Emerging Donors and Development Cooperation: Thailand and Malaysia

Author: Manon Carle
Supervisor: Ming Chee Ang

Abstract

Using textual analysis based on a constructivist perspective, this thesis attempted to analyze how development cooperation policy builds the emerging donor identity. It did so by looking at foreign policy in the case studies of two small Asian donors, Thailand and Malaysia. In particular, it looked at the notion of heterogeneity which exists in the emerging donor identity, and Thailand and Malaysia's positioning within that heterogeneity.

The thesis found that Thailand portrays a recipient-turned-donor identity based on the Prosper-thy-Neighbor, Forward Engagement and Constructive Engagement policies, while Malaysia currently outlines a simultaneous donor-recipient identity founded in a Prosper-thy-Neighbor and middle power strategy. The countries engage mutually through trilateral and multilateral development cooperation mechanisms as well as locally in the case of Thailand's Southern conflict.

Keywords: Emerging donor, Development cooperation, Thailand, Malaysia

Acknowledgments

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Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
MTCP	Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program
NEDA	Neighboring Countries Economic Development Agency
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
TICA	Thailand International Cooperation Agency

1. Emerging Donors' Development Cooperation

1.1. Introduction

Development cooperation is a problematic concept: it goes beyond the notion of foreign aid, which refers to individual countries' bilateral or multilateral assistance flows (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 81). Yet, there is no common agreement for the characterization of development cooperation (ibid.). Beneath this concept lies another multi-faceted notion, the emerging donor. The latter categorizes some of the providers of development cooperation. The notion of the emerging donor arose within international development cooperation architecture from the need to create a category where the relationship between donor and recipient was no longer mutually exclusive: some recipients double as donors. However, the very category essentializes the meaning of the term. Emerging donors vary in size, interests and outlook. The diversity spans from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the BRICS) to Eastern European states, the oil-rich Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and in the case of this thesis, East Asian countries (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011, p.713).

Southeast Asian donors are often eclipsed by their Northeastern counterparts; Japan, South Korea and China overshadow states such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, which also run their own development cooperation programs (Mulakala, 2014). While the Northeast Asian donors possess sizeable schemes, they similarly remain visible because they retain influence: Japan, once the biggest donor in the world, remains one of the most important bilateral providers in the wider East Asian region (Söderberg, 2010, p. 130). South Korea has taken leadership in transnational research and policy-making, hosting a key international conference in Busan in 2011 (Hyun and Arnold, 2011, p. 3). China is also a popular provider among recipients because of its non-conditional principles of provision (Söderberg, 2010, p. 133). Southeast Asian donors, on the other hand, have smaller schemes and are less visible. This creates a literary gap which makes this latter grouping a worthwhile focus point for contributing to the literature on the emerging donor.

1.2. Concepts

It is important to clarify the vocabulary used in this thesis, especially given that both development cooperation and emerging donor have varying definitions. The terms possess an essentializing quality because they denote a grouping without leaving room to observe differences within the categories. The idea of heterogeneity within the emerging donor addresses this shortcoming (Sato et al., 2011, p. 2092). Indeed, multiplicity contends that

common principles exist within the groupings, but that the emphasis put on certain principles differs according to local specificities. This notion of heterogeneity will be used as a foundation to understand the emerging donor and development cooperation categories.

1.2.1. *The Emerging Donor*

The category of the emerging donor is often built in contrast to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (thereafter DAC) and its understanding of the donor identity (Mawdsley, 2011, pp. 153-155). The DAC, a central institution in international development cooperation architecture, perceives itself to be the main body of development cooperation providers which defines key lines for the regulation and delivery of official flows (OECD, 2010a, p. 8). Comprising mainly of Western members also known as traditional donors, the DAC is very much centered on the group's concepts and experiences (Chaturvedi, 2012, p.26). These include promoting donor interests over the recipient's (ibid.). The organization is therefore selective in outlook, and is the same within the donor community: in order to adhere to the DAC, candidate countries have to send a report detailing its strategies, the running of an evaluation and monitoring system for its programs, and details that it spends over 100 million US dollars (OECD, 2015a). Acceptance of the candidate remains at the DAC's discretion.

Against this backdrop, emerging donors are portrayed to be developing countries which embody their own history by taking on a dual identity (at times simultaneously) of donor and recipient (Sidiropoulos, Fues and Chaturvedi, p. 3). Development cooperation provision then changes from a one to a two-way flow where a donor provides for a recipient but also where the recipient can provide back. In other words, the DAC's mutually exclusive definition of donor and recipient creates tension in the emerging donor identity (OECD, 2015b). Nevertheless, the "emerging" characteristic of the term does not denote a recent transformation of countries into new donors. Instead, the emergence resonates in the identity gaining prominence only recently at the international level (Kim and Lightfoot, 2011, p. 713).

1.2.2. *Development Cooperation*

Differences between emerging donors also arise from their development cooperation provision as this term possesses tensions as well. Development cooperation is a vague term because no international guide-set exists to frame development cooperation provision (Chaturvedi, S., 2012: 23). This is unlike the DAC's precise definition of official flows (ibid.). The DAC defines assistance flows under the term of "Official Development Assistance". This has a specific definition outlining concessional flows with a grant element of 25 percent or

more distributed bilaterally or multilaterally (OECD, 2010b, p. 15). Today, the term is used interchangeably with "aid" or "development assistance" by the traditional donor community.

Emerging donors, on the other hand, prefer the term of development cooperation because it embodies values as well as flows (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 81); it goes beyond the restrictive definition. "Provision" and "South-South Cooperation" then become more popular vocabulary as they reject a post-colonial hierarchy and status set embedded in the first set of terms (ibid., p. 6-7). Values promoted within development cooperation become mutual interest, an economic emphasis and partnership (Söderberg, 2010: 131). In other words, the notion recognizes that emerging donors provide according to their own interests, which may include economic development. However, it also includes the notion that countries share these interests. Additionally, hierarchy under a mutually exclusive donor and recipient terminology is replaced by the promotion of a partnership which recognizes the responsibility and interests of both parties.

Development cooperation's vagueness becomes problematic when trying to coordinate flows at the international level. Nevertheless, the vagueness also allows the concept to exist; it accepts heterogeneity within the term. This heterogeneity is represented by the individual country interests and common principles promoted by emerging donors, which are outlined in chapter two. The next section addresses the scope of research, as well as methodology and limitations.

1.3. Methodology

1.3.1. *Research Question*

This thesis therefore aims to look at heterogeneity within the emerging donor construct. The following research question is addressed: how do development cooperation policies construct the emerging donor identity*?* In order to narrow the research question, two case studies are selected from within Southeast Asia, Thailand and Malaysia. The study focuses on their bilateral relations. Secondary research questions consider:

- To what extent is there heterogeneity within the emerging donor identity?
- How do Thailand and Malaysia position themselves as development partners within this identity?

The hypothesis considered is that Thailand and Malaysia, as emerging donors, identify to the principles of the emerging donor but also express differences by emphasizing selected elements of the development cooperation construct.

1.3.2. *Selecting the Case Studies*

Thailand and Malaysia were selected as case studies for two reasons. Firstly, considering that Southeast Asia is an under-studied region, availability of literature is of great importance for writing the thesis (Bryman, 2008, pp. 98-113). Thailand is the most visible development cooperation partner in Southeast Asia; in the past few years, it has been used as a case study example alongside Japan, South Korea and China (OECD, 2014; Söderberg, 2010; Mawdsley, 2014). Thailand's visibility therefore implies that materials in English are available both locally and internationally. Malaysia, on the other hand, possesses varied local authorship in English due to the fact that the country was a British colony; some of the research continues to take place in that language.

Secondly, the two case studies are linked by historical, geographical and political ties through a common border (Latif and Yusof, 2007, p. 279). Despite significant cultural difference, the countries therefore share values. Furthermore, the geographical proximity makes each country more central to the other's policy concerns (Starr, 2005, pp. 396-397). Hence, a study of their development cooperation policies at the bilateral level is necessary. Indeed, writing on Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation policies addresses a gap in Anglophone literature on the countries' cooperation programs. In engaging with already-existing literature on the emerging donor, a bilateral study links international, regional and national framings.

1.3.3. *Research Methodology*

The thesis adopts a constructivist epistemology, with meaning as subjective and informed by social actors (Bryman, 2008, p.19). This perspective portrays states' identities as influenced by norms and agency, with development cooperation construed by foreign policy (Mawdsley, pp. 26). The epistemology thus addresses both state discourse construction as well as provides an outlook on changes in international agendas (ibid.).

The thesis uses textual analysis to look at identity construction and heterogeneity within the emerging donor construct. Secondary English-language sources including books, journals, reports and online publications are employed to analyze Thailand and Malaysia's foreign policy. Thus, governmental sources from the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Thailand International Cooperation Agency and the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program are considered. Think-tanks publications from organizations such as the Asia Foundation and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies are examined, together with information from regional groupings such as the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the OECD. Finally, general academic articles, books and chapters by Malaysian, Thai and international authors are studied. Only recent publications are considered in order to ground this research within the current context. The vast majority of the employed literature dates from after 2010, with other publications falling within the 2000-2009 range.

1.4. Ethical Considerations

This thesis was constrained by several limitations. Firstly, accessing primary resource types was restricted for two reasons. On the one hand, the post-2014 coup political context in Thailand (The Nation, 2014), the theme of this thesis and the short fieldwork duration of three months made it difficult to obtain information directly from governmental sources. On the other hand, travel restrictions to the border area between Thailand and Malaysia were imposed by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At the time of stay in the two countries, Southern Thailand was inaccessible due to an ongoing violent conflict while severe floods hit Northern Malaysia. Together, these elements made interview conduction difficult to undergo, thus a more adequate method based on secondary publications was selected.

A second limitation, transparent in the case study selection, was the restriction to English-language sources despite a literature gap on Malaysia and Thailand as emerging donors. This constraint to the scope of analysis is due to the author speaking neither Malay nor Thai. However, the restriction to English-language sources suited the short fieldwork duration by ensuring greater consistency in the analysis. These sources were either collected online or at Thai, Malaysian and international libraries.

A last consideration concerning the research design is related to data analysis. Self-criticism was attempted in order to look at assumptions concerning the emerging donor and Asian discourses (Scheyvens, Nowak and Scheyvens, 2006, pp. 149-152). Having been educated in the Western world, the author is receptive to European preconceptions. Self-criticism therefore allowed against reproducing assumptions or expectations. Additionally, power associations were considered. These exist in the researcher's relation to its subject of study as well as within the subject of study itself (Brydon, 2006, pp. 27-28). Each actor has its own agenda (ibid.). Thus, attention was paid to using data from multiple sources types and a mix of Malaysian, Thai and international authorship. This diversity mitigates power relations within sources as well as moderates the limitation to English-language sources.

1.5. Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into the following chapters. While chapter one provided an introductory discussion to the topic of study, chapter two addresses the first sub-question on diversity within the emerging donor construct by the means of literature review. Chapters three and four focus then on the second sub-question, looking into Thailand and Malaysia as development partners. Chapter three addresses Thailand's identity as an emerging donor while chapter four analyzes Malaysia's positioning on the issue. Chapter five consequently compares the two situations by reflecting on similar policies and circumstances. Chapter six concludes on the findings of the thesis: Thailand's development cooperation policies place the country's recipient identity in the past and construct it as a development hub for mainland Southeast Asia. This is mitigated by the state of its domestic and international politics. Malaysia's development cooperation policies, however, place the country's recipient status alongside its donor identity within a limited time-frame. As part of this, the country is constructed as a regional player in ASEAN.

2. THE EMERGING DONOR IN INTERNATIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND ASIA

This chapter provides background information on the emerging donor by addressing four themes. It begins by looking at the possible institutionalization of the emerging donor within a changing international agenda. Then, literary trends in thinking about the emerging donor are developed, before the third theme of interests and motivations for providing development cooperation is discussed. Finally, commonalities between Asian development cooperation providers are explored. These four elements outline the notion of heterogeneity within the emerging donor (Sato et al., 2011, p. 2092), as well as cohesion within the notion at the Asian and international level.

2.1. Institutionalizing Emerging Donors' Development Cooperation

Two processes are currently taking place in relation to emerging donors. Firstly, the Development Assistance Committee has recognized the presence of these donors and attempts to include them in the international agenda. Secondly, the emerging donor community is aiming to create a place for itself that is beyond the DAC.

2.1.1. *The Current DAC Framework*

In recent years, the DAC has been opening to the outside donor community. Not only have five European countries, namely Iceland, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, joined the twenty-five other members in 2013, but the DAC now provides general figures on non-DAC providers. These providers are primarily Brazil, Russia, India and China (better known as the BRICs), considered sizeable enough to be compared to DAC members (OECD Development Cooperation Report, 2014, pp. 382-383). The DAC therefore begins to look beyond the boundaries of its organization at changes taking place on the international level.

Nevertheless, the DAC provides unequal coverage of emerging donors: it has begun to include Thailand but does not report on Malaysia. This may be because Malaysia does not report to the OECD like Thailand does; only seventeen non-DAC providers do so, and Thailand is the only in Asia together with Taiwan to make such an effort (OECD Development Cooperation Report, 2014, pp. 382-383). While such an improvement implies that data for countries such as Thailand is made comparable at the international level, this limitation also portrays the DAC's enquiries on emerging donors as very general.

2.1.2. *Changes in the International Architecture*

Financial estimation of development cooperation remains controversial; emerging donors use multiple methods to measure development cooperation provision, depending on what they understand fit the values in the term (Mulakala, 2014). Despite this limitation, existing figures still help to understand the potential of this category: emerging donors are projected to provide as much as 50 billion US dollars by 2025 (ibid.). This is between three and four times the amount of 12 to 15 billion US dollars provided in 2008 (Davies, 2010, p. i). Emerging donors also provided 8.4 percent of total international provision in 2012 (OECD Development Cooperation Report, 2014, pp. 382-383), when global provision has decreased by six percent since its highest point in 2010 (Mulakala, 2014). Amidst the growing role of emerging donors' development cooperation, initiatives have arisen to institutionalize the status and form of cooperation.

Two symbolic processes began in 2014 as alternatives to the already-existing international financial institutions: China's establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and (AIIB) and the BRICS' founding of the New Development Bank. The first, as the name entails, addresses Asia's need for infrastructure investment. It is backed worldwide, from Asian states including South Korea and Bangladesh, to Eastern European countries and DAC members such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Australia (AIIB, 2015). The DAC members are also known as traditional donors. The second initiative establishes an alternative to establishments such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Chen, 2014). These developments indicate greater visibility for the emerging donor as they establish recognition and legitimacy to the identity outside of the current international paradigm: these changes are recognized by emerging donors and traditional donor alike.

The DAC acknowledging the existence and role of the emerging donor, the financial potential of the grouping as well as the international community recognizing the institutionalization of the latter indicates that the identity is receiving validation at the international level.

2.2. Literary Trends

With the important changes taking place in the international arena, the emerging donor is judged according to its potential; this leads authors to analyze it in terms of threats and opportunities. On the one hand, the emerging donor community challenges traditional understandings of the donor when it integrates the international architecture (Naim, 2007, pp. 95-96). On the other hand, its very existence renders possible transnational cooperation

between donors (Davies, P., 2010). A more detailed review of this debate can be found in Lightfoot and Kim's article (2011, p. 716). If the emerging donor is source of tension at the international level, theorizing about its characteristics can also go beyond this threat-opportunity dichotomy.

Another lesser-known regime of development cooperation coexists with the Development Assistance Committee: the United Nations' "embryonic" Development Cooperation Forum (Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, 2012, pp. 251-254). Under this dual system, traditional and emerging donors can co-exist, as the Development Cooperation Forum is non-exclusive (ibid., p. 252). On a second level, emerging donors portray multiple interest sets in relation to the DAC framework. Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos contend that a first category of emerging powers, the BRICS, is hostile to the DAC regime but that a second middle-income group is more open yet limits interaction with the organization (ibid.). This point reveals that the extent to which emerging donors interact with the framework varies among the very emerging donor category.

The institutionalization of the emerging donors therefore does not have to contain a dichotomous element of threat or opportunity, as highlighted by international literature. Instead, emerging and traditional donors can already co-exist, provided that international governance makes use of mechanisms such as the Development Cooperation Forum and the Development Assistance Committee which are already in place. Co-existence does not however undermine the different sets of interests that are present among emerging donors. This multiplicity can be portrayed in various sources of motivation.

2.3. Motivations for Development Cooperation

All development cooperation providers emphasize the normative element of their provision (Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 245). Looking at a common set of motivations helps to outline these norms, therefore two main theories are outlined below. Firstly, theorizing about donor principles, whether from emerging donors or not, is often framed in terms of Mauss's theory of the gift. The gift acts as an exchange aimed at creating and maintaining relationships but behind an altruistic image has a hidden purpose (Mauss, 1923, p. 12). In such terms, development cooperation becomes a geostrategic mechanism to provide for the donor's needs (Cave, 2012). The emerging donor does not, however, hide that provision comes with a purpose. The concept puts forth the notion of mutual benefit to portray the existence but also respect of the interests of the parties. Maintaining relationships is also expressed via the principle of solidarity, which implies the existence of shared ethics.

Such principle is founded on the ideational creation of a common experience of the countries as recipients. This relationship is additionally voiced on the basis of partnership, which relays an equality of status between the donor and the recipient standings. Finally, the relationship is enhanced by respect for national sovereignty as development cooperation operates according to the notion of non-interference in a country's internal affairs (Mawdsley, 2012, pp. 152-157; Mulakala, 2014; Walz and Ramachandran, 2010, p.14).

On a second level, motivations can be categorized according to the nature of donors' interests. These can be categorized according to three types: political interests relating to the security, sovereignty and influence of a country, economic interests grounded in resource-driven performance, and commercial focus on trade links between neighboring countries (Browne, 2006, pp. 123-127). Development cooperation can thus aim to enhance bilateral or regional stability, security and potential (Cave, 2012), as well as amplify alliance-building, soft power and international status (Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, 2012, pp. 5). Mutual benefit, solidarity, partnership and non-interference must be framed according to these motivations. Indeed, it is from the diversity of motivations that each principle can be modulated to fit a donor's context and priorities. This is what brings heterogeneity to the emerging donor.

2.4. Asian Donors

Asian donors tend to work according to principles rather than sector priorities (Mulakala, 2014). The emerging donor identity within Asia can therefore be contextualized by identifying similarities in the principles promoted. Söderberg (2010, pp. 130-133) does so by establishing common characteristics between China, Japan, South Korea and Thailand's development cooperation programs. She concludes that their understanding of development cooperation contains an economic dimension and that it integrates elements of security, stability and wealth (ibid.). In particular, these Asian donors provide technical cooperation, or project-based practical assistance. Their provision of technical cooperation, however, focuses on specific fields, namely infrastructure, health, education and agriculture (ibid.). Human resources and capacity-building taking priority (ibid.).

Additionally, the regional context also matters because Asian donors engage in sub-regional apparatuses (Mulakala, 2014); in the case of Southeast Asia, these are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Greater Mekong Sub-region. These apparatuses play an important role because they provide a space for dialogue as well as for promoting individual interests and influence. This matters to Asian donors because they portray themselves to be

models to follow for other developing countries (Söderberg, 2010, p. 134). In so doing, development cooperation contributes to enhancing soft power and status.

2.5. Conclusion

Several changes are taking place in the international architecture: the DAC is opening up to the non-DAC community and attempts at institutionalizing emerging donors' development cooperation are taking place. The emerging donor identity therefore gains international validation. Amidst such important transformations, the concept is termed into threats and opportunities; it does not have to be so when it can coexist with other donors. Instead, heterogeneity exists as multiple interest sets cohabit in the notion. The principles of mutual benefit, solidarity, partnership and non-interference vary in accordance to the political, economic and commercial interests of individual countries. Looking into the Asian context, the second economic aspect stands out together with political motivations. Additionally, regional mechanisms work alongside bilateral relations for Asia's emerging donors to promote their interests.

Consequently, heterogeneity within the emerging donor exists to the extent that motivations and interests are plural and unique to each providing country. Nevertheless, these interests can also be grouped together to form cohesion within the emerging donor principles. The next two chapters focus on Thailand and Malaysia as emerging donor case studies, with the first centering on Thailand and the second on Malaysia. Analyses begin from their foreign policy elements to investigate the development cooperation discourses of the two countries. Doing so addresses Thailand and Malaysia's positioning within the emerging donor identity.

3. CONSTRUCTING THAILAND'S DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

3.1. Introducing Thailand

Known as the Kingdom of Siam until 1939, Thailand has roots going back to the Sukhothai, Lan Na and Ayutthaya eras (Wyatt, 2003). Unlike its neighbor countries, the country was never formally colonized: Thailand's monarchs and governments skillfully navigated state foreign policy through a set of alliance networks (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, 34). Foreign policy therefore has a primary role in the country's historical development.

Additionally, Thailand's current name comes from the Tai ethnic group, the country's majority and primarily Theravada Buddhist ethnicity (Wyatt, 2003: 1). It contrasts with Thailand's ethnic Malay minority residing in the South of the country. The divergence originates in Thailand's acquiring its Southern states during the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. These states had previously been under the Pattani and Kedah sultanates (Latif and Yusof, 2007, p. 279). If foreign policy plays a prime role in Thailand's historical development, the sultanates represent a major factor to Thailand and Malaysia's bilateral relations. As they were composed of both Thailand's Southern and Malaysia's two Northern states (ibid.), the past sultanates contributed to a shared identity. This motivates Malaysia to engage with the region while it creates tension with Thailand;

Coming to the current context, Thailand remains under Prayuth Chan-o-cha's military rule a year after the dismissal of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra and the subsequent May 2014 coup (The Nation, 2014). This is the twelfth time a military coup has taken place since the 1932 institution of the constitutional monarchy (Chachavalpongpun, 2014). Despite the political disruption this brings, the government maintains some constant elements to that of previous governments (military or civilian) in foreign policy formulation. This chapter therefore attempts to analyze Thailand's development cooperation elements from the beginning of Thailand's provision in the 1990s until today.

This chapter investigates three issues: Thailand's foreign policy and development cooperation principles, the Thai International Cooperation Program, and Thailand's relations with Malaysia and its effects on bilateral development cooperation provision. Greater attention is paid to Thaksin Shinawatra's premiership from 2001 to 2006 and his legacy in relation to past and present policy. Indeed, despite a controversial leadership, his time in power brought a period of political stability for the country and this has proven difficult to maintain. It was also under his leadership that Thailand's development cooperation program was expanded.

3.2. Development Cooperation and Foreign Policy

Due to the continuously unstable state of the country's political affairs (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. vii), Thailand's foreign policy has not expanded. In the past decade especially, Thailand has had to address border issues with Myanmar, Cambodia and Malaysia, domestic protests between political factions and frequent changes of government (Pongsudhirak, 2012). In order to study Thailand's development cooperation strategy, this section focuses on the country's post-Cold War foreign policies.

3.2.1. *From Anand Panyarachun to Prayuth Chan-o-cha*

Thailand has been providing technical cooperation since the 1960s. It was only in 1992, however, that Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun formalized its development cooperation provision (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 2). Indeed, prior to the end of the Cold War, Thailand's foreign policy had a passive attitude: in response to international issues, it focused on accommodating foreign countries by either taking sides or balancing powerful countries against one another. This is the premise to Thailand's long-time Bending with the Wind, or Bamboo Diplomacy (ibid., p. 15). Based on an ancient proverb, the bamboo symbolizes a pragmatic outlook of both strong roots and bendability to adapt to the external environment (Kislenko, 2002 cited in ibid., p. 34). However, with the late 1990s, the government became more proactive. It formalized regional priority under the Constructive Engagement framework. Initially formatted on relations with Myanmar, the term designates Thailand's use of soft power via ASEAN to establish political-economic ties strengthening relations with neighbor countries (Masilamani and Peterson, 2014, pp. 2-4).

The 1990s were however also marked with high political instability (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 85); this resolved only when Thaksin Shinawatra rose to power in 2001. His rule brought the country under a long-awaited bout of political steadiness, as Shinawatra remains to this day Thailand's only democratically-elected prime minister which has seen through and stayed longer than a four-year term (ibid., p. 2). This stability allowed Thailand enough time to grow its foreign policy. Shinawatra revised foreign policy based on his controversial influence, which brought disruption to the policy formulation process and structure (Krongkaew, 2009, p. 27).

Thaksin Shinawatra's foreign policy was characterized by two main elements: personalization and business-oriented politics to create an ambitious national outlook. Business-orientation portrays the restructuring of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs according to his CEO

Ambassador framework and Dual-Track politics (Krongkaew, 2009, pp. 28-29). Under the CEO Ambassador alteration, foreign officials became market leaders. This underscores a strategy named after Shinawatra, entitled "Thaksinomics" (ibid.). This policy relates efficiency, opportunity and competitiveness to national development (ibid.). Shinawatra therefore personalized foreign policy by restructuring the Foreign Ministry to bypass the decision-making process in policy formulation and adapted the bureaucratic system to fit his business outlook. In marketizing foreign relations, foreign policy consequently highlighted economic and commercial terms. This is reminiscent of Browne's (2006, pp. 123-127) classification of motivations and Söderberg's (2010, pp. 130-133) economic quality to Asia's development cooperation. The Dual-Track policy also linked foreign strategy to domestic concerns, as Shinawatra merged market-oriented elements with his state-backed social initiatives (Krongkaew, 2009, pp. 27-29). In creating this combination, Thaksin Shinawatra used foreign policy to gain domestic support, all the while legitimated by his democratic accession to power (ibid., p. 27).

Shinawatra's personalization and business orientation led to political fragmentation (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. xii). This outlines a new type of governmental instability which exists today. Consequently, foreign policy once again struggled to develop. It remains limited to bilateral and regional engagement focusing on neighboring countries and ASEAN. Military man Surayud Chulanont was the first to access power following Shinawatra's coup ousting in 2006. Despite unethical beginnings, he sought to repackage the country's image via an ethical policy based on silent diplomacy (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, pp. 281-284). Using the emerging donor principle of mutual benefit, Chulanont thus reached out to neighboring countries via cooperation to build trust and reduce tension (ibid., p. 283). Silent diplomacy also manifested itself via Thailand's avoidance of criticism on issues it disagreed with (ibid., p. 284). This diplomacy can be interpreted as built on the foundation of another emerging donor principle: non-interference.

Following two short-lived pro-Shinawatra governments after Chulanont, leadership transitioned to Abhisit Vejjajiva in 2008. The Prime Minister pursued a policy of Flexible Engagement (Vejjajiva, 2009). While this flexibility appears reminiscent of previous Bending with the Wind policy, it is however based more on a geographical proximity element. Flexible Engagement portrays Thailand's commitment to prosperous relations with neighbor countries as promoting Thailand's own development: this is the principle behind the Prosper-thy-Neighbor policy (ibid.). Thailand's status as a dependable partner becomes crucial (ibid.). This places importance on the principles of solidarity as well as mutual benefit.

Vejjajiva resigned in 2011 following border conflicts with Cambodia and Myanmar (Pongsudhirak, 2012, p. 75). Thaksin Shinawatra's sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was subsequently elected to power. Like her predecessors, she sought to build Thailand's status through a "next door" policy prioritizing immediate neighbors and regional powers (ibid., p. 74). This next door framing of Thailand resembles Söderberg's observation (2010, p. 134) that Asian donors portray themselves to be models. Yingluck Shinawatra's administration additionally increased the country's engagement in ASEAN due to the rising international interest in the ASEAN Community formation process (Busbarat, 2013, p. 3). Renewed engagement in the mechanism is significant as ASEAN embodies emerging donor benefits and especially the partnership and non-interference principles. ASEAN promotes partnership as a means to foster cooperation between countries and non-interference as a guarantee of states' sovereignty (Pongsudhirak, 2012, p. 78). Therefore, if ASEAN is often conceptualized as an economic community, this observation points to the institution operating primarily on Browne's political motivations. Commercial interests under Thaksin Shinawatra therefore reverted back to political motivations under Yingluck Shinawatra's leadership.

Similarly to her brother, Yingluck Shinawatra suffered a condemnation and a coup. In early May 2014, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha accessed the premiership following the Constitutional Court verdict removing her from the role of national leader (The Nation, 2014). The recent nature of this event therefore cautions against a definite formulation of foreign policy analysis; nevertheless, it can be noted that the incumbent Prime Minister places border relations in a geopolitical framework. Thailand plays a role in ASEAN because it connects parts of the region as a transport and communication hub (ibid.). In doing so, Thailand becomes the middleman of Southeast Asia, and this status therefore justifies further development cooperation provision. This explains infrastructure development provision as encouraging integration ahead of the institutionalization of the ASEAN community at the end of this year. In a politically volatile situation, it also reinforces confidence in Thailand's regional capability (ibid.).

3.2.2. *Positioning Development Cooperation*

Thailand's political environment of the past 20 years was therefore punctuated by numerous coups and policies. This caused foreign policy expansion to be constrained as Thaksin Shinawatra was the only prime minister who benefited from sufficient time and political stability to develop an adequate foreign policy. Other Prime Ministers pursued a "wait and see" attitude (Söderberg, 2010, p. 130). From such a perspective, Shinawatra's leadership was

exceptional (Chongkittavorn, 2009, p. 74-75). Nevertheless, foreign policy evolved from Constructive Engagement to Thaksinomics and Dual-Track strategy, ethical diplomacy, flexible engagement and Prosper-thy-Neighbor. Additionally, each of the policies promoted one or several of the mutual stability, solidarity, partnership and non-interference principles. Emphasis on these different elements evolved together with the policies. Indeed, as Vejjajiva argued, it is not the main features of Thailand's foreign policy which changed with the governments, but rather the approach to policy-making which evolved (Vejjajiva, 2009).

If Thailand's foreign policy addressed the emerging donor principles, Thaksin Shinawatra also used the political stability from his time in office to formulate a specific development cooperation policy. Thus, in March 2003, Shinawatra gave a speech entitled "Forward Engagement" (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 79). This later on became the name of a policy characterizing the country's emerging donor identity; Shinawatra resorted to the status of donor and recipient to indicate a symbolic change. Thus, under Anand Panyarachun, Thailand was simultaneously a donor and recipient. With Shinawatra's intervention, the dual status transformed into a "recipient-turned-donor" standing (cited in Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, 2002, p. 72). In doing so, Shinawatra claimed that Thailand would aim to reach for developed status (ibid.). Such a statement distanced implications of Thailand as a developing country.

In giving this speech, Shinawatra highlighted the notion that status matters for development cooperation provision (Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 5). The timing of his Forward Engagement policy is however also significant: with Thailand recovering from the 1997 financial crisis, the recipient-turned-donor shift symbolized a "reinvention" for the country (Chachavalpongpun, 2010). With development cooperation at the forefront, this emphasized Thailand's political need for recognition as well as for consolidating its international standing. This prominence of status further accentuated Thailand's positioning as a middle power connecting countries in the Southeast Asian region (Pongsudhirak, 2012, p. 78). Such a formulation additionally points towards Middle Power theory; this concept suggests that countries use a multilateral strategy to position themselves internationally (Karim, Campbell and Sriniwas, 2013, p. viii). In Thailand's case, the country therefore used the Middle Power status to situate itself regionally. It placed itself as a hub connecting West Asia, ASEAN states and China while also remaining central to the Sub-Mekong region (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. xii).

Such positioning must nevertheless be questioned: by linking domestic and international politics together under the Dual-Track framework, Thaksin Shinawatra related internal stability to the country's external outlook. This weakened the country politically, with "Thailand's international problem [becoming] its domestic politics" (Pongsudhirak, 2012, p. 78). In undermining the foreign policy framework, Thailand consequently cannot sustain this Middle Power status, as it necessitates that Thailand act as a leader on the regional level.

Following this analysis of the country's foreign and development cooperation policies, the specificities of Thailand's development cooperation provision are outlined. A final section then links Thailand's foreign politics and its development cooperation program to the specificities of the bilateral relations with Malaysia.

3.3. The Thai International Cooperation Program

This section looks at the structure of Thailand's development cooperation provision. It begins by delineating structural changes before addressing the scope of Thailand's program. Finally, Thailand's endorsement of development cooperation values is discussed.

3.3.1. *Existing Infrastructure*

Thailand's International Cooperation Program was established in the 1960s, when the country began providing technical cooperation (Söderberg, 2010, p. 127). It operated under the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, established in 1963 to primarily coordinate and plan reception of development assistance (Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, 2002, p. 8). A second mechanism was formed in 1966 to run parallel to this program: the Neighboring Countries Economic Development Fund provided loans to the country's neighbors (NEDA, 201-a).

Nevertheless, as stated above, it was only in 1992 that Thailand's technical cooperation was formalized as development cooperation (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 2). Ten years later, with the 2003 speech, Thaksin Shinawatra initiated the Forward Engagement strategy. Along with modifying Thailand's foreign policy-making mechanism based on the CEO Ambassador and Thaksinomics frameworks, he revised the structure of the country's development cooperation program to fit the change of international status highlighted by Forward Engagement. The Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation therefore became the Thailand International Cooperation Agency (TICA) in 2004 (TICA, 2013), and the Neighboring Countries Economic Development Fund changed into Neighboring Countries Economic

Development Cooperation Agency in 2005 (NEDA, 201-a). This infrastructure has been kept to this day.

The Thai International Cooperation Program additionally observes Thailand's five-year development plans (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 79). Formulated by the country's National Economic and Social Development Board, these plans outline middle-term strategies for the country's development. In keeping to the current eleventh plan, the Thai International Cooperation Program thus operates based on the country's identified development needs.

3.3.2. *Scope of the Program*

Other than the restructuring of the country's development cooperation provision arrangement, Thailand evolved to operate on several levels. Originally working exclusively on a bilateral level only, the Thai International Cooperation Program has come to incorporate six programs as bilateral and trilateral initiatives (Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, 2002, pp. 14-15; 54-55):

1) A training course system aimed at transferring knowledge to selected individuals,

2) A fellowship program for postgraduate students,

3) A technical cooperation platform focused on promoting mutual cooperation,

4) A trilateral training scheme funded by international organizations but taking place in Thailand,

5) A trilateral cooperation program for human resource development, and

6) Its bilateral agenda.

Indeed, trilateral cooperation began in the early 2000s to reduce cooperation expenses (Söderberg, 2010, p. 127), so that today Thailand provides only 45 percent of its development cooperation on a bilateral level (OECD, 2014).

In terms of geographical distribution, the Thai International Cooperation Program focuses primarily on the Greater Mekong Sub-region, which reflects the Prosper-thy-Neighbor principle: 57 percent of its cooperation goes to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (TICA, 2013). An additional 3.5 percent of expenses go the rest of the Southeast Asian and 17 percent to the wider South Asia and the Middle East region (ibid.). Smaller amounts are provided to central Asia, Africa and Latin America (ibid.). While the greater Asia stands out as a regional priority with a combined three quarters of total expenses, the Greater Mekong area overtakes both against the rest of Southeast Asia and other parts of the Asian region.

The importance of Thailand's neighbor countries is underscored by the very existence of the Neighboring Countries Economic Cooperation Agency (NEDA). This organization works by giving loans, grants and technical cooperation to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam to promote infrastructure projects (NEDA, 2009?). Until 2010, 5.5 billion Thai bahts had been invested in these projects (NEDA, 201-b). However, unlike TICA, the agency has lost influence since Shinawatra's stepping down from office in 2006. Financially, its budget decreased by a third between 2005 and 2009 (NEDA, 2010?). At the same time, the agency became less efficient as it doubled management costs despite the substantial decrease in funding (ibid.).

3.3.3. *Values Promoted*

Beyond the scope of the development cooperation provision, the Thai International Cooperation Program also promotes emerging donor values. Thus, the Thai International Cooperation Program focuses primarily on human resource development together with educational opportunities (TICA, 2013). It provides technical cooperation together with grant-making (ibid.). In so doing, the country promotes infrastructure and capacity-building according to the values of mutual benefit and partnership. This is emphasized by TICA's promotion of self-help and independence as part of the non-interference principle, but also via highlighting the recipient's needs by providing a demand-driven program. This request-based quality comes from the recipient being the one to initiate development cooperation (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 82). Additionally, NEDA procures on the basis of mutual benefit, a sense of responsibility as solidarity, and the need for peaceful cohabitation (NEDA, 2009?). Once again, political and economic motivations prime. However, considering that NEDA's loans are conditional on a minimum of 50 percent of Thai inputs, Thaksin Shinawatra's business-oriented priorities underline commercial opportunities (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 83).

Since the restructuring following Shinawatra's 2003 speech, Thailand's International Cooperation Program therefore works on the bilateral and trilateral level to provide infrastructure, capacity-building and human resource development. It also greatly prioritizes the Greater Mekong Sub-region against other regional arrangements. The next section addresses Thailand's development cooperation at the bilateral level and outside of the Greater Mekong Sub-region. Doing so contextualizes Thailand's endorsement of development cooperation principles together with its foreign policy formulation.

3.4. Thailand's Development Cooperation with Malaysia

Thailand and Malaysia have maintained an overall stable relationship over time (Pongsudhirak, T., 2012: 76). However, in recent years, bilateral relations have been marked by the presence of an internal conflict in the country's Southern states, which has also affected development cooperation provision. This section addresses the Thailand-Malaysia relation under the current context.

3.4.1. *Thailand's Southern Conflict*

As delineated in the introduction, Thailand's Southern states are home to an ethnic Malay Muslim minority (Latif and Yusof, 2007, p. 279). Amidst the country's Buddhist majority, their presence has historically been a source of tension (McCargo, 2009, p. 83). From Thailand's acquisition of the Southern provinces until Thaksin Shinawatra's arrival to power, this tension had been kept latent and had not affected foreign policy (ibid.). It may be said that both Thailand and Malaysia had a mutual interest in keeping the area stable for domestic and international steadiness. However, Shinawatra changed this *quid pro quo* situation by neglecting to cater to the area (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 188): he attempted to increase the military presence, which led to a rise in violence (McCargo, 2009, p. 96). Furthermore, the situation worsened when the prime minister simplified the problem and labelled this violence as an external threat to the country (Chongkittavorn, 2009, p. 79); he externalized the conflict.

In depicting the conflict as going beyond the borders of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra also disregarded relations with Malaysia. Indeed, the external threat was put on the ethnic Malays from Malaysia's Kedah and Kelantan states as he accused them to have instigated violence in Thailand's South (ibid., p. 78). Such a statement is based on the premise that Thailand's Muslim minority shares cultural ties with Malaysia's Northern Malays (Latif and Yusof, 2007, p. 281).

3.4.2. *Thailand-Malaysia Bilateral Cooperation*

Despite a limited focus on Southeast Asia beyond the Greater Mekong Sub-region, Thailand's International Cooperation Program incorporates relations with Malaysia at the bilateral level. It also works multilaterally via trilateral apparatuses such as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (Badawi, 2012, p. 9). Under the post Thaksin Shinawatra-agenda, however, efforts have concentrated on the country's Southern conflict. In particular, Thailand's leaders have attempted to mitigate local violence and improve bilateral relations. A means to do both

arose through calling for Malaysia's assistance. Surayud Chulanont did so by requesting Malaysia's development cooperation (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 282).

On Thailand's side of the bilateral relations, the country therefore does not expand on its development cooperation provision but instead on its development cooperation reception. Such a strategy is underscored by the political motivations of ensuring security and stability while preserving the country's sovereignty. Thus the political dimension primes in Thailand-Malaysia diplomacy, and so over economic or commercial relations (Browne, 2006, pp. 123-127). This reception also remains within the scope of the country's emerging donor principles: it is portrayed under the notion of mutual benefit, which fits within the country's Prosper-thy-Neighbor strategy (Vejjajiva, 2009). Nevertheless, Thailand requesting cooperation however goes against its portrayal as a regional hub within a Middle Power policy (Pongsudhirak, 2012, p. 78) or as a model to follow (Söderberg, 2010, p. 134).

Currently, Thailand is engaging in a peace process with the Southern provinces in order to curb the violence. This initiative was initiated by Surayud Chulanont , taken up by Yingluck Shinawatra and followed by Prayuth Chan-o-Cha (Parameswaran, 2014, p. 1). Running parallel to Malaysia's development cooperation provision, this enterprise attempts to regain stability for the mutual benefit of Thailand and Malaysia; Chan-o-cha hopes to reach an agreement before 2015 ends (ibid.).

3.5. Thailand as Emerging Donor

Together with India and China, Thailand is currently seen as one of the most visible development cooperation provider in the region (Mulakala, 2014). Consequently, the country is more commonly used as a case study for the Southeast Asian region. This international portrayal of Thailand as an example mirrors the country's self-perception of being a model to follow (Söderberg, 2010, p. 134). Nevertheless, in contrast with its international image, the country "underachieves" (Pongsudhirak, 2012, p. 78). Indeed, the country's foreign policy and development cooperation provision have been lacking due to internal stability and short-lived governments. Nowadays, Thailand is under another military government following last year's twelfth military coup. This situation is likely to persist as it is hypothesized that the army remains in power to manage a royal transition (Chachavalpongpun, 2014, p. 169-171); Thailand's much revered monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, is currently suffering from poor health and old age (ibid.).

Despite the political uncertainty, Thailand situates itself within the emerging donor identity by emphasizing a recipient-turned-donor status with the country aiming for developed standing (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 79). The very political unsteadiness also points to stability, security and sovereignty as predominantly political motivations for development cooperation. This is all the more so as Thailand's internal and international politics have come to be linked since Thaksin Shinawatra's dual track politics (Krongkaew, 2009, p. 27-29). Thailand's emerging donor values are also embodied in policies such as mutual benefit via Prosper-thy-Neighbor and respected in the Thai International Cooperation Program's Greater Mekong Sub-region focus, solidarity and partnership via Forward Engagement and the demand-driven nature of development cooperation provision, and non-interference being promoted via Constructive Engagement and through self-reliance in human resource development and capacity-building.

At the bilateral level, Thailand receives Malaysia's development cooperation as a means to maintain relations (Mauss, 1923, p. 12), but also to address its internal conflict at the local Southern level. This development cooperation remains in line with Thailand's recognition of the emerging donor principles. Nevertheless, the constriction of Thailand's development cooperation program due to its inability to solve this conflict leads to questioning whether Thailand's development cooperation principles need to be reviewed (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 83). The next chapter introduces Malaysia's emerging donor principles and portrays the country's vision on bilateral Malaysia-Thailand interaction and particularly in relation to the Thai conflict.

4. CONSTRUCTING MALAYSIA'S COOPERATION POLICY

4.1. Introducing Malaysia

Malaysia gained independence in 1957 from the United Kingdom. Originally known as the Federation of Malaya, it finalized its boundaries in 1965 when Singapore left the grouping (Hamid, 2005, pp. 14-15). The country is distinct for its plural society, formed of a majority ethnic Malay Muslim population with significant Buddhist, Hindu and Christian Chinese and Indian minorities (Mohktar Selat, 2006, pp. 13-14). Despite the relative youth of the country, Malaysia portrays itself as a model of successful economic development for other developing countries to follow (Karim, Campbell and Sriniwas, 2013, p. 1). This is based on the country's championing high growth until the Asian financial crisis (Jimenez, Nguyen and Patrinos, 2013, p. 142). It asserts this model image by taking regional leadership in ASEAN (Karim, Campbell and Sriniwas, 2013, p. 1).

Concerning ASEAN, the year 2015 symbolizes a turning point for Malaysia both in terms of domestic and external policy. The ASEAN Community is to come together under the country's fourth chairmanship of the association (ASEAN, 2014b; 2014c). Such a milestone for the apparatus thus increases Malaysia's visibility on the regional and international level. The year also denotes another countdown. By the next five years, Malaysia is due to high-income status (Yusoff, 2013, p. 6-7). This countdown is embodied by the country's latest Malaysia Plan, part of the five-year policy designs which outline the country's middle-term economic development (ibid.). This countdown also embodies the emblematic target set by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1991 under his Vision 2020 policy (Mohamad, 1991). Mohamad's strategy therefore provides justification for the country's past and current development cooperation provision.

The following chapter analyzes Malaysia's development cooperation policy by looking at three elements: foreign strategy and development cooperation principles, the structure and content of Malaysia's Technical Cooperation Program and Malaysia's programs and relations with Thailand are addressed in a third part.

4.2. Malaysia's Foreign Policy

Malaysia's development cooperation provision began in 1980 with the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program (MTCP) under the premise of "South-South Cooperation" formulated by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015). The inception of this program is highly linked to the country's foreign policy. This section

consequently aims to look at the charismatic leader's external agenda. This is best done by looking into policy elements of previous prime ministers, as Mohamad is often described from having broken past lines (Baginda, 2007, pp. ix-xiii; Mohktar Selat, 2006, p. 20; Karim, 2013, pp. 37-38). A first sub-section therefore addresses Malaysia's foreign strategy prior and up to Mahathir Mohamad before a second part brings foreign policy analysis into the current context.

4.2.1. *From Tunku Abdul Rahman to Mahathir Mohamad*

Malaysia's core policy stance evolved together with the country's development capacity. Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1970), the country's first prime minister, initiated foreign strategies by encouraging a pro-Western position due to the state's high dependence on the United Kingdom. This changed after 1969, when Premier Abdul Razak Hussein (1970-1976) came into power. He changed the country's policy focus from accommodation to proactive Equidistance and Neutralization positioning with foreign partners. In other words, in a Cold War era, Razak Hussein expanded international connections by establishing relations with both communist and non-communist countries. Doing so created the fundamentals of the country's external approach (Baginda, 2007, p. x). The next leaders altered policies from these foundations (ibid.). Malaysia's third Prime Minister, Hussein Onn (1976-1981), thus consolidated Razak Hussein's position by making the most of the Cold War's détente agenda: he evened foreign relations between the communist and non-communist parties while taking the lead in ASEAN via the country's middleman role in regional issues (ibid, p. xii).

Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003) succeeded Hussein Onn. Upon taking office, he introduced a new policy approach with three key elements (Karim, 2013, pp. 34-36). Firstly, he promoted the Looking East strategy, a policy which explicitly looked to Japan and South Korea for developmental opportunities (Mohktar Selat, 2006, p. 23). Mohamad thus focused away from Razak Hussein's Neutralization and Equidistance elements. Secondly, Buy British Last sought to counter the Abdul Rahman-era favoring of the United Kingdom and Western states by engaging with a greater number of countries (ibid., p. 22). Thirdly, Mohamad placed Malaysia as a representative for the developing country community by criticizing Western measures he perceived to be unfair such as trade protectionism and United Nation positions (Hamid, 2005, p. 3). The three elements thus form a wider policy named after Mahathir Mohamad, "Mahathirism" (Khoo, 2003, cited in Karim, 2013, p. 37). Together, they also encouraged the enhancement of Malaysia's economic and commercial interests towards the developing country community.

In so doing, Mohamad both personalized foreign policy and linked economic and commercial interests. Firstly, Malaysia's critical stance was defined solely by his condemnation of international conditions. Secondly, economic and commercial interests showed in the country's attempt to create new markets in the developing world and begin development cooperation as "South-South Cooperation" underlining economic relations (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 27).

Under Mahathir Mohamad's leadership, Malaysia gained international prominence: criticism of the Western countries created both controversy with the latter partners and a voice for the developing world. In so doing, Malaysia became recognized worldwide. This international visibility was re-introduced in Mohamad's initiation of the country's development cooperation provision.

4.2.2. *The Post-Mohamad Era*

Mahathir Mohamad's engaged and high visibility diplomacy stance places him as an exception in Malaysia's foreign policy (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 130). His policies were both adopted and mitigated by his successors. Following Mohamad's retreat, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009) returned to Razak Hussein's balanced position. Less voiceful, his focus on bilateral ties lined with Malaysia's interests while he promoted engagement via regional organizations such as ASEAN (Baginda, 2007, p. xiii). Najib Razak, Malaysia's current prime minister, then acceded power in 2009; two observations can be made about his strategy. Firstly, he continues to emphasize foreign policy as a means to boost domestic economics (Khalid, 2011, p. 437). This once more acknowledges Söderberg's observation (2010, pp. 130-133) on the economic motivation of Asian donors. Secondly, Razak adapts to rather than changes the international agenda but promotes a large-scale vision at the regional level. In so doing, his strategy adopts foreign policy qualities of his father, Razak Hussein, and Mahathir Mohamad (Khalid, 2011, pp. 433, 439-440).

Malaysia's foreign policy therefore oscillated between balance and preference. It evolved from a pro-Western take to neutralization and equidistance, an even policy, Looking East together with Buy British Last, and finally a balanced and reactive strategy. Such variation follows the country's development needs (Hamid, 2005, p. 18). Currently, the balance element prevails as a means to preserve Malaysia's political stability. The next section analyzes the emerging donor principles behind Malaysia's foreign policy.

4.3. Development Cooperation Values

Among the characteristics of Malaysia's foreign policy, several apply to the values purposed for development cooperation provision. Firstly, this is emphasized by the pragmatism employed by all of the country's prime ministers (Mohktar Selat, 2006, p. 13). This corresponds to the vision that development cooperation is grounded in interests as it is given for practical purposes (Mauss, 1923, pp. 12), with a need for flexibility to adapt to contextual changes and the country's interests. Secondly, via balance and preference, Malaysia's role on the international scene is emphasized through a Middle Power strategy: the state operates multilaterally to position itself on the international level (Karim, Campbell and Sriniwas, 2013, p. viii). This construction relates to the country's positioning as an emerging donor.

In his second decade as prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad made a speech entitled "Vision 2020: The Way Forward". This talk conceptualized a middle-term deadline for the visualization of Malaysia as a developed economy (Mohamad, 1991). This resulted in the Vision 2020 policy, where to this day Malaysia aims to reach for high income status by 2020. The policy reflects the transitory quality to Malaysia's middle-income status by justifying the use of a multilateral strategy to acquire developed status (Kaim, 2013, pp. 39-40). In other words, the strategy relates to the concept of "middlepowerism" (Nossal and Stubbs, 1997, cited in Karim, 2013, p. 39), Malaysia's Middle Power strategy.

Thus, Malaysia invests in ASEAN leadership and showcases its interests. Due to Malaysia's involvement, ASEAN possesses its own Vision 2020 deadline which aims to fully implement the ASEAN Community by the set date (ASEAN, 2014). The primacy of ASEAN also demonstrates Malaysia's political motivation for regional stability and security (Kharim, 2013, pp. 11-12). Malaysia's security concerns are observed in the ASEAN Community process, which is expected to strengthen regional reognition (Ahmad and Chandran, 2013, p. 84). At the same time, the regional mechanism safeguards the emerging donor principle of non-interference and partnership (ibid.). Such a remark echoes a similar observation of ASEAN in chapter three where non-interference is founded on self-reliance and respect for sovereignty.

Malaysia's Middle Power stance thus inscribes itself in the construction of the state's ability to lead the regional mechanism and cater to its own interest while building alliances and cooperating with other international forces (Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 5). This is currently embodied by the country's chairmanship of the apparatus (ASEAN, 2014c). A second element in the construction of Malaysia's emerging donor identity is that development cooperation as South-South Cooperation underscores a Prosper-thy-Neighbor

policy. The strategy promotes the idea that better-off neighbors impacts Malaysia positively (Hamid, 2005, p. 40). The outlook therefore puts forth the notion of mutual benefit in foreign relations based on a principle of solidarity. In other words, Prosper-thy-Neighbor also justifies the need for development cooperation provision.

Malaysia's imminent developed status therefore works to define the country's development cooperation process. It gives legitimacy as a development cooperation provider while ensuring enough flexibility to identify with developing countries' concerns under an implied developing status. This "developing-but-soon-to-be-developed" positioning is developed via Prosper-thy-Neighbor and mutual benefit as well as outlined under regional peace and security in a Middle Power placement. However, the status is also endangered if Malaysia does not achieve its Vision 2020. The next section focuses on the country's development cooperation provision, which began in 1980 under Mahathir Mohamad's leadership (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015). It looks into the infrastructure of the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program and the principles which direct this cooperation. The next section then addresses bilateral Thailand-Malaysia relations.

4.4. The Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program

Malaysia continues to receive development cooperation today. Between 2000 and 2010, it obtained 144 million US dollars annually (Wajjwalku et al., 2014, p. 142). This contrasts with the country's own provision of a yearly average of 30 million ringgits between 2001 and 2005 (ibid., p.148). Using the same exchange rate as for the former figure, this amount represents 8.55 million US dollars (XE, 2015). In other words, this is only a fraction of the amount received. Despite Malaysia's development cooperation provision being comparatively much smaller than its reception, it remains sizeable. This section addresses the infrastructure and scope of the MTCP before analyzing the values it promotes via its cooperation.

4.4.1. *The Program's Infrastructure*

The Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program is thirty-five years old; conceptualized in February 1978, it officially launched in 1980 and has been running since then (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015). Its conceptualization therefore precedes Mahathir Mohamad's premiership but it was his government which oversaw its development. Until January 2010, the MTCP operated under the Economic Planning Unit, which itself ran under the Prime Minister's Office. After this date however, authority shifted to Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lafaye de Micheaux, 2014, p. 92). This organizational shift is significant

as it implied the Prime Minister was removed from having direct control over development cooperation formulation. Moreover, the past arrangement undermined the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by limiting it to an implementing rather than a policy-making body.

Development cooperation provision additionally operates based on Malaysia's five-year development plans. Entitled "Malaysia Plans", they elaborate the general aims for national development (Yusoff, 2013, pp. 3-4). Malaysia is currently preparing its eleventh plan (2016-2020) to be made public in June of this year. As the last plan before Malaysia is due to reach the Vision 2020 high-income status (Yusoff, 2013, pp. 6-7), its targets are of crucial importance. This puts greater emphasis on Malaysia's cooperation program. It can be portrayed by the MTCP's budget having more than quadrupled from nine million ringgits under the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1980-1985) to 40 million ringgits under the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2011) (Lafaye de Micheaux, 2014, pp. 96-97).

The MTCP operates as part of three cooperation initiatives. The first of these is the Malaysia South-South Association, an organization geared towards bridging the business arena and governmental strategy to promote trade and investments with other developing countries (Hazri and Tang, 2011, p. 72). The body therefore operates as a means to promote Malaysia's commercial interests (Browne, 2006, pp. 123-127). The second initiative is the South-South Information Gateway. Designed as a platform for information exchange based upon Malaysia's development cooperation principles (Hazri and Tang, 2011, p. 72), its emphasis on communication denotes political motivations (Browne, 2006, pp. 123-127). Developed as part of the Prosper-thy-Neighbor policy, the two mechanisms focus on networking and information as a means to promote solidarity and cohesion (Hazri and. Tang, 2011, p. 72).

4.4.2. *Scope of the Provision*

The Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program nevertheless remains the sole body responsible for direct development cooperation provision. Looking at geographical distribution, the program has provided services to over 20,000 individuals from 138 countries since its inception (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015). The MTCP also prioritizes ASEAN in regional distribution: over 1980 and 2011, one third of the educational program participants belonged to the regional grouping, against one fifth for Africa and one fourth for the West Asia, North Africa, and South Asia grouping (Hazri and Tang, 2011, p. 67).

Geographical proximity therefore matters, which highlights the Prosper-thy-Neighbor principle like the two other cooperation enterprises. However, development cooperation also

extends beyond the principle of mutual benefit as the provision is not limited to the Southeast Asian region geographical boundary. The value of solidarity then encompasses other motivations such as alliance-building and status (Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 5).

On a surface level, Malaysia's development cooperation also functions on multiple levels: while its provision remains mostly bilateral, the country operates trilaterally via funding organizations and engages multilaterally (Hazri and Tang, 2011, p. 71). Malaysia therefore engages via mechanisms such as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle and the Greater Mekong Sub-region (Hamid, 2005, pp. 42, 155-157). This engagement highlights the regional aims of the country by giving importance to an ASEAN integration effort currently amplified with the ASEAN Community formation. It also outlines the security element to the development cooperation provision. Such collaboration consequently allows the country to extend development cooperation to a greater scope as this implies development cooperation is not limited to the MTCP's budget. It also denotes political as well as commercial and economic interests.

4.4.3. *Values Promoted*

The Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program observes the emerging donor values promoted in the country's foreign policy: mutual benefit and solidarity such as Prosper-thy-Neighbor and partnership and non-interference in regional engagement. The program therefore targets capacity-building within a wider goal of stimulating economic growth (Hazri and Tang, 2011, p. 69). Yet, promoting the economic dimension of development cooperation, similarly to other Asian donors (Söderberg, 2010, pp. 130-133), is complemented by other political motivations. Vision 2020's regional emphasis reveals Malaysia's interest in ensuring stability and security beyond its national boundaries (Cave, 2012). Beyond the Prosper-thy-Neighbor strategy, it encompasses a Middle Power strategy which spans across the developing world (Karim, Campbell and Sriniwas, 2013, p. viii).

Another characteristic of the MTCP's development cooperation provision is its demand-driven nature: Malaysia provides programs based on requests from potential recipients (Wajjwalku et al., 2014, pp. 141-143). These vary in coverage, from public administration, good governance, health, education, agriculture, ICTs, investment and banking (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015). They also come in the shape of educational opportunities and funding, via bilateral scholarships for long-term courses, short-term training, study visits and expertise as well as funding for infrastructure or development projects and in-kind

material supply (ibid.) The request-based element therefore echoes an observation from chapter three whereby such structure respects recipient's needs and portrays emerging donor elements of self-reliance, sovereignty and partnership. The nature of the program additionally obliges Malaysia to be flexible and responsive while simultaneously making the recipient responsible for analyzing its own needs for adequate development cooperation provision. Such a requirement is portrayed by the Economic Planning Unit and now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs selecting projects using the Malaysia Plan's strategic outlines.

A final observation notes that Malaysia's focus on education, human resource development and technical cooperation underscore the country's political use of soft power (Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 5). Thus, together with the Malaysia South-South Association and South-South Information Gateway, the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program uses the soft power focuses to promote Malaysia's pending status as a "developing-but-soon-to-be-developed" emerging donor. The next section analyzes Malaysia's current development cooperation provision in the context of bilateral relations with Thailand.

4.5. Malaysia's Development Cooperation with Thailand

The Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program exists since 1980 with greater emphasis on development cooperation from the 1990s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015; Mohamad, 1991). It spans across a short period in Malaysia and Thailand's mutual history. Nevertheless, it remains a significant element of the countries' current bilateral relations. Historically, Malaysia and Thailand have maintained mostly stable relations (Pongsudhirak, 2012, p. 76). In 2004, however, Thailand's latent tensions with its Southern provinces escalated into a violent conflict (Latif and Yusof, 2007, p. 279).

After a floating moment of tense bilateral relations during the conflict's two-year escalation, Malaysia progressively addressed the situation by delivering technical cooperation to Thailand's border area at the latter's request (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 282). Malaysia's targeted bilateral development cooperation thus primarily outlines the country's principally political motivations of security and stability in an unsteady context (Cave, 2012). This may be interpreted as operating under a reverse principle of Prosper-thy-Neighbor, with the possibility that Thailand's instability cross the border and reflect on Malaysian politics.

Malaysia's role model characterization in its development cooperation policy is also repeated in this bilateral context. By providing technical cooperation in Thailand's time of need, the country uses soft power to promote itself as an example to follow. This is done via Najib

Razak's "three E" concept: Education, Entrepreneurship and Employment (Khalid, 2011, pp. 445-446). Malaysia projects a small number of educational and entrepreneurship opportunities for the targeted ethnic Malay Thai nationals which take place through its scholarship and short-term training programs. One of these is the GiatMARA skills-training program. Operating under the Malaysian government agency MARA, the organization primarily caters to Malaysian Muslim bumiputera (Ali, A., 69). However, with TICA's endorsement, GiatMARA's course provision is adapted for the Thai context. Thus, for the year 2015, twenty four participants are to participate in nine-month training at GiatMARA's centers all over Malaysia (Royal Thai Embassy of Kuala Lumpur, 2015). Upon completion, trainees are expected to return to Thailand and share their skills and knowledge. Thus, providing development cooperation to Thailand addresses stability concerns and stimulates Malaysia's self-characterization as a role model.

4.6. Malaysia as Emerging Donor

Several conclusions may be drawn from the discussions above. Firstly, Malaysia currently stands as both a provider and receiver of development cooperation but will have to reframe this emerging donor positioning when 2020 comes. Nonetheless, despite this impending change of conceptualization, the country maintains a constant identification to the emerging donor values via a middle income and Prosper-thy-Neighbor policy. Lastly, Malaysia's bilateral relations with Thailand are currently maintained via the latter's provision of development cooperation amidst a visible conflict in Thailand's Southern provinces.

Malaysia situates itself within the emerging donor identity by emphasizing its donor status amidst a pending developed standing. Indeed, Malaysia continues to receive development cooperation (OECD, 2015b), but also procures it to other countries since 1980 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015). In being so, the country simultaneously portrays a dual identity: its emerging donor construct exists through the aim to reach high-income status in the near future. It is also made possible by imagining a "still-developing but imminent high-income" positioning and emphasizing that the country has not reached this yet.

This emerging donor positioning is therefore temporary: the standpoint will have to be realigned when 2020 comes (Karim, Campbell and Sriniwas, 2013, p. 2). In other words, if Malaysia reaches its high income Vision 2020 goal, its new situation will require an updated emerging donor framing. This necessitates another form of "niche diplomacy" (ibid.). Nevertheless, the completion of this goal may prove problematic: the Economic Planning Unit estimates that Malaysia's economy needs to grow by minimum five percent annually over the

next four years to reach high income status (Yusoff, 2013, p. 11). Malaysia's growth rate of 4.7 percent in 2013 and estimated growth of between 4.5 and 5.5 percent in 2014 indicates that it will not meet the deadline under current circumstances (Omar, 2014, p. 5). Malaysia consequently has to reformulate its emerging donor identity even if it does not reach Vision 2020.

Secondly, Malaysia's emerging donor identity is shaped by the country's foreign policy. Firstly, Malaysia uses a Middle Power strategy: it qualifies the emerging donor status by framing its leadership on a multilateral level (Karim, Campbell and Sriniwas, 2013, p. viii). By engaging in ASEAN as a leader, Malaysia institutionalizes its own cooperation principles at the regional level (Karim, 2013, p. 110); ASEAN possesses its own Vision 2020 (ASEAN, 2014). Malaysia therefore promotes its politically-oriented security and stability principles (Cave, 2012) of solidarity, sovereignty, non-interference via the regional mechanism.

In addition, a complementary framework is underscored by Malaysia's Prosper-Thy-Neighbor policy. This highlights geographical proximity by focusing on neighboring countries: it is the principle that the prosperity of Malaysia's neighbors impacting Malaysia positively (Hamid, 2005, p. 40). While denoting Malaysia's economic and commercial interests (Browne, 2006, pp. 123-127) via mutual benefit and partnership, it also portrays more political values of stability and peaceful coexistence.

At the bilateral level with Thailand, development cooperation serves to maintain stable relations with the neighbor country. Malaysia thus engages under Najib Razak's current "three E" concept of Education, Entrepreneurship and Employment (Khalid, 2011, pp. 445-446). This commitment denotes both commercial and economic interests via the Prosper-thy-Neighbor framework, but also highly under security and stability concerns: the border area with Thailand is currently unstable due to a violent conflict (Latif and Yusof, 2007, p. 279). With regards to the situation, Malaysia then engages with Thailand for mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. This localized priority denotes a sense of responsibility to reinforce cooperation between Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia, as the two regions share a similar culture, language and religion (ibid.). The next chapter draws comparisons between Malaysia and Thailand's development cooperation before an ultimate chapter closes the discussion.

5. COMPARING THAILAND AND MALAYSIA

5.1. Symbolic Transitions

Two speeches characterize turning points for Malaysia and Thailand's statuses as emerging donors: Mahathir Mohamad's 1991 "Vision 2020: The Way Forward" discourse (Mohamad, 1991) and Thaksin Shinawatra's 2003 Forward Engagement call (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 79). In the first case, Mohamad envisions a future where Malaysia reaches high-income status by 2020, a date now set to take place in five years (Yusoff, 2013, p. 7). The country therefore manages the current transition from middle to high-income by providing development cooperation as a means to forge and manage relations with other countries. In the second case, Shinawatra emphasizes transition by promoting Thailand as a recipient-turned-donor country. This alteration is situated in the past, as the 2003 declaration took immediate effect once it was formulated. This recipient-turned-donor also represents Thailand's institutionalization of its development cooperation provision. It additionally downplays the fact that Thailand continues to receive portions of development cooperation; Malaysia and Thailand both remain on the 2015 DAC recipient list (OECD, 2015b).

The two states therefore distance themselves from the image of being a recipient country. Thailand does so by an immediate conversion embodied by the act of the speech and Malaysia through temporarily remaining a recipient country until the Vision 2020 target is completed. In the latter case, the experience of being a recipient country becomes an identity which the country shares with its own recipients. In other words, Malaysia's economic status legitimizes the country's transition to an emerging donor while it is Thailand's transition to an emerging donor which legitimizes the latter nation's economic status. The legitimation mechanisms then differ based on an alternate conceptualization of time, with the language of transition codifying development cooperation promotion despite these points of transitions being situated differently in the past or the future.

With transition and status as important starting points to understanding development cooperation provision in Malaysia and Thailand, this chapter looks into their foreign policy symbolism by establishing comparisons between the development cooperation policy and the providing programs.

5.2. The Trends, Leadership and Policies

This comparative discussion approaches three themes about Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation provision. It first opens on the general trends observable in the two countries' development cooperation programs. Focus then shifts to Shinawatra and Mohamad's impact as national leaders as leaders. Finally, the discussion continues on to address Thailand and Malaysia's subsequent policy focus. These three elements are taken up once again in the next section regarding the bilateral situation between Thailand and Malaysia.

5.2.1. *Trends in Development Cooperation*

Two observations can be made in relation to Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation provision. Firstly, a tendency exists in the steady increase of both Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation budget size on the long term: since their inception, Malaysia's MTCP budget has quadrupled (Hazri and Tang, 2011, p. 68), while Thailand's TICA budgeting has tripled (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 81). These figures quantitatively point to a rise in importance of development cooperation within foreign policy. However, this very observation is also undermined by a second tendency: in recent years, development cooperation funding has reversed. The amount of funding for the MTCP went down from 200 million ringgits under the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) to 74 million ringgits under the Tenth Plan (2011-2015) (Ambrose, 2015?). Similarly, Thailand's recent development cooperation budgeting has proven unsteady: over the past three years, its provision of ten million US dollars in 2010 peaked to 31 million dollars by 2011 but once again reduced to 17 million USD dollars in 2012 (OECD, 2014, p. 398).

Whether the trends for both Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation provision keep up remains to be observed. Nevertheless, such inconsistency reflects the semi-permanent state of Thailand's political instability and governmental change despite only few changes taking place at the foreign policy level (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 85). It also indicates Malaysia's longer-term economic constraints due to the international financial crisis (Jimenez, Nguyen and Patrinos, 2013, p. 142).

A warning note must also be taken against the association of the two countries' figures. In particular, budgeting numbers are not comparable between Thailand and Malaysia because the two states use separate frameworks for reporting their development cooperation. Thailand thus reports at the country level but also transforms the figures to correspond to the Development Assistance Committee formatting (OECD Development Cooperation Report, 2014, pp. 382-383). Malaysia, however, operates its own reporting which does not make data

as internationally comparable. Inconsistency in data availability is one of the problems of East Asian providers (Mulakala, 2014).

Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation programs have therefore grown in size on the long-term but have also been undermined in recent years due to internal or international conditions. As part of the development to this provision, the next section addresses Prime Ministers Thaksin Shinawatra and Mahathir Mohamad's leadership as legacy.

5.2.2. *Thaksin Shinawatra and Mahathir Mohamad*

Development cooperation provision in Thailand and Malaysia existed prior to Shinawatra and Mohamad's premiership; Thailand has been delivering it since the 1990s (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 2) while Malaysia has done so from the 1980 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015). Yet, Shinawatra and Mohamad explicitly formalized development cooperation as central to the respective country's well-being within the two speeches highlighted above: Vision 2020 and Forward Engagement have become permanent features of the countries' foreign policy.

Mohamad's premiership ended as Shinawatra's began. Despite leading at different times, both the Thai and Malaysian leaders had significant impact on their respective states' foreign policy. Several authors remark that within the literature on Thailand and Malaysia's foreign policy, a majority focuses on Shinawatra and Mohamad as the countries' most charismatic leaders (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, pp. vii- viii; Karim, 2013, pp. 28-36). This fact indicates a tendency in studying Thailand and Malaysia's foreign policy through contrasting the two leaders' policy elements with the general body of respective national foreign policy makers. Doing so also establishes them as unconventional and controversial leaders. Thaksin Shinawatra unconventional policy began with his departing from the previous Bamboo Diplomacy. Focusing away from balancing powers, Thaksin put forth Forward Engagement (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 15). Likewise Mahathir Mohamad's Vision 2020 based on Look East additionally moved away from past Equidistance and pro-Western lines (Mohktar Selat, 2006, p. 22-23).

Both prime ministers were charismatic because they possessed a particular leading style. A key characteristic was their overshadowing government mechanisms for better control over foreign policy-making (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 3; Karim, 2013, pp. 37-38). Within their "Forward Engagement" and "Vision 2020: The Way Forward" speeches, Shinawatra and Mohamad explicitly outlined economic and commercial concerns. On the one hand, Thaksin

Shinawatra emphasized the CEO Ambassador scheme, while on the other, Mahathir Mohamad used high visibility diplomacy such as the Looking East policy and Buy British Last strategy to promote Malaysia's international concerns. Doing so distinguished Thailand and Malaysia's policy at the international level. For development cooperation policy, however, this meant that it was impacted by their personal elements. Development cooperation discourse mirrored the leaders' Thaksinomics (Krongkaew, 2009, pp. 28-29) and Mahathirism (Karim, 2013, p. 37) stances. The next section identifies common long-term policy elements between Thailand and Malaysia.

5.2.3. *Similar Policy Elements*

Starting from a general level inquiry, Malaysia and Thailand both belong to the same OECD income group: they are also the only countries in Southeast Asia to have reached this high middle-income status (World Bank, 2015). If they are internationally perceived as middle income countries, the two states also acknowledge this perception through their Middle Power strategy. In other words, Malaysia and Thailand characterize themselves as middle powers by building their foreign policy on a multilateral basis (Karim, Campbell and Sriniwas, 2013, p. viii). Indeed, they benefit from a strategic positioning within Southeast Asia because the countries both link different part of the region as well as different parts of Asia (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. xii; Karim, 2013: 93-106). As political recognition depends on leadership in the area, status therefore matters for promoting development cooperation (Fues, Chaturvedi and Sidiropoulos, 2012, p. 5). Thailand and Malaysia thus link the need for development cooperation provision to their economic standing. They also aim to change that positioning by emphasizing the high income outlook within the Vision 2020 and Forward Engagement policies.

This section discusses three policy elements directing Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation: Prosper-thy-Neighbor, middlepowerism and regional concerns. These form stable principles which define the two countries' emerging donor identity.

Prosper-thy-Neighbor

A first principle which legitimizes the need for development cooperation provision is the prioritization of the Prosper-thy-Neighbor within Thailand and Malaysia's foreign policy. The countries relate their own development to its neighbors' economic health and development. Doing so promotes the emerging donor principle of mutual benefit based on regional

proximity (Starr, 2005, pp. 396-397). Such a formulation additionally denotes a basis for both bilateral and multilateral provision.

The Middle Power Strategy

A second principle is Thailand and Malaysia's Middle Power strategy underlined by the two countries' sub-regional emphasis. Thailand and Malaysia engage multilaterally: Thailand's NEDA and more visibly the Thai International Cooperation Program promote a Greater Mekong Sub-region focus (TICA, 2013), while Malaysia's MTCP engages highly in ASEAN (Hazri and Tang, 2011, p. 67). Such regionally-inscribed Middle Power strategy indicates the countries' need for soft-power and recognition. Additionally, the regional emphasis portrays Malaysia and Thailand as leaders, or models to follow within Asian donors (Söderberg, 2010, p. 134). Doing so positions them as emerging donors against other emerging donors in the region.

Regionalism

Thirdly, relating to the Middle Power regional emphasis is Thailand and Malaysia's presence in regional apparatuses such as ASEAN and the Greater Mekong Sub-region. The two countries' development cooperation provision promotes their regional stability and cooperation interests via trilateral and multilateral engagement (Söderberg, 2010, p. 127; Hazri and Tang, 2011, p. 71). At the bilateral level, Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation provision therefore goes beyond the two-sided level as bilateral engagement can take place through trilateral mechanisms such as the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (Hamid, 2005, p. 42).

Nevertheless bilateral considerations are also linked to the regional level: the Thailand-Malaysia border situation is an explicit concern mentioned and mitigated by ASEAN (Chalk, 2015, p. 9). The bilateral level impacts regional concerns and thus emphasizes the connection between national and international aims (Krongkaew, 2009, pp. 27-29). The final section addresses bilateral development cooperation principles with the broader emerging donor construct.

Malaysia and Thailand's development cooperation provision can therefore be compared on three levels. Firstly, two trends characterize the growth of their development cooperation program: a tendency to increase budget is observable on the long-term, but this has been recently constrained on the short-term. On a second level, the visibility of the programs is linked to the foreign strategy of two exceptional prime ministers, Thaksin Shinawatra and

Mahathir Mohamad. This is because the prime ministers personalized development cooperation policy formulation. Vision 2020 and Forward Engagement policies still have an impact today. Lastly, core principles which are common to the two countries emphasize status via a Middle Power strategy, mutual benefit via a Prosper-thy-Neighbor policy, and regionalism in preferential engagement.

5.3. The Malaysia-Thailand Nexus and Positioning

The Prosper-thy-Neighbor and Middle Power element are also found at the bilateral level in the case of Thailand-Malaysia relations. Mutual development cooperation takes places at the trilateral level, as noted in the two countries' involvements in mechanisms such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (Hamid, 2005, pp. 42, 155-157; Badawi, 2012, p. 9). Nevertheless, this thesis highlights that bilateral cooperation also goes through Thailand's reception of Malaysia's development cooperation. This is despite Thailand categorizing itself primarily as a provider only (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 79).

Thailand's reception becomes a way to preserve bilateral relations (Mauss, 1923, p. 12): the scope of this provision addresses Thailand's internal conflict resolution need against prominent internal, bilateral and regional instability apprehensions. Malaysia's provision also enhances the country's interests: Najib Razak's current "three E" concept (Khalid, 2011, pp. 445-446) highlights a need for prosperity and recognition, with the framework putting forth mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence under Prosper-thy-Neighbor. Along with the demand-driven emphasis on human resource development and capacity-building by Malaysia's MTCP, this principle matters because it is shared, recognized and utilized by Thailand in its development cooperation formulation.

Thailand's recipient-turned-donor identity (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 79) therefore does not stand considering Malaysia's provision of development cooperation to the former country. However, Thailand recognizes mutual benefit, sovereignty and security issues: solidarity and partnership are embedded in Forward Engagement and the request-based Thai International Cooperation Program framework, and self-reliance in its human resource development emphasis. Malaysia, on the other hand, positions itself as a dual development cooperation provider and receiver until 2020; its emerging donor construct exists in portraying high-income status as achievable in the near future. Like Thailand, Malaysia thus portrays mutual benefit and partnership via Prosper-thy-Neighbor. The more political stability-oriented solidarity, sovereignty and non-interference interests also operate via ASEAN. Indeed, by engaging as a regional leader,

Malaysia institutionalizes its development cooperation principles regionally (Karim, 2013, p. 110).

5.4. Conclusion

Status is a key consideration for both Thailand and Malaysia; the idea of transition acts as a legitimizing mechanism for development cooperation provision. The two countries construct their emerging donor identity by distancing themselves from recipient status at the discursive level although they remain recipients of development cooperation. Thailand becomes a recipient-turned-donor while Malaysia maintains a dual identity of donor and recipient. Status, embodied by the speeches of Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad and Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra promote the Middle Power strategy, Prosper-thy-Neighbor policy and regional considerations. At the bilateral level, Thailand and Malaysia engage mutually through provision founded on such shared characteristics, whether in terms of common emerging donor principles or in relation to the nature of the development cooperation program.

Having completed this comparison of Thailand and Malaysia's foreign policy and development cooperation provision, the next chapter provides the conclusions to this thesis. It relates together the emerging donor identity in terms of principles, motivations and diversity while linking Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation provision to the local bilateral context.

6. THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND BEYOND

This thesis related development cooperation policy to the emerging donor identity. In particular, the thesis approached the emerging donor as a heterogeneous concept (Sato et al., 2011, p. 2092), where Thailand and Malaysia situate themselves separately through foreign policy. In doing so, this thesis aimed to answer the research question of how development cooperation policies construct the emerging donor identity. To facilitate the study, the bilateral relationship of Thailand-Malaysia foreign policy was selected as a case study and two additional sub-research questions were put forward. Chapter two first looked at the extent to which heterogeneity exists within the emerging donor identity by examining attributes to development cooperation in Asia and internationally. Chapters three and four then addressed the question of how Thailand and Malaysia position themselves as development partners within this identity by analyzing foreign policy. Finally, chapter five compared findings from chapters three and four to address general findings, similarities in leadership and common development cooperation policy elements. This ultimate chapter provides a general conclusion. It addresses the emerging donor construct, looks into the Thailand-Malaysia case study, and finally goes beyond the thesis's methodological limitations by suggesting possible ways to deepen the study.

6.1. The Emerging Donor Construct Matters

The emerging donor identity is portrayed by Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation policies. The two countries share a similar understanding of emerging donor values: the two countries recognize principles of mutual benefit, solidarity, partnership, sovereignty, self-reliance and non-interference, as portrayed in their foreign policy (Mawdsley, 2012, p. 152). However, their positioning within the emerging donor identity differs as they construct it in different ways. Thailand first constructs a recipient-turned-donor transition where the country's recipient status is located to the past due to an improved economic situation. Malaysia, on the other hand, defines a simultaneously donor and recipient identity based on a "developing-but-soon-to-be-developed" status where the country is currently experiencing a recipient to donor transition.

This international status becomes a legitimizing mechanism for development cooperation provision, with Thailand and Malaysia both positioning their recipient identity as distant from their current economic situation despite differing strategies. Malaysia therefore plays on the Vision 2020 goal for flexibility: it allows the country to claim legitimacy as a provider because of the impending developed status while simultaneous using its developing status to

emphasize the need for mutual benefit, partnership and solidarity with its development cooperation partners. Such a policy line nevertheless needs to be reconfigured after 2020, as it marks the end of the recipient-to-donor transition; as five years remain before Malaysia is due to meet this deadline, the country is entering a critical time.

Thailand, on the other hand, refutes this flexibility by focusing solely on the donor status. Thailand's current internal instability contrasts with its external ambitions: the country's image requires that stability be accentuated to enhance trust and legitimacy in its development cooperation provision. Situating its recipient identity permanently in the past therefore allows it to emphasize greater sovereignty and self-reliance while recognizing the other emerging donor principles. The emerging donor construct therefore matters because it allows Malaysia and Thailand to negotiate their dual donor-recipient identity in providing flexibility to the characteristics: the former notion is malleable to fit the specificities of context.

6.2. Thailand-Malaysia Bilateral Relations

At the bilateral level, Malaysia and Thailand's mutual relations are based on the countries' respective development cooperation policies. On the one hand, Thailand began providing development cooperation in the early 1990s with a higher emphasis from 2003 onwards (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. 2; Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 79). It has traditionally given importance to political stability and the Greater Mekong Sub-region (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 84). On the other hand, Malaysia began providing development cooperation in 1980 and more visibly from 1991 under Mohamad's leadership (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, 2015; Mohamad, 1991). Malaysia also values stability with high emphasis on regionalism; it acts regionally as a leader of ASEAN, embodied by its current chairmanship (ASEAN, 2014b).

Similarly, both Thailand and Malaysia similarly recognize the Middle Power strategy and mutual benefit under the Prosper-thy-Neighbor framework. Their development cooperation provision, characterized by a technical, demand-driven modality (Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 82; Wajjwalku et al., 2014, pp. 141-143), is also directed by five-year national development plans which emphasize human resource development and capacity-building via infrastructure, health, education and agriculture programs (Hazri and Tang, 2011, pp. 67-69; Wajjwalku, 2011, p. 82). This mutual understanding over development cooperation principle and modality makes it possible for Malaysia to act as the provider and Thailand as the recipient. Such a perspective was portrayed in this thesis via the current conflict situation in Southern Thailand.

Thus, Malaysia's development cooperation program is used as a means to maintain the Thailand-Malaysia relationship following a period of strain for the two countries (Mauss, 1923).

6.3. Looking Ahead

The emerging donor identity matters for understanding development cooperation provision and its construction of bilateral relations. However, a critical approach is necessary as a next step to this research. This final section therefore proposes suggestions for future research based on three potential themes: greater variety in the type of research resources used, the international context of development cooperation provision, and the sustainability of Malaysia and Thailand's development cooperation programs.

Further research may begin with examining policy elements at the practical level and look into greater depth at individual projects initiated by the Thai and Malaysian authorities. Such an approach would complement and go beyond the sole utilization of official documents, think-tanks publications and general academic discourse by using primary sources. In particular, using resources in the local language would address one of the main weaknesses to this study. Another limitation, outlined by Thai and Malaysian authors (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, p. vii; Karim, 2013, p. 28), is that foreign policy for the two countries has been understudied or selective in focus. Research would therefore benefit from more in-depth foreign policy publications available for study.

Another consideration about Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation provision is the international agenda. Context is essential to understand how the identity of the emerging donor affects evolves: the donor agenda is dynamic. It becomes key to refer back to the recent changes in the past years, from the fast-growing visibility of the emerging donor to very recent events such as the setting-up of the AIIB and New Development Bank (AIIB, 2015; Chen, 2014). The setting-up of such new infrastructure denotes a process of internationally-recognized institutionalization for the emerging donor community: with the adherence of countries ranging from Denmark to Australia and Brazil, the AIIB has already become an international institution promoting emerging donor principles (AIIB, 2015). Further theorizing on the institutionalization of the emerging donor must therefore come about to understand external influence and how this may affect foreign policy.

Lastly, concerns arise over the sustainability of Thailand and Malaysia's development cooperation programs. When looking at Thailand, its unstable political situation as a semi-

permanent feature of domestic politics makes it difficult for governments to formulate long-term foreign policies. Therefore, Thailand's development cooperation program is likely to continue being undermined without a clear outline. Malaysia, on the other hand, does not have an independent think-tank agency such as Thailand's TICA, as its Ministry of Foreign Affairs has traditionally worked as an implementing rather than conceptualizing body (Lafaye de Micheaux, 2014, p. 92). Malaysia's development cooperation program therefore also lacks a clear structure (Hazri and Mun, 2011, p. 74). Greater attention to the structure and reflective capacity of existing mechanisms should therefore be included in further study.

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