

# Republic of Korea's Sunshine Policy: The sweeping fall in support for the Sunshine Policy and the role of the Ministry of Unification during the tumultuous Sunshine years

Author: Alec Axelblom  
Supervisor: Paul O'Shea



## **Abstract**

This thesis aimed to discover the underlying causes for the drastic loss in support for the Sunshine Policy and the role of the Ministry of Unification throughout its duration. The Sunshine Policy was a new approach to inter-Korean relations by the progressives in South Korea which, despite initially strong support, would eventually become disfavoured among large parts of the population. An established foreign policy alternative under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, the Sunshine Policy may be resumed by newly elected President Moon Jae-in as well as with future presidents. During the Sunshine period the Ministry of Unification played a central role in policymaking, however its function is understudied. The understanding of the loss in support over time would serve to explain the shifting roles of the ministry. This paper concentrates on a multitude of factors that explain why the policy lost support, such as the role of the opposition, North Korean behaviour, the US, and the domestic media. This paper looks at how changes in support for the Sunshine Policy, the 2003 transfer of power to Roh, and the role of the minister himself, all play into how the function of the Ministry changed.

The research revealed that in a complicated process the analysed factors decreased the support of the policy, all factors being intertwined as each factor strengthened the effect that the other factors had, with the role of the behaviour of North Korea having the largest impact. My findings also show that the Ministry of Unification had a larger presence in the later administration, partially due to personal policymaking decisions by Roh. Furthermore, the analysis finds that the Roh administration inadequately prepared the Ministry or the new reshaped policy for the realities of inter-Korean relations.

**Keywords:** Sunshine policy, Inter-Korean relations, South korea, North korea, Ministry of unification, Public support

## **Acknowledgements**

I want to thank the people at the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies at Lund's University for giving me the opportunity to study what I am so passionate about. A special thanks of course goes to my supervisor Paul O'Shea who has read so many of my drafts and provided valuable input. Towards the people in the program; I am very grateful for the camaraderie that I have enjoyed.

I also have to thank my family for always being so supportive. I am also very grateful to Kim Ji-eun who has helped me with Korean sources.

## Table of Contents

<b>Introduction</b> .....	1
Problem .....	1
Purpose and Aim of the Thesis .....	2
Research Question .....	2
Thesis Disposition .....	3
<b>Background</b> .....	3
History of Inter-Korean Relations and Policies before Sunshine .....	3
The Rise of Kim Dae-jung and the Sunshine Policy .....	6
History of the Inter-Korean Nuclear Issue .....	7
History of the Ministry of Unification .....	8
<b>Research Design</b> .....	8
Research Method .....	8
Choice and Study of Materials .....	9
Ethical Considerations .....	10
Limitations and Self-critical Assessment.....	11
Contribution to the Research Area .....	11
<b>Literature Review</b> .....	12
What issues did the Sunshine Policy encounter? .....	12
What was the role of the Ministry of Unification during the Sunshine period?.....	17
<b>Analysis</b> .....	18
What were the causes for the Sunshine Policy’s decline in support? .....	18
Influence of the Minister of Unification .....	26
How did the role of the Ministry of Unification change as the Sunshine Policy lost support?.....	31
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	37
<b>Bibliography</b> .....	41

## Abbreviations

MOU Ministry of Unification

SP Sunshine Policy

ROK Republic of Korea

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea

PRC People's Republic of China

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

## Introduction

### Problem

The Sunshine Policy (SP) was the Republic of Korea's (ROK) foreign policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 1998-2008. The policy was first implemented under the progressive President Kim Dae-jung who held the tenure of president from 1998-2003. After Roh Moo-hyun became president in 2003 the policy was kept intact with only small ideological differences. At the core of the policy was its goal to foster inter-Korean relations, the South Korean government wanted to achieve this by encouraging closer diplomatic ties with the DPRK and providing economic aid and assistance.

The policy faced a large drop in support during its active period under Kim, which meant that Roh, when becoming president, faced a difficult situation. Despite President Roh making changes to the policy with the aim of making it more appealing to the public, by 2008 it was generally regarded as a failure, with the then new president Lee Myung-bak moving to a stricter policy towards the DPRK (Hogarth, 100-101).

Within the Sunshine Policy the Ministry of Unification (MOU) played a central role, as it is an executive department of the government focused on inter-Korean relations. Under the Kim administration the MOU was central to inter-Korean policymaking, but it is further unclear what influence the MOU had under the Roh administration with regards to how it conducted the policy towards the DPRK (Levin and Yong-Sup, 65). The role of the MOU is an understudied area, though it is briefly mentioned in articles focused on other topics, no cohesive research exists concerning its function during the period. The two issues of the SP losing support and the changing role of the MOU are intertwined due to how tied the MOU was to the policy and the administration. By figuring out why the support for the policy, and in turn the administration, declined, we will more easily understand how the role of the ministry changed. Therefore this paper analyses first why the SP lost support, and subsequently how the role of the MOU changed during the period.

## **Purpose and Aim of the Thesis**

The main goal of this thesis is to add knowledge to the scholarly community pertaining to why the Sunshine Policy lost support and the role of the Ministry of Unification during this time period. In regards to the MOU this thesis primarily focuses on the role of the MOU in establishing and organising the policy towards the DPRK, which at that time was the Sunshine Policy. I analyse primary sources on the Sunshine Policy which not only discuss its public support and history, but also provides information on the role the Ministry of Unification had, and how it changed during this period. With these varied primary sources, along with sources from the ministry itself, I will put together a puzzle and show how the role of the ministry and its approach to the SP changed during this time. Though we know much about the SP, we do not know as much about why it lost public support, and especially not if this is linked with the role of the MOU. However, understanding why the SP lost support and comprehending the role of the MOU may be useful and relevant to any future developments in inter-Korean relations. With the election of Moon Jae-in on the 9<sup>th</sup> of May, 2017, we may see a shift in South Korean policy towards North Korea, compared to the two previous administrations. The MOU can play a central role in inter-Korean relations, and perhaps its role may be even more important in the kind of Sunshine-like policy that Moon Jae-in is expected to have. This thesis aims to add new knowledge on the role of the MOU and about what may have caused public support to drop for the Sunshine policy, a policy that Moon Jae-in advocates and that a future president may support as well. By analysing these two questions we may gain an understanding that can benefit scholars and future policymaking on the area.

## **Research Question**

The following is the research question which is the subject of this study:

What caused the Sunshine Policy to lose public support and how did the role change for the Ministry of Unification in regards to its responsibility in organising the policy towards North Korea during the tumultuous Sunshine period?

If we split up the research question into two parts, making it easier to answer and understand, we have these two interrelated questions that will be answered and analysed in this thesis:

- What were the causes for the Sunshine Policy's decline in support?

- How did the role of the Ministry of Unification change as the Sunshine Policy lost support?

## **Thesis Disposition**

This chapter contains the introduction, including a problem statement, the purpose and aim of the thesis and the research question. Chapter 2 details and introduces necessary background information regarding inter-Korean relations and the political development of South Korea. Chapter 3 introduces the research design including the chosen method along with the choice and study of materials, limitations and a self-critical assessment, and contribution to the research area. Chapter 4 contains the literature review, where background information written by experts on the topic is discussed and interpreted. Chapter 5 contains the analysis in three different parts, along with a chapter conclusion. Chapter 6 is the final conclusion of analysis.

## **Background**

This section is aimed at providing the framework for inter-Korean relations to foster an understanding of the topic, necessary for proper analytical interpretation. To fulfil that goal, this section will discuss information on four different topics. First, the history of inter-Korean relations beginning with the founding of the two Korean states in 1945, pre-Sunshine Policy. Secondly, important information on the Sunshine Policy not fully expounded in other sections of the thesis. Third, the background for the nuclear issue. Lastly, there will be a general outline on historical relevance of the Ministry of Unification.

Inter-Korean relations are an immense freestanding topic, meaning that this overview merely scratches the surface of North and South Korean experiences. However, the most essential and vital information for understanding the area has been chosen for this segment. This background will inform on the foundation of which the Sunshine Policy was built on, which will aid the answering of the literature review topics and furthermore the analysis.

## **History of Inter-Korean Relations and Policies before Sunshine**

During the Second World War Korea was under Japanese control, formally annexed by Japan in 1910. When the war was coming to an end the Soviet Union and the Allied powers decided to initially split up the Korean peninsula in a northern and southern half, with both sides disarming the present Japanese soldiers (Weathersby). Due to complications and developments post-war there would develop two separate governments in the two regions.

The northern government, in close relation to the Soviet Union, was communist, with the southern government being anti-communist (Oberdorfer and Carlin). Relations would deteriorate due to the different ideologies of the two governments, and eventually North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950 (Weathersby). After huge initial success by North Korea, South Korea received increasing military aid from the US and the UN, which eventually pushed back the North Korean forces. After another foreign intervention, this time by the People's Republic of China, the frontline would eventually stabilise. Following the war South Korea would see a large transformation and enormous economic growth with reforms by President Park Chung-hee who guided the nation economically from 1961 until his assassination in 1979 (Amsden, 14).

While the DPRK was relatively stable under the Kim family, which has ruled since the DPRK's foundation, South Korea experienced large domestic struggles, going back and forth between authoritarian and democratic governments until 1987 when the modern democratic Sixth Republic of Korea was created. One of the central pieces of post-Korean war tensions between the two Korea's was South Korea's anti-communism ideology and the National Security Act, which was enforced since 1948, which criminalised communism (Kim, "Unification policies"). Inter-Korean relations would contain a huge amount of incidents and complications in the following decades, with among other things, assassination attempts against both President Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan and smaller military confrontations.

After the democratisation of South Korea in 1987 the idea of a specific policy towards North Korea that not only centred on anti-communism solidified (Oberdorfer and Carlin). Roh Tae-woo, the first president of the democratic South Korea during 1988-1993 had a new interactive 'Nordpolitik' policy (Ibid). This leads us to the topic of what existed before the Sunshine policy. Nordpolitik meant a huge diplomatic effort by the South Korea not only towards North Korea, but towards its historical allies, the Soviet Union and the PRC (Ibid). South Korea was by now a larger economic power and had more influence and could due to this easier improve its relations with the Soviet Union, especially due to the latter facing a time of economic turbulence (Ibid). By achieving closer relations with the DPRK's closest allies, the DPRK would become further isolated. The closer relations between South Korea

and the Soviet Union and the PRC led to both nations attending the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, which the DPRK had tried to get all communist nations to boycott (Ibid).

Nordpolitik eventually led to a large range of successes, with inter-Korean relations improving with the signing of multiple important agreements on topics such as denuclearisation and trade. Many of the agreements and cooperation initiated during Roh Tae-woo were important for modern inter-Korean relations, and the successes of the policy would encourage the growth of future policies directed towards the DPRK.

The successor to Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, faced larger difficulties during his administration in 1993-1998. Kim had long been a pro-democracy activist and during his administration democracy solidified. Despite inter-Korean agreements on the area, North Korea continued its nuclear development which led to deteriorating relations between the two nations, and there were large discussions in American media concerning sanctions and a possible war (Oberdorfer and Carlin).

It is important to not only understand the background and history of South and North Korea, but also the geopolitical balance since the Korean War. The DPRK had long found its allies in either the PRC or the Soviet Union. But as the Cold War geopolitical structure collapsed, along with the Soviet Union, the international landscape changed in the 1990's, with the US becoming the international hegemon (Lee, "The Korean" 177).

After the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994 an Inter-Korean summit was cancelled, which led to criticism of the Kim Young-sam administration by the opposition. When Kim Dae-jung later won the 1997 election and became president the year after, a new policy towards the DPRK was put in action; the Sunshine Policy. The hopes with this new engagement policy was to shine a light over the peninsula, it meant to improve the relations between the two nations using diplomatic tools and economic aid so they could coexist and become further cooperative (Lee, "The Korean" 176). Despite viewing the DPRK regime as weak and the DPRK's system as having failed, the Kim administration did not expect the DPRK regime to collapse anytime soon (Ministry of Unification, "2001" 21). In comparison, the Kim Young-sam administration had believed that the North Korean regime would collapse, following the other collapsing communist states of the Cold War era (Lee, "The Korean" 178-179).

## **The Rise of Kim Dae-jung and the Sunshine Policy**

Kim Dae-jung had been politically active ever since around he was 20 years old, at the end of the Second World War, becoming a member of the national assembly in the early 1960's (Donald, 23). He did not approve of what he saw as the suppression of rights under the Park Chung-hee leadership, and he was progressive on other issues such as wanting to broaden cooperation with the Soviet Union and the PRC as early as in the 70's, like Roh Tae-woo's Nordpolitik later would (Donald, 34-35). As the ROK reformed and became a democracy Kim would return and run for president, after a few years prior being forced to live in exile due to government criticism, losing in 1987 and 1992 (Donald, 47-52, 98, 107, 122, 128). Kim would go on to win the 1997 election, which was to be the first peaceful democratic transition of government since the ROK independence (Moon, "The Sunshine" 1). When the Asian financial crisis had hit the nation in 1997 it became the most important topic in the election, and partially due to how Kim had nothing to do with the failing economy, his opposition party saw a large boost and he won the election (Donald, 138). Kim ended up winning 40,3% of the votes with his main opponent, Lee Hoi-chang claiming, 38,7 and the third candidate Rhee In-je who received 19,2% took a large amount of votes from conservative voters who otherwise would have voted for Lee (Donald, 139). It was impressive for a progressive candidate to win the presidential election where almost half of the population identify as conservative and slightly above 20% identify as progressive (Gallup Korea, "I am conservative"). Shortly after Kim's inauguration, he would unveil the new policy and plan for reconciliation and cooperation which was to be one of the central aspects of his administration, the Sunshine Policy (Ministry of Unification, "2001" 20).

This policy was the most useful way, believed the Kim administration, to reconcile and approach North Korea. Kim closely tied the Sunshine policy to his administration, saying that closer relations with North Korea would be one of the most important aspects of his administration during his inauguration speech (Levin and Yong-Sup, 23).

At the core of the Sunshine Policy were three pillars: that armed provocations by the DPRK would not be tolerated, the ROK would not attempt to undermine or absorb the DPRK and the ROK would work towards reconciliation and closer ties (Levin and Yong-Sup, 24). The policy had another central aspect: The failures and successes in the political area would not

affect economic aid which meant that despite incidents with casualties in 1998 and 1999 between the two nations the economic aid towards North Korea persisted (Foley, 179).

### **History of the Inter-Korean Nuclear Issue**

This section discusses the history of the inter-Korean nuclear issue that has since the middle of the 1980's been a central aspect of the relations on the peninsula since. The history of DPRK nuclear development is long and complicated and this section will merely touch on the topic. The nuclear program would first be discovered by the US in 1982, when US surveillance photographed what looked like a nuclear reactor being built at a place called Yongbyon (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 250). Due to the power and geopolitical importance of nuclear weapons the development and search to acquire these weapons by the DPRK has been a core factor in the history of inter-Korean relations since it was discovered that the DPRK were moving to develop this kind of weapon of mass destruction.

The DPRK had long before 1982 sought to gain nuclear power and had requested the help of the PRC and the Soviet Union, but only the Soviets would eventually in 1985 agree to provide four civilian light-water nuclear power reactors if the DPRK joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it did (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 258). Later in 1992 when the relations between the ROK and the DPRK were fairly positive both nations signed an agreement which included that the Yongbyon nuclear facilities were to be open to inspection, and US-DPRK negotiations led to the DPRK signing a nuclear safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 269). The issue again became tense in 1993 and 1994 but due to intense negotiations involving the US, the DPRK, the PRC and the ROK, the situation de-escalated with the US making several assurances regarding not using force or interfering with DPRK domestic affairs (Arms Control Association). When the DPRK after continued disagreements with the IAEA announced it would leave the IAEA in June 1994, former US president Jimmy Carter helped solve the crisis by meeting and negotiating with the DPRK leader Kim Il-sung (Arms Control Association). Following this crisis, in October the US and the DPRK signed an "agreed framework" where the US would provide the DPRK with light-water reactors, less useful for proliferation, if the DPRK agreed to other concessions (Oberdorfer and Carlin, 336). Apart from various missile developments by the DPRK, which spurred US-DPRK negotiations, the

nuclear issue would calm down until 2003, which is discussed later in the thesis regarding the role that the DPRK nuclear development had on the Sunshine Policy.

### **History of the Ministry of Unification**

The Ministry of Unification has existed since 1969 under Park Chung-hee although at its creation the agency was called the National Unification Board (Ministry of Unification, “Brief History”). It wasn’t until Kim Dae-jung’s presidency that the Ministry of Unification received its current name, under the umbrella of a large government reorganisation program (Ibid). The MOU expanded slowly but steadily during the 1970’s to the 1990’s, broadening its work and receiving more facilities and a higher status within the government (Ibid). In the years preceding the presidency of Kim the MOU saw a continued broadening in powers, including responsibilities in taking care of North Korean refugees (Ibid).

The responsibilities of the MOU are the following: Establishing the DPRK policy, coordinating inter-Korean dialogue, pursuing inter-Korean cooperation, pursuing inter-Korean humanitarian cooperation, and providing an education program on unification (qtd. in Jeong, 110).

## **Research Design**

### **Research Method**

For writing this paper certain methods were quickly ruled out, such as doing interviews or questionnaires, as there would be a wide range of complications and problems if either were used as the primary source. Due to the large amount of texts and information that would be necessary to answer the research question there were two viable options for the method. These two options were the qualitative content analysis and the quantitative content analysis.

For this study the choice eventually became using a qualitative content analysis. This method was chosen due to how it is highly recommended when analysing content and texts while also trying to gain a deeper understanding of the topic. A qualitative content analysis is useful when the researcher has to sift through a large amount of information and then determine what the most important and relevant information is (Esaiasson, et al. 210). Due to the nature of the questions asked and their precision it was determined that a quantitative content analysis would not be as useful. A quantitative content analysis would force me to look at variables such as space and frequency when doing data collection in regards to the Sunshine

policy and the ministry; however this would be an inefficient method and way of understanding and analysing the topic. Instead, to gain a deeper understanding of the topic to discern what the most important factors were when answering my questions, the qualitative content analysis would be more beneficial for that purpose. By actively reading and questioning the text materials and cross-referencing source material, it would be easier to gain a deep understanding of the larger picture to help answer the research question, which is the goal of using a qualitative content analysis (Esaiasson, et al. 210). To help answer the research question about the role of the Ministry of Unification during the period of the Sunshine Policy, there were two questions regarding the Sunshine policy that were identified to be necessary as background before conducting analysis. These two questions were:

- What were the causes for the Sunshine Policy's decline in support?
- How did the role of the Ministry of Unification change in regards to carrying out the nation's North Korea policy during the Sunshine period?

Without answering these two questions it would become a problem to identify relevant information needed for the analysis. These two precise questions would make the analysis avoid problems due to it now having a necessary foundation to use as a background.

### **Choice and Study of Materials**

This thesis will among other sources use 'White Papers' published by the Ministry of Unification. These papers, ranging from 100 to 280 pages, published by the ministry are a resource used by the ministry to inform people about the current situation in inter-Korean relations as well about what the ministry and the government are doing in regards to inter-Korean relations. Two White Papers were chosen to be used as source material from the Ministry of Unification, the White Papers released in 2001 and 2005, this was due to the fact that they were published at a time that is helpful for the analysis. The first White Paper from 2001 discusses the North-South summit and also was released after the support for the Sunshine Policy had started fading, and the 2005 paper heavily discussed the new policy under Roh Moo-hyun. These White Papers are an extension of the policy of the Ministry of Unification and are heavily relied on for the analysis section, but to complement the analysis other source material is used as well, as the White Papers do not for example discuss topics such as the role of the minister of the ministry. Though the White Papers are used by the ministry to inform ROK citizens about inter-Korean relations and current policy it also wants

to show the successes of the ministry. Partially this may be to give much needed hope on the topic of inter-Korean relations, but it may also be for the ministry to justify its existence in the ever-changing political climate. It is customary that the Minister of Unification writes the preface to each White Paper, and thousands of copies of the White Papers are distributed to the national assembly, state departments, libraries, unification experts and a wide range of organisations and institutions (Ministry of Unification, "Ministry of Unification publishes 2017").

Apart from these two sources a large range of other sources had to be used to successfully conduct this study. Initially a wide net was thrown out to try locate as many relevant sources apart from the White Papers as possible and eventually two books and primary sources that were to add a deep knowledge of the topic were chosen: *Sunshine in Korea: the South Korean debate over policies toward North Korea* from 2003, and *The Sunshine Policy: In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea* from 2012. These two sources were used to build a foundation of knowledge on the topic, but later a much wider range of sources were to be used. Research done by other scholars and experts on Korean studies and international relations who have published in academic papers, journals and written books all played a part in this study. Eventually as the paper developed and new questions and issues arose, more relevant sources were added to fill in the gaps on the Sunshine Policy. The decision to initially throw out a wide net to identify relevant sources was made to make sure no crucial sources were missed. The reason for not initially focusing on a narrow set of sources and material was that I possibly could have missed information that was important for my analysis and background. With this method I felt confident I would be able to retrieve viable information that would be necessary for my thesis, despite it taking a longer time for me to sift through relevant information. However that is one of the reasons a qualitative content analysis was chosen, as it is good for helping me identify what material will be the most relevant if I use a large amount of sources.

### **Ethical Considerations**

While this study did not use a method such as interviews, which would require a larger degree of ethical considerations, there are still considerations to be done. The ethical considerations in this thesis rely on the UNESCO code of conduct for social science research (Guchteneire). I took into consideration things such as whether there could be any harmful

effects due to my research, but found that there wasn't. The source material was also judged on whether it was based on ethical research, and I found no questionable research or content among the sources.

### **Limitations and Self-critical Assessment**

A self-critical assessment of decisions during the thesis process is important when conducting academic research so as to not only describe and identify eventual weaknesses in the thesis but also to learn and improve. A general self-critical and self-reflexive attitude during the thesis process also strengthens the research.

The central limitation for this thesis was that I do not speak Korean, which would have been beneficial, to gain access to a larger degree of sources. In trying to negate any disadvantage caused by this I had the help of a South Korean friend who helped me find much necessary information regarding for example old polling statistics, accessed on Korean websites.

Originally there was a problem in framing the question of the changing role of the Ministry of Unification as it was not a large enough topic by itself to analyse. However, by also involving the Sunshine Policy and analysing how its decline affected the role of the Ministry, the thesis found a better method to approach the topic.

### **Contribution to the Research Area**

The goal of this thesis is to improve knowledge on not only how the Sunshine Policy changed between the two governments during the time period, but also how the role of the ministry changed. By analysing the causes for the loss in support for the Sunshine Policy we may also find a connection to how the function of the Ministry of Unification was affected. The ways the ministry promoted the Sunshine policy is relevant for experts on this area of study to understand as we can further gain an understanding of how the policy was carried out in practice. This is all put into relation of the decline in support of the policy. The thesis will also help us understand how tied the ministry was to the two respective governments during the time. Understanding the history and role of the ministry is important for the future as the ministry will continue serving an important role in inter-Korean relations, especially under an eventual reunification of the two nations or during a new Sunshine-type of policy approach.

## Literature Review

### What issues did the Sunshine Policy encounter?

This section will identify the scholarly debates and opinions on the Sunshine Policy and its decline in support. This section will to a smaller extent discuss of the role of the Ministry of Unification. A wide range of factors played a role in delegitimising, undermining, and decreasing support for the Sunshine policy. These factors include opposition criticism, the behaviour of North Korea, media criticism, and the role of the US.

### The Role of Opposition Criticism and the Domestic Political Situation

In the face of North Korean provocations, the Kim Dae-jung administration endured criticism from the conservatives, who said the Sunshine policy was started by “pro-North Korean leftist elements” (Ko, 259). Ko argues that this criticism was used effectively against both administrations of the Sunshine Policy as the leaders both were from a party that previously stood against the military dictatorship, with some conservatives still viewing them as possible enemies of the army (262). Chung-in agrees with Ko, however he values the factor of opposition criticism even higher, saying it was one of the two largest reasons why the Sunshine Policy failed and became unpopular (Cyrus Mahan).

There are a large number of identifiable variables that affected the opposition criticism, with Kim pointing out that opposition criticism also arose due to Kim Dae-jung’s nominations to the government, where he broke a promise and often nominated people from regions heavily supportive of him (Kim, “The 2000” 899-900). The opposition criticism would increase even further when people who voiced criticism towards this favouritism lost their jobs (Ibid).

Meanwhile, Ko points out that though the Sunshine Policy was not the main topic of criticism by the opposition of Roh Moo-hyun, the policy did suffer as he received criticism for other diplomatic blunders, due to how the administration was tied to the policy (Ko, 263). Son also points out that due to the difference in ideology between the progressives and the conservatives, the opposition was critical of almost any initiative by the Kim administration aimed at the DPRK (Son, 94).

Scholars raise the issue of opposition criticism as being very important and central to the history of the Sunshine Policy, however these scholars differed on what they viewed was the most important part of the criticism. There was much, varied, opposition criticism of the two administrations during the Sunshine period. The possibly largest factor for the criticism was

the background and ideology of the two presidents, meaning that almost no matter what, conservatives would oppose them.

### **The Role of North Korean Behaviour and Nuclear Weapon Development**

Foley argues that the separation of the political sphere and economic assistance in the Sunshine Policy created absurd situations, where aid given by the ROK still resulted in DPRK violations without any sanctions as punishment (Foley, 179). As there were two smaller naval battles between the two nations in 1999 and 2002 this meant that the ROK would not sanction the DPRK despite aggression. Although one of the central pillars of the Sunshine Policy was that armed provocation by the DPRK would not be tolerated, there was still a lack of backlash towards the DPRK after incidents due to the disconnect between the political sphere and economic assistance. This is argued by Levin and Yong-Sup as being a reason that the first administration became viewed as naïve and weak (138). Chung-in disputes this argument, that the policy was weak on the DPRK, pointing out that one of the three central pillars was about not tolerating armed provocations (Cyrus Mahan). Thus, in his view, this is a flawed criticism of the policy (Ibid).

Even though Chung-in disputes the argument that the two administrations were weak on North Korea, Kim argues that the opposition viewed the policy as “appeasement” (Kim, “The 2000” 900). Due to the aggressive behaviour by North Korea, Kim points out that the criticism of the Kim Dae-jung administration’s foreign policy became intensified, with Kim Dae-jung being viewed as soft on communism (Ibid). These views go hand in hand with the administration’s response towards North Korea regarding its nuclear weapon development, which would become a large issue again in 2006. With a more threatening posture on the peninsula as North Korea left the NPT in 2003 the US would also become further involved, complicating inter-Korean relations further. The behaviour of the DPRK and US behaviour were tightly linked at this time, argues Yoo, with general progress being made in inter-Korean relations until the US, under the relatively new Bush administration in 2002, called the DPRK a member of the “axis of evil” (Yoo, 7).

The aggressive behaviour by the DPRK would continue to jab at the patience that South Koreans had with its northern neighbour, especially as these citizens viewed their country as being very generous. The confrontations between the two nations would harm not only inter-Korean relations, but also the Sunshine Policy’s credibility.

### **The Role of the US**

The first US administration of the SP period was the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration was supportive of the attempts by Kim Dae-jung to bring reconciliation and cooperation to the peninsula, as the Clinton administration favoured a more interactive North Korea, to decrease the threat of hostilities on the peninsula (The White House, 42-43). Yoo however calls attention to the new US administration, saying that in 2001 problems would arise, and when North Korea was dubbed being a member of the “axis of evil” in early 2002 by the Bush administration much progress on the peninsula stopped (Yoo, 7). The DPRK became less cooperative, and the Sunshine policy lost much of its momentum. Kwak and Seung-ho also argue that while the Clinton administration had been supportive of the chosen policy by the Kim administration, the Bush administration instead decided to approach North Korea in a new way that simply was not compatible with how the ROK wanted to conduct its relations with the DPRK (41). Levin and Yong-Sup argue that the increased gap between the policies of the Kim and the Bush administration, due to the nuclear weapons development, did decrease public support for the SP by bolstering the opposition in its criticism of Kim (134). It seems to be a consensus among scholars that the Clinton administration enabled a better chance of success for the Sunshine Policy, the debate instead revolving around the extent by which the Bush administration negatively impact it.

The year of 2002 saw a lot of turmoil in the ROK regarding ROK-US relations, not only in regards to the “axis of evil” statement. Kwak and Seung-ho argue that the topic of anti-American sentiment in the ROK is further complicated, pointing at the death of two South Korean school girls who were killed by a US army vehicle, which saw huge protests when the soldiers responsible were acquitted (43). Kwak and Seung-ho also contend that Roh, who was viewed as more independent from the US alliance, may have been boosted in the election due to anti-American sentiment at the time (42). Kwak and Seung-ho argue that the Iraq invasion and the new US pre-emptive attack policy also brought worries to the ROK, as more feared that the US would attack the DPRK (41). They also point out the damages that the US had on inter-Korean relations due to the “axis of evil” speech along with its more aggressive activity on the peninsula, concluding with the DPRK freezing the diplomatic process with the ROK that had been ongoing since the June 2000 summit (Ibid).

Roh who had not been a politician for long when he was chosen to be the new president would be criticised heavily on foreign policy, not only by the opposition but by his

constituents. Ko argues that what was viewed as Roh's "amateur leadership" and how he negotiated with the Bush administration weakened the Sunshine Policy as he conformed more and more to the US policy towards the DPRK (263). The external lack of support for the SP by the US also undermined the policy domestically. Funabashi argues that many of Roh's constituents voted for him in the 2003 election due to him being anti-establishment, and he had high support among voters who opposed US interference on the Korean peninsula, so when the administration further aligned with the Bush administration, he lost core support (219). Kwak and Seung-ho also assert that while the Bush administration was more inclined to use forceful ways towards the DPRK, it was the ROK citizens who were afraid, as they would be the ones suffering if the US attacked or provoked the DPRK into attacking the ROK (50). While Levin and Yong-Sup dispute that the US administration was a major hindrance of the SP, instead arguing that the US is often seen as a scapegoat and will likely continue to be seen as such by Kim Dae-jung supporters (140). Kwak and Seung-ho claim that the SP was not compatible with the policy advocated by the Bush administration, however under different circumstances with a flexible US administration and the 1994 Agreed Framework in place the SP would not cause bad relations between the ROK and the US (50).

While Levin and Yong-sup dispute the argument that the US played a role in hindering the Sunshine Policy, Chung-in argues that the US was instead one of the two major barriers of it, saying "the advent of the Bush administration screwed up the entire Sunshine Policy" (Cyrus Mahan).

With the Bush administration the US was to play a much further active role in the region. This would influence not only the behaviour of the DPRK but also as previously mentioned the criticisms of the opposition, as South Korean conservatives strongly supported close US-ROK relations. The US here played a large adverse role.

### **The Role of the Media**

The Kim Dae-jung administration would experience a large amount of media criticism, partially due to scandals involving corruption and what was viewed as errors in leadership, according to Kim (Kim, "The 2000" 898). Kim continues with arguing that many viewed the imprisonment of the publisher of the JoongAng Ilbo in 1999, on the allegation of tax evasion charges, to be political, due to the criticisms of the Kim Dae-jung administration by the newspaper (Kim, "The 2000" 899). This was to be one of several interactions between the

administration and the media which would harm public opinion of the administration. Much of the criticism by the opposition and by influential citizens in society was conducted through the media, and the media played a large role in revealing that the Korean Intelligence Service had been monitoring GNP politicians (Ibid). Levin and Yong-Sup argue that the media is so highly influential in South Korean society due to its history, how the media is older than the nation itself, and due to how many politicians have journalism as their background (72). Also they argue that the fact that South Korean society is so divided, and the political parties fairly weak, gives the media a high degree of influence (Ibid). The media is however multifaceted and not always critical towards the leadership and the SP. As the two authors point out, the major TV broadcasting companies were generally supportive of the SP and the two administrations (71). Son contends that despite an at times more positive attitude among the public towards the DPRK, the opposition, including the strong media, heavily opposed the engagement that was at the core of the SP (94).

The media did, according to scholars, affect the support of the Sunshine Policy, of this there is no dispute within the scholarly field with them agreeing that the strong conservative and traditional media played a deteriorating role. It is however hard to find a scholarly debate on exactly how large of a role the media played, but we can put the role of the media in relation to opposition criticism which went hand in hand with media criticism. The media did, along with opposition criticism, help undermine and delegitimise the Sunshine Policy and the administration.

### **Conclusion**

While different authors put varying values on the most important factors that caused the decline in support for the Sunshine Policy, it becomes clear that the issues surrounding why the policy lost support is highly complex. The cause of the significant drop in support does not lead back to a singular event or incident, or even a single factor. All these factors mentioned play a role and they together strengthen each other. While an aggressive North Korean behaviour is bad for the Sunshine Policy, it worsens when a strong conservative media will use it to criticise the administration, along with opposition ready to use it to destabilise the policy and president. Though there are disagreements to what extent the US administration influenced the SP, it is generally agreed upon by most scholars that the Bush administration played a deteriorating role during the period. With an uncooperative Bush administration the conservatives in South Korea viewed the progressive leaders Kim Dae-

jung and Roh Moo-hyun as harming the alliance between the two nations, causing great upset. Meanwhile if the US administration had been more cooperative like the Clinton administration, perhaps the opposition would find less to criticise Kim and Roh about, due to positive relations between the two nations. The role of the media may have played the smallest role of the mentioned factors due to its fairly balanced nature, a strong conservative media was largely counterweighted by a popular government media being mostly supportive of the Sunshine Policy. Meanwhile, the most important factor, according to scholars, may be the role of North Korea's behaviour and of course its nuclear weapons programme. The issue with nuclear weapons is also tightly linked to the role of the US and criticisms that the administrations received. If the DPRK had behaved differently in a number of ways, including not provoking battles, or by agreeing to more meetings and cooperation-talks, there could have been further progress. The ball is often in the DPRK's court, without the nation being willing to act in a cooperative and progressive way. However, the DPRK behavioural issue was negatively affected by the fact that the Bush administration called it a member of the "axis of evil".

### **What was the role of the Ministry of Unification during the Sunshine period?**

The topic of the Ministry of Unification and its role within the South Korean government is an understudied area. There is not much research done focusing specifically on the MOU, which is why this section is quite short. There are articles that weigh in on the MOU in regards to the Sunshine Policy; however the focus in these articles lies on other topics. Jeong details the responsibilities of the MOU as the following: Establishing the DPRK policy, coordinating inter-Korean dialogue, pursuing inter-Korean cooperation, pursuing inter-Korean humanitarian cooperation and providing an education program on unification (qtd. in Jeong, 110). Funabashi also points out that a Minister of Unification at the time played a central role in the cabinet and in regards to inter-Korean policymaking, hence influencing the Sunshine Policy (220).

Because this is an understudied area, with a lack of scholarly research done, my thesis hopes to further the understanding of the Ministry of Unification and its role during the SP in a concrete manner.

## **Analysis**

A wide range of factors played a role in delegitimising, undermining and decreasing support for the Sunshine policy. This section will answer the first of my two sub-questions regarding the support for the Sunshine Policy, both of which are crucial to understand the role of the Ministry of Unification during this period. The factors discussed include opposition criticism, the behaviour of North Korea and its continual production of nuclear weapons, media criticism and the position of the current US administration on the policy.

The topics for the analysis are: what caused the decline in support for the Sunshine Policy, what influence and role did the Minister of Unification have, and how did the role change for the MOU. Analysing the decline in support for the SP relies on a broad range of sources, while analysing the role of the MOU relies heavily on the White Papers released by the MOU. It would be beneficial and easier to have information on the influence of the Minister of Unification if the MOU discussed this in its White Papers; however it is not at all touched upon. This meant that I had to rely on other sources than the White Papers to analyse the role of the Minister of Unification.

The seat of the Minister of Unification seems highly politicised due to how, for example, the Kim Dae-jung administration had Lim Dong-won, a founder of the Sunshine Policy, as minister. This politicisation of the seat also links the loss in support of the policy and the administration to the role of the Ministry of Unification. Opposition criticism of the Sunshine Policy, which caused it to lose support, also included critique of the ministry, due to how it was intimately tied to the administration. If the SP was to receive less criticism from the opposition, perhaps the MOU would also have avoided some criticism, and the role of it may have looked different depending then on the support of the policy.

### **What were the causes for the Sunshine Policy's decline in support?**

As previously introduced in the literature review, the following factors that will be discussed in this section that affected the decreasing support for the Sunshine Policy are: opposition criticism, the behaviour of the DPRK, the role of the US, and the media.

As for the support and how it decreased, it has been documented by, among other organisations, Gallup Korea and Chosun Ilbo, a large South Korean newspaper. Kim Dae-jung would initially have a high public approval of his administration, with 70.7% approval just a month after the inauguration in 1998 (Gallup Korea, "Political Indicators"). Shortly

before the 2000 summit however, the amount of people who approved of the administration's performance was merely 49.5% (Kim, "The 2000" 900). The support for the Sunshine policy however did rise up heavily with the summit, and it was nearly 87% in August 2000, but in February 2001 it had again dropped lower, to 49%, and it continued to drop to 34% by June 2001 (Levin and Yong-Sup, 86). In the second half of the Kim presidency, the president's approval would dip below 30% and in December of 2002 the approval would be as low as 24.1% (Gallup Korea, "Political Indicators"). After the Kim presidency, in a poll conducted by Gallup Korea, the SP was ranked as the best part of the administration, and also the 2<sup>nd</sup> worst part of the administration, which shows just how contentious the policy was (Ibid). The Kim Dae-jung administration started off highly popular and then quickly fell down in approval, however with the North-South summit in the middle of 2000, the support rose heavily. The momentum of the summit however, died down, and the support and approval of the administration continued falling. Kim Young-sam had experienced a similar huge approval at the start, with 70.9% approval at the start of his presidency, but his presidency would also see falling approval, reaching 55% at the start of the second year in office, and only 13.9% at the start of the fifth and last year (qtd. in Min, 47). Roh Moo-hyun would have a somewhat comparable approval trajectory during his presidency. Roh started with 59.6% approval at the start of his presidency, but reaching 40.2% approval roughly 100 days after, and getting as low as 30.4% approval after half a year (Gallup Korea, "Roh's approval"). Roh's approval would eventually move to 20.2% in the middle of 2006 (Gallup Korea, "Roh's approval"). In late 2007, in a break from the pattern of the two previous administrations' approval, Roh would receive 37.3% approval, a large increase from the 20.2% in 2006 (Choi).

### **The Role of Opposition Criticism and the Domestic Political Situation**

When Kim Dae-jung won the election in 1997 it was a very narrow win, and the party he represented was relatively small in the national assembly. When his administration began large anti-corruption investigations, where the strong oppositional party, the GNP, was heavily affected, his party was able to get a majority in the assembly together with a smaller third party, the ULD (Kim, "The 2000" 895). The use of these anti-corruption investigations guaranteed harsh criticism of the administration by the strong opposition, and it was to be the start of a large domestic political struggle in the assembly to gain power, between the traditionally strong GNP and the new progressive administration.

During the Kim administration a large scandal was unravelled in 2002, continuing in 2003, concerning huge amounts of money that the Kim administration had given the DPRK for the 2000 North-South summit to become reality. When Roh became president, and the scope of the scandal became clear, he was pressured heavily by the opposition, with the opposition demanding more information about the deal. (BBC News, “S Koreans charged”).

Roh faced a large domestic political power struggle in the second year of his administration, when the powerful opposition, which held a large majority in the assembly due to a split of Roh’s party in late 2003, voted in March to impeach him (Lee, “Law, politics” 409-411). The impeachment became a central issue in the campaigns for the 2004 parliamentary election, where the newly created Uri party loyal to Roh, which was created in the split of the government party, moved from having 47 members to 152 in the assembly (Lee, “Law, politics” 412). The election and the later reinstatement of Roh was a huge success for his administration, considering how grave the situation had seemed just before the election. Roh would also receive criticism due to his appointment of Lee Jong-seok to be the Minister of Unification, as the opposition disapproved of him being the chairman of the National Security Council at the same time (Chosun, “Roh Appoints Ministers”). This meant that not only was opposition criticism tied to the Sunshine Policy, but it was also tied to the Minister and Ministry of Unification itself. The appointment by Roh meant that the Ministry of Unification was kept very close to the administration which may have aimed opposition criticism towards the ministry as well. Lee and the Roh administration would also receive criticism from the opposition where they argued that Lee was closer to North Korea than the US, and him being the Minister of Unification meant that the Roh administration tried distancing itself from the US (Lee, “New policymaker”).

With the background of the two presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun being vocal critics of previous governments supported by the military, many conservatives were deeply critical of them. The increasing will by these presidents to approach North Korea in a friendly way drew accusations of the policy being started by “pro-North Korean leftist elements” (Cyrus Mahan).

The close personal connection between the policy and the two presidents of the two administrations also weakened the support for the policy as the general approval ratings for the two administrations fell. As the Kim Dae-jung administration tried to use the policy to

gain popularity, the opposition also started heavily criticising it (Levin and Yong-Sup, 135). This personalisation of the policy would closer tie the support for the policy and the administration (Ibid). A policy can of course remain popular despite a government not being popular, but due to how this policy had been used so heavily and publicised by the two presidents, with the first being a founder of it, and the second president being his protégé, the ties to the policy were strong. The opposition criticism of the policy came hand in hand with the criticism of the administration, and the attitude and behaviour of the DPRK plays a large role due to how the conservatives generally are stauncher in their criticism of the DPRK (Levin and Yong-Sup, 135). This meant that when the DPRK behaved unfavourably towards South Korea, the conservatives would criticise the SP and the administration. Though Roh would receive a lot of opposition criticism due to his foreign policy decisions, it was not only about the SP. It would often be due to other diplomatic blunders, especially concerning ties to the US and relating to the complicated relationship with the Bush administration (Ko, 263).

#### **The Role of North Korean Behaviour and Nuclear Weapon Development**

Of central importance is the fact that the Sunshine Policy separated the political sphere and economic assistance which meant that aggressive DPRK behaviour went mostly unpunished (Foley, 179). After military incidents between the two nations, when the South Korean population saw North Korea being treated generously with economic aid despite incidents or provocations, support for the policy was tested. The administration came to be viewed as weak by some due to this lack of response and sanctions, preceding an act of aggression by the DPRK (Levin and Yong-Sup, 138). It did not sit well with many South Koreans that the DPRK could commit acts of aggression and still be given aid by the administration. The strong opposition yet again played a role in decreasing the public support for the policy regarding the DPRK behaviour (Levin and Yong-Sup, 134). Conservatives generally viewed the policy as a type of appeasement which again solidified the opinion that the administration was weak, with many seeing that the administration would do anything it could to satisfy the DPRK (Kim, "The 2000" 900).

Since the crisis of 1994 the nuclear issue had been lingering but the region had still avoided a confrontation on the topic. That changed in late 2002, when the nuclear issue again became pivotal in inter-Korean relations due to a senior DPRK official allegedly admitting to a US official that the DPRK had secret nuclear weapons (Kwak and Seung-Ho, 42). Around the turn of the year the DPRK also restarted a nuclear reactor and ordered IAEA inspectors to

leave the country, which drew condemnation from the IAEA (Arms Control Association). Subsequently, on the 10th of January, the DPRK said it would withdraw from the NPT, effective the day after (Arms Control Association). After a tedious series of ineffective six-party talks between the DPRK, Japan, South Korea, Russia, the US, and China, the North Korean foreign ministry on the 10th of February 2005 announced that it had nuclear weapons, and in October 2006 there was an underground nuclear test (Kwak, “The Six-Party Talks” 212). There would later be important international agreements on the nuclear issue that the six-party talks concluded with in 2007, temporarily cooling down the nuclear issue tensions on the peninsula (Ibid).

The ever present issue of nuclear weapon development by the DPRK heavily undermined any talk of progress with the Sunshine Policy, as long as the SP could not produce results that stopped the nuclear development. The issue however lay partially dormant during the Sunshine period which meant that it did not undermine the policy as much as it could potentially have. The issue would flare up in 2006 as the nation tested an underground nuclear device. Roh Moo-hyun had stated in his inauguration speech in 2003 that “Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development”, but, with the 2006 nuclear test, this objective had shattered and the Sunshine Policy had been undermined (Funabashi, 215). Despite what South Koreans thought was a friendly policy that helped the DPRK, Sunshine had failed in solving the nuclear issue. In 2006 many became further dissatisfied with it as they saw that a nuclear test had been the result despite the friendship shown by South Korea. Though the nuclear topic had been discussed many times during the Sunshine period by the two nations, the lack of a real solution to the issue would frustrate many South Koreans.

Though the nuclear development and tensions during the SP period can be seen as a failure of the SP, much of the inter-Korean problems were ignited by the US playing a more aggressive and active role on the peninsula under the Bush administration. It is impossible to say whether these issues would have come to bloom with a more friendly US administration, but the Bush administration certainly made the regional situation further volatile. The nuclear issue is tightly linked to the role the US played, especially during the Bush administration, when the US became more inflexible than the Clinton administration had been in dealing with the DPRK and working with South Korea. It is hard to deny that the nuclear issue would

be ever-present unless the DPRK made a huge change in behaviour and transparently stopped its nuclear weapons programme.

### **The Role of the US**

While the Clinton administration had cooperated well with the Kim Dae-jung administration during the first half of the administration, the new Bush administration in 2001 meant a harder policy towards the DPRK from the US. In early 2002, with the State of the Union speech by George W. Bush the US would have a huge impact on inter-Korean relations, when it called the DPRK a member state of the “axis of evil” (Yoo, 7). At this point Bush had a large approval rating among South Koreans, mostly due to the September 11 attacks (Gallup Korea, “Bush, 82%”). This huge shift in the US standpoint on the SP towards the DPRK complicated South Korea’s ability to conduct its own policy. The new inflexible Bush administration wanted to conduct its own policy at will, and that new policy was incompatible with the Sunshine Policy (Kwak and Seung-ho, 50). Bush even openly showed favour to the candidate opposing Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 presidential election, with the hopes that it would get someone more favourable to the US in a position of power (Kwak and Seung-ho, 42). Due to a wide range of factors US-ROK relations deteriorated, and an anti-America attitude existed among a large part of the South Korean voters, something which helped Roh get elected (Ibid). Once Roh did become elected however, the strong reliance that South Korea had on the US was undeniable, and the administration folded under US pressure to send troops to Iraq (Funabashi, 230). This caused upset among core voters of Roh, as the administration became closer to the Bush administration when the president had previously campaigned using anti-US rhetoric (Funabashi, 219). The fact that Kim Jong-il in a poll from late 2003 narrowly received a higher vote than George W. Bush when asked who the biggest threat to the Korean peninsula was shows just how dangerous many South Koreans viewed the Bush administration at the time (Gallup Korea, “Who is more threatening”). The belligerent US with a more proactive intervention policy, with pre-emptive strikes, and having attacked both Iraq and Afghanistan, meant that many South Koreans were afraid that war would come to their own doorstep (Ibid). The plan by Roh to approach the US administration in a more friendly way seems to have ended up negatively affecting the Sunshine Policy due to the high disapproval of US interference on the peninsula by many core voters.

The Clinton administration mostly shared the goals of Kim Dae-jung, which is why both administrations' policies towards the DPRK could coexist, but the radically different US policy under Bush meant that the policy would face large obstructions. The pro-American conservative opposition mostly agreed with the Bush administration on inter-Korean issues and due to the importance of the ROK-US alliance the pro-engagement and progressive SP became further delegitimised (Levin and Yong-Sup, 134). While the two administrations had a different approach towards the DPRK, it seemed like Sunshine could not make much progress. But the Bush administration is not solely responsible for the failure of the SP and there would even be battles between the DPRK and the South Korean navy during the Sunshine period under the more cooperative Clinton administration. We do know that the Bush administrations strict policies stifled the chances of the Sunshine policy, but it is not solely responsible for its fall in public support, though it certainly did embolden and strengthen the opposition. Not only did the Bush administration strengthen the opposition however, Roh also threw away some of his support as he tried approaching the US (Funabashi, 219).

### **The Role of the Media**

The media is another factor that would decrease the public support of the Sunshine Policy, and it would be closely associated with the criticism by the opposition aimed at the administration. Due to how the media is tightly linked to politics due to how many politicians come from the media sphere the ties between respective media outlets and politicians can be tight and where both share the same ideology and goal (Levin and Yong-Sup, 72). There would be multiple large flare-ups between the two administrations and the media, with the administrations being critical of media that was critical of the government (Kim, "The 2000" 898). There would also be scandals such as a large bribery scandal involving the Kim Dae-jung government and the North-South summit which caused huge criticism. The scandal, which had concerned payments to the DPRK in turn for the North-South summit to take place, meant a large blow to the Sunshine Policy due to how it showed that the administration had not been transparent. Also it displayed the fact that the DPRK had not met particularly willingly with the South Korean government, if it had only come to the table after receiving payments. While the media itself did not cause the takedown it played the role that it should in a democracy, it criticised the administration for what it thought was wrongly handled or

done. This did help the opposition by giving the conservatives a strong supporter, especially due to how strong the conservative media is (Levin and Yong-Sup, 71).

One of the ministers of unification during Sunshine was Lim Dong-won, who would visit North Korea at one point which drew criticism from the media, not only towards the minister of unification, but also to Kim Dae-jung's administration (Funabashi, 204). This also ties media criticism to the Minister and Ministry of Unification, and not only the administration itself. Chosun Ilbo would also point out in 2006 that the then new Minister of Unification, Lee Jong-seok, had received 12 speeding tickets since 2000, with the opposition also being critical of the the Roh administration for the appointment, albeit for other reasons (Chosun, "Roh Appoints Ministers").

### **Conclusion**

Despite the fact that opposition criticism, working with large parts of the media, destabilised the Sunshine Policy, it is not as important for the success of it, as the role and behaviour of the DPRK. Even if the SP would have an immense public support and the DPRK behaved negatively or antagonistically, it would still have failed. We are however discussing why the public support dropped for the policy, not why it was ineffective at producing positive results. It has to be acknowledged that the strong conservative opposition played a crucial destabilising and delegitimising role for not only the SP but also the two administrations. Various unforced errors, such as the scandal with payments to the DPRK for the inter-Korean summit, heavily damaged the policy and especially the Kim Dae-jung administration. Other issues such as the background of the two presidents and the military engagements between the two nations were used by the conservatives to criticise the two administrations, which in turn affected the policy. Though the media played a role in this, the opposition had a further central role; with the media being one of the ways the opposition was able to decrease the support for the policy. Due to the nuclear developments made by the DPRK there is an underlying sense of urgency in dealing with the regime. This factor is not only a security threat to the region, but it is also a major reason why US administrations may be heavily involved politically in the region.

The role of the US is highly important, due to how the Bush administration not only helped conservatives and their criticisms of the policy, but also due to the effect that it had on the DPRK. If the cooperation and attitude of the DPRK had improved, the support for the policy

would likely have remained high. However, the possibility that the DPRK was to work cooperatively with South Korea heavily decreased due to not only the rhetoric but also the policies of the new Bush administration. While the Clinton administration had worked cooperatively with the SP this had negated criticism from the conservatives concerning how the policy affected US-ROK relations, this was not to be the case with the new Bush administration, which stood at odds with it.

As was discussed in regards to the role of the media and the bribery scandal affecting the Kim Dae-jung administration, the scandal may have been a leading cause as to why Roh Moo-hyun reshaped the policy. Due to the loss in support the policy faced, the policy was reshaped with the new Roh administration, and the issue of transparency became a central aspect. This means that the loss in public support for the policy would directly affect the role of the Ministry of Unification, as it carries out the now changed policy. Similarly, other factors such as opposition criticism, which was strengthened by the behaviour of the DPRK and the role of the US, can have an effect on the role of the MOU if the administration feels it has to adjust its policies as response to critique. We can also see that even though it was not one of the main points of weaknesses of the two administrations, both received criticism from the media and the opposition regarding what the role of the Ministry of Unification was. The opposition would criticise Roh's appointments of among other the Ministry of Unification due to the dual seats held by the minister at the time. The media would also criticise Lim Dong-won when carrying out his duties as the Minister of Unification by visiting Pyongyang.

### **Influence of the Minister of Unification**

The role of the minister of unification is important for the work of the ministry, as not only is that person the figurehead of the ministry, the person also represents the MOU in the cabinet and can have close contact with the president. This section aims to examine what role and influence the Minister of Unification had, to gain a complete view of the role of the Ministry of Unification during this period, especially due to how important the minister can be in an administration. Due to the White Paper not discussing the role of the Minister of Unification, as previously mentioned, this section relies on other source materials such as academic journals and books by experts and scholars on the area.

### **During the Kim Dae-jung Administration**

Lim Dong-won played a key role in the Kim Dae-jung administration, being the minister of unification at two different times, and having a leading role as an intelligence chief, and he along with Kim had been the architect of the Sunshine policy. However when the policy became further unpopular in 2001 Lim lost his position after a no-confidence vote in early September in the National Assembly (Levin and Yong-Sup, 117). And later, after it was revealed that he had played a part in the secret cash payments to North Korea to help set up the 2000 North-South summit he received an 18-month suspended jail sentence for his role in it.

Lim notably reported in October 1999 in a speech to the National Assembly that the “government is ready to accept all North Korean refugees, if they want to emigrate to the south”, showing that the minister played a highly active role (Lankov). However, the ministry after the speech “clarified” that the minister had only referred to North Koreans who had gone through the overseas South Korean embassies and completed necessary procedures, which meant that the huge group of North Koreans in China effectively were not affected. This clarification by the ministry meant that the statement by the minister really had no effect on the policy on North Korean refugees (Ibid). Even though the minister has an active role they and their ministry are severely limited in their independent policymaking, they did however play a part in influencing a greater government policymaking on inter-Korean relations under the Kim administration (Levin and Yong-Sup, 136).

The central role that Lim had played in the ministry, which he had controlled, using close supervision, would affect the ministry negatively after he left it. Due to his central role in the Sunshine policy, considering he had been one of the two architects for it, the ministry now clearly would have a less intimate relation to the policy with whoever their next minister was. After the vote of no confidence Lim took on the role as a policy advisor to the president, still meaning he had a central role in the administration, but no longer as the minister of unification administration (Levin and Yong-Sup, 117). After Lim there were to be two more ministers during the Kim administration and during the Roh administration there would be four different ministers (Ministry of Unification, “Previous Ministers”). Before the transition to the Roh administration the Kim administration sent a delegation to North Korea which not only included Lim but also Lee Jong-seok, who would have a central role in the eventual Roh administration (Funabashi, 203). This was a way for the Kim administration not only to

prepare Lee in leading inter-Korean policymaking, but also in reassuring North Korea that Sunshine would continue with the following administration (Ibid).

#### **During the Roh Moo-hyun Administration**

After Roh Moo-hyun became president, both the architects of the Sunshine policy were effectively powerless in policymaking. This gave the Roh administration freedom to try redeveloping the policy, which it did with the aim of gaining larger public support (Ministry of Unification, “2005”). Roh would not be alone in shaping the foreign policy towards the DPRK in his administration. Two other notable individuals were Yoon Young-kwan, the foreign minister, and Lee Jong-seok, the deputy secretary of the National Security Council and intermittently the Unification Minister (Funabashi, 220). Yoon however thought that the policy should be focused on working towards the normalisation of relations between North Korea and both Japan and the US, instead of simply pursuing dialogue without clear goals (Funabashi, 221). There were varying opinions of how the policy towards the DPRK should be shaped, and on the other end of the spectrum we had Lee Jong-seok.

One of the notable ministers of unification under the Roh administration was Lee Jong-seok, appointed in 2006, who was tightly linked to the Sunshine policy, having close ties to Lim and participating in the 2000 summit (Lee, “New policymaker”). Lee had critics, saying he cared more about North Korea than the US-ROK alliance and some conservative critics also said that having Lee appointed as the minister of unification was an attempt by the Roh administration to distance South Korea from the US (Lee, “New policymaker”). This appointment and the central role that Lee had in the administration did however show that the Roh administration still wanted a continual of the Sunshine policy. Lee did not value the role of the US as highly as Yoon, who thought the US played a crucial role in enabling South Korean diplomatic success with the DPRK (Funabashi, 222).

One of Yoon Young-kwan’s central ideas concerning how the foreign policy towards the DPRK should be conducted was that the Ministry of Unification was to play a larger role (Ibid). Yoon wanted a further active dialogue with the DPRK and the Ministry was to be the leader in the effort to improve Inter-Korean relations (Ibid). Due to the different ideas of Yoon and Lee, about the Sunshine Policy, it was important who would become the person influencing it the most. It was an important turning point then for the Roh administration when on the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 2004 Yoon resigned from his post as the foreign minister. He

resigned due to disagreements within the Roh administration concerning foreign policy and the role of the US (BBC News, “S Korea foreign minister resigns”). As previously mentioned when discussing Lim, the Ministry does not have much independent policymaking capabilities, instead it often plays a role in the greater government policymaking. Especially under the Roh administration we can see the policymaking in foreign affairs comprising of a wide range of experts, with experts even being taken on as “covert foreign policy advisors” (Funabashi, 206-207). The government policymaking be it on inter-Korean relations or other foreign policy areas seem to have under the Roh administration been a large scale project with not only a few voices in the administration controlling it.

Due to the ties between Lee and the Ministry of Unification, the ministry was highly involved in the conflict between Lee and Yoon in shaping the foreign policy and in extension the Sunshine Policy. Due to Lee being intermittently the Minister of Unification, it is highly likely that he wanted the ministry to play a large role in inter-Korean relations and dialogue, and that is something he agreed on with Yoon (Funabashi, 222). This meant that the two biggest foreign policy heavyweights, apart from the president, at the start of the Roh administration, viewed the ministry as strategically important in inter-Korean relations. Lee’s power laid not only in being the Minister of Unification, as he would at the same time be the chairman of the National Security Council, just like his predecessor Chung Dong-young also held both positions at the same time (Chosun, “Roh Appoints Ministers”). This dual positioning of the Minister of Unification, also being the chairman of the National Security Council meant that the person would have an even larger influence. This meant that when Lee did his duties as chairman of the National Security Council or used the influence that the seat gave him, he was also acting on the behalf of the Ministry of Unification, actually increasing its influence. Roh received criticism from the opposition for having a person in two positions at the same time however he dismissed the critique (Ibid). During the Roh administration the National Security Council would also have its responsibilities broadened (International Business Publications USA, 208).

During Iraq war discussions, regarding sending South Korean military personnel to Iraq, the Minister of Unification also played a part in influencing the foreign policy towards the US, and not only towards the DPRK (Funabashi, 233). Jeong Se-hyun alongside with another administration official, believed the legitimacy of the Iraq war was in question and that

sending a larger amount of troops could problematise the domestic support for the Roh administration (Funabashi, 233-234). That the Ministry of Unification was represented in these broader foreign policy discussions, represented via its minister, shows the influence the ministry did have in the Roh administration. However, there is no similar hugely important event during the Kim administration, that didn't concern the DPRK, where we can compare the impact and role that the minister would have had. This means that it is hard to make a fair comparison regarding the role of the minister in issues that related to foreign policy that did not concern the DPRK. Though we can with certainty say that the minister and in turn the ministry played a central role not only in carrying out the Sunshine policy, but also in other foreign policy areas and decisions.

### **Conclusion**

To a large degree the Ministry of Unification and its responsibilities are tied to the Minister of Unification. Due to the central role that the minister has in the cabinet in both administrations and due to the fact that they are central in policymaking in inter-Korean relations, we know that their role is important when analysing the MOU. The choice of the minister also had an effect on how central the ministry was in regards to affecting policies. Lim Dong-won for example played an important role in shaping the Sunshine Policy due to being a founder of it, and also being the minister meant that the seat of the minister during this period was to be intrinsically involved in the administration. Certain ministers did have more influence than others, with Lim standing at the forefront. To conclude, the politicisation of the seat of the minister meant that the minister not only played an influential role but also different ministers had varying degrees of impact. While Jeong Se-hyun did play a central role in policymaking in the Roh administration he played a different role than Lim, partially explained by the experiences of the administration. Though Lim was a highly politicised appointment other ministers during Sunshine were not as attached to the Sunshine Policy as him. As we previously discovered when analysing the personalisation of the Sunshine Policy by Kim Dae-jung, we know that this meant that it also faced more critique from the opposition. The same politicisation and sort of personalisation of the MOU also opened up for criticism concerning its role as previously discussed in the role of the media, regarding a delegation sent to the DPRK including Lim and Lee Jong-seok. Due to how the minister is partially an extension and also the figurehead of the ministry itself, this means that the

influence and role of the MOU in regards to policymaking changed depending on the minister.

The role of the Minister of Unification is complicated due to the changing personalities and connections of the various Ministers; however the Roh administration did generally give them a higher degree of influence. This is due to several Ministers also being chairmen of the National Security Council, and the Ministers had the opportunity to not only work with policymaking regarding the DPRK, they also worked with Iraq. As well as having to deal with a more aggressive Bush administration that opposed Roh. While the Kim administration started facing heavy opposition from the Bush administration in 2001, Roh faced it before he even became elected. When I say that the Roh administration did give the Ministers more influence, it has to be taken into consideration that Lim in the first administration had a huge amount of influence as well, and he should not be dismissed. However, Lim was not the only Minister during the first administration, but he was the one that was noteworthy for this thesis, due to his ties to the policy.

### **How did the role of the Ministry of Unification change as the Sunshine Policy lost support?**

This section will discuss how the role of the Ministry of Unification changed, in regards to it carrying out the Sunshine Policy. The Minister of Unification is the central figure and the representative of the Ministry within the president's cabinet; however we also need to analyse the way the policy changed, and in extension the Ministry that stands at the centre of inter-Korean relations. This section aims to analyse how the responsibilities of the Ministry changed as the policy was redeveloped, and changed due to the criticisms and loss in support. First this section analyses the White Papers from the two administrations, which are at the core of this question. Using these White Papers this analysis aims to find out the differences in how they describe the content of the Sunshine Policy and the role of the Ministry in carrying it out. With the loss of support and criticism of the Sunshine Policy the Roh administration wanted to reshape the policy. The loss in support of the Sunshine Policy is linked not only to opposition and media criticism of the Minister and Ministry of Unification, but also to the role of the Ministry, as the Sunshine Policy got redeveloped. By previously analysing what caused the loss in support for the Sunshine Policy we gain an understanding of what the most severe criticisms of the policy was. Due to this we can easier understand why and how the role of the Ministry and the policy changed, as it tried to adapt to this loss

of public support. Secondly this section analyses, to a smaller extent, the role of the South-North Korea Cooperation Fund.

The Ministry has a wide range of responsibilities, but as previously discussed the responsibility discussed here is its role in carrying out and framing the DPRK policy. The inter-Korean diplomacy that the Ministry conducted also meant that individuals in it could help other South Korean government branches. Such as in early 2004 when a bureau director in the Ministry of Unification was moved to help in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism due to the person's knowledge on inter-Korean relations (Moon, "Transforming Korean Public" 20). The experience of the people working at the Ministry means that it is important in not only inter-Korean diplomacy but also trade and tourism, which can be seen in this type of repositioning of people with knowledge within the government.

#### **The Kim Dae-jung Administration**

With the background of having the inter-Korean summit behind it, the Ministry of Unification is exuberant in the White Paper published in 2001. Though there was a second summit scheduled later in 2001, it would not take place until 2007. The Minister of Unification at the time, Lim Dong-won, introduces the White Paper by saying "South and North Korea have just opened the door to peace, reconciliation, cooperation and prosperity", hoping for a highly positive future for inter-Korean relations (Ministry of Unification, "2001").

The positive attitude is visible clearly in the preface authored by Lim, saying:

"The North Korean attitude has also changed. Recently, Pyongyang has been pursuing practical profits and trying hard to improve its external ties... ..With the improvement in inter-Korean relations, support of the international community and changes that are occurring in North Korea, the South Korean government will endeavour to make the year 2001 a year in which peace and cooperation between the two Koreas will be expanded in earnest." (Ibid)

The MOU now acts in a new environment, it is said, without the overshadowing Cold War, and this has changed the role of the ministry itself. The MOU details that it will not use a policy to promote immediate reunification, as that is not realistic it argues, instead the ministry should focus on improving inter-Korean relations and providing a "favourable

environment” where the DPRK can change itself (Ministry of Unification, “2001” 22). The Sunshine Policy is also proposed to be used in a way that South Korea is the leading initiator for cooperation on the peninsula as the nation is far more capable both economically and militarily than the DPRK, and the nation therefore has it as a responsibility (Ministry of Unification, “2001” 23). The MOU and the White Paper also extensively discuss the North-South summit previously discussed in the thesis, where a wide range of topics were discussed to improve the two nation’s cooperation. With improved inter-Korean relations due to the summit, the MOU believes the two nations can work towards ending the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula (Ministry of Unification, “2001” 57). Overall the White Paper is highly positive, though it does also say:

“When we reflect on the past 55 years of division and confrontation, it is not difficult for us to expect that there will be many obstacles and difficulties awaiting us in the future.” (Ministry of Unification, “2001”)

The MOU also describes other projects that are seeing progress, and explains the government’s plan to continue its work, with for example connecting the Kyongui Railway between Seoul and Shinuiju in northern North Korea (Ministry of Unification, “2001” 88). With this White Paper we have something to compare the later 2005 version with. The biggest takeaway from this White Paper is the positivity, but also the lack of structure of the role and shape of the policy and the Ministry of Unification. This is something that would drastically change, with the 2005 White Paper heavily discussing issues of public support and transparency.

### **The Roh Moo-hyun Administration**

The Roh administration would try to gain more support for the policy by reshaping it by including more transparency in the redeveloped policy which we can see in the White Paper published in 2005 (Ministry of Unification, “2005”). This new reshaped policy was to be called “the Policy of Peace and Prosperity”, even though it essentially was the same as the SP. The lack of support for the SP had forced the administration to make changes to it, in an effort to gain more support for its policy towards the DPRK, and the new policy now heavily leaned towards public participation (Ministry of Unification, “2005”). Though Roh Moo-hyun was a protégé of Kim Dae-jung, it was expected of him to slightly distance himself from the Sunshine policy when he became president, while still maintaining the core of it as

his administration's policy towards the DPRK (Levin and Yong-Sup, 142). This was partially due to the bribery scandal and the connection of the Sunshine Policy founders to it, which was discussed earlier regarding how media caused a loss in support for the policy.


The White Paper from 2005 goes into deep detail on the rebranded policy, The Policy of Peace and Prosperity. The Ministry of Unification argues within the 2005 White Paper that the policy was going to "build upon the accomplishments of past administrations." while also taking into account "international circumstances, inter-Korean relations and public opinion" (Ministry of Unification, "2005" 13). Though the policy as previously mentioned now valued public support and participation higher there is a lack of discussion on the role of the DPRK military provocations within the White Paper. After the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong which left six South Korean soldiers dead in 2002, the trust of the DPRK by the South Korean people had decreased. However the new reshaped policy did not discuss military provocations by DPRK within the policy in the way the role of public participation had become much more important. Supporters of the SP might argue that it always opposed military provocations by the DPRK, nonetheless it is still a topic of criticism of the policy as discussed earlier (Cyrus Mahan). Apart from the added role of public participation in the policy the new reshaped policy changed a more subtle topic, the regionalisation of the policy. The MOU points out that the SP had focused on exactly just the inter-Korean relations, while the new policy under the Roh administration stated the importance of elevating the policy to all of Northeast Asia, and not only focusing on inter-Korean relations (Ministry of Unification, "2005" 16). This has a larger scope and stands in contrast with the MOU during the Kim administration talking about ending the Cold War on the Korean peninsula. Whilst the new policy did not discuss military provocations, the MOU concedes that the neighbouring nations now play a crucial role in improving inter-Korean relations due to the escalated nuclear issue (Ibid).

In this White Paper the stated purposes and goals of the SP are laid out as; inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, and these have in the new policy been exchanged for the promotion of peace and prosperity (Ministry of Unification, "2005" 14-17). Prosperity is in the new policy to be achieved not only on the Korean peninsula, but also in Northeast Asia according to the MOU (Ministry of Unification, "2005" 17). The MOU also details the four principles that the new policy centre on: dialogue, mutual understanding and reciprocity,

international cooperation and making the policy further tied to the public, reflecting the public's will (Ibid). The MOU when discussing these principles says that the region must move toward reconciliation and cooperation, again using the two most central words of Kim Dae-jung's SP (Ibid). Under the previous topic of the role of the media in the loss of support for the SP, the issue of the large inter-Korean summit bribery scandal was discussed. Here one of the large criticisms of the Kim administration in regards to this bribe was the lack of transparency, and this transparency is something that the new Peace and Prosperity policy seems to address. Here is another example of where we see how the loss in support of the SP is linked to the role of the MOU, as it carries out this reshaped policy under Roh.

### The South-North Korea Cooperation Fund

In regards to financial means of the Ministry in carrying out inter-Korean diplomacy: below is a graph showing the amount of funds appropriated to the South-North Cooperation Fund, from which the Ministry of Unification used money to fund various things such as education programs, workshops or aid. This fund was the only means of support from the South Korean government aimed at the DPRK (Cyrus Mahan). Due to the fact that the money shown is money appropriated and not actual money used, not too much should be read into the graph. We do know however that the Roh administration did spend a much larger amount on aid and projects due to a report from 2007 by the Export-Import Bank, which organises and sends aid to the DPRK (DailyNK).



**Figure 1** - Funds appropriated to the South-North Korea Cooperation Fund

*Source:* Ministry of Unification, “White Paper on South-North Cooperation Fund”.

The South-North Cooperation Fund did present a financial mean for the Ministry to influence and carry out the Sunshine Policy. However, the Kim Dae-jung administration in 1998 also started allowing civilian organisations to supply aid to North Korea (Flake, 88). This decreased the influence that the Ministry would have in directing aid as it would not be the only organisation or branch in South Korea from then on to carry out this single-channel policy.

### **Conclusion**

With these two White Papers from 2001 and 2005 we have received a substantial overview of how the Sunshine Policy changed as it lost support, and in extension the Ministry of Unification which stands at the centre of the policy. The 2005 White Paper is far more detailed regarding the policy of the government and it is better structured than the 2001 paper. While the 2001 White Paper is highly optimistic often discussing projects that it wishes to start, or going into detail on previous meetings and how successful they were, it does not in practice discuss future plans in actual detail. The 2001 White Paper reads more like an ideological morale boost for the Sunshine Policy, while the later paper is practical in trying to work through problems that the policy faces. In 2001 it was still obvious that the Sunshine Policy did face troubles, despite a successful meeting in the middle of 2000, the approval ratings for the Kim Dae-jung administration would quickly fall again. It is highly possible that Lim Dong-won, considering he was a founder of the policy, wanted to carry on with it in 2001 without making public changes to the policy. However in 2005 the Roh administration had the chance to change it after the two creators of the policy now were gone from the administration. The first White Paper shows that the Ministry of Unification puts great hopes to the inter-Korean summit talks and other negotiations at the time; this in a way makes the ministry passive as it puts the ball in North Korea's corner. Meanwhile the 2005 White Paper shows the Ministry of Unification trying to build momentum for its new policy after it had been weak at the end of the Kim administration, with the nuclear-issue flaring up and not much progress since the "axis of evil" speech. The Ministry of Unification in 2005 had a more organized outlook and with an enhanced Sunshine Policy aimed at countering the faults of the previous administration, the Ministry sets out on an optimistic course. The new Peace and Prosperity policy changed the role of the Ministry of Unification to focus on gaining public support and participation to a higher degree, which may have showed itself in things like a larger amount of education programs and workshops. Though we do not know

what exactly the appropriated funding in the South-North Korea Cooperation Fund was spent on, it may have been these kinds of programs and workshops. As we saw, the Roh administration appropriated more money to areas such as workshops and aid than the Kim administration. This meant that the Ministry of Unification received a broadened responsibility under the Roh administration as it had to use this larger amount of appropriated funding.

Despite the changes to the Ministry of Unification and the policy with the new Roh administration, there were a lot of criticisms not answered in the 2005 White Paper, such as the role of repercussions against DPRK aggressions. The Ministry did not change its attitude in carrying out punishments or sanctions towards the DPRK if it was to show an unfavourable attitude. However, here it has to be recognized that even though it is the Ministry's responsibility to establish the DPRK policy it is not alone in policymaking on this issue. Influential members of the cabinet do play a large role, as well as of course the president, who as previously mentioned in Roh's case even resorted to using covert foreign policy advisors. This is where our previous analysis of the influence and role of the Minister is important for answering our question. By analysing only the White Papers we do not get a satisfactory answer as to how the role of the Ministry changed. Combined, however, with the detailed analysis of the role of the Ministers and their influence in the cabinet, these different sections can provide a satisfactory conclusion.

## **Conclusion**

This study has attempted to answer what caused the Sunshine Policy to lose public support and how did the role change for the Ministry of Unification in regards to its responsibility in organising the policy towards North Korea during the tumultuous Sunshine period.

This study concluded that it is impossible to boil down the factors for why the Sunshine Policy lost so much support into one single point, due to the complexity of the divided South Korean society and the criticism and difficult situations that both administrations faced. All these factors combined sank the support for the two administrations, but as previously mentioned the preceding administration of Kim Young-sam had seen a similar fall in support, so the experience of the two administrations may not have been unique. However, there were identifiable factors that mattered the most in the decline of the Sunshine Policy.

My findings were that one of the centre pillars of causes for the loss in support is the role that the DPRK played. Not only can we see this in the fact that much opposition criticism and the influence of the media is related to how the DPRK acts. DPRK provocations meant that the opposition and the media had ammunition to criticise the administration, which in turn resulted in lower approval ratings. The role of the US in the public support of the administrations is also tightly linked to inter-Korean relations and the DPRK. The belligerent Bush administration attitude severely harmed not only inter-Korean relations but also the South Korean administration, while a more flexible Clinton administration, working with the same goals as their counterpart, could achieve more on inter-Korean relations. It is highly likely that a more cooperative US administration had helped the Sunshine Policy's approval ratings at least to an extent, and perhaps it could have influenced the DPRK in becoming more cooperative, which in turn would provide even better approval for the policy. Though the US played a central role in the loss of support for the Sunshine Policy it was at the end of the day the behaviour of the DPRK that was the largest factor. It was visible in the huge approval ratings shortly after the inter-Korean summit. Though it is important to remember that the US heavily influenced the DPRK's behaviour, the nation is always free to do as it pleases, and if it had continued cooperating closer with South Korea the Sunshine Policy could very well have been a highly approved policy.

Regarding the role of the Ministry of Unification and the seat of the Minister, there is another complex conclusion. As Lim Dong-won and the first administration went out of office, with the new Roh administration leading the nation, the policy was reshaped. While this meant that the two founders of the policy were no longer in a position of power, the policy was now finally freer to adjust itself to its faults and critiques. The changes to the Ministry of Unification and the Sunshine Policy however were not substantial. The Roh administration did appropriate more funding for the Ministry, however the administration did not change the policy in a way that would satisfy many in the opposition. Seeking public support was not an answer to critique itself; and the policy did not actually seek to change in its approach to the DPRK. The Roh administration would simply try to be more in tune with the public and listen to them, in the hopes that support would increase for the policy. It was clear that the policy had been stunted with Roh's new administration; however the Ministry would still have a surprisingly strong presence in it. This is especially unusual considering that Roh was not an experienced politician, and especially not when it came to foreign affairs.

Hypothetically on the surface, it is easy to believe that the Ministry did play a smaller role in the Roh administration after the Sunshine Policy lost momentum; however that seems to not have been the case. Though Lim played a hugely important role in regards to the Sunshine Policy, other Ministers of Unification under the Roh administration played a central role in his cabinet regarding a multitude of issues, not only inter-Korean relations. The personal decision by Roh to nominate the Ministers of Unification that would have two seats gave the Ministry more influence, but it also meant that he faced criticism from the opposition.

These two questions and conclusions come together as one when we view the issue from a larger perspective. The Roh administration wanted to reshape the policy due to its lack of support, and this lack of support was due to criticism of not only the Sunshine Policy but also the Ministry of Unification itself. By identifying that the DPRK's behaviour played a large role in this paper, for the loss of support for the policy, we should expect to see that the Ministry of Unification's role changed in regards to this. However, in the new policy in 2005, the policy did not make any changes as previously mentioned, with regards to repercussions against aggressive DPRK behaviour. The Roh administration seems to have committed a fault, they did not seem to either identify or even care about why the Sunshine Policy had lost support, instead the Ministry under Roh said it would seek to gain public support, without answering to the criticism that I have discussed. Here, if the Roh administration really wanted to gain public support, it would have identified the criticisms and tried adjusting the policy accordingly. Many people wanted a higher degree of repercussions against this aggressive DPRK behaviour; however that simply did not exist in the new Peace and Prosperity plan. Supporters of the Sunshine Policy may then argue that one of the central pillars of the Sunshine Policy concerns repercussions towards aggressive DPRK behaviour. However, these repercussions do not often actually take effect, as the South Korean administration knows how easy it is to scare off the DPRK from any negotiations and cooperation agreements, which is what is crucial for the support of the policy. While the Ministry's role should have changed here, after the loss in public support, it does not; instead Roh even brings in new Ministers of Unification that get new types of criticism from the opposition. Thanks to the analysis of the White Papers as well as analysing the causes for the loss in support, we have identified that the Roh administration did not react in a sustainable way to meet this loss in public support. There was no chance for the Sunshine Policy to make a comeback under the Roh administration unless the DPRK would for some reason suddenly

make a long range of concessions, which is unrealistic. Future presidents wanting to conduct a similar policy towards the DPRK need to take into consideration the strong opposition to any type of policy that can be viewed as a possible appeasement-policy by conservatives. The president and their policy should also become further flexible in dealing with an unpredictable DPRK. And strong relations with the US are a must, which also means that the US administration has to be cooperative and willing to work with the South Korean president's policy. In other words, if a South Korean president promoting a Sunshine-type of policy becomes president, South Korea is entirely dependent on the US administration being willing to cooperate, much unlike the Bush administration was.

Conducting this study I found that it would be relevant and beneficial for the field if there were future studies on how and why the support was so strong for both Sunshine administrations at the start of their periods. This is considering how strong the conservative faction is, and the huge ideological divide between the progressives and conservatives in South Korea.

## Bibliography

- Arms Control Association. (April, 2017). Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy. Accessed 28 Apr. 2017 <  
<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron> >
- Amsden, Alice Hoffenberg. *Asia's next giant: South Korea and late industrialization*. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1992.
- Choi, Kyung-woon. "□□□□ □□□ □□" 37%... □□ □□". Chosun. 17 Oct. 2007. Accessed 7 May 2017 <  
[http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html\\_dir/2007/10/17/2007101700049.html](http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/10/17/2007101700049.html) >
- Esaiasson, Peter, et al. *Metodpraktikan*. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik AB, 2012
- Flake, L. Gordon, and Scott Snyder. *Paved with good intentions: the NGO experience in North Korea*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003
- Foley, James A. "'Sunshine' or showers for Korea's divided families?." *World Affairs* 165.4 (2003): 179-184.
- Funabashi, Yoichi. *The peninsula question: A chronicle of the second Korean nuclear crisis*. Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
- Gallup Korea. (8 March, 2002). Bush, 82% support rating. Accessed 7 May 2017 <  
<http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/newsContent.asp?seqNo=105&pagePos=327&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=> >
- Gallup Korea. (2 May, 2003). 'I am conservative' 46.5%. Accessed 7 May 2017 <  
<http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/newsContent.asp?seqNo=593&pagePos=295&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=> >
- Gallup Korea. (11 January 2004). Korea's Security Threat, the United States Ranked # 1. Accessed 7 May <  
<http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/newsContent.asp?seqNo=807&pagePos=282&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=> >

- Gallup Korea. (23 February, 2003). Political Indicators – Evaluation of Kim Dae-jungs government over five years. Accessed 7 May 2017 <  
<http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/newsContent.asp?seqNo=543&pagePos=299&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=> >
- Gallup Korea. (5 June 2006). President Roh’s approval rate is 20.2%. Accessed 7 May <  
<http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/newsContent.asp?seqNo=1503&pagePos=238&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=> >
- Gallup Korea. (1 September, 2003). Roh’s approval ratings. Accessed 7 May 2017 <  
<http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/newsContent.asp?seqNo=680&pagePos=290&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=> >
- Gallup Korea. (18 September, 2003). Who is more threatening to peace in Korea? Accessed 7 May 2017 <  
<http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/newsContent.asp?seqNo=758&pagePos=285&selectYear=&search=&searchKeyword=> >
- Guchteneire , Paul. "Code of conduct social science research UNESCO." UNESCO, n.d. Web. Accessed 15 May 2017.
- Hogarth, Hyun-key Kim. "South Korea’s Sunshine Policy, Reciprocity and Nationhood." *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology* 11.1 (2012): 99-111.
- Korea South: a "spy" guide*. International Business Publications, USA, 2016.
- Jeong, Bok-Gyo. “Peace Dividend and Regional Stability on the Korean Peninsula: Focusing on the South–North Korea Cooperation Fund Allocation.” *Towards a Northeast Asian Security Community*, edited by Seliger, Bernhard, and Werner Pascha. Springer, 2011, 99-127.
- Kim, Hong Nack. "The 2000 parliamentary election in South Korea." *Asian Survey* 40.6 (2000): 894-913.
- Kirk, Donald. *Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine*. Springer, 2009.

- Kim, Hak-chun. *Unification policies of South and North Korea: a comparative study*. Seoul National University Press, 1987.
- Ko, Sung-Bin. "South Korea's search for an independent foreign policy." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 36.2 (2006): 258-273.
- Kwak, Tae-Hwan, and Seung-Ho Joo, eds. *The United States and the Korean peninsula in the 21st century*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006.
- Kwak, Tae-Hwan. "The Six-Party Talks and North Korea's Denuclearization: Evaluation and Prospects." *Pacific Focus* 25.2 (2010): 211-236.
- Lankov, Andrei. "Bitter taste of paradise: North Korean refugees in South Korea." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 6.01 (2006): 105-137.
- Lee, Brian. "New policymaker for North preceded by his reputation." *Korea Joongang Daily*. 13 Jan. 2006. Accessed 8 Apr. 2017 <  
<http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2671803> >
- Lee, Dong Hyung. "The Korean Sunshine Policy: Its Light and Shade." *Pacific Focus* 18.1 (2003): 175-200.
- Levin, Norman D, and Han Yong-Sup. *Sunshine in Korea: the South Korean debate over policies toward North Korea*. Rand Corporation, 2003.
- Lee, Youngjae. "Law, politics, and impeachment: The impeachment of Roh Moo-hyun from a comparative constitutional perspective." *The American Journal of Comparative Law* (2005): 403-432.
- Mahan, Cyrus. "Professor Chung-In Moon." YouTube. YouTube, 24 Mar. 2014. Web. 11 May 2017
- Min, Jeonghun. *Campaign effects in Korean presidential elections*. Diss. Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 2010.
- Ministry of Unification. (April, 2001). *Korean Unification White Paper 2001*. Seoul.
- Ministry of Unification. (2005). *Korean Unification White Paper 2005*. Seoul.

- Ministry of Unification. (2008). White Paper on South-North Cooperation Fund. Seoul.
- Ministry of Unification. "Inter-Korean Dialogue by Area". Accessed 27 Apr. 2017 <  
<http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3892> >
- Ministry of Unification. "Brief History". Accessed 27 Apr. 2017 <  
<http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1827> >
- Ministry of Unification. "Previous Ministers". Accessed 13 May. 2017 <  
<https://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1525> >
- Ministry of Unification. "Ministry of Unification publishes 2017 White Paper on Korean Unification." 3 Apr. 2017. Accessed 24 Apr. 2017 <  
<http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1832&mode=view&cid=53419> >
- Moon, Chung-in. "Between Principle and Pragmatism: What Went Wrong with the Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korean Policy?." *Journal of International and Area Studies* (2011): 1-22.
- Moon, Chung-in. *The sunshine policy: in defense of engagement as a path to peace in Korea*. Yonsei University Press, 2012.
- Moon, M. Jae. *Transforming Korean Public Governance: Cases and Lessons*. OECD/Korea Policy Centre, 2008
- Oberdorfer, Don, and Robert Carlin. *The two Koreas: A contemporary history*. Basic Books, 2013.
- Park, Hyun Min. "'Sunshine Policy' Funds \$1.92BN in 9 Years, North Responds with Nuclear". *DailyNK*. 28 Jun. 2007. Accessed 6 May 2017 <  
<http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00300&num=2288> >
- "Roh Appoints Ministers Over Lawmakers' Objections". Chosun. 10 Feb. 2006. Accessed 13 May 2017 <  
<http://web.archive.org/web/20070311124503/http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200602/200602100028.html> >

Son, Key-young. *South Korean Engagement Policies and North Korea: Identities, Norms and the Sunshine Policy*. Routledge, 2006.

"S Koreans charged over summit cash." *BBC News*. 25 Jun. 2003. Accessed 15 Apr. 2017 <  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3018874.stm> >.

"S Korea foreign minister resigns." *BBC News*. 15 Jan. 2004. Accessed 15 Apr. 2017 <  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3398203.stm> >.

The White House. (October, 1998). *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*.  
Accessed 16 Apr. 2017 <  
<https://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr.pdf> >.

Weathersby, Kathryn. *Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives*. Vol. 8. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1993.

Yoo, Chan Yul. "South Korea's Sunshine Policy Revisited." *Korean Social Science Journal* 31.2 (2004): 107-131.