatas […] (§38)

(4) quid ego irrigationes, quid fossiones agri repastionesque **proferam**, quibus fit multo terra fecundior? (§53)

(5) […] satietas vitae tempus maturum mortis **adfert** (§76)

(6) sua enim vitia insipientes et suam culpam in senectute **conferunt**. (§ 14)

([…] on the other hand, to those who seek all good from themselves nothing can seem evil that the laws of nature inevitably impose.

Those, therefore, who allege that old age is devoid of useful activity adduce nothing to the purpose […]

I act as counsel for my friends; I frequently attend the senate, where […] I propose subjects for discussion after having pondered over them seriously and long…

Why need I allude to irrigation, ditching, and frequent hoeing of the soil, whereby its productiveness is so much enhanced?

[…] man has his fill of life and the time is ripe for him to go.

For, in truth, it is their own vices and their own faults that fools charge to old age […])

The carrying of something towards a centre can also be varied in many ways and used for many different purposes. Some examples concern the carrying forward of arguments into a discussion or debate ((2), (3) (partly)) or the mentioning of examples (4). *Naturae Necessitas* touches on a personification of nature (See the clear example of this in § 5) as the carrier in question (1). A death in peace at the right time is 'brought to' a person who has lived enough (5). Personal vices of the unwise can be 'gathered at' (the place of) old age, which means 'blamed on it' in the target domain (6).

Another group (III) focuses on the distance or closeness of something relative to the centre:

> (1) […] quattuor reperio causas cur senectus misera videatur: unam quod avocet a rebus gerendis […] quartam quod **haud procul absit a morte**. (§15)

> (2) Non enim video cur quid ipse sentiam de morte non audeam vobis dicere, quod eo cernere mihi melius videtur, quo **ab ea propius absum**. (§ 77)

> ([…] I find four reasons why old age appears to be unhappy: first, that it withdraws us from active pursuits; […] and, fourth that it is not far removed from death.

> Really I do not see why I should not venture to tell you what I, myself, think of death; for it seems to me that I apprehend it better as I draw nearer to it.)

It is difficult to say what metaphorical concepts lie behind these expressions, for they may refer to movement towards a centre as well as movement along a line towards an end (with life as target domain). However, not enough linguistic information is given for us to say that we are dealing with the latter idea. We can only say that old age (1) and Cato himself (2) are 'close to' death, which here constitutes the centre in the centre-periphery construction.

Since we are here studying very basic spatial relations, it is not surprising that separation or movement away from a centre is employed as the source domain just as movement towards the centre is. There are several examples of movement away from a centre in *De senectute*. In some instances, something or someone moves objects away from the centre (Group IV:i):

> (1) A rebus gerendis senectus **abstrahit**. quibus? (§15)

> (2) […] sic illum [sc. Sophoclem] quasi desipientem a re familiari **removerent** iudices […] (§22)

> (3) o praeclarum munus aetatis, siquidem id **aufert** a nobis quod est in adulescentia vitiossissimum! (§39)

(4) [...] habeoque senectuti magnam gratiam, quae mihi sermonis aviditatem auxit, potionis et cibi **sustulit**. (§46)

(5) [...] quattuor reperio causas cur senectus misera videatur: unam quod **avocet** a rebus gerendis [...] tertiam quod **privet** fere omnibus voluptatibus [...] (§15)

("Old age withdraws us from active pursuits." From what pursuits?

...in order to secure a verdict removing him from the control of his property, on the ground of imbecility...

O glorious boon of age, if it does indeed free us from youth's most vicious fault!

[...] and I am profoundly greatful to old age, which has increased my eagerness for conversation and taken away that for food and drink.

[...] I find four reasons why old age appears to be unhappy: first, that it withdraws us from active pursuits, [...] third, that it deprives us of almost all physical pleasures [...])

Again, *senectus* is the central target domain. It carries away vices (3,4), draws/calls a person away from an active life (1, *avocet* in 5), or deprives a person of pleasures (*privet* in 5). In the example about Sophocles (2), the act of declaring someone incapacitated is explained by a metaphor of removal.

In the next category (IV:ii), a person or a phenomenon leaves a centre by his or its own force. Several expressions in *De senectute* adheres to what Lakoff and Turner call the DEATH IS DEPARTURE concept:

(1) Aptissima omnino sunt, Scipio et Laeli, arma senectutis artes exercitationesque virtutum; quae in omni aetate cultae, cum diu multumque vixeris mirificos ecferunt fructus; non solum quia numquam **deserunt** ne extremo quidem tempore aetatis (quamquam id quidem maximum est) verum etiam quia conscientia bene actae vitae multorumque benefactorum recordatio iucundissima est.[181] (§9)

---

[181] See another example of *desero* in an abstract sense in § 72; in § 84, the word seems to be literally meant.

(2) 'nolite arbitrari, o mihi carissimi filii, me cum **a vobis discessero** nusquam aut nullum fore.' (§79, Cato quoting Cyrus.)

(3) sed nescio quomodo animus erigens se posteritatem ita semper prospiciebat, quasi cum **excessisset e vita**, tum denique victurus esset. (§82)

(4) [...] **ex vita discedo tamquam ex hospitio** [...] (§84)

(Undoubtedly, Scipio and Laelius, the most suitable defenses [sc. arms] of old age are the principles and practice of the virtues, which, if cultivated in every period of life, bring forth wonderful fruits at the close of a long and busy career, not only because they never fail you even at the very end of life – although that is a matter of the highest moment – but also because it is most delightful to have the consciousness of a life well spent and the memory of many deeds worthily performed.

"Think not, my dearest sons, that, when I have left you, I shall cease to be. [...]"

(But somehow, my soul was ever on the alert, looking forward to posterity, as if it realized that when it had departed from this life, then at last it would be alive.)

[...] and I quit life as if it were an inn [...]

Desero (ex. (1)) is employed by Cato to describe how virtue, and the happiness it brings, does not leave an old person, as his health and vigour does. At the end of *De senectute*, Cato repeatedly uses departure as a source domain when he speaks about death. Some expressions describe the soul leaving the body[182] and these are probably literally meant, but the phrases about death as departure in general are metaphorical (Cf Swedish 'gå bort', English 'pass away'). We note that either the person (2),(4) or the soul (3) might 'leave' life. The metaphorical concepts LIFE IS PRESENCE HERE and DEATH IS DEPARTURE are analyzed by Lakoff and Turner in *More than Cool Reason,* and they are frequent at the end of *De senectute*.[183]

Separation is also used to express disdain. The verb *sperno(r)* means 'to spurn' in classical Latin, but, as Forcellini points out, its basic sense is 'to separate from'.

---

[182] See §§ 79-80.
[183] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 10-20.

The thought behind the different meanings of the word is evident: one rejects (Swedish: 'tar avstånd ifrån') something one dislikes. The verb meets us twice in *De senectute*:

> quae C. Salinator, quae Spurius Albinus, homines consulares nostri fere aequales, deplorare solebant! – tum quod voluptatibus carerent, sine quibus vitam nullam putarent, tum quod **spernerentur** ab eis a quibus essent coli soliti. (§7)

> qui [Manius Curius, Tiberius Coruncanius, Gaius Fabricius] cum ex sua vita, tum ex eius quem dico Deci facto, iudicabant esse profecto aliquid natura pulchrum atque praeclarum, quod sua sponte peteretur, quodque **spreta** et contempta **voluptate** optimus quisque sequeretur. (§43)

> ([…] complaints made also by the ex-consuls, Gaius Salinator and Spurius Albinus, who were almost my equals in years, wherein they used to lament, now because they were denied the sensual pleasures without which they thought life not life at all, and now because they were scorned by the people who had been wont to pay them court.

> […] and they all were firmly persuaded, both by their own experience and especially by the heroic deed of Decius, that assuredly there are ends, inherently pure and noble, which are sought for their own sake, and which will be pursued by all good men who look on self-gratification with loathing and contempt.)

Sperno seems to have lost its concrete sense in Cicero's time, but there are examples from Ennius and Plautus (OLD 1).

While the categories II-IV discussed above use approaching, proximity or separation relative to a centre as source domains, the category that will be discussed now (V) instead employs the durable presence of something at a place or in a centre. This source domain (remaining at a place) is central in the following phrases:

> (1) **manent** ingenia senibus, modo **permaneat** studium et industria […] (§22)

> (2) […] nec enim libidine dominante **temperantiae locum esse**, neque omnino in voluptatis regno virtutem posse consistere (§41)

> (3) qui [Nearchus Tarentinus] **in amicitia populi romani permanserat** [….] (§41)

> (4) quorum [sc. Pauli, Africani, Maximi] non **in sententia** solum sed etiam **in nutu residebat auctoritas**. (§61)

78

(Old men retain their mental faculties, provided thir interest and application continue […]

[…] for where lust holds despotic sway self-control has no place, and in pleasure's realm there is not a single spot where virtue can put her foot.

[…] who had remained steadfast in his friendship to the Roman people […]

These men had power, not only in their speech, but in their very nod.)

Presence in a place denotes mental powers (1), which can remain in an old person if he remains active. In (2), *temperantia* and *libido* are pictured as fighting for a common ground from which one or the other can be squeezed or pressed out. The next passage (§41) develops into an elaborated metaphor, where the body is compared to a kingdom where *voluptas* has seized power. Friendship with the Roman people (3) is described as a place where one can stay (or implicitly, depart from). In (4), authority is said to have resided in the opinions and gestures of Lucius Paulus and Scipio Africanus.

One thing which becomes obvious when one collects the metaphors having to do with presence in a place is that they are related to the CONTAINER metaphor. The notion of containers as a source domain also often imply presence (i.e. inside the container). See a longer discussion of this subject in the section *Containers as source domains*. In the examples quoted above, the minimalistic principle must prevail. A place in general is more vaguely defined than a container, so when we have a difficult case, it must be decided whether enough linguistic information is given for us to be able speak of a container. If this is not the case, we are rather dealing with presence in a place as a source domain.

A few expressions in *De senectute* (category VI in my survey) use the idea of a horizontal plane as a source domain.The central Latin word here is *aequus* and its compounds. In the cases in question, they serve to explain equanimity or equity of status:

(1) Cicero: novi enim moderationem animi tui [sc. Attici] et **aequitatem** […](§1)

(2) Ego Quintum Maximum, eum qui Tarentum recepit, senem adulescens ita dilexi ut **aequalem** […] (§ 10)

(3) quid quod sapientissimus quisque **aequissimo animo** moritur, stultissimus **iniquissimo**? nonne vobis videtur is animus qui plus cernat et longius videre se ad meliora proficisci, ille autem cui obtusior sit acies non videre? (§83)

([…] for I know of your self-control and the even temper of your mind […]

79

I was as fond of Quintus Fabius Maximus, who recovered Tarentum, as if he had been of my own age […]

And what of the fact that the wisest men die with the greatest equanimity, the most foolish with the least? Is it not apparent to you that it is because the soul of the one, having a keener and wider vision, sees that it is setting out for a better country, while that of the other, being of duller sight, sees not its path?)

Although the references to the horizontal plane are weak in many ways, the metaphorical thought is easy to discern. Changes in temper are considered to be elevations or hollows in a flat surface. The expressions with *aequus* and its compounds are related to UP and DOWN as source domains.

We now come to a source domain which is related to journeys, and which is sometimes difficult to separate from that domain (category VII). I am talking about movement forward in space. This is, above all, a common way to speak about time in Latin and it will be discussed in the section *Time as target domain*. But we also find it in other functions in *De senectute:*

nihil Sextus Aelius tale, nihil multis annis ante Ti. Coruncanius, nihil modo P. Crassus, a quibus iura civibus praescribebantur; quorum usque ad extremum spiritum est **provecta prudentia**. (§27)

ignoscetis autem, nam et **studio rerum rusticarum provectus sum,** et senectus est natura loquacior – ne ab omnibus eam vitiis videar vindicare. (§ 55)

(Of a far different stamp were Sextus Aelius and Titus Coruncanius of ancient times, and Publius Crassus of a later date, by whom instruction in jurisprudence was given to their fellow-citizens, and whose skill in law continued to their very last gasp.

However, forgive me if I go on, for my farmer's zeal has carried me away; besides, old age is naturally inclined to talk too much – and this I say in order not to acquit it of every fault.)

Although the first example also deals with time, we see that *proveho* can be used to describe the advancement of sagacity (1) or Cato being driven forward by his enthusiasm (2).

In this context, I also would like to bring up some Latin words, which, among other things, mean 'to ask for', 'to inquire' (category VIII). Several of these, *quaero, requiro,* and *peto*, have 'to search for' as the basic sense. This metaphorical concept can be formulated as TO ASK FOR IS TO SEARCH FOR and includes the following expressions from *De senectute*:

qui [Gorgias Leontinus] cum ex eo **quaereretur**, cur tam diu vellet esse in vita: 'nihil habeo' inquit, 'quod accusem senectutem'. (§13)

ego L. metellum memini puer, qui cum quadriennio post alterum consulatum pontifex maximus factus esset […] ita bonis esse viribus extremo tempore aetatis, ut adulescentiam non **requireret**. (§30)

[…] qui autem omnia bona a se ipsi **petunt**, eis nihil malum potest videri quod naturae necessitas adferat. (§4)

(When some one asked him why he chose to remain so long alive, he aswered: "I have no reason to reproach old age".

I remember that in my boyhood I saw Lucius Metellus, who, four years after his second consulship, became Chief Pontiff […] and I recall that he enjoyed such great vigour of body to the end of his days, that he did not feel the loss of youth.

[…] on the other hand, to those who seek all good from themselves nothing can seem evil that the laws of nature inevitably impose.)

Both when we look for something or ask for something, we have the same goal: to obtain it. This is obviously the principle which governs these recurring double senses of *quaero, requiro,* and *peto*. Lakoff and Johnson stress the metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS as deeply grounded in the human conceptual system, because in our everyday lives we often go to a place in order to achieve a purpose.

I will end this section by discussing a theme which strictly speaking cannot be called a source domain only. It concerns Cato's way of talking about his own speech. In the expressions that follow, moving and direction are central. I have chosen to call this metaphorical concept TALKING IS MOVING. It includes the following expressions in *De senectute*:

Quorsum igitur haec tam multa de Maximo?(§13)

Sed **redeo** ad me […] (§32)

Quorsus hoc? (§42)

Sed quid ego alios? Ad me ipsum iam **revertar**. (§45)

Venio nunc ad voluptates agricolarum, quibus ego incredibiliter delector […] (§51)

Possum **persequi** permulta oblectamenta rerum rusticarum, sed ea ipsa quae dixi sentio fuisse longiora […] (§55)

81

Sed **venio** ad agricolas, ne a me ipso **recedam** […] (§56)

(Why, then, have I said so much about Maximus?

But I return to myself.

Now, why did I quote Archytas?

But why speak about others? Let me now return to myself.

I come now to the pleasures of agriculture, in which I find incredible delight.

I might enlarge upon all the many charms of country life, but I realize that I have already said too much.

But lest I wander from the subject, I return to the farmers.)

When Cato discusses his own speech, he employs verbs of movement and adverbs of direction. It is as if he conceives of his speech as himself walking around in an area. *Quorsum* and *quorsus* also has a clear intentional sense (besides 'whither?'). Again, we are dealing with the PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS concept. Is Cato moving around in the company of Laelius and Scipio? No, this is not the case. The use of the first person singular makes this clear. The walk rather takes place in Cato's mind.

In this section, we have established nine different categories of orientational metaphors. Without this kind of metaphors, it would be notably difficult for Cicero to express such concepts as excellence, arguing, equanimity, mental states, ageing, and many others. We have also seen that orientational metaphors are not combined with any markers such as *velut* and *ut ita dicam.* The Lakoff-Johnsonian notion of primary metaphors is very helpful for explaining this fact. Another thing that strikes the reader when these metaphors are gathered together is that they can be said to bring up background information. Orientational metaphors do not constitute the key words and central expressions in Cato's dissertation; rather, they help to accentuate these elements.

2.5. Physical size as source domain

One of the most basic source domains in Latin is physical size. It is also pervasive in modern English and Swedish. Lakoff and Johnson formulate concepts such as BIGGER IS BETTER and IMPORTANT IS BIG.[184] They list IMPORTANT IS BIG as a primary metaphor and suggest its origin in the idea that we, as children, conceive our parents as both important and big.[185] To those concepts, I would like to add GREAT IN DEGREE IS GREAT IN SIZE, although it of course comes close to IMPORTANT IS BIG in meaning.

It is also common, in Latin as well as in English and Swedish, that these metaphorical concepts are combined with ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS. This concept follows logically from the act of explaining the abstract by the concrete. When Cato speaks about memory (§ 21 in *De senectute*), he can say that it shrinks (*minuitur*) when one grows old. This implies that memory is an object (or possibly a substance)[186] which can grow or shrink.

In this section, I discuss the words *magnus* and *parvus* and their compounds, a group of verbs that have to do with growing and shrinking, and also some words for quantity.

It is perfectly natural for Cato to use *magnus* of people to denote their excellence:

> nec vero ille [sc. Gaius Flaminius] in luce modo atque in oculis civium **magnus**, sed intus domique praestantior […] (§12)

> accipite enim, optimi adulescentes, veterem orationem Archytae Tarentini, **magni** in primis et praeclari viri, quae mihi tradita est, cum essem adulescens Tarenti cum Quinto Maximo. (§39)

> (Nor was it merely in public and under the gaze of his fellow-citizens that he was great, but he was greater still in the privacy of his home.

> Now listen, most noble young men, to what that remarkably great and disttinguished man, Archytas of Tarentum, said in an ancient speech

---

[184] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 22-24, 50. The authors are inconsistent when they write BIGGER IS BETTER instead of BETTER IS BIGGER. As a rule, the source domain comes last when they formulate their metaphorical concepts.
[185] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 50.
[186] For a discussion on the metaphorical use of substances, objects, and containers, see Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 25-32.

repeated to me when I was a young man serving with Quintus Maximus at Tarentum […])

We have here clear examples of the BETTER IS BIGGER concept.[187] Equally conventional is the use of the adjective for abstract things, to describe a great degree:

> Moderatio modo virium adsit, et tantum quantum potest quisque nitatur, ne ille non **magno desiderio** tenebitur virium (§33).

> (Only let every man make a proper use of his strength and strive to his utmost, then assuredly he will have no regret for his want of strength.)

As we see, the formulations are so basic that we want to ask the question: how would Cicero/Cato express this without the use of physical size as source domain? The expression *magnitudinem animi* is employed to describe nobility of mind:[188]

> quam fuit inbecillus Publius Africani filius, is qui te adoptavit, quam tenui aut nulla potius valetudine! quod ni ita fuisset, alterum illud extitisset lumen civitatis; ad paternam enim **magnitudinem animi** doctrina uberior accesserat. (§35)

> (Note how weak, Scipio, was your adoptive father, the son of Publius Africanus. What feeble health he had, or rather no health at all! But for this he would have shone forth as the second luminary of the state; for to his father's greatness of intellect he had added a more abundant learning.)

We might say that a great mind can 'hold' or 'contain' many perspectives and a great deal of knowledge.

Magnus is far more common than its opposite *parvus* in *De senectute*. Although this can probably be explained by the fact that most of Cato's sayings are positive and laudatory rather than negative and critical, it seems that the use of *magnus* in a metaphorical sense is more strongly established than that of *parvus*. One reason for this is perhaps that large size is more striking than small size. Lakoff & Johnson list IMPORTANT IS BIG as a primary metaphor, but not the opposite

---

[187] The earliest use of *magnus* in the sense of 'great in reputation or authority' in OLD (12) is Ennius, *Annales* 151, *'magnae gentes opulentae'*.
[188] OLD does not give any examples of expressions of the type *magnitudo animi* or *magnitudo ingenii* which are older than Cicero (OLD 9).

UNIMPORTANT IS SMALL. Although the one follows from the other, the former one might be more central in our way of thinking.

In connection with the examples mentioned above follow a group of verbs having to do with growing and diminution, which connect to the GREAT IN DEGREE IS GREAT IN SIZE concept:

> At memoria **minuitur**. (§21)

> atque haec [sc. studia doctrinae] quidem prudentibus et bene institutis pariter cum aetate **crescunt** […] (§50)

> non viribus aut velocitate aut celeritate corporum res magnae geruntur, sed consilio auctoritate sententia; quibus non modo non orbari, sed etiam **augeri** senectus solet. (§17)

> (But, it is alleged, the memory is impaired.

> […] and this zeal, at least in the case of wise and well-trained men, advances in even pace with age […]

> It is not by muscle, speed, or physical dexterity that great things are achieved, but by reflection, force of character, and judgement; in these qualities old age is usually not only not poorer , but is even richer.)

It is difficult to see how Cicero would be able to explain changes in abstractions such as *memoria, studium* and *consilium* without taking the aid of physical size as a source domain.[189] There are, of course, other ways, but this is one of the more significant ones. Many words that concern quantity function in the same manner. Degree is compared to physical size:

> omnem autem sermonem tribuimus non Tithono, ut Aristo Ceus – **parum** enim esset **auctoritatis** in fabula – sed Marco Catoni seni, quo maiorem auctoritatem haberet oratio […] (§3).

---

[189] The earliest examples of *minuo, cresco* and *augeo* in the same sense as in the quotations which are given in OLD are Terence, *Phormio* 435*, 'minue iram'*, Cato, *Orator* 162 *(Hist.* 95a) *plerisque hominibus rebus secundis…ferociam augescere atque crescere'*, and Terence, *Adelphoe* 25 *'facite aequanimitas poetae ad scribendum augeat industriam'*.

[…] quam [sc. senectutem] ut adipiscantur omnes optant, eandem accusant adeptam; **tanta** est stultitiae **inconstantia** atque perversitas. (§4)

At **minus** habeo **virium** quam vestrum utervis. (§33)

(But the entire discourse I have attributed, not to Tithonus, as Aristo of Ceos did (for their would be too little authority in a myth) but, that I might give it greater weight, I have ascribed it to the venerable Marcus Cato […]

[…] which [sc. old age] all men wish to attain and yet reproach when attained; such is the inconsistency and perversity of Folly.

But it may be said that I have less strength than either of you […])

In this section, I have tried to show how very fundamental physical size is as a source domain in *De senectute*. It is probably safe to say that few metaphorical concepts are as basic in Latin as BETTER IS BIGGER, IMPORTANT IS BIG and GREAT IN DEGREE IS GREAT IN SIZE . We also notice that the concepts are not employed in elaborated metaphors or similes. Without doubt, this can be explained by the fact that they are much too basic to be used in this manner.

2.6. Containers as source domains

In Lakoff-Johnsonian theory, the CONTAINER constitutes a central metaphorical source domain. [190] It is possible to claim that many expressions in Latin that contain the preposition *in*, such as

Non sunt **in senectute** vires? (§34)

(But, grant that old age is devoid of strength […])

imply a container on a metaphorical level, but in cases such as the one just quoted, the container only plays a background role and its distinct qualities are not emphasized by the speaker. However, when another word in the sentence stresses and describes the presence of something inside the container, as in the following cases:

---

[190] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 29-32; Johnson 1987, 21-23.

(1) nihil igitur adferunt qui **in re gerenda versari senectutem negant** […] (§17)

(2) quid enim est iucundius **senectute stipata studiis iuventutis**? (§29)

(3) […] qui [sc. Nearchus Tarentinus] **in amicitia** populi romani **permanserat** […] (§41)

(4) quorum [sc. Pauli, Africani, Maximi] non **in sententia** solum sed etiam **in nutu residebat auctoritas**. (§61)

(Those therefore, who allege that old age is devoid of useful activity adduce nothing to the purpose […]

For what is more agreeable than an old age surrounded by the enthusiasm of youth?

[…]who had remained steadfast in his friendship to the Roman people […]

These men had power, not only in their speech, but in their very nod.)

the container has a more prominent role. In the examples above we see how old age is placed 'inside' an active life (1), how old age is surrounded by eager youth, but also 'stuffed' (OLD 3) with the interests characteristic of young people (2), how Nearchus Tarentinus remains 'inside' the friendship of the Roman people (3), and how the authority of some prominent Romans 'resides' not only in their opinions but also in their gestures (4). We see how the idea of a container is used to express the relations between people and abstract states and qualities such as old age, an active life, authority, etc, and one can generally say that it contributes to expressing a strong relationship between these people and the states and qualities. To some degree, the metaphorical content of the container is also subordinated in significance to the metaphorical container itself.

The container metaphor is also employed when measurewords describe the degree or 'quantity' of abstract entities such as emotions or human qualities. We find examples of this in *De senectute* when Cato discusses his attitude towards *voluptas*:

[…] neque enim ipsorum conviviorum delectationem voluptatibus corporis magis quam coetu amicorum et sermonibus **metiebar**. (§45)

quod si quem etiam ista delectant (ne omnino bellum indixisse videar **voluptati**, cuius est fortasse quidam naturalis **modus**), non intellego ne in istis quidem ipsis voluptatibus carere sensu senectutem. (§46)

87

(Nor, indeed, did I measure my delight in these social gatherings more by the physical pleasure than by the pleasure of meeting and conversing with my friends.

But if there are any who find delight in such things (that I may by no means seem to have declared war on every kind of pleasure, when, perhaps, a certain amount of it justified by nature), then I may say that I am not aware that old age is altogether wanting in appreciation even of these very pleasures.)

In some instances, an abstract quality is more explicitly described as a substance which fills the container:

‘ille vir haud magna cum re sed **plenus fidei**’ (§1)

(‘That man/ of little wealth, but rich in loyalty’)

If the man is ‘filled’ with *fides*, *fides* must be either a liquid or a substance in the source domain. In an expression as the following one, the number of years that a person has lived are compared to containers.[191] It is obvious from the context that the use of the container metaphor, albeit in a subtle way, stresses the *virtus* of the speaker; by living an active life, Gorgias succeeded in making his life long:

[…] cuius [sc. Isocratis] magister Leontinus Gorgias centum et septem **complevit annos**, neque umquam in suo studio atque opere cessavit. (§13)

(His teacher, Gorgias of Leontini, rounded out one hundred and seven years and never rested from his pursuits or his labours.)

Another thing which becomes apparent when one studies the role of metaphorical containers in *De senectute* is that they are also used for expressing causation. Lakoff and Johnson have made the same observation regarding English and formulate the metaphorical concepts THE OBJECT COMES OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE and CREATION IS BIRTH[192]:

---

[191] An early example of *plenus* in this sense is Plautus, *Pseudolus* 380 *‘negoti nunc sum plenus’*.
[192] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 69-76.

cuius [sc. Quinti Maximi] sermone ita cupide fruebar, quasi iam divinarem, id quod **evenit**, illo exstincto fore unde discerem neminem. (§12)

[…] **ex quo** intellegitur, Pyrrhi bello eum [sc. Appium Claudium] grandem sane fuisse […] (§16)

(I was, at that time, as eager to profit by his conversation as if i already foresaw what, in fact, came to pass, that, when he was gone, I should have no one from whom to learn.

Hence, it is known that he was undoubtedly an old man at the time of the war with Pyrrhus…)

The CREATION IS BIRTH metaphor is especially salient in Cato's criticism of *voluptas* in §§ 39-40, where he uses the verb *nascor* to describe how many vices are caused by *voluptas*:

nullam capitaliorem pestem quam voluptatem corporis hominibus dicebat [Archytas Tarentinus] a natura datam, cuius voluptatis avidae libidines temere et ecfrenate ad potiundum incitarentur; hinc patriae proditiones, hinc rerum publicarum eversiones, **hinc** cum hostibus clandestina colloquia **nasci** […] (§§39-40)

("No more deadly curse," said he, "has been given by nature to man than carnal pleasure, through eagerness for which the passions are driven recklessly and uncontrollably to its gratification. From it come treason and the overthrow of states; and from it spring secret and corrupt conferences with public foes.")

In the sections *The human life as target domain* and *Death as target domain*, I show the great number of metaphors that Cato employs to speak about life and death. One of them is the container. It is used especially for speaking of death as the exit from life:

[…] quasi cum **excessisset** [animus] **e vita**, tum denique victurus esset. (§82)

([…] as if it realized that when it had departed from this life, then at last it would be alive.)

In the example above, Cicero leaves it open whether he uses the container or the DEATH IS DEPARTURE metaphor. A few paragraphs later, he becomes more specific:

[…] et ex vita discedo tamquam ex hospitio, non tamquam domo: commorandi enim natura deversorium nobis, non habitandi dedit. (§84)

89

([…] and I quit life as if it were an inn, not a home. For Nature has given us an hostelry in which to sojourn, not to abide.)

Yet, throughout the whole section, it is obvious that he prefers leaving the expressions open to different metaphorical interpretations.

In this section, we have seen how the container metaphor recurs in Cato's speech. Even though it only plays a background role, it is a necessary tool for speaking about abstract states and conditions. The movement out of the container can be employed to express changes of states, as in the example where death is described as a movement out of life.

2.7. Physical objects and substances as source domains

Perhaps the most basic of all metaphorical concepts can be formulated as ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS. Lakoff and Johnson write:

> Understanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or substances of a uniform kind. Once we can identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group them or quantify them – and, by this means, reason about them.[193]

Many of the metaphorical source domains that have been discussed earlier in this chapter can be viewed as elaborations of this generic-level metaphor.[194] Thus, in OLD AGE IS A BURDEN, BETTER IS BIGGER, TIME MOVES and in many of the metaphors that were discussed in the section *Orientation in space as source domain*, one can ascertain the ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS metaphor as a basic part of the metaphorical reasoning. Some of the metaphorical concepts that have been discussed earlier, such as OLD AGE IS A BURDEN, are elaborations of the more generic concept, where the original structure (old age functions as a physical object) is maintained. In the section

---

[193] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 25.
[194] See A. Szwedek's article '*Objectification: a new theory of metaphor*' in Thormählen (ed.) 2008. Szwedek argues that '[t]he other types of metaphors, structural and orientational, as aspects of objecthood, are the consequence of objectification.' (p. 315).

Speech as target domain, I also show that speech is sometimes treated as a physical object in *De senectute*.

In this section, I primarily want to draw attention to a sentence in the beginning of the dialogue, where Cicero actually plays with the concrete and abstract senses of some words. In a somewhat flattering way, he adresses Atticus with the following phrase:

> Cicero: novi enim moderationem animi tui [sc. Attici] et aequitatem, teque non **cognomen** solum Athenis **deportasse,** sed **humanitatem** et **prudentiam** intellego. (§1)

> ([…]for I know your self-control and the even temper of your mind, and I am aware that you brought home from Athens not only a cognomen but culture and practical wisdom too.)

With *deporto*, one expects a concrete noun (OLD 1-3, TLL V:1, 587-89)[195], but instead, Cicero says that Atticus conveyed not only his *cognomen* but also civilization and sagacity back to Italy. The surprising effect is achieved by the use of not only one, but three abstract nouns together with the verb. The flattery becomes more elegant when it is combined with, and concealed by, a joke.

Another, especially vivid example of this concept is the following, where Cato describes his passionate interest for Greek learning in a metaphor where he says that he eagerly 'seized' it[196]:

> quas [sc. litteras Graecas] quidem sic avide **arripui**, quasi diuturnam sitim explere cupiens, ut ea ipsa mihi nota essent quibus me nunc exemplis uti videtis. (§26)

> ([…] Greek, which I seized upon as eagerly as if I had been desirous of satisfying a long-continued thirst, with the result that I have acquired first-hand the information which you see me using in this discussion by way of illustration.)

An important linguistic function of the ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS metaphor comes into play when it is combined with the source domain

---

[195] Plautus, *Stichus* 297, '*ultro id [sc. gaudium] deportem?*' is an early example of *deporto* with an abstract noun.
[196] An early example of *arripio* in a similar sense is Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus* 220 '*arripe operam auxiliumque ad hanc rem*' (TLL II, 641).

physical size. By describing the size of the metaphorical object, it is possible to express degree or abstract quantity in the target domain, as in the following example:

> […] habeoque senectuti **magnam gratiam**, quae mihi sermonis **aviditatem auxit**, potionis et cibi sustulit. (§46)

> ([…] and I am profoundly grateful to old age, which has increased my my eagerness for conversation and taken away that for food and drink.)

As we saw in the preceding section, there are also a few passages in *De senectute* where an abstract entity is described as a substance rather than a physical object. This is especially the case in the quotation from Ennius, '*plenus fidei*' (§1), and also in the following phrase, where *modus* seems to retain its original sense, 'a measured amount' (OLD 1) in the source domain[197]:

> quod si quem etiam ista delectant (ne omnino bellum indixisse videar **voluptati**, cuius est fortasse quidam naturalis **modus**), non intellego ne in istis quidem ipsis voluptatibus carere sensu senectutem. (§46)

> (But if there are any who find delight in such things (that I may by no means seem to have declared war on every kind of pleasure, when, perhaps, a certain amount of it justified by nature), then I may say that I am not aware that old age is altogether wanting in appreciation even of these very pleasures.)

Physical objects and substances as source domains allow in themselves few details but function rather as a basic way of reasoning about and categorizing abstract entities. They can easily be combined with the metaphorical use of hands, the act of grasping, and also vision as source domains, which I showed in the section *The human body as source domain*.

2.8. Liquids as source domains

In their discussion of the conceptualization of time in English, Lakoff and Johnson claim that the idea of 'moving time' can also be varied to the effect that time is

---

[197] TLL suggests '*dum id modo fiat bono*' (Plautus, *Amphitruo* 996) as an early example of *modus* in roughly the same sense as in the quoted passage (TLL VIII, 1262).

viewed as the flow of a river. Time then corresponds to a substance or liquid (water) in the source domain. Since a substance can be quantified, we are able to speak of much or little time, letting the 'Motion of Substance Past the Observer' (Sic!)[198] denote the 'passage' or 'length' of time. It should be emphasized though, that Lakoff and Johnson refer to this metaphor as only a 'minor variation' of the MOVING TIME metaphor.[199]

In *De senectute*, the interesting passages from this perspective are two instances that contain the verb *effluo*[200]:

> praeterita enim aetas quamvis longa, cum **effluxisset**, nulla consolatione permulcere posset stultam senectutem. (§4)

> cum enim id [sc. mors] advenit, tum illud quod praeteriit, **effluxit**.[…] (§69)

> (In fact, no lapse of time, however long, once it has slipped away, could solace or soothe a foolish old age.)

> […] for then that end arrives, then that which was is gone […])

We see that Cicero/Cato is not using the source domain 'river'. Rather, the prefix e- (ex) expresses that time has been wasted or idled away ('has ran out'). Cato is using the TIME IS A SUBSTANCE and TIME IS A RESOURCE (because it can be consumed) metaphors, and with the verb *effluo,* the substance or time is described as a liquid.[201]

The other part of *De senectute* where we find liquids used as source domains is the one that contains Cato's thoughts about death and immortality (§§ 77-78). Here, human souls are likened to water:

> est enim animus caelestis, ex altimisso domicilio depressus et quasi **demersus** in terram, locum divinae naturae aeternatique contrarium. sed

---

credo deos immortales **sparsisse** animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui terras tuerentur […] (§77)

Audiebam Pythagoram Pythagoreosque, incolas paene nostros, qui essent Italici philosophi quondam nominati, numquam dubitasse quin ex universa mente divina **delibatos** animos haberemus […] (§78)

[…] for the soul is celestial, brought down from its most exalted home and buried, as it were, in earth, a place uncongenial to its divine and eternal nature. But I believe that the immortal gods implanted souls in human bodies so as to have beings who would care for the earth [...]

I used to be told that Pythagoras and his disciples, – who were almost fellow-countrymen of ours, inasmuch as they were formerly called "Italian philosophers," – never doubted that our souls were emanations of the Universal Divine Mind (Sic!).

Demergo is usually associated with water ('to dip, immerse') but if we interpret the simile, it is rather *terram* which is compared to water. *Spargo* can be employed for the spreading of seed as well as sprinkling of water. Powell writes about *delibo*:

delibare presumably originally meant 'pour off, 'draw off' in contexts of liquids…[202]

The three words associated with water make it clear that Cicero wants to draw a parallel between the soul and a liquid. It is difficult not to connect human souls to rain in the passage. Water has the ability to evaporate, rise upwards, and also to be invisible. Moreover, just like rain, souls may come down from heaven and go back there in the form of vapour.

2.9. Physical force as source domain

In Zoltan Kövecses' analysis, physical FORCE is the most central source domain (the 'master' metaphor[203]) for talking about and conceiving of emotions in a

---

[202] Powell (ed.) 1988, 254.
[203] Kövecses 2000, 193.

metaphorical way.[204] In a metaphorical concept such as ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER, the ability of a fluid to expand when it is heated is an example of this kind of metaphorical force.[205] In the section *Emotions as target domains*, I show that several expressions in *De senectute* use physical force in a metaphorical way for speaking about emotions. In *The Body in the Mind*, Mark Johnson shows the omnipresence of literal physical force in our lives (when we are moved by a crowd, bump into a wall, watch American football, etc) and how, by this omnipresence, it develops into an *image schema* and acquires direct metaphorical status in our brains.[206] In *De senectute*, it is possible to distinguish a pattern of verbs that hold the double meaning of physical pushing and metaphorical force to 'move' a person in a certain 'direction':

> primum quis **coegit** eos falsum putare (4)

> num igitur hunc [sc. Sophoclem][…] **coegit** in suis studiis obmutescere senectus? (§23)

> Non sunt in senectute vires? – ne postulantur quidem vires a senectute: ergo et legibus et institutis vacat aetas nostra muneribus eis quae non possunt sine viribus sustineri, itaque non modo quod non possumus, sed ne quantum possumus quidem **cogimur**.(§34)

> nec me solum ratio ac disputatio **impulit** ut ita crederem [sc. homines clarissimos mortuos vivere] sed nobilitas etiam summorum philosophorum et auctoritas. (§77)

> (In the first place, who has forced them to form a mistaken judgement?

> Think you, then, that old age forced him to abandon his calling […]?

> But, grant that old age is devoid of strength; none is even expected from it. Hence both by law and by custom men of my age are exempt from those public services which cannot be rendered without strength of body. Therefore, we are not only not required to do what we cannot perform, but we are not required to do even as much as we can.

---

[204] Kövecses 2000, 61-86, 193.
[205] Kövecses 2000, 21-22.
[206] Johnson 1987, 42-48.

95

Nor have I been driven to this belief solely by the force of reason and of argument, but also by the reputation and authority of philosophers of the highest rank.)

We notice here the strong connection between physical force and the human body as source domains.[207] Verbs such as *cogo* and *impello* add a very direct nuance to the metaphorical force, making it concrete, inevitable.[208]

The source domain physical force is also employed for describing the inherent inclination for ethical behaviour in Romans who possessed *virtus*:

> […] qui [sc. Manius Curius, Gaius Fabricius, Tiberius Coruncanius] tum ex sua vita, tum ex eius quem dico Deci facto, iudicabant esse aliquid natura pulchrum atque praeclarum, quod **sua sponte peteretur**, quodque spreta et contempta voluptate optimus quisque sequeretur. (§43)

> sed nescio quo modo animus erigens se posteritatem ita semper prospiciebat, quasi cum excessisset e vita, tum denique victurus esset. quod quidem ni ita se haberet ut animi immortales essent, haud optimi cuiusque animus maxime ad immortalitatem et gloriam **niteretur**. (§82)

> …and they all were firmly persuaded, both by their own experience and especially by the heroic deed of Decius, that assuredly there are ends, inherently pure and noble, which are sought for their own sake, and which will be pursued by all good men who look on self-gratification with loathing and contempt.)

> But somehow, my soul was ever on the alert, looking forward to posterity, as if it realized that when it had departed from this life, then at last it would be alive. And, indeed, were it not true that the soul is immortal, it would not be the case that it is ever the souls of the best men that strive most for immortal glory.)

---

[207] See also the example with *commoveri* (§1) in the section *The human body as source domain*.

[208] Early examples of *cogo* in a transferred (metaphorical) sense is found in Plautus: '*nisi necessitate cogar*' (*Epidicus* 731); and Terence, *Andria* 72 '*mulier…commigravit huc…inopia et cognatorum neglegentia coacta*'(OLD 12; TLL III, 1526.). Terence, *Andria* 524 '*non impulit me…haec ut crederem*', is an early example of *impello* in a sense similar to the one in *De senectute* 77.

It is obvious that Cato wants to stress the innate, natural 'drive' towards the good with these expressions. The virtuous men are not described as acting deliberately or steered by will, and that is the very point of his choice of words.

2.10. Light and lustre as source domains

In this section, I will investigate a number of words and expressions where light and lustre are used in a metaphorical way. Lakoff and Turner suggest such metaphorical concepts as LIFE IS LIGHT and UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING as central metaphors connected with light.[209] Other metaphorical concepts such as A LIFETIME IS A DAY tie light to life and its opposite darkness to death.[210] The KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor connects light with reason and darkness with ignorance.[211] In order to understand the use of light as a source domain in *De senectute*, it has been necessary for me to formulate some metaphorical concepts that are related to the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor. I call these FAME IS LIGHT and TALENT IS LIGHT. Fame spreads and usually has a centre – the person or place from which it emanates – just the way light does. Fame and light are also analoguous in the respect that they can be strong or weak, and light becomes weaker the more distant it is, which can also be said of fame. Since many talents bring fame, the TALENT IS LIGHT concept may have developed secondarily from FAME IS LIGHT. Since e.g. a talented speaker, in a Roman context, also stood at the centre (at least the centre of attention) – on the Rostra, in the senate or in a court – the light metaphor works flawlessly with talent as a target domain too. The concepts can also be explained by the fact that metals such as gold and silver have lustre and are often associated with, and worn by, important and mighty people. The investigation in this section will focus on the words *clarus, clareo, praeclarus, splendor, lux,* and *lumen*.

   Clarus is found five times in the text. Although the basic sense of the adjective is related to sound rather than light and lustre (See OLD 1, TLL III, p.1271), it is evident that the latter sense becomes the most important one early in the history of Latin (see, again, the article on *clarus* in TLL, where the section *de candore* is much longer than the preceding *de voce et sono*). Here are some of the instances of the adjective in *De senectute*:

---

[209] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 29, 58, 70, 87-89, 98, 94.
[210] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 86-89.
[211] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 393-397.

[…] ut Themistocles fertur Seriphio cuidam in iurgio respondisse, cum ille dixisset non eum sua sed patriae gloria splendorem adsecutum, 'nec hercule' inquit, 'si ego Seriphius essem, nec tu si Atheniensis esses, **clarus** umquam fuisses.' (§8)

ego vestros patres, Publi Scipio tuque Gai Laeli, **viros clarissimos** mihique amicissimos, vivere arbitror, et eam quidem vitam quae est sola vita numeranda. (§77)

(For example, there is a story that when, in the course of a quarrel, a certain Seriphian had said to Themistocles: "Your brilliant reputation is due to your country's glory, not your own," Themistocles replied: "True, by Hercules, I should never have been famous if I had been a Seriphian, nor you if you had been an Athenian."

It is my belief , Scipio, that your father, and yours, Laelius – both of them most illustrious men and very dear to me – are living yet, and living the only life deserving of the name.)

In the first example, the light metaphor is strengthened by the noun *splendor*. Although Cicero sometimes has *clarus* in its concrete sense (not in *De senectute,* but *e.g.* in *De natura deorum*. 2.92 and *Verres* 4.62), he mainly uses the word in its abstract (metaphorical) sense. According to OLD, the earliest attested instance of *clarus* in Latin in the sense 'celebrated, famous' is found in Plautus.[212] It is obvious that, for Cicero, this is a conventional way of expressing himself; there is no need for him to add '*quasi*' or '*velut*' when employing *clarus* in this sense. It should also be observed that the metaphorical use of *clarus* primarily has to do with *fame,* but not, like *splendor*, also '*talent*', although these concepts, naturally, are related.

Praeclarus[213], a common word in the dialogue, combines an orientational metaphor ('better is in front of') with the FAME IS LIGHT and TALENT IS LIGHT concepts.

The verb *clareo* is only found once in the dialogue, in a quotation from Ennius:

---

[212] Plautus, *Trinummus* 664 '*in occulto iacebis quom te maxime clarum voles*'. (OLD 6; TLL, 1273.)

[213] *Praeclarus* is found nine times in *De senectute*, and then solely in a transferred sense. This use of the word is old. Plautus, *Miles Gloriousus* 1041 '*Hominem tam pulchrum et praeclarum virtute et forma*' is an early example.

'Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem,
non enim rumores ponebat ante salutem:
ergo postque magisque viri nunc **gloria claret**.'[214] (§10)

'One man's delay alone restored our state:
He valued safety more than mob's applause;
Hence now his glory more resplendent grows.'

The expression connects clearly with the FAME IS LIGHT concept, but of course, the verses also imply Fabius' talent as a strategist.

In the example about Themistocles above we also find the word *splendor* (the only instance of the word in *De senectute*), which has a metaphorical meaning similar to *clarus*, although the stress is put on talent rather than fame.[215] Perhaps one can follow how the word gradually acquires its metaphorical sense. In Plautus it is found only in its concrete sense, while the metaphorical sense becomes common in Lucretius, Cicero and Ovid. The early examples are few (four in Plautus, none in Terence) so it is difficult to be definite about this.

The verb *splendesco* is employed once in the text:

omnino canorum illud in voce [sc. oratoris] **splendescit** etiam nescioquo pacto in senectute […] (§28)

(In old age, no doubt, the voice actually gains (I know not how) that magnificent resonance […])

Its function here is to describe the sonority of a good speaker's voice. We see how the source domain light brings forward an aspect (euphony) of the target domain sound, while still connecting with the TALENT IS LIGHT concept. According to OLD (3c), this is the earliest example in Latin of *splendesco* in this sense.

We have two examples of *lux* in *De senectute*. It is used once in a concrete sense (§49), but the interesting case occurs in §12:

nec vero ille [sc. Quintus Maximus] **in luce** modo atque in **oculis civium** magnus, sed intus domique praestantior […] (§12)

---

[214] Ennius, *Annalium fragmenta* (in aliis scriptis servata) 12.370-372.
[215] OLD 2b and 5 on *splendor*. The word does not seem to be used in the sense 'brilliance of style or language' (OLD 5) before Cicero.

> Nor was it merely in public and under the gaze of his fellow-citizens that he was great, but the was greater still in the privacy of his home.

What is meant here is the light of publicity. Although Cicero has an lush style and is fond of pairing words and phrases, it is possible that he here specifies what he means by *in luce* by adding the words *atque in oculis civium*.[216]

There is an expression that is akin to the earlier examples when Cato speaks about the son of Scipio Africanus:

> quam fuit imbecillus Publius Africani filius, is qui te [sc. Scipionem] adoptavit, quam tenui aut nulla potius valetudine! quod ni ita fuisset, alterum illud **exstitisset lumen civitatis**; ad paternam enim magnitudidinem animi doctrina uberior accesserat. (§35)

> (Note how weak, Scipio, was your adoptive father, the son of Publius Africanus. What feeble health he had, or rather no health at all! But for this he would have shone forth as the second luminary of the state; for to his father's greatness of intellect he had added a more abundant learning.)

While in the former example, *in luce* (§12), the person was standing 'in the light', he is now the light source itself. One of the metaphorical connotations of the expression *lumen civitatis* is that Scipio is compared to a shining heavenly body (OLD 5b). These facts contribute to making the expression much stronger than the one from §12. *Lumen* is not used in a metaphorical way before Cicero (See OLD 6d on the word) .

The next case of *lumen* focuses on another target domain:

> quocirca nihil esse tam detestabile tamque pestiferum quam voluptatem, siquidem ea cum maior esset atque longior, omne **animi lumen extingueret**. (§41)

> (Hence there is nothing so hateful and so pernicious as pleasure, since, if indulged in too much and too long, it turns the light of the soul into utter darkness.)

Here, we are dealing with light as a metaphor for reason and the ordinary functions of the mind. The light of reason is said to be quenched by lust. I have not found any examples of *lumen* in this sense that are earlier than Cicero.

---

[216] According to OLD, Cicero is first in using *lux* in the sense 'light of publicity' (3d).

The final example of *lumen* in the text (§36) will be discussed in the section *Fire and heat as source domains*.

In this section, we have seen that light and lustre function as living, although conventional, source domains, which helps Cicero when he speaks about fame, talent, and reason. The basis for the light metaphor is that light spreads, illuminates and catches people's sight. In these respects, it functions flexibly in helping an author to speak about the target domains in question. There are also obvious connections between the metaphorical conceps mentioned here and the LIFE IS FIRE concept, which I placed in the section *Fire and heat as source domains*. This is especially apparent in the verb *exstinguo*, which is central in Cicero's/Cato's discussion about death.

2.11. Fire and heat as source domains

In *More than Cool Reason,* the metaphorical concepts LIFE IS A FIRE, LIFE IS A FLAME, and LIFE IS HEAT are discussed in detail. Since a living body is warm and a dead one is cold, these metaphors are grounded in basic human experience. They also have to do with the sun, whose heat causes vegetable life to grow in summer. The ignition of a fire corresponds to human procreation, fire itself to life, and extinction to death. Since a fire, besides heat, also creates light, and most humans are active in daylight and inactive – asleep – during night, these metaphors are also closely related to the LIFE IS LIGHT concept.[217] The metaphors just mentioned seem especially apt for describing the gradual extinction of life that is brought by old age.

Most of the metaphorical expressions with fire as a source domain in *De senectute* are connected to the LIFE IS A FIRE concept. My discussion in this section will concentrate on the words *ignis, flamma, extinguo,* and *fervor.*[218]

The word *ignis* is found in a concrete sense twice in the dialogue (§§ 46 and 57) and only once with an abstract meaning. The latter case is part of an elaborated simile, which also includes the word *flamma*:

> quid est autem tam secundum naturam quam senibus emori? quod idem contingit adulescentibus adversante et repugnante natura. itaque adulescentes mihi mori sic videntur **ut cum aquae multitudine flammae vis opprimitur**,

---

[217] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 29, 30-33, 52, 87-89, 97-99.
[218] The verb *calesco* and the noun *calor*, which might have fitted in here, are found only in a concrete sense in *De senectute* (§ 57 and 53).

senes autem **sic ut cum sua sponte nulla adhibita vi consumptus ignis exstinguitur;** (§71)

([…] and indeed, what is more consonant with nature than for the old to die? But the same fate befalls the young, though Nature in their case struggles and rebels. Therefore, when the young die I am reminded of a strong flame extinquished by a torrent; but when old men die it is as if a fire had gone out without the use of force and of its own accord, after the fuel had been consumed […])

Cato's point is that the death of old people is in accordance with nature, but the death of young people is against it. The simile enriches the metaphorical concept of fire by highlighting several aspects of it: the force of a powerful fire compared to the expiring glow of the fire in a later phase and the great amount of water needed to put it out while it is still burning strongly. The water in the source domain corresponds to something that stops the 'natural' course of life but cannot easily be mapped onto a specific target domain.

In the rest of *De senectute,* there is one aspect of the source domain fire which stands out as more frequent and momentous than any other. Logically, since the dialogue is about old age, it is the verb *exstinguo*, which appears seven times. Here are some examples:

[…] ita sensim sine sensu aetas senescit nec subito frangitur, sed diuturnitate **exstinguitur**. (§38)

o miserum senem qui mortem contemnendam esse in tam longa aetate non viderit! quae aut plane neglegenda est, si omnino **exstinguit animum**, aut etiam optanda si aliquo eum deducit ubi sit futurus aeternus; atqui tertium certe nihil inveniri potest. (§66)

quodsi non sumus inmortales futuri, tamen **exstingui** homini suo tempore optabile est […] (§85)

(Thus employed his life gradually and imperceptibly glides into old age, and succumbs, not to a quick assault, but to a long-continued siege.

O wretched indeed is that old man who has not learned in the course of his long life that death should be held on no account! For clearly death is negligible, if it utterly annihilates the soul, or even desirable, if it conducts the soul to some place where it is to live forever. Surely no other alternative can be found.

Again, if we are not going to be immortal, nevertheless, it is desirable for a man to be blotted out at his proper time.)

Exstinguo in the sense 'to cause the death of,' 'kill' is first found in Terence (OLD

102

2, TLL V:II, 1918), while the passive middle sense (OLD 2b, TLL V:2, 1918) – which dominates in *De senectute* – is first attested in Cicero. *Exstinguo* is used to describe the end of life, the weakening of the faculties and, perhaps, the annihilation of the soul. Other aspects of the source domain flame or fire, such as 'setting fire' to something (which metaphorically could have been used in the sense of procreation) are not found in the text. There is one instance of *exstinguo* in *De senectute* that is perhaps more interesting than the others:

> nec vero corpori solum subveniendum es, sed menti atque animo multo magis. **nam haec quoque nisi tamquam oleum instilles, exstinguuntur senectute** […] (§36)
>
> (Nor, indeed, are we to give our attention solely to the body; much greater care is due to the mind and soul; for they, too, like lamps, grow dim with time, unless we keep them supplied with oil.)

The mind is compared to a lamp, which burns out if new oil (i.e. mental exercise, reading, philosophy) is not added. The target domain is not life as in the examples mentioned earlier, but rather the mental faculties. Since the metaphor is more elaborated – the source domain has been extended with the lamp and the adding of oil – Cicero has had to add '*tamquam*' to it.[219]

The next word connected to the metaphorical concept of fire which we encounter in the text is *flagro*. It appears only once:

> quid de Publi Licini Crassi et pontificii et civilis iuris studio loquar, aut de huius Publi Scipionis qui his paucis diebus pontifex maximus factus est? atque eos omnes quos commemoravi his studiis **flagrantes** vidimus […] (§50)
>
> Why need I speak of the zeal of Publius Licinius Crassus in pontifical and civil law, or of that of the present Publius Scipio, who was elected Chief Pontiff only a few days ago? And yet I have seen all these men whom I have mentioned, ardent in their several callings after they had grown old.

---

[219] The use of *exstinguo* in § 41, '*quocicrca nihil esse tam detestabile quam voluptatem, siquidem ea, cum maior esset atque longior, omne animi lumen extingueret.*' has more to do with light than with fire and is discussed in the section *Light and lustre as source domains*.

In this paragraph, fire is used to nuance another target domain, that of enthusiasm and engagement. Fire's capacity to grow in intensity corresponds to human zeal. *Flagro* in this sense (OLD 3; 'to burn (with passion, zeal'); TLL 6:I; 846-847) is not attested before Cicero. In *Metaphor and Emotion* (2000), Zoltán Kövecses sees this metaphor (EMOTION IS FIRE/INTENSITY IS HEAT) as one which 'indicates intense activity'[220], a description which fits Cato's words well.

I have chosen to include the concept of heat in this section. Heat is, of course, related to fire. The only instance of heat working as a source domain in *De senectute* seems to be in § 45:

> […] epulabar igitur cum sodalibus, omnino modice, sed erat quidam **fervor aetatis**, qua progrediente omnia fiunt in dies mitiora […] (§45)

> ([…] I used to dine with these companions – in an altogether moderate way, yet with a certain ardour appropriate to my age, which, as time goes on, daily mitigates my zest for every pleasure.)

In the LIFE IS A FIRE metaphor, the heat is of course stronger in young people, and gradually expires in the elderly. OLD and TLL give no examples of *fervor* in this sense ('hot blood', 'ardour', OLD 5) prior to this instance.[221]

Finally, I will discuss the quotation which begins the dialogue:

> 'O Tite, si quid ego adiuvero, curamve levasso
> quae nunc **te coquit et versat in pectore fixa**,
> ecquid erit praemi?' (§1)

> **(**O Titus, should some aid of mine dispel
> The cares that now within thy bosom dwell
> And wring thy heart and torture thee with pain,
> What then would be the measure of my gain?)

Ennius' words present a more striking image to us than the other expressions that use fire as a source domain in *De senectute*. The problem 'roasts' Titus, but it also penetrates him in the form of a spit. It would have been difficult for Cato/Cicero to go this far in elaborating fire as a source domain in his speech – the listener would have been surprised and it would have clashed with the style of the rest of the

---

[220] Kövecses 2000, 75-77.
[221] Cf Terence, *Adelphoe* 152, *'defervisse adulescentiam'*.

dialogue. But the context and style of Ennius's poetry gives him, the poet, wider frames than the prose style of *De senectute*.[222]

Fire and heat function in several ways as source domains in *De senecute*. They serve to express the gradual or sudden extinction of life, of young hot blood, and of enthusiasm for different skills. The metaphorical concepts LIFE IS A FIRE and EMOTION (here: ENTHUSIASM) IS FIRE/HEAT, which seem to lie at the centre of the expressions above, can be modulated in several ways in order to express different aspects of the target domains life and enthusiasm. This is particularly apparent in the simile in §36 which extends the metaphor by adding the related concepts of oil and water to it.

2.12. Animals as source domains

Animals function as a source domain only a few times in *De senectute*. I think that this is due to the theme of the dialogue. In heroic poetry, lions can be used to denote courage, and in love poetry, women can be compared to fawns, but in a treatise on old age, few examples come easily. Still, we find a few instances. The first is a quotation from Ennius, who likens himself to an old horse:

> 'Sicuti **fortis equus** spatio qui saepe supremo
> vicit Olympia nunc senio confectus quiescit'.[223]
>
> Equi fortis et victoris senectuti comparat suam. (§14)
>
> (He, like a gallant steed that often won
> Olympic trophy in the final lap,
> Now takes his rest when weakened by old age.
>
> He is comparing his old age to that of a brave and victorious horse.)

The aspects of the source domain that are brought forward are the former strength of the horse, its earlier victories in Olympia and its pleasant rest now that it is old. The target domain is mainly the political and military life of the Roman upper class. Cato speaks exhaustively of the importance of struggles and success in one's

[222] For an early example of *coquo* in a similar sense, see Plautus, *Trinummus* 225 *'egomet me coquo et macero et defetigo'*.
[223] Ennius, *Annalium fragmenta (in aliis scriptis servata)* 12.374-75.

prime in order to be harmonious as an old man (§§ 9-14, 49-50, 62). The former active life is a condition for the later contentment.

Apart from Ennius' simile in §14, there are two other similes in *De senectute* where humans are compared to animals. The first one is in § 49:

> at illi quanti est, animum tamquam emeritis stipendiis libidinis, ambitionis, contentionum, inimicitiarum, cupiditatum omnium, secum esse secumque ut dicitur vivere! si vero habet aliquod **tamquam pabulum studii atque doctrinae**, nihil est otiosa senectute iucundius. (§49)

> (But how blessed it is for the soul, after having, as it were, finished its campaigns of lust and ambition, of strife and enmity and of all the passions, to return within itself and, as the saying is "to live apart"! And indeed if it has any provender, so to speak, of study and learning, nothing is more enjoyable than a leisured old age.)

We may note that *pabulum* in this sense is not commonplace, since Cicero adds *tamquam* in front of it. It seems that the point of the simile is to highlight certain aspects such as slow digestion (of thought), the peaceful (bucolic) life of cattle and the daily need of the (philosophical) fodder. There is also a possible reference to the slowness and quietness of cattle. The adjective *otiosa* that follows strengthens this interpretation. The metaphor is indeed one of the most elegant in the dialogue. It is difficult to find earlier examples in Latin of *pabulum* in this sense.[224]

Animals function in a very different way in Cato's discussion of lust in the middle part of the dialogue:

> sed si aliquid dandum est voluptati, (quoniam eius blanditiis non facile resistimus –divine enim Plato **escam malorum** appellat voluptatem, **quod ea videlicet homines capiantur ut pisces),** quamquam immoderatis epulis caret senectus, modicis tamen conviviis delectari potest. (§44)

> (But if some concession must be made to pleasure, since her allurements are difficult to resist, and she is, as Plato happily says, "the bait of sin," – evidently because men are caught therewith like fish – then I admit that old age, though it lacks immoderate banquets, may find delight in temperate repasts.)

---

[224] See OLD, TLL X:1, 9. Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 4, 1063, '*pabula amoris absterrere sibi atque alio convertere mentem*' has a metaphorical sense, but a different one.

The reference is to *Timaios* 69d.[225] The metaphor connects to the GREAT CHAIN concept[226], where lower parts of the chain serve to describe higher parts and where every higher step on the chain contains the characteristics of all lower steps. Here, it is the instinctive behaviour of fish, attracted by the bait, that has taken grip on humans, thus forcing them to behave in a non-human, non-rational way. Although there is a Greek precursor, '*escam malorum*' must be said to be fresh metaphor in the context, a metaphor which here, in a second step, also forms part of a greater simile.[227]

One might also bring up Cicero's use of the verb *obrepo* here. In § 4 he writes:

obrepere aiunt eam [sc. senectutem] citius quam putavissent […] (§4)[228]

(They say that it [sc. old age] stole upon them faster than they had expected.)

Old age here steals upon a person. Although *obrepo* usually denotes abstract entities[229], it possibly implies an animal, even though Cicero nowhere has the word in this sense. The point of the metaphor is the unnoticed and gradual coming of old age and, stressing the meaning of *-repo*, the danger of it, as if it were a snake. Plautus employs the same metaphor with *mors*: *atque hoc evenit/ In labore atque in dolore ut mors obrepat interim.* (*Pseudolus,* 686). In this instance (in *De senectute*), however, *obrepo* might as well imply a personification of old age – an approaching enemy. The strength of the metaphor lies in the vague and obscure mysteriousness of the target domain.

Animals occur as source domains comparatively few times in *De senecute*. They serve to set off different traits and different aspects of human behaviour. The horse (in its prime) for strength, cattle for slowness, quietness and slow digestion (i.e. of philosophy and learning in the target domain), and fish for its non-rational, instinctive behavior. In the case of *obrepo*, it is possible that the hidden, wily approach of a dangerous animal or the bite of a poisonous snake is evoked to describe the unnoticed and invisible coming of old age.

---

[225] Plato writes 'ἡδονὴν μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ'.
[226] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 160-216.
[227] Cf Plautus, *Asinaria 221, 'auceps sum ego, esca est meretrix, lectus inlex, amatores aves'*.
[228] *Obrepo* for old age is used twice in § 4 and once in § 38.
[229] See TLL, 9:II, 146-147.

The most interesting *locus* in this section for a description with a mapping is without doubt the phrase *pabulum studii atque doctrinae*. The metaphorical mapping of the phrase might look like this:

Source domain	*Target domain*
Cattle	Humans
Fodder	Learning and philosophy
Peaceful life	Old age
Slow digestion	Slow but genuine acquirement of learning, which is not possible for younger people

As we see, the expression *pabulum studii atque doctrinae* brings several larger domains into play and makes an intricate point, which perhaps can be said to be a definition of a good metaphor.

2.13. Plants and vegetable life as source domains

In *More than Cool Reason* (1989) George Lakoff and Mark Turner also explore the metaphorical capacities of vegetable life as a source domain. In their scrutiny, two metaphorical concepts are placed at the centre of this sphere: PEOPLE ARE PLANTS and A LIFETIME IS A YEAR.[230] The concepts in question, rooted in the year-cycle of trees and vegetable life, also appear in *De senectute*, and, notably, become more frequent towards the end of the work. It is obvious that the reason for this is that they contribute to giving Cato's speech a poetical and elevated tone which fits this part of the dialogue.

The most explicit case of the A LIFETIME IS A YEAR concept appears in § 70:

ver enim tamquam adulescentiam significat, ostenditque fructus futuros;
reliqua autem tempora demetendis fructibus et percipiendis accommodata

---

[230] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 6-18, 67-82.

sunt; fructus autem senectutis est, ut saepe dixi, ante partorum bonorum memoria et copia. (§ 70)[231]

(For spring typifies youth and gives promise of future fruits; while the other seasons are designed for gathering in those fruits and storing them away. Now the fruit of old age, as I have often said, is the memory of abundant blessings previously acquired.)

We see how the concept adapts flexibly to Cato's positive view of old age. While playing down the aspect of autumn-winter as death, it here functions to stress the results of the work in the spring and possibly summer (which correspond to youth and the active time of life). The results are riches, wisdom, and a good reputation in old age.

But the concept appears already in § 5, when Cato speaks about the importance of living in accordance with nature:

[…] sed tamen necesse fuit esse aliquid extremum **et tamquam in arborum bacis terraeque fructibus maturitate tempestiva quasi vietum et caducum** […] (§5)

(And yet there had to be something final, and – as in the case of orchard fruits and crops of grain in the process of ripening which comes with time – something shrivelled, as it were, and prone to fall.)

Here, the ripeness or falling of the fruits and berries refers not only to the acquired wisdom but also to the physical death of old people. *'caducum'* – the falling of the fruits – is presented as something happening at the right time (*maturitate tempestiva*). The ripe state of the crop/the fruits also denotes wisdom. The other agricultural metaphors in *De senectute* make it clear to the reader that these elements are to be seen as one: death comes at a right time – when the fruits are ripe and the philosophical wisdom is acquired – and all this follows nature's command. The adjective *vietum* focuses on the outward likeness: the wrinkles on old fruits and in an old person.

The next example we meet in the text is the following one:

---

[231] OLD quotes Catullus 68: 16, '*iucundum cum aetas florida ver ageret'* as an early example of *ver* in this sense. (OLD 2b)

Aptissima omnino sunt, Scipio et Laeli, arma senectutis artes exercitationesque virtutum; **quae in omni aetate cultae cum diu multumque vixeris mirificos ecferunt fructus** […] **(§9)**

(Undoubtedly, Scipio and Laelius, the most suitable defenses of old age are the principles and practice of the virtues, which, if cultivated in every period of life, bring forth wonderful fruits at the close of a long and busy career […])

The idea here is that a long practice of the (Stoic) virtues of character before reaching old age gives good results in the end. Powell points out that *ecferre* is common in agricultural contexts and strengthens the metaphor.[232] The phrase is related to the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS concept, but the focus is on the virtues, which are considered to be cultured fields (or possibly trees or plants) which can finally be harvested. These imagined fields are then placed in the mind of a person.

One passage at the end of the dialogue uses an agricultural metaphor in a similar, but not identical, way:

quasi poma ex arboribus cruda si sunt vi evelluntur, si matura et cocta decidunt, sic vitam adulescentibus vis aufert, senibus maturitas […] (§71)

([…] and, just as apples when they are green are with difficulty plucked from the tree, but when ripe and mellow fall of themselves, so, with the young, death comes as a result of force, while with the old it is the result of ripeness.)

Again, what lies behind the statement is the notion of 'nature' (see the preceding passage; '*Omnia autem quae secundum naturam fiunt sunt habenda in bonis'*.). Here, young and old people are compared not to entire trees, but only to one specific part of them, the fruit. By reasoning in this way, and because virtue is compared to *fructus* in *e.g.* § 9, Cato can also stress the growing virtue of old age in which he believes. With the verb *decidunt*, the simile also brings aspects of the GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN concepts into play, viz. LIFE IS UP, DEATH IS DOWN.[233] The word *caducum* in §5 also connects to these concepts.

---

[232] Powell 1988. TLL quotes Cicero, *Pro lege Manilia* 59, '*cepit magnum suae virtutis fructum ac dignitatis (sc. Cn. Pompeius)*' as an example of *fructus* in a similar sense.
[233] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 15.

In their discussion about metaphors for death in *More than Cool Reason*, Lakoff and Turner propose the metaphorical concepts TIME IS A REAPER and DEATH IS A REAPER.[234] These concepts are also present in the simile in question, especially through the words *poma…vi evelluntur*. We see how very little in the simile is said by coincidence or at random; every word is steered by an underlying concept.

One more expression deserves to be brought up in this section.[235] It is Cato's pseudo-prophetical words to his interlocutor Scipio:

> Carthagini male iam diu cogitanti bellum multo ante denuntio; de qua vereri non ante desinam, quam illam exscissam cognovero. quam **palmam** utinam di immortales, Scipio, tibi reservent, ut avi reliquias persequare! (§§ 18-19)

> ([…] I am declaring war on Carthage, for she has long been plotting mischief; and I shall not cease to fear her until I know that she has been utterly destroyed. And I pray the immortal gods to reserve for you, Scipio, the glory of completing the work which your grandfather left unfinished!)

Palmam here functions as a metonymy for victory. It is well established in this sense in Cicero's time (the earliest examples in Latin are, according to OLD, from Plautus[236] and there is a much older Greek equivalent[237]). It is typical for Cato's attitude in the dialogue that he focuses not on Scipio's struggles in the war that he will lead but on his moment of triumph. The metonymy *palma* serves to bring forward this aspect.

I now turn to some Latin words that appear frequently in *De senectute* and have a basic sense connected, or possibly related, to agriculture. The discussion will concentrate on the verbs *colo* and *puto* and the adjective *laetus*.

Colo, and its derivations *cultus* and *cultura*, are found 22 times in the text. The agricultural sense, 'to cultivate', is frequent (§§ 53, 54, 65, 70) as well as the transferred one, which applies to describing friendship, religious worship, and the cultivation of virtue. I think that the formulation in § 9 (already quoted above) and the frequent use of the agricultural sense show that *colo* functions as a living,

---

[234] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 26, 41, 73-76, 78-79, 86.
[235] I will not discuss the quotation from Statius in § 25, '*serit arbores quae alteri saeculo prosient*' since it is clear from the context that this phrase is literally, not metaphorically, meant.
[236] Plautus, *Amphitruo* 69 '*qui ambissent palmam his histrionibus*'.
[237] See LSJ on φοῖνιξ.

although, of course, conventional metaphor. This is also due to the fact that the metaphor works flawlessly and well. Devotion and care are important in friendship (cf *De amicitia*), in religious worship, and in the cultivation of virtue, as well as in an agricultural context.

While *colo* maintains its literal sense, this is not the case with *puto*[238]. I have not found any examples anywhere in Cicero's entire oeuvre of *puto* in its concrete, agricultural sense, 'to prune'. The agricultural connotation of the word is not oblique at his time; it is *e.g.* used by Vergil in *Georgica* 2.407, but it is important to note that Vergil's main theme in that book *is* agriculture, a topic that is not explored at length by Cicero.

It is very difficult to say why *colo* and *puto* differ in this respect, but I think that while *colo* functions perfectly as a conventional metaphor, this cannot be said about *puto*. One could say metaphorically that a person can '*prune his views*,' but it is hard to see that this could become a conventional stock phrase. The correspondence between source domain and target domain is too weak.

Laetus occurs twice in the text. What interests me here is primarily the fact that its etymological background is unclear. It means 'happy', 'cheerful' (of persons) as well as 'flourishing', 'lush' (of plants, crops). This ambiguity triggers a metaphorical link and can be said to activate the concepts PEOPLE ARE PLANTS and one that might be formulated HAPPINESS IS DAZZLING VERDURE. These double senses are possibly present in Cato's comment in § 54 of *De senectute*:

> nec vero segetibus solum et pratis et vineis et arbustis **res rusticae laetae sunt** sed hortis etiam et pomariis […] (§ 54)

> (Nor does the farmer find joy only in his cornfields, meadows, vineyards, and woodlands, but also in his garden and orchard […])

What I mean is that the words *res rusticae laetae sunt* signifies the happiness of the farmer which is related to the state of his fields and gardens. *Laetus* here functions as an interesting and etymologically mysterious connection between these two domains.

In this section, we have seen that agricultural similes and metaphors function to describe how life (according to Cato) should be lived in accordance with 'nature' and its rules. The concepts PEOPLE ARE PLANTS and A LIFETIME IS A YEAR constitute the centre of these comparisons, but related metaphorical concepts are richly evoked as well. Agriculture as a source domain is an aid for

---

[238] *Puto* is found 8 times in *De senectute*, and only with the meaning 'to consider'.

Cato as he expounds the Stoic way of life. We have also seen how the verb *colo* and its derivates are well established as conventional metaphors for Cicero because of the clear connections between source domain and target domain, while this functions less well for words such as *puto,* and that, therefore, the frequency of *colo* in *De senectute* is no coincidence.

2.14. Personification

When we come to personification[239], or here rather the use of a human being as a metaphorical source domain, we are faced with some difficulties of delimitation. A large group of expressions in *De senectute* can be said to be related to the metaphorical concept AN ABSTRACT ENTITY IS A PERSON. This is especially true of the word *senectus*, which occurs in expressions such as *magnam habendam…senectuti gratiam* (§42), *invitat atque allectat senectus* (§57), and *caret epulis* [*senectus*] (§44). There are also other expressions where a single word adds personal traits to an object or a phenomenon, as in the phrase *Catonis sermo explicabit nostram…sententiam* (§3). In this large group, I have chosen to concentrate on the *loci* where the metaphor adds something important to the interpretation of a passage. I have also tried to distinguish some phrases where we deal with quite uncomplicated metonymies. This concerns especially the *loci* where *senectus* simply stands for *senes*.

There are, however, also more clear and extended examples of personification in *De senectute*. I will start with these and then move on gradually to the more difficult cases.

It is logical to start with an example where *senectus*, the main theme of the dialogue, is personified, which is the case in the quotation from Caecilius[240]:

'edepol Senectus, si nil quicquam aliud viti
apportes tecum, cum **advenis**, unum id sat est,
quod diu vivendo multa quae non vult videt' (§ 25)

(In truth, Old Age, if you did bring no bane
But this alone, 'twould me suffice: that one,
By living long, sees much he hates to see.)

---

[239] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 33-34.
[240] Caecilius, *Comoediarum palliatarum fragmenta* (in aliis scriptis servata) 173-175.

The personification is combined with an orientational metaphor (arrival at a place) and with the ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS concept (the *vitium* being carried). This quotation is typical of the use of personification as a source domain in *De senectute*. We are not, perhaps with one exception, acquainted with the metaphorical 'person'. The 'person' does not speak, neither is his or her face described. The 'personality' is only faintly outlined, and only a few traits, which are stressed as the important ones, are communicated to the reader. In the quotation from Sophocles (§ 47), the violence and brutality of the personified *voluptas* (which the tragedian claims he has escaped by ageing) are the only aspects that are mentioned:

> 'libenter vero istinc [sc. res venerias] **sicut ab domino agresti ac furioso profugi**!' (§47; Sophocles quoted by Cato[241])

> ("Indeed I have fled from them as from a harsh and cruel master.")

The quotation is well in accordance with Cato's Stoic contempt for lust, and functions to demonstrate its baseness by the authority of the wise Greek. Sophocles has been dominated and ruled by lust. But did the *dominus* have a good sense of humour? Was he ever nice to his *servus*? This is not revealed to us. (Note also the orientational metaphor in *profugi*: separation from a centre.)

De senectute contains one example of a somewhat further developed personification. In § 5 Cato uses the standard image of *natura* as a person (or rather a god with certain human traits) who leads people[242]:

> […] in hoc sumus sapientes, quod naturam, optimam ducem, tamquam deum sequimur eique paremus. (§5)

> ([…] I am wise because I follow Nature as the best of guides and obey her as a god[…])

and at first the personification at seems to be similar to the ones mentioned above. We learn that Cato follows and obeys the god. But then the theme is elaborated:

---

[241] Probably taken from Plato, *Republic* 1.329b.
[242] The phrase *duce natura* and similar expressions are common in Cicero, e.g. in *Laelius* 19, *De officiis* 2.21*, De natura deorum* 2.128. I have not found any examples of the theme that are older than Cicero.

Nature is depicted as the poet of a drama – a personification tied to the LIFE IS A PLAY concept[243]:

> **a qua (sc. natura)** non veri simile est, **cum ceterae partes aetatis bene descriptae sint, extremum actum tamquam ab inerti poeta esse neclectum** […](§5)

> ([…] and since she has fitly planned the other acts of life's drama, it is not likely that she has neglected the final act as if she were a careless playwright.)

Nature writes the play (of life), it is a good playwright, and it knows how to tie the plot together – the last act, which corresponds to *senectus*. In this, Cato trusts. Still, the god remains quite anonymous to the reader. The situation is quite different from the scene where *Philosophy* reveals herself to Boethius (in *De Consolatione Philosophiae*), speaks to him and gains his confidence. The feminine ending of the word *natura* also makes it tempting to speak of a goddess rather than a god, but Cato/Cicero seems to leave this question open to the reader.

Why are the personifications in *De senectute* outlined so vaguely? There is no obvious answer to this question but some speculations suggest themselves: it has to do with Cato's way of telling us his thoughts, which is very down to earth. He has no visions or deep religious and philosophical insights to relate to Scipio and Laelius, but rather comes across as a man without any illusions but with great practical experience. This is mirrored in his way of speaking. It is not a coincidence that the clear instances of personification are found in two quotations and in one conventional theme. As often happens in *De senectute,* the quotations contain incisive wordings that demonstrate Cato's points. The latter are rendered in a more low-keyed manner. To Cato, personification is a strong rhetorical means, which is employed with moderation.

However, as I mentioned earlier, there is also a large group of verbs and adjectives in *De senectute* that, although in a more implicit way than the examples above, hint at personification, often in order to give emphasis to a saying. In these cases, we have to do with single words that denote a person:

> iam enim ipsius Catonis sermo **explicabit** nostram omnem de senectute sententiam. (§3)

---

[243] See also the section *Theatre as source domain* on this passage.

[…] habenda ratio valetudinis; utendum exercitationibus valetudinis; utendum exercitationibus modicis, tantum cibi et potionis adhibendum ut reficiantur vires, non opprimantur. nec vero **corpori** solum **subveniendum est**, sed menti atque animo multo magis. (§36)

Quorsus hoc? ut intellegeretis, si voluptatem aspernari ratione et sapientia non possumus, **magnam habendam esse senectuti gratiam**, quae efficeret ut id non liberet quod non oporteret. (§42)

(For from now on the words of cato himself will completely unfold to you my own views on old age.

[…] it is our duty […] to adopt a regimen of health; to practice moderate exercise; and to take just enough food and drink to restore our health and not to overburden it. Nor, indeed, are we to give our attention solely to the body; much greater care is due to the mind and soul.

Now, why did I quote Archytas? To make you realize that if reason and wisdom did not enable us to reject pleasure, we should be very grateful to old age for taking away the desire to do what we ought not to do.)

It is characteristic of this group that the metaphors, although they create a nuance of vividness in our notion of a speech, in the human body, or in old age, add little new meaning in the given context. It would also deeply impoverish the language of Cato/Cicero if words that primarily are used in connection with humans could not be employed as in the examples above. It is obvious that in this case we have to search for the instances where the metaphor adds an important point to the interpretation of a passage. In contrast to the examples mentioned above, I will now bring up two examples where I think this happens. The most illustrative case is probably the exclamation of the athlete Milo in § 27:

quae enim vox potest esse contemptior quam Milonis Crotoniatae? qui cum iam senex esset athletasque se exercentes in curriculo videret, aspexisse lacertos suos dicitur illacrimansque dixisse at 'hi quidem **mortui** iam sunt'. (§27).

(For what utterance can be more pitiable than that of Milo of Crotona? After he was already an old man and was watching the athletes training in the race-course, it is related that, as he looked upon his shrunken muscles, he wept and said: "Yes, but they are now dead.")

116

Milo's muscles are dead. The choice of the word *mortuus* here serves, I think, to underscore the pathetic lamentation in his words. He is not a wise man, and therefore, in contrast to Cato, he regrets the ways of nature, i.e. that people grow old and weak, and finally die.[244]

The following example is akin to the previous one:

> qui [Gorgias Leontinus], cum ex eo quareretur, cur tam diu vellet esse in vita, 'nihil habeo' inquit, 'quod **accusem senectutem**.' (§13)

> (When some one asked him why he chose to remain so long alive, he answered: "I have no reason to reproach old age.")

Here, the verb *accusem* makes *senectus* a well-known person, someone with whom the speaker is well acquainted. He has gradually got to know and respect old age and it is no longer an evil stranger or an enemy to him. The metaphor highlights this familiarity.[245]

As I said, there is also a group of expressions in *De senectute* where *senectus* simply stands for *senes*, and where, without a great loss of meaning, it could have been replaced by the latter word. Although formally personifications, these expressions function as metonymies. I am thinking about passages such as the following:

> nam quos ait Caecilius 'comicos stultos senes', hos significat credulos obliviosos dissolutos; **quae vitia non sunt senectutis, sed inertis ignavae somniculosae senectutis**. (§36)

> Lysandrum Lacedaimonium (cuius modo feci mentionem) dicere aiunt solitum Lacedaimonem esse honestissimum **domicilium senectutis**; nusquam enim tantum tribuitur aetati, nusquam est senectus honoratior. (§63)

> senectutis autem nullus est certus terminus recteque in ea vivitur, quoad munus offici exsequi et tueri possis et tamen mortem contemnere; ex quo fit ut **animosior** etiam **senectus** sit quam adulescentia et **fortior**. (§72)

---

[244] For an early example of a part of the body being called 'dead', cf Plautus, *Casina* 622, *'cor metu mortuomst, memebra miserae tremunt'.*

[245] Plautus uses *accuso* with an abstract quality as object in *Epidicus* 549*, 'haud accuso fidem'.*

(For when Caecilius speaks of "the old fools of the comic stage", he has in mind old men characterized by credulity, forgetfulness, and carelessness, which are faults, not of old age generally, but only of an old age that is drowsy, slothful, and inert.

Moreover, Lysander, the Spartan, of whom I just now spoke, is reported to have said more than once that in Sparta old age has its most fitting abode; because nowhere else is so much deference paid to age and nowhere else is it more honoured.

But old age has no certain term, and there is good cause for an old man living so long as he can fulfil and support his proper duties and hold death of no account. By this means old age actually becomes more spirited and more courageous than youth.)

Since it is the main theme of the dialogue, the word *senectus* acquires a special status in the text. Cato/Cicero gradually permits himself to linguistically treat it in a more and more free manner. This happens in agreement with the reader, who gets used to it because the subject is brought up again and again from different perspectives. If one wants to formulate a metaphorical concept which is valid for the last examples given above, it might be THE CHARACTERISTIC TRAIT (here: old age) IS THE GROUP, but highlighting a certain trait is typical for metonymies.

In this section, we have seen that extended personification only occurs in a few passages of *De senectute*: in two quotations and in the conventional theme of the god *natura*. We also find a group of metaphors where a single adjective or verb denotes personification, but in most of these cases the metaphors add little to the interpretation of the passage. It is only in a few instances that this kind of personification seems to make an special point. We have also seen that the noun *senectus*, since it constitutes the main theme of the dialogue, acquires a special linguistic status in the text. The frequent use of it allows Cato/Cicero to treat in a more free manner than other words.

2.15. Theatre as source domain

The theatre plays a prominent role as a metaphorical source domain in *De senectute*. For a wider investigation of this theme, see M. Kokolakis' *The Dramatic Simile of Life* (1960). Several times, Cato compares life to a drama where people or *natura* are either actors, writers, or spectators. The majority of the similes (regarding drama we have to do with similes rather than metaphors) evolve around and are closely attached to the metaphorical concept LIFE IS A PLAY. This concept is discussed by Lakoff and Turner in *More than Cool Reason*. The authors list several reasons why this concept is important for our ability to

speak about the abstract, vague and many-faceted notion of life:

> This is an extraordinarily productive basic metaphor for life, perhaps because plays are often intended to portray significant events and parts of life, and the ways in which a play can be made to correspond to life are extensively developed and conventionalized in our culture. Our schema for a play is also very rich. It includes actors, make-up, costume, a stage, scenery, setting and lighting, audiences, scripts, parts, roles, cues, prompts, directors, casting, playwrights, applause, bowing, and so on. Very many of the components of the schema for play have a function in the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor.[246]

Lakoff and Turner do not specify what they mean by 'our culture', but it is clear from the context that they are speaking about the 'western', and, more precisely, English-speaking culture – their succeeding discussion brings up examples from Shakespeare and T.S. Eliot – but the majority of the features of a play which they propose are valid for Cicero's time and context as well.

In *De senectute*, life is compared to a play already in § 5:

> quocirca si sapientiam meam admirari soletis (quae utinam digna esset opinione vestra nostroque cognomine!), in hoc sumus sapientes, quod naturam, optimam ducem, tamquam deum sequimur eique paremus. a qua non veri simile est, **cum ceterae partes aetatis bene descriptae sint, extremum actum tamquam ab inerti poeta esse neglectum** […] (§5)

> (Wherefore, if you are accustomed to marvel at my wisdom – and would that it were worthy of your estimate and of my cognomen – I am wise because I follow Nature as the best of guides and obey her as a god, and since she has fitly planned the other acts of life's drama, it is not likely that she has neglected the final act as if she were a careless playwright.)

The different periods of life are likened to the acts of a play – the noun *partes* functions as a smooth transition. In accordance with the theme of the dialogue, the last act – old age – is put into the centre. This act usually contains the outcome of the drama and thus the simile works to transfer the important period – supposed to be the active period of life – to the last years of it.[247] Natura, personified in the

---

[246] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 20.
[247] OLD and TLL give no examples earlier than Cicero of *actus* in the sense 'an act or episode in the drama of life' (OLD 9 c.).

preceding lines, is the poet of the play. Cato claims that this wise playwright must have come up with a good ending for the play. People, the actors, must play their parts well until the end, and this they do by acting according to nature's will.

In § 48 the concept reappears, but in a different shape:

> Ut Turpione Ambivio magis delectatur qui in **prima cavea** spectat, delectatur tamen etiam qui **in ultima**, sic adulescentia voluptates propter intuens magis fortasse laetatur, sed delectatur etiam senectus procul eas spectans tantum quantum sat est. (§48)

> (Just as Ambivio Turpio gives greater delight to the spectators in the front row at the theatre, and yet gives some delight even to those in the last row, so youth, looking on pleasures at closer range, perhaps enjoys them more, while old age, on the other hand, finds delight enough in a more distant view.)

It is difficult to interpret this simile since *voluptates* can mean so many things.[248] It is possible that sexual activity is intended, since Sophocles has just been quoted speaking about that (§47), but *voluptates* rather seems to refer to pleasure in general. The simile focuses on the distance of the spectators from the stage. It is a centre – periphery situation where the stage constitutes the centre. The theatre image helps Cato to describe the philosophical and clear-sighted detachment of the elder 'spectators'. Kövecses explains similar expressions in English by the metaphorical concepts INVOLVEMENT IS CLOSENESS and LACK OF INVOLVEMENT IS DISTANCE, orientational metaphors which use centre and periphery to describe abstract relations.[249]

The third instance of theatre metaphor appears in § 64:

> quae sunt igitur voluptates corporis cum auctoritatis praemiis comparandae? quibus qui splendide usi sunt, ei mihi videntur **fabulam aetatis peregisse, nec tamquam inexercitati histriones in extremo actu corruisse**. (§ 64)

---

[248] According to Powell, this is not an elaborated theatre simile as in §§ 5, 64, 70 and 85. (Powell 1988, 200.) I do not agree fully with him on this point. It is true that the details of the play has lesser importance in this paragraph than in the others, but the stage and the actors still function as the centre of the situation described, and the LIFE IS A PLAY concept is only modified; people are compared to spectators instead of participants.
[249] Kövecses 2002, 222.

(What physical pleasures, then, are comparable to the distinction which influence bestows? The men who have put these distinctions to noble use are, it seems to me, like skilful actors who have played well theirs parts in the drama of life to the end, and not like untrained players who have broken down in the last act.)

Again, the focus is on the last act of a play. People are compared to actors who must play their roles well until the end. The strong word *corruisse*, 'to make a fiasco (on stage)', corresponds to old people lacking the *auctoritas* that is supposed to have been earned at this time of their lives. The simile is largely enriched by the preceding paragraph. There, it is related that the Spartans on one occasion in the theatre of Athens all rose to offer their seats to an old man. For this, they were applauded by everyone present. This applause, '*a cuncto consessu plausus…datus*', aimed primarily at the young Spartans but indirectly at the old man (§64, beginning), constitutes the essence of *auctoritas* and the opposite of the shameful *corruisse* in the simile. The simile also stresses the competence needed to play life, or the drama, well until the end. This ability corresponds to *auctoritas*. Only untrained actors do well in the first acts but fail in the last.

The opinion that the life-drama must be performed until the end is contradicted by a metaphor that appears later in the text:

neque enim **histrioni** ut placeat **peragenda fabula est**, modo **in quocumque fuerit actu probetur** neque sapienti usque ad '**plaudite**' veniendum est […] (§70)

(The actor, for instance, to please his audience need not appear in every act to the very end; it is enough if he is approved in the parts in which he plays […])

This passage could be an allusion to Cato the younger, who died by his own hand in 46 B.C., only a few years before *De senectute* was written. This is of course anachronistic from Cato the elder's point of view, but perfectly reasonable from Cicero's perspective. If this interpretation is true, it gives a (pseudo-)prophetic touch to Cato the elder's statement.

In this comparison, the standpoint that the drama of life must be played until the end is problematized. Under special circumstances, it may be allowed for some 'actors' to quit earlier, either by committing suicide or because their *virtus* compels them to do so, as in the case with soldiers in a just war (cf § 75 on Roman

121

soldiers and generals killed in battle).[250]   The constraints which are put on the target domain by the basic structure of the source domain are not violated; it is perfectly in accordance with the possibility that some actors 'die' on stage during the course of a play.

The fact that Cato returns to the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor in the very last paragraph of *De senecute* attests to its importance, and to its aptness to the theme of the dialogue:

> […] senectus autem aetatis est **peractio tamquam fabulae**, cuius defetigationem fugere debemus praesertim adiuncta satietate (§85)

> (Moreover, old age is the final scene, as it were, in life's drama, from which we ought to escape when it grows wearisome and, certainly, when we have had our fill.)

The phrase contains an elegant transition, which is elucidated when the passage is related to the LIFE IS A PLAY concept: in the first part of the simile, people are actors. In the following part (*adiuncta satietate*) they have become spectators instead. It seems more reasonable that *satietas*, 'satiety', refers to the audience rather than to the participants in the play.

Plays and playwrights are also mentioned elsewhere in *De senectute*, (especially in §§ 50 and 65[251]), but in these instances, (the writing of a) drama rather works as an example of achievements in general (§50) and of different personalities (§ 65) than as a metaphorical source domain.

An interesting question which presents itself when one studies the role of drama in *De senectute* is whether the verb *ago* to any degree can be said to implicate a nuance of acting in expressions such as *senectutem agunt* (§ 7) and *conscientia bene actae vitae* (§9). The broad spectrum of meanings inherent in *ago* (44 different uses in OLD!) makes the word almost impossible to interpret in any metaphorical sense, but I still think that the frequent use of 'acting' as a source domain in the text makes the question worth posing, at least concerning the following *locus*:

---

[250] I have not found any earlier examples in Latin of the exhortation *'plaudite'* used to denote the end of life than this instance in *De senectute*.

[251] *Quam gaudebat bello suo punico Naevius, quam Truculento Plautus, quam Pseudolo!* (§50); *quae tamen omnia [sc. difficultates senectutis] dulciora fiunt et moribus bonis et artibus idque cum in vita tum in scena intellegi potest ex eis fratribus qui in Adelphis sunt* (§65).

est etiam quiete et pure atque eleganter **actae aetatis** placida ac lenis
senectus […] (§13)

(But there is also the tranquil and serene old age of a life spent [sc. 'acted'?]
quietly, amid pure and refining pursuits […])

Would a Roman who read the text when it was fresh have noticed a slight allusion
to acting here? Probably not, since *ago* had so many self-evident, well-established
meanings. But can we know for sure? From a purely literary standpoint, it is
difficult to deny that the connection exists.

In this section, it has been shown how Cicero/Cato repeatedly returns to theatre
in *De senectute*. The metaphorical concept LIFE IS A PLAY is the basic idea
behind the similes, but we are also confronted with metaphorical concepts having
to do with closeness and distance. People are viewed as spectators of a drama as
well as actors in it. In accordance with the theme of the dialogue, the 'last act' is
brought forward as an especially important element. In one of the similes, *natura*
functions as the poet of the play.

2.16. Journeys as source domains

One of the metaphorical concepts that recurs in the research that was inspired by
Metaphors we live by is LIFE IS A JOURNEY. In *The contemporary theory of
metaphor*, George Lakoff shows how this metaphor can be related to such
metaphors as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and LOVE IS A JOURNEY.[252]
Moreover, in *More than Cool Reason*, Lakoff and Turner give examples of how
the journey along a road is also used to denote ethical behavior, 'following the
right path'.[253] Since we often conceive of our lives as movement forward in space,
it is self-evident that the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is also related to that
orientational source domain. The LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor dominates the
current section. One of the special qualities of this metaphor is its great
possibilities of extension, options and variations: the beginning and end of the
journey, people with whom we travel, obstacles, crossroads, turning-points, going
uphill and downhill: all these elements can be attributed to a journey and are also
easy to map on to the target domain life. In *De senectute*, this concept is most

---

[252] Ortony (ed.) 1993, 202-251.
[253] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 9-10.

clearly present in two similes and one elaborated metaphor. It appears for the first time in § 6, where Cato is asked by Laelius to account for the experiences that he has made during his 'journey of life':

> Laelius: Volumus sane nisi molestum est, Cato, **tamquam longam aliquam viam confeceris, quam nobis quoque ingrediundum sit, istuc quo pervenisti videre quale sit**. (§6)[254]
>
> (Unless it is too much trouble to you, Cato, since you have, as it were, travelled the long road upon which we must also set out, we really do wish to see what sort of place it is at which you have arrived.)

Cato, by his age, has reached a certain 'place' (The STATES ARE LOCATIONS concept) and Laelius wants to know what it is like there. The reader does not acquire a lot of information about the nature of the journey or the road – only that it has been long. This can partly be explained by the fact that the question, which *de facto* constitutes the starting point of Cato's long speech that runs through most of *De senectute*, wants to stress Laelius' lack of knowledge of the *via* and to give Cato free hands in telling his listeners about it and of the 'place' that he now has reached. By only including the 'sceletal structure' of the concept in his question, Laelius leaves it to Cato to add the details – which will then be mapped on to the target domain. While proceeding along the *via*, Cato has conquered the *voluptas* of his youth (which never seems to have been very strong, or if it was, his *virtus* was much stronger!), he has learned to be a great speaker in the senate and become a successful politician and a philosophically wise man. All of this is not, however, explained by the LIFE IS A JOURNEY concept, but it is implicit in Cato's speech by the fact that the simile is placed in the question to which it is an answer.

In fact, Cato only sporadically avails himself explicitly of the concept in question. In the following passage, where he discusses greed in old age, the metaphor focuses on the 'provisions for the journey' (of life). The target domain is money and riches:

---

[254] In §§ 6-8 of *De senectute*, Cicero quite closely copies Plato's *Republic* 328d-330a, where Socrates discusses old age with Cephalus. The passage quoted is inspired by the following passage in Plato: "καὶ μήν," ἦν δ ἐγώ, "ὦ Κέφαλε," χαίρω διαλεγόμενος τοῖς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνεσθαι ὥσπερ τινὰ ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἐστιν, τραχεῖα καὶ χαλεπὴ, ἢ ῥᾳδία καί εὔπορος.

avaritia vero senilis quid sibi velit non intellego: potest enim quidquam esse absurdius quam quo **viae minus restet**, eo plus **viatici** quaerere?(§66)

(As for avariciousness in the old, what purpose it can serve I do not understand, for can anything be more absurd in the traveller than to increase his luggage as he nears his journey's end?)

This is a very early instance of *viaticum* in this sense, maybe the oldest. (Another early instance is Quadrigarius, *Historia* 8[255].) The fact that the quotation contains a word-play, or at least a repetition (*via-viaticum*) perhaps indicates that we are dealing with a metaphor which is not fully conventionalized.

In a simile at the end of the dialogue, Cato returns to the concept, but in this case he speaks of the 'journey of life' as made not along a road but by ship:

quae [sc. maturitas] quidem mihi tam iucunda est, ut quo propius ad mortem accedam **quasi terram videre videar aliquandoque in portum ex longa navigatione esse venturus**.(§71)

(To me, indeed the thought of this "ripeness" for death is so pleasant, that the nearer I approach death I feel like one who is in sight of land at last and is about to anchor in his home port after a long voyage.)

In this simile, Cato employs the dangers of a sea voyage to explain the difficulties of life. To employ the road or journey by land as a source domain would have created associations far too peaceful for his needs in this context. The simile also confronts the reader/listener with one of the goals of the metaphorical journey: death, which is portrayed as something very positive by Cato in the succeeding paragraphs. The *portus* here clearly denotes security and peace in contrast to the dangers of the voyage.[256]

There is also an elaborated passage about the activities on board a ship in *De senectute*:

---

[255] Quadrigarius, *Historia* 8 (first century B.C. (early)) '*forma, factis, eloquentia...praecellebat (sc. Marcus Manlius), ut facile intellegeretur magnum viaticum ad rem publicam evertendam habere*'.
[256] Cicero often uses *portus* as an image for death (*Epistulae ad Atticum* 14.19, *Disputationes Tusculanae* 1.118.) An early, related instance of this metaphor, though focusing more on the body than the soul, is Ennius, *Scaenica* 364 '*neque sepulcrum quo recipiat, habeat naufragus, portum corporis, ubi [...] corpus requiescat malis*'.

nihil igitur adferunt qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant, **similesque sunt ut si qui gubernatorem in navigando nihil agere dicant, cum alii malos scandant, alii per foros cursent, alii sentinam exhauriant, ille autem clavum tenens quietum sedeat in puppi.** non facit ea quae iuvenes; at vero multo maiora et meliora facit. (§17)

(Those, therefore, who allege that old age is devoid of useful activity adduce nothing to the purpose, and are like those who would say that the pilot does nothing in the sailing of the ship, because, while others are climbing the masts, or running about the gangways, or working at the pumps, he sits quietly in the stern and simply holds the tiller. He may not be doing what younger members of the crew are doing, but what he does is better and much more important.)

What is the meaning of this comparison? I think that it should be interpreted by way of the metaphorical concept A STATE IS A SHIP[257], but it might also refer to a household. It is also possible that it is simply a comparison which should not be given another meaning. Still, it seems difficult to ignore the possibility of comparing the ship to a state. A STATE IS A SHIP is a very complex metaphor, possible to elaborate in many ways, which can be shown by this mapping:

Source domain	*Target domain*
Ship	State
Storms	Dangers of the state
Steering	Governing
Good steermen	Wise statesmen
Right course, right speed	Right political decisions
Sailors	Citizens
Destination	A state that functions well (or other, more specific goals)

etc.

If we interpret the simile with the help of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, it denotes a collective, not an individual, journey. Cato, again, describes the excellence of old men and subordinates the young by giving them necessary, but

---

[257] This passage seems to be inspired by Plato, *Republic* 488a.

easier, tasks on the ship. He slants the metaphorical concept so as to fit his purposes.

As I mentioned above, Lakoff and Turner stress that the journey or road is also used metaphorically to denote ethical behaviour. They write:

> One of our major ways of conceiving of ethical behaviour is an elaboration of the life-as-journey-metaphor: there are paths of righteousness and evil ways.[258]

The word *via* is employed in this manner in *De senectute*. In § 33, Cato describes the prescription that one should live in accordance with nature in terms of walking along the right path. The passage is related to § 5[259], where nature is personified as a god or goddess who leads people in the right direction. We also note the expression *cursus aetatis* where ageing is described as movement forward:[260]

> **Cursus** est certus aetatis, et una **via** naturae eaque **simplex** […] (§33)

> (Life's race-course is fixed; Nature has only a single path and that path is run but once […])

In § 16, in a quotation from Ennius[261], the act of taking cowardly decisions is compared to deviating from a road:

> 'quo vobis mentes, rectae quae stare solebant
> antehac, dementes sese **flexere viai**?' (§16)

> (Your minds that once did stand erect and strong,
> What madness swerves them from their wonted course?)

It should be emphasized that the road of life and the right road are different metaphorical roads. Depending on the context and the implied mappings, they sometimes, but far from always, converge.

---

[258] Lakoff & Turner 1989,10.
[259] '*…in hoc sumus sapientes, quod naturam, optimam ducem, tamquam deum sequimur eique paremus.*'(§5)
[260] Cf Dido's words in Virgil, *Aeneis* 4.653 '*Vixi et quem dederat cursum Fortuna peregi*' (though later than Cicero) and Varro, *Menippeae* 174, '*vitae cursum*'.
[261] Ennius, *Annalium fragmenta (in aliis scriptis servata)* 6.201-202.

Besides the very clear examples mentioned above, *De senectute* also contains a group of expressions that imply that attaining old age or a good old age (or death in old age) is like reaching the destination of a journey:

> […] quam [sc. senectutem] ut **adipiscantur** omnes optant, eandem accusant **adeptam** […] (§4)

> […] num igitur si **ad centesimum annum vixisset** [sc. Scipio Africanus], senectutis eum suae paeniteret? (§19)

> Haec habui de senectute quae dicerem: **ad quam** utinam **perveniatis**, ut ea quae ex me audistis re experti probare possitis. (§85)

> ([…][old age] which all men wish to attain and yet reproach when attained […]

> If, then, he had lived to his hundredth year, would he be repenting of his old age?

> Such, my friends, are my views on old age. May you both attain it, and thus be able to prove by experience the truth of what you have heard from me.)

Adipiscor lays a certain stress on the work which is demanded to gain the goal or destination. The preposition *ad* has the double meaning of arrival at a place and reaching a set goal (or here: a certain age; the STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor). *Pervenio* puts emphasis on the success of a journey (OLD 2). The fact that the sentence that contains it is the last sentence of the dialogue means that the LIFE IS A JOURNEY concept, by also being present in Laelius' question in §6, so to speak, encloses Cato's long dissertation.

In this section, we have seen how journeys function as source domains to denote 'the voyage of life' in *De senectute*. Two types of travelling are employed: journeys by ship and journeys along a road. The aspects of the source domain journey which are mapped on to the target domain life is the length of the road, difficulties of the journey in general (it is interesting to note that the kind of difficulties is not specified), provisions for the journey, and the futility of saving them till the end of the journey. Finally, the goal of the journey is brought forward as a central aspect: a death in contendedness or a moment of success and satisfaction.

The notion of 'the right path' is employed to prescribe ethical behaviour. In these instances, the word *via* stands forth as the most central.

A difficulty when one tries to delimit the use of journeys as source domains in *De senectute* is that there is another source domain that is closely related to it, namely movement forward in space, and it does not seem possible to separate the two completely (it depends on how a journey is defined). Consequently, I have

128

chosen to place a group of expressions which could have been included here in the sections *Orientation in space as source domain* and *Time as target domain*.

2.17. Weapons and warfare as source domains

Weapons and warfare[262] are used only to a lesser extent as source domains in *De senectute* and when they are, the source domain is rarely elaborated in detail. When Cato wants to modulate his criticism of *voluptas* he expresses himself in the following way:

> quod si quem etiam ista delectant (ne omnino **bellum indixisse** videar voluptati, cuius est fortasse quidam naturalis modus), non intellego ne in istis quidem ipsis voluptatibus carere sensu senectutem. (§46)

> (But if there are any who find delight in such things (that I may by no means seem to have declared war on every kind of pleasure, when, perhaps, a certain amount of it is justified by nature), then I may say that I am not aware that old age is altogether wanting in appreciation even of these very pleasures.)

The declaration of war (which is only mentioned as a possibility, never clearly aimed at *voluptas*) serves to express Cato's acceptance of moderate and small-scale pleasure.[263] In § 5, in his discussion of *natura*, the refusal to accept natura and its ways is described as a fight against it. Cato alludes to the mythological war between the Greek gods and the giants:

> quid est enim aliud **Gigantum modo bellare cum** dis, nisi naturae repugnare? (§5)

> (For what is warring againt the gods, as the giants did, other than fighting against Nature?)

---

[262] See also A. A. Imholtz' article *Gladiatorial Metaphors in Cicero's Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino*. Imholtz argues that Cicero plays with the multiple meanings of such words as *gladiator* and *lanista,* which can mean not only 'gladiator' and 'gladiatorial instructor', but also 'murderer' and 'executioner'.
[263] Another early example of the expression *bellum indicere* with a similar sense is Cicero, *De oratore* 2.156 *'cur philosophiae…bellum indixeris'*.

The comparison emphasizes a particular aspect of the source domain war: the defeat of the giants. Refusal to accept the ways of *natura* is pointless hubris and leads to ruin.[264] Other instances in *De senectute* also depict attitudes or events that are contrary to *natura* as 'fighting against it'.[265] The first example concerns young people dying from illness, the second one connects a life in accordance with *natura* to the keeping of an armed post:

> quod [sc. mors] idem contingit adulescentibus **adversante** et **repugnante natura**. (§71)

> […] vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est dei, de **praesidio et statione vitae decedere**.(§73)[266]

> (But the same fate befalls the young, though Nature in their case struggles and rebels.

> Pythagoras bids us stand like faithful sentries and not quit our post until God, our captain, gives the word.)

In one instance, weapons (*arma*) are also employed to describe moral qualities (*virtutes*), the long practice of which helps to create a pleasant old age[267]:

> Aptissima omnino sunt, Scipio et Laeli, **arma senectutis** artes exercitationesque virtutum; quae in omni aetate cultae, cum diu multumque vixeris mirificos ecferunt fructus […] (§ 9)

> (Undoubtedly, Scipio and Laelius, the most suitable defenses of old age are the principles and practice of the virtues, which, if cultivated in every period of life, bring forth wonderful fruits at the close of a long and busy career […])

One might have expected that the source domain 'enemy in war' would be frequently used for old age in *De senectute*, but this is not the case. Only in one

---

[264] Cf Plautus, *Persae* 26-27, '*disne advorser quasi Titani?*'.

[265] The expression *naturae repugnare* (and similar ones) are common in Cicero, e.g. *De officiis* 1.31.110. Cf also Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 4, 1088, '*quod fieri contra totum natura repugnat*' (i.e. that the fire of love will be quenched by the touch of the beloved).

[266] The source of the reference to Pythagoras seems to be Plato, *Phaedo* 61d ff.

[267] Cicero has *arma* with other abstract qualities too: *armis prudentiae* (*De oratore* 1, 172).

passage do we meet this theme, but it is intimated rather than clearly stated. Still, as I also pointed out in the section *Physical burdens as source domains*, the use of *urgeo* and *advento* in combination makes the reader associate to an approaching enemy or army:

> Cicero: hoc enim onere, quod mihi commune tecum [sc. Attico] est, aut iam **urgentis aut certe adventantis senectutis**, et te et me etiam ipsum levari volo […] (§2)

> ([…] for I fain would lighten both for you and for me our common burden of old age, which, if not already pressing hard upon us, is surely coming on apace […])

In § 37, in Cato's description of Appius Claudius Rufus' old age, we meet a related, but not identical, theme. The old man did not succumb to old age, but fought it like a warrior. The passage is the only one in *De senectute* where a specific weapon (the bow) is used as a source domain. It denotes the constant, sharp attention with which Appius controlled his *domus*:

> […] **intentum enim animum tamquam arcum** habebat [sc. Appius Claudius Rufus], nec languescens succumbebat senectuti. tenebat non modo auctoritatem, sed etiam imperium in suos; metuebant servi, verebantur liberi, carum omnes habebant […] (§37)[268]

> ([…] for he did not languidly succumb to old age, but kept his mind ever taut, like a well-strung bow. He maintained not mere authority, but absolute command over his household; his slaves feared him, his children revered him, all loved him […])

The main function of weapons and warfare as source domains in *De senectute* is to describe an attitude or an ideal attitude towards certain problems in life, especially lust and the general problems connected with old age. Events and actions which are not in accordance with *natura* are repeatedly described as wars or fights.

---

[268] OLD and TLL (VII:I, 2113) do not give any earlier clear examples of the mind being compared to a bent bow.

2.18. Offices and duties as source domains

When Cato speaks about offices and civic duties, it is not always clear whether he means 'duty of life' in a metaphorical sense or the literal civic duty of a Roman aristocrate. The distinction becomes even harder to make when one considers Cato's Stoic view of life, which in many ways makes life a duty. The following passage seems to stress the literal civic duties. We remember Plutarch's opinion that an elder man can only preserve his dignity as long as he is able to uphold his official duties (See the introduction!) and perhaps Cato is referring to such values:

> senectutis autem nullus est certus terminus, recteque in ea vivitur quoad **munus offici exsequi** et **tueri** possis et tamen mortem contemnere […] (§72)

> (But old age has no certain term, and there is good cause for an old man living so long as he can fulfil and support his proper duties and hold death of no account.)

By contrast, the following passage, by stressing the duty we have as long as we 'remain in our bodies' ('*sumus inclusi in his compagibus corporis*), rather uses the everyday duties of a Roman citizen as a metaphor for the (Stoic) 'duty of life':

> ego vestros patres, Publi Scipio tuque Gai Laeli, viros clarissimos mihique amicissimos, vivere arbitror, et eam quidem vitam quae est sola vita numeranda. nam dum sumus inclusi in his compagibus corporis **munere** quodam necessitatis et gravi **opere perfungimur**. (§77)

> (It is my belief, Scipio, that your father, and yours, Laelius – both of them illustrious men and very dear to me – are living yet, and living the only life deserving of the name. For while we are shut up within these frames of flesh we perform a sort of task imposed by necessity and endure grievous labour […])

Life is called a task (*munus*), which we must carry through (*perfungi*) till the end. Then, by death, the human soul will be liberated. The reason why the soul is in this world is that it should spread the heavenly order (§77, after the passage quoted), an idea which Cicero seems to have taken from Plato's *Timaeus*.[269] Although it is

---

[269] Plato, *Timaeus* 47c.

apparent from the context that the statement is part of Cato's religious belief, the words *munus, opus,* and *perfungi* make the reader associate to the duties of a (male) person in a Roman context, whether those be the duties of a *cliens*, a *patronus* or a *senator*. *quodam* perhaps indicates that Cicero feels he is widening the common use of *munus* and *perfungi*. He makes Cato, in an implicit way, compare the duties inherent in the Stoic way of life to the duties of a Roman aristocrate.

Only a few lines later, when Cato discusses suicide, we find a somewhat different interplay between source domain and target domain:

> ita fit ut illud breve vitae reliquum nec avide appetendum senibus nec sine causa **deserundum** sit; vetatque Pythagoras iniussu **imperatoris**, id est dei, de **praesidio** et **statione vitae decedere**. (§§ 72-73)

> (Hence, it follows that old men ought neither to cling to fondly to their little remnant of life, nor give it up without a cause. Pythagoras bids us stand like faithful sentries and not quit our post until God, our Captain, gives the word.)

This is a more clear case. The duty is placed in a military context. Taking his stand on Pythagoras[270], Cato compares life to a battle in which a munition must be held and suicide to a soldier's desertion. The verbs *deserere* and *decedere* also connect to the metaphorical concept DEATH IS DEPARTURE. The Pythagorean/Platonic god is compared to an emperor, in whose army the person is a soldier. The comparison to a soldier makes the metaphor much more transparent than when the duties of a Roman citizen are likened to the 'duty of life'.

2.19. Ships as source domains

Ships are used as source domains in three different passages in *De senectute*. Two of them has been discussed already in the section *Journeys as source domains*. The most salient example of the journey metaphor that involves ships describes the 'land of death' which Cato, having reached old age, now feels he is approaching. The ship itself (not explicitly mentioned) plays a subordinate role in the simile and cannot be distinguished from the journey. As I pointed out earlier, it

---

[270] Even if the reference is to Pythagoras, the source for the passage is rather Plato, *Phaedo* 61d ff.

seems as if Cato chooses to speak of a journey by ship because such a journey has the connotations that he searches: storms, dangers, being lost at sea, etc:

> […] quae [i.e. maturitas] quidem mihi tam iucunda est, ut quo propius ad mortem accedam **quasi terram** videre viderar aliquandoque **in portum ex longa navigatione esse venturus.** (§71)

> (To me, indeed, the thought of this "ripeness" for death is so pleasant, that the nearer I approach death I feel like one who is in sight of land at last and is about to anchor in his home port after a long voyage.)

The second example is the ship simile in § 17, which was also quoted in the section on journeys. The various, obligatory tasks on a ship are (so it seems!) employed to describe the duties in a state or society. The ship as a source domain functions to delimit a group of people (the crew/the citizens) and to give them a joint goal – and to entrust the most important tasks to the old men.

If the source domain ship is closely tied to the journey metaphors in the examples above, it is given another meaning in § 72. Here it corresponds to the human body in the target domain:

> sed vivendi est finis optimus cum integra mente certisque sensibus opus ipsa suum eadem quae coagmentavit natura dissolvit. ut **navem**, ut aedificium idem destruit facillime qui **construxit**, sic hominem eadem optime quae **conglutinavit** natura dissolvit; iam omnis **conglutinatio recens aegre, inveterata facile divellitur**. (§72)

> (But the most desirable end of life is that which comes when the mind is clear and the faculties are unimpaired, when Nature herself takes apart the work which she has put together. As the builder most readily destroys the ship or the house which he has built, so Nature is the agent best fitted to give dissolution to her creature, man. Now every structure when newly built is hard to pull apart, but the old and weather-beaten house comes easily down.)

Again, we are faced with the idea of nature ordaining everything in the optimal way. Since nature built the ship/the man, it is also best that nature takes it or him apart. An old ship or house almost falls apart by itself, Cato claims, while, as is described in the preceding paragraph, the death of a young person is contrary to nature and therefore more prolonged and painful. The *conglutinatio recens* or *inveterata* points to the natural course of life in the target domain. One should not interfere in this process, but leave it to nature, Cato seems to say. We also meet with another personification of *natura* here – that of the craftsman.

134

2.20. Buildings as source domains

In *Metaphors we live by*, Lakoff and Johnson claim that the source domain BUILDING is often used in metaphorical concepts such as THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS and ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS.[271] Kövecses adds concepts such as COMPLEX SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS, ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ARE BUILDINGS, – concepts that can be treated as subcategories of THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS – and RELATIONSHIPS ARE BUILDINGS.[272] A characteristic trait of the source domain building, as Lakoff and Johnson see it, is that there is an unusally clear limit between the parts of a building that can be conventionally employed in a metaphorical way and the parts that cannot.[273] Foundations and construction belong to the former category, while an expression such as the following:

> He prefers massive Gothic theories covered with gargoyles.[274]

elaborates the THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS concept in an unconventional way. When Cato speaks about the importance of developing one's virtue and of striving to better one's character earlier in life in order get a good old age, we find an example of the conventional use of the source domain BUILDING:

> […] sed in omni oratione mementote eam me senectutem laudare, quae **fundamentis** adulescentiae **constituta** sit.(§62)

> (But bear well in mind that in this entire discussion I am praising that old age which has its foundation well laid in youth.)

The metaphor is, of course, commonplace for Cicero (there are examples of it in Plautus[275]). Cato means that a person's *auctoritas* must be earned through his actions and conduct during all his life (§ 61), and then he can enjoy it as an old man.

---

[271] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 46, 52-55.
[272] Kövecses 2002, 108, 109, 111-112, 122, 235.
[273] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 52-53.
[274] Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 53.
[275] Plautus, *Mostellaria* 121, *'parentes fabri liberum sunt: i fundamentum superstruunt liberorum'*.

Another, more subtle example of the source domain BUILDING is the following:

> quodsi legere aut audire voletis externa, maximas res publicas ab adulescentibus **labefactatas,** a senibus **sustentatas** et **restitutas** reperietis. (§20)

> (And indeed, if you care to read or hear foreign history, you will find that the greatest states have been overthrown by the young and sustained and restored by the old.)

The building here stands for order and organization in a state. Cooperation and experience make it possible to construct a tall and stable building. The old and experienced citizens are the ones most fit for this work. Kövecses discusses political metaphors and formulates the concepts A STATE IS A PERSON and A STATE IS A FAMILY, but not A STATE IS A BUILDING.[276]

At the end of *De senectute*, we also find a simile where life (on earth) is compared to a building:

> […] et ex vita discedo tamquam ex **hospitio, non tamquam domo**: commorandi enim natura deversorium nobis, non habitandi dedit.(§84)

> ([…] and I quit life as if it were an inn, not a home. For Nature has given us an hostelry in which to sojourn, not to abide.)

The simile does not emphasize the physical shape of the building but its function. If life is a temporary shelter, one need not be afraid of leaving it.

In the preceeding section (ships as source domains) we saw how Cato compared an old person to an old ship because such a ship is easy to take apart. The source domain BUILDING fills the same function in the passage and is used as a parallel to the ship:

> ut **navem**, ut **aedificium** idem destruit facillime qui construxit, sic hominem eadem optime quae conglutinavit natura dissolvit […] (§72)

> (As the builder most readily destroys the ship or the house which he has built, so Nature is the agent best fitted to give dissolution to her creature, man.)

---

[276] Kövecses 2002, 60-62.

2.21. Investments and economic profit as source domains

Cato speaks little of money and economical transactions in *De senectute*, but when he starts praising agriculture in §51, there is a short passage where he suddenly changes to an economic terminology:

> Venio nunc ad voluptates acricolarum, quibus ego incredibiliter delector; quae nec ulla impediuntur senectute, et mihi ad sapientis vitam proxime videntur accedere. habent enim **rationem** cum terra, quae numquam recusat **impendium**, nec umquam sine **usura** reddit quod accepit, sed alias minore, plerumque maiore cum **fenore**. (§51)

> (I come now to the pleasures of agriculture, in which I find incredible delight; they are not one whit checked by old age, and are, it seems to me, in the highest degree suited to the life of the wise man. For these pleasures have an account in the bank of Mother Earth who never protests a draft, but always returns the principal with interest added, at a rate sometimes low, but usually at a high per cent.)

This is indeed one of the more elaborated metaphors in the dialogue. According to Powell, it is inspired by Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*.[277] The economic terms do not have any established meanings in an agricultural context. Cato is describing the sowing and harvest as well as the daily work on a farm, but *impendium* also denotes the time spent in the fields through the TIME IS MONEY metaphor. Since he is also speaking of the *voluptates agricolarum* in this part of *De senectute*, *usura* and *fenus* also refer to the happiness derived from agricultural labor.

When Cato criticizes *voluptas*, we find another economic metaphor. The relationship between *voluptas* and *virtus* is described by the word *commercium*:

> impedit enim consilium voluptas, rationi inimica est, mentis ut ita dicam praestringit oculos, nec **habet** ullum **cum virtute commercium**. (§42)

> (For carnal pleasure hinders deliberation, is at war with reason, blindfolds the eyes of the mind, so to speak, and has no fellowship [sc. trade, exchange] with virtue.)

---

[277] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 8.3.38.

What Cato seems to mean by this metaphor is that *voluptas* and *virtus* are fundamentally different, that the one abstract quality completely excludes the other. As Powell points out, the use of *commercium* in the passage above is unique in classical Latin in that it unites two abstract qualities, not a person with one such quality.[278]

2.22. Sleep as source domain

The metaphorical concept DEATH IS SLEEP is closely related to the A LIFETIME IS A DAY concept. Together with LIFE IS LIGHT, DEATH IS DARKNESS, LIFE IS UP and DEATH IS DOWN, they form a coherent group of metaphorical concepts.[279] Sleep is used to denote death when Cato quotes Cyrus in § 80:

> iam vero videtis nihil esse **morti tam simile** quam **somnum**; atqui dormientium animi maxime declarant divinitatem suam; multa enim cum remissi et liberi sunt futura prospiciunt: ex quo intelligitur quales futuri sint cum se plane corporum vinculis relaxaverint. (§80-81)[280]

> (Again, you really see nothing resembling death so much as sleep; and yet it is when the body sleeps that the soul most clearly manifests its divine nature; for when it is unfettered and free it sees many things that are to come. Hence we know what the soul's future state will be when it has been wholly released from the shackles of the flesh.)

Cato claims that a sleeping person is able to see into the future and into the afterlife of the soul. The sleeping person can see what a dead person will experience. The similarity between sleep and death, as Cato sees it, is this possibility: in both states the soul is freed from the body and becomes aware of its own nature. Again, we notice the use of metaphorical sight ('*multa…futura prospiciunt*').[281]

Is sleep being used in a metaphorical way for death? Cato's words are mainly a comparison, '*nihil…morti tam simile quam somnum*', and the similarity only goes half way: in both death and sleep, the soul is liberated from the body, he claims.

---

[278] Powell 1988, 188.
[279] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 49-56, 86-89.
[280] The source for the passage is Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 8.7.17-22.
[281] This passage seems to be inspired by Plato, *Apology of Socrates*, 40c.

But the sleeping person can only 'see' what life after death will be like, not experience it. Sleep functions as a source domain for death, not in order to describe its essential nature, but because the two states have certain similarities. For our interpretation, we rather ought to stress the ancient belief in the prophetical value of dreams.

2.23. Competitions as source domains

As we saw in the section *Animals as source domains*, Cicero/Cato quotes Ennius in §14. In that quotation, the poet compares himself to an old race-horse, which enjoys the memory of its victories earlier in life. Cato wants to stress the importance of success and achievements during the active period of life for a pleasant old age. In his line of argumentation, life itself is not a race, but, for a virtuous man, it contains many (metaphorical) races. The other instance where the race course is used as a source domain instead focuses on the analogy between the starting point and goal in a race and the metaphorical path or journey of human life:

> […] et si qui deus mihi largiatur ut ex hac aetate repuerasceram et in cunis vagiam, valde recusem, nec vero velim **quasi decurso spatio ad carceres a calce revocari**. (§83)

> (Nay, if some god should give me leave to return to infancy from my old age, to weep once more in my cradle, I should vehemently protest, for truly, after I have run my race I have no wish to be recalled, as it were, from the goal to the starting-place.)

carceres means 'the barriers at the beginning of a race-course' (OLD 3), *calx* the finishing-line. The mapping of the simile is somewhat obscure. If death is the goal of the race, why not commit instant suicide? Cato seems to stress the necessary efforts in life rather than the analogy to the race from the beginning to the end. Otherwise, the simile does not make any sense. The following passage throws some light over Cato's words:

> At illi quanti est, animum tamquam emeritis stipendiis libidinis, ambitionis, contentionum, inimicitiarum, cupiditatum omnium secum esse secumque ut dicitur vivere! (§49)

> (But how blessed it is for the soul, after having, as it were, finished its campaigns of lust and ambition, of strife and enmity and of all the passions, to return within itself, and, as the saying is, "to live apart"!)

Here, we probably have the intended target domain that corresponds to *carceres* and *calx*: the multiple conflicts and   strifes necessary for a successful

career such as Cato's, and the struggle for controlling the human passions in a Stoic way.

2.24. Trials as source domains

I now turn to the question whether one might speak of a metaphorical 'trial' against old age in *De senectute*. It should first be noted that the lists of faults that Cato finds in old age (§15) are not formulated as 'accusations'. Instead, they are called the '*causas, cur senectus misera videatur*'. In the text, two words which are used together with *senectus* have clear forensic connotations: the verb *accuso*[282] and the noun *crimen*.[283] *Accuso* is used twice together with *senectus*, in §§ 4 and 13:

> […] quam [sc. senectutem] ut adipiscantur omnes optant, **eandem accusant** adeptam […] (§4)

> […] 'nihil habeo', inquit [sc. Gorgias Leontinus], 'quod **accusem senectutem**'.(§13)

> ([…] [old age] which all men wish to attain and yet reproach when attained.

> […] he answered: "I have no reason to reproach old age.".)

and Cato/Cicero once speaks of the closeness to death as a *crimen* of old age:

> quod est istud **crimen senectutis** [sc. mortis impendentis], cum id ei videatis cum adulescentia esse commune? (§67)

> (What fault is this which you charge against old age, when, as you see, it is one chargeable likewise to youth?)

These are rare instances; we do not find a large number of words in the text that might indicate that Cicero models the dialogue as a trial with charges and defense. One might argue that the structure of *De senectute*, in which Cato can be said to plead in defense of old age and meet the reproaches which are levelled against it, constitutes a parallel to a trial. Such a view, however, is hardly supported by the

---

[282] OLD 2 on *accuso*.
[283] OLD 1 on *crimen*.

text itself. The indications that Cicero metaphorically puts old age on trial are too few, and the method of letting two sides vindicate their arguments in a debate is a basic part of the ancient (Platonic) philosophical dialogue and in no way unique to pleadings in court. Therefore, it is more reasonable to say that Cicero intimates such a parallel in a few passages (the ones quoted above) than to speak of a metaphorical trial against old age in *De senectute.*

2.25. Minor source domains in *De senectute*

In the preceding sections, the larger metaphorical connections in *De senectute* have been investigated. Other metaphors in the text, e.g.:

> Cicero: mihi quidem ita iucunda huius libri confectio fuit, ut non modo omnes **absterserit** senectutis molestias, sed effecerit mollem etiam et iucundam senectutem. (§2)

> (To me, at any rate, the composition of book has been so delightful that it has not only wiped away all the annoyances of old age, but has even made it an easy and a happy state.)

and

> o praeclarum diem, cum ad illum divinum animorum consilium coetumque proficiscar, cumque ex hac turba et **colluvione** discedam! (§84)

> (O glorious day, when I shall set out to join the assembled hosts of souls divine and leave this world of strife and sin [sc. uncleanliness]!

tie troubles and corruption to dirt and uncleanliness. An adjective such as *purus* (*De senectute*, §80) also carries the metaphorical sense of 'morally clean' (OLD 4).

Human life is a major target domain in *De senectute*, and source domains such as journeys, theatre, and fire are used for describing different aspects of it, but in one case, it also functions as a source domain:

> Sed nescio quo modo animus erigens se posteritatem ita semper prospiciebat, quasi cum excessisset e vita, tum denique **victurus esset**. (§82)

> (But somehow, my soul was ever on the alert, looking forward to posterity, as if it realized that when it had departed from this life, then at last it would be alive.)

This sentence constitutes, in my opinion, the climax of Cato's long speech. The extremely drastic comparison, that death is the real life, meets us in the middle of

his *peroratio* (§77-84). He is convinced that he will meet his son, and other great men, in the afterlife:

> proficiscar enim non ad eos solum viros de quibus ante dixi, verum etiam ad Catonem meum, quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate praestantior; cuius a me corpus est crematum, quod contra decuit ab illo meum […] (§84)

> For I shall go to meet not only the men already mentioned, but my Cato, too, than whom no better man, none more distinguished for filial duty, was ever born. His body was burned by me, whereas, on the contrary it were more fitting that mine had been burned by him […])

I also want to bring up a single instance of the metaphorical concept A LIFETIME IS A DAY[284], the only one in *De senectute*:

> quamquam quis est tam stultus, quamvis sit adulescens, cui sit exploratum se ad **vesperum esse victurum**? (§67)

> (And yet is there anyone so foolish, even though he is young, as to feel absolutely sure that he will be alive when evening comes?)

Here, Cato not only refers to the dangers of life, which make it uncertain whether anybody will live to the end of the present day, but he also compares *senectus* to an evening.

---

[284] Lakoff & turner 1989, 6.

3. The target domains

3.1. Old age as target domain

Old age is, of course, the dominating theme of *De senectute*, and Cicero employs many metaphors to express his ideas about it. In the beginning of the dialogue, it is repeatedly referred to as an *onus*. By means of this metaphor, Cicero is stating the human and philosophical problem that *De senectute* will deal with. By first formulating the problem with a powerful and concrete metaphor, he can then proceed to attack and refute it. As we saw in the section *Physical burdens as source domains*, the metaphorical concept OLD AGE IS A BURDEN is varied with the words *gravis, ingravesco, levare, ferre, urgeo,* and *molestus,* and also the hyperbole about the mountain of Aetna (§4). Later in the dialogue, when Cicero/Cato has started defending old age, it will be referred to as *levis* instead.[285] Despite the ample occurrence, the metaphorical concept is elaborated only to a very limited degree. The 'burden' may become heavier or lighter but that is all the reader is allowed to know about it. Extending the concept, e.g. by letting a character add weight to the burden the ageing person is carrying or naming what material the burden is made of, would adventure the reader's understanding of the target domain.

When one investigates whether Cicero puts old age 'on trial' in *De senectute*, one finds that he only intimates such a parallel, partly by the criticism and rhetorical defense of old age, partly by expressions such as

> […] quam [sc.senectutem] ut adipiscantur omnes optant, **eandem accusant** adeptam. (§4)
>
> ([…][old age] which all men wish to attain, yet reproach when attained.)

and

> quod est istud **crimen senectutis**, cum id ei videatis cum adulescentia esse commune? (§67)

---

[285] *De senectute*, §§ 8 and 85.

(What fault is this which you charge against old age, when, as you see, it is one chargeable likewise to youth?)

Interpreted this way, the expressions also point to a personification of *senectus*, but this association is weak. It should also be noted that *accuso* and *crimen* do not have an exclusively forensic sense.

Another source domain that is only slightly hinted at is 'an enemy in war'. The following passages suggest such an interpretation:

> Cicero: hoc enim onere, quod mihi commune tecum [sc. Attico] est, aut iam **urgentis** aut certe **adventantis senectutis**, et te et me etiam ipsum levari volo […] (§2)
>
> […] intentum enim animum tamquam arcum habebat [sc. Appius], nec languescens **succumbebat senectuti**.(§37)
>
> ([…] for I fain would lighten both for you and for me out common burden of old age, which, if not already pressing hard upon us, is surely coming on apace […]
>
> […] for he did not languidly succumb to old age, but kept his mind ever taut, like a well-strung bow.)

Since both *urgeo* and *advento* can have a military sense[286], and the words are used in combination, old age is here being compared to an approaching hostile army. *succumbo* might imply that Appius did not concede military defeat against old age, especially if we take the preceding words, '*intentum enim animum tamquam arcum habebat*', into account and think of him as 'mentally armed'.[287]

Other source domains are also active in the passages just mentioned: *urgentis* can be tied to the OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept (the pressure of the burden) and *adventantis* to the source domain 'orientation in space'. This leads us into the group of orientational metaphors that are used for speaking about old age. In fact, *De senectute*, in addition to the phrase '*urgentis aut certe adventantis senectutis*', contains several expressions where the theme of somebody or something drawing near or approaching the ageing person functions as a source domain for old age:

---

[286] OLD 5 on *urgeo* and 1 on *advento*.
[287] OLD quotes Cornelius Nepos, *Themistocles* 5.3 '*Graecia liberata est Europaeque succumbuit Asia*' as the earliest example of *succumbo* in this sense.

obrepere aiunt eam [sc. senectutem] citius quam putavissent […] (§4)

'edepol **senectus**, si nil quicquam aliud viti
apportes tecum cum **advenis** unum id sat est,
quod diu vivendo multa quae non vult videt' (Caecilius quoted by Cato; §25[288])

(They say that it [sc. old age] stole upon them faster than they had expected.

In truth, Old Age, if you did bring no bane
But this alone, 'twouldme suffice: that one,
By living long, sees much he hates to see.)

The quotation from Caecilius (§25) is an apparent personification: old age is represented as a human being which comes to the ageing person and brings the fault or shortcoming of having had too many troublesome experiences. In the example from § 4, *obrepere*[289] emphasizes the gradual and threatening arrival of old age and implies that the ageing person might not be aware of it. The choice of the verb *obrepo* perhaps also makes the reader associate to a snake.

Another group of metaphorical expressions where aspects of old age are described by means of orientational metaphors is constituted by the ones where it is viewed as a place to which the ageing person arrives:

[…] quam [sc.senectutem] ut **adipiscantur** omnes optant, eandem accusant **adeptam**. (§4)

facilius in morbos incidunt adulescentes, gravius aegrotant, tristius curantur. itaque pauci **veniunt ad senectutem** […] (§67)

Haec habui de **senectute** quae dicerem: ad quam utinam **perveniatis**, ut ea quae ex me audistis re experti probare possitis. (§85)

([…][old age] which all men wish to attain and yet reproach when attained […]

[…] the young fall sick more easily, their sufferings are more intense, and they are cured with greater difficulty. Therefore few arrive at old age […]

---

[288] Caecilius, *Comoediarum palliatarum fragmenta (in aliis scriptis servata),* 173-175.
[289] *Obrepo* is first used of conditions, etc. in Plautus, *Pseudolus* 686, '*ut mors obrepat interim'* (OLD 2).

Such, my friends, are my views on old age. May you both attain it, and thus be able to prove by experience the truth of what you have heard from me.)

The passages connect to the Lakoff-Johnsonian concept STATES ARE LOCATIONS and LIFE IS A JOURNEY, and also to the *path* schema.[290] *Adipiscor, venio,* and *pervenio* all hold the double meaning of arriving at a place and reaching a state or a condition. In all the examples, and perhaps most obviously in the one where *pervenio* is used, the arrival is considered to be a success or something positive[291]; not all people attain old age. Cato also implies, somewhat ostentatiously, that his personal 'journey of life' has been successful in terms of health, philosophical insight, and political career.

Orientation in space is also employed in other ways when Cato/Cicero speaks about old age. The following examples include the notion of old age as an agent calling or pulling people away from an active life, separating them from pleasures, and the notion of old age (or the old person) as being located 'close to' death. Curiously, these expressions are especially abundant in § 15, the *partitio,* or the list of reasons why old age is miserable:

> […] quattuor reperio causas cur senectus misera videatur: unam quod **avocet** a rebus gerendis […] tertiam quod **privet** fere omnibus voluptatibus, quartam quod **haud procul absit a morte**. (§15)

> **a rebus gerendis senectus abstrahit.** (§15)

> Non enim video cur quid ipse sentiam de morte non audeam vobis dicere, quod eo cernere mihi melius videor, quo **ab ea propius absum**.(§77)

> ([…] I find four reasons why old age appears to be unhappy: first, that it withdraws us from active pursuits; […] third, that it deprives us of almost all physical pleasures; and, fourth; that it is not far removed from death.

> "Old age withdraws us from active pursuits."

> Really I do not see why I should not venture to tell you what I, myself, think of death; for it seems to me that I apprehend it better as I draw nearer to it.)

---

[290] Johnson 1987, 113-117.
[291] Cf OLD 2 on *pervenio*.

146

In accordance with an important characteristic for orientational metaphor in general, few details are given in these expressions. As we have seen earlier, orientational metaphor often constitutes the most conventional way of speaking about everyday, although abstract, notions. It is not easy to imagine how Cicero would have expressed what he says in the phrases quoted above *without* using orientational metaphor.

When Cato starts refuting the fourth allegation against old age (§66), we meet some metaphorical expressions that may clearly be tied to the Lakoff-Johnsonian concepts A LIFETIME IS A DAY and A LIFETIME IS A YEAR:

> quamquam quis est tam stultus, quamvis sit adulescens, cui sit exploratum se **ad vesperum** esse victurum? (§67)

> breve enim tempus aetatis satis enim longum est ad bene honesteque vivendum. sin processerit longius, non magis dolendum est, quam agricolae dolent praeterita **verni** temporis suavitate aestatem autumnumque venisse. **ver** enim tamquam adulescentiam significat, ostenditque f**ructus** futuros; reliqua autem tempora **demetendis** fructibus et **percipiendis** accommodata sunt; fructus autem senectutis est, ut saepe dixi, ante partorum bonorum memoria et copia. (§§70-71)

> (And yet is there anyone so foolish, even though he is young, as to feel absolutely sure that he will be alive when evening comes [or: until the evening of life]?

> For even if the allotted space of life be short, it is long enough in which to live honourably and well; but if a longer period of years should be granted, one has no more cause to grieve than the farmers have that the pleasant springtime has passed and that summer and autumn have come. For spring typifies youh and gives promise of future fruits; while the other seasons are designed for gathering in those fruits and storing them away. Now the fruit of old age, as I have often said, is the memory of abundant blessings previously acquired.)

In the first example, night corresponds to death, day to life, and evening to old age. Other common source domains are also invoked, such as light – for life, darkness – for death, activity (connected to daytime), and passivity (connected to the night). The waning of light in the evening might denote a gradual process of ageing. The second passage is interesting and exceptional for *De senectute* in that it contains an explanation of a metaphorical expression: '*ver enim tamquam adulescentiam significat*.' Moreover, it is not surprising that we find the metaphorical concept A LIFETIME IS A YEAR together with agricultural imagery, since it, by its essence, is connected to the year-cycle of plants and crops. I think that the passage is best interpreted by means of another agricultural metaphor in the beginning of *De senectute*:

147

Aptissima omnino sunt. Scipio et Laeli, arma senectutis artes exercitationesque virtutum, quae in omni aetate **cultae**, cum diu multumque vixeris mirificos **ecferunt fructus** […] (§ 9)

(Undoubtedly, Scipio and Laelius, the most suitable defenses of old age are the principles and practice of the virtues, which, if cultivated in every period of life, bring forth wonderful fruits at the close of a long and busy career […])

If we read the passage from § 70-71 in the light of the one from § 9, it seems obvious that the target domain that is intended in the former passage is the cultivation of *virtus* or *virtutes*, which, as Cato sees it, brings contentment later in life. Powell points out that old age is usually compared to winter in ancient literature, but in Cato's version it instead corresponds to autumn – perhaps one of the old Stoic's many subtle ways of describing old age in a positive, or, at least, less negative, way. In other passages where agricultural metaphors are used, especially in § 5, the mature state of the plants and fruits of course represent old age.

When Cicero/Cato employs the metaphorical concept LIFE IS A FIRE, old age, naturally, corresponds to a late stage in the lifespan of a fire. This is particularly clear in § 71.

In a simile in § 35, we also meet the notion of old age as a disease one must struggle against:

[…] pugnandum, tamquam contra **morbum**[292], sic contra senectutem […] (§35)

([...] it is our duty […] to fight against it [sc. old age] as we would fight against disease […])

Cato explicitly states what he means by the simile: just like a person who is ill, an elder should eat and drink properly and exercise in a careful way in order to maintain his physical and mental health (§ 36).

When we investigate whether Cicero/Cato makes use of the *container* as a source domain to refer to old age, we find some instances with the preposition *in*, which might imply a container. The best example of this is the expression '*Non*

---

[292] *Morbus* is first used in a transferred sense in Plautus, *Asinaria* 55 '*eum morbus [sc.poverty] invasit gravis.*'(OLD 2)

sunt in senectute vires?' (§34). But the use of the preposition in question seems too weak an indication that the container metaphor is employed as a source domain. Similarly, in a passage such as the following:

> quid enim est iucundius **senectute stipata** studiis iuventutis? (§28)

> (For what is more agreeable than an old age surrounded by the enthusiasm of youth?)

one might argue that *senectus* is being compared to a container (*stipo* can mean "to stuff" (OLD 3)), but Cato primarily speaks about old people being *surrounded* (OLD 2) by eager and ambitious young people. In the section *Containers as source domains* I showed that the container metaphor is usually only slightly hinted at in the dialogue, and this is valid in the special case of *senectus* as a target domain too.

The stage or theatre metaphor, where old age corresponds to the last act, was discussed already in the section *Theatre as source domain*. In that section, we saw that closeness and distance to the stage may stand for old age and youth respectively. We also found that *natura,* according to whose principles there is nothing negative in ageing, in one instance was described as the poet of the play of life.

Finally I want to draw attention to the following passage:

> praeterita enim aetas quamvis longa, cum effluxisset, nulla consolatione **permulcere** posset stultam **senectutem**. (§4)

> (In fact, no lapse of time, however long, once it has slipped away, could solace or soothe [sc. 'caress to peace'] a foolish old age.)

Here, *senectutem* obviously functions as an instance of metonymy for old people. The memory of earlier times of life (*praeterita aetas*) cannot console foolish elders. The idea that (the memory of) earlier times might console the old person is expressed by a metaphor in which the person is being caressed (*permulcere*). We are dealing with a slight personification (of *praeterita aetas*) and THE MIND IS A BODY concept, where the person is caressed in the source domain and consoled in the target domain, although these acts fail in the context, because the people in

149

question lack the wisdom Cato demands.[293] According to OLD, there are no earlier (attested) passages in Latin with *permulcere* in this sense, so it is possible that the metaphor was not conventional for Cicero.

3.2. Youth as target domain

Youth mainly functions as a contrast to old age in *De senectute* and is, logically, not developed as a target domain to the same degree. Of course, the metaphorical concepts LIFE IS A JOURNEY and LIFE IS A PLAY refer to youth too, but it is the later periods of life (the 'last act', the 'end' of the journey) which are in focus when these concepts are brougth into play in *De senectute*. When we come to the metaphorical concepts A LIFETIME IS A YEAR and PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, the situation is somewhat different. Several of the metaphors in *De senectute* that include these concepts refer to youth. This is true of the simile in §71 (See the section *Plants and vegetable life as source domains*), but also of the following phrases:

> **ver** enim tamquam adulescentiam significat, ostenditque fructus futuros […] (§70)
>
> temeritas est videlicet **florentis** aetatis, prudentia senescentis. (§20)
>
> (For spring typifies youh and gives promise of future fruits […]
>
> […] rashness is the product of the budding-time of youth, prudence of the harvest-time of age.)

Floreo/florens in a metaphorical sense is found in Plautus, but OLD and Forcellini give no examples of *ver* in the sense of 'the spring of life' that are older than Cicero.[294]

---

[293] The passage quoted (§ 4) is mentioned in OLD as the first attested instance of *permulcere* in a transferred sense (OLD 2 on *permulceo*). Cicero's words in § 5, *'mihi quidem ita iucunda huius libri confectio fuit, ut non modo omnes absterserit senectutis molestias, sed effecerit* **mollem** *etiam et iucundam* **senectutem'** (§2), which employs the source domain '(soft to) touch' for describing a pleasant old age in the target domain, are also linked to the metaphorical concept THE MIND IS A BODY.

When Cato speaks about his youth and earlier friends, we also meet the source domain 'heat' , which denotes 'young hot blood' or intensity:

> primum habui semper sodales – sodalitates autem me questore constitutae sunt sacris Idaeis Magnae Matris acceptis – epulabar igitur cum sodalibus, omnino modice, sed erat quidam **fervor aetatis**, qua progrediente omnia fiunt in dies mitiora […] (§45)

> (In the first place I have always had my club companions. Moreover, it was in my quaestorship that clubs in honour of Cybele were organized, when the Idaean worship was introduced at Rome, and therefore I used to dine with these companions – in an altogether moderate way, yet with a certain ardour appropriate to my age, which, as time goes on, daily mitigates my zest for every pleasure.)

In one of the theatre similes, the equanimity and meekness of the wise elderly are contrasted to the desire for pleasure, corresponding to the closeness to the stage, among the young:

> ut Turpione ambivio magis delectatur qui in prima cavea spectat, delectatur tamen etiam qui in ultima, sic **adulescentia voluptates propter intuens magis fortasse laetatur**, sed delectatur etiam senectus procul eas spectans tantum quantum sat est. (§48)

> (Just as Ambivio Turpio gives greater delight to the spectators in the front row at the theatre, and yet gives some delight even to those in the last row, so youth, looking on pleasures at closer range, perhaps enjoys them more, while old age, on the other hand, finds delight enough in a more distant view.)

In my view, the most interesting metaphor that describes youth in *De senectute* is Cato's description of the young Hannibal:

> hic [sc. Quintus Fabius Maximus] et bella gerebat ut adulescens cum plane grandis esset, et **Hannibalem iuveniliter exsultantem** patientia sua molliebat […] (§10)

---

[294] Plautus, *Menachmi* 372, '*benefactis tuis me florentem facis*' (OLD 2 on *florens*; TLL 6:I, 921.).

(Though quite old he waged war like a young man, and by his patient endurance checked the boyish impetuosity of Hannibal [sc. 'Hannibal jumping around'].)

Hannibal's bold and ruthless way of waging war is described by the word *exsultantem*, literally 'leaping about', 'dancing'. We have here a clear example of THE MIND IS A BODY concept – the energetic movement of the body corresponding to the mind making bold plans and acting in an unexpected way.

Besides the connotations it has in the examples mentioned above, youth functions, as I said, mainly as a contrast to old age in *De senectute*. This is particularly clear in the discussions about politics (§20), *voluptas* (§§ 46-50), and diseases (§§ 67, 71).

The target domains 'youth' and 'old age', are also connected to the metaphorical view of time as movement forward in space and the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. From such a perspective, youth is of course considered to be an earlier 'stop' on the journey than old age. In addition, expressions such as

> qui enim citius adulescentiae senectus quam pueritiae adulescentia **obrepit**? deinde qui minus gravis esset eis senectus si octingentesimum annum agerent quam si octogesimum? **praeterita** aetas quamvis longa, cum effluxisset, nulla consolatione permulcere posset stultam senectutem. (§4)

> (For how much more rapidly does old age steal upon youth than youth upon childhood? And, again, how much less burdensome would old age be to them if they were in their eight hundredth rather than in their eightieth year? In fact, no lapse of time, however long, once it has slipped away, could solace or soothe a foolish old age.)

can be tied to the 'moving time' metaphor.[295] This will be further investigated in the section *Time as target domain*.

3.3. Death as target domain

Another central target domain, especially in the last paragraphs of *De senectute* (§§ 77-85), is the theme of death. As Lakoff and Turner show in *More than Cool Reason* (1989), several source domains are conventionally used for speaking about

---

[295] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 141-144.

death in the English language.[296] As will be shown in this section, many of the metaphorical concepts they discovered when they investigated English are also found in *De senectute*. These include especially the theme of extinction (LIFE IS A FIRE), death viewed as departure and the DEATH IS SLEEP concept (at least one clear instance, in § 80). It is also self-evident that in the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, death (usually) corresponds to the end of the journey and that in the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor, death is represented by either the end of the play or the death of an actor on the stage. Target domains such as 'life' and 'death' can not be completely separated from each other since the former is a prerequisite for the other (e.g. the DEATH IS EXTINCTION concept presupposes, and is also a part of, the LIFE IS A FIRE concept.). That the two themes are interrelated is also obvious from the list of common metaphorical concepts for them which is found in *More than Cool Reason*. This list includes, among others, the following concepts: LIFE IS A JOURNEY, DEATH IS DEPARTURE, PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, A LIFETIME IS A YEAR, A LIFETIME IS A DAY, DEATH IS SLEEP, DEATH IS REST, LIFE IS A FLAME, LIFE IS BONDAGE, and LIFE IS A BURDEN.[297] As we see, many of these deal with life as well as death. The target domain 'death' will therefore be touched upon also in the section *Human life as target domain*.

One of the major source domains for death in *De senectute* is that of a fire that goes out:

> cuius [sc. Quinti Maximi] sermone ita cupide fruebar, quasi iam divinarem, id quod evenit, illo **exstincto** fore unde discerem neminem. (§12)

> o miserum senem qui mortem contemnendam esse in tam longa aetate non viderit! quae aut plane neglegenda est, si omnino **exstinguit animum**, aut etiam optanda si aliquo eum deducit ubi sit futurus aeternus; atque tertium certe nihil inveniri potest. (§66)

> quid est autem tam secundum naturam quam senibus emori? quod idem contingit adulescentibus adversante et repugnante natura. itaque adulescentes mihi mori sic videntur ut cum aquae multitudine flammae vis opprimitur, senes autem sic ut cum sua sponte nulla adhibita vi consumptus ignis **exstinguitur** […] (§71)

---

[296] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 1-26.
[297] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 52.

(I was, at that time, as eager to profit by his [sc. Quintus Maximus']
conversation as if I already foresaw what, in fact, came to pass, that, when
he was gone, I should have no one from whom to learn.

O wretched indeed is that old man who has not learned in the course of his
long life that death should be held on no account! For clearly death is
negligible, if it utterly annihilates the soul, or even desirable, if it conducts
the soul to some place where it is to live forever. Surely no other alternative
can be found.

[…] and indeed, what is more consonant with nature than for the old to die?
But the same fate befalls the young, though Nature in their case struggles
and rebels. Therefore, when the young die I am reminded of a strong flame
extinquished by a torrent; but when old men die it is as if a fire had gone out
without the use of force and of its own accord, after the fuel had been
consumed […])

exstinguo cannot in any manner be said to be a novel metaphor in Latin in Cicero's
time.[298] According to OLD, the passive sense, 'to die', is first found in Cicero, but,
there are examples of the active sense, 'to kill', from Terence. *exstinguo* recurs
when Cicero/Cato speaks about death in *De senectute*. In the majority of the
examples, the metaphor describes the actual moment of death, but in the passage
from § 71 above the metaphor is more elaborated. It develops the *natura* theme
and makes the point that a fire – and a human life – has a natural course. An old
person's life ends in accordance with nature, while the death of a young person is
contrary to it. The water that appears in the simile cannot be easily transferred to
the target domain but the point is clearly that it stops the fire from having its
natural course.

The other main category of metaphors for referring to death is the orientational
metaphors. In one type of these, Cato speaks about the old person as being situated
'close to' death:

[…] quattuor reperio causas cur senectus misera videatur: […] quartam quod
haud procul absit a morte. (§15)

Non enim video cur quid ipse sentiam de morte non audeam vobis dicere,
quod eo cernere mihi melius videor, quo **ab ea propius absum**. (§ 77)

---

[298] Some early examples are Terence, *Adelphoe* 314, '*seni animam exstinguerem ipsi*' ,
and Plautus, *Pseudolus* 906 '*di me servatum volunt esse et lenonem exstinctum*'.

154

([...] I find four reasons why old age appears to be unhappy: [...] fourth, that it is not far removed from death.

Really I do not see why I should not venture to tell you what I, myself, think of death; for it seems to me that I apprehend it better as I draw nearer to it.)

In another type the person is said to approach death:

quae [sc. maturitas] quidem mihi tam iucunda est, ut **quo propius ad mortem accedam**, quasi terram videre videar aliquandoque in portum ex longa navigatione esse venturus. (§71)

[...] **appropinquatio mortis**, quae certe a senectute non potest esse longe.(§66)

(To me, indeed, the thought of this "ripeness" for death is so pleasant, that the nearer I approach death the more I feel like one who is in sight of land at last and is about to anchor in his home port after a long voyage.)

[...] the nearness of death; for death, in truth, cannot be far away.)

These expressions can be connected to the *path schema*. A path, as Johnson describes it, has a beginning, a line of movement, and an end, and this can easily be transferred to the target domain 'life'. If we argue this way, some of the expressions above can be said to emphasize the person's location on the path, and some of them his or hers movement along it. This is reasonable if we accept the *path schema* as a general metaphor for life in *De senectute*, but if we concentrate on these particular examples, the only linguistic information that is given is that a person is either moving towards death (described as a place) or being located in a place close to death. It should also be noted that the phrase *appropinquatio mortis* (§66) might be an objective genitive, implying that death is approaching the person, not vice versa. Although there are some other expressions in *De senectute* that express such a thought,[299] it seems less probable that Cicero meant to say this, (the *motif* where the person approaches death prevails in the text) but we cannot completely exclude that interpretation of the sentence, especially not when we study the structure of orientational metaphors.

---

[299] See *obrepit* in § 4 and the quotation from Caecilius in § 25.

In other expressions, death is described as the dying person moving away from life, or from his companions:

> nolite arbitrari, o mihi carissimi filii, me cum **a vobis discessero** nusquam aut nullum fore. (Cyrus quoted by Cato; §79)

> […] **ex vita discedo** tamquam ex hospitio, non tamquam domo […] (§84)

> (Think not, my dearest sons, that, when I have left you, I shall cease to be.

> […] and I quit life as if it were an inn, not a home.)

Lakoff and Turner link the metaphorical concept DEATH IS DEPARTURE to other metaphorical concepts such as LIFE IS PRESENCE HERE and BIRTH IS ARRIVAL.[300] The quotation from Cyrus is probably not a conventional metaphor for Cicero. *Discedo* in the meaning 'to die' is conventional only if '*ex vita*' (as in the other example) or some similar words are added (See OLD 3d on *discedo*). The metaphor *a vobis discessero* instead seems to express a certain degree of solemnity. The other example (§84) rather highlights a view of life than of death (it will be brought up in the section *Life as target domain* also) and extends the metaphor: Cato considers life to be like a stay in a temporary lodging rather than a permanent home. But this view has implications for the target domain 'death' too, since that domain is often related to the target domain 'life'. If life is seen as a *hospitium*, leaving it is not a dramatic but an ordinary event. Again, it is Cato's view of *natura* which is reflected: '*Omnia autem quae secundum naturam fiunt sunt habenda in bonis*.' (§71)

The passages where *discedo* is employed for speaking about death are also related to Cato's statements about the soul leaving the body. The latter expressions (§§80, 84) seem to be meant in a literal rather than metaphorical sense, but will be discussed in the section *The mind and mental capacities as target domains; the soul leaving the body.*

As I mentioned earlier, we also have an example of the DEATH IS SLEEP concept in *De senectute*. Like the majority of the metaphors for death in the dialogue, this simile meets us in the *peroratio* when Cato reflects on death and the afterlife:

---

[300] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 1, 86, 121; Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 205-206.

iam vero videtis nihil esse morti tam simile quam **somnum** […] (Cyrus quoted by Cato; §80)

(Again, you really see nothing resembling death so much as sleep […])

Sleep as a source domain for death has many connotations: peace, rest, the A LIFETIME IS A DAY concept (the night that follows after the day of life) and, for ancient people, the absence of the terrifying underworld. But the passage that follows immediately after the simile clarifies what Cyrus means by the preceding words (and Cato fully agrees with him):

[…] atqui dormientium animi maxime declarant divinitatem suam; multa enim cum remissi et liberi sunt futura prospiciunt: ex quo intelligitur quales futuri sint cum se plane corporum vinculis relaxaverint. (§81)

([…] and yet it is when the body sleeps that the soul most clearly manifests its divine nature; for when it is unfettered and free it sees many things that are to come. Hence we know what the soul's future state will be when it has been wholly released from the shackles of the flesh.)

The human souls are liberated during sleep, Cyrus says, and while sleeping they can see what life after death will be like. When they are (partially) released from the 'chains' of the bodies they can understand their own divine nature. This is expressed by complex metaphorical connections: *vinculis*, which the reader primarily understands as chains fettering the body, refer instead to the bodies themselves, which are metaphorically described as fetters for the souls.

Agricultural metaphors, as we saw in the section *Plants and vegetable life as source domains*, are mainly employed to describe the cultivation of friendship and the virtues, but the connection ripeness/harvest – death is of course inherent in the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS metaphor. This aspect of the PEOPLE ARE PLANTS metaphor is especially stressed in the agricultural simile in § 71:

[…] quasi **poma ex arboribus cruda si sunt vi evelluntur**, si matura et cocta decidunt, sic vitam adulescentibus vis aufert, senibus maturitas […] (§71)

([…] and, just as apples when they are green are with difficulty plucked from the tree, but when ripe and mellow fall of themselves, so, with the young, death comes as a result of force, while with the old it is the result of ripeness.)

One might have expected to find some personifications of death in *De senectute*, but perhaps since Cato tries hard to defuse death, the theme is never developed. The closest we come to a personification of death in *De senectute* is the following passage:

157

quae [sc. mors] aut plane neglegenda est si omnino exstinguit animum, aut etiam optanda si aliquo eum **deducit** ubi sit futurus aeternus […] (§66)

(For clearly death is negligible, if it utterly annihilates the soul, or even desirable, if it conducts the soul to some place where it is to live forever.)

deducit ('leads away') seems to imply a personification, although, characteristically, no details are given about the 'person'. The idea is taken from Plato's *Apology*, which uses the word μετοίκησις for the migration of the soul.[301] Instead, I suggest that we interpret the sentence by means of the EVENTS ARE ACTIONS[302] metaphor, which usually serves to make an event (here: death and the migration of the soul) easier to understand by involving a more or less anonymous actor or an action in it.

3.4. 'Human life' as target domain

In this section, my intention has been to distinguish the target domain 'human life' in itself from related target domains such as time and emotions. The latter domains constitute, of course, aspects of 'human life', but not life seen as a whole. In this section, the metaphors that describe life as a whole have been gathered, although this delimitation is difficult to maintain. For a full understanding of life as a target domain, the reader will have to study several other sections in this chapter, the target domain life being one of the richest and most many-faceted of all.

Certain Lakoff-Johnsonian concepts that deal with life, such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY, LIFE IS A FLAME and A LIFETIME IS A DAY usually have individual lives as target domains, while several, and sometimes all, people's lives constitute the target domain in a concept such as LIFE IS A PLAY. This distinction must also be kept in mind. I will start by recalling the central source domains which are used for speaking about life in *De senectute* and which were discussed in the chapter about source domains. In that chapter, we saw how the theatrical stage recurs as a metaphor for life by means of the LIFE IS A PLAY metaphor. We saw how the last act of a play in particular, corresponding to *senectus* in the target domain, was emphasized in several of Cato's statements, and how people could take both the actors' and the spectators' roles in the metaphors

---

[301] Plato, *Apology of Socrates* 40c.
[302] Lakoff & Turner 1989, 37-38.

and similes that were used (§ 5, 48, 64, 70, 85). We also found that the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor was employed, especially in the passages with the word *viaticum* (§ 66), in the verbs having to do with arrival (§ 4, 19, 85), in the simile about the harbour of death (§ 72), and in the 'sceletal structure' of the concept that was employed when Scipio asked Cato to account for his 'journey of life' (§ 6).

It was shown in the sections *Offices and duties as source domains* and *Weapons and warfare as source domains,* that when life is compared to a task or duty, the connections to civic duties were weak, only intimidated (§ 72, 77), while military duties stood forth as a more outspoken metaphorical source domain for 'the duty of life', especially in §§ 72-73:

> ita fit ut illud breve vitae reliquum nec avide appetendum senibus nec sine causa **deserundum** sit; vetatque Pythagoras iniussu **imperatoris**, id est dei, de **praesidio** et **statione vitae decedere**. (§§ 72-73)
>
> (Hence, it follows that old men ought neither to cling to fondly to their little remnant of life, nor give it up without a cause. Pythagoras bids us to stand like faithful sentries and not quit our post until God, our Captain, gives the word.)

Whenever the DEATH IS DEPARTURE metaphor is employed, the target domain 'life' is also brought into play, and corresponds to presence as opposed to departure (the LIFE IS PRESENCE HERE metaphor[303]), but the expressions that connect to these concepts in *De senectute* stress departure rather than the presence in life (§ 79, 82) . An exception to this is the simile in § 84:

> […] et ex vita **discedo** tamquam ex **hospitio**, non tamquam **domo**. commorandi enim natura **deversorium** nobis, non habitandi dedit. (§84)
>
> (…and I quit life as if it were an inn, not a home. For Nature has given us an hostelry in which to sojourn, not to abide.)

where the source domain is elaborated by the use of *domus, hospitium,* and *deversorium,* which terms stress the transient nature of life in the target domain.

The function of the LIFE IS A FIRE metaphor in *De senectute* (e.g. in §§ 12, 66, 71) is analoguous to that of DEATH IS DEPARTURE. Just as departure

---

[303] Lakoff & Johnson 1989, 10-20.

rather than presence is highlighted in the latter concept, so the extinction of the fire, not the burning fire (of life), is emphasized in the former.

In the cases where we find the metaphorical concepts PEOPLE ARE PLANTS and A LIFETIME IS A YEAR (§§ 5, 70, 71), these concepts play down the analogy to life as a whole (which corresponds to the growing of the plants, from seeds to withering or harvest) and instead emphasize the parallels youth – spring and old age – ripeness.

In some instances, words having to do with measures and satiety are also employed for speaking about life (§§ 76, 84). These expressions, which include the nouns *modus* and *satietas* and are connected to the metaphorical concepts LIFE IS A SUBSTANCE, or perhaps LIFE IS FOOD, inculcate Cato's view that there comes a time for every person when he or she has had enough of life.

The metaphors where a race or a competition functions as a source domain for life (§§ 14, 83) describe the repeated efforts needed for a successful life rather than life as a race from start to goal. The quotation from Ennius (§14) draws the parallel between an old race-horse and a *senex* who looks back on a successful life, and especially stresses the satisfaction connected to the memories of earlier victories and former success.

Almost at the very end of the dialogue, Cato speaks about the earth that he is about to leave. He calls life 'chaos' and 'turmoil' (*turba et colluvione*):

> o praeclarum diem, cum ad illud divinum animorum consilium coetumque proficiscar, cumque ex hac **turba** et **colluvione** discedam! (§84)

> (O glorious day, when I shall set out to join the assembled hosts of souls divine and leave this world of strife and sin!)

The nouns *turba* and *colluvio* should probably be interpreted as instances of metonymy. Cato stresses the chaotic and dirty aspects of life as characteristic of life in general. In order to give a more positive picture of life after death he constrasts it with a negative description of life on earth. One might add that few target domains are as multifaceted and rich as human life and that every metaphor which is used for it necessarily has to diminish it and highlight certain aspects of it.

3.5. Emotions as target domains

Generally speaking, Cato is reticent in a Stoic way when he is talking about emotions in *De senectute*. We find, however, a few examples of metaphors that serve to express different feelings:

Sorrow after a loss is expressed by the DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS metaphor: Cato praises Quintus Maximus for having endured the loss of his son in a dignified way:

160

multa in eo viro [sc. Quinto Maximo] praeclara cognovi, sed nihil admirabilius quam quomodo ille mortem fili **tulit**, clari viri et consularis […] (§12)

(Many are the remarkable things I have observed in that great man, but nothing more striking than the manner in which he bore the death of his distinguished son, a former consul.)

The metaphor emphasizes Maximus' Stoic strength of mind.[304] We have also seen earlier how the DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS concept is employed in the beginning of the dialogue for speaking about the worries connected with ageing. Feelings of concern and anxiety are also formulated in words where the anxious person is being (metaphorically) shaken and agitated:

Cicero: et tamen te [sc. Atticum] suspicor eisdem rebus quibus me ipsum interdum gravius **commoveri**[305] […] (§1)

[…] quamquam certo scio non ut Flaminium '**sollicitari** te Tite sic noctesque diesque'.[306] (§1)

(Nevertheless I suspect that you, at times, are quite seriously perturbed by the same circumstances which are troubling me; but to find comfort for them is too difficult a task to be undertaken now and must be deferred until another time.)

(And yet I am perfectly sure that it cannot be said of you, as the poet said of Flaminius: 'You fret and worry, Titus, day and night' […])

During his investigation of the English language, Zoltan Kövecses coined the conceptual metonymy PHYSICAL AGITATION STANDS FOR FEAR.[307] Cicero's words are about anxiety rather than fear, but clearly connect to this concept, the underlying idea being the same.

---

[304] OLD quotes Plautus, *Miles Gloriosus* 1343 '*fer aequo animo*' as the earliest instance of *ferre* in this sense (OLD 16).

[305] The first attested instance of *commoveo* in this sense is Terence, *Phormio* 101 '*commorat omnis nos*' (OLD 8).

[306] *Sollicito* seems to have some connection to physical movement or stirring. Cf *sollicitus*. Forcellini writes: '*SOLLICITO proprie est loco moveo, agito, labefacto*'.

[307] Kövecses 1990, 70; Kövecses 2000, 24.

When Cato speaks of disdain (an attitude but also an emotion) he employs the GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN concepts (*despici*) and an orientational metaphor of separation (*spernerentur*):

[…] ac morositas tamen et ea vitia quae dixi, habent aliquid excusationis, non illius quidem iustae, sed quae probare posse videatur; contemni se putant, **despici**,[308] inludi; praeterea in fragili corpore odiosa omnis offensio est. (§65)

quae Gaius Salinator, quae Spurius Albinus, homines nostri fere aequales deplorare solebant! – tum quod voluptatibus carerent, sine quibus vitam nullam putarent, tum quod **spernerentur**[309] ab eis a quibus essent coli soliti. (§7)

(Yet moroseness and the other faults mentioned have some excuse, not a sufficient one, but such as it may seem possible to allow, in that old men imagine themselves ignored, despiced, and mocked at; and besides, when the body is weak, the lightest blow gives pain.

([…] complaints made also by the ex-consuls, Gaius Salinator and Spurius Albinus, who were almost my equals in years, wherein they used to lament, now because they were denied the sensual pleasures without which they thought life not life at all, and now because they were scorned by the people who had been wont to pay them court.)

No more than the other metaphors used for emotions (the ones discussed above in this section) are the metaphors for disdain novel or unconventional. This is also valid for the words Cato chooses when he talks about desire for learning, gratitude and contentness (perhaps with the exception of the word *sitis* ('thirst for knowledge'; §26) which is not attested before Cicero). For these themes, the text combines the metaphorical concepts THE MIND IS A BODY (which expresses metaphorical hunger and thirst), SIGNIFICANT IS BIG (*magnam gratiam*, *aviditatem auxit*) and the ABSTRACT ENTITIES (here: emotions) ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS (*sustulit*, implying that the *aviditas* can be removed):

---

[308] *Despicio* in the sense of 'to disdain' is first found in Cicero, but Plautus have *despicor* with the same meaning (Plautus, *Casina* 186 '*pessumis me modis despicatur*').
[309] The earliest attested example of *sperno* in the sense of 'to disdain' is Ennius, *Annales* 269 '*spernitur orator bonus, horridus miles amatur*' (OLD 2).

quas [sc. litteras Graecas] quidem sic avide arripui, **quasi** diuturnam **sitim**[310] explere cupiens, ut ea ipsa mihi nota essent quibus me nunc exemplis uti videtis. (§26)

[…] habeoque senectuti **magnam** gratiam, quae mihi sermonis aviditatem **auxit**, potionis et cibi **sustulit**. (§46)

[…] **satietas vitae** tempus maturum mortis adfert. (§76)

([…] Greek, which I have seized upon as eagerly as if I had been desirous of satisfying a long-continued thirst, with the result that I have acquired first-hand the information which you see me using in this discussion by way of illustration.

[…] and I am profoundly grateful to old age, which has increased my eagerness for conversation and taken away that for food and drink.

[…] man has had his fill of life and the time is ripe for him to go.)

The emotion which Cato dwells on more than any other is that of *voluptas*, pleasure. It should be noted that when he speaks of *voluptas*, he refers not only to the feeling but also to the corruptive consequences of it – and of the craving for it. Cato's Stoic values make him hostile to *voluptas*. It is as if he wants to place it outside of himself, dissociate himself from it, and this has certain consequences for the metaphors that are used for it. *Voluptas* is repeatedly described as an enemy. The clearest example of this is found in § 46, where Cato considers 'declaring war' against it:

quod si quem etiam ista delectant (ne omnino **bellum indixisse** videar **voluptati**, cuius est fortasse quidam naturalis modus), non intellego ne in istis quidem ipsis voluptatibus carere sensu senectutem. (§46)

(But if there are any who find delight in such things (that I may by no means seem to have declared war on every kind of pleasure, when, perhaps, a certain amount of it is justified by nature), then I may say that I am not

---

[310] Perhaps *sitis* in a transferred sense was not established in Cicero's time. Here, at least, he adds *quasi* when he uses the word, but in *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 6 it is employed without such a marker: '*neque umquam expletur nec satiatur cupiditatis sitis*'. I have not found any examples of the transferred sense in the earlier authors.

aware that old age is altogether wanting in appreciation even of these very pleasures.)

Here I quote a longer passage in order to show Cato's view on *voluptas* and what metaphors he employs to express it:

Sequitur tertia vituperatio senectutis, quod eam carere dicunt voluptatibus. o praeclarum munus aetatis, siquidem id **aufert** a nobis quod est in adulescentia vitiossissimum! accipite enim, optimi adulescentes, veterem orationem Archytae Tarentini, magni in primis et praeclari viri, quae mihi tradita est cum essem adulescens Tarenti cum Quinto Maximo. nullam capitaliorem **pestem**[311] quam voluptatem corporis hominibus dicebat a natura datam, cuius voluptatis avidae libidines temere et ecfrenate ad potiundum **incitarentur**; **hinc** patriae proditiones, hinc rerum publicarum eversiones, **hinc** cum hostibus clandestina colloquia **nasci**; nullum denique scelus, nullum malum facinus esse, ad quod suscipiendum non libido voluptatis **impelleret**; stupra vero et adulteria et omne tale flagitium nullis excitari illecebris nisi voluptatis; cumque homini sive natura sive quis deus nihil mente praestabilius dedisset, huic divino muneri ac dono nihil tam esse **inimicum** quam voluptatem; nec enim libidine dominante **temperantiae locum esse**; neque omnino in voluptatis **regno** virtutem posse **consistere**.(§§39-41)

(We now come to the third ground for abusing old age, and that is, that it is devoid of sensual pleasures. O glorius boon of old age, if it does indeed free us from youth's most vicious fault! Now listen, most noble young men, to what that remarkably great and distinguished man, Archytas of Tarentum, said in an ancient speech repeated to me when I was a young man serving with Quintus Maximus at Tarentum: "No more deadly curse", said he, "has been given by nature to man than carnal pleasure, through eagerness for which the passions are driven recklessly and uncontrollably to its gratification. From it come treason and the overthrow of states; and from it spring secret and corrupt conferences with public foes. In short, there is no criminal purpose and no evil deed which the lust for pleasure will not drive men to undertake. Indeed, rape, adultery and every like offence are set in motion by the enticements of pleasure and by nothing else; and since nature – or som god perhaps – has given to man nothing more excellent than his intellect, therefore this divine gift has no deadlier foe than pleasure; for

---

[311] OLD's distinctions between the different meanings of *pestis* are perhaps too subtle, but it seems that the sense that we have here, 'an instrument of ruin' (OLD 5), is not attested before Cicero.

where lust holds despotic sway self-control has no place, and in pleasure's realm there is not a single spot where virtue can put her foot.)

In the passage quoted, we first have a metaphor of removal: old age carries away (*aufert*) the vices of youth. Then *voluptas* is compared to a disease (*pestem*). There is the FORCE metaphor (emphasized by Kövecses as a central notion for emotions[312]) in *incitarentur* and *impelleret*. *hinc* and *nasci* can be tied to the CREATION IS BIRTH metaphor, and point to *voluptas* as the origin or cause of a number of vices. The words *nec enim libidine dominante temperantiae locum esse* combine the FORCE metaphor (temperance being squeezed out) with a metaphor of location or perhaps the CONTAINER metaphor; the rest of the sentence specifies the place/location as a kingdom over which *voluptas* and *virtus* – or *libido* and *temperantia* – fight. The large number of metaphors in this passage work together to blacken and disparage *voluptas*.

In an expression which follows shortly after, Cato changes to metaphors having to do with light and darkness in order to express how *voluptas* extinguishes the light of reason:

> quocirca nihil esse tam detestabile tamque pestiferum quam voluptatem, siquidem ea cum maior esset atque longinquor, omne animi lumen **exstingueret**. (§41)

> (Hence there is nothing so hateful and so pernicious as pleasure, since, if indulged in too much and too long, it turns the light of the soul into utter darkness.)

The same theme is varied when he speaks about *voluptas* as the enemy of reason (*ratio*), blinding the 'eyes of the soul':

> impedit enim consilium voluptas, rationi **inimica** est, mentis ut ita dicam **praestringit** oculos […] (§42)

> (For carnal pleasure hinders deliberation, is at war with reason, blindfolds the eyes of the mind, so to speak, and has no fellowship with virtue.)

The clearest example of a personification of *voluptas* appears when Cato quotes Sophocles:

---

[312] Kövecses 2000, 61-86.

bene Sophocles cum ex eo quidam iam adfecto aetate quaereret, utereturne rebus veneriis, 'di meliora!', inquit, 'libenter vero istinc **sicut ab domino agresti ac furioso profugi**!' (§47)

(It was an excellent reply that Sophocles made to a certain man who asked him, when he was already old, if he still indulged in the delights of love. "Heaven forbid!" he said. "Indeed I have fled from them as from a harsh and cruel master.")

Although the term *rebus veneriis*, not *voluptas,* is used here, it is obvious from the context that the simile refers to *voluptas*. The metaphorical 'person' stands out with characteristic traits: hot temper, boorishness, and a position of power over Sophocles. Typically, since the source domain contains details, we find a simile instead of a metaphor. The quotation develops the theme of *voluptas* taking power of the mind and enslaving *ratio*. This theme is combined, as has been pointed out earlier, with an orientational metaphor: Sophocles escaping from a place or centre (*profugi*).

Commerce functions in one instance as a metaphor for the relation between *virtus* and *voluptas*:

> [...] mentis ut ita dicam praestringit oculos [sc. voluptas], nec habet ullum cum virtute **commercium**.[313] (§42)

> [carnal pleasure] blindfolds the eyes of the mind, so to speak, and has no fellowship [sc. 'business] with virtue.)

The choice of words accentuates the estrangement between the two. No balance or positive exchange between them can be achieved. They are enemies of each other by their very nature.

Nevertheless, there is also a positive side to *voluptas* for Cato. He speaks of the pleasures of agriculture (*voluptates agricolarum*; § 51) and of studies and literary interests. *Voluptas* can be accepted if it is enjoyed in moderate quantities, and here we find metaphors having to do with measures and amounts:

> ne omnino bellum indixisse videar voluptati, cuius est fortasse quidam naturalis **modus** (§46)

---

[313] OLD quotes Plautus, *Aulularia* 631 '*quid tibi mecum est commerci?*' as the earliest example of *commercium* in this sense.

[…] neque enim ipsorum conviviorum delectationem voluptatibus corporis magis quam coetu amicorum et sermonibus **metiebar**. (§45)

([…] that I may by no means seem to have declared war on every kind of pleasure, when, perhaps, a certain amount [sc. 'measure'] of it justified by nature […]

(Nor, indeed, did I measure my delight in these social gatherings more by the physical pleasure than by the pleasure of meeting and conversing with my friends.)

Finally I would like to mention a short simile in which Cato describes the nature of *voluptas* in old men:

At non est voluptatum tanta **quasi titillatio** in senibus. (§47)

(But it may be urged that, in old men, "pleasure's tingling" if I may so call it, is not so great.)

Cato seems to mean that in (wise) old men *voluptas* has become a feeling which can be controlled. The negative side of it, where it turns into a *dominus agrestis et furiosus,* is gone and the positive side, genuine pleasure under the control of *virtus*, can be enjoyed in a small-scale manner.

3.6. Speech as target domain

One might consider the following words by Cato to be a personification of speech:

Cicero: Iam enim ipsius Catonis **sermo explicabit** nostram omnem de senectute sententiam. (§3)

(For from now on the words of Cato himself will completely unfold to you my own views on old age.)

but as I showed in the section *Personification*, not enough information is given in the source domain to allow us to speak of such a feature. It is true that *explico* is often used with a person as subject (See OLD on the verb), but here the meaning of the phrase is just to make it clear that Cicero will use Cato as a mouthpiece for his own reflections.

When Cato employs the verb *splendesco* to describe the voice of a good speaker, we have a more evident instance of a metaphor:

omnino canorum illud in voce [i.e. oratoris] **splendescit** etiam nescioquo pacto in senectute […] (§28)

167

(In old age, no doubt, the voice actually gains (I know not how) that magnificent resonance […])

OLD and Forcellini give no earlier example of *splendesco* for describing the quality of a voice than this one (OLD c). The qualities of light and lustre are transferred to a human voice in a synaesthetic way. Continuing his description, Cato employs the following words:

> sed tamen est decorus seni sermo quietus et remissus, facitque per sepse sibi audientiam diserti senis **compta** et mitis oratio. (§28)

> […] and yet the style of speech that graces the old man is subdued and gentle, and very often the sedate ['combed'] and mild speaking of an eloquent old man wins itself a hearing.)[314]

The perfect participle *comptus* means 'adorned', 'decorated' (OLD 1) but perhaps here also 'combed' (OLD 2 on *como,* TLL III, 1992-1993). The metaphor that an old person's speech should be 'combed', i.e. carefully put in order, makes sense in the context. It would compensate for the loss of strength in the voice and is present at least as a connotation in the passage, a connotation which is strengthened by the phonological similarity to *coma* (the words have very different etymological backgrounds).

Most of Cato's opinions about the ability of old men to speak well are gathered in §§ 28-32. Here, he also praises the Homeric Nestor as a model for old men and quotes *Iliad* I.*249* (translated to Latin prose):

> 'ex eius [sc. Nestoris] lingua **melle dulcior** fluebat oratio' (§31)

> ("Speech sweeter than honey flowed from his tongue")

By another instance of synaesthesia, Cato here describes the sound and content of Nestor's words by comparing them to honey.[315] But would the listeners have to repeat Nestor's words in order to 'taste' them? It is tempting to involve the movement of a mouth, present in both speaking and eating, in the mapping of the

---

[314] Some changes have been made in the translation of this passage since Falconer has chosen another reading than Powell.
[315] Another early example of *mel* to describe speech is *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4.33.44, '*cuius ore sermo melle dulcior profluebat*'.

comparison, but this is constrained by the fact that a listener does not have to open or move his mouth. Therefore, the words can be mapped in the following way:

Source domain   *Target domain*

Honey   Speech
Listening   Tasting, eating

but we cannot add 'speaking' and a corresponding 'tasting' to the domains, unless we argue that Nestor enjoys his own voice, which is clearly not what Cato intends to say – it would go against his general argumentation in the dialogue to suggest vanity in an old man.

Michael Reddy's article *The Conduit metaphor* was discussed in the first chapter of this thesis and George Lakoff has acknowledged that it inspired the theories that were developed in *Metaphors we live by*. The conduit metaphor describes how communication is often viewed as a reciprocal process of sending and receiving 'packets' of information in the English language. No clear examples of this type of metaphor are found in *De senectute*, but when Cato speaks of a dissertation that he heard in his youth by Archytas Tarentinus, the verbs have the double meaning of receiving a concrete object and an abstract concept (here: the speech or teaching):

> **accipite**[316] enim, optimi adulescentes, veterem orationem Archytae Tarentini, magni in primis et praeclari viri, quae mihi **tradita est** cum essem adulescens Tarenti cum Quinto Maximo. (§39)
>
> (Now listen [sc. 'receive'], most noble young men, to what that remarkably great and distinguished man, Archytas of Tarentum, said in an ancient speech repeated [sc. 'handed'] to me when I was a young man serving with Quintus Maximus at Tarentum.)

Cato makes use of the metaphorical concept ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS in order to describe how he received the teaching and took it to his heart. In *De senectute*, the verb *accipio* recurs in a similar sense several times (§§ 13, 16, 41, 60).

---

[316] *Accipio* in a sense similar to the one in the quotation is found in e.g. Terence, *Hecyra* 607 '*quem cum istuc sermonem habueris, accepi, uxor*'.

In the section *Personification*, we also saw that Cato several times brings quotations, where personification is used, into the text. In § 50, persuasiveness, Πειθώ in Greek, is personified:

> Marcum vero Cethegum, quem recte '**Suadae medullam**' dixit Ennius, quanto studio exerceri in dicendo videbamus etiam senem! (§50)

> (Then, too, there was Marcus Cethegus, whom Ennius justly styled "the marrow of eloquence". What enthusiasm I saw him also display in his public speeches, although he was an old man!)

According to Powell, the personified *Suada*, a translation of the Greek word, is Ennius' invention.[317] The metaphor functions well to praise Marcus Cethegus (consul in 204 BC) as the very essence or definition of pervasive speech. *Medulla* in a metaphorical sense, but with another nuance, is found also in Plautus.[318]

Finally, we have Cato's references to his own speech, '*sed redeo a me ipsum*', '*quorsus tam multa de Maximo*', *etc*. These expressions were discussed in the section *Orientation in space as source domain* and I argued that it is possible to view them as a person that is moving around from place to place in an area, the places corresponding to different subjects and Cato's varying thoughts to the movement of his body.

3.7. 'Natura' as target domain

The Stoic idea of *natura* has a prominent role in Cato's speech and argumentation, his general claim being that a good life is lived in accordance with *natura*, while a bad way of life is contrary to it. The many-faceted meaning of the concept of *natura* forces him to use a great number of source domains to speak about it. It is personified as a leader, a poet, and a craftsman. When Cato speaks about the right way of life, he says:

> […] in hoc sumus sapientes, quod **naturam, optimam ducem**, tamquam deum **sequimur** eique **paremus**. (§5)

---

[317] Powell 1988, 204.
[318] Plautus, *Stichus* 340, '*ego perii, quoi medullas lassitudo perbibit*'.

([…] I am wise because I follow Nature as the best of guides and obey her as a god […])

The phrase comes close in meaning to the following one, even if the latter stresses the 'right road', as an idea that denotes acceptance of one's fate and ethic behaviour, rather than *natura* as the guide or leader[319]:

[…] una **via naturae** eaque simplex […] (§33)

(Nature has only a single path and that path is run but once […])

Since the verb *sequor* is used (see the quotation from § 5 above) together with *natura* it seems necessary to suggest the connection also with the following phrase:

Omnia autem quae **secundum naturam** fiunt sunt habenda in bonis; quid est autem tam **secundum naturam** quam senibus emori? (§71)

(Moreover, whatever befalls in accordance with [sc. 'following'] Nature should be accounted good; and indeed, what is more consonant with Nature than for the old to die?)

As has been shown earlier, *natura* is also depicted as the writer of the play of life in one of the theatre similes in the dialogue (§ 5). In this simile, Cato wants to defend old age by claiming that the wise *natura* cannot have failed in writing a good 'last act' of life:

a qua [sc. natura] non veri simile est, cum ceteras partes aetatis bene descriptae sint, **extremum actum** tamquam ab inerti poeta esse neglectum […] (§5)

([…] and since she has fitly planned the other acts of life's drama, it is not likely that she has neglected the final act as if she were a careless playwright.)

---

[319] See also the section *Journeys as source domains* for a discussion of *natura* and the 'right way'.

The third way in which *natura* is personified in the dialogue is when it is likened to a craftsman. The builder of a house or a ship (the human body in the target domain) is also the person most suited for tearing them apart:

> sed vivendi est finis optimus cum integra mente certisque sensibus opus ipsa suum eadem quae coagmentavit natura dissolvit. **ut navem, ut aedificium idem destruit facillime qui construxit, sic hominem eadem quae conglutinavit natura dissolvit**; iam omnis **conglutinatio recens aegre, inveterata facile divellitur**. (§72)

> (But the most desirable end of life is that which comes when the mind is clear and the faculties are unimpaired, when Nature herself takes apart the work which she has put together. As the builder most readily destroys the ship or the house which he has built, so Nature is the agent best fitted to give dissolution to her creature, man. Now every structure when newly built is hard to pull apart, but the old and weather-beaten house comes easily down.)

By these personifications, Cato expresses his confidence in *natura* and its wisdom. The personified *Natura*, as he sees it, makes no mistakes, and if one just follows and obeys her, all difficulties, including that of old age, become possible to overcome.

Not living in accordance with *natura* is repeatedly described in terms of war and struggle. Although Cato speaks about a 'deus' in the second example, it is obvious from the context that he refers to *natura*:

> quod idem [sc. mors] contingit adulescentibus **adversante** et **repugnante natura**. (§71)

> […] vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est dei, de **praesidio et statione vitae decedere**.(§72)

> (But the same fate befalls the young, though nature in their case struggles and rebels.)

> Pythagoras bids us stand like faithful sentries and not quit our post until God, our captain, gives the word.)

In a comparison in § 5, the refusal to accept ageing is also described as 'fighting against' *natura*. Such a behaviour is compared to the failed mythological war of the giants against the Greek gods:

> quid est enim aliud **Gigantum modo bellare cum dis** nisi **naturae repugnare**? (§5)

> (For what is warring againt the gods, as the giants did, other than fighting against nature?)

172

I also want to point to a typical use of the CONTAINER metaphor having to do with *natura*. As I showed in the section *Containers as source domains,* this source domain is usually only hinted at, not sketched in detail, perhaps because a detailed description would confuse the reader when he or she transfers it to the target domain. When Cato gives his view of the afterlife, the allegedly 'Pythagorian' (§78) but in fact rather Platonic vision, is described in the following way[320]:

> sic persuasi mihi, sic sentio: cum tanta celeritas animorum sit, tanta memoria praeteritorum futurorumque prudentia, tot artes, tantae scientiae, tot inventa, non posse eam **naturam** quae res eas **contineat** esse mortalem […] (§78)

> (That is my conviction, that is what I believe – since such is the lightning-like rapidity of the soul, such its wonderful memory of things that are past, such its ability to forecast the future, such its mastery of many arts, sciences and inventions, that its nature, which encompasses all these thing,s cannot be mortal […])

It is tempting to translate *contineat* with 'keep or hold together' (OLD 3), but the verb can also mean 'to contain' (OLD 8-11). If this second nuance is emphasized, Cicero compares *natura* – or the soul – to a container, a wording which serves to praise the greatness of *natura* in the target domain. But as in several other cases with the source domain CONTAINER in the dialogue, this sense is only slightly hinted at, not clearly stated.

Natura as a target domain is also combined with the source domain 'wine' when Cato reflects that some, but not all, men become greedy or irascible when they grow old. Here, *natura* is not used in its wider, philosophical sense but refers to the individual character of different people:

> ut enim non omne **vinum**, sic non omnis **natura vetustate coacescit**.[321] (§65)

> ([…] as it is not every wine, so it is not every disposition, that grows sour with age.)

As Cato sees it, the difference is in the quality of the wine; a fine wine keeps its good taste, even as it is ageing.

---

[320] See Plato, *Timaeus* 47c.
[321] For parallels to this simile in Greek comedy, see Powell (ed.) 1988, 237-238.

Natura and the metaphors and similes that are used to described it are interesting in that they constitute one of the few themes in *De senectute* where a typical Graeco-Roman way of thinking can be discerned. While the majority of the metaphorical concepts that are discussed in this thesis show a striking similarity to the findings of Lakoff, Johnson, and Kövecses in the English language, *natura* as a target domain stands forth as an idea strongly tied to Graeco-Roman culture.

3.8. Political states as target domains

When Cato speaks about states or republics, one simile and one metaphor stand forth as the central ones in *De senectute*. The simile meets us when Cato refutes the first complaint against old age, i.e. that it makes people inactive. He gives many examples of old men who lived an active life and also compares the state to a ship where an old man sits by the rudder[322]:

> nihil igitur adferunt qui in re gerenda versari senectutem negant**, similesque sunt ut si qui gubernatorem in navigando nihil agere dicant, cum alii malos scandant, alii per foros cursent, alii sentinam exhauriant, ille autem clavum tenens quietus sedeat in puppi. non facit ea quae iuvenes, at vero multo maiora et meliora facit.** (§17)

> Those, therefore, who allege that old age is devoid of useful activity adduce nothing to the purpose, and are like those who would say that the pilot does nothing in the sailing of the ship, because, while others are climbing the masts, or running about the gangways, or working at the pumps, he sits quietly in the stern and simply holds the tiller. He may not be doing what younger members of the crew are doing, but what he does is better and much more important.

While the younger members of the crew move around, performing different tasks, the old man takes the important decisions as *gubernator*. In the section *Ships as source domains*, I described the complex mapping of the metaphor A STATE IS A SHIP. But the passage also connects to such metaphorical concepts as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and STATES (conditions) ARE LOCATIONS and to the source domain of the 'right path'. Cato's purpose is clearly to emphasize the role of the elders and tone down that of the young. The metaphor that follows a few paraparaphs later has the same function. Although much less explicit, it compares

---

[322] Plato, *Republic* 488, seems to have influenced Cicero in this passage.

republics to buildings that are demolished by the young and restored and rebuilt by the elderly[323]:

> quodsi legere aut audire voletis externa, maximas res publicas ab adulescentibus **labefactatas**, a senibus **sustentatas** et **restitutas** reperietis. (§20)

> (And indeed, if you care to read or hear foreign history, you will find that the greatest states have been overthrown by the young and sustained and restored by the old.)

We see how the simile and the metaphor have exactly the same purpose: to praise the elderly and the work done by them and to disparage the work and actions of the young.

3.9. Fame and public life as target domains

When Cato speaks of fame and public life, the examples he gives describe men that he admires and considers to have accomplished great things for the Roman republic or the state of Athens. The dominating source domain in this group of metaphors is *light*. The clearest example of this is the anecdote about Themistocles and the description of the son of Scipio Africanus:

> ut Themistocles fertur Seriphio cuidam in iurgio respondisse, cum ille dixisset non eum sua, sed patriae gloria **splendorem** adsecutum: 'nec hercule' inquit, 'si ego Seriphius essem, nec tu si Atheniensis esses **clarus** umquam fuisses.' (§8)

> quam fuit imbecillus Publius Africani filius, is qui te [sc. Scipionem] adoptavit, quam tenui aut nulla potius valetudine! quod ni ita fuisset, alterum illud **exstitisset lumen civitatis**; ad paternam enim magnitudinem animi doctrina uberior accesserat. (§35)

> (For example, there is a story that when, in the course of a quarrel, a certain Seriphian had said to Themistocles: "Your brilliant reputation is due to your country's glory, not your own," Themistocles replied: "True, by Hercules, I

---

[323] Cf especially Cicero, *Epistulae ad Familiares* 2.8.1 '*ut ex tuis litteris, cum formam rei publicae viderim, quale aedificium futurum sit, scire possim*'.

should never have become famous if I had been a Seriphian, nor you if you had been an Athenian."

Note how weak, Scipio, was your adoptive father, the son of Publius Africanus. What feeble health he had, or rather no health at all! But for this he would have shone forth as the second luminary of the state; for to his father's greatness of intellect he had added a more abundant learning.)

As was shown in the section *Light and lustre as source domain*, the adjectives *clarus* (§ 8,12, 22, 77, 80), and *praeclarus* (§ 12, 39), the nouns *splendor* (§8)*, lux* (§12), *lumen* (§35), and the verb *clareo* (§10) recur in *De senectute* and denote fame and honour (*praeclarus, splendor,* and *lumen* also expressing brilliance and talent). As we saw in that section, light and fame are analoguous in many ways, but Cato/Cicero does not elaborate the metaphor in detail. This is probably due to the fact that he considers fame in itself to be less important and more a consequence of virtue and of a way of life in accordance with *natura*.

Other source domains that are used for fame and public life are physical size and orientation in space. Physical size (the IMPORTANT IS BIG concept[324]) comes into play especially by the use of the adjective *magnus* in the sense of 'eminent', 'notable', 'powerful' (§§ 12, 39). Orientational metaphors are found in the following expressions:

nec vero in armis **praestantior** quam in toga [Quintus Maximus] […](§11)

Nec vero ille [Quintus Maximus] in luce modo atque in oculis civium magnus, sed intus domique **praestantior** […] (§12)

(But, indeed, he was not more distinguished in war than in civil life.

Nor was it merely in public and under the gaze of his fellow-citizens that he was great, but he was greater still in the privacy of his home.)

which stress the achievements rather than the fame of the politicians. In Cato's positive descriptions of the senate:

[…] quae [consilium, ratio, sententia] nisi essent in senibus, non **summum consilium** maiores nostri appellassent senatum. apud Lacedaimonios quidem

---

[324] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 50.

176

ei qui **amplissimum magistratum** gerunt, ut sunt sic etiam nominantur senes. (§19)

(If these mental qualities were not characteristic of old men our fathers would not have called their highest deliberative body the "senate". Among the Lakedaimonians, for example, those who fill their chief magistracies are called "elders", as they are in fact.)

we find the GOOD IS UP and VIRTUE IS UP[325] concepts, but also the BIGGER IS BETTER[326] concept in the words '*amplissimum magistatum*'.

3.10. Interpersonal relations as target domains

Interpersonal relations are described by the means of three different kinds of metaphors in *De senectute*. First, we have the verb *colo*.[327] Friendship and relations are frequently cultivated in the text:

ego Quintum Maximum, eum qui Tarentum recepit, senem adulescens ita dilexi ut aequalem; erat enim in illo viro comitate condita gravitas, nec senectus mores mutaverat; quamquam eum **colere** coepi non admodum grandem natu, sed tamen iam aetate provectum. (§10)

ut enim adulescentibus bona indole praeditis sapientes senes delectantur, leviorque fit senectus eorum qui a iuventute **coluntur** et diliguntur, sic adulescentes senum praeceptis gaudent, quibus ad virtutum studia ducuntur […] (§26)

(I was a fond of Quintus Fabius Maximus, who recovered Tarentum, as if he had been of my own age, though he was old and I was young. For there was in him a dignity tempered with courtesy, and age had not altered his disposition; and yet when I began to cultivate him he was not extremely old, though he was well advanced in life.

For just as wise men, when they are old, take delight in the society of youths endowed with sprightly wit, and the burdens of age are rendered lighter to

---

[325] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 14-17.
[326] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 22-24.
[327] An early example of *colo* for describing the cultivation of friendship is Plautus, *Cistellaria* 23 '*merito vostro amo vos, quia me colitis*'.

those who are courted and highly esteemed by the young, so young men find pleasure in their elders, by whose precepts the are led into virtue's paths […])

As I discussed in the section *Plants and agricultural life as source domain*, a reason why *colo* appears so often in this sense is that it so easily maps on to friendship and relations. The metaphor is elaborated when Cato speaks about the cultivation of the virtues (§9), but not when he discusses friendship.

In the second of the quotations above we also note the adjective *aequalis*. With this adjective, a flat surface functions as a source domain. In *De senectute, aequalis* is primarily used in the sense of 'equal in age' (§§7, 10, 46; OLD 2) but the sense 'equal in status' (OLD 3) cannot be completely separated from the former one.[328] In a Roman context, status was also connected with age.

Friendship is also described by the container metaphor in the phrase below, with the implication that an end of the friendship in the target domain corresponds to moving out of the container in the source domain. The container metaphor here seems to stress the security and permanence of the relation between Nearchus Tarentinus and the Roman people:

> […] qui **in amicitia** populi romani **permanserat** […] (§41)

> […] who had remained steadfast in his friendship to the Roman people […]

3.11. Influence as target domain

A target domain which is akin to interpersonal relations – since it often describes aspects of a relationship – is that of influence or effect.[329] As we saw in the section *Physical force as source domain*, the verbs *cogo* and *impello* repeatedly denote metaphorical 'pressure' in *De senectute*, e.g. in phrases such as

> primum quis **coegit** eos falsum putare? (4)

> nec me solum ratio ac disputatio **impulit** ut ita crederem [sc. homines clarissimos mortuos vivere] sed nobilitas etiam summorum philosophorum et auctoritas. (§77)

---

[328] For *aequalis* in the sense of 'equal in status' in Cicero, see e.g. *De amicitia* 32, '*ut [amici] sint pares in amore et aequales*'.
[329] See Johnson 1987, 42-48.

(In the first place, who has forced them to form a mistaken judgement?

Nor have I been driven to this belief solely by the force of reason and of argument, but also by the reputation and authority of philosophers of the highest rank.)

Cogo and *impello*, although of course being conventional for Cicero, add a nuance of concretizing to the influence which is formulated in these examples. Other concrete source domains in *De senectute* denote other aspects of influence. In § 10, Fabius Maximus' way of waging war against Hannibal makes the latter 'soft' ('calmer' in the target domain) and in § 4, no consolation is said to be able to caress (i.e. mitigate) a foolish old age into calmness:

Hic et bella gerebat ut adulescens cum plane grandis esset, et Hannibalem iuveniliter exsultantem patientia sua **molliebat**. […] (§10)

Praeterita enim aetas quamvis longa, cum effluxisset, nulla consolatione **permulcere** posset stultam senectutem. (§4)

(Though quite old he waged war like a young man, and by his patient endurance checked [sc. softened] the boyish impetuosity if Hannibal.

In fact, no lapse of time, however long, once it has slipped away, could solace or soothe [sc. 'caress to peace'] a foolish old age.)

The influence of old men, who lead the young onto the road of virtue, is related to the source domain of the 'right path'. Just like *natura* (§5), the old men can act as guides:

Ut enim adulescentibus bona indole praediti sapientes senes delectantur, leviorque fit senctus eorum qui a iuventute coluntur et diliguntur, sic adulescentes senum praeceptis gaudent, quibus **ad virtutum studia ducuntur** […] (§26)

(For just as wise men, when they are old, take delight in the society of youths endowed with sprightly wit, and the burdens of age are rendered lighter to those who are courted and highly esteemed by the young, so young men find pleasure in their elders, by whose precepts the are led into virtue's paths [...])

Metaphorical 'pressure' or influence connects to several other common metaphorical concepts, especially THE MIND IS A BODY, in the sense that the mental influence is described by pressure on the body, the STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor, since the changed views or attitude in a person is described by him or her being moved to another spot, and, as we saw in the last

example above, the source domain of the 'right path' – and of course the 'wrong path', as with the influence of *voluptas*.

3.12. Human qualities as target domains

In Cato's long dissertation, he gives many examples of virtuous men whose behaviour and attitudes Scipio and Laelius are urged to imitate and follow, and also examples of despicable traits of character that they should fight to overcome in themselves. For this reason, different human qualities are a common metaphorical target domain in *De senectute*.

A quality such as courage is described by means of the 'upright posture' of the soul (with the soul described by the metaphorical concept THE MIND IS A BODY). This idea meets us first in the quotation from Ennius:

'quo vobis **mentes, rectae quae stare solebant**
antehac, dementes sese flexere viai?'(§16)

(Your minds which once did stand erect and strong,
What madness swerves them from their wonted course?)

but also in the description of the courageous Roman soldiers, who march against death in § 75.

Dignity and inconstancy are expressed by means of metaphors having to do with lightness and heaviness. As we saw in the chapter about source domains, heaviness and lightness have double metaphorical meanings. When they depict human qualities in *De senectute*, heaviness is associated with positive values, while lightness has negative connotations:

ut petulantia, ut libido magis est adulescentium quam senum, nec tamen omnium adulescentium sed non proborum, sic ista senilis stultitia quae deliratio appellari solet, **senum levium** est, non omnium. (§36)[330]

[…] erat in illo viro (Quinto Maximo) **comitate condita gravitas** […] (§10)

[…] ferocitas iuvenum et **gravitas** iam **constantis aetatis** […] (§33)

---

[330] See also the use of *levis* in § 63 and, perhaps, 50.

(Just as waywardness and lust are more often found in the young man than in the old, yet not in all who are young, but only in those naturally base; so that senile debility, usually called 'dotage', is a characteristic, not of all old men, but only of those who are weak [sc. 'light'] in mind and will.)

For there was in him a dignity tempered with courtesy […]

[…] the impetuosity of youth, the seriousness of middle life […])

The words *comitate condita gravitas* (§10) also describe the mixture of seriousness and friendliness in Quintus Maximus' character by means of a metaphor linked to taste.[331]

When Cato compares the two brothers in Terence's *Adelphoe*, the harshness of one of them is expressed by the characterization of him as 'hard':

quanta in altero **duritas**, in altero comitas! (§65)

(What a disagreeable ['hard'] nature one of them has, and what an affable disposition has the other!)

Many of these metaphors of human qualities are so self-evident that the reader hardly notices that they are metaphors. Physical size is of course employed to describe eminence or greatness, and tranquility of mind is expressed by means of the source domain of an even surface:

[…] nec vero ille [Quintus Maximus] in luce atque in oculis civium **magnus**, sed intus domique praestantior. (§12)

quam fuit inbecillus Publius Africani filius, is qui te [Scipionem] adoptavit, quam tenui aut nulla potius valetudine! quod ni ita fuisset, alterum illud extitisset lumen civitatis; ad paternam enim **magnitudinem animi** doctrina uberior accesserat. (§35)

novi enim moderationem **animi** tui [Attici] et **aequitatem**[332] […] (§1)

---

[331] Cf the noun *acerbitas* in § 65 which also ties a human quality to the source domain 'taste'.

[332] *Aequitas* (with *animi*) is first found in Cicero: '*tris personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate*' (De oratore 2.102; (OLD 2)).

quid quod sapientissmus quisque **aequissimo animo** moritur, stultissimus **iniquissimo**? (§83)

(Nor was it mearly in public and under the gaze of his fellow-citizens that he was great, but he was greater still in the privacy of his home.

Note how weak, Scipio, was your adoptive father, the son of Publius Africanus. What feeble health he had, or rather no health at all! But for this he would have shone forth as the second luminary of the state; for to his father's greatness of intellect he had added a more abundant learning.

[…] for I know the self-control and the even temper of your mind […]

And what of the fact that the wisest men die with the greatest equanimity, the most foolish with the least?)

For mental strength, the noun *vires (animi)*, with at least some degree of connection to physical strength, occurs repeatedly (§§ 33-34). We have also seen earlier how temperance (*temperantia*) has to fight against *voluptas* in order to preserve its place within the human mind (§ 41), and how *auctoritas* and *virtus* is depicted by means of the GOOD IS UP metaphor:

apex est autem senectutis auctoritas […] [333] (§60)

[…] Lysander Lacedaimonius, vir **summae virtutis** […] (§59)

(But the crowning glory of old age is influence.

[…] Lysander the Spartan, a man of the highest virtue […])

Virtues in general must be cultivated in order to blossom later in life:

Aptissima omnino sunt, Scipio et laeli, arma senectutis artes exercitationesque virtutum; **quae in omni aetate cultae cum diu multumque vixeris mirificos ecferunt fructus** […] **(§**9)

Undoubtedly, Scipio and Laelius, the most suitable defenses of old age are the principles and practice of the virtues, which, if cultivated in every period

---

[333] In our sources, this seems to be an early use of *apex* in this sense (OLD 1).

182

of life, bring forth wonderful fruits at the close of a long and busy career
[…]

The best example of the container metaphor which denotes a human quality is the first quotation from Ennius:

'ille vir haud magna cum re sed **plenus fidei**' (§1)

(That man/ of little wealth, but rich in loyalty)

Orientational source domains denote personal qualities in Cato's statements about the virtues, which do not leave an old person ('separation from a centre', §9), in his statements about the farmer's way of life, which almost 'reaches' the wisdom of a wise man ('approaching a centre'; §51), and in adjectives such as *praeclarus* and *praestans* (BETTER IS IN FRONT OF; TALENT IS LIGHT).

I also want to draw attention to Cicero's use of the metaphorical concept ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS. In the *exordium*, when he speaks of Atticus' *humanitas* and *prudentia*, he treats them linguistically as physical objects:

novi enim moderationem animi tui et aequitatem, teque non **cognomen** solum Athenis **deportasse,** sed **humanitatem** et **prudentiam** intellego. (§1)

([…] for I know your self-control and the even temper of your mind, and I am aware that you brought home from Athens not only a cognomen but culture and practical wisdom too.)

Generally, this group of metaphors, just like the ones used for emotions, point to the necessity of using concrete source domains for speaking about different mental states. We must, again, stress the generic-level metaphor THE MIND IS A BODY as a central idea behind many of the metaphorical concepts that have been discussed in this section.

183

3.13. Time as target domain

We met with the target domain 'time' in many of the sections about different source domains. Several metaphors are employed for time, in Latin as well as in English. I will start by pointing to the central role of the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor in *De senectute*. Lakoff and Johnson map this metaphor in the following way. They stress that the observer usually moves forward with the face towards the future and the back towards the past[334]:

Source domain	*Target domain*
Locations on observer's path of motion	Times
The motion of the observer	The 'passage' of time
The distance moved by the observer	The amount of time 'passed'
The location of the observer	The present
The space in front of the observer	The future
The space behind the observer	The past

So when Cicero postpones his and Atticus' problems (§1), he metaphorically pushes them further ahead on the path of time, to a moment which he and Atticus will 'arrive at' later:

> Cicero: Et tamen te [sc. Atticum] suspicor eisdem rebus quibus me ipsum interdum gravius commoveri; quarum consolatio et maior est et **in aliud tempus differenda** […] (§1)
>
> (Nevertheless I suspect that you, at times, are quite seriously perturbed by the same circumstances which are troubling me, but to find comfort for them is too difficult a task to be undertaken now and must be deferred until another time.)

The MOVING OBSERVER metaphor also explains why Cicero/Cato speaks of old age as a location which one reaches: it is a place close to the end of every individual 'path' of life:

> […] quam [sc. senectutem] ut **adipiscantur** omnes optant, eandem accusant **adeptam**. (§4)

---

[334] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 145-147.

facilius in morbos incidunt adulescentes, gravius aegrotant, tristius curantur. itaque pauci **veniunt ad senectutem** […] (§67)

Haec habui de **senectute** quae dicerem: ad quam utinam **perveniatis**, ut ea quae ex me audistis re experti probare possitis. (§85)

([…] [old age] which all men wish to attain and yet reproach when attained […]

[…] the young fall sick more easily, their sufferings are more intense, and they are cured with greater difficulty. Therefore few arrive at old age […]

Such, my friends, are my views on old age. May you both attain it, and thus be able to prove by experience the truth of what you have heard from me.)

Here, one must also stress the connection to the STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor. The different locations on the metaphorical path are also states, old age of course being the state which is most exhaustively described in *De senectute*.

When Cato claims that people see into the future during sleep, he implies that they are situated at a specific location on the path, but can see further ahead on the path:

[…] atque dormientium animo maxime declarant divinitatem suam; multa enim cum remissi et liberi sunt **futura prospiciunt** […] (§81)

([…] and yet it is when the body sleeps that the soul most clearly manifests its divine nature; for when it is unfettered and free it sees many things that are to come.)

The quotation from Caecilius (§25) describes time in a similar way: the observer looks into the future. Adjectives such as *brevis* and *longus* (e.g. in §70) denote distances on the path of time. The prepositions *ante*, *inter* and *post* (§ 15) refer to relations betweens different locations on the path. The MOVING OBSERVER metaphor also seems to account for the cognitive background for expressions such as *aetate provectum* (§10) and *cum aetate processisset* (§21).

The MOVING TIME metaphor[335] plays a smaller role in *De senectute* than that of the MOVING OBSERVER. We find, however, at least one passage which

---

[335] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 141-144.

185

seems to describe time as an entity moving by us rather than a path along which we move:

> da enim supremum tempus, expectemus Tartessiorum regis aetatem (fuit enim, ut scriptum video, Arganthonius quidam Gadibus, qui octoginta regnaverit annos, centum viginti vixerit), sed mihi ne diuturnum quidem quidquam videtur in quo est aliquid extremum; cum enim id **advenit**, tum illud quod **praeteriit** effluxit […] (§69)

> (For grant the utmost limit of life; let us hope to reach the age of the Tartessian king – for at Cadiz there was, as I have seen it recorded, a certain Arganthonius, who had reigned eighty and had lived one hundred and twenty years – but to me nothing whatever seems "lengthy" if it has an end; for when that end arrives, then that which was is gone […])

advenit stresses that a certain moment *comes* to the person, while *praeteriit* stresses that different times have moved by him or her earlier. By the choice of the word *advenit*, Cato seems to emphasize the suddenness of that moment (which of course corresponds to death).[336]

The word *effluxit*, which finishes the quotation above, connects to another source domain. As I showed in the section *Liquids as target domains*, liquids sometimes denote time in *De senectute*, not in the sense that time flows by us like a river, but in the sense that it runs out, as if from a container.

Another metaphor that Lakoff and Johnson consider to be central for speaking of and conceiving of time is TIME IS A RESOURCE.[337] In the quotation from §40, we note how Manius Curius spends or uses up the last time of his life. It is more or less implied in Cato's description that there was not much time left, and Manius wanted to use it well:

> ergo in hac [sc. rustica] vita Manius Curius, cum de Samnitibus, de Sabinis, de Pyrrho triumphavisset, **consumpsit extremum tempore aetatis** […] (§55)

> (Well then, it was in this sort of life that Manius Curius passed his remaining years after he had triumphed over the Samnites, the Sabines, and Pyrrhus […]

---

[336] See other instances of *praetereo* with a similar sense in §§ 4, 70, 78.
[337] Lakoff & Johnson 1999, 161-163.

An interesting temporal expression, which lacks equivalents in the Lakoff-Johnsonian studies, meets us in § 26:

> Sed videtis ut senectus non modo languida atque iners non sit, verum etiam sit operosa et semper agens aliquid et moliens, tale scilicet quale cuiusque studium **in superiore vita** fuit. (§26)

> (But you see how old age, so far from being feeble and inactive, is even busy and is always doing and effecting something – that it to say, something of the same nature in each case as were the pursuits of earlier [sc. higher] years.)

The phrase *in suporiore vita* seems to imply verticality in the source domain rather than the horizontal movement of the MOVING OBSERVER and the MOVING TIME metaphors. Even if there is no such expression in *De senectute*, the opposite i*nferior* can also be used for speaking about time (OLD 3 on *inferior*). In this case, the passage of a time is connected to a movement downwards in the source domain.

3.14. The mind and mental capacities as target domains; the soul leaving the body

What metaphors does Cicero employ when he speaks about the human mind in *De senectute*? We must here, first of all, note the importance of the metaphorical concept THE MIND IS A BODY. Different parts of the human body are consistently employed in order to describe the mind and different mental capacities and states. Sight and the eyes primarily denote understanding (the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor), as in the following example[338]:

> iam vero **videtis** nihil esse morti tam simile quam somnum […] (§80)

> (Again, you really see nothing resembling death so much as sleep […])

but also how a person forms or holds an opinion. The latter sense is particularly connected to the passive use of *videre* (See e.g. §§ 3, 8, 56) An especially

---

[338] See other examples in §§13 and 66.

elaborated theme is that of the 'mind's eye' being blurred by lust or lack of wisdom (§§ 42, 83).

Besides the eyes, human hands hold a number of metaphorical meanings tied to the mind. We here note the connection with memory, which is especially salient in the phrase *memoria(m) tenere* (§§ 12, 80), but also when Cato says he 'embraces' (*complectitur*) a question (§15) or lets Fabius Maximus form (*fingere*) an idea in his mind (§41).

The strength of the human body, as has been pointed out earlier, constitutes a source domain that corresponds to mental strength in the target domain. The clearest examples of this use in *De senectute* are the following passages:

> Olympiae per stadium ingressus esse Milo dicitur cum humeris sustineret bovem. utrum igitur **has corporis** an Pythagorae tibi malis **vires ingenii** dari? (§33)

> hae sunt **exercitationes ingeni**, haec **curricula mentis**, in his desudans atque elaborans corporis vires non magnopere desidero. (§38)

> (It is said that Milo walked the length of the race-course at Olympia, carrying an ox on his shoulders. Which, therefore, would you prefer should be given to you – the physical powers of Milo, or the mental powers of Pythagoras?

> These employments are my intellectual gymnastics; these the race-courses of my mind; and while I sweat and toil with them I do not greatly feel the loss of bodily strength.)

Orientational metaphors also play a certain role as source domains connected to the target domain of the mind, but it is difficult to distinguish this target domain from that of human qualities (See that section!). Still, an expression such as

> **manent** ingenia senibus, modo **permaneat** studium et industria […] (§22)

> (Old men retain their mental faculties, provided their interest and application continue […])

can be said to describe the mind – and Cato's advice on how to make it remain sane – by an orientational metaphor (presence at a location) . A similar theme is the expiring of the 'light of reason':

> nec vero corpori solum subveniendum est, sed menti atque animo multo magis, **nam haec quoque, nisi tamquam lumini oleum instilles, exstinguuntur senectute** […] (§36)

188

(Nor, indeed, are we to give our attention solely to the body; much greater care is due to the mind and soul; for they, too, like lamps, grow dim with time, unless we keep them supplied with oil.)

The mind has to be supplied with exercise and appropriate food and drink in order not to lose its acuity and strength.

Physical size of course denotes nobility of mind, implying that it can hold a large quantity of knowledge or *virtus*:

> quam fuit imbecillus P. Africani filius, is qui te adoptavit, quam tenui aut nulla potius valetudine! Quod ni ita fuisset, alterum illud extitisset lumen civitatis; ad paternam enim **magnitudinem animi** doctrina uberior accesserat. (§35)

> (Note how weak, Scipio, was your adoptive father, the son of Publius Africanus. What feeble health he had, or rather no health at all! But for this he would have shone forth as the second luminary of the state; for to his father's greatness of intellect he had added a more abundant learning.)

When Cato speaks about the soul (*animus*) leaving the human body, he seems to employ a liquid (rain) as a source domain (§§ 77-78)[339], but there are also instances where he literally describes this theme (§§ 80, 84). In the following phrase:

> iam vero videtis nihil esse morti tam simile quam somnum; atqui dormientium animi maxime declarant divinitatem suam; multa enim cum remissi et liberi sunt futura prospiciunt: ex quo intelligitur quales futuri sint cum se plane **corporum vinculis relaxaverint**. (§80-81)[340]

> (Again, you really see nothing resembling death so much as sleep; and yet it is when the body sleeps that the soul most clearly manifests its divine nature; for when it is unfettered and free it sees many things that are to come. Hence we know what the soul's future state will be when it has been wholly released from the shackles of the flesh.)

the bodies (by being fettered) function as source domain for the souls, but so do the chains, which is shown by the following mapping:

---

[339] See the section *Liquids as source domains*.
[340] The source to the passage is Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 8.7.17-22.

Source domain	Target domain
Chains	Bodies
Fettered bodies	Souls
Bodies breaking free from fetters	Souls leaving bodies, bodies dying [341]

3.15. Events and causation as target domains

The metaphors for causation, as we have seen, form two groups. We have, first, the verbs *cogo* and *impello* (§§ 4, 23, 34, 39, 40, 77), which use metaphorical pressure in order to express influence, constraint or effect. The verbs usually have a person as the direct object.

Secondly, causation is described with the metaphorical source domains CONTAINER (THE SUBSTANCE COMES OUT OF THE OBJECT) and CREATION IS BIRTH.[342] We here note phrases such as ex *quo intellegitur* (§16) and *id quod evenit* (§13). Cato's reflections on *voluptas* in §§39-41 contain numerous examples of both the source domain FORCE and the CREATION IS BIRTH metaphor. They uniformly serve to describe lust as the origin of sin and corruption, impelling people to behave in a destructive, non-rational way.

For events, the verbs for sudden touch, *accido* and *contingo* are central (§§7, 8, 31, 67, 71). We also find expressions that use the EVENTS ARE ACTIONS metaphor, especially when Cato speaks about death in §66. As Mark Turner has showed, involving concrete action (including movement) helps to make an abstract event such as death easier to understand and speak about.[343]

3.16. Agriculture and the earth as target domains

Besides constituting a frequent source domain in *De senectute* (see the section *Agriculture as source domain*), farming also functions as the target domain in the

---

[341] See also the section *Death as target domain* for a discussion of the expression '*corporum vinculis*'.
[342] Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 72-76.
[343] Turner 1996, 26-37.

banking metaphor in § 51.[344] Shortly after this passage, Cato changes to another source domain:

> quae [terra] cum **gremio** mollito ac subacto sparsum semen excepit, […] deinde tepefactum vapore et **compressu suo** diffundit, et elicit herbescentem ex eo viriditatem; quae nixa fibris stirpium sensim **adulescit** culmoque erecta geniculato vaginis iam quasi **pubescens** includitur […] (§51)

> (It takes the scattered grain of wheat within its soft, upturned breast, […] then, having warmed with the heat of its embrace, expands it and from it brings forth a verdant blade, which, supported by fibrous roots, and maturing by degrees, stands erect upon its jointed stalk, enfolded in a sheath, when now, so to speak, it has arrived at a man's estate […])

'Mother Earth'[345] receives the seed in her bosom, warms it and embraces it. The seed then grows like a child to a ripe state (*adulescit*, *pubescens*). The comparison explores the similarities between people and plants just like Cato's similes in §5 and 71, but source domain and target domain have now changed places. *Compressus* means sexual intercourse in Plautus and Terence and is not found in the sense that is has here before Cicero.[346] *Adolesco* and *pubesco* refer primarily to people rather than plants, even if *pubesco* is used for plants in Ennius' *Scenica* 152.[347] The main function of the metaphor in *De senectute* is clearly to describe Cato's love of agriculture and his wonder at the process of vegetable growth.

---

[344] See the section *Investments and economic profit as source domains*.
[345] The inscription dedicated to one of the early Scipios (CIL 1:33), probably from the second century BC, contains the metaphor *gremium terrae*: '*quare lubens te in gremiu Scipio recipit terra*'.
[346] OLD 1, 2 on *compressus*.
[347] '*vites laetificae pampinis adulere*'.

4. Conclusions

The main result of this study is that it shows striking similarities between the findings of Lakoff-Johnsonian research on the English language and a classical Latin text. The system of metaphorical concepts functions generally in the same way in *De senectute* as in Lakoff, Johnson, and Kövecses' studies on the English language. Even if some of the metaphorical concepts that one ascertains in *De senectute* do not always have an exact equivalent in the Lakoff-Johnsonian research, they are closely related in terms of content and correspondence between target and source domains. This conclusion confirms the Lakoff-Johnsonian idea that many metaphorical concepts have developed in connection with the way our bodies and minds are constituted and how we function in the world. The central roles of the human body and of spatial orientation as source domains in *De senectute* particularly point to the relevance of the claims of Lakoff-Johnsonian research for classical Latin.

We are now also in a position where we can sketch a 'coherent metaphorical system' in *De senectute*. This 'coherent system' can also, with Fauconnier and Turner's terminology, be called a *blended space* or *blend*.[348] As we remember from the introduction, a blend gathers parts of different source domains or input spaces into a new combination, which is reasonable for our understanding but cannot be entirely found in any of the separate input spaces. In the centre of this system, we find a human body, which corresponds to the human mind. The body moves forward on different roads or paths: the road of life, the ethically 'right' road, and the path of time. These roads often, but not always, converge. The metaphorical body can be weighed down by burdens, corresponding to difficulties and problems in life. It can also be pushed in different directions by other metaphorical persons or other outer influences. (This aspect of the system is connected to the STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor and the source domain 'physical force'.) The body can be shaken by worries or jump and dance from youthful strength. It gradually loses heat as it advances on the path of time or the road of life, and a state of contentment is connected to the body as it becomes lighter or less heavy in the source domain. The eyes of the body function as understanding and knowledge in the target domain and can also apply different metaphorical perspectives. They can look into the future and form opinions by perceiving physical objects. The physical objects correspond to abstract entities

---

[348] Fauconnier & Turner 2002, 39-57, 291-295.

such as emotions, states, or philosophical questions in the target domain. The metaphorical hands of the body can touch, hold, and turn the physical objects and generally denote abstract relations to those objects/abstract entities. The metaphorical body can also grow bigger and shine in the view of others if it is talented or famous. We see how this 'coherent metaphorical system' or *blend* is made up by the metaphorical concepts THE MIND IS A BODY, LIFE IS A JOURNEY, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS, LIFE IS HEAT, UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, SIGNIFICANT IS BIG, TALENT IS LIGHT, FAME IS LIGHT, ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL OBJECTS, DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS, and of the source domains (physical) FORCE and PATH (the path of time).

This coherent metaphorical system is present in *De senectute* but has a much wider application in Latin as a whole. The questions how widely spread it is and whether it can be further elaborated cannot be answered in this investigation.

When he discusses all the central themes in *De senectute*, Cicero is obliged to use metaphor. That is not to say that we do not find non-metaphorical language in the dialogue, which we of course do. Nevertheless, the role of metaphors is so salient that they must be said to constitute an indispensable part of the language in the text. Many of them are of course employed as rhetorical devices and for ornamentation, but their function is much more important than that. Cicero would hardly have been able to say what he says in the text without metaphors. Further, it is reasonable to suppose (although in no way proven in this thesis) that studies of a larger Latin material would confirm this result: the central and inevitable need of metaphor in order to discuss most subjects, to argue for a cause, or explain almost any abstract idea. Lakoff writes:

> Metaphor is the main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts and perform abstract reasoning.[349]

and this claim is confirmed in the case of *De senectute* by my investigation. Naturally, a study of a much larger Latin material would have given us a clearer picture of the similarities and differences in the use of (Lakoff-Johnsonian) metaphors in modern English and classical Latin. However, it must be stressed that the majority of the metaphorical concepts that have been found in *De senectute* in this study are common and established in Latin – which is proven by

---

[349] Lakoff in Ortony (ed.) 1993, 244.

the fact that they usually can be traced back to earlier authors. Thus, my investigation has validity for at least polished language in Cicero's time.

A detailed description of the metaphors and similes that Cicero employs for speaking about themes such as *voluptas, natura, senectus* and many others deepen our knowledge of how the Romans themselves understood these and related concepts. The metaphorical connections perhaps provide a more direct understanding of them than literal descriptions. The interplay between source domains and target domains shows the direct Roman view on those themes.

The majority of the metaphors that Cicero employs in the dialogue can be traced back to earlier authors, usually to Plautus and Terence. Others are not found before Cicero, but from this fact, no conclusions can be drawn. Since many of Cicero's works survive and constitute a large *corpus*, it is only logical that we find many metaphorical expressions in his text with no earlier equivalents. It is necessary to argue from case to case when one wants to distinguish conventional metaphors from less established ones. The marker *ut ita dicam* represents, in my view, our best indication that a metaphor is non-conventional in the text. This marker, although common in Cicero[350], is employed only once in *De senectute*, in the following phrase:

> impedit enim consilium voluptas, rationi inimica est, **mentis ut ita dicam praestringit oculos**, nec habet ullum cum virtute commercium. (§42)

> (For carnal pleasure hinders deliberation, is at war with reason, blindfolds the eyes of the mind, so to speak, and has no fellowship with virtue.)

The mind is likened to the human body but this connection cannot be too overt; a reservation must be added in order to stress that the mind and the body, although metaphorically linked to each other, remain separate entities.

The quotations from poets in the dialogue contain metaphors and similes that are more boldly elaborated than Cato's own speech. This is especially evident in the lines from Ennius in §1 and §14, from Caecilius in §25, and in the translation of Homer in §31.

When we try to ascertain the differences between the use of similes and of metaphorical language in the dialogue, our study permits of one general conclusion: the most basic source domains – orientation in space, physical object, physical size, container – are not employed in similes. The reason for this fact is

---

[350] The phrase '*ut ita dicam*' seems to recur around 40 times in Cicero's *oeuvre*.

doubtlessly that they are too fundamental to form part of explicit comparisons. In contrast, Cicero prefers similes to metaphors when he uses a rich, complex source domain such as that of theatre. We distinguish a pattern where the degree of complexity in the source domains governs the choice between metaphor and simile.

Many of the metaphorical concepts which recur in the text are necessary for Cicero's composition of the dialogue – such as the THE MIND IS A BODY, GOOD IS UP, and the many categories of other orientational metaphors – but only some are of crucial importance for our literary interpretation of the text: The OLD AGE IS A BURDEN concept helps Cicero in stating the problem of the dialogue (§§1-4). It functions perfectly for describing the different sorts of difficulties connected with old age, and makes way for Cato's answer. Since the metaphorical burden has such a conspicuous position in the early part of the text, Cato's answer to the criticism of old age must be seen as a metaphorical lightening or annihilation of the burden.

The fundamental principle in Cato's argumentation, however, is the idea of *natura*, which is explained primarily by metaphors. *Natura* as the guide (§5), the poet of the drama of life (§5), the craftsman who constructed the human body (§72), the fire simile in §71, and the war metaphors employed for describing a way of life which is contrary to *natura* (§§5, 71, 72) all work together in inculcating the idea that accepting and obeying the principles of *natura* solves all the problems that are stated in the *partitio* (§15).

The theatre metaphors are connected to the *natura* theme by the fact that nature is depicted as the poet and by Cato's advice on how to play one's role in the drama of life. The four recurring similes (§§5, 48, 64, 85) give prominence to Cato's distanced view of life – for the wise man it is just a play – and helps him to diminish the multi-faceted real life by reducing it to a performance on a stage.

The LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is also given a central function by being placed in Scipio's opening question to Cato (§6) and in the final lines of the dialogue. It is closely connected to the STATES ARE LOCATIONS metaphor, whereby different stops on the journey correspond to different states. The state of old age, in Cato's idealistic view, ought to be synonymous with a state of wisdom and acceptance of *natura* and its principles.

In the *peroratio*, death, the last stop on the journey of life (§71), stands forth as the central theme and central metaphorical target domain. Since death befalls an old man in accordance with *natura*, it need not be feared, Cato claims. This idea has already been foreboded in the fire simile (§71) and in the agricultural metaphors. Man dies as an expiring fire, a ripe fruit and as a traveler who both reaches his destination and takes leave – and for virtuous men, death brings a change for the better. The climax of the dialogue meets us in Cato's statement that with death, real life begins. The elaborated target domain human life suddenly becomes the source domain, and instead serves to explain death:

196

Sed nescio quo modo animus erigens se posteritatem ita semper prospiciebat, quasi cum excessisset e vita, tum denique **victurus esset**. (§82)

(But somehow, my soul was ever on the alert, looking forward to posterity as if it realized that when it had departed from this life, then at last it would be alive.)

197

Bibliography

Astin, A.E., *Scipio Aemilianus*, Oxford 1967.

Astin, A.E., *Cato the Censor*, Oxford 1978.

Bizzell, P. and Herzberg, B. (eds.) *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present* (second edition), Boston, New York 2001.

Black, M., *Models and Metaphors*: *Studies in Language and Philosophy*, New York 1962.

Conte, G.B. *Latin Literature, A History* (transl. by Joseph B. Solodow), Baltimore 1994. First Italian edition, *Letteratura Latina. Manuale storico dalle origini alla fine dell'impero romano*; Florence 1987.

Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum I- (TLL), Berlin (1863-).

Fauconnier, G., *Mental Spaces*. *Aspects of Meaning in Natural Language*, Second rev. Edition, Cambridge 1994. First edition MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1985.

Fauconnier, G., *Mappings in Thought and Language*, Cambridge/New York 1997.

Fauconnier, G. and Turner, M., *The Way We Think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities*, New York 2002.

Hawkes, T., *Metaphor*, London 1972.

Imholtz, A. A., *Gladiatorial Metaphors in Cicero's Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino*, CW 65, 1972.

Johnson, Mark, *The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason*, Chicago 1987.

Kennedy G. A., *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, Princeton 1972.

Kennedy, G. A., *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, Princeton 1994.

Kokolakis, M., *The Dramatic Simile of Life*, Athens 1960.

Kövecses, Z., *Metaphor. A Practical Introduction*, Oxford 2002.

Kövecses, Z., *Metaphor and Emotion. Language, Culture and Body in Human Feeling,* Cambridge/New York 2000.

Kövecses, Z., *Emotion Concepts*, New York 1990.

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M., *Metaphors we live by*, Chicago 1980/2003.

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M., *Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought*, New York 1999.

Lakoff, G. and Turner, M., *More than Cool Reason. A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*, Chicago 1989.

Nietzsche, F., *Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne* [1873]. English translation: *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, in Breazeale, D. (ed. and trans.), *Philosophy and Truth,* Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1979.

The Oxford Classical Dictionary (OCD), third. rev. edition; Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.), Oxford/New York 2003.

Oxford English Dictionary (OED), second edition, Oxford 1989.

Oxford Latin Dictionary (OCD), ed. P.G.W. Glare, Oxford/ New York 1982.

Ortony, A. (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought*, Cambridge 1979.

Ortony. A. (ed.), *Metaphor and Thought* (second, rev. edition), Cambridge 1993.

Parkin, T.G., *Old Age in the Roman World. A Cultural and Social History*, Baltimore/London 2003.

Powell, J.G.F. (ed.), *Cato Maior De Senectute*, Cambridge 1988.

Reynolds, L.D. (ed.), *Texts and Transmission. A Survey of the Latin Classics*, Oxford 1983.

Richards, I.A., *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, New York 1936.

Rolf, Eckhart, *Metaphertheorien. Typologie, Darstellung, Bibliographie*, Berlin/New York 2005.

Shackleton-Bailey, D.R. (ed.), *Introduction* in Cicero, *Letters to Atticus*, vol. I,

Cambridge, Massachusetts/London 1999.

Szwedek, A., *Objectification: a new theory of metaphor*, in Thormählen, M. (ed.), *English Now. Selected Papers from the 20th IAUPE Conference in Lund 2007*, Lund 2008.

Taverniers, Miriam, *Metaphor and Metaphorology. A Selective Genealogy of Philosophical and Linguistic Conceptions of Metaphor from Aristotle to the 1990s*. Gent 2002.

Thesaurus Linguae Latinae I- (TLL), Leipzig (1900-).

Totius latinitatis lexicon / opera et studio Aegidii Forcellini lucubratum et in hac editione post tertiam auctam et emendatam a Iosepho Furlanetto ... novo ordine digestum ... cura et studio Vincentii De-Vit ('Forcellini'), Prati 1858-1875.

Turner, M., *The Literary Mind. The Origins of Thought and Language*, Oxford 1996.

Tuwe, Rosemond, *Elisabethan and Metaphysical Imagery*, Chicago 1947.

Appendix 1: Select list of editions of *De senectute*

Otto, F.W., Leipzig 1830.
Madvig, J.N., Copenhagen 1835.
Tischer, G., Halle 1847.
Reid, J.S., Cambridge 1879 (second edition 1886).
Kornitzer, A., Vienna 1888.
Moore, F.G., New York 1904.
Simbeck, K., Leipzig 1912-1917.
Wuilleumier, P., Paris 1940-1961.
Venini, P.,Turin 1959.
Powell, J.G.F., Cambridge 1988.

202

Index of metaphorical concepts and conceptual metonymies

2

Studia Graeca et Latina Lundensia

Ediderunt Birger Bergh & Jerker Blomqvist (1-7), Anders Piltz & Jerker Blomqvist (8-13), Anders Piltz & Staffan Wahlgren (14), Arne Jönsson & Karin Blomqvist (15-16)

1. Arne Jönsson, Alfonso of Jaén, His Life and Works with Critical Editions of the *Epistula Solitari*, the *Informaciones* and the *Epistula Servi Christi*. 1989. 207 pp.
2. Bengt-Arne Roos, Synesius of Cyrene, A Study in his Personality. 1991. xviii+157 pp.
3. Brita Larsson, Johannes Magnus' Latin Letters. A Critical Edition with Introduction and Commentary. 1992. v+193 pp.
4. Lars Nyberg, Unity and Coherence. Studies in Appolonios Rhodius' Argonautica and the Alexandrian epic Tradition. 1992. v+193 pp.
5. Dimitrios Karadimas, Sextus Empiricus against Aelius Aristides. The Conflict between Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Second Century A.D. 1996. xx+270 pp.
6. Arne Jönsson, St. Bridget's Revelations to the Popes. An Edition of the so-called Tractatus de summis pontificibus. 1997. 69 pp.
7. Karin Kulneff-Eriksson, On 'have' in Ancient Greek. An investigation on ἔχω and the construction of εἶναι with a dative as expression for 'have'. 1999. xxvi+192 pp.
8. Georg Walser, The Greek of the Ancient Synagogue. An investigation on the Greek of the Septuagint, Pseudepigrapha and the New Testament. 2001 xxvi+197 pp.
9. Vassilios Sabatakakis, Aspects of Morphological and Stylistic Variation of the Verb in Erotokritos. 2004. 163 pp.
10. Rea Ann-margaret Mellberg, Minnet går gränsvakt. Fyra poeter ur 1970-talets grekiska diktargeneration. 2004. xix+282 pp.
11. Cajsa Sjöberg, Ubi est Unitas? Letters from Johannes Annorelius, a Swedish Catholic Convert, to his Brother. A Critical Edition with an Introduction. 2005. 352 pp.
12. Johanna Akujärvi, Researcher, traveller, narrator. Studies in Pausanias' Periegesis. 2005. xxviii+314 pp.
13. Fotini Skenteri, Herodes Atticus reflected in occasional poetry of Antonine Athens. 2005. xii+119 pp.
14. Elisabet Göransson, Letters of a learned Lady. Sophia Elisabeth Brenner's Correspondence, with an edition of her letters to and from Otto Sperling the Younger. 2006. 262 pp.
15. Magdalena Öhrman, Varying Virtue. Mythological Paragons of Wifely Virtues in Roman Elegy. 2008. 218 pp.
16. Aron Sjöblad, Metaphors Cicero lived by. The Role of Metaphor and Simile in De senectute. 2009. 209 pp.