Inviting Interpillar Incoherence

Mapping out the Reasons for Horizontal Incoherence in the European Union’s External Relations and Why This Matters

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Abstract

This thesis addresses the problem of horizontal incoherence between the first and second pillar of the European Union in its external relations. Horizontal coherence is an important concept for the European Union’s legitimacy and strength. Internally, coherence is essential for the Union’s democratic legitimacy, as democratic influx comes from the Council. Externally, to the extent incoherent positions result in unfulfilled external policy goals, observing the set of moral duties that legitimize the Union’s right to carry out ‘social good’ is at stake.

Scrutinizing interpillar relations in the EU’s policy implementation process in the field of external relations, the main suggestion of this essay is that incoherence has two sources of origin: one is the institutionalized intra-EU cleavage of competences within the Union’s organizations. The other derives from the theory of organizations, explained consuming Barnett & Finnemore’s bureaucracy theory. The theory proposes that through analyzing international organizations such as the EU as bureaucracies rather than as extensions of states’ power, we can establish a solid foundation for interpreting their behavior.

Key words: EU, Horizontal Coherence, Incoherence, External Policy, Pillar, CFSP, Accountability, Bureaucracy

Words: 9833
List of Abbreviations

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
Commission – European Commission
Community – European Community
Council – European Council
EU – European Union
HR – Human Rights
HRD – Human Rights and Democracy
IO – International Organization
PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
QMV – Qualified Majority Voting
SEA – Single European Act
TEU – Treaty on the European Union
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1 Introduction

1.1 Preamble

The global political system is changing. A multi-polar world is evolving in the aftermath of the Cold War and in this, many actors interrelate. Three of the fastest developing and changing actors are the European Union, Russia and The People’s Republic of China; the former is a political construction built upon democratic principles and the two latter are national states with authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2007:a, Freedom House, 2007:b).

China and Russia have both gained considerable power on the international stage since the post-Cold War era. China’s growing presence in Africa, Russia’s entrance into the G8 and its increasingly swanky tone in its external relations illustrate this. This development is a challenge to the Western conceptualization which sees world democratization as a dispersion of universal liberal norms and economic principles as the given outcome of the post-Cold War world.

The EU strives to position itself as a prominent norm-spreading power in the new world. Human rights and democracy (HRD) have been recognized as indivisible features that should imbue the Union’s work (European Council 1991; 26). The signing of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in Maastricht 1991 extended both the EU’s ambitions and capability to play this role. Underpinning the relevance of the EU’s self–imposed external policy goals, Miller’s (2001; 453ff) distributive principles ascribe moral responsibilities to the Union’s realization of its agenda and clarify the origin of the moral responsibility of the EU. The categorization presented below is complemented by the two last principles of Szigeti (2006; 3) in his chapter “The Problem of Institutional Responsibility and the European Union” in the book “A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs” (Mayer & Vogt (eds.) 2006.

i. The beneficiary principle

This principle argues that the EU has a responsibility to compensate whenever a situation which brings increased prosperity to the Union harmfully affects other actors. This stance has some moral authority for EU behavior. On the micro level, many of the rural poor in China and Russia can be seen as losers of the EU’s trade focused policies which leave many behind and call for EU action. Of even greater relevance, on a political level all Chinese can be seen as losers of the trade crusade – to the extent that Gallagher (2002), Lagerkvist (2007) and Pei (2004) are correct in their assumption that EU trade is system-upholding or even reinforcing CCP Rule.

ii. The community principle

The mere fact that we belong to the same human race gives the EU a moral duty.

iii. The capacity principle
Emphasizing ability, the rule’s logic is that if an agent has the power to bring about change that is desirable and sanctioned by the agent’s own moral imperatives, it is responsible to do so. The broad scope of this principle makes it hard to operationalize. Yet, it is principally of great importance: if agents with the capacity to perform desirable change do not, change (although subjective) is not achieved.

iv. The legitimate expectations principle
This principle states that if an agent by its behavior indicates the intention to perform a certain action, causing others to expect the agent to act, the agent has incurred the responsibility of acting.

v. The consent principle
The simple logic of this principle is that if one consents (or proclaims) to do X, one is compelled to do X. The logic is authoritative by calling to account for the EU’s living up to the moral imperatives of human rights and democracy (HRD) promotion that the Union uses to authorize its existence.

By observing these core distributive principles, the Union can achieve wider policy influence on the international stage (2006; 234). Surmounting problems to achieve sought-after outcomes, however, “…can only be dealt with through a clear sense and strategy of inter-institutional cooperation” (2006; 235). We let this prayer of Mayer & Vogt’s be the motivational ground for this thesis.

1.2 Purpose

As made clear in the Preamble, how the EU fulfills its norm-spreading duties is important for the Union, both for the internal democratic legitimacy and for the legitimacy that springs from achievement of the external relations goals of the EU.

Horizontal coherence is one of the important ingredients that affect the Union’s capability to achieve its goals. The purpose of this thesis is to explain how the competence sharing in the EU, institutionalized through the pillar structure, leads to incoherent organizational behavior. We further aim to categorize the reasons for this.

Recognizing horizontal coherence as a key component to a democratically consolidated and internationally influential Union, the scarce literature on the subject is disproportional to its significance in the development of the modern EU. This fact spurred our choice of research field: we believe that only after having explained the sources of incoherence, can adequate solutions be chiseled out.

It is important to point out that this paper is not primarily an empirical survey of occasions when coherence has been insufficient. Although the essay presents empirical illustrations of incoherence, our foremost aim is to deliver a theoretical explanation as to why the pillar division is unsatisfactory.
1.3 Research Question

How can we explain and categorize EU interpillar incoherence in the external policy field?

1.4 Thesis Disposition

The text begins with an account of terms vital to the thesis. Thereafter, the background chapter explains the ascent of the dual executives of the EU, giving a backdrop to the Commissions bureaucratic character. The background furthermore shows how these split powers were institutionalized in the pillar structure of the TEU. The paper concludes by presenting the Union’s policy on HRD in the world in general and China and Russia in particular.

Chapter 3 briefly explains how the quest for coherence has been central to the Union’s foreign policy development up to the TEU and shows why the introduction of the CFSP has proven troublesome as far as coherence is concerned. Two main reasons for this are given, illustrated by examples from the EU’s relations to China and Russia.

Chapter 4 introduces a theoretical framework that serves as a fundament to interpret intra-EU institutional behavior. The analysis then maps out the sources of intra-EU incoherence and uses the bureaucracy theory from chapter 4 in explaining why interpillar this incoherence erupts.

The discussion inculcates some potential internal and external consequences of incoherence.

1.5 Methodology

The place of lookout we choose will have an impact on our results. Lundquist (1993; 95) stresses the interrelation between method, material and results and these factors, in turn, are affected by our choice of problem and theory. This establishment connects to the insight that we are social creatures, bound to interpret the world through our social context. However, that “facts are facts only within some theoretical framework” (Guba 1990; 25) dispels absolute knowledge while reminding us that knowledge indeed is important within our theoretical framework.

We search to explain qualitatively why EU institutions act incoherently. Having presented empirical evidence on the subject matter, we consume a theory of organizations which suggests that it is inherent in the nature of organizational life as a social form. Continuously (re)defining and (re)motivating its own
structures, mandate and raison d’être, it is in the nature of organizational life to develop. In an endeavor to understand how EU institutions are developing given this innate process of change, we find the motivation for our study. This purpose corresponds with Kramer’s description of scientific inquiry:

The central object of scientific inquiry is to understand some part of the empirical world, by discovering the principles governing its behavior, and showing how they do (1986: 11)

Although bearing some resemblance to a theory testing study, we quitclaim this procedure with the motivation that we are attempting to explain a certain state of affairs rather than testing the theory’s general plausibility (compare Esaiasson et al. 2004; 40f).

The analytical contribution of our work is a categorization of formal and informal institutional practices that are hotbeds of incoherence. Unwittingly, the analysis also maps out some of the mechanisms of incoherence, i.e. how formally institutionalized incoherence accommodates and spurs informally, organizationally based incoherence.

We have sought to separate the factors leading from \( x \rightarrow y \) from the outcome dimension, i.e. \( y \rightarrow x \), in our analysis, focalizing on the former aspect. In the discussion, we have dedicated space to incorporating the \( y \rightarrow x \) discussion, which is vital as both a motivational ground for our work and as a way to position the thesis’ scope in its larger context.

Pro-unionists occasionally disparage complaints of incoherence by saying that coherence is a lodestar; a naïve ideal not designed to be fulfilled. This is an important objection. Gauttier (2004: 24) remarks that “perfect coherence proves to be nevertheless impossible to achieve in a pluralist political system because of the diverging interests a government needs to compromise or arbitrate with. A certain amount of incoherence remains thus inevitable”. Our answer will be that naïve idealism is essentially distinct from partaking in the democratic ritual of scrutinizing power shortcomings.

Recognizing the relativity of the term ‘fact’ or ‘truth’ settled above, we do not investigate the correctness of the values that underlie the EU’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, the implicit benchmark value that provides the grounds for this thesis is a democratic one - the EU’s mandate rests on its ability to observe the duties brought upon it as a democratic actor.

1.6 Material

Two theoretical works are central for our essay; the IO bureaucracy theory of Barnett & Finnemore’s and the attribution of moral duties belonging to Mayer & Vogt. Well aware of the risks of building a text upon theories launched by someone else, we still consider these well-renowned works as credible enough to constitute part of the thesis’ theoretical foundation.

There are both methodological and material obstacles to proving the existence of coherence. Firstly, there is a multitude of potential cause variables. To solve this problem, the researcher would have to identify the actor responsible for
implementing broad EU objectives and construct an operational mechanism for measuring the extent to which the Union achieves the goal. While recognizing that secondary sources are less persuasive evidence than primary sources, the resources of time and space that frame the thesis have limited our work to using secondary sources to prove incoherence.

A material problem is the limited access to EU records of interpillar connections:

…the study of any CFSP issue continues to be hampered by the Union’s systematic lack of transparency – even in areas where there is no defensible reason for the existing secrecy; as well as by the paucity of real ‘hard’ databases on the CFSP – be it concerning all the meetings that take place at different levels (with their agendas) or any other attempts at quantifying the interaction between EU organs and third parties. (De Spégeliere 2001; 85)

At times, internal structural problems make evaluation difficult as incoherencies and imprecise objectives make it hard to determine what the actual policy goals are. Literature available on the subject often limit the line of argumentation to ascertaining that incoherence is a problem to goals achievement (Balfour 2006, Haukkala & Medvedev 2001, Mayer & Vogt 2006, Panebianco 2006, Smith 2001, Smith 2001, Tietje 1997).

1.7 Limitations

Studying the European Union’s institutional arrangements sometimes feels like a Sisyphean task: close one door of potential problematic character and 19 new ones open. Because of the peculiar structure of the EU, restricting the aspects covered by the study is crucial in order to arrive at something less than a novel.

For instance, explaining incoherence between the first and the second pillar of the EU structure is the core of our work. Still, we allow ourselves to limit the studied explanations of incoherence. The most noticeable of these limitations is perhaps the exclusion of voting procedures – an area so confused with different rules and implications that were they accounted for, this text would consist of nothing else. The text dedicates a mere sentence to the extensive debate on Council Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and its effects on interpillar coherence.

Although it is clear that a legal framework regulates the process of transforming broad guidelines into policy\(^1\), judicial obstacles to achieving coherence are not privileged in this piece of work. While mentioning certain fundamental legal features of interpillar communication, we do not aspire to

\(^1\) The EU legislation is said to cover some 80000 pages of text
comprehensively covering the functions of this framework. Instead, our research privileges an organizational-theoretical approach to understanding incoherence.

Institutional coherence is an ideal supposed to permeate the EU’s work. However, the Union has particularly emphasized this in the field of external policy, which, together with the laying down of the Union’s normative responsibility in a wider context, leads us to focus on the external relations field. Thus, when using the term ‘interpillar’, we exclusively refer to the first and the second pillar since the third one is not primarily concerned with external relations.

Finally, explaining incoherence with policy processes and/or principal-agent theory is a potentially rewarding procedure unfavored in our work. This, as well as the exclusion of the aforementioned aspects, is a conscious demarcation – involving too many elements in our analysis would compromise the depth of the analysis.

1.8 Definitions

1.8.1 Defining ‘Power’

How we define the concept of power is a central analytical dimension of this essay. What power we can attribute to the EU is important, as power is what subjects the Union to live up to the moral principle exposed in the Preamble.

Throughout history, the EU has been a civilian power. “Economic carrots rather than political sticks, persuasion rather than coercion, have been its way of influencing other actors.” (Mayer & Vogt 2006; 8) To a significant extent, the formation of the CFSP introduced a more power-political, realistic dimension of EU power wielding (Mayer & Vogt 2006; 8).

In the case of democracy promotion, to understand the autonomous power of the EU bureaucracy discussed in chapter 4, it is necessary to turn to non-traditional aspects of power. The Joseph Nye-launched concept of ‘soft power’ is one relevant form, defined as “the ability to influence others to get them to want what you want” (Nye 2004; 5). Under the same heading, Lucarelli (2002; 4) discusses the ‘normative’ or ‘discursive’ power of the EU, referring to the “Union’s capacity to influence through its values and norms and this way control the dominant discourses of the world – and thereby actions”.

A last form of power worth mentioning, distinct from coercive and normative power is ‘structural’ power. This power springs out of the EU representing Europe, with the historical weight the continent possesses (Manners 2002; 252).

One objection commonly raised against the notion of the EU as an actor with moral weight and responsibility, is that the Union is still a conglomerate of sovereign nation-states, with little to no autonomous power to hold the Union accountable for failing to attain ambitious goals (Szigeti 2006; 24ff). Including non-military and discursive aspects of power in the way we define the term however, provides ground for attributing power to the EU.
1.8.2 Defining ‘Coherence’

The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework, which shall ensure the consistency, and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the ‘acquis communautaire’.

The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers. (The Treaty on the European Union, Article C)

As stated in the initial phrases of the Treaty on the European Union, the term ‘consistency’ refers to the objective of unity within the organization. This term can be argued to mean something different depending on how we interpret the Treaty. Consistency indicates an absence of contradictions while coherence means achieving synergy between the actors within the organization (Gauttier 2004; 36, Tietje 1997; 212). The former is a static condition while the latter is more a matter of degree and, though not mutually excluding, a distinction between those two, together with a definition of which one the Treaty aims at, is vital to our argumentation.

The choice of ‘consistency’ in the English translation of the TEU is controversial and has been widely criticized (Gauttier 2004, Tietje 1997, Smith 2001). Of the other ‘main languages’, the French version refers to cohérence, the German to kohärenz and the Spanish to coherencia. Also in the more minor languages’ versions the ‘coherence’ term is favored: samenhangel in the Dutch, coerência in the Portuguese and coerenza in the Italian are all used in article C. With this widened picture, following Tietje (1997; 213, emphasis added) we assume that “the TEU refers to coherence and not, as the English version seems to indicate, to consistency”.

The Principle of Coherence is, in fact, divided in two, one having greater relevance for our work than the other. The vertical implication of the term, though the most discussed, is outside this thesis’ scope. It deals with coherence between the Union and the member states. Nevertheless, the focus for our study is the degree of horizontal coherence, i.e. the extent to which the Union manages to pursue its goals “…despite the use of different institutional mechanisms and policy tools” (Smith 2001; 173). In other words, how the Union’s institutions manage to work as one. From now on, the term ‘coherence’ refers to this horizontal aspect of the broader expression.

1.8.3 Defining the EU as an IO – the ‘European Council’ and the ‘European Commission’

How to define the EU complex deserves a thorough investigation. Willets (2005; 439f) defines an IO as an organization in which membership is reserved to states and in which government representatives of the member countries jointly carry out the decision-making. However, the enacting of the TEU put emphasis on the joint external policy façade, which contains considerable supranational elements. This requires a flexible interpretation of the EU as both an IO and a supranational
phenomenon. In this thesis’, we consider the EU to be an IO, referring to the EU as an international as well as a supranational organization.

According to Beetham (1996; 9ff) the Commission is a bureaucracy, as it exhibits four characteristic bureaucratic traits: hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and expertise. Hierarchy refers to clearly defined competence spheres where officials at every level are responsible to superiors. Continuity means that the office constitutes a full-time salary. Impersonality refers to the absence of arbitrary and politicized influences while expertise means meritocratic rule. The Commission operates under all of these principles. Therefore, we interpret the Commission as a bureaucracy, granting it some autonomy within the EU framework.

A linguistic limitation is important for the reader to bear in mind. We sometimes simply refer to ‘the Council’, in a careless manner when talking about what in fact consists of two different bodies: the Council of the European Union (informally the Council of Ministers) and the European Council (as the superior Council consisting of heads of governments). In this paper, this term is used to contrast the intergovernmental second pillar with the supranational Commission from the first pillar.
2 Background

Henry Kissinger once famously stated that he would believe in the concept of ‘Europe’ when he got a central phone number to call in order to get in touch with it. Until this date, no such number has been provided and the European Union remains a tricky hybrid of a political project, with little or no resemblance to the nation-states that remain our main frames of reference. The three common branches of government - executive, legislative and judicial – are, though existing within the system, not as easy to distinguish as in most nation states. Even when the discussion is limited to the realm of IOs, the EU stands out as one of a kind. The unique institutional arrangement that constitutes the European integration is, besides being the favorite object of study for scholars and politicians alike, is also most commonly referred to when discussing the widely acclaimed notion of a Union with a large democratic deficit.

2.1.1 The Dual Executives of the EU

Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in the 1950’s, the dual executives of the EU have been a characteristic of the EU’s institutional arrangements. This motivates a brief explanation of the two organs and their emergence on the institutional scene.

The Council comprises representatives of the member states that make consensus decisions. Its intergovernmental structure gives it the mandate to set the general agenda of the Union. Gradually, however, it has lost the sole supremacy over overarching responsibilities. For instance, in some policy domains legislation is carried out together with the Parliament while the Commission is involved in agenda setting matters.

The Commission was constructed as a replica of Monnet’s French elitist bureaucracy administration. His ideology was technocrat; expert rule was the guarantor of an impartial, effective and efficient administration (Cini 2002; 47 Tallberg 2007; 22f). The Commission constitutes the executive branch of the EU, but it also has scrutinizing obligations – it is responsible for ensuring that all actors within the institutional structure comply with the guidelines of the Council. Fast hierarchical decision procedures and a clear chain of command were encouraged (Cini 2002; 47). ‘Accountability’, as opposed to ‘efficiency’, was not even an issue for the Commission before the late 1980’s (Cini 2002; 47).

The Commission is the most common target for complaints about the EU’s lack of democratic legitimacy. Complaints grew considerably in the 80’s and the 90’s in the wake of the Commission’s de jure and de facto growth. As a result of this, the Union’s governance ideal shifted away from effectiveness and efficiency
towards the softer notion of ‘good governance’ through the TEU (Cini 2002; 50f).

### 2.1.2 The EU’s Pillar Structure

That the EU’s decision-making requires consensus in many policy fields is an important explanation of the somewhat complex pillar structure. Whenever a major decision is pushed through in the external policy area, for instance, it has to conform to a myriad of the nation states’ interests. The pillar structure from the TEU serves to delegate Commission and Council competences in this delicate field. The competences of the Union were divided into three pillars:

(Tallberg 2007, Bomberg & Studd 2004)

The first pillar – low politics - is the European Commission’s (and the European project’s) home ground. Here, it enjoys extensive powers to handle economic and

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2 “Good Governance refers to the provision of “open, participatory and democratic governance without creating hierarchical, exclusionary and centralised government” (Manners 2006; 37).

3 The pillar structure was also first endorsed through the TEU.
technical matters. These include developmental, trade-related and regional policies. The second, intergovernmental, pillar comprises harder political issues traditionally belonging to the nation states’ vital realm of interest, i.e. “war and peace among states […], defense, diplomacy and ideology” (Gauttier 2004; 24).

Faced with the member states’ different approaches to further integration, the pillar division was an uneasy compromise that is “certainly not a structure that will enable the Union effectively to pursue the tasks its Member States have assigned to it” (Pryce 1994:10f).

2.1.3 The EU Human Rights and Democracy-Promoting Policy toward Russia and China

The EU has an ambitious agenda for democracy promotion, broadly formulated for the Union in general as well as for China and Russia policy in particular. This chapter presents the EU’s positions in order to provide a basis for the upcoming discussion of intra-EU external relations incoherence.

Adopted in 2001, the document *The European Union’s Role in promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries* says that the basis for European Union (EU) action is clear. The European Union seeks to uphold the universality and indivisibility of human rights - civil, political, economic, social and cultural. (European Commission 2001:b; 3)

*The Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union*, drafted as a result of the Council’s meeting in December 2001, is maybe even more firm on the position that the EU has to let HRD values be superior to its other objectives. It states that, in external relations “the European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights” (European Council 2001; art I).

In the EU’s Russia policy, Russian openness, governance accountability, respect for human rights and the spreading of democratic ideals are prominent features of what the Union wishes to achieve. These goals make part of the “good governance” goal set up by the EU (Mayer & Vogt 2006; 26). They are stated explicitly as the most senior “strategic goal” in the Union’s Common Strategy on Russia:

A stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the rule of law […] benefiting alike all the people of Russia and of the European Union (European Council 1999; part I)

The press on China to democratize has, some argue, been softer in the latest years. Nonetheless, the most recent of the Council’s China declaration on the matter still devotes a chapter to this issue (European Council 2006; 9). A comprehensive list of areas where the EU urges China to improve its record in the field is presented, saying that “the Council continues to have serious concerns about the human

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4 It was as a matter of fact a big trigger for signing the TEU which states as one of the foreign policy objectives of the Union 'to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' (Title V, Art. J.1)
rights situation in China and deeply regrets the fact that there has been little progress in a number of areas”.

The guiding documents for the bilateral relations policy toward China and Russia are ambitious in their declaration of purposes and aims of the bilateral relations, but, as we will see in the next chapter, the instrumental dimension is vaguely worded.
3 The Treaty on the European Union: The Coherence Principle and the CFSP

The quest for coherence in the Union’s external actions has been a key factor behind the development of the modern EU. It was an important triggering mechanism motivating the TEU (Gauttier 2004, Smith 2001, Duff 1994, Duke 1999, Tietje 1997).

3.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy

The argument for a coherent Union gained prominence as the Union itself gained power. In the years between the signings of the SEA and the TEU, the world changed quickly and the Union found itself unable to cope with the global challenges that the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Persian Gulf War and the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc presented (Smith 2001; 72, Pryce 1994; 3ff). This resulted in the coherence principle being brought up in several treaties (Single European Act 1986; Article 30:5, The Treaty on the European Union 1992; Article C).

Through the signing of the TEU, a new chapter in European foreign policy opened. In the process in which the former Community turned into a Union, something formerly unknown to the global political community was created: autonomous nation-states announcing their intention to carry out foreign policy as an entity. However, the Treaty not only fundamentally changed the way the Union’s foreign policy was to be conducted in the future, it also institutionalized and made coherence legally binding.

Nonetheless, a division between different aspects of security and foreign policy had to be made, since it turned out to be impossible to get all members to abandon certain “harder” areas of influence; hence the pillar structure described in the background. Leaving out the cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs as it is peripheral for our essay, the pillar division basically split the Union’s external relations competences in two.

After the introduction of the pillar system and the institutionalization of a splintered foreign policy (discussed below), some measures were taken in the later part of the 1990’s to improve what turned out to be dissatisfaction with the Maastricht arrangement (Smith 2001, Gauttier 2004, Duke 1999). Most notable of these are the introductions of some “external faces” – the Commissioner for external affairs, the High Representative for the CFSP (“Mr CFSP”), and the acting president of the Council – together with their interaction in a “Troika” representing the EU.
Another instrument introduced after the TEU is the Common Strategy-tool (CS), giving the Council better control and binding it to the Commission under a common frame. The CSs are drawn up on a country-basis and have so far only been used three times (European Commission 2008, Gauttier 2004). The CS on Russia is the first and most prominent one, but many have dismissed it as a “shopping list of grand political ideas without anything specific to back them up” (Haukkala 2001; 44).

3.2 The CFSP and the Coherence Principle

As far as horizontal coherence is concerned, the introduction of the CFSP and the pillar system is problematic mainly for two reasons, illustrated with the EU’s relations to two key partners: Russia and China.

3.2.1 Institutionalized Separation of Policy Areas

The EU division of foreign policy into different areas has been evolving since the 1970’s. In short, it marks a distinction between hard political tools and soft economic tools. In spite of attempts made to soften this division in recent years (Panebianco 2006; 132f), the first pillar continues to accommodate “low” politics while “high” politics lies within the second pillar. When facing external partners, who have not made this distinction and are able to use political tools from both areas, the EU’s coherence lags behind. Both China and Russia have used the weapon of high and low politics together in a common effort (The Economist 2007, The Economist 2008, Jakobson 2004). Gauttier (2004; 24) argues that the very principle behind the division is “out of tune with the international system and the increasing interaction between the political and economic dimensions of foreign policy”. The two areas and their patron institutions are thus bound to intertwine.

Using different aspects of foreign policy together in a synergetic manner is a strength for an actor (Haukkala 2001, Emerson & Vahl 2006) and the two growing powers are masters of this discipline. One of the more telling examples of this is the way Russia has used energy trade as a tool for reaching political goals. Threatening to or actually cutting the flow of oil and gas to EU members is an effective way of consolidating a power position for Russia that brings about problems for the Council to face in time (The Economist 2007, Wood 2007).

China, too, is keen on using tools traditionally belonging to low politics in order to achieve harder results corresponding with political ambitions. One fine illustration of this is the Chinese regimes pressure on allies to unite behind the “One China”-policy. Recognizing Taiwan as an independent entity is impossible for a country wishing to maintain relations with the world’s most populated country. The Chinese government uses this effective weapon against its global partners. Although controversial, the European Council has decided to comply with the “One China”-policy in order for the Union, through the Commission, to maintain economic relations with China (Jakobson 2004, Dent & Johnson 2000, European Council 2006). This sheds light on a clash with wider implications for
EU policy: an agreement on the principal setting Council level is more or less unattainable which leads the non-democratic, non-responsive Commission to handle soft politics with considerable political relevance with large implemental elbowroom.

As shown, the EU has had problems with presenting a coherent position against these kinds of actions, because the only organ that can make crucial decisions in these harder issues is the Council, which rarely meets and even more rarely reaches agreements on hot topics (Smith 2001; 175). The Commission, in its turn, often succumbs to “business as usual” which together with the Council’s ambivalence forms the image of a Union where the first and second pillars do not walk in the same pace (Smith 2001; 178).

Another example of when this division has shown to be troublesome to EU coherence is the promoting of China into the worldwide economic community. The Commission was the major supporter of accepting China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) application to integrate it into a wider global trade system in the 1990’s (Kerr & Fei 2007). It did so even though the Council did not endorse this agenda since some member states raised objections (Kerr & Fei 2007, Dent 2001). Formally, this was in institutional order since economic matters as well as external representation lies within the Commission’s competences. As far as coherence is concerned, however, it is questionable whether the Commission’s eager promoting of China’s admittance to the WTO was coherent with the guidelines set in the Council’s declaration on China from the 1989 Madrid meeting5, laying down the China policy for the 1990’s.

The TEU phrase that addresses the separation of powers issue stipulates that the Commission and the Council “shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers” (The Treaty on the European Union 1992; Art C), a formulation that leaves a lot of ‘wiggling room’. As the Council has competence over all pillars, and the Commission is responsible for implementing the CFSP, the phrasing “its respective powers” gives reason for both institutions to claim competence over the Union’s external activities (Gauttier 2004; 27). This overlapping is as most evident in areas such as human rights promotion and economic sanctions (Fei 2007; 122, Balfour 2006; 114f). There are many examples of when this condition has affected the Union’s external relations policy. Because the Commission is a uniform actor6, it tends to become problematic when it works simultaneously with the non-uniform Council towards an external actor and does it through different policy channels. This has become obvious in the Russian case, where the Russian counterpart quickly learned how to explore the built-in weakness that emerges when the two EU executives overlap their duties in conducting foreign policy (The Economist 2008, De Spiegeleire 2001). De Spiegeleire expresses this as follows:

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5 Laying down the China policy seems to have been tinged with ambiguity, it was reported that there was a ”climate of uncertainty created in the economic field by the present policy of the Chinese authorities” (Council of Europe 2008; Annex I).

6 In the sense that the Commissioners represent only the Commission and quickly form joint positions as opposed to the Council where the members also represent individual member states’ interests and need longer time to reach decisions.
Clearly the role that the Commission plays in the first pillar (where Russian interlocutors are dealing with a fairly identifiable, cohesive and permanent partner), has not been transposed to [...] the second pillar. In this field, the respective EU presidencies are not willing to give up their national prerogatives, leading, especially with a country like Russia, to additional complications in the dialogue. (2001; 91)

Not knowing which institution to address is of course something that can prove troublesome for a third country dealing with the Union and this threatens the perception of the EU as a coherent actor.

In conclusion, when the Council with its broad agenda of democracy ideals, clashes with the more pragmatic and efficiency-oriented Commission, within a policy area that both feel that they are entitled to, the Union’s external actions deviate

3.2.2 Illogical and Broad Implemental Strategies

The executive branches of the Union seem to have trouble defining common interests ahead of time, as a result of overly broad and sometimes redundant objectives (Gauttier 2004; 27)

The EU’s external relations are guided by documents drafted on a case-to-case basis. Russia relations are regulated by the CS on Russia (CSR), adopted in 1999. The China relations are instead guided by the Council declaration from 2006 as well as two Commission policy papers approved by the Council (European Commission 2006, European Commission 2003).

The EU has committed itself to frame policy in a logically coherent manner. Interpreting the CSR literally, the procedure is lived up to as it successively moves from the general, visionary level to a level of principal objectives and, at last, to the specific, instrumental level.

![Logical Framework Diagram]

*The logical framework was initiated through the Union’s evaluation unit. See Methods and Instruments for Project cycle management: Methods and Instruments for Project Cycle Management no. 1. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, Directorate General for Development, Evaluation Unit, 1993.*
However, as De Spiegeleire (2001; 81) points out, the CSR shows a “weak sense of genuine prioritization” and is “hardly a paragon of logical consistency”. Logical links between and within the different levels of policy-making are often absent, and general objectives are mixed with concrete policy suggestions (European Council 1999; 2ff). Categorizations of recommendations on the different levels differ, which blurs the connection between policy guidelines and the concrete measures that are initiated in their name. Similarly, important guideline principles lack implemental strategies, a fact obscured by the deviating categories (European Council 1999; 2ff). The second link of “principal objectives” can furthermore be seen as a buffer for hiding general guidelines that lack concrete implemental measures. This since some of the areas of action included in the principal objectives are left out in the middle link, they are therefore not observed on the implemental level (European Council 1999; 2ff).

Chris Patten (2002), a former Commissioner, sees difficulties in implementing EU HRD policy in China relations. He stressed the need to produce policy and stimulating dialogue that is result oriented, through focusing on specific cooperation projects in the three fields of the bilateral relations, respectively. Meanwhile trade relations are focused on the implemental level, the European Parliament, the only purely democratic organ in the EU complex, regularly expresses its concerns on China’s lack of respect in the HRD area and has at occasions endorsed limiting EU-China diplomatic relations as a precaution to the Chinese regime (Panebianco 2006; 141).

Thus, adding to the institutionalization of functional duality in the TEU, the lack of a unanimous vision of instrumental dimensions in the Union’s external policies, has left the Commission with plenty implemental strategy power. De Spiegeleire (2001; 84) addresses the matter through questioning the functioning of the CSR, suggesting it has “very much has developed a life of its own”, favoring trade relations over other responsibility areas of the Union. Xiang (2001; 94) points at the same type of development in EU-Sino relations saying that relations, despite a threefold approach inculcating political dialogue, technical assistance and economic and trade relations, are neatly focusing on economy and trade.
4 Explaining Interpillar Incoherence in the EU – A Theoretical Framework

The bureaucratic theories introduced in this chapter serve the purpose of providing tools for understanding incoherent intra-EU behavior. Establishing a comprehensive framework for interpreting reality we believe is the key to understanding and categorizing implementation shortcomings.

4.1 International Organization Behaviour According to Barnett & Finnemore

IR scholars have traditionally considered IOs as states’ extended arms. According to this view, IOs are viewed as instruments that principally accomplish whatever function their state founders created them to do (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; 4). There are good reasons for such expectations – after all IOs are state created, state governed and state funded (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; 4). A constructivist approach, however, ascribes greater autonomy to IOs. It states that diverging historical, contextual or professional experiences inevitably results in the establishment of an intra-organizational culture with a set of goals different from those of states’ and the society around it (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; 4).

The assumption of autonomous IO actions puts the theory at odds with the prevailing realist assumption that states are the only power-holders in IR.

To chisel out an explanation to autonomous behaviour on behalf of IOs, Barnett & Finnemore suggest that seeing IOs as bureaucracies could be fruitful (2004; 5).

4.1.1 IOs as Bureaucracies

Mainstream, realist IR ideology regards IOs as rational, non-violent and impartial implementers of state policy. One reason for the habitual overlooking of evidence of IO autonomy is, that organizational power wielding still is inferior to powerful states’ opposition (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; 27). While this is probably true, discussing how the EU can evolve its own purposes and its own culture, Smith (2001; 46) points out that

…the organization itself can become an autonomous actor with influence over both policy innovation and institutional change. Organizations often possess important resources such as knowledge or expertise … [and] develop their own interests concerning international cooperation. When embedded within a complex rule-of-law
system like the EU, they can even exert “supranational” influence over policy coordination among the member states.

Analogous to this view, Barnett & Finnemore assume by analyzing IOs with organizational analysis tools, behavioural traits previously unexplained can be decoded (2004; 17).

As made clear in our definition of power (see 1.8.1), power has multiple faces. Barnett & Finnemore (2004; 17) argue that the authority of IOs to a great extent stems from their mission to accomplish a commonly defined ‘social good’. In a mutually reinforcing spiral, they use their expertise and authority to classify and extend the definition of social good they were created to promote – successively extending their legitimate areas of intervention (2004; 27). Other proofs of IO autonomy can be found in their involvement where states are indifferent, in acting against states’ interests or even in their failure to carry out state-initiated missions (2004; 27). Furthermore, IOs’ perceived neutral nature is in itself a grandiose power resource since it carries with it legitimacy that is harder to question than that of self-serving, particularistic nation-states (2004; 5).

The consequences of a growing mandate, though, are often double-sided. When there is no societal consensus about which IO action yields the ‘social good’ the organization was established to produce, political judgements enter the organization. Such development strikes at the very core of IO authority – impartiality and consent. Depending on the extent to which there is consensus about what is a ‘social good’, an organization will encounter different hardships in realizing its agenda.

4.1.2 IO Policy Implementation Difficulties

Achieving the outcomes prescribed by states is rarely feasible. Broad missions need narrowing down to hands-on, action-permitting dogmas. In the quest to outline such dogmas, IO bureaucracies will be exposed to innumerable goal contradictions:

…a liberal world polity is full of contradictions. For instance, a liberal world polity has several defining principles, including human rights, markets, and democracy, that might conflict at any one moment. Thus, environments are often ambiguous about missions and contain varied and often conflicting functional, normative, and legitimacy imperatives (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; 37)

Since IOs are part of this ambiguous social context, contradictions belonging to the circumstances are likely to be reproduced within the organizational frame (Barnett & Finnemore 2004; 38). The presupposed rationality and instrumentally of IOs, when seen as bureaucracies, is at best relative – for whom is the behaviour rational? At this point, relevant sources of pathological EU behavior deserve to be elucidated.
4.1.3 IO Pathologies – Sources of Incoherence

The previous parts of this chapter can be narrowed down to a few concrete organizational pathologies. Barnett & Finnemore define the concept of pathological behavior as behavior “generated by the internal organizational culture that violates the self understood core goals of the organization”. Furthermore, these dysfunctions “flow from constitutive features of bureaucracy as a social form” (2004; 38).

Out of the five mechanisms presented as creators of pathologies, three are of special interest for this essay. Bureaucratic universalism means that knowledge is non-contextual. This is a constitutive necessity for bureaucratic activity since inattentiveness to circumstances is inherent in bureaucracy’s universalistic nature. Insulation refers to the lack of public response many IOs face. Through such a lack of accountability, procedures counter-productive to goals achievement can erect. The conglomeration of similarly trained professionals can alter the harmony between worldviews in the society as a whole and those existing within the bureaucracy. When the ranking of values and norms within the IO is inconsistent with the values and norms of society as a whole, the IO runs the risk of prioritizing the wrong goals (Barnett & Finnemore; 40). Another problem related to insulation originates in the difficulty of evaluating IO goals achievement. Inefficient or even counter-productive policies can therefore live on within the IO.

The final pathology of relevance to this thesis is cultural congestion. It addresses the problems that spring from incoherent intra-organizational structures. These IO clashes can erupt from diverging internal historical experiences, distinct roles resulting in different competence mixes (compare with insulation above).

Having developed and presented the tools for understanding incoherence, we move on to the analysis.
5 Analysis

Our analysis aims at explaining why the two chief external policy-involved organs act incoherently. It suggests that the main reason for intra-EU external policy incoherence lies within the very pillar structure introduced in the TEU. We have found three such cause variables:

1. The institutional overlapping of competences described in chapter 3.1.1.
2. The absence of an accountability-wreaking institution
3. The illogical and inadequate implementation strategies presented in chapter 3.1.2.

Attempting to explain where illogical and inadequate implementation strategies come from, we have turned to an additional organization theoretical source.

Once these factors have generated incoherence, however, there are additional factors adding to the existing incoherence through generating room for autonomous intra-organizational behavior. These are the pathologies explained in chapter 4.1.3: insulation, bureaucratic culture and cultural congestion. It is important to note that in our analytical model, the room for autonomy suggested by Barnett & Finnemore’s organizational theory only results in incoherence through the institutional structure of the Union. This is illustrated in the map below:
If no room for autonomous behavior is provided for insulation, bureaucratic culture or cultural congestion through institutional cleavages, then organizational behavior will be more coherent. However, if constitutional cleavages are large, the three organizational creators of incoherence obtain space to operate within the institutional structure.

5.1 Explaining Pillar Structure Incoherence

This section of the analysis describes the three creators of incoherence.

5.1.1 Overlapping Competences

The efficiency of foreign policy is, however, [...] down to the quality of the link between the political and economic spheres.” (Gauttier 2004:24)

When the TEU was created, it was important for many negotiating parts that Community institutions did not receive extensive foreign policy powers. Thus, the Pillar Division made sure that all ‘hard’ policy issues stayed in control by the Council and thereby the national representatives.

Economic relations, including the sanction instrument, and promoting HRD are areas where the CFSP arrangement leaves the field open for the executive organs’ overlapping. For instance, the CFSP decides to interrupt economic relations with a Russia that does not respect the rules set by the EU whereas its implementation falls under Community law. Insisting on Human Rights in China is done through Council declarations but the Commission does the actual promoting.
The inability to provide for flexible joint use of both these spheres within the frames of the TEU we believe contributes to the lack of coherence in behavior towards exterior actors.

5.1.2 The Lack of Accountability

As the Union evolves into an even stronger entity, the lack of channels through which to scrutinize powerful actors, most prominent the non-elected bureaucrats of the Commission, grows more and more evident. The deficient control and revision of acting organs is a factor facilitating incoherent actions.

As our work has established, the need for an institution with extensive scrutinizing abilities becomes obvious in the light of the Union’s (and, in particular, the Commission’s) increased foreign policy competences. As described earlier, the European Parliament has some means by which to examine the Commission but the normal rule of order is that the Commission, itself a big policy initiator and a major power player, is also the reviewing and monitoring organ. These dual competences put in the hands of what is essentially a bureaucracy is problematic as far as coherence is concerned and one could only imagine what an independent and powerful reviewer would do to rationalize Commission’s work for it to quadrate with the Union’s guidelines and norms.

5.1.3 Illogical, Broad and Unclear Implemental Strategies

First, in order to be successful, a strategy has to express clear aims and objectives for future action. Second, a strategy has to provide clear ways and means how these objectives shall be reached (Haukkala 2001; 31)

The relation between policy and practice is one of the most common topics when studying organizational and institutional behavior (March 1988; 149). We believe that there is some value in trying to understand incoherent EU actions with help from this organizational theoretical field. To establish a horizontally coherent position is essentially about implementing the policy that the organization guidelines stipulate and getting the different institutions to work towards this in a synergetic conduct (Gauttier 2004). However, as has been shown, the documents regulating how to act towards China and Russia tend to be vague on how to execute the policies.

The instrumental dimensions of the CSR, for example, predate the actual common strategy. Instead, it relies on urging member states to adhere to and further enforce the PCA which, as mentioned in chapter 3, has developed a life of its own (Haukkala & Medvedev (eds.) 2001; 84). It is no long shot that this instrumental section of the CSR, stating inter alias that the Commission should “make full and appropriate use of existing instruments and means, in particular
the PCA” (European Council 1999; Instruments and Means; II) is a short way out for the Council.

When interpreting inadequate decision implementation, one of two well-recognized possible explanations\(^8\) is, according to contributors to the classic *Decisions and Organizations* (Baier et al 1988; 151), a "conflict of interest between policy makers and bureaucratic agents, and thus [...] deficiencies in organizational control". In the light of the trade-focused bureaucratic European Community that the Commission comes from, combined with presented evidence on the Commission’s partly autonomy, this explanation seems plausible.

To this, we would like to add a possible third explanation: the lack of comprehensive policy-implementation instructions. The Commission may know very well how to regulate energy trade policies with Russia. But is it an uncontested matter what way to do this to “improve the exploitation and management of resources and security of supplies in Russia and in Europe” and in a way that corresponds with the Council’s guidelines about the “integration of Russia into the European and world economy”? (European Council 1999; Principal Objective II) As opposed to formulating the policy, implementing political decisions

may seem tedious. It certainly involves less glamorous people. Those who formulate and adopt policies – the powerful actors – do not concern themselves with the nitty-gritty of implementation. It is the controversy surrounding new ideas and programs that is exciting and rewarding to politicians. How easy it is to assign the responsibilities for implementations to the bureaucrats […]. (Beyer et al 1983; 240f)

In the ubiquitous discussions about EU institutions, one trivial fact is often forgotten: The Council’s delegates are politicians, The Commission’s are not (at least not constitutionally). As pointed out by Beyer and co-authors in an old but convincing truth, there are no incentives for politicians to spend time formulating concrete action plans. This principle may traditionally mostly concern national administrations but is applicable also on the European Union, where the premier executive organ meets under compressed conditions only a couple of times a year.

### 5.2 Explaining Organizational Reasons for Incoherence with Barnett & Finnemore’s IO Pathologies

Previously in the text, interpillar incoherence has been presented chiefly as result of the peculiar institutional arrangement of the EU. When overlapping competences are present, when instrumental dimensions of policy implementation are inadequate alongside with poor constitutional arrangements for accountability, coherence is a practical impossibility. That these preconditions lie creates space for the more extensive incoherent behavior that can result from

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\(^8\) The other one being incompetent bureaucracy, a condition that does not seem very likely in the case of the European élite administration.
bureaucratic culture and insulation. However, it is not only a precondition but also a regenerating process; constitutionally framed incoherence provides space for cultural incoherence – presented below as cultural congestion.

Using Barnett & Finnemore’s pathological IO traits when exploring the sources of incoherence, the analysis consists of three parts: Bureaucratic universalism, insulation and cultural congestion. The three matters are addressed one by one.

5.2.1 The Bureaucratic Culture

The Commission’s bureaucratic culture is strong. As stated in chapter 2, the Commission is founded on a French bureaucracy-ideal that holds bureaucracies in high esteem, considering them to be impartial and efficient policy implementers. Previously the only sizeable institution of the Union that possesses supranational competencies in implementing European market integration-related policy, the Commission had large elbowroom in implementing its decisions. It could maintain this maneuvering space partly because achieving economic interdependence throughout Europe was regarded as the best way to sustainable peace in a war-ridden, peace-longing Europe. Today, the EU has attained a considerably higher degree of politicization. Implementation of the CFSP – which involves power political international relations - for instance, is much more delicate a task than dealing with internal market trade.

The Commission’s chances to live up to the bureaucratic universalism-ideal are not good. As mentioned in the analysis’ previous chapter, the lack of instrumental aspects in policy guidelines contestably makes policy implementation a politicized task. Furthermore, when conflicting goals are present, the illogical framing of policy guidelines makes a ranking of what goals to prioritize unfeasible, providing the Commission space to implement policy arbitrarily based on its own agenda.

5.2.2 Insulation

The second pathology that Barnett & Finnemore distinguishes is insulation. The case of the EU’s divided stance on China’s forthcoming WTO entrance is an example of such. As holding the Commission accountable for its actions is difficult, the Commission could override the public decision making by choosing a policy deviating from that of an ambiguous Council. Such Commission behavior, at odds with prevailing IR theory, makes perfect sense when approaching the Commission as a partly autonomous, trade-focused institution.
5.2.3 Cultural Congestion

Incoherence as result of cultural congestion has already been propounded. The core of the EU’s work, i.e. ruling the internal market to enhance intra-European trade relations, remains a key feature in the post-TEU structure. In external relations, where goals have been merged with other overarching duties, trade issues are increasingly political and disputed. Once again, in the case of China’s WTO entrance, Member States concerned with Chinese poor HRD performance were set aside by the Commission’s devotion to trade as a development tool - a clear-cut example of how an outdated bureaucratic culture lives on within the EU-system.

5.3 Conclusion

The conclusion of the analysis is that the Commission’s intra-organizational historical traits, that contribute to shape its identity and provide it some autonomy, amplifies constitutionally based incoherencies. Reversely, incoherencies derived from formally institutionalized structures result in autonomous Commission implementation.
6 Discussion

Having analyzed explanations to intra-EU external policy incoherence, we wrap up with a discussion about some possible consequences of incoherence.

6.1 What is at stake?

As we see it, there are two main implications of incoherence. Externally, the power of the EU in its external relations will be less the optimal, since its power depends on its ability to adhere to its goals. Internally, the EU loses democratic legitimacy as the Council is the main provider of (though dubious) people’s representation in the EU’s political system.

In the same spirit as the moral principles in the Preamble, we believe expecting the EU to actively promoting HRD and holding the Union accountable for living up to its words is not to disregard as naïve procedure for idealists. Considering moral principles when assessing the EU’s responsibility profoundly influences the way we should expect the Union to behave. However, one cannot directly transform the logics into EU responsibility, since the problem of identifying who carries what responsibility remains. Ironically, this problem was what the principles initially were consulted to disentangle.

The mandate on which the Commission was founded was one of ensuring European peace and fostering democracy. The method to achieve the goal was clear; to interlink Europe’s war-ridden industrial heart through economic cooperation. The mandate penetrated the core of the organization, providing it its much needed raison d’être.

Over time however, our social framework changes. New generations form perspective essentially different from that of the past. The EU no longer needs to defend its territory as a peace and democracy guarantor, it acquires legitimacy through being a part of a social context – as people expect the EU to exist, it exists.

There are many analogues between the EU in its cradle and the EU of today. Peace and democracy (at least nominally) remain chief interests, economic integration continues to be the executive’s preferred route to get there. However, the world to which the Union seeks to proliferate its values and ideas has changed. China and Russia are good examples of large international actors with a set of values and principles different from those of Europe, partly derived from fundamentally different historical experiences. Thus the political aspirations and expectations of Russia and China are considerably different from ours. For this reason, we believe it is important to investigate thoroughly what instruments designed to influence have desirable effects. A positive instrument, such as trade, can be an important tool. When soft power political tools coexist with realpolitik, as in the EU since the implementation of the TEU, however, these tools need to
be very carefully designed. Otherwise, bureaucracy rule comes to challenge public power, the very core of what the bureaucracy was established to safeguard.

Being aware of the Commission’s autonomous tendencies, historically entrenched trade competences, unclear instrumental aspects and deficient accountability, the Council should be responsible for presenting clear, noncontradictory instrumental aspects.

It is tempting to suspect that the built-in incoherence in the modern EU is something that few within the system actually want to change. In the current system both the Council and the Commission can have clean consciences when it comes to how the EU has handled HRD in China and Russia. On the other hand, with an objective scrutinizer within the system or clearer instructions for how to actually fulfill the goals, neither of them would probably feel as well. The lacking accountability within the EU system is maybe the biggest threat to its continuing development.

As the distributive principles listed in the preamble show, with power comes moral responsibility. It is our view that failure to observe this responsibility needs to be taken seriously not only as it is of relevance to our own democracy, but as it may affect the outlooks for living in freedom for billions of people in the world.

The thesis has addressed the issue of bold authoritarian states emerging on the world political arena. This reinforces the importance of an EU that acts coherently in its external relations. Beetham argued that standing up for democratic values abroad is a measurement of democratic status at home. Although we have shown that it is inevitable that ‘low’ and ‘high’ political spheres clash, the Union should take every measure to bridge the institutionalized cleavages we have mapped out. When institutions are provided playing room by such a separation of competences, each institution will act in the way that seems rational to it – provided its unique history and competences. In order for the institutions under the European Union roof to form an entity, institutional cleavages need to be compressed.

It might appear like we, as many others (primarily Eurocrats), advocate a stronger influence of supranational decision making in the EU’s policy process. This is however not the case – our reasoning can be used to take the opposite position: when the system generates incoherent positions, no extensive external competence shall be allowed the European Union. In our view, acting coherently is an important precondition for the EU to have foreign policy competence.

6.1.1 Conclusion

An incoherent EU is a weakened EU. Whether negligence or incapacity is to blame for the Union’s failure to live up to democratic ideals and foreign policy goals, the result is a flimsy approval base from the Union’s citizens and an ambivalent international actor.

Incoherence also poses a potential threat in the changing world order. To deal with China and Russia in a proper manner, the EU needs chivalrous ways and economic carrots. However, this does not contradict the procedure of contemplating over how to form policies and institutional mechanisms through which the EU can stay true to its values. These values,
in turn, should mirror the values of the population of Europe. We hope that explanations provided will be of help in this discussion.
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