The European Administrative Space

A Discussion of Administrative Integration in the Enlarged European Union

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Abstract

Europeanization investigates how political integration in Europe affects the domestic power structures and policies. Less research has been carried out on what impact the EU has on national public administrations. It is in fact disputed whether administrative Europeanization even exists. Furthermore, there is no explicit European model of administration; no blueprint that the EU can enforce in its member states or candidate countries. It was recognized that the candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe had too poor administrative capacity to be able to implement and enforce the EU legislation. Therefore, something had to be done, and Twinning was the answer, now extended to additional countries. Twinning is a program in which a public administration official from a member state is chosen to assist the beneficiary country for a period of time, usually two years. The Commission supervises and finances the programme. The responsibility of reaching a sufficient administrative capacity thereby lies partly on the shoulders of the MS and the Commission.

Two questions arise. Are peculiarities in the CEEC administrations accepted by the member states and by the Commission? And does the Twinning programme result in Europeanization of administration, and if so, how?

I have answered these questions by studying theoretical literature of Europeanization. Such literature takes its stand in the theoretical perspectives of ‘new institutionalisms’. Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism are the most common reference points, but I have included Historical Institutionalism for a wider understanding. I have also analysed evaluations of the Twinning programme conducted by both MS and Commission actors, to reveal the attitudes of different EU actors upon administrative integration. I have used the theoretical literature to draw up ideal types to be used for analysing the evaluations.

My conclusions are that:

1. Norms and values are being Europeanized within a framework of existing institutional norms and values but this does not necessarily result in tangible convergence of administrative structures.
2. The administrative legacies from the communist past of the CEECs to a great extent hamper even modest reform programmes such as Twinning.
3. Peculiarities of CEEC administrations are viewed upon with scepticism even in cases where they do not hamper good administration.

Key words: European Administrative Space, Administration, Integration, Twinning, Europeanization

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Abbreviations

- **BC** Beneficiary Country
- **CARDS** Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation for Western Balkans
- **CC** Candidate Country
- **CEEC** Central and East European Countries
- **DG** Directorate-General
- **EAS** European Administrative Space
- **EU** European Union
- **HR** Human Resources
- **JHA** Justice and Home Affairs
- **MEDA** the principal financial instrument of the European Union for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
- **MS** Member States
- **NAT** National Administrative Traditions
- **NCP** National Contact Point
- **NPM** New Public Management
- **OECD** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- **OMC** Open Method of Coordination
- **OMAS** The Organisation for Monitoring and Assessment Services
- **PA** Public Administration
- **PAR** Public Administration Reform
- **PHARE** Pologne-Hongrie, Aide à la Restructuration Economique
- **RCI** Rational Choice Institutionalism
- **RTA** Resident Twinning Adviser
- **SI** Sociological Institutionalism
- **Sida** Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
- **SSAS** State-Socialist Administrative Space
- **TA** Technical Assistance
- **TACIS** Technical Assistance to 12 countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia – the Commonwealth of Independent States
- **UK** United Kingdom
- **Sigma** Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries
1 Introduction

Administration has traditionally not been a matter of either the Commission, or other sources of supranational, influence (Olsen 2007 p. 261). The European Union consists of as many administrative traditions as member states, and as long as the national administrations successfully implemented EU policy, the state of affairs was of no concern. Administrative capacity was, perhaps as a result of this, not included in the Copenhagen criteria; the standards that the candidate countries have to fulfil in order to gain membership in the Union. However, the CEEC administrations were too poorly organized to be able to implement the *acquis communautaire*, which every member state is obliged to. This problem was recognized in the Madrid Summit of 1995, stating that administrations in the CEEC had to be improved.

The instrument called for was Twinning, a much institutionalized form of administrative learning through interconnection and thus a manifestation of the theoretical concept of Europeanization. The aim with the programme is to facilitate implementation of the *acquis*. However, Twinning is also likely to produce more complex forms of Europeanization. These side-effects tell us something about what direction administrative integration takes under influence of active European support, and whether this development is accepted.

It is interesting to examine what the main actors’ views on administration are. Is there an agreement that national administrations ought to, as far as possible, be arranged in accordance with national traditions or do some actors have visions of a more integrated European model of administration, a so called European Administrative Space? If so, who ought to have the power to influence the administrative organisation within a state? The Commission, the other Member States or is it solely a national matter? This thesis will try to shine some light on these abstract questions by studying the Twinning program.
1.1 Statement of Purpose

Extensive research exists concerning what Europeanization is and how it works. There is not, however, extensive research of how the political actors, like the Commission or the Member States (MS), relate to the Europeanization phenomenon when they face it and whether they take advantage of it deliberately. Particularly intriguing are these questions in the context of administrative integration, where Europeanization has been contested. As Scherperel (2004) has shown, the new member states’ administrations rest upon an administrative tradition that is quite different from the ones in the old member states. I will try to answer the question:

1. Is the different administrative tradition in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) tolerated or is the EU trying to transform the administrations into a more ‘European’ model?

I will try to answer this question by analyzing evaluations of Twinning\(^1\) made by different actors. Although my reasoning mainly will circle around the specific issue of Twinning, my ambition is that the result will reveal something about visions of administrative integration on a more abstract level.

My hypotheses are that the Commission has a vision of an integrated administration in Europe, a much developed European Administrative Space (Olsen 2007 p. 252ff.) based on a European administrative model and that the Commission for this reason tends to look upon administrative peculiarities with more scepticism. The member states in contrast strive to preserve their different administrative traditions, and therefore accept that CEECs administrations differ from their own. These hypotheses will be tested in the thesis. The main purpose of my discussion is to illuminate the complexity of administrative integration, and discuss what responsibility different actors have and think they ought to have.

My second question has to be dealt with in order to put the first question in its proper context.

2. How and why does Twinning cause administrative integration?

I define administrative integration as the gradual fading of national administrative traditions and the gradual increase of compatibility with other administrative models in Europe. It does not necessarily mean convergence, although administrative integration usually implies that the administration imports structures or ways of framing and labelling from a(other) MS. Europeanization will be the theoretical framework in which I paint my study. It has been one of the most active research fields within European studies since the 1990s and it is strongly coloured by, or rather a manifestation of, the institutional turn within

\(^1\) I will use the term Twinning consistently, even though it is called transition facility in the new member states.
political science. It thus contains theoretical tools from both Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Sociological Institutionalism (SI) (Börzel & Risse 2003 p. 58-73). I will follow Bulmer’s (2007) recommendation and include Historical Institutionalism (HI) in my understanding of the empirical material. All three belong to the ‘new institutionalism’.

Many have argued that there is no administrative blueprint that the EU can enforce upon the member states, and it is unclear how Europeanization works when there is no European model. This essay is thus also a study on this that lies on a more abstract level. We are now witnessing a public administration ‘turn’ in EU studies which also this thesis is a manifestation of (Trondal 2007 p. 961). According to Demmke, the public administration Europeanization theory “certainly represents an important intellectual interest” (cited in Matei and Matei 2008 p. 50).

My model to be tested is that Twinning produces Europeanization (in two versions as we will see). Europeanization in turn produces effects on the administrative integration. As a result of this, actors’ views on administrative integration can be studied by analyzing evaluations of Twinning.

1.2 Method and Material

My investigation attempts to follow certain methodological guidelines enabling me to draw conclusions of administrative integration.

Twinning is chosen because it is the main instrument that the EU uses to strengthen administrative capacity in candidate states and new member states (European Commission 2001 p. 25). At first sight, it seems to have several elements that are likely to influence administrative integration. Therefore, by
studying evaluations of the programme Twinning, it is possible to draw conclusions about the evaluator’s norms of administrative integration in Europe. However, in a case-study like this, one must recognize the difficulties of generalizing from the results (Landman 2004 p. 34-35). I will make my strategic choices explicit at every time, to enable the reader to follow in my footstep and judge my results accordingly. A case study has the advantage of allowing the researcher a more in depth understanding of the phenomenon (Ibid.), and as Twinning is the most important administrative instrument, the results will be interesting per se, even without generalizations.

The underlying methodological assumption that supports my focus on the evaluations is that it is impossible to conduct an evaluation without basing it on values, ideals or norms. I rely in this choice of method on the Swedish evaluation guru Evert Vedung:

“Evaluations are an integrated part of the fight over power in political and administrative systems. Therefore, evaluations are permeated by strategic considerations. Evaluation is a game, with the sole purpose of deluding the opponents” (Vedung 1998 p. 97 [my translation from Swedish]).

Evaluations do not necessarily contain the true values of the evaluator, at least not explicitly. The evaluators (in the involved administrations) seek to give a positive picture of their work (Tulmets 2005 p. 671-2). Therefore, I must get a proper understanding of the evaluator’s position and the Europeanization processes at work, to be able to get small pieces of information that can be put together into a greater picture. To be able to actually extract something from the evaluations, I have in a Weberian spirit attempted to construct ideal types (in chapter 3 below) and have these in mind when reading the evaluations. I will make one ideal type where administration in Europe is organized according to one single European model, imposed by supranational influence. I call this ideal type European Administrative Space (EAS). The contrasting ideal type is called National Administrative Tradition (NAT) and it opposes every effort to weaken national administrative traditions. It is important to remember that these ideal types not necessarily have any analogue in the empirical reality, but are constructed ideological extremes to facilitate text analysis (Bergström & Boréus 2005 p. 159 ff.).

Twinning has been in use in its present form since 1998 when DG enlargement decided to replace the highly unpopular Technical Assistance (TA) strategy (Tulmets 2005 p. 659, O’Connor & Kowalski 2005 p. 437). Since then, over 1300 Twinning projects have been carried through only within the PHARE-countries (TSCT-IBU 2007). Evaluations of singular Twinning projects are immense. On the advice of the Swedish Twinning National Contact Point (NCP), I have decided to study only such evaluations that assess the Twinning instrument as such, rather than individual projects. The latter tend to be highly technical and would not contribute to improved understanding of administrative integration in Europe.

Evaluations of the Twinning instrument as such are far from countless; in fact, I have studied every evaluation that I have been able to find to get a sufficiently
large material to draw conclusions from. It gives me the luxury to not motivate exclusions in my empirical material. There is thus no bias in the selection of material. Additional information of the evaluations is found in chapter four.

Why not then to study the actors themselves, and ask how they comprehend European administrative integration or read their statements of administrative issues, instead of taking the methodological detour of Twinning evaluations?

It is important to recognize in relation to this question that administrative integration is a sensitive subject, even in relation to the new member states and their administrations. Administrative ‘ways of doing things’ are, as mentioned, deeply entrenched in national traditions. It would be political suicide for the Commission for instance to publicly announce that they wish to replace national models of administration with a single European model (e.g. Sigma 1998b p. 13). If they have such a hidden agenda, it may however be revealed in evaluations of Twinning, according to the reasoning above.

1.3 Theory

My theoretical understanding is gathered from the literature of how national administrations and policies are influenced and transformed by what happens at the European level. This research-field is called Europeanization. Europeanization is mainly explained using rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism, and this is a road that also I will follow. However, I have found that the third branch of the ‘new institutionalism’, Historical Institutionalism (HI) is able to complement our understanding of Europeanization, particularly in administrative issues as we will see. HI argues that institutional choices are sticky, once an administration for instance is organised in one way, it is difficult and resource-demanding to change it. Administrative systems become ‘path dependent’ and face increasing returns (Pierson 2000). My understanding of administrations as nationally entrenched is reflected in both a sociological and historical institutionalism. I will develop the theoretical point of departure further below.

1.4 Disposition

In chapter two, my second question is discussed, namely the connection between Twinning and Europeanization on the one hand and between Europeanization and administrative integration on the other. Chapter three develops my two ideal models and discusses the problem of relating different actors to different administrative models. Chapter four contains the findings from the evaluations. The final part is the conclusion, where the most important results are emphasized.
2 Studying Administrative Integration through Twinning and Europeanization

Institutional and administrative capacity was not included in the Copenhagen Criteria and it has traditionally not been a matter of supranational influence, the Commission has had no power to reform the national administrations within the EU (Olsen 2007 p. 260-1). However, the CEECs were in the 1995 Madrid summit demanded to “adapt” their administrative structures to be able to implement and enforce EU legislation (DG Enlargement website 2009). The Commission recognized that CEECs’ administrations had to be improved for acquis communautaire to be implemented.

The administrations in the CEECs were frequently described as weak during the 1990s and the measures taken by the Commission within the Phare-programme, mainly the so called Technical Assistance, TA, proved to have poor results (Tulmets 2005 p. 659). The Commission therefore had to try fresh tools to strengthen institutional capacity.

“The puzzle was: while there is no acquis communautaire on administration, how could the Commission bring the candidate states to reform their institutions, thus to adopt a European ‘model’ that is not defined?” (Tulmets 2005 p. 660).

2.1 What is Twinning?

The Institutional Twinning instrument was launched 1998 and quickly became the most important mechanism to support administrations in candidate countries (O’Connor & Kowalski 2005 p. 437). Other international aid organisations, for instance Sida and the World Bank, have used the instrument since the 1980s, but the massive scale on which the EU made Twinning available for its candidate countries was unsurpassed (World Bank 2004 p. 4-10). The central purpose of Twinning is to enable the recipient country to implement EU laws and policies. 2005, over 1300 Twinning projects had been conducted in over 25 countries and the EU had invested more than € 1 billion in the programme (TSCT-IBU 2007). In 2002 it was extended and is now a possible tool in the EU’s neighbourhood policy (see appendix A). I will study the new member states and the candidate countries.

Twinning is a much institutionalized measure to enable institutional learning. The Beneficiary Country (BC) identifies an area where it believes that problems may arise in implementing the acquis. The BC plans a Twinning project and gets
the details approved by the Commission. It then writes an inquiry to the member states’ National Contact Points, the NCPs, who delegates the project to a relevant authority or ministry in the MS. A BC jury judges the proposals that it receives from the member states. It is possible for MSs to join together in a consortium of two to improve their chances to win the project. The chosen MS draw up a so-called Twinning convention, including the ‘guaranteed results’ that the project must fulfil. The MS then sends a Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA) who work full time in the BC for up till two years (European Communities 2006, European Commission 2007). There is also a project leader in the BC and in the MS and detailed reports are regularly sent to the Commission delegation (Ibid.).

The BC often chooses a MS that it is used to collaborate with. National identities influence this choice, but more often is it strategic reasons behind the selection (Tulmets 2005 p. 665). According to the Twinning manual, written by the Commission, it is the BCs that take full responsibility for selecting the administrations that are to be in question for Twinning and for choosing MS (European Commission 2007 p. 37). Papadimitriou and Phinnemore have shown though that the Commission delegation often has a say in this process (2004 p. 627). Perhaps this is why the RTAs sometimes are viewed upon as Brussels-spies, and the feeling of partnership is seldom achieved (Cooper & Johanssen Evaluation 2003 p. 6, Papadimitriou & Phinnemore 2004).

Twinning has a number of distinct features. It is often claimed to contain important inspiration from the New Public Management and the Open Method of Coordination (Tulmets 2005). The most important characteristics that DG Enlargement themselves emphasize are that the objectives are jointly agreed, that “the beneficiary country retains ownership” (European Communities 2006 p. 8), that the projects have ‘guaranteed results’, that it contains peer-to-peer advise from public sector expertise and that it is based on partnership (Ibid.).

Twinning implies a very close cooperation between a member state administration, a beneficiary state administration and the Commission over a long period of time. It covers not only the period when a RTA engages in the daily work of the BC administration and the entire MS administration in general and the MS project leader in particular assist the BC administration. It also covers the period when a Twinning Contract and a Work Plan are drafted and the period after when follow-ups are made. In addition, some of the administrations sustain their close cooperation in their further work after the Twinning project and its aftermath are finished (Cooper & Johansson 2003 p. 7).

2.2 What is Europeanization? A Theoretical Odyssey

The definition of Europeanization that I will use in this study is borrowed from one of the most influential Europeanization scholars, Claudio M. Radaelli:

*Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘way of doing things’*
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the
making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of
domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies. (Radaelli
2003 p. 30)

Note that Europeanization is neither a theory, nor an empirical outcome like for
instance convergence, but a process. Europeanization is thus a phenomenon with
convergence as one possible but not certain outcome (Matei & Matei 2008 p. 37).
I will almost exclusively discuss Europeanization on administrative issues, i.e.
using the above definition but using Occam’s razor to focus on administration. However, Europeanization consists of two different ways of influencing domestic
politics, vertical and horizontal Europeanization (Radaelli 2003 p. 40-44).
Twinning definitely contributes to vertical Europeanization on the kinds of public
policy areas that are in the focus of the particular project, by enabling BS to
implement the *acquis communautaire*. But this is the main and uncontested
purpose of the programme. Much more interesting is the effect Twinning and
Europeanization may have on administrative integration. Kassim has shown that
theories predicts quite opposite outcomes on administrative integration, which
we will see below (Kassim 2003 p. 88).

Europeanization stands on two theoretical legs. As earlier mentioned, it is a
manifestation of the institutional turn in political science and it collects its
explanatory factors from Rational Choice Institutionalism and Sociological
Institutionalism. RCI commonly emphasizes the importance of fit/misfit, multiple
veto points and formal institutions to explain the existence or non-existence of
Europeanization while SI focuses on norm entrepreneurs and political cultures
(Börzel & Risse 2003 p. 58-73). RCI and SI are not mutually exclusive. They
cooperate in providing explanatory power of different phases of Europeanization
(*Ibid.* p. 68-9). As earlier mentioned, I have included Historical Institutionalism in
my discussion.

### 2.2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism and Europeanization

The fit/misfit-model predicts that if an institution or a policy is perfectly
compatible with its European counterpart, no Europeanization can take place. If
the misfit is very large, the adaptation cost that it would imply to approach a
hypothetical European model might be overwhelming. In between these two
extremes, the misfit will provide with pressure towards convergence, and
Europeanization will arise (Radaelli 2003 p. 45-46). The fit/misfit model has seen
its explanatory power decrease somewhat as scholars have found deviating
examples, and it is sometimes criticized for being overly simplistic (*Ibid*; Andersen 2004).

Veto-players can block any reform proposals and thereby obstruct the
Europeanization process. The higher the number of formal or factual veto points,
the lesser the probability of policy or administrative integration. Veto points can
be circumvented if there is a political culture of consensual decision-making and
cooperation. Administrative structures will more readily be adjusted if veto points
are absent and if there is a cooperative decisional tradition (Héritier 2001 p. 44-45).

Europeanization takes advantage of formal institutions that provide the frames for reform. When the process has started, it often implies a redistribution of resources, which alter the actors’ logics of consequentialism. Europeanization is a window of opportunity that changes the domestic cost-benefit calculations (Börzel 1999 p. 575-580).

RCI believes that convergence of administrations is the most likely effect of Europeanization in this area. Rational actors copy the best available model, and administrative integration will thus mean that the most successful national model of administration will develop into a pan-European model (Kassim in 2003 p. 88-9).

2.2.2 Sociological Institutionalism and Europeanization

SI emphasizes the logic of appropriateness and predicts that individuals strive to fulfil social expectations (March & Olsen 2004 p. 4). SI believes that Europeanization provides new sets of norms and ideas of what kind of situations and behaviour is appropriate.

Institutions that frequently interact and engage in different kinds of interchange will approach each other in terms of culture, framing of problems and priorities and so on. This is called institutional isomorphism and predicts that organizations that interact will homogenize over time. It happens through coercion, normative imitation or mimicry to avoid uncertainty (Olsen 2007 p. 229).

SI Europeanization can alternatively be understood as influence from norm entrepreneurs. Politics are influenced by strong networks which often are dominated by individuals who may initiate change by their mere existence. The central bankers for instance bore a heavy burden to induce a monetarist approach in domestic policy throughout Europe. Furthermore, in SI theory, informal institutions are more important than formal. It is the informal institutions that above all determine what behaviour is appropriate in a given situation (Börzel & Risse 2003 p. 67-8).

SI tends to be sceptical towards convergence as a result of Europeanization in administrative issues (or other cases where there does not exist a clear European model). SI argues that administrations interpret new challenges i.e. EU requirements or increased competitiveness between different models in accordance to the norms that are embedded within the existing organization. All convergence is therefore merely a play to for the gallery (Kassim 2003 p. 89).

2.2.3 Historical Institutionalism and Europeanization

HI is usually not included to provide explanatory power of the Europeanization phenomenon, although exceptions do exist. It is worth mentioning Bulmer here
HI argues that institutional choices are path dependent. It means that

“[T]he cost of switching from one alternative to another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time” (Pierson 2000 p. 251).

The institutional matrix that surrounds a society at a given time shapes the mental maps of its inhabitants. People, and existing institutions, make their strategic choices in relation to the possibilities that institutions give them. Every actor thereby learns from and adapts to the institutional matrix and renders it very difficult to change. In addition, many institutions face high start-up costs and ‘increasing returns’, which mean that it is difficult to change the nature of an institution once in place, and the difficulties increase with time (Pierson 2000 p. 255). The institution invests energy, resources and human capital in coming into being. It is easy to find examples of this in the real world. A person’s first employment, although partly random due to the employment market at the time, has big implications on that person’s future career as it shapes social expectations of both the individual and future employers. Examples are equally easy to find at the level of European integration, where European supranational institutions, once created, struggle hard to sustain its influence (Pierson 1996).

HI complements the Europeanization literature with a touch of humbleness. In particular RCI tends to argue that only the best type of policies and administrations in Europe will survive, as the other identify its superiority and adapts accordingly (see above). HI shows that administrative models, deeply entrenched in the national mind-maps and institutional matrix, are not so easily transformed. One can argue that the administrations in the CEECs have climbed quite far on their branch, which makes it difficult to switch to another branch even if it may reach higher up towards the sky.

2.3 Does Twinning produce Europeanization?

To answer this, one must not only know the theoretical foundation of Europeanization, but also how it actually happens in the European countries. As mentioned, there are two categories; direct/vertical and horizontal Europeanization.
2.3.1 Twinning and Vertical Europeanization

Vertical, direct, top-down or hierarchical Europeanization is the effect European legislation implementation has on domestic policies (Bulmer 2007 p. 51-2). This is where the fit/misfit-model usually comes in. The political integration in Europe has become deeper as the Union has gained influence over more areas. When new members are entering, they must adjust to EC-law. They were willing to do this, because the incentives posed to them under conditionality were strong. ‘The Return to Europe’ was the primary goal in the CEECs foreign policy and the negotiations preceding the accession implied an unrivalled possibility for the EU to enforce adjustment (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier p. 88-92).

The administrative capacity was insufficient in many CEECs which made it difficult for them to implement and enforce the \textit{acquis}. Therefore Twinning made entry. In the Twinning contract that is signed by the BC, MS and the Commission, it must be clearly stated how the project is to achieve \textit{acquis} implementation (European Commission 2007). Most of the projects are successful in achieving this policy cohesion and construct, diffuse and institutionalize these formal rules of public policies. Europeanization is thereby a clear result of Twinning. Or rather, Twinning enables the Europeanization that is necessary as a minimum for a country to access the Union as a member state.

This type of direct top-down enforcement is much less common on administrative issues. The reason is that there exist no European model, no blueprint, to enforce upon the MS. Therefore, Twinning projects does not have institutional integration as explicit purpose. In some cases, as we will see, administrative integration has been relabelled to fall under a less sensitive label (see chapter four).

2.3.2 Twinning and Horizontal Europeanization

Horizontal, or indirect, Europeanization is Europeanization that is not connected to the implementation of legislation, but rather of increased exchange of information and a bigger market of models to find inspiration of. It is often more difficult to see and measure for a student of Europeanization, than direct effects due to \textit{acquis} implementation are.

It is sometimes argued that the Open Method of Coordination, OMC, is one example (Matei & Matei 2008 p. 37, Vink & Graziano 2007 p. 10). OMC is taken from the corporate governance world and emphasizes partnership, benchmarking,

\footnote{However, it is not certain that \textit{acquis} implementation always, by definition, is Europeanization. According to Radaelli and Pasquier, mere implementation of EU legislation is not sufficient for Europeanization (2007 p. 37). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier also point to the fact that much of the \textit{acquis} implementation during conditionality was Potemkin harmonization (2007 p. 95).}
peer reviews, evaluations, action plans and so on. It is related to New Public Management ideals. OMC influences the implementation process mostly in those areas where the community method of legislation is not used, for instance social policy and employment issues. OMC is more non-hierarchical than legislative rules, but the downside for the Union is that there is no way of sanctioning a state that fails in the OMC method or remains passive. Under OMC, the council defines the benchmarks that the states are to follow. The Commission is responsible to manage and to supervise the progress. Europeanization is more or less voluntary under OMC, and it works through sociological, rather than rational, mechanisms of institutionalism (Wincott 2003 p. 296-297). OMC seeks to find a European model from national elements by finding a Best Practice in Europe. The idea is that once an institution is perceived to function in a superior way, other institutions will, by Commission assistance, gradually transform itself to approach the Best Practice model (Ibid.).

OMC is highly integrated in the Twinning programme and Twinning thereby contributes in diffusing this form of administrative integration (Tulmets 2005 p. 663-6). Tulmets argues that the influence and use of OMC is strongest in those cases were acquis is absent, for instance administrative issues. When engaging in Twinning, both MS and BC adjust to the OMC ideals (Ibid.).

2.4 Does Twinning and Europeanization produce Administrative Integration?

Administrative integration is a form of institutional change. Institutional change is most commonly described as happening through coercion, mimetic or normative adaptation, building on a much cited article by DiMaggio and Powell from 1991 (e.g. Königová et al 2006 p. 17). This way of explaining institutional change has the advantage of including both rational choice and sociological logics. Coercion takes place in the Twinning programme through the formal pressure of conditionality, but also through informal pressure from MS project leaders and the like.

During the entire period under transition, the CEEC have been under constant change. In such uncertain environment, institutions are more likely to turn to mimetic for inspiration and development, rather than trusting their own ability to provide a way forward (Königová et al 2006 p. 17). In the CEEC, the ‘Return to Europe’ was the main purpose of politics. Many Europeanization scholars that are sceptical of Europeanization of administration think that it for this reason may apply to the candidate countries (e.g. Olsen 2007 p. 267-8). However, Twinning is also strategically used by the BCs. By merely labelling a project as successful, they are able to check of that part of the acquis list, and move closer to accession
Twinning is used to formally accept the *acquis*, but the BCs find ways during the project period to deviate as much as possible from the European course to avoid adjustment costs (*Ibid.*).

Perhaps the most vivid way that Twinning may provide institutional change and European administrative integration is through the creation of professionalization. It concerns the normative adaptation concept and sociological institutionalism. Twinning creates network of officials who soon begin to frame problems and solutions in similar ways (Königová et al 2006 p. 17). The concept of isomorphism applies here. Isomorphism refers to the phenomenon that if two institutions have frequent contact and interaction, they will develop similarly and gradually converge (Olsen 2007 p. 229).

Through these three different ways of enabling institutional change, Twinning facilitates individual, collective and organisational learning in administrative issues (Königová et al 2006 p. 17).

However, it is most unclear whether the result of Twinning will be convergence, understood as less variety of administrative styles within the EU. Grabbe, for instance, argues that the Twinning programme is not centrally controlled by the Commission, but rather supervised, and that the Twinning agents come from many different MSs. This has the effect that the CEECs import the administrative heterogeneity that marks the EU (Grabbe 2001 p. 1024-27). The BC collects inspiration from one member state in one area, and another in another area, but without adopting a distinctive new model.

Twinning has had some tangible effects on organisation of public administration in all the BCs at an early stage, i.e. even before accession. Twinning reinforced the national administrations’ bonds to Brussels. This communication had to take the detour of an agency under the executive government, for example when the Commission approved the Twinning contracts. Thus, Twinning contributed to centralise the communication with Brussels, imitating the French and British system (Tulmets 2005 p. 666-7). Another effect has been the establishment of agencies in each BC to manage the money-flow associated with Twinning (Tulmets 2005 p. 667-8).
Ten years ago, the concluding paper after a huge seminar on administrative reform arranged by Sigma stated:

“It is clear that a European Administrative Space is now beginning to emerge.”
(Sigma 1998:a p. 15)

Where is EAS today, ten years after the seminar? According to Hofmann, inspired by Olsen, EAS is the ever more integrated administration in the EU that will lead to a common European model (2008 p. 662). Hence, EAS is still a process, an ever-more integrating administration in Europe.

The European Administrative Space itself does not spell out its administrative model in the literature. It is merely described as increased integration between national and European level administrations (Balint et al 2008), and the blurring of the two levels (Hofmann 2008 p. 668).

Therefore, when I refer to EAS, I somewhat distance myself from the common definitions. I embrace both the contemporary integration of administration that is enforced as a by-product of the EU, and the supposed European model that lies in the end of the integration road. Matei and Matei conclude in their recent assessment that EAS:

“Appears as the closure for a large process that implies convergence, Europeanization and administrative dynamics” (2008 p. 46).

Scherperel (2004) has in one study compared a European Administrative Space ideal type with one of State-Socialist Administrative Space (SSAS) that he argues marks the CEE countries. I will use his comparison in my reading of the evaluations but I will problemize his model and contrast it with the clear divergence that colours the contemporary administrative organisation in Europe.

According to Scherperel the administrative spaces differ in six important aspects that it is possible to operationalize. EAS is characterized by (Scherperel 2004 p. 560-1):

- bureaucrats are gathered from the ‘crème’ of university graduates and enjoy a high degree of social status,
- EAS administrations cooperate in between ministries and are coloured by horizontal coordination,
- bureaucrats are employed by the state, and identify themselves as officers in state, rather than in individual ministries or authorities,
- career opportunities are high and built on individual merits (see discussion below though),
although administrations are entrenched in nation-states, the degree of international cooperation within the EU is very high and a European identity is slowly emerging among bureaucrats,
EAS administrations are relatively depoliticized (see discussion below though).

By contrast, the administrative space that has marked the CEE countries since the early fifties is characterized by (Scherperel 2004 p. 554-60);

• low prestige and low wages in administrative sector, and this has been a big problem in the development of CEECs’ administrations since the fall of communism,
• SSAS is “highly fragmented […] and privileges vertical over horizontal coordination”,
• there exists no identification with bureaucrats as a social group in CEEC,
• there is little opportunity for career within the public administration,
• administrative cooperation between administrations is rare,
• administrative management is highly politicized.

Scherperel’s ideal types are summed up in the table below. As we so far have discussed Europe as an area where administration is highly nation-based, I will now discuss how the EAS ideal type can be questioned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of State-Socialist Administrative Space (SSAS) and European Administrative Space (EAS)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages and social prestige of employment in state administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremost direction of administrative communication/coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with civil service as distinctive social group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of contact with international organizations and other states’ bureaucrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of relationship to politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Scherperel 2004 p. 562

I will control four of these variables in my investigation of the evaluations. ‘Identification with civil service as distinctive social group’ is a variable more suitable in an interview-based study and is difficult to include by studying evaluations. International contacts are the bearing idea behind Twinning and this variable is fundamentally affected by the Twinning projects. Sometimes the relationship between the BC and the MS is sustained even after the project is terminated.
3.1 Key Features of Administration within the Commission

According to a recent study by Balint, Bauer and the renowned Christoph Knill (2008), there are two distinct ways of organising administration among the member states in Europe. The authors have used what they label the ‘standard method’ of comparing administrations, namely the degree of politicization of higher management on one axis and the openness of the career system on the other (Balint et al. 2008 p. 682ff.). They find that the Commission has taken large steps of approaching UK and Scandinavian models of administration at the expense of the Napoleonic continental model.

“The Commission clearly moves in the direction of the Anglo-Scandinavian position” (Balint et al 2008 p. 691).

That means that the Commission has become considerably less politicised in management and more open in recruitment (Ibid. p. 685).

![Administrative Patterns in the EU-15 and the European Commission (Post-Kinnock and Before 2004 Enlargement)](source: Balint et al 2008)

Also Schout and Jordan have shown that the Commission has moved away from a Napoleonic type of administration towards a more Weberian bureaucracy, less hierarchical and more rule-driven, with efficiency and network management as catchwords (2008 p. 969-970).

3.2 Key Features of Administration within Official Guidelines

The Commission and other supranational actors related to it have published guidelines in administrative issues in a number of documents. They are often written in a high-flown and general manner, with no tangible propositions of how
to arrange administration. In fact, the Commission seems very careful not to cross any limits of its mandate. It often emphasizes that it is up to the MSs to decide how to arrange their public administration. In the *European Governance – a White Paper* for instance, the Commission even wants to:

“[B]ring greater flexibility into how Community legislation can be implemented in a way which takes account of regional and local conditions” (European Commission 2001 p. 4).

Sigma is an organisation till 90% financed by the DG Enlargement’s Phare programme but under the supervision of OECD. It is engaged in promoting minimum standards for the national administrations in the CEECs. Sigma’s publications clearly state that the Commission is not engaged in instructing the CCs of how to organize their national administrations, but is merely demanding a minimum administrative capacity, all along its mandate:

“The Commission was careful not to impose a[n administrative] model” (Sigma 1998b p. 13).

Thus, the recommendations given by Sigma and the Commission are emphasizing broad principles\(^3\) that are not politically sensitive.

Using Balint’s ‘standard’ model described above of comparing administrations according to their degree of politicization and openness in HR-policy, Sigma seems to prefer an Anglo-Scandinavian model arguing that career opportunities and wage levels ought to be well regulated and open (Sigma 1999 p. 11, 21), which would imply a model to the far right in the scatter above. Furthermore, Sigma argues that the public domain of politics “as far as possible” ought to be distinguished from the public domain of administration, which I interpret as a preference of a model close to the bottom in the scatter. Thus, the European model according to Sigma ends up in the Anglo-Scandinavian group of administrative models.

### 3.3 National Administrative Tradition

NAT\(^4\) means the prioritization of nationally entrenched administration over possible gains by converging it into a European model. It is a challenging task to settle whether an administrative structure is nationally entrenched and therefore not desirable to transform from simple malfunction of the administration. Clearly

\(^{3}\) *Reliability, predictability, openness and transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness*, (Sigma 1999 p. 8). Although these are general principles, they are not entrenched in every administrative tradition throughout the member states. Sigma for instance points out that many old member states states are too rigid in deeming documents classified, when they ought to be public (Sigma 1999 p. 15).

\(^{4}\) There exist three groups of national administrative traditions. SSAS is of particular interest because it is the one that dominate the CEEC administrations. We have also come across the Anglo-Scandinavian model and the Napoleonic model. All three fall under the NAT umbrella, if they are prioritized over increased integration.
certain characteristics of the SSAS model are example of the latter, most notably the low status of working in public administration and the resulting high staff turnover rate. Other cases are more unclear. Vertical coordination for instance is not necessarily a manifestation of bad administration, but possibly a manifestation of a certain political culture that is not inferior to another political culture with horizontal coordination (Kassim 2003 p. 104). If this feature is inherently unaccepted it is indicated that distinctive features of the National Administrative Tradition in CEEC is not accepted. If the evaluations instead are judging the negative outcomes (if any) of the lack of horizontal coordination, the NAT might still be accepted as such.

3.4 The Sliding Scale – Europeanization and National Models

The administrative development of the Commission described above indicates that we need to problemize the EAS concept. The sharp edges of national administrative traditions have eroded somewhat during the last decade. However, as we have seen, Europeanization and administrative integration does not necessarily mean convergence (Andersen 2004 p.23, Goetz 2001, Grabbe 2001). Still, two contrasting administrative models persist within the EU, in addition to the SSAS model in the new member states.

I follow Balint, Bauer and Knill’s (2008) example and label these two models Anglo-Scandinavian and Napoleonic. Olsen (2007 p. 256 ff.) has a different approach and label the two models New Public Management and Old Public Administration, a less geographic labelling that has the advantage of making it possible to have two models co-existing within the same member state. However, the point to emphasize is that there exist two essentially different administrative models within the European Administrative Space.

3.4.1 Hypotheses concerning degree of SSAS-acceptance

Börzel and Risse argue that it is most convenient for a state to ‘upload’ their own ‘way of doing things’ to the EU-level, in order to avoid adaption costs related to Europeanization when the MS implements it (2003 p. 62). Particularly the big and powerful states have the potential to be successful in the uploading type of endeavour. Also Kassim emphasizes that it is political and economically costly to be far from the position that the Commission prefers (2003 p. 84). When it comes to administration, it seems like the Anglo-Scandinavian model has drawn the winning ticket. As shown in previous passages, both the development within the Commission’s administration and the guidelines published by Sigma indicates that central European actors prefer an Anglo-Scandinavian model.
According to Wincott, it has been an outspoken strategy in the UK, especially under Blair, to make their model in different issues become the pan-European model, through the process of OMC. Thereby Labour would avoid to ‘take’ policies shaped elsewhere (Wincott p. 297). UK is thus an active player in shaping the EAS.

Does this mean that UK and the other Anglo-Scandinavian countries with necessity disapprove of the SSAS model found in CEEC? My hypothesis, presented in chapter one, argues that this will not necessarily be the case. Such a statement would be an important precedent that might hit back on the Anglo-Scandinavian countries in another policy area. They are also traditionally Eurosceptic countries, indicating that they might resist a development where the Commission by Twinning or other means enforces a European model. Member states have guarded their administrative turf vis-à-vis the Commission jealously and have been reluctant to grant even supervisory competence to supranational institutions (Olsen 2007 p. 261).

However, I argue that the Anglo-Scandinavian states will be more disapproving of the SSAS model than the Napoleonic countries. The Commission has stated that even many of the EU15 MS are underachievers, and that it would like to see that the Twinning instrument was available also for these countries, to improve (or even transform) their administrative model (European Commission 2001 p. 25)5. I argue that countries with a different administrative model than the one the Commission prefers, oppose such a development and thereby accept the deviations in the CEECs to a greater degree.

I therefore argue that we will find values in the evaluations of along the scale in the figure. The Commission will be most disapproving of the SSAS model, thereby promoting the European Administrative Space, followed by the Anglo-Scandinavian groups of countries, while the Napoleonic group is more accepting, emphasizing the superiority of National Administrative Traditions.

5 According to Sigma, it is possible to rank the (old) member states from the best to the worst regarding their administrative model (Sigma 1999 p. 15).
4 Analysis - Evaluating Evaluations

Twinning evaluations have been conducted en masse. Most of these concern a single project and are highly technical. Moreover, they are far from being objective reflections of the reality. Tulmets (2005) shows that such follow-ups often are described in an exaggerated positive tone. The reason for this becomes clear when reading the Commission’s reply to the evaluation conducted by the Court of Auditors who argues that the Commission treats the BCs with kid gloves—if a Twinning project fails it has immediate consequences for that country’s accession negotiations (Special Report No 6/2003 by the Court of Auditors, p. 52).

A much smaller number of evaluations concern the instrument as such and are more suitable as the empirical material of my thesis. A compilation of all evaluations studied is found in Appendix B. To facilitate for the reader, I have in the MS case chosen to refer to the evaluations by their assigner. I write (Swedish Ev. 2003) instead of referring to actual author or the consultancy firm that they work for. Appendix B provide the interested reader with more detailed information. Hence, if a MS is mentioned in the reference, it is a MS-ordered evaluation, if not, it is ordered by the Commission.

I have gathered these evaluations by searching the Internet for evaluations, then by sending an inquiry to all the NCPs under the Phare and Cards programme and in the old member states, in total 35 NCPs. A number of them answered my request and extended my list of evaluations. The lists were almost identical in all cases, and I have good reason to believe that I have found all relevant evaluations. In addition, the DG enlargement’s Twinning office helped me to find material after a similar enquiry.

4.1 SSAS - Alive and Kicking

It becomes evident when reading the evaluations that one cannot change from the SSAS to the EAS overnight. Institutional structures persist and constrain reform efforts, just as the ‘new institutionalisms’ predict (Pollack 2005 p. 137-156).
4.1.1 Staff Turnover

Almost all evaluations point to the fact that the high fluctuation of key personnel is a major problem (e.g. Czech Ev. 2006 p. 20). As pointed out in the SSAS model above, the status of working in public administration is low, as are the wages. Involvement in a Twinning project means international exchange, additional vocational training etcetera which becomes a valuable merit for the employees on the labour market (German Ev. 2006 p. 12). Thus, Twinning itself hasten the staff turnover which lowers the sustainability of the project. Here we see institutionalist explanations in practice. Previous ‘choices’ in the public administrative sphere—low competence in PA and officials being paid poorly—hit back on reform initiatives. Pierson’s relative cost of switching path is as predicted higher than staying on the same path (2000 p. 252). When the Twinning programme tries to increase competence in the PA, trained individuals are recruited by private sector.

The Twinning project does not include any knowledge management tool to ensure that knowledge stays in the organisation in spite of high staff turnover, which the German evaluators wish for (German Ev. 2006 p. 12).

Many studies of the Twinning programme mention that the BC officials claim that the RTAs are over-paid (e.g. Tulmets 2005 p. 671). There is a risk that the cooperative environment is impaired by the often excessive differences in income. However, many times it is disadvantageous for the individual RTA to be away from his home office for two years or more and it is sometimes difficult to convince competent individuals to engage in Twinning (Lithuanian Ev. 2007 p. 2, Czech Ev. 2006 p. 44-5). Decreasing the pay of the RTAs is therefore not a solution to any problem. The problem is the low status of being a bureaucrat in the CEECs.

4.1.2 Horizontal Co-operation

Another characteristic in the SSAS is the low degree of horizontal co-operation. This is frequently Mentioned as a problem by all evaluators; even the CEEC ones (Czech Rep. Ev. 2006 p. 61).

The lack of horizontal co-operation is a problem that most Twinning projects actually address, through the elaboration of interministerial working groups etc. Thus, Twinning contributes to the Europeanization of administration and the convergence of administrative organization by strengthening horizontal cooperation. This effect is particularly emphasized by supranational evaluators and European Commission respondents in other evaluations (DG Enlargement/EMS-Consortium 2004 p. 25, German Ev. 2006 p. 20), although the positive statements of this development are frequent in several evaluations. The OMAS Consortium states that too little emphasis has been put on the lack of

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6 Interestingly, in the German evaluation, the Commission officials and the MS officials mention this as a problem, but the BC respondents do not (2006 p. 18)
horizontal co-operation within the CEEC administrations. The Commission could have enforced conditionality on this issue to a greater extent (DG Enlargement/OMAS 2001b p. 11). Although Twinning in many cases deals with horizontal co-operation, the initial lack thereof is often a big problem for the functioning of the instrument. Twinning projects become isolated islands even when several projects within the same policy field share similar objectives (DG Enlargement/OMAS 2001b p 12). A more recent evaluation focusing on the Justice and Home Affairs inter alia in the then Candidates Bulgaria and Romania states that:

"All Questionnaire responses for Commission Delegations in Romania and Bulgaria express concern about the lack of synergy in interinstitutional co-operation. This is one of the most negative responses to any question by any stakeholder and shows the seriousness of this issue." (DG Enlargement/Ecotec 2006 p. 12)

Commission-related evaluators often propose that reform and acquis implementation in any policy field ought to be preceded by a comprehensive national strategy. This ensures that several ministries are engaged in the planning and preparatory phase and share the same objectives. Thereby, the Twinning instrument works in a more co-operative environment. However, opinions differ whether national strategies actually have been used in reform programmes. New member states officials tend to state that their country followed such strategies stringently, contrasted by Commission officials that most often state that such a strategy was absent (DG Enlargement/Ecoc 2006 p. 7-8). Ecotec even suggested future Twinning-projects to be conditional on secured inter-institutional co-operation. No co-operation, no money, in other words (2006 p. 29). As we have seen, the Commission argues that this always has been standard procedure.

Bureaucrats rarely have a good overview and knowledge and inspiration does not diffuse due to the very hierarchical structure of CEEC administration. It is therefore essential according to several evaluations related to the Commission that the Twinning project is entrenched high up in the hierarchy to assure sustainability (DG Enlargement/OMAS 2001 p. 15, DG Enlargement/OMAS 2001b p. 15-18, DG Enlargement/Ecotec 2006 p. 20).

It is quite clear that vertical organization in the SSAS is not accepted by the evaluators. Although some parts of the acquis communautaire surely are manageable even without horizontal co-operation, horizontal co-operation is still demanded. This therefore might be an area where departure from the SSAS legacy and entrance into the EAS is prioritized over ability to implement the acquis. It is not self-evident that horizontal co-ordination is essential for good administration. It might be a reflection of an administrative culture that exists also within the old member states. In Italy, Germany and Greece for instance, the notion of departmental autonomy is taken more seriously and coordination is therefore more relaxed than in many other member states, most strikingly UK (Kassim 2003 p. 104). It is therefore interesting that the aversion to the lack of horizontal co-operation is so strong.
4.1.3 Politicization and Employment System

The degree of politicization of higher management in public administration and whether the employment system is career or position based are administrative ingredients used in both Balint, Bauer and Knill (2008) and in Scherperel (2004) to compare administrations. It is interesting because the degree of politicization and the type of employment system differ significantly also within the Union (see 3.1). My ambition was therefore to compare the evaluations and see if the evaluators’ origin and background matter and if their values in these matters are revealed in their evaluations. That would also have provided me with a litmus test for my method in general. If used as a litmus test, the result is not very encouraging. These aspects of administrative integration are barely mentioned in the evaluations, which can be compared to the overwhelming information about the lack of horizontal co-operation and the high staff turnover, both threatening project sustainability.

Perhaps is also the lack of statements telling? It could be so for several reasons:

- The evaluators are aware that it is a sensitive matter to explicitly criticize something that is abundant within a group of member states within the European Union, the Napoleonic group. The evaluators would therefore watch their step to not annoy their assigners.
- The evaluators might themselves be entrenched in a Napoleonic administrative model with a high degree of politicization and a muddled career system, and are therefore unable to discover that ‘the Emperor has nothing on’.
- It could be that the degree of politicization and type of employment system do not matter much for the functionality and sustainability of the Twinning programme. If so, even if these aspects are perceived as peculiarities, the evaluators have no reason to mention them.
- Finally, it could be that Scherperel is wrong in his claim that these two aspects are two of the six aspects that really distinguish the State-Socialist Administrative Space. One indication is that he ignores the fact that these two aspects in fact are very diverse within the European Administrative Space, and therefore do not constitute a good basis for comparison.

The first two points might be true for the evaluators ordered by the Commission or by member states within a Napoleonic model, for instance Germany, while the Anglo-Scandinavian evaluators would be more eager to identify and comment on politicization and a position-based, non-transparent, employment system. This leaves only the Swedish evaluation in my limited material. Maybe I cannot use what Balint, Bauer and Knill call the standard model for administrative comparisons (2008 p. 682) as a litmus test after all, at least not with my limited empirical material.

The Czech evaluation mentions that Politicization in the management of administration is one the two greatest threats to sustainability of Twinning project achievements (the other is high staff turnover) (2006 p. 11). Other evaluations
pragmatically conclude that Twinning projects must be sensitive to changed political priorities in the BC.

Only one evaluation touches upon the employment system. Ecotec argues that the level of career development ought to be a prioritized part of a national strategy on the JHA area that the evaluation concerns (DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 2006 p. 6).

4.2 Institutions Matter

“The administrations of the ancien régime have also proved surprisingly resistant to radical transformation” (Olsen 2007 p. 270).

Communist administrative legacies find new ways to survive and flourish even under the external pressure from the EU. According to Olsen, this is partly because the uncoordinated voice of the EU’s. The EU itself is ambivalent of what model to impose and is weakened by low resources and the fact that the EU has no say over administrative processes within the old member states (Olsen 2007 p. 660ff.). It becomes presumptuous and illegitimate to demand a certain model in the new MS, although it is reasonable to demand an appropriate capacity in the administrations. Twinning and OMC does provide an answer. Although not all actors fully apprehend or concur with the notion of Twinning as partnership among peers (e.g. Cooper & Johansen Evaluation 2003 p. 7), the BCs do have a relatively important ownership of the instrument and can adjust to best practice within Europe7 (European Court of Auditors 2003). Ownership is important. Almost all evaluations have found a relation between the degree of political support and commitment in the BC and the success of the project (e.g. German Evaluation 2006 p. 9). What then, determines whether the project has political support, or whether the project is treated without full commitment? Reasonably, the political priorities in the BC determine whether the project will be fully supported, or just carried through with the purpose of ticking of a new part of the acquis. For instance, many CEEC seeks cooperation with Ireland in internal market-acquis, to duplicate the Irish economic miracle (DG Enlargement/ EMS 2004 p. 16). This has great political support in the BC, while other issues might not be so highly prioritized. It all boils down to the political priorities of the BC, which might be difficult to avoid if one wants the BC to have ownership.

The early evaluations, in particular the one on Public Administrative Reform (DG Enlargement/OMAS 2001b p. 9-11), argued that ownership ought to be partly transferred from the BC to the MS. The BC was unable due to too poor PA to identify their problems, and could not fully appreciate the MS expertise,

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7 One has to be aware of the difficulties when speaking of ‘ownership’ of a program. It is very difficult to belay that the BC’s really have true ownership. Papadimitrou and Phinnemore (2004) suggest that this is not really the case. I cite the European Court of Auditors, but include my caveats for casual interpretations.
according to the evaluation (*Ibid*). This line of reasoning has been toned down in later evaluations.

To sum up; the relatively great BC ownership allows the BC to interpret the new influences according to their old traditions and norms. Administrative reform becomes path dependent (Tulmets 2005 p. 672). Institutions which are positive to Europeanization get Europeanized to a higher degree (Trondal 2007 p. 967).

### 4.2.1 Commission Involvement

The evaluations frequently emphasize that the Commission does not try to impose any administrative model (e.g. Czech Ev. 2006, DG Enlargement/ OMAS 2001 p. 1). Many civil officials in the CEECs saw the early Twinning RTAs as spies for the Commission, and it made cooperation difficult (Cooper & Johansen Evaluation 2003 p. 6, Tulmets 2005 p. 671). The Commission therefore had to increase the notion of partnership and ownership of the Twinning instrument among administrations in the CEECs, which they seem to have been relatively successful with. Cooperation has become more of a matter of personal chemistry than of relations to the Commission. This development is likely to have improved the capacity of the Twinning instrument, but the Commission has lost control over the direction of many projects.

The EMS-consortium discusses this problem in their evaluation. They are troubled by the fact that the results of many projects disappear in a malfunctioning administration. Twinning deals too little with administrative reform, they argue, and propose that the RTAs ought to report weaknesses in the BC administration to the Commission (DG Enlargement/ EMS 2004 p. 25-26). Also the European evaluation conducted by Cooper and Johansen 2003 concluded that Twinning should be extended to cover administrative reform issues more often and more explicit than currently. Twinning is a suitable instrument for this endeavour, but they recognize that western style administrative reform is not easily transferable to CEECs (p. 22-4).

The Commission involvement is therefore a balancing act. If it takes an active approach, and for example influences the priorities in the Twinning-project\(^8\), the RTAs are seen as spies and the sustainability of the project is negatively affected.

> “Many East European officials have questioned the notion of partnership within Twinning, which they saw as a subtle attempt by the Commission of increasing its power and control over their internal affairs” (Tulmets 2005 p. 672).

However, if the Commission is passive many projects risk to be low prioritized in the BC and public administration is not improved. Conditionality has been the

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\(^8\) Which sometimes happens even though it is formally a responsibility of the BC (DG Enlargement/ EMS 2004 p. 20)
strongest incitement for the BC (Czech Ev. 2006 p. 45), and it is a tool with a clear best-before date.

For Commission officials, administrative capacity is a particularly sensitive issue. Especially after the candidate countries were approved as fulfilling the political Copenhagen criterion (DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 2006 p. 9). The solution was to move administrative capacity concerns to Twinning projects under the Justice and Home Affairs acquis, thereby relabeling the administrative projects to a less sensitive name (Ibid.). Ecotec tones down this phenomenon, and argues that most projects have been explicit in its purpose. But the fact is that it has played a role at least in the Commission officials’ minds.

4.3 Differences in the Evaluations

Several separation lines could be expected among the actors. There are three groups of member states with different administrative models as mentioned; the SSAS, the Napoleonic and the Anglo-Scandinavian models. In addition, the Commission was expected to prefer increased administrative integration. My material is not sufficiently extensive to allow me to make conclusions of differences between these four groups.

Evaluations from OMAS, EMS and Ecotec, all assigned by the DG Enlargement, tend to view Commission influence as too small and too indistinct, as we have seen above. Clearer Commission explanation of priorities and preferred models is needed to enable genuine reform in culture and transformation of “deeply entrenched attitudes” (DG Enlargement/ Ecotec 2006 p. III). However, the Czech evaluation argues that the Commission has recognized individual nations’ need for individual administrative solutions (Czech Ev.2006 p. 11). It is telling that central European evaluations complain over too little Commission involvement, while BC evaluations describe it as adequate.

4.3.1 Indicators of Success

The most striking general difference in the evaluations (i.e. not directly connected to my question) is the indicators of success. The member states’ evaluations tend to view their own involvement as the overarching goal of Twinning. Twinning is seen as a way to strengthen the connections to important new member states (Swedish Ev. 2003 p. 2, 18-19, German Ev. 2006 p. 13, Czech Ev. 2006 p. 41-2, Lithuanian Ev. 2007). This can be connected to the theoretical discussion above concerning that it is advantageous for a MS to have ‘their’ model diffused in the EU, and thus try to upload it to the European level (see 3.4.1 above). In the Swedish case, it is also motivated by the importance to have good relationship with neighbouring countries, which is said to be of particular importance for a little country like Sweden (2003 p. 9). Germany also considers improved bilateral relations (2006 p. 13) and the Czech evaluation mentions that it is common with
so-called ‘deal-making’ to win Twinning contracts (2006 p. 41-2). Also at individual level, Twinning is perceived as providing benefits. Cultural and language skills are highly valued (Lithuanian Ev. 2007 p. 4).

Evaluations assigned by the Commission are less concerned of who actually conducts the Twinning projects in the BC, and more interested in the degree of success of the instrument in terms of implementation ability.

The Court of Auditors argued in their evaluation from 2003 that the so called ‘guaranteed results’ have not been fulfilled to a satisfactory degree. The Commission then answers that Twinning is valuable despite this because it creates results that are intangible (behavioural and cultural change through new sources of inspiration). But, in the Twinning manual, written by the Commission, it is clearly stated that “the sole reason and justification for Twinning is the achievement of the mandatory result” (European Commission 2007 p. 88). It is clear that the Commission, despite its relatively passive role, is aware of the Europeanization effects that Twinning is likely to trigger.
Administrative integration is a complicated matter. The Twinning programme has contributed to some Europeanization along with the conditionality that preceded accession. However, it has mostly been on the terms of the beneficiary states. This has had the advantage that administrative capacity has increased in areas prioritized by the BC, for instance internal market *acquis*. It has had the disadvantage of not improving administrative capacity very much in areas with low political commitment, and it has had low impact on the core characteristics of the general administrative model in the CEEC, described as SSAS above.

Twinning does not automatically and immediately transform CEEC administration into a West-European type of administration. However, norms and values are being transferred from MS to BC through the mechanism of isomorphism and of sociological institutionalism more generally, but only in a way that the existing institutions in CEEC admit. New norms and influences are interpreted along with old institutional structures. Any administrative reform therefore happens gradually and over a long period of time. This is remarkable, as the conditionality led many scholars to believe that change would come more quickly.

Within public administration, there is no European blueprint to enforce upon the candidate countries. This has allowed the BCs to gather influences from MS of their choice. This is in accordance to the OMC principle of ‘Best Practice’. However, the notion of best practice seems to be dependent on the observer. Almost every member state has been involved in Twinning. This has implied that the CEECs have imported the administrative divergence that colours the European Union. Convergence has thus not been the effect of Europeanization, although the EU27 is somewhat less divergent than it would have been without any Europeanization. Twinning is a win-win-win instrument, providing benefits for the MS, the BC and the EU. However, one should recognize that progress is slow, and it is up to the BC to decide what to do with the new administrative input.

Historical institutionalism argues that the historical path of an institution matters for its future development. We have seen how large of an impact the State Socialist past has had on the Twinning instrument. Not only are the new influences interpreted along old norms and institutional standards, but path dependence also has more tangible implications on the sustainability of every single Twinning project. The extremely high mobility of staff for instance, resulting from low prestige in the public administration sector, prevents knowledge from staying in the sector.
Evaluators of the Twinning program have confronted many of the characteristics within SSAS with great scepticism. This is understandable, since SSAS as mentioned threatens the sustainability of Twinning results. However, and more remarkable, evaluators seem to be sceptical of SSAS peculiarities even when they do not hamper the functionality of Twinning, i.e. that vertical administrative communication is prioritized before horizontal in SSAS.

The Commission has been very careful to not impose a particular European model, although I have found indications that it prefers an Anglo-Scandinavian type of administration. The responsibility of administration is still a national matter, despite the fact that the Commission is very aware of the Europeanization side-effects of the Twinning program. Administrative integration is mainly driven by the Member States, cheered on by the Commission but not steered by the Commission.

Finally, regarding the Twinning program as such, the most common complaint about the Twinning agents is that they have limited knowledge of, or interest in, local conditions. This has negative effect on the functionality of Twinning.
6 References


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## Appendix A

<table>
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## Appendix B

### The Evaluations

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<td>Support to the Justice and Home Affairs <em>Acquis</em> (Phare)</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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See References for further information