Democratization and Structured Contingency in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

-A Nested Investigation

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Abstract

The aim with this study is to empirically investigate explanations behind different levels of democracy in a competitive authoritarian setting. My theoretical perspective is based on a structured contingency approach, since I argue that the common dichotomy between structural and actor-oriented causes behind democratization is unfruitful. Moreover, I use a nested research design that combines cross-national analyses with case study research.

The main finding of the quantitative analysis is that diffusion effects and opposition mobilization are significant when it comes to explaining variation on the dependent variable. Among these factors the small-N analysis focuses on the latter, which is motivated by the fact that the statistical result concerning opposition mobilization is relatively more secure.

The case study investigates the bulldozer revolution that occurred in Serbia (2000). In this analysis I demonstrate that the ousting of Milosevic can be understood from a background of low regime legitimacy and international inspiration effects. These structural circumstances enabled actors within the Serbian opposition to mobilize massively, which in the end led to splits between the incumbent regime and the state security forces.

*Key words*: competitive authoritarianism, nested research design, structured contingency, opposition mobilization, diffusion effects.
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1 The End of the Transition Paradigm

During the “third wave” of democracy, the democratization literature has been clearly influenced by the “transition paradigm”. One of the core assumptions within this line of thought is that any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition toward democracy (Diamond, 2002: 23).

The empirical reality does, however, show that the breakdown of authoritarian rule can lead anywhere and today numerous countries inhabit the “foggy zone” between closed authoritarianism and liberal democracy. Such regimes should not be conceptualized as “in transition”. Instead, they consist of relatively established institutional forms that are likely to remain for the foreseeable future (Howard et al, 2006: 365).

The rise of regimes that mix both democratic and authoritarian elements is not a new phenomenon, but it resonates distinctively with the post-Cold War era. Thus, the drying up of aid to Soviet and U.S. client states, the military and economic ascendance of Western democracies and the virtual disappearance of legitimate regime alternatives have created strong incentives to adopt formal democratic institutions (Levitsky et al, 2005: 20).

The above factors have facilitated a situation where “hybrid regimes” have become the most common regime type in the world (Diamond, 2002: 26). They are, nevertheless, seldom investigated on an empirical basis and the aim of this study is to address this gap in the literature by using a “nested” research design and a “structured contingency” approach.

Academic writings have produced a variety of labels for mixed regimes, including: “delegative democracy” (O’Donnell, 1994), “semi democracy” (Case, 1996), “semi authoritarianism” (Ottaway, 2003) and “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria, 1997). My intention is to investigate causes behind democratic development in states that are “competitive authoritarian” (CA). This regime type constitutes, in comparison to other forms of authoritarianism, a typical stepping stone to democracy and it entails a relatively dynamic interaction between the opposition and the incumbent regime (McFaul, 2005: 7). With this said the guiding question for this thesis is as follows:

(Q) What explains differences in levels of democracy in a competitive authoritarian setting?

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1 This implies that they: (a) have attributes of a democratic political life and (b) that they at the same time suffer from serious democratic deficits that it makes no sense to classify them as democracies (Schedler, 2002: 36f).

2 These measures are the primary building blocks of this thesis and the combined use of them separate my study from other works in the field, such as the ones performed by Howard et al (2006) and Wahman (2008).

3 See figure 1 on p.3.
2 Theory

In this chapter my first aim is to give an account for how I aim to conceptualize competitive authoritarianism. My second purpose is to address the traditional division between structural and agency-centered explanations behind democratization.

2.1 Competitive Authoritarianism as a Regime Type

Following the argument made by Adcock et al (2001: 532), I argue that it is essential to provide a fleshed out account of the “systematized concept” under consideration. In order to do this I intend to use a five-fold typology that relates CA to the larger universe of political regimes in the world today.

This scheme is displayed in the tree diagram below (p. 2). The four factors that distinguish different regimes are listed on the left and the regime types are listed on the right. With figure 1 at hand one important caveat is necessary to make. Elections are at the center of this categorization. This does not imply that elections should be regarded as a sole indicator of democracy. I do, however, follow the tradition of e.g. Schumpeter (1975) and Huntington (1991) and argue that the degree of contestation and participation in the selection of national leaders is crucial when it comes to separating different types of political regimes.

As figure 1 shows, closed authoritarian regimes are marked by the absence of national elections. In addition, these countries are characterized by the banning of oppositional parties, the wide spread use of repression and harassment by the incumbent regime and a weak civil society (Schedler, 2002: 38f).

Hegemonic authoritarian regimes are also recognized by violation of political rights and civil liberties. On the other hand they do hold elections, although these largely constitute an authoritarian facade, where the dominant party wins almost the entire vote (Diamond, 2002: 29ff).

Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from hegemonic authoritarian ones in the sense that regular, contested elections are held between the ruling party and a legitimate opposition. Thus, in CA regimes elections are viewed as the principal means of obtaining power, even though the incumbents repress the opposition and in some cases manipulate electoral results.

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4 The phrase “absence of national elections” refers to the absence of national elections for the direct selection of authoritarian executive leaders or for a parliament that selects authoritarian executive leaders (Howard et al, 2006: 367).
To summarize; even if the autocratic leaders have a clear advantage in the political playing field, democratic institutions exist and the rulers, as well as their opponents must take them seriously. Taken together, this dynamic implies that significant steps of democratization can (and frequently do) occur in a CA setting (Levitsky et al, 2002: 52ff).

Both hegemonic authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism involve regular elections under authoritarian conditions. Schedler (2002: 47) has therefore united them into a broader category: “electoral authoritarianism”. Personally, I prefer to withhold the above distinction since it is hard to argue that e.g. Tunisia, where President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali won 99.91 % of the vote in 1999 should be categorized together with Zimbabwe, where President Robert Mugabe won with great difficulties in 2002 (Howard et al, 2006: 367).

The separation between electoral democratic regimes and CA is based on the general free and fairness of the elections. In electoral democracies contests comply with minimal democratic norms, in competitive authoritarian regimes they do not (Schedler, 2002: 37f).

Finally, liberal democratic regimes go one step beyond. In addition to the existence of free and fair elections, such countries are also characterized by e.g. the rule of law, horizontal accountability among officeholders and the widespread protection of political rights and civil liberties (Diamond, 1999: 10).
2.2 Structured Contingency

Much of the democratization literature has been divided into two major theoretical benchmarks. On the one hand authors such as Lipset (1959) and Rueschemeyer et al (1992) have advocated a structuralist perspective. This approach states that certain social structures (e.g. high levels of socioeconomic development) are essential for the prospects of democracy. On the other hand scholars such as O’Donnell et al (1986) and Di Palma (1990) have emphasized an explanatory model based on contingency, meaning that outcomes depend less on objective conditions than on the decisions and behaviors of political leaders.

I find this dichotomy unfruitful and I argue that important theoretical critique can be addressed against both the above perspectives\(^5\). One of the main objectives with this investigation is thus to overcome some of the problems associated with the structure/actor division. In order to do this I aim to show how structure and agency can be merged into a relatively coherent causal model. The key to this enterprise lies in the structured contingency perspective (see figure 2 below). The intuition behind this approach is that the relationship between structure (x) and agency (z), at a given time point, can be understood as a model of direct and indirect effects in relation to the outcome (y), where: \((x) \rightarrow (z) \rightarrow (y)\)\(^6\).

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\(^5\) The structuralist perspective typically assumes that actors face extremely narrow choice sets and it tends to be overly deterministic (Kitschelt, 1992: 1028). Moreover, contingent analyses often commit the mistake of voluntarism by minimizing the possibility of political leaders to be affected by economic, social and institutional factors (Adeney et al, 2004: 4f).

\(^6\) The term “structure” is defined widely and as the ceaseless constraints imposed by e.g. geography, social hierarchy, institutions, collective psychology and economic need (Braudel, 1994: 27f). “Agency” is conceptualized as the actions, choices and behavior of individual agents, organizations, parties etc. Finally, “outcome” is understood to be the dependent variable, i.e. the phenomenon that one seeks to explain.
Before moving over to the aggregated research design of this investigation two clarifications are necessary to make in regard to the above discussion. First, I stipulate that historically created structures impart a motif for political action. This does not imply that the arrows in figure 2 are deterministic. The way I see it people can make their own history, even if not under conditions of their own choosing. On the other hand structures are not unimportant and they constitute “confining conditions” that restrict or enhance the choices available to political leaders (Karl, 1990: 7).

Second, the standpoint that (x) affects (z) at a snap shot in time does not exclude the possibility of a more dynamic relationship; the structured contingency perspective also assumes that the decisions of influential political actors today, may lead to outcomes that change even durable structures in the future (Bratton et al, 1997: 45). In the causal scheme that was outlined on the previous page, this thought is represented by the connections flowing from outcome at (T¹) to structure at (T²) and so forth.
3 Method

Below, I present the aggregated research design. This is followed by a description of how I aim to operationalize two of the main concepts of this investigation.

3.1 Aggregated Research Design

The purpose with this thesis is to explain democratization in a CA setting from a structured contingency perspective by using a nested method that combines quantitative investigations with a case study analysis. In short, I argue that this “mixed method” combines the advantages of each approach and that there is a synergistic value to the nested research design; statistical analyses can guide selection for in depth research and case studies can be used to assess the plausibility of statistical relationships. This integrated strategy thus improves the prospects of making valid causal inferences (Lieberman, 2005: 435).

With this said the investigation will start with a large-N analysis (LNA), which more specifically will be based on a multiple regression analysis. This method makes generalizations possible and it provides a flexible tool for evaluating the isolated effect of an independent variable, while controlling for other explanatory factors (Esaiasson et al, 2004: 405).

In order to capture some part of the structured contingency argument the independent variables of the statistical investigations will be divided into two groups, which will be analyzed separately before they are included into the same regression model. As will be clear later on (see chapter 4) I aim to evaluate both structural (category 1) and actor-oriented factors (category 2) and since I have stipulated that agency, at a given time point, is an effect off rather than the cause behind structural conditions, I find it theoretically problematic to, in a first step control the variables in the first group for those in the second.

It is, however, difficult to adequately detect fine tuned causal processes on a quantitative level (Lieberman, 2005: 444). The more exact mechanisms of the structured contingency perspective will therefore be investigated through a small-N analysis (SNA), where one of my key intentions is to seek linkages between specific structural circumstances and certain forms of political action.

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7 The intuition behind this statement is that according to the logic of causal order, more proximate causes should not be controlled for when more remote explanatory factors are tested (Hadenius et al, 2006: 21f).
3.2 Operationalizations

Within this section my purpose is to give an account for how I, in the LNA, intend to measure levels of democracy as well as competitive authoritarianism.

3.2.1 Levels of Democracy

The dependent variable of this study is levels of democracy and I aim to operationalize this concept through a combined scale that includes two of the most acknowledged indices within the democratization literature. More specifically I will use a 10-point measure (where 0 represents “least democratic” and 10 “most democratic”), which calculates the mean value of each country’s democratic status according to Freedom House and Polity Score\(^8\). This is an index that according to Hadenius et al (2004: 30) outperforms all rival operationalizations of democracy.

Figures from Freedom House and Polity Score are commonly used in quantitative studies of democratization and I argue that they provide an adequate operationalization of the dependent variable. This does not imply that they are flawless and I am aware that important critique has been directed towards them both. Freedom House has, for example, been accused for systematically disadvantaging leftist governments and the Polity Score has been criticized for having insufficient coding rules (Mainwaring et al, 2001: 53ff).

3.2.2 Competitive Authoritarianism

The purpose with the LNA is to investigate CA regimes. It is, however, difficult to quantitatively operationalize this concept since the nature of authoritarian elections is a “black box”, which we (almost) never can whiten in its entirety (Schedler, 2006: 8). How then do we recognize a CA country when we see one? Within the frame of this study I use the following coding criteria:

First, and in order to separate CA regimes from liberal and electoral democracies (see section 2.1), I exclude states that receive a score of 7.5 or better on the combined Freedom House and Polity Score index\(^9\). Second, I leave out countries that are marked by the “absence of national elections” (i.e. closed authoritarian regimes).

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\(^8\) More information about the dependent variable and the Freedom House and Polity Score indices are presented in the codebook (section: 9.1).

\(^9\) This threshold is of course arbitrary but it is motivated by the fact that the same cut off point is used by Hadenius et al (2007: 145) in a similar study.
This leaves me in a third step with competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes. To capture the difference between these political systems, which crucially hinges on the prevalence of “contested elections” (see figure 1), I include a threshold based on electoral data. In this sense I argue that regimes where the winning party gains more than 70 % of the seats in the national legislature should be coded as hegemonic authoritarian, whereas regimes with a winning party that receives less than 70 % of the seats should be classified as CA.

This threshold is not self evident and Munck et al (2004: 13f) have criticized it for being simplistic. With this objection in mind the strategy is inspired by scholars such as Howard et al (2006) and Wantchekon (2003). On the other hand my operationalization differ somewhat from theirs as they count the popular vote while I, due to lack of data measure the distribution of seats in the national legislature

The above measures leave me with a population that consists of 714 observations that cover 95 countries during the time range: 1972- 2004. This time span is motivated by the fact that Freedom House starts measuring democracy in 1972. At last, the number of observations related to my independent variables begins to decrease in the most recent years and I have therefore decided to use 2004 as an end point.

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10 Theoretically, it is possible to argue that this measure is inadequate since it, *ceteris paribus*, should be easier to receive a higher proportion of seats within majoritarian electoral systems. The population could therefore be accused for having a systematic bias. This relationship is not, however, present within my universe of cases, where 222 observations are categorized as “proportional” and 284 as “majoritarian”.

4 Previous Research

In this chapter I present the explanatory factors of the LNA. These are divided into two main groups, structural and actor-oriented variables (see section 3.1), and my intention is to give an account for their theoretical background and to shortly discuss my operationalizations of them\textsuperscript{11}.

4.1 Structural Variables

Below, my purpose is to describe some of the most widely emphasized structural variables within the democratization literature. The following text discusses seven more specific factors, which are divided into three thematically ordered categories: domestic economic determinants, institutional determinants and international determinants.

4.1.1 Domestic Economic Determinants

Since the seminal article provided by Lipset (1959), numerous investigations have confirmed that one of the most stable determinants of democracy across the globe is the level of \textit{socioeconomic modernization}\textsuperscript{12}. I thus find it essential to include this factor into the analysis and I aim to measure it through the Bank’s modernization index.

The existent level of socioeconomic modernization is not the only economic factor that has been stipulated to have an effect on democratization. Another variable of importance is the short-term \textit{economic growth}. To concretize, rapid economic decline is assumed to affect the legitimacy of the incumbent regime negatively, which in turn increases the possibility for popular protests to occur (McFaul, 2005: 8f). This factor is operationalized by the annual growth in real GDP per capita. With this said I expect the following:

\textsuperscript{11} For more detailed information about the operationalizations of the variables, see codebook (section 9.1).
\textsuperscript{12} See for example Jackman (1973) and Bollen (1979).
(H1) Higher levels of socioeconomic modernization increase the likelihood of democratization.

(H2) Higher levels of economic growth decrease the likelihood of democratization.

4.1.2 Institutional Determinants

The importance of institutional factors has been discussed for a long time amongst political scientists and one particularly longstanding debate concerns the relative effectiveness of parliamentary and presidential systems\textsuperscript{13}. Even though theoretical expectations can go in both directions, the general consensus is that presidentialism is less conducive to democracy (Przeworski et al, 2000: 44ff).

This conclusion can be understood as follows: presidentialism is more prone to “winner-take-all” politics. Moreover, it has a tendency to lead to political polarization and violent contests for the presidency, especially in ethnically divided countries (Linz, 1990: 60).

Another important institutional discussion within the democratization literature concerns the merits of different electoral systems. Although the presumed effects once again are somewhat unclear, Lindberg (2006: 157f) has argued that proportional electoral systems (PR) typically give minorities better representation and that they thereby tend to reduce anti-democratic behavior. Having stated this the effects of both presidentialism and a proportional electoral system are, for the purpose of this investigation, measured by data from the Database on Political institutions\textsuperscript{14} (Keefer, 2005).

The final institutional factor that I aim to test in the statistical analysis is electoral experience. The inclusion of this variable is based on the assumption that experience with elections functions as a rough “proxy” for the extent to which the citizens in a given country have played a part in national political life. In turn, a high level of previous participation is assumed to affect recurrent patterns of mass political behavior and expectations about citizenship. In other words, a long history of previous elections, even if under conditions that are not free and fair, encourage people to play a part in politics (Bratton et al, 1997: 143). This factor is measured by the number of elections that a country has held since 1919. To conclude, I hypothesize as follows:

\textsuperscript{13} See for example Lijphart (1991) and Horowitz (1990).

\textsuperscript{14} When it comes to presidentialism and proportional elections it would also have been interesting to measure the effects of their institutional counter parts, i.e. parliamentarism and majoritarian elections. I have, however, chosen to not perform such tests. This decision is primarily motivated by the high number of observations that are excluded from the analysis when such controls are undertaken.
(H3) Presidential systems decrease the likelihood of democratization.

(H4) Proportional electoral systems increase the likelihood of democratization.

(H5) Higher levels of electoral experience increase the likelihood of democratization.

4.1.3 International Determinants

International factors have traditionally been seen as relatively unimportant compared to domestic explanations behind democracy. A growing literature on democratization at the international level has, however, flourished in recent years. This increased interest in the external dimension of regime development can be exemplified with the works of writers such as Brinks et al (2006) and Huntington (1991), who both have discussed the importance of geographical diffusion effects – the spread of democracy or autocracy from one country to another.

To operationalize such “snowballing effects” is not an easy task and it is especially hard to determine the spatial level of importance; should diffusion be assumed to be most profound among neighboring countries, or is it regional or global mechanisms that matter? In this study I have decided to follow the argument laid forward by Bunce et al (2006) and Bieber (2003), which implies that I intend to use a measure that calculates the mean democratic value (according to the combined Freedom House and Polity Score index that was described in section 3.2) on a regional basis.

Another international determinant that is tested in this investigation is aid dependence. This factor is assumed to affect the dependent variable in two ways: (a) Regimes that are dependent on aid assistance tend to be more vulnerable to international political pressures regarding human rights. (b) The more economically dependent a country is, the more its population will perceive that its government is weak, which increases the likelihood of popular challenges against the incumbent regime (Bratton et al, 1997: 135f). The prevalence of aid dependence is measured by the share of aid as a percentage of GDP. To summarize, two hypotheses can be drawn from the above discussion:

(H6) Higher levels of democracy, on a regional basis, increase the likelihood of democratization.

(H7) Higher levels of aid dependence increase the likelihood of democratization.
4.2 Actor-Oriented Variables

In this section my intention is to give an account for the actor-oriented variables that will be used in the LNA, but before I describe the different factors one caveat is important to make. The aim of this study is to investigate both structural and actor-oriented factors. The conceptual distinction between these categories is, however, sometimes muddled within the democratization literature.

To exemplify, Hadenius et al (2006) investigate aspects such as: demonstrations, riots and strikes and they implicitly label them as “structural determinants”. According to my opinion these factors should instead be seen as related to strategic decisions within the opposition to mobilize and in this way they are more adequately described as “actor-oriented factors”, although they do not capture the full breadth of the traditional contingency perspective that was briefly outlined in section (2.2)\textsuperscript{15}. With this said the following text focuses more closely on two of the most important actors within the competitive authoritarian context, i.e. the opposition and the incumbent regime.

4.2.1 The Opposition

Below, I develop three hypotheses related to the opposition in a CA setting and to begin with I argue that widespread public mobilization, orchestrated by the opposition, can play an essential role in challenging the regime. Such protests decrease the legitimacy of the authoritarian rule and provide signals to the electorate that the incumbents are vulnerable to defeat (Howard et al, 2006: 372).

In order to operationalize opposition mobilization I have created an index that incorporates Bank’s measures of anti-government demonstrations and strikes. This operationalization differs from the variable “political protests” used by Bratton et al (1997: 128), which also includes number of riots. Even though riots generally are assumed to have a positive impact on democratization, the theoretical support for this factor is weaker than for demonstrations and strikes because riots counts violent oppositional activities.

The intuition here is that violent forms of protests are more likely to tip the political development in an authoritarian direction since the regime during such conditions are more likely to respond with repression and strengthened authoritarian control (Binnendijk et al, 2006: 412f). To summarize, I test opposition mobilization (demonstrations, strikes) and riots separately. Both these variables are expected to affect democracy positively, although the effects of riots are theoretically more uncertain.

\textsuperscript{15} A similar conceptualization has been used by Howard et al (2006: 370) and Bratton et al (1997: 184).
Finally, I also want to make an assessment on the effects of opposition cohesion, which according to Van de Walle (2006: 77f) is correlated with democratic advances. He argues that divided oppositions expend energy and political capital in internal discussions and by criticizing each other as much as the authoritarian leaders, such movements inevitably lose credentials.

Even though it is difficult to fully measure this aspect by using quantitative data, I argue that it is possible to investigate some part of this important mechanism by looking at the number of seats distributed to the leading opposition party in the national legislature. I am aware that this variable has difficulties with capturing the interaction between different political parties. Moreover, a high degree of cohesion can be achieved in the absence of a large oppositional contender if several minor parties chose to cooperate. Despite this objection I argue that the above factor should function as a rough proxy for the degree of opposition cohesion in a given country, assuming that the higher the number of seats distributed to the leading opposition party, the more likely the opposition is united. With this said I expect that:

\( \text{(H8)} \) Higher levels of opposition mobilization increase the likelihood of democratization.

\( \text{(H9)} \) Higher levels of riots increase the likelihood of democratization.

\( \text{(H10)} \) Higher levels of opposition cohesion increase the likelihood of democratization.

4.2.2 The Regime

The other major player that is crucial for democratization in a CA context is the incumbent regime and in this investigation I intend to look at two more specific variables related to this actor.

First, I aim to control for the effects of chief executive tenure. The theoretical background of this factor is as follows: the stability of competitive authoritarian regimes often rests on the personalistic rule of the incumbent and his/her ability to overcome pressures for democracy. Consequently, when the autocratic leader dies or is forced out of office, political liberalization is more likely to occur (Howard et al, 2006: 372). This theory is measured by the number of years that the chief executive of a given country has remained in power.

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\(^{16}\) A similar operationalization has been used by Van de Walle (2006: 81). He does, however, look at the share of the vote received by the leading opposition candidate while I, due to lack of data measure the number of seats in the national legislature.
The second variable that I intend to test within this section is *spoils* distributed by the authoritarian government. Following the discussion put forward by Gandhi et al (2007: 1282f), it is possible to argue that authoritarian rulers often need to cooperate with various segments of society in order to avoid popular unrest and that one way of doing this is to distribute spoils throughout the population.

I operationalize this aspect through the indicator public spending as a fraction of per capita GDP. Two setbacks are, nevertheless, associated with this measure: To begin with it is problematic to look at public spending and assume that it should have a negative effect on democratization, when aspects such as education and public schooling, which are stipulated to have a long term positive impact on democracy are correlated to it. Moreover, it only serves as a rough proxy for the standpoint outlined by Gandhi et al, who also argue that spoils can be made out of perks, privileges and direct monetary rewards. With these caveats in mind I hypothesize that:

(H11) Higher levels of chief executive tenure decrease the likelihood of democratization

(H12) Higher levels of spoils distributed by the incumbent regime decrease the likelihood of democratization.
5 Cross-National Statistical Analysis

This study uses a nested research design in order to analyze explanations behind democratization in a CA context. Following the recommendation of Lieberman (2005: 436) the investigation starts with a cross-national statistical analysis, which eventually will provide case selection criteria for the SNA.

In the method chapter I mentioned that the independent variables of the LNA are divided into two categories, which will be analyzed separately before they are controlled for each other. This means that I, in order to roughly capture some aspects of the concept structured contingency; first aim to test the structural factors of the study. In a next step my intention is to evaluate the actor-oriented variables and finally, the theories that have received statistical significance (p) in the prior analyses will be included into a third model. With this said the statistical analysis ends with a test for a lagged dependent variable (LDV).

Before moving over to the regression analyses two caveats are necessary to make: First, the above distinction is very rough and it is also possible to argue that causal interactions take place within the different categories. In this way spoils distributed by the incumbent can, for example, be hypothesized to have a negative effect on opposition mobilization (Gandhi et al, 2007: 1282f).

Second, it may seem contradictory to argue that it is problematic to control structural variables for the effects of actor-oriented ones (see section 3.1), when this is exactly what I do in the third model. To build a comprehensive scheme is not, however, the purpose with these measures. My intention is rather to avoid some easily identified causal mistakes.

5.1 Structural Variables

The results concerning the structural variables of the investigation have been outlined on the left hand side (model 1) of figure 1 (p. 20). To begin with this analysis shows that a relatively high number of variables: diffusion effects, socioeconomic modernization, proportional electoral system, presidentialism and electoral experience, have received statistical significance.

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17 The threshold for statistical significance is at the .10 level. This cut off point is arbitrary but commonly used in regression analyses (Barro 1999: 169).
All of the significant factors have reached expected signs except socioeconomic modernization, which have a negative coefficient. This surprising result contradicts years of quantitative research and implies that a high degree of socioeconomic modernization should be seen as negatively correlated with democratization. Even though a similar relationship has been found by Way (2005: 242) in the cases of: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, I argue that this result needs to be further investigated.

In order to do this I performed an outlier test where I excluded the units of analysis related to Lebanon 1992-1999, which constituted the most extreme observations within my population in regard to the socioeconomic modernization variable. The result of this regression (model 5) is presented in the appendix (section 9.2) and it shows that the negative significance is driven by these influential cases. Unfortunately, there is no agreed upon action about how to proceed with such results and Kennedy (1993: 45) has stated that simply omitting the outlier is a mistake. In a first step I therefore continue to use the modernization factor (Lebanon included) to see whether it survives some of the more demanding statistical tests that will be performed further on in the investigation.

Two variables, aid dependence and economic growth, failed to reach (p). When it comes to the first of these factors the result corresponds to the findings of McFaul (2005: 16), who argues that foreign aid in the democratization of Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) was an “unessential factor”.

The outcome of economic growth is, however, somewhat more surprising since it has been emphasized by a wide range of scholars in the literature on hybrid regimes18. One possible explanation behind this result is that political factors (vote fraud, repression etc.) are relatively more important than economic meltdowns as triggers for transitions in a CA setting (Thompson et al, 2004: 170f).

5.2 Actor-Oriented Variables

The analysis concerning the actor-oriented variables is represented by model 2 in table 1. This regression shows that three factors: opposition mobilization, chief executive tenure and opposition cohesion reach (p) at the .01 level with theoretically expected coefficients. These variables will therefore be used further on in the investigation and they will be included into model 3 as well as into model 4.

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Two of the factors, spoils and riots, failed to reach statistical significance. In the former case it is possible that the result is an effect of an inadequate operationalization. Previously, I stated that rulers often need to cooperate with various segments in the society and that the indicator government spending only captures a part of this argument. Moreover, the factor received a positive sign, which suggests that it is related to aspects such as public schooling and education rather than to the avoidance of popular unrest (see section 4.2.2).

The frequency of riots was the second variable that did not manage to achieve (p) in the analysis. This result stands in line with the conclusion reached by Foweraker (1995), who found no systematic empirical evidence for the assumption that wide spread strike activity leads to democratization. Another interesting point concerning this factor is related to its negative coefficient. In section 4.1 I argued that the prevalence of riots could be expected to have both a positive and a negative impact on democracy. With the statistical analyses at hand it is clear that the overall effect of the variable is negative, even though it lacks statistical significance.

The number of observations in model 2 is relatively low (n = 225). The single most important variable that accounts for this drop is spoils. In order to raise the (n) and to increase the validity of my findings, I have also made an analysis where this factor has been excluded (model 6). This regression is presented in the appendix (section 9.2) and it analyzes 361 cases. The results are, however, relatively constant in this model and it is the same variables that reach (p).

5.3 Combined Analysis

Below, I combine the significant factors in model 1 and model 2 into a third regression (model 3). My expectation is: (a) that the importance attributed to several of the variables in the first analysis will disappear and (b) that few factors from the second model will fail to reach (p). Earlier (section 2.2) I stipulated that structure and agency constitute a model of direct and indirect effects. Thus, when including more proximate variables into the LNA, I assume that the explanatory power of the structural factors will decrease. Moreover, I hypothesize that the overall significance related to the actor-oriented variables will survive a control for more remote causal factors.

With model 3 at hand it is evident that five factors: diffusion effects, presidentialism, opposition mobilization, chief executive tenure and opposition cohesion, survived the test. The variables that did not achieve (p) were: proportional electoral system, socioeconomic modernization and electoral experience. Before turning to the aggregated interpretation of this analysis I will briefly comment upon these factors.
The variable proportional electoral system failed to achieve statistical significance in the combined regression. This result contradicts the conclusions made by e.g. Reynolds et al (1997) and Kuenzi et al (2005). The second factor that proved to be insignificant was electoral experience. This finding stands in contrast to the conclusion drawn by Bunce et al (2006: 8), who state that a long experience with elections have been an important democratic asset in the post-communist region.

The third variable that failed to reach (p) was socioeconomic modernization. In section 5.1 I noted that the explanatory power of this factor was clearly influenced by an outlier case. In model 3 we can see how the significance of socioeconomic modernization (including the observations related to Lebanon 1992-1999) weakens when additional statistical controls are performed. Taken together, this result implies that modernization is of secondary importance when it comes to explaining democratization in a CA context (McFaul, 2005: 15f).

As hypothesized above, several structural variables have lost their explanatory power in model 3. On the other hand both diffusion effects and presidentialism have survived this test, which may seem contra-intuitive. It has, however, been difficult to adequately operationalize several actor-oriented theories on a quantitative level and it is possible that the explanatory power of these factors would have disappeared in the face of more extensive controls. Finally, and more in line with the expectations of the structured contingency argument, none of the actor-oriented factors have failed to achieve (p), even though opposition mobilization has lost some of its previous significance.

5.4 Lagged Dependent Variable

In this section I describe my fourth model (the right hand side of table 1), which includes a lagged dependent variable. The LDV test is performed with the same variables that were used in Model 3 and the reasons for making this analysis are threefold:

First, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable controls for endogeneity and causality due to the path: \( Y_t \leftarrow Y_{t-q} \leftarrow Y_{t-2q} \rightarrow X_{t-q} \)\(^{19}\) (Finkel, 1995: 24f). Second, it works as an explanatory factor in itself, suggesting that having democracy today may have a positive impact on the probability of having democracy tomorrow. Third, the LDV constitutes a rigidity test since it works as a proxy for every possible explanation behind \( Y_{t-q} \) (Hadenius et al, 2006: 13f).

\(^{19}\) Where \((y)\) is the dependent variable, \((x)\) the independent, \((t)\) the specific time point measured and \((q)\) the prevailing time lag.
If we take a look at model 4 the empirical evidence demonstrates that in addition to the LDV, only two variables: diffusion effects and opposition mobilization, survive this demanding test. Three variables that gained (p) in the previous analysis have thus failed to prove important in this last regression. These factors are: presidentialism, chief executive tenure and opposition cohesion.

The insignificance regarding presidentialism stands in contrast to the conclusion made by Birch (2007). Moreover, the result concerning chief executive tenure decreases the explanatory power of the argument laid forward by Howard et al (2006: 372), who have stated that incumbent turnover should be seen as positively correlated with democratization.

The third variable that failed to reach (p) was opposition cohesion. This outcome contradicts the finding made by Van de Walle (2006: 77f). On the other hand this factor has been difficult to measure quantitatively and as mentioned earlier (section 4.1), it fails to capture such crucial aspects as interactions among different political parties. It is therefore possible that the non-confirmatory result is an effect of an inadequate operationalization.

The two variables that succeeded the LDV test were diffusion effects and opposition mobilization\(^{20}\). The result concerning diffusion is interesting since it stands in contrast to a significant body of work that has downplayed international factors when it comes to democratization\(^{21}\). The finding regarding the positive effects of opposition mobilization is, however, more expected since it lends support to the conclusions made by a large number of scholars, such as Bratton et al (1997) and Howard et al (2006).

Among the above factors the SNA will focus upon opposition mobilization. This decision is motivated by the fact that the variable receives (p) at the .01-level in this last and very conservative control, while diffusion is significant first at the .10-level. I therefore argue that the statistical results concerning the opposition’s decision to mobilize is relatively more secure and that it would be interesting to investigate this aspect more closely.

Even though it would have been preferable to further analyze both the above factors, such measures has not been possible in the present study. I have not had access to statistical programs that have allowed me to identify a case situated on the regression line. Instead, I have been obliged to use a method that analyzes the separate variables used in the quantitative models and since neither diffusion effects nor opposition mobilization show any similarities in this regard, I have decided to only analyze the latter\(^{22}\).

\(^{20}\) In relation to the theoretical discussion about how to measure diffusion (section 4.1.3) I performed two additional analyses (model 7 and model 8 in section 9.2), where I also tested for the effects of diffusion on a neighbourhood/global level. Taken together, these controls suggest that it is the regional level that matters.

\(^{21}\) See for example Carothers (2001) and Grugel (2000).

\(^{22}\) In short, the measure that I have used is called Dfbetas and it calculates the effect that the inclusion/exclusion of a given observation, within a specific variable, has on the regression coefficient. This result is in turn divided with the standard error.
Table 1: Regression Analyses 1972-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Levels of democracy</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid dependence</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief executive tenure</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.128***</td>
<td>-.092***</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion effects</td>
<td>.442***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.214***</td>
<td>.047*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral experience</td>
<td>.041**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition cohesion</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.787***</td>
<td>.215***</td>
<td>-.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition mobilization</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.157***</td>
<td>.065**</td>
<td>.068***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
<td>.537***</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.019***</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional electoral system</td>
<td>-.348**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.355</td>
<td>-.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic modernization</td>
<td>-.277*</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>-.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoils</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.821</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDV</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.900***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R square</td>
<td>.1919</td>
<td>.4327</td>
<td>.3751</td>
<td>.8648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observation</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* significant at the .10-level. ** significant at the .05-level ***significant at the .01-level

Note 1: all the independent variables are lagged with one year.
Note 2: the table displays (p) and the b-values on the coefficients.
6 Case Study

In this chapter I aim to perform a case study related to the previous statistical analysis. According to King et al (1994) it is always useful to investigate as many cases as possible. It has not, however, been possible for me to follow this recommendation because of the limited frames of this thesis. I have therefore decided to only work with one case, even though I am aware of the methodological constraints with this choice.

My purpose with the following text is twofold: First I aim to, from a structured contingency perspective, analyze the relationship between specific structural circumstances and certain forms of political action (see section 3.1). In detail, this implies that I want to review the conditions for the emergence of broad based political protests in the case under consideration. Second, I intend to explain why the opposition’s decision to mobilize is crucial, arguing that such inquiries increase the validity of my quantitative findings by providing a check for spuriousity. With this said the observation that I have decided to focus on is the “bulldozer revolution”, which occurred in Serbia on 5 October 200023.

Before turning to a short summary of the Serbian electoral revolution, my overall argument (which has been outlined in figure 3) runs as follows: the ousting of Milosevic can be understood from a background of low regime legitimacy and facilitated by international inspiration effects, the opposition was able to mobilize massively. In the end this led to splits within the ruling regime, which in turn caused an authoritarian break down.

Figure 3: The Pathway to Democratic Progress in Serbia 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background factor</th>
<th>Facilitating factor</th>
<th>Proximate factor</th>
<th>Causal mechanism</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime legitimacy</td>
<td>Inspiration effects</td>
<td>Opposition mobilization</td>
<td>Regime Splits</td>
<td>Democratic progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 This case has been chosen since it, according to the measure Dfbetas (see section 5.4), constituted one of the most “confirmed observations” on the opposition mobilization variable. I therefore argue that since Serbia 2000 has a strong influence on the regression result, an investigation of this case should provide adequate empirical support for the mechanisms that generate this outcome. Moreover and among the ten observations that were highlighted by Dfbetas (see section 9.3), the decision to focus on the bulldozer revolution was arbitrary but based on the high amount of easily accessible information that was present on the subject.
6.1 The Bulldozer Revolution

On several occasions during the 1990s, large numbers of activists protested against Milosevic. The most widespread of these demonstrations occurred in 1996-1997, when clearly fraudulent municipal elections were held. As a response against the actions of the incumbent regime, citizens mobilized for 88 days until Milosevic made concessions on the election results (D’Anieri, 2006: 340f).

In the wake of these protests the Serbian opposition movement was plagued by deep internal divisions, which made it difficult to create a viable political alternative to the prevailing authoritarian government. This situation changed first in January 2000, when the leaders of the Serbian opposition decided to set their differences apart and to unite behind the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). The DOS was made out of 18 political parties and it appointed Vojislav Kostunica as its presidential candidate (McFaul, 2005: 9).

On 24 September 2000 a presidential election was held and two days later, representatives of both Kostunica and Milosevic declared that their candidate had won. The following day the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) presented the official results, which undermined both these claims. According to their count, Kostunica had only won with 48.96 % of the vote (while Milosevic received 38.62 %) and since the constitution demanded that the winning candidate receives a majority of the popular support, they announced that a run off should be held on 8 October (Birch, 2002: 505).

This decision was rejected by Kostunica and the DOS since the parallel vote tabulation performed by the opposition showed that the official election result was fraudulent. On 2 October the DOS increased the stakes even further, calling for demonstrations and a general strike throughout the country (Miskovic, 2001: 104).

On 5 October citizens from around Serbia converged on Belgrade and the crowd, which was made out of approximately one million protestors, stormed the parliamentary buildings and the headquarters of the regime led Radio Television Serbia (McFaul, 2005: 13). One particular event –the breaking of a police barrier by a driver using heavy construction equipment- gave the events their name: the bulldozer revolution. On 6 October Milosevic eventually recognized Kostunica to be the democratically elected President and he decided to, at least temporarily, step down from the political scene (Thompson et al, 2004: 168).

6.2 Background Factor

In this section, my aim is to give an account for the structural background factors that enabled the Serbian opposition movement to oust Milosevic in the 2000 election. The discussion is centred on four specific factors, which all are related to low levels of regime legitimacy.
(a) During the end of his rule Milosevic began to tighten the degree of authoritarian control in Serbia and the increased use of repression decreased his support. In 1998 the regime moved openly against the independent media and the universities and in May 2000, Milosevic put down demonstrations with large-scale violence for the first time since 1991 (Gordy, 2000: 81).

(b) Another factor that was crucial in the falling support for Milosevic was the several military defeats he suffered, which culminated with the 1999 NATO air campaign. With the end of the Kosovo war and the subsequent loss of control over Serbia’s “sacred places”, Milosevic’s image as a saviour of the country was eventually shattered (Thompson et al, 2004: 165).

(c) Even though the living standard had been low in Serbia for a long time, the NATO bombings served to further undermine the economic situation. The 78-day bombing campaign resulted in more than $30 billion in material damages (Miskovic, 2001: 100). Moreover, the war led to wide spread economic sanctions and in April 2000 unemployment rates were as high as 27.4% (Birch, 2002: 504).

(d) As mentioned above (section 6.1), Milosevic tried to steal the 2000 presidential elections by committing himself to a wide spread use of electoral fraud. This did, however, enable the opposition to focus attention on the regime’s misdeeds and to engage protestors all over Serbia in the ousting of the incumbent regime. More specifically, Milosevic’s attempt to steal the election gave rise to a single grievance for all citizens to focus on simultaneously, which provided an ideal mobilization opportunity (D’Anieri, 2006: 335).

To summarize, the opposition mobilization that occurred in Serbia can be understood against the background of a long growing popular discontent against the incumbent regime, where the fraudulent election in 2000 served as a “trigger event” and a “focal point” for a large number of people who already wanted to achieve political change.

6.3 Facilitating Factor

From a background of low regime legitimacy, several factors served to facilitate the Serbian electoral revolution. Among these explanatory variables I have chosen to more intensely focus on the significance of international inspiration effects. This factor is connected to the diffusion variable that achieved (p) in the statistical analysis, which calls out for a more thorough investigation.

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24 They released the Law on Public Information, which severely restricted the already limited media freedom and the Law on the Universities that resulted in a major purge of academic staff (Birch, 2002: 500).

25 To exemplify, the presence of independent media, the experience that was gained in the 1996-1997 protests and the donations of Western governments and organizations were instrumental in the break down of the Milosevic regime.
What I label “inspiration effects” is a part of the larger diffusion literature, which can be divided into two general stands: First, authors such as Bunce et al (2006: 8ff) argue that diffusion affects democratization through inspiration, the sharing of ideas and techniques and the establishment of cross-national contacts among dissident groups. Second, scholars such as Brinks et al (2005: 466) argue that countries tend to adapt to the general level of democracy within their cultural sphere. The intuition behind this statement is that regimes are rewarded when they are similar to those who lie close to them in terms of: peace, mutual security, trade, investments, ease of communication and so forth. While the latter notion could be perceived as a long-term adoption effect, the sharing of techniques and ideas could be understood as more immediate and coupled to inspiring events in geographically proximate countries.

In the LNA both the diffusion variable and opposition mobilization reached statistical significance in model 4. This implies that their effects on democracy are independent of each other. If we take a closer look at the bulldozer revolution such a conclusion may seem misleading, since several writers have argued that the Serbian opposition clearly was facilitated by prior democratic advances in Eastern Europe. It is, however, possible to suggest that this “puzzle” is contingent upon the above described conceptual differences.

To specify I have, in the LNA, operationalized diffusion as the mean level of democracy in a given region. This strategy is similar to the one employed by Brinks et al, but it hardly captures short-term inspiration effects. If we in a next step turn to Serbia it does, nevertheless, seem like it is these kinds of mechanisms that facilitated the fall of Milosevic and the million-man march on Belgrade.

In this sense Bunce et al (2006: 11f) have argued that Serbian activists clearly were inspired by other successful electoral revolutions in the post-communist region. In the same way Bieber (2003: 86f) has emphasized that the sharing of strategies and the establishment of international contacts between dissident groups were instrumental explanatory factors behind the bulldozer revolution.

6.4 Proximate Factor

Thus far, I have stated that the ousting of Milosevic can be understood from a background of low regime legitimacy and inspiration effects, which in relation to the theory outlined in section 2.2 can be labelled as “confining conditions”.

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26 See for example Miskovic (2001) and Steinberg (2004).
27 Even though a relatively high degree of democracy can be a result from an inspiring event (such as an electoral revolution), this does not necessarily have to be the case. Moreover, specific forms of interactions among oppositional groups are hardly captured by this measure.
In this section my intention is to analyze the actor-oriented variable opposition mobilization and as argued elsewhere in the investigation, this factor should be perceived as relatively proximate to the dependent variable. With this said my aim with the coming text is to demonstrate how the above structural circumstances enabled actors within the Serbian opposition to mobilize against the incumbent regime in the year 2000.

One of the most influential players behind the downfall of Milosevic was the student organization Otpor. This association was funded in 1998 as a response to the increased political harassment in Serbia and the implementation of the university law, which in effect abolished the autonomy of the universities (Birch, 2002: 502). It is possible to identify at least two crucial functions that were played by Otpor in the bulldozer revolution.

First, through its activities aimed at achieving political change, it undermined the widespread political apathy that characterized the late end of the Milosevic rule. Thus, by using humour and ridicule to mock the regime and by organizing large-scale music festivals, Otpor managed to attract a base of 30,000-40,000 citizens prior to the 2000 elections (Bieber, 2003: 84f).

Second, Otpor did not only direct efforts against the incumbent regime. The organization also criticized the existing political opposition, which throughout the 1990s had been characterized by internal divisions. In this way Otpor posed an ultimatum, demanding the opposition parties to cooperate and to present a united front and as a result of this intensive pressure, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia was founded in January 2000 (Bunce et al, 2005: 11).

The formation of the DOS and the decision to unite behind a single presidential candidate, Kostunica, was crucial. The DOS created together with: Otpor, the G17, a think tank of leading opposition economists, the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), the orthodox church, regional heads and union leaders, a broad opposition coalition that created a viable political alternative to the authoritarian regime (McFaul, 2005: 13).

The formation of Otpor and the DOS can be seen as a function of the low levels of popular support enjoyed by Milosevic. With this condition at hand it is also possible to suggest that the strategic decision to form an opposition coalition was inspired by previous democratic advances in the post-communist region since similar strategies had been employed in Slovakia and in Croatia (Bunce et al, 2008: 11ff). Moreover, Serbian civil society leaders met with activists from these countries and learned from their experience (1998 and early 2000) how to arrange get-out-the-vote campaigns and how to monitor elections (Bieber, 2003: 86f).

To conclude, these structural circumstances facilitated the formation of a well funded, well organized and tightly knit opposition movement that was able to attract one million citizens (out of Serbia’s total population of ten million) into the streets and to simultaneously coordinate general strikes throughout the country (D’Anieri, 2006: 334f).
6.5 Causal Mechanism

In the LNA, I demonstrated that the mobilization of the opposition was an essential element in explaining different levels of democracy in CA regimes. Below, my aim is to show how it matters.

Several scholars have discussed why the Serbian political protests finally managed to oust Milosevic and a common theme within these studies, as well as in analyses of the electoral revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004), is the importance of splits within the ruling elite general and its disability to control the security forces in particular\textsuperscript{28}.

State security forces constitute a critical centre of gravity in CA regimes. The police and the military function as tools of coercion and they can apply serious sanctions against political challengers. The capacity of a regime to control this instrument is therefore essential for its ability to hold on to political power (Binnendijk, 2006: 441f).

If we take a closer look at the bulldozer revolution, we can see how the sheer size of the protests that broke out after Milosevic falsified the presidential vote convinced many police and intelligence officials that violent repression was no longer an option. We can thus observe how the army chief of staff, Nebosja Pavkovic, after seeing how large the demonstrations were, publicly declared that the armed forces would take a neutral stand in the conflict. Moreover, Milosevic’s own paramilitary forces cooperated with the opposition in order to avoid bloodshed (Thompson et al, 2004: 168).

The behaviour of the security forces can be understood as follows: the march against the capital city demonstrated the broad support for the opposition coalition and indicated a potential victory. Presumably, this led to opportunistic calculations among the armed services since violent acts by regime hardliners could be expected to lead to criminal investigations by a new government. Taken together, this drastically raised the cost of repression (McFaul, 2005: 13).

Through the withdrawal of the support from the “guys with guns” the opposition managed to create an “end game”, in the sense that credible threats of imprisonment, juridical sanctions and physical harm eventually forced Milosevic out of office (D’Anieri, 2006: 336f).

\textsuperscript{28} See for example: Tucker (2007) and Kuzio (2006).
7 Conclusions

The aim of this thesis has been to seek explanations behind differences in levels of democracy in a competitive authoritarian setting. My theoretical perspective has been based on a structured contingency approach and in order to investigate the theme under consideration, I have used a nested research design.

The main result of the cross-sectional statistical analysis is that the factors opposition mobilization and diffusion effects are statistically significant when it comes to explaining the dependent variable, even when controlled for a LDV.

In the case study, which more closely investigated the opposition’s strategic decision to mobilize, I have studied the bulldozer revolution. In the SNA I have shown that the ousting of Milosevic can be understood from a background of low regime legitimacy and international inspiration effects. These “confining conditions” enabled a massive mobilization. In turn, these protests led to a split between the incumbent regime and the state security forces and without them supporting the incumbents, the opposition managed to create an “end game”.

With this said two caveats are necessary to make before I end this thesis: First, the LNA has only analyzed regimes that are competitive authoritarian during the time span: 1972-2004 and I argue that my findings, without any further measures, are tied to this specific context. To exemplify, I have stated that the level of socioeconomic modernization insignificantly explains variation on the dependent variable (see section 5.3). This conclusion does not, however, imply that the variable is unimportant when it comes to giving an account for democratic advances in more democratic countries\textsuperscript{29}. Moreover, the result could have been different if I had chosen to work with an other time range.

Second, the SNA has investigated a case that clearly influences the cross-national relationship between opposition mobilization and levels of democracy. This suggests that the bulldozer revolution represents a larger population than the case itself. On the other hand, I have chosen to work with one of the most confirmed observations within my population and I argue that the mechanisms connected to the mobilization of the opposition can be different in e.g. a non-revolutionary situation. To exemplify, Howard et al (2006: 372) have stated that although the variable is generally conducive to democracy, it is only in cases of extremely high mobilization that the opposition immediately manages to force the incumbent to step down, as happened in Serbia 2000. To conclude, I argue that it always is difficult to make wide reaching generalizations from case studies and that the SNA primarily functions as an assessment of the plausibility of my quantitative results (Lieberman, 2005: 440ff).

\textsuperscript{29} See for example Przeworski et al (2000).
8 References


World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

9 Appendix

9.1 Codebook

**Aid dependence**
(N: 604)

Official development assistance and net official aid record the actual international transfer by the donor of financial resources or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor, less any repayments of loan principal during the same period. Grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance Committee are included, as are loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent, and technical cooperation and assistance. Aid per capita includes both ODA and official aid in US$: 1972-2001, and is calculated by dividing total aid by the midyear population estimate.

Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

**Chief executive tenure**
(N: 532)

Measures the number of years in office for the chief executive of a given country. The chief executive can be either a president or a prime minister, depending who is perceived to be the most powerful.

Competitive authoritarianism
(N: 714)

Competitive authoritarianism has been operationalized in two steps: First, I have used the factor “regimeny”, which classifies different regime types in the world as follows:

1 Limited Multiparty
2 Partyless
3 No-Party
4 Military
5 Military No-Party
6 Military Multiparty
7 Military One-party
8 One-Party
9 Other
16 One-Party Monarchy
17 Monarchy
18 Rebel Regime
19 Civil War
20 Occupation
21 Theocracy
22 Transitional Regime
23 No-Party Monarchy
24 Multiparty Monarchy
25 Multiparty Occupied
100 Democracy

Within this variable I have excluded all observations with a value: > 1. This leaves me with limited multiparty countries. Such regimes hold elections where (at least some) candidates are able to participate who are independent of the ruling regime. This categorization holds even when opposition parties refrain voluntarily from taking part in elections.

In a second step I have excluded countries that receives a value higher than .70 on the factor “partsz”. This measure counts the largest parties’ number of seats divided by the legislative assemblies’ total number of seats expressed in fractions.

**Diffusion effects**  
(N: 622)

Calculates the mean level of democracy, according to the combined Freedom House and Polity Score index, on a regional basis. The world is divided into ten regions; Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America (including Cuba and Haiti), Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe and North America (including Australia and New Zealand), East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, Pacific Islands (excluding Australia and New Zealand) and the Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana and Suriname). Finally, I have also used two additional diffusion variables that in the same way measure the level of democracy in the world and among neighboring countries.


**Economic growth**  
(N: 618)

Measures annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local currency. By GDP per capita I refer to the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is moreover the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.

**Electoral experience**  
(N: 653).

This factor takes into account the number of cumulative historical elections since 1919. For countries that did not gain independence until after 1919 electoral information is sometimes transferred from the country of which it was a part previously. This does not, however, apply to former colonies. More precisely the following insertions has been done: all the former member states of the USSR and the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (until 1991), the Czech and Slovak Republics (until 1992), Timor-Leste (a part of Indonesia until 2002), Bangladesh (a part of Pakistan until 1971), Eritrea (a part of Ethiopia until 1993), Iceland (a part of Denmark until 1944), Ireland (a part of the UK until 1921), Yemen (a continuation of North and South Yemen from 1991), South Yemen (a part of Yemen until 1966), and East Germany (a part of Germany until 1948).
I treat West Germany as a continuation of inter-war Germany, reunified Germany as a continuation of West Germany, Vietnam as a continuation of North Vietnam, and Ethiopia after the secession of Eritrea, Pakistan after the secession of Bangladesh and North Yemen after the secession of South Yemen, as a continuation of themselves, which means that no data needs to be filled in for these countries.


Levels of democracy (N: 714)

Consists of the average on Polity & Freedom House scores (scaled 0–10), where missing values have been imputed by regressing the index on the Freedom House scores, which have better country coverage than Polity.

The Freedom House index consists of two main elements. The first of these is “civil liberties”, which assesses freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The second indicator is “political rights”. This measure includes the right to: vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate.

Democracy is, according to the Polity Score, made out of three essential aspects. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific manifestations of, these general principles.

Opposition cohesion
(N: 421)

Number of seats for the largest opposition party in the legislative assembly (lower house). In presidential systems the party which holds the presidency is always regarded as the largest.


Opposition mobilization
(N: 579)

This variable is based on number of anti-government demonstrations, defined as: any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. In addition, I have also included number of strikes into the measure, which is understood as: any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.


Presidentialism
(N: 646)

This factor captures the existence of a presidential system and it is coded as follows:

0 Direct presidential
1 Strong president elected by assembly
2 Parliamentary

**Proportional electoral system**  
(N: 525)

The variable measures the prevalence of a proportional electoral system and it is coded as follows:

0 Proportional  
1 50% plurality and 50% proportional  
2 Plurality


**Socioeconomic modernization**  
(N: 543)

The indicators combined into this index are: (a) industrialization, measured as the net output of the non-agricultural sector expressed as a percentage of GDP; (b) education, measured as the gross secondary school enrollment ratio; (c) urbanization, measured as the urban percentage of the total population; (d) life expectancy at birth (in years); (e) the inverse of infant mortality (per 1000 live births); (f) the number of radios per capita; (g) the number of Television sets per capita; and (h) newspaper circulation per capita. The source of indicators (a)-(e) is WDI (2004) and when it comes to the indicators (f)-(g) figures Banks (2002) are used.


**Spoils**  
(N: 347)

Measure central government expenditure and it includes: requited payments other than for capital assets or for goods or services to be used in the production of capital assets, and unrequited payments for purposes other than permitting the recipients to acquire capital assets, compensating the recipients for damage or destruction of capital assets, or increasing the financial capital of the recipients.

Source: WDI, International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and data files
**Riots**
(N: 579).

Measures the number of riots in a given country, where riots are understood to be: any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.

### 9.2 Additional Models

Table 2: Regression Analyses 1972-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable: Levels of democracy</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aid dependence</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief executive tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.110***</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion effects</td>
<td>.387***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral experience</td>
<td>.033*</td>
<td></td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition cohesion</td>
<td></td>
<td>.506***</td>
<td>-.052</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition mobilization</td>
<td></td>
<td>.065*</td>
<td>.067***</td>
<td>.066***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidentialism</td>
<td>.531***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional electoral system</td>
<td>-.288*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>-.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td></td>
<td>.031</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic modernization</td>
<td>-.109</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>-.054</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spoils</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.901***</td>
<td>.907***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R square</td>
<td>.1708</td>
<td>.2839</td>
<td>.8637</td>
<td>.8637</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of observation</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * significant at the .10-level. ** significant at the .05-level. *** significant at the .01-level

Note 1: all the independent variables are lagged with one year.

Note 2: the table displays (p) and the b-values on the coefficients.

Note 3: model (5) represents the analysis where the outlier Lebanon (1992-1999) has been excluded from the modernization variable. Model (6) shows the regression of actor-oriented variables (-) spoils. Model (7) constitutes the LDV test where I have used the mean level of democracy in neighbouring countries to operationalize diffusion effects. Finally, model (8) is made out the analysis where I control the mean level democracy in the world for a LDV.
## 9.3 Most Confirming Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>