

# Authoritarian Foundations

The Mechanisms of Support Behind Authoritarian Takeovers

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# Abstract

In this study the author builds on previous materials and a statistical comparison between states with successful coup attempts and states without successful coups in an attempt to isolate a series of factors that may have an effect on the outcome of an attempted coup d'état. The isolated factors are then tested on the cases of Gambia, Ghana, Ecuador and Thailand.

The five factors that resulted from this study and should be present in all countries with successful coups are: Low level of internationalisation and international interest, Economical instability and widespread poverty, often coupled with accusations of corruption, as well as a rurally or raw materials based production, Undereducated and largely illiterate population with a generally low status and ethnic clashes between themselves, Culturally and historically an authoritarian tradition, Incentives for the army or some other elite to attempt to seize power via a coup.

The situation of support on the domestic arena and disinterest internationally is created by an interaction between all of the factors, and leads to a much higher success rate of the attempted coups.

*Keywords:* Coup, Support, Authoritarianism, Opinion, Democracy

# Table of Contents

<b><u>1 Introduction .....</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b>
1.1 Research Problem and Purpose.....	1
1.2 Theory and Methodology.....	2
1.2.1 Selecting the Cases.....	2
1.2.2 Definitions of the Key Concepts.....	3
1.2.3 Disposition.....	3
<b><u>2 Where Does Authoritarianism Find Support?.....</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>
2.1 The Importance of International Reactions.....	4
2.1.1 International Repression of Coups.....	4
2.1.2 International Support of Coups.....	5
2.2 Economy and the Salvation From Misery.....	6
2.2.1 Poverty and Corruption.....	7
2.2.2 The Importance of Instability.....	7
2.3 The “Antidemocratic Personality”.....	8
2.4 The Authoritarian Legacies of Religion and Culture.....	9
2.4.1 Post-Colonial Issues.....	10
2.4.2 The Overrepresentation of Africa.....	10
2.5 Incentives For Coups According to Game Theory.....	11
2.5.1 The Filter of Plausibility.....	11
2.5.2 Individual Incentives.....	12
<b><u>3 Overview of Some Selected Cases.....</u></b>	<b><u>13</u></b>
3.1 The Gambia 1994, Popularity Lasting to This Day.....	13
3.1.1 History and Background.....	13
3.1.2 Economy.....	14
3.1.3 Geopolitical Context.....	14
3.2 Ghana 1966, False Claims and Foreign Interests.....	15
3.2.1 History and Background.....	15
3.2.2 Economy.....	15
3.2.3 Geopolitical Context.....	16
3.3 Ecuador 2000, Strong Population and Soft Army.....	16
3.3.1 History and Background.....	16
3.3.2 Economy.....	17
3.3.3 Geopolitical Context.....	17
3.4 Thailand 1991, Coups Under the Great King.....	18

3.4.1 History and Background.....	18
3.4.2 Economy.....	19
3.4.3 Geopolitical Context.....	19
<b>4 Conclusions.....</b>	<b>20</b>
4.1 Common Features in the Cases.....	21
4.1.1 Authoritarian Traditions and Domestic Support.....	21
4.1.2 Unrest in the Region and In the Population.....	22
4.1.3 Ethnic Heterogeneity.....	22
4.1.4 Poor Economic Situation.....	23
4.2 The Factors and Their Impact.....	23
<b>References.....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Appendix 1: Statistical Comparison Between States With Successful Coups and World Averages.....</b>	<b>26</b>
Method and Selection of Cases.....	26
List of the States With Successful Coups Included.....	27
Statistical Averages For States With Successful Coups.....	27
Statistical Averages For All States .....	28
Significant Differences.....	29
<b>Appendix 2: Application on a Fresh Case; Guinea.....</b>	<b>30</b>
The Coup Attempt.....	30
The Factors and How They Manifest Themselves.....	30
Conclusion.....	31

# 1 Introduction

In this study I will focus the factors making an attempt at takeover via the means of a coup fail or succeed. The answer to why coups succeed is of course complicated, and I make no illusions that I have found a definite answer to hand over as a godsend gift to the coup makers of the world, or their opponents for that matter. Further research is always needed, but my attempt is to narrow down the possible answers to a few and clearly distinguishable factors in the society where a coup attempt takes place. Where these are present the coup makers seemingly enjoy a greater chance of success.

Juan Linz has already explained that a superficial analysis suggesting that it is the *absence* of conditions making democracy possible that leads to the establishment of authoritarianism does not hold up to realistic inspection, many cases of nondemocratic regimes have appeared in countries that should have a high probability for democracy (Linz 2000, p. 137-140). The study of why an attempted coup succeeds or fails needs a different approach. Breakdown of democracy is not identical with the establishment of authoritarian rule, nor is it a prerequisite of such (ibid p. 138). In the fast workings of a coup there might sometimes be an institutionalized democracy falling for the superior might of its military under an authoritarian commander, a commander that the population often like and support for a variety of reasons, these reasons will be the main focus of this study.

It is important to point out here that no totalitarian or authoritarian systems have yet been overthrown by internal force, however many have transferred into weaker and more democratic systems that were then ultimately replaced (ibid. p. 139). Many authoritarian systems have experienced attempted coups which they have struck down, showing that a successful coup is a sign of a weak state that strong forces within the army or similar institutions see as “up for grabs”.

## 1.1 Research Problem and Purpose

The specific question addressed in this study is: *which factors need to be present in a country to create an atmosphere that facilitates a successful Coup d'état and the establishment of authoritarian rule?*

The purpose of this study is to either confirm or disprove the theory of pre-existing conditions being the determining factor in the outcome of a coup attempt, and to define more specifically the nature of these conditions to be able to better understand how these conditions can be used to prevent authoritarian takeovers. It is not my purpose to explain the exact workings behind the coup itself, nor is this

an attempt to study the de facto regimes that are the outcome of the coup. Both of these are however crucial for the understanding of the factors creating the outcome. I will focus on the absence or presence of the theoretical factors allowing the new regime to evolve into a stable authoritarian rule.

## 1.2 Theory and Methodology

There are three possible outcomes to a coup attempt. Either the coup leader takes power to create a new leadership, or the status quo government remains, or a civil war breaks out (Sutter 2000, p. 208). Since civil wars can in some cases last for decades and evolve into conflicts between completely different factions than the ones involved in the initial coup I have decided to limit this study to the cases where either the first or second possible outcome occur within a year of the initial coup attempt.

The theory tested is that in the states where coups take place you can find a set of pre-existing conditions for a transition to authoritarianism, in other states these conditions are absent. If the pre-existing conditions are a foundation to continued authoritarian rule the first outcome will occur and a new leadership will be set up, authoritarian if the coup leaders have such intentions. If the conditions are absent the second outcome will occur and the status quo remain. This theory is supported by the fact that until the mid 1980s coups were widespread in a large part of the underdeveloped world (also defined as the third world, the south, or the non-western world), since then it has become an almost exclusively African problem (McGowan 2003, p. 340f). This can be interpreted to signify a change of the underlying conditions for coups in the rest of the world, but not in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also important to note that in most of countries where successful coups have occurred there has also been failed coups (ibid p. 346). This is interpreted as a sign that coup attempts have a small window of opportunity where the conditions are right to succeed, and if this “window” is missed there is no longer any strong foundations to establish a new leadership, and subsequent coup attempts fail.

### 1.2.1 Selecting the Cases

Almost all coup attempts take place in the developing regions of the world, south Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these regions of the world the flow of free information is poor at best, limiting my access to statistics and independent studies, and leading to a weak first hand material which must be taken into account. There are few coups that establish left wing or socialist rule, as further discussed in chapter two these tend to be the result of revolutions rather than coups, leading to an over representation of right wing dictatorships. For purposes of clarity I have excluded the cases in which it is clear that the coup is made with the explicit purpose to establish democratic power.

I have found it necessary to restrict the cases mentioned in detail due to the lack of previous research and source materials about coups outside the region of sub-Saharan Africa. The material and numbers such as statistics used for the cases are as close as possible to the time of the coup being studied, however in some cases these numbers are separated from the year of the coup attempt by a few years.

### 1.2.2 Definitions of the Key Concepts

- Linz divides undemocratic systems into totalitarian and authoritarian. I have chosen to not make this division, instead using the term authoritarian to describe any kind of ruler that is not elected democratically and/or uses undemocratic means to govern. Meaning that all regimes that are formed by coups are de facto authoritarian until they either transform into democratic regimes by allowing elections, step down in favor of a democratically elected leader, or are replaced by a counteraction from the previous rulers.
- A coup, unlike a revolution, is not achieved by a large amount of people working together for a political goal, but rather by a small elite wishing to rule over the masses. As such a coup attempt in itself represents a kind of authoritarian “mentality”. My definition of coup is for this purpose shared with McGowan “[The coup] can install a military, or an alternative civilian government. It can maintain, or change, social policy. In its essence the coup is a lightning action at the top, in which violence is the ultimate determinant, even if it is not used. [...] [E]xisting regimes are suddenly and illegally displaced by the action of a relatively small group, in which members of the military, police or security forces of the state play a key role, either on their own or in conjunction with civilian elites such as civil servants, politicians and monarchs” (McGowan 2003, pp 342-344).

### 1.2.3 Disposition

I will begin by in chapter 2 determine a set of factors that influence the support of authoritarianism, beginning on the international and then lowering to the national and finally personal levels, focusing on the economical and cultural factors involved in the individual decision to support authoritarian leaderships. I will give a brief overview and description of the so called antidemocratic personality, which connects with an unstable national situation to form incitements for coup makers to participate in a coup. In chapters 3 and 4 four cases will be examined with regard to the theoretical factors developed in chapter 2. Finally in chapter 5 I will summarise with my conclusions. Appendix 1 is a purely statistical study aimed at aiding the study with factual numbers. Appendix 2 gives an overview of the at the time of writing still ongoing coup in Guinea.

## 2 Where Does Authoritarianism Find Support?

Any leader, regardless of the means used to assume power, needs to enjoy a certain minimal level of support, not least within his own lines and power apparatus, in order to not be immediately overthrown. In some cases this support comes in the form of a lack of resistance (or apathy), in others the fear of repercussions, international allies or, as in the case of Thailand recently, outright popularity fuel the non-negative reactions. In many cases the people of a country are for differing reasons ready for a change, and will welcome a new rule without scrutinising its nature. Nearly all successful coup attempts takes place in a place and time of major political and economical turmoil. In such situations the population more often than not has more pressing things like starvation at their hands, and other factors that will prevent active opposition. Due to modern communications it is not uncommon for international reactions to begin the same day of the coup, making the international community into a possible tool to skew the outcome of the attempt.

### 2.1 The Importance of International Reactions

It is nearly impossible for a coup attempt and completely impossible for a successful coup to be without any effect on the relations with foreign nations, especially in the current international political climate where democratic elections is the only approved way to change a democratically elected rule. For this same reason it is also easier to gain domestic than international support for a coup. In most cases the reactions from foreign nations will be condemnation and sanctions directed as incentives to re-establish democracy. The support or opposition of a powerful world power can have a significant impact on the outcome of the coup attempt, and so one of the most important things coup leaders need to consider is how, and from where, they will gain their support.

#### 2.1.1 International Repression of Coups

An important part of history for many countries is their traditional ties to parts of the western world through spheres of interest. These are often created by the colonisers of the region by leaving behind their language, legal systems and cultural legacies as well as establishing companies and trade routes still in force

today. These legacies can be used to preserve the interests of the west of an atmosphere of stability and democracy. One such example can be found in Northwest Africa where for many years the French government kept their spheres of interests stable by guaranteeing civilian governments in the former colonies the support of the French army, which no native military force could measure itself against (Clark 2007 p. 142). In other parts the British-supported Kenyan model of buying off the army with material benefits seems to work well to stop anyone from trying to take over power by force (ibid.). This type of stabilising means taken by foreign states can be very effective to hinder coup attempts, and may keep entire regions free from coup attempts (see McGowan 2003 p. 356).

Even with a coup already in process an undesired reaction from the international surroundings can cause the coup leaders to react in ways that ultimately affect the outcome of the coup. One example from my cases is the condemnation of the Gambian coup which led to a near complete stop in the tourist industry and other important economical sources, leading in turn to a “transition to civilian rule” of the regime with the coup leader installing himself as president, a turn that otherwise might not have happened and which was a key part in the consolidation and acceptance of the new regime amongst its citizens (Saine 2008 p. 62).

### 2.1.2 International Support of Coups

At times the coup leader might gain the support of a foreign power to fight against a “common enemy”. This was more common during the cold war with the American intervention in Chile 1973 as one of many examples. During the Portuguese colonial war of the early 1970's the Soviet Union and Sudan as well as many in the population supported the MPLA in Angola despite its open intentions of establishing a one-party state (Wright 1997 pp. 9-10). Sudan still supported the party in semantics and materially long after the fall of the soviet union and until at least 1997, despite Sudan itself not being a communist nation (ibid.). In both these cases and many more it was the international support that ultimately led to the success of the coup, thereby not said that the native population did not play a role by in part supporting the new leaderships being installed.

In the geopolitical situation of the 21<sup>st</sup> century this kind of direct actions of support for coups in other sovereign nations seems to have played out their role and been replaced by direct interventions from the countries themselves, such as in Iraq or South Ossetia, and the covert support of coups has seemingly played out its role amongst the larger and more powerful nations to favour an agenda of spreading democracy rather than blind support for right- or left wing authoritarian takeovers. In a smaller and more regional context however the practice remains relatively widespread, with for example China, Venezuela and Bolivia stepping in with support for like-minded leftist revolutionary groups seeking power in the nearby area, or alternatively supported like-minded governments against the same kind of groups<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>For an example of Venezuela see [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=9](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=9) (20081215)

## 2.2 Economy and the Salvation From Misery

No state, authoritarian or otherwise, can stand outside of the globalised economical system of today. As authoritarian regimes by their nature impose laws strongly regulating national activities, especially political activity, this will have an effect on the economical institutions in the country as well. The specific factors effecting how growth progresses over time vary strongly from case to case, but foreign investors and multinational companies are often “scared off” by authoritarian takeovers and the new order they often bring to the country. Thus, newly authoritarian states must gain the support of the international financial community, and with that comes the trust of the population, by providing somewhat stable conditions for economical institutions.

The economy of the states with coup activity often rely on export of tangible goods and agriculture<sup>2</sup>, as is common in the developing world where the majority of the coup attempts take place. In some cases there is few or no independent capitalist businesses, but in others mining companies and the like have enormous resources and power over the working population. These domestic businesses often support authoritarian regimes because the other options would mean less economical freedom, or more regulation of wages etc. that would mean less profit (Greenwood 2008 pp. 837, 840-843). Greenwood studied the subject using the cases of south America and the Arab world, coming to the perhaps unsurprising conclusion that businesses support the best option for themselves and their profit, which in many cases, especially where the business is labour intense and needs workers that do not complain or have the right to organize, is authoritarianism (ibid. pp. 837, 856, passim.). In places where foreign businesses are rare with the possible exception of investments from the former colonial powers the question instead becomes how a coup will affect the export of raw materials and the prospects of investments in the future, in these cases sanctions are crucial, and can be used as a tool to turn domestic opinion against the foreign investors.

For the countries where a large amount of the production facilities belong to foreign companies or owners, often from a former colonial power in the country itself or in a nearby country who has had impact on the region, it is easy to blame economical hardships and poverty on foreign interests. During the cold war blame was placed on “the communists” or “the capitalists”. Now it is far more often blamed on the more diffuse “the west”. Apart from the occasional racist or religious usage of minority groups as scapegoat which is the cause of the problems (such as in Rwanda) former colonial powers or other western interests, together with accusations of corruption in the ruling government, are by far the most popular powers to blame for poverty and lack of standard of living, often giving support to the coup plotters where the population sees such allegations as justified.

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<sup>2</sup>See appendix 1

### 2.2.1 Poverty and Corruption

Poverty and the dependence on one or a few goods for a very large portion of the national income is widespread in the parts of the world where coups are the most frequent (see appendix 1).

As McGowan points out with the example of Ivory Coast (2003 pp. 365-367) the sudden fall of world prices of any goods that a small, otherwise poor state relies on for export will lead to increased poverty and in turn often to revolt, unrest and protests amongst the population. While these countries often get aid from international organisations extreme and overt corruption often decimate the share reaching to population to near nothing. This often leads to a sharp rise in the public support for any new leaders promising change and better conditions.

The absence of coup attempts in some of the worlds poorest countries shows that poverty in itself is not a factor for coups to occur and be successful (ibid.). However, in combination with other factors poverty may pose an incitement for the population to welcome a change in leadership, if this desire for change is coupled with factors that encourage democracy coups are unlikely. In the countries where coups do occur there is often an absence of “democratic-mindedness” in the population that weakens the distinction between democracy or authoritarianism as the good or bad option respectively.

### 2.2.2 The Importance of Instability

Instability is a common factor in countries that experience coup attempts, but why is instability a factor? Perhaps a better question would be why *stability* is so important, because coup attempts do indeed, although more rarely, occur in some stable and well established countries. The question at hand is what makes coups succeed, and here instability of the current system is a crucial factor.

Most coup makers in their decrees<sup>3</sup> pointed to widespread corruption, inefficiency or misuse of power from the previous rulers as the reason for their coup attempts and excuse for the subsequent takeovers (Clark 2007 p. 141). Therefore it would seem that absence of corruption, inefficiency and power abuse deters from *successful* coups, but not necessarily from the *attempts*. As we will see the difference is small but crucial, and depends largely on the decisions of individual coup makers. This approach is however very simplified.

Instability is often also strengthened by a heterogeneous population where ethnic, cultural or religious clashes can flare up into violence, and there is often bickering about the mechanics of power sharing between different ethnic groups. In this situation an authoritarian rule can often work to quiet down the clashes, or at least the violence. While people may vote for their preferred ethnic group, many seem to have an easier time to support a non-elected leader of a different ethnic group.

The widespread chaos in the first decades after independence the basic order provided by the abandoning colonisers set the stage for the actors to, after

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<sup>3</sup>See appendix 2 for the recent example of Guinea

independence, promise to bring back law, order and economical prosperity to the country. Via such promises they may gain a greater support from the population, despite their actual agendas. The role of instability is to create the need and hope for a better option than the currently available.

## 2.3 The “Antidemocratic Personality”

There is, in any society, individuals who favor and even support authoritarian rule. These people may take active part in the coup if they somehow become convinced that the coup leader is a good leading figure, or may simply be more happy with an undemocratic system. The personality type that enjoys authoritarian situations is often rigid and intolerant, prejudice and religiously strict (see Napier and Jost 2008, p. 598 and 611 for a more elaborate description of this personality type and its distinctive patterns). It is also strongly linked to low levels of education (ibid pp. 599-600). Interesting in the context is that in the 11 nations that went from free to partly free in the freedom house index between 1979 and 2005 the average level of education was considerably lower than the world average, with 62% literate, compared to a world average of 70%<sup>4</sup>.

The broadening of ones view of the world provided by education can counteract ethnocentrism and other prejudice often found in authoritarian programs, but the psychological profile is more complicated than just education. The theory also stresses the importance of authoritarian child rearing, of the kind commonly found in some deeply religious and third world cultures, and low socio-economic status (Napier and Jost 2008, p. 600).

Given that most of the factors, if not all, that Napier and Jost point to as determinative for a personality that supports authoritarianism are present in Africa, South Asia and to some extent South America it should not be surprising that coups more often occur and succeed in these areas. The presence of many individuals with an authoritarian personality in the population will unavoidably lead to a greater support and perhaps more importantly to less resistance to an authoritarian takeover. The leaders of a coup meet many obstacles, but a population well drilled in the routines of having an authoritarian leadership is less likely to be one. There is some evidence pointing to the theory that in some parts of the world the population has a higher prevalence of people with this sort of personality due to some religious and cultural heritage.

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<sup>4</sup>See Appendix 1 for statistical information concerning this and other variables in the relevant states.

## 2.4 The Authoritarian Legacies of Religion and Culture

A major part in the life of every human being, and also a major part in developing an authoritarian personality, is the culture one was raised in, combined in many cases with a religion to have faith in. Most of the major religions can be considered “puritan”, or “religions of restraint”, as Muslims, Jews, Catholic Christians, Buddhists, Confucianists and followers of any other reasonably “modern” religion follow a set of rules limiting their worldly pleasures and setting up a strict moral code of conduct. A part of religion is also often listening to the words and orders an authority, priests or similar spiritual leaders whose decrees are seldom questioned, this strict adherence to rules and authority sets its distinct marks in the way followers of these religions view authority.

Milan Zafirovski claims that puritan views lead to an authoritarian legacy within the population which coup makers and authoritarian rulers can easily play on to win support (Zafirovski 2007, pp. 2-4). However there are many kinds of puritans, in many aspects of society, and while they are spread in nearly all societies and religions not all societies have a majority large enough to change the *overall* outlook on authoritarian rule.

Zafirovski argues that in western societies such as the U.S.A the legacy of puritanism has worked in an authoritarian direction to increase the support for authoritarian style rule (ibid. pp. 249-251). In some cases the process towards a secular democracy is reversed in times of conservatism (ibid p. 258). If such links can be shown in countries that separated church and state centuries ago, it would not be unreasonable to say a similar link could be found in countries with an even greater portion of religious believers. This theory fails to explain the lack of coup attempts in other countries in which a large part of the population follows puritan religions, such as Saudi Arabia or the U.S.A, but the authoritarian style of leadership is there, suggesting perhaps that if a coup did occur it would be easier for the coup leaders to establish new authoritarian leadership.

Cultural aspects in some parts of the world have a similar effect to religion, specifically in regions where the culture of warriors, tribes and the idea of revenge is strong military or even brutal leaderships are not necessarily seen as something aberrant (Clark 2007, pp. 141-142). In the South and West Asian region a well documented Confucian-inspired culture of submission and hierarchies, albeit more peaceful, plays a similar role in making the population at peace with authoritarian forms of leadership and control.

Naturally, the importance of any of these factors can also die out over time and through influence from other cultures or a loss of the grip of religion. This is shown by several examples where countries with a big prevalence of coups suddenly turned towards attempts at democracy instead, like in sub Saharan Africa in the 1990s (ibid.).

The factor of an authoritarian legacy in the culture and overall population would seem to be an important catalyst in connection with other factors, but

nonetheless one that can be reformed away with time and efforts of democratization. Assuming that little attempts at reforming the traditional religion or culture are made authoritarian rulers can undoubtedly benefit from an authoritarian cultural legacy.

#### 2.4.1 Post-Colonial Issues

While not all countries experiencing coups are former colonies many, especially in Africa, are. One of the most widespread theories sees the reasons for decolonisation as an economical matter, due to the colonial powers not having the financial situation needed to keep them by use of force any longer, leaving the administrations to inexperienced locals who had not “proved fit” for self-government (see First 1970, pp. 41-43). Countries such as Kenya where the independence was planned and timed by the British, and in the former French colonies of northern Africa, there was much less coup activity in the years following independence than in other parts of the continent, signifying that the means of decolonisation is a factor that should be considered (ibid pp. 46-48).

In the former colonies where independence was gained extremely rapidly, by simple acts such as signing a constitution and running a national flag up a flagpole, the message sent to the population and to the officers in the military controlling the means of force was that change of government is an easy, single and fast act, one undertaken after a struggle to rid the country of unwanted rulers (see First 1970, pp. 49-50).

It is not hard to see the similarities between the rapid independence of the African colonies and the kind of transition seen in a coup situation. The sharp decline of coups in many parts of the world in the 1990s could be seen as a generation shift, with other more democratic influences being consolidated in the minds of the population and the leaders.

#### 2.4.2 The Overrepresentation of Africa

In Africa during the first decades of independence from colonial rule, the 1960s through the 1980s, coups were abundant, and at times there were few democratic regimes in any given area. Within a period of 46 years there were 80 successful coups, 108 failed attempts and 139 reported plots to commit coups never carried out in 41 of the 48 independent sub Saharan African nations (McGowan 2003, p.339). Although there is doubt of the validity of many of the claims of coups, as they might have been made up as an excuse by the regime to eliminate political opponents.

The diagram presented by McGowan shows that the majority of the coups took place in the western and north-east parts of the continent, proportionally higher frequency than any other part (2003, p. 356). By contrast the data shows that the central, southern and Indian ocean parts of Africa have proportionally lower frequency of coups than what would be expected given the number of

states. As McGowan continues to explain, there is no single reason for the absence of coup behaviour in these states, rather they all have their own specific factors preventing such behaviour, for example being preoccupied with civil war or having the safety of the government guaranteed by external forces such as ex-colonisers (McGowan 2003 p. 356).

In the regions of Africa with the majority of the coups, especially in the 1960's and 1970's, we find major instability in the form of political chaos after decolonisation, authoritarian legacies in the form of a culture that stresses the value of warriors and/or obedience, all of the factors seen as formative for an authoritarian personality, and last but not least a widespread poverty coupled by the corruption bringing the full circle to close again with instability and mistrust in the leadership. These parts of Africa would seem to be perfect places for a coup to be successful, and they most of the time were, giving credibility to the aforementioned factors. Remaining are the factors which might drive soldiers and officers to attempt to seize power.

## 2.5 Incentives For Coups According to Game Theory

### 2.5.1 The Filter of Plausibility

For anyone to start planning a coup seriously there first and foremost needs to be a possible reward of doing so, i.e. the prospect of taking over power in the country must seem to be within reach. If the plotters for any reason do not see the timing right the plan gets caught in a “filter of plausibility” and seems too far fetched to attempt to put into action. When this occurs the coup leaders may choose to wait for the proper timing, or themselves try to create a mood or a situation more suitable for their needs. If the coup plotters see a very widespread negative opinion of the current leadership among the population, if they see themselves as very popular, or more realistically if they feel they have the superior force needed to brutally remove the current leaders from power the filter is passed and a coup will be attempted (see Sutter 2000, pp.208-214). The coup leaders are for the same reason (weaknesses of the current state, etc.) not expecting the risk of punishment to be very high, they expect to succeed. But experience and history tells us they sometimes don't. In other words the perceived, not actual, circumstances must show that there exists an equilibrium or an advantage in favor of the coup plotters for the coup to seem feasible and therefore for it to be rational to launch a coup attempt (ibid. p. 212).

These conditions naturally occur more often in countries that are plagued by economical difficulties or ethnic splits, and where a new, often harsh, leadership is likely to be welcomed. There is also an increased likelihood when the country is unstable and divided in warring factions that the plotters of the coup are allied with one of the already fighting factions within the country, and can count on the

support of this group. However it is not always given that the plotters of a coup have the support of a majority of those who will partake in the coup itself, often the military where the hierarchical structure gives opportunity for lower ranking officers and sometimes even individual soldiers to swear their allegiance to someone other than a coup leader. Generally it can be said that before a coup few other than the faithful want any part of the plan, but after success is evident everyone wants to join in, a tactic that evidently also eases personal responsibility should the coup fail (see First 1970 pp. 360-365).

### 2.5.2 Individual Incentives

Fitch (1977) explores how individuals within an army makes the decision to support a coup or oppose it, giving their support to the standing leadership of the country, primarily by responding to 6 criteria as follows; Public opinion hostile to the government, Large scale public disorders, Private political opinion, Government attractiveness to institutional interests, Level of perceived [communist or fascist] threat, and Proximity of a threatening election (p. 77-79). The source material used by Fitch is interviews with the officers partaking in the Ecuadorian coups of 1954-1966, and might not be directly transferable to all coups, especially coups after the full effects of globalisation came into effect with computerisation, but it does show that officers consider a wide variety of factors before they decide whose side to stand on in an impending coup attempt.

Factors determining how many of the officers support the coup are important in determining if a coup is at all attempted, giving higher or lower incentives by form of expected success. The proportion of supporting officers and soldiers has major influence over the successfulness of the coup given that the officers and soldiers not taking part in the coup may later rebel against the coup leadership, as happened on many occasions in the past. If the coup leaders know that the external conditions for getting support are not met they might, in much the same way as they may manipulate the population by for example spreading chaos, try to create such conditions by lies or exaggerations, or may choose to wait until more officers support them.

## 3 Overview of Some Selected Cases

In this section I will show how the factors presented in the previous chapter are present in a selection of coups, although some are more prominent than others I believe that all are present to some degree not only in these cases, but in all coups. The five factors are: Low level of internationalisation and international interest, Economical instability and widespread poverty, often coupled with accusations of corruption, a rurally or raw materials based production, Undereducated and largely illiterate population with a generally low status and ethnic clashes between themselves, Culturally and historically an authoritarian tradition, Incentives for the army or some other elite to attempt to seize power via a coup.

### 3.1 The Gambia 1994, Popularity Lasting to This Day

#### 3.1.1 History and Background

In the 1980s this previously British colony was on the track towards moderate policies, democracy and adherence to human rights. However many believe this to have been a façade covering president Jawara's authoritarian tendencies (Saine 2008, p. 61). A failed coup was staged in 1981 that further contributed to the raising opposition and instability in the country (ibid.).

In 1994 a military coup lead by the current president, then general, Yahya Jammeh the elected president was overthrown and all political activity was banned. His leadership was later consolidated in several elections, the latest in 2006, and very little seems to be done in ways of democratizing the country (ibid. p. 59). In the 2006 elections Mr Jammeh and his ruling party defeated two different parties in a comparably fair and free election (ibid.).

Seine sees the coup as preceded by “the complacency of the ruling People’s Progressive Party and endemic corruption [...] These factors inspired deep-seated dissatisfaction and disillusionment among the populace, especially its young people, who became increasingly convinced that the solution to their problems could be found only outside the framework of [the previous] President Jawara's democracy” (Saine 2008 p.61). Here we have a democracy which was overthrown and replaced by a more popular authoritarian rule gaining support especially domestically but to some extent also internationally.

From this the conclusion regarding the attitude in the country towards Mr Jammeh is that he is, or at least at some point was, widely seen as a saviour from previous despair and hardships.

### 3.1.2 Economy

As many as 75% of the population of The Gambia depends on agriculture for their livelihood, and the rest is mostly dependant on the tourist industry and foreign aid (CIA Factbook, The Gambia). In this kind of situation it becomes important to appease the foreign interests of tourists and aid organisations by meeting their demands. By meeting every demand set up by the of the commonwealth the supply of aid and tourism was “saved”, giving the president and his government a position as the “better option” within the country, leading in practice to a foreign legitimisation of the regime on several levels. At the same time as the international community does not wish to support an authoritarian president it is also in their best interests to provide humane situations and aid to the population. In the case of Gambia the lack of an effective opposition to support forces the aid agencies to economically legitimise the government of president Jammeh.

With a GINI index value of 50 in 1998 the country is more economically equal than many in the region, but still with a very large share (37%) of the income going to the 10 richest percent of the population (CIA Factbook, The Gambia).

### 3.1.3 Geopolitical Context

There has been little international attention or protests directed at the country. The commonwealth, of which The Gambia is a member, has made a few official protests but overall the country has essentially been ignored on the international stage. Initially after the coup in 1994 a wide condemnation of the country from the west and sanctions pending a change to democratic rule speeded up the transition from the initial military rule to a civilian rule by means of a new constitution. As soon as the transfer was complete, in 1996, elections were held, in which Mr Jammeh won 56% of the votes (Saine 2008 p. 62). This change meant that the tourist industry could make a comeback and an economical revival after two years, easing the strain on the population in a way that might have worked as a catalyst to an increasing popularity of the government as well as a strong legitimising factor. In 2001 further pressures led to the ban on formations of political parties being repealed, also further legitimising the win of the ruling party in the following elections (ibid.).

By taking measures that were clearly guided towards making the opposition beat the government democratically but failing in doing so the international community has instead helped the authoritarian leadership of president Jammeh to consolidate and given legitimacy to his role as a saviour of the economy and upholder of law and order to a significant part of the population.

## 3.2 Ghana 1966, False Claims and Foreign Interests

### 3.2.1 History and Background

Ghana became the first independent former colony in sub-Saharan Africa in 1957. At the time of independence, as was custom in this part of the world at the time, few of its resources were nationalised, instead belonging to British colonial interests and foreign companies. The president since independence, Kwame Nkrumah, was heavily involved with dealings with the west, but with very little changes in policy being made and what many, both internationally and in Ghana itself, saw as an incompetent leadership (First 1970 p. 169).

When news of the coup were spread in February 1966 military officers and exiled citizens all over the continent and abroad started presenting themselves as masterminds or at the least cooperatives of the coup ousting the unpopular Nkrumah from power (First 1970 pp. 363-366). The country was to be thrown into a decades long struggle over who was to ultimately rule the country, ending in 1981 with a flight lieutenant by the name of Jerry Rawlings, ultimately banning political activity.

### 3.2.2 Economy

Ghana's economy always relied heavily on the export of expensive raw materials for the world market such as gold, diamonds and cocoa, these resources are traded for foreign financial and technical assistance on which the country depends (CIA Factbook, Ghana). Agriculture is the dominant sector domestically and a large portion of the population works within the farming, plantation or mining industry, often with little or no education (ibid.). Having always been considered a poor country despite its natural resources and little profit from its resources came to the good of the people. The ruling party for the first 10 years of the independent nation of Ghana made no changes whatsoever to the colonial structures of economy, giving away all revenues to foreigners. During world war 2 Ghana, along with most west African colonies, had been tied to the allied economies, and thereby felt the full force of the eventual economic crash with a steep decline in the terms of trade and soaring prices due to shortages (see First 1970 p. 169). This downturn would last until the coup of 1966 when the new rulers started taking decisive and directed action towards reviving the economy, among other methods by recreating the export values of cocoa by a decrease in production (ibid.). This situation helped creating a "hero role" for the coup makers who in the eyes of the population brought back power and property values to the people with much sought after international support.

### 3.2.3 Geopolitical Context

In the first year after the coup there was what many would see as a “swing to the west” in Ghanaian politics, along with allegations of Western powers being accomplices in the coup, at the same time an English newspaper proclaimed that “Ghana would be worth salvaging again” (First 1970 p. 376). To those with a realistic (in IR theory use of the word) outlook this approach signifies that the west, or any nation for that matter, has no interest in a country that it cannot have any use of, be it militarily or as a source of natural resources. Caught in the middle of the power struggle of the cold war with “limited strategical importance” and as a former colonial power it was subject to pressure and arms deals with both the west and the soviets and strong economical pressures from the American administration to “not take a path that is hostile to American interests” (ibid p. 378-379).

## 3.3 Ecuador 2000, Strong Population and Soft Army

### 3.3.1 History and Background

The history of Ecuador since its independence from the Spanish kingdom has been volatile, with around 20 different constitutions (CIA Factbook Ecuador). In January 2000 indigenous people in Ecuador led a march into the capitol of Quito in order to overthrow the government of ruling president Jamil Mahuad, gaining the support of the army under the explicit condition that labour unions or the maoist-inspired socialist groupings were not involved (Walsh 2001 pp. 174-176, *passim*). The breakthrough came when the indigenous protesters with the support of the army occupied the government headquarters on 21<sup>st</sup> January and demanded the resignation of the president, which was granted by the fleeing president (ibid p. 178-181).

In the months following the coup many of the involved officers were jailed or prosecuted before an amnesty was granted in may (Walsh 2001 p. 201).

The indigenous population in Ecuador is traditionally powerful but disadvantaged (ibid p. 175). There is frequent attempts at coups in the country coupled with protests in the population that has lead to the resignation of the last three democratically elected presidents. Despite this the country is considered to be relatively stable compared to its neighbours, and has enjoyed long periods of unbroken civilian rule in the past, notably 21 years by the year of 2000. Unlike their counterparts in other Latin American countries the Ecuadorian armed forces have never had a reputation for violence or strong repression (ibid. 2001 p. 178). This might have put them in a less feared position to excess control over the population, and won them the trust of the people.

### 3.3.2 Economy

In 1999/2000, just before the coup, Ecuador suffered a severe economic crisis, with GDP contracted by more than 6%, with a significant increase in poverty, a collapse of the banking system, and failure to pay its external debt (CIA Factbook Ecuador). Unlike many poorer countries in the region Ecuador has large deposits of oil which makes up half of its export revenues, and a majority of the population works in the service and industrial sectors, many of them in the oil industry (ibid.). The country has a GINI value of 46 (ibid). Oil provides a stability in the trade balance, due to the fact that oil is normally a stable and profitable commodity and access to it normally allows countries to make more long term investments. The fact that the finances were so bad and poverty so widespread in 1999 could easily have been seen by some as proof of the president and government lacking judgement, speeding up the loss of trust, the allegations of corruption and the protests from the native population.

### 3.3.3 Geopolitical Context

According to their own statements, the goal of the indigenous people was not to take power, but rather to express dissatisfaction and “confront reality”, while keeping a change in government a secondary goal (Walsh 2001 p. 193). The military however used this support and the created instability to oust a very unpopular, publicly and militarily, leadership. The Ecuadorian army must have had fresh in memory the defeats they suffered in the short border war with Peru in 1995<sup>5</sup>, a conflict that was only resolved two years before in the peace agreement of 1998, giving the officers taking part in the coup yet another strong reason to oppose the president who signed the treaty.

Given the situation of a displeased population the military might have seen it appropriate to make the choice of stepping in as a “saviour” force to take over and create a new, hopefully more popular, order.

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<sup>5</sup>Also called the Cenapa War

## 3.4 Thailand 1991, Coups Under the Great King

### 3.4.1 History and Background

Thailand is an interesting example due to its constitutional monarchy, with king Bhumibol having extensive powers and being recognised as the Head of State, the Head of the Armed Forces, the Upholder of the Buddhist Religion, and the Upholder of All Religions. He has also initiated and maintains a great number of popular projects in his name<sup>6</sup>, and seemingly enjoys a massive amount of support and respect amongst the population. In practice this means that the leaders of any coup must have the approval of the king for the new rule, as happened in 1991 when the king was presented with a choice of four candidates for premiership, picked by the leaders of the junta which had taken over, and chose one to rule (Christensen 1991 p. 95). Though the military rule lasted for only slightly longer than a year before the junta was forced from power in early 1992 there has been several coups and attempts in the country both before and since and I believe this to be an interesting example of coups under a higher power (the king), with the added factor of popular support from the population..

Thailand had previously been the scene of failed coup attempts in 1981 and 1985 which failed to attract the support of most military officers (ibid). As recently as in 2006 and latest in November 2008 royalist protests erupted in Bangkok demanding a military coup removing the elected government for the benefit of a more royalist rule. The outcome of this latest conflict is still unknown at the writing of this thesis, but the large public support for the king and for a coup ousting an elected leader shows what most would agree is an authoritarian preference in a large part of the population. Some scholars indeed argue that the spirit of the Thai culture and values is incompatible with a western style electoral democracy, much like many neighbouring countries in the region (Christensen 1991 p. 97). As we have seen in chapter 2.4 this sort of argument is not uncommon amongst those supporting more authoritarian style systems, and is commonly found with similar connotations in debates about for example Islam.

It would seem that Thailand makes the ideal example of a state where a majority of the population is of an authoritarian personality type. They see no problem with having an extremely popular king ruling over the country instead of an elected leader, and are willing to support, even demand, a military coup to restore their preferred order.

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<sup>6</sup> See <http://kanchanapisek.or.th/projects/index.en.html> for an extensive list of projects and titles (20081121)

### 3.4.2 Economy

Thailand is, unlike most African or Latin American countries, relatively prosperous and well developed with a working infrastructure and reasonably high growth (CIA Factbook, Thailand). The country has a GINI index of 42 and depends to a large part of tourism and services, although the major part of the population is occupied in the agricultural sector (ibid.). This gives a dispersion between the population in the cities of this relatively modern country working with foreigners daily, giving them the language skills needed to understand foreign media and a wage, and those in the rural areas with little income and education and little free time to spend on learning. It is this rift in the population that is the main cause of the clashes between the (mostly urbanely based “elite”) traditional royalists and the “democrats” of the rural areas supporting the authoritarian-modernising politics of the prime minister. Both factions are supporting authoritarian means (due to a common antidemocratic personality), but in differing aspects due to their different economic situations.

### 3.4.3 Geopolitical Context

The fact that Thailand has never been colonised by any foreign power further supports the theory that it is the authoritarian preferences of the population and the generally extensive trust in the army which gives the foundation to so many successful coups. Since the country relies on its tourist industry for a large part of the national income (CIA Factbook, Thailand) it becomes important to maintain a public image of a stable “paradise” internationally, leading to the political and rhetorical inclusion of foreign citizens in a way the nations of Africa or South America never do, as these countries rely on export and not physical travel, while most people might be prepared to buy coffee or gold that comes from a dictatorship, few are willing to travel there if they believe themselves to risk oppression or violence, one example being the lack of extensive tourism to Saudi Arabia<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup>The income from tourism in the state revenues of Saudi Arabia are negligible according to official statistics found at <http://www.saudiembassy.net/> (20081208)

## 4 Conclusions

Coup attempts are highly unlikely to succeed unless they are met by support in some form, either from the population or from a stronger foreign power on par with the superpowers of the cold war. Domestic support is formed where many citizens with an already culturally formed antidemocratic personality are affected by economical hardships, perceived unfair treatment by their government and isolation from democratic influences from the rest of the world. When the stability of such a country dissolves into instability due to for example ethnic clashes, the death of a previous strong leader, decolonisation, widespread corruption, unfair conditions for the population or any other releasing factor the people will crave for change. The difference between the countries where a popular revolution forms and those where coups are supported is that a population with a strong antidemocratic personality and a preference for an authoritarian rule will choose the option of supporting a change by proxy, enacted by the physically stronger and thereby often culturally admired warriors of the army, as opposed to themselves attempting a revolution like the ones seen in many western societies.

Coup attempts occur at the time where the leaders of the coup see an opportunity where it is plausible that they can establish a new rule, this “filter of plausibility” means that many plots are never carried out, while others are found out by the current rulers and stopped. If a plot is carried out while the population is displeased with the previous rule *and* not preferring a democratically elected leadership over the undemocratic capture of power the population will give their moral and sometimes physical support to the coup and thereby help it succeed. Conversely, if the population in general have a democratically minded personality or if they are pleased with their current situation and government the coup is likely to gain little support or to be opposed until it falls to a more popular counter coup or to demands of elections. The support gained is often also maintained until the population grows displeased at their conditions worsening or not improving, which in turn lays the foundation for a new coup later on in time. This pattern may continue for decades until the population becomes democratically minded through outside (western) influence, a development which often requires extensive urbanisation and improvement of the technological and educational standards.

International support for coups, which may lead to an interference that affects the outcome, grows out of the self interest of the country to maintain a supply route or change power relations in favor of their own preferred system, which is also the reason for modern day condemnation of practically all coups on the grounds of being “undemocratic” and therefore wrong.

These results are supported by the presented cases as described below.

## 4.1 Common Features in the Cases

### 4.1.1 Authoritarian Traditions and Domestic Support

Some of the cases have been colonized by other nations in the past, while some, like Thailand, have never had any foreign ruler. This gives the simple conclusion that a colonial past is not a major factor in determining the chances of a successful coup, or even the attempt of one, however the past *administrations* might be an important factor to consider, as is the tradition of the surrounding area and the countries that has traditionally influenced the policies of the country.

In the case of Thailand the previous system before constitutional rule was adapted in 1932 was absolute monarchical rule, Gambia and Ghana were both ruled by similar styles of kingdoms before they came under colonial rule, and Ecuador had been under a long and authoritarian rule of the Spanish king since the early 16<sup>th</sup> century before independence.

The factor of a long term authoritarian rule is also in all cases combined with cultural factors encouraging obedience, such as the often violent child rearing with a strong prevalence of corporal punishment seen in Ghana<sup>8</sup>, Ecuador<sup>9</sup>, The Gambia<sup>10</sup> and Thailand<sup>11</sup> alike (see list at The United Nations Initiative to End Corporal Punishment of Children). A larger statistical comparison shows similar results (see appendix 1). This would, according to the theories of Napier and Jost (2008) put the the majority of the population in these countries in the possibility of developing an authoritarian personality type. Judging by the apparent lack of resistance, even signs of support, in these countries I find this to be one of the plausible factors. It should be noted here that many states that practice corporal punishment have not had any coups, but I feel it is important to stress it as a *contributing* factor to the mentality that facilitates support for coups, *not* a *decisive* factor.

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<sup>8</sup>See united nations reports for corporal punishment in Ghana at [www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/ac4310078407480cc1257101003e15f7/\\$FILE/G0640110.DOC\(20081212\)](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/ac4310078407480cc1257101003e15f7/$FILE/G0640110.DOC(20081212)) &

<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRGHStakeholdersInfoS2.aspx> (20081212)

<sup>9</sup>See united nations reports for corporal punishment in Ecuador at [http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/CRC.C.SR.481.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CRC.C.SR.481.En?Opendocument) (20081212)&

<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPREcuadorStakeholderInfoS1.aspx> (20081212)

<sup>10</sup>See united nations reports for corporal punishment in The Gambia at [http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/\(Symbol\)/CRC.C.SR.740.En?Opendocument](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CRC.C.SR.740.En?Opendocument) (20081212)

<sup>11</sup>See united nations reports for corporal punishment in Thailand at [www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/54c00eda0882cbf0c125722d002c60c9/\\$FILE/G0645200.doc](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/54c00eda0882cbf0c125722d002c60c9/$FILE/G0645200.doc) (20081212)& [http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/6f6879be758d0e8ec12570d9003340ba/\\$FILE/G0544374.pdf](http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/6f6879be758d0e8ec12570d9003340ba/$FILE/G0544374.pdf) (20081212)

### 4.1.2 Unrest in the Region and In the Population

Ecuador is a case of a weak and under-equipped army having difficulties staging a coup on their own. In these cases it is crucial to have a dissatisfied population willing to lend their moral and sometimes direct physical support, for example in the form of mass gatherings and protests. Ecuador has a tradition of communal uprising, and in the event of a coup being initiated and carried out by the military the strong community was willing and able to step in to change the outcome to their preference in cooperation with the army itself, who agreed without force. This builds on what can only be a self image in the population that they are stronger than the army, a factor that seems dearly lacking in most countries with successful coups.

Ghana and Gambia have long been politically unstable countries for a variety of reasons, most prominently as a reaction the widespread poverty and unfair distribution of the income from exports, as well as power struggles within an elite leading to suffering in the population overall. This in turn leads to a desire for change, which can manifest itself as support for coup leaders.

In Thailand the unrest is both dampened and exaggerated by the powerful king, whose powers have been a matter of dispute but acknowledged by all prime ministers and other rulers over the years. Outside the subject of royalty the conflicts in Thai politics also revolve around corruption and power struggle, with large and sometimes violent protests being the result.

### 4.1.3 Ethnic Heterogeneity

In many situations a very ethnically, culturally or religiously heterogeneous population can lead to internal clashes of the type seen in India between Hindus and Muslims, or the overstated example of Rwanda. In Gambia<sup>12</sup> and Ghana<sup>13</sup> different ethnic groups have had sporadic clashes over leadership since their respective years of independence, Ecuador has experienced much tension between the native indian population and the more recently arrived Spanish Europeans and immigrants<sup>14</sup>, and in Thailand Muslim separatists have attacked the Buddhist majority along with clashes between tribes in the north-eastern areas<sup>15</sup>. In general the evidence of ethnic heterogeneity being a catalyst for unrest and for the need of a strong leader to unite the factions is strengthened by these examples.

<sup>12</sup><http://allafrica.com/stories/200112040617.html> (20081220)

<sup>13</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1690746.stm> and <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/tribes> (20081220)

<sup>14</sup>See Walsh 2001

<sup>15</sup>[http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/assam-to-see-cbi-probe-into-ethnic-clashes\\_100106152.html](http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/politics/assam-to-see-cbi-probe-into-ethnic-clashes_100106152.html) (20081220)

#### 4.1.4 Poor Economic Situation

The presented cases, with the possible exception of Thailand, share a very poor economical situation with most states experiencing successful coups. Exports, of raw materials in the African and South American cases and of manufactured goods in the case of Thailand, are high and the profit rates or terms of trade low.

Thailand an exception from the agricultural average with their large tourism industry, giving profits but at unstable rates, although most of the rest of the population are in the agricultural production. The instability of incomes from tourism means that the country has a low security of income, meaning less resources for long term projects and a poorly maintained infrastructure.

## 4.2 The Factors and Their Impact

While some coups are still after the end of the cold war directly supported by foreign powers to forward their own interests, most modern day coups are condemned by an international community that heavily favours democracy as the “right” form of rule. This condemnation and subsequent embargoes and blockades intertwine with the fact that nearly all countries that experience coup attempts are poor and rely on export for income to become a very, if not the most, important tool to deter from coups that the international community has at hand. However there are many, many examples, the latest being Guinea, that coup makers ignore this and persist in their attempts, often under the excuse of trying to make the situation better for the population, thereby discarding the foreign arguments as wrongful and unfounded.. The important impact of sanctions lies in the population who suffer shortages and other hardships, which may further increase the support for the coup makers.

A population which can easily be convinced of the superiority of the new leadership, due to being poorly informed and/or already convinced that authoritarianism is a viable way of change for the better, will abstain from any expressions of opposition that might foil the coup. An authoritarian personality created by the individual religious beliefs, cultural patterns and exposure to hierarchical or violent orders in the childhood also plays an important part in determining if a person actively opposes an authoritarian rule, or simply ignore it or even decides to support it. If the individual is at the same time disadvantaged by a bad economical situation, widespread poverty, unfair treatment, corruption on part of the previous administration or a lack of education that gives access to independent information there is a major chance that he or she will choose to welcome the new administration regardless of the means by which it took office.

The most important of the factors remains the traditions and culture of the country, it is the most important factor in creating an antidemocratic personality and it is the most resistant to change of the factors. Where an authoritarian culture is present the population are just a personal crisis and a promising strong leader away from cheering a new dictator.

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# Appendix 1: Statistical Comparison Between States With Successful Coups and World Averages

## Method and Selection of Cases

The statistics in this appendix are, unless any other source is given, taken from the database “länder06” administered by Docent Leif Johansson at the Department for Political Science at Lund University. The data has been processed using the statistics program SPSS.

“All States” includes the 190 states acknowledged by the United Nations in 2006. The 16 cases under “States With Successful Coups” include those coups that have led directly to an authoritarian rule, they do not include failed coups, the successful coups that were quickly and peacefully replaced by democratically approved governments (such as in France 1958 or frequently in Turkey) nor does it include those who led directly to democratic and non-authoritarian regimes, such as in the cases where dictators were ousted.

Due to a lack of reliable statistics older than 30 years I have unfortunately only been able to include coups taking place after 1970, forcing me to bypass some of the more interesting cases and admittedly limiting the validity of the statistical study. See chapter 1 for further specification.

The variables used are indicative of the economical, geopolitical, and historically shaping aspects of a country, as well as some indicators of the factors for the “antidemocratic personality” discussed in chapters 2.3 and 2.4. To be able to assess the situation as close to the coup as possible the cases with coups will be grouped according to decades (1970's, 1980's etc.) and the data closest to this date will be chosen, or an average if there are several data points in the decade. In the case of coups in several different decades the latest coup For the non-coup cases and the world averages average values of all data points are used.

## List of the States With Successful Coups Included

### Year of coup in parenthesis.

#### **Group 1.**

*Uganda (1971)*

*Chile (1973)*

*Rwanda (1973)*

*Chad (1975)*

*Argentina (1976)*

*Ecuador (1976)*

*Ethiopia (1977)*

*Mauritania (1978)*

*Comoros (1978)*

#### **Group 2.**

*Suriname (1980)*

*Bolivia (1980)*

*Liberia (1980)*

*Nigeria (1983)*

#### **Group 3.**

*Trinidad & Tobago (1990)*

*Thailand (1991)*

*Gambia (1994)*

*Ivory Coast (1999)*

## Prevalence of Corporal Punishment

Of the 23 countries which have totally banned corporal punishment none had any coups after the ban, and only one, Venezuela, had ever had successful coups before the ban. Consequently, of the above mentioned states none had a ban on corporal punishment both at home and in school or other institutions<sup>16</sup>.

## Statistical Averages For States With Successful Coups

### Economy

- *GDP growth 1960-1995 (All groups): 1.1%*
- *Yearly inflation rate 1980-1993 (Group 2+3): 35%*
- *Military spending in % of GDP 1981 (2+3): 2.6%*
- *Workforce in agricultural sector 1980 (2+3): 52%*

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<sup>16</sup>The United Nations Initiative to End Corporal Punishment of Children  
<http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/pdfs/charts/Chart-Global.pdf> (20081212)

## Dependence on the International Community

- *Globalisation index 1-10*: 1975 (All groups): 1.6, 1990 (group 3): 1.5
- *Foreign direct investments in % of GDP*: 1980 (Group 2+3): 0.8%, 1990 (Group 3): 1.4%
- *Amount of GDP that consists of export + import*: 1980 (Group 2+3): 81%, 1990 (Group 3): 85%
- *Foreign aid in % of GDP*: 1960 (all): 2.6%, 1980 (2+3): 6%

## Education and the Conditions of the Population

- *Human development index 0-1000 (according to "Human development report")*: 1980 (2+3): 547, 1990 (3): 636
- *Respect for human rights index 0-100 (according to "Humana")*: 1991 (3): 74
- *Percentage literate of the adult population*: 1960 (All groups): 33%, 1985 (2+3): 70%, 1995 (3): 63%
- *Newspapers per 1000 inhabitants*: 1974 (All groups): 40, 1980 (2+3): 66, 1992 (3): 55
- *Technology index 0-100*: 1970 (All groups): 37, 1980 (2+3): 48, 1990 (3): 58
- *Population in urban areas*: 1960 (all): 25.8%, 1980 (2+3): 37.4%

## Factors for Instability, Ethnic and Religious Variables

- *Ethnic Fragmentation Index 0-100 (all)*: 60.7
- *Religious Fragmentation Index 0-100 (all)*: 43.5

## Statistical Averages For All States

### Economy

- *GDP growth 1960-1995*: 1.1%
- *Yearly inflation rate 1980-1993*: 27.5%
- *Military spending in % of GDP 1981*: 4.1%
- *Workforce in agricultural sector 1980*: 45.4%

### Dependence on the International Community

- *Globalisation index 1-10*: 1975: 2.3, 1990: 2.2
- *Foreign direct investments in % of GDP*: 1980: 1.1%, 1990: 1.7%
- *Amount of GDP that consists of export + import*: 1980: 80%, 1990: 75%
- *Foreign aid in % of GDP*: 1960: 21.7%, 1980: 8.2%

## Education and the Conditions of the Population

- *Human development index 0-1000 (according to "Human development report")* 2003: 1980: 629, 1990: 664
- *Respect for human rights index 0-100 (according to "Humana")*: 1983: 65, 1991: 64
- *Percentage literate of the adult population*: 1960: 60%, 1985: 75%, 1995: 74%
- *Newspapers per 1000 inhabitants*: 1974: 109, 1980: 101, 1992: 115
- *Technology index 0-100*: 1970: 54, 1980: 59, 1990: 61
- *Population in urban areas*: 1960: 34.3%, 1980: 45%

## Factors for Instability, Ethnic and Religious Variables

- *Ethnic fragmentation index*: 43.8
- *Religious fragmentation index*: 43.9

## Significant Differences

From these statistics it is easy to draw the conclusion that the population in states with successful coups undoubtedly face many severe problems in their everyday life, amongst the most important are lower levels of literacy and education, a higher ethnic fragmentation, low urbanisation with an economy dependant on agriculture, low access to modern technology and information, and an overall lower dependence on and interaction with foreign nations.

As previously mentioned the factors leading to an antidemocratic personality are intimately combined with prejudice and low socio-economic status. Corporal punishment, another factor linked to the antidemocratic personality type and is an indicator of pre-existing authoritarian structures, is also more common in countries with coups. Prejudice comes, according to many scholars including Napier and Jost, from a lack of education and knowledge of other cultures and customs, and in the international perspective the population of these countries, with the exception of the leaders themselves, are at the very lowest of the (international) socio-economic scale, and with a majority of the population on the low side of the (national domestic) scale. The statistics thereby confirm that in the countries where successful coups take place there is a bigger prevalence of the factors leading to the kind of situation where citizens *do not protest against* and in many cases *support* authoritarian rule.

## Appendix 2: Application on a Fresh Case; Guinea

### The Coup Attempt

After the death of Mr Conte on the night of the 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2008 the military almost immediately attempted to seize power<sup>17</sup> <sup>18</sup>. Foreign reactions were negative with The African Union, European Union, United States and former colonial power France all condemning the attempted coup<sup>19</sup>, however a portion of the guinean people seem to support the coup as there has been reports of “thousands” of supporters taking to the streets to greet the coup leader<sup>20</sup>. President Conte was by some, internationally and in recent native comments, seen as a dictator, but still managed to win a row of elections and popular votes to stay in power. The fairness of these elections remains disputed and heavy irregularities has been reported (CIA Factbook, Guinea).

On the 25<sup>th</sup> of December the prime minister and other ministers were reported to have submitted to the coup makers, thereby consolidating the new rule, which is supposed to last until new elections are held “within two years”, breaking the rules of the constitution saying elections should be held within 60 days<sup>21</sup> <sup>22</sup>. Whether or not this coup was to lead to an authoritarian rule or not was still unclear at the completion of this thesis, but it seemingly bears many of the signs pointing towards a possibility of such a rule.

### The Factors and How They Manifest Themselves<sup>23</sup>

- Guinea is a country with major supplies of natural resources (bauxite), although most of the population lives on less than 1 dollar per day, the limit for extreme poverty, agriculture and the bauxite mining industry makes up the main part of the countries production (CIA Factbook Guinea). The population has an extremely low literacy rate of 29.5%.

<sup>17</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7796902.stm> (20081225)

<sup>18</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7796741.stm> (20081225)

<sup>19</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7798876.stm> (20081225)

<sup>20</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7799279.stm> (20081225)

<sup>21</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7799548.stm> (20081225)

<sup>22</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7799888.stm> (20081226)

<sup>23</sup>All numbers and percentages in this section are taken from the CIA Factbook article on Guinea (20081225)

- Ethnically the country is divided between the favoured (by Comte) Soussou minority (20%) and the larger groups of Peul (40%) and Malinke (30%), ethnic tensions are feared when there no longer is the repressive power of the president to force peace between the groups<sup>24</sup>.
- The majority, 85% of the population, are Muslims, which according to the theories of Napier&Jost and Zafirovski is a religion which opens the population to an authoritarian personality.
- The country has achieved a nationalized industry of bauxite production, lessening the dependence on foreign investors. After the long and widely condemned rule of president Conte there is little international respect and support left to lose, and many would say the country is already an outsider on the international arena, with few diplomatic contacts.
- The stability of the country was for 24 years guaranteed by the hard-handed rule of the previous president, discouraging coup attempts during his rule.
- In the official statement of the coup plotters<sup>25</sup> they addressed the problems of the country by promising “To fight corruption, To restore state authority and public administration, To ensure the actual liberalisation of airwaves throughout the national territory, To initiate a constitutional amendment, To provide basic services of water, electricity, and health care to the people.”.

## Conclusion

The recent case of the coup in Guinea exhibits all factors that have been presented in this thesis, and supports the conclusion that support for a coup is formed in the occasions where the population believes themselves to be better off with a new rule, regardless of its disposition or means of seizing power. Democratic elections or left-right scale positioning means little or nothing compared to the change this coup appears to represent to a population tired of the old rule, and so the coup seems to have good chances of succeeding in creating a new leadership if not the pressures from the international community to hold earlier elections become too strong.

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<sup>24</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7798876.stm> (20081225)

<sup>25</sup>See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7797629.stm> (20081225)