Comparison of the Discourse of Europe in Ukraine and in the EU

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Abstract

This paper presents the results of a study on the discourse of Europe in Ukraine (among the pro-European movement) and the European Union (EU). I argue that the relations between the EU and its neighbours (and Ukraine is the biggest potential applicant for joining the Union) and the Europeanization affects on them it is necessary not to concentrate merely on possible institutional changes but take ideational factors into consideration as well. The concept of public sphere developed by J. Habermas is applied in the study. Public sphere can be defined as the social space where ideas and identities are being formed and developed by the means of the discourses. Due to the scope of the paper I concentrated on one of the discourses that exist both in Ukraine and the EU, namely the discourse of Europe. For Ukraine only the discourse among the pro-European movement was analysed by the means of frame and content analysis of the media and interviews with the representatives of the pro-European movement. The study of the discourse of self-identification in Europe is based on investigations made by other researchers.

The empirical ambition of the paper is to compare the discourses of Europe inside Europe and in the neighbouring country. The theoretical ambition is to prove the importance of the study of ideational factors in relations between the EU and its neighbours.

Key words: EU, Ukraine, discourse of Europe, public sphere
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1 Introduction

1.1 Short description of the relations between Ukraine and the European Union

Being the biggest country in Europe by territory and fourth biggest by population, Ukraine is, however, excluded from the main European political organization, namely the European Union. 16 years after gaining independence and 10 years after proclaiming European integration the main objective of Ukrainian foreign policies, the relations between them remain unclear.

Ukraine’s relationship with the West in general and the European Union in particular have gone through a few stages since gaining independence in 1991. Taras Kuzio in the article written in 2003 speaks about three periods: disinterest, partnership and disillusionment. “The first period is disinterest during 1992-94 when the West prioritized relations with a reformist Russia. The second period was 1995—99 when Ukraine and the West developed a strategic partnership. From 2000, Ukraine's relations with the West are best described as disillusionment due to the growing gap between official rhetoric of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and Eurasian domestic policies.”

It was during the second period that Ukraine signed the most important agreements with the EU, the most important of which are the “Partnership and Co-operation Agreement” (PCA). Both sides have clarified their position towards each other in internal political strategies. On the EU side, the basic approach to relations with Ukraine was laid down in the “Common Strategy” of 1999. For Ukraine, the President’s “Strategy for European Integration” of 1998 has repeatedly been confirmed by former President Kuchma and received support from the Parliament. However, Ukrainian leaders never went beyond pure declarations. The political process in the country more and more failed to meet European standards of democracy,

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1 Kuzio, Taras, 2003b. Ukraine's Relations with the West: Disinterest, Partnership, Disillusionment. European Security, Vol.12, No.2 (Summer 2003), pp.21-44
human rights, the rule of law. This “integration without Europeanization”\textsuperscript{3} resulted in what was often referred to as “Ukraine fatigue”\textsuperscript{3}.

The Orange Revolution in 2004 has shaken the domestic politics in Ukraine. Despite mass falsifications during the elections, the pro-European liberal Yushchenko won on the re-election in January 2005. “Yes! to Europe” was one his most important slogans during his election campaign\textsuperscript{4}. But what was more important, was the huge support from people all over the country (much less on the East and South compared to the West and Centre however) not to the mere idea of “European integration” but their demands to the government to adhere to the declared “European values” of democracy, free media and freedom of choice. Thus, after the Orange Revolution Ukraine was named to have proven that Ukraine belongs to the European civilization and shares its main values.\textsuperscript{5}

Moreover, the Orange Revolution was a challenge for the common European foreign policy; it presented the EU with an opportunity to act as a strong political player. “It was an opportunity Brussels grasped”\textsuperscript{6}. The Presidents’ of Poland (Aleksander Kwasniewski) and Lithuania (Valdas Adamkus), as well as the High Representative of the EU Javier Solana were active participants of the negotiations between ex-President Mr. Kuchma and two candidates for Presidency Mr. Yanukovych and Mr. Yushchenko.\textsuperscript{7} It should be noted that formal EU foreign policy mechanisms failed during negotiations in Kyiv: the Troika was not involved and the (Dutch) Presidency played a secondary role. At the same time the EU’s foreign policy was strengthened by the solid common position adopted by EU states\textsuperscript{8}. The ‘non-formal’ character of the EU mission in Ukraine is increasingly seen as a possible template for the future of CFSP activities\textsuperscript{9}.

Thus, European engagement in the Orange Revolution was of big importance for both sides and expectations for the improvement of the relations between Ukraine and the EU were high. Having formed the new government headed by Mrs. Yulia

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[7] Ibid.;
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Tymoshenko in January 2005, Mr. Yushchenko appointed Mr. Tarasyuk as a Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was a clear message for the European partners about the persistence of the “European choice” since Mr. Tarasyuk has always been one of the main advocates of European integration of Ukraine\textsuperscript{10}. “From now on, our policy priorities will be determined by a clear course towards integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures.”\textsuperscript{11} What seemed crucial was that Ukraine’s aspirations for closer connection with the EU were welcome by Europe as well. The Orange Revolution leaders, especially to the newly-elected President Mr. Yushchenko, were given credit to by the Western world, his speech in Bundestag\textsuperscript{12} in March 2005 was the highest manifestation of the new relations between Ukraine and the EU.

However optimistic about European perspective were the Ukrainian leaders in the beginning of 2005, the EU’s official rhetoric stayed very calm. Thus, External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner speaking about Ukraine’s possible membership in the EU stated that „The door is neither closed nor open.”\textsuperscript{13} The only immediate consequence of the Orange Revolution has been the characterization of Ukraine as a European state\textsuperscript{14}, which, however, has not led to an immediate change in the nature of its relationship with the EU. It confirms the assumption made by the researchers of the Batory Foundation in December 2004 (during the Revolution) that Yushchenko’s victory poses a bigger challenge for the EU than possible Yanukovych’s since then the EU would have to accept Ukraine’s claim for membership\textsuperscript{15}. It became quite visible in 2005 already when, despite the fact that the Action Plan (AP) was negotiated under the regime of president Kuchma, president Yushchenko’s government was given the option of “take-it-or-leave-it”: there was no scope for its renegotiation\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{12} From the official web-site of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/uk/publish/printable_article?art_id=13615155
The situation got even more complicated after the parliamentary elections in March, 2006. After the Socialist Party changed its position the “Orange” parties lost the majority in the parliament and President Yushchenko had to accept a “pro-Russian” Mr. Yanukovych as a Prime-Minister. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, the President is still responsible for the foreign policy and appoints Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense. However, in January 2007 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tarasyuk, was sacked by the pro-Yanukovych majority in the parliament. Even before that Mr. Yanukovych made a speech in Brussels, in which he declared that Ukraine is not ready for the membership in the EU an especially not in NATO. In March 2007 President Yushchenko dissolved the Parliament and appointed new elections. This caused instability in domestic politics and influenced the perception of Ukraine in Europe. The negotiations about new agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which is meant to replace the old one, which terminates at the end of 2007, started the same time as the political crises in Ukraine. The President and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arsenyi Yatsenyuk, stick to the idea of getting the prospect of membership for Ukraine, however, it is hardly possible a result of negotiations.

As for the position of the European Union, it hasn’t changed a lot since the end of 1990s. The European Commission is not eager to promise membership to Ukraine referring to the official documents. Thus, it is necessary to mention briefly official position of the EU concerning possible enlargement. According to the Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union “any European State which respects the principles set out in the Article 6 (1) may apply to become a member of the European Union”. Article 6 specifies that the principles the Union is founded on are “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” In June 1993 on the Council meeting in Copenhagen three main criteria were set for the countries in order to join the EU. The criteria require that a state have the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, a functioning market economy, and that the state accept the obligations and intent of the EU.

This is the official basis for the negotiations with the potential EU-applicants. However objective these criteria are (even though their objectivity can also be doubted) it is difficult to claim that joining the EU is a matter of a pure technical

18 "Ukraine's leaders in bitter fight", 15th of December, 2006, "The Washington Times" at
19 However, this has been the usual treatment for the CEEs countries when they were applying for membership. See: Sjursen, Helene. Why Expand? The question of justification in the EU's enlargement policy. ARENA Working Papers. WP 01/6
achievement of standards. The official basis for certain level of subjectivity is laid out already in the Conclusions to the Copenhagen Summit by the following declaration: “the union’s capacity to absorb new members...is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.”21 The so-called absorption criteria is not new (thus in 1976 in Commission’s 1976 opinion on Greece’s membership applications the same ideas about the Union’s absorption abilities were expressed22), however it is now, after the last two enlargements that this criteria seems far more important than it did23.

At the June 2006 meeting of the European Council summit, ‘absorption capacity’ became one of the most controversial issues24. The conclusions of this summit stated that: “It will be important to ensure in future that the Union is able to function politically, financially and institutionally as it enlarges, and to further deepen the Europe’s common project.”25

Thus, enlargement is becoming a matter of rather a political decision, which is to be taken by the leaders of the EU. However, one cannot say that the possible applicant-country cannot change the attitude towards itself. Successful reform that is what is expected from the aspirant applicant, Ukraine in this very case. There was a lot of research being made on the impact of the European integration on the domestic political and social processes of the member states and prospective members. Radaelli defines this process of Europeanization as a “set of processes through which EU political, social, and economic dynamics become part of domestic discourse, identity formation, political structures and public structures”26. Such a definition emphasizes that “not only can Europe affect formal structure, it can also influence the values, norms and discourses prevalent in member states.”27

21 Ibid.;
23 Europe: The absorption puzzle; Charlemagne The Economist. London: Jul 1, 2006. Vol.380, Iss. 8484; pg. 48
27 Ibid.
1.2 Research problem

This is the sphere I want to concentrate on in my thesis: Europeanization in Ukraine; to specify, my main area of research would be the first one mentioned in Radaelli definition, namely, the Europeanization of the public discourse in Ukraine.

In this work discourse is referred to as any form of language use in society. A crucial concept associated with discourse is that of social communicative event: discourse is the use that people make of language to convey ideas, thoughts or beliefs within a social context\(^28\). What is also essential is that discourse is “socially shaped” but it is also “socially constitutive”. Thus in this paper we rather refer to Foucauldian than Habermasian definition of discourse (which is very much based on the rational argumentation; “the ethics of discourse”). It implies that analyzing one of the existing discourses in the public sphere we can discover some deeply rooted ideas and identities, and then try to generalize and mark out certain characteristics of the general public discourse. Thus understood discourse in case of proper analysis can re

The theoretical frame for the research is social constructivism. According to Alexander Wendt, it is grounded on two basic tenets: 1) "structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces; and 2) "the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature"\(^29\). Since the study of ideas and identity formation is accepted as a key component of constructivist research, the role of language and of discourses becomes crucial.\(^30\)

Basing on these social constructivist premises I want to research how Europe is being framed in Ukrainian political discourse. However, this research project is way too big for the scope of this paper, thus I concentrate on the pro-European movement in Ukraine, their vision of, sources of information about and attitude towards the EU. The idea for the project is based on the premise that these are the representatives of the pro-European movement that mostly shape the idea of

Europe when it comes to the discussion about the European integration of Ukraine.

Then I want to compare the ideas pro-European movement has about Europe with the self-identification of Europe itself, meaning, I want to compare if the two visions of Europe, the Ukrainian and the European one, coincide or not, explore the main differences or similarities.

1.3 Methodology

In order to held such a research I will use diverse methods of analysis of discourse. In order to get the raw material for analysing the discourse of Europe in pro-European movement in Ukraine, namely the messages in written or textual forms, I hold interviews with the representatives of pro-European movement in Ukraine and I also chose one newspaper to analyze\(^{31}\). Then using the tools of content and frame analysis, I analyzed the media discourse and interviews.

Content analysis is a set of tools used to classify textual material, reducing it to more relevant, manageable bits of data\(^ {32}\). Content analysis uses a lot of different techniques, both quantitative and qualitative. In the thesis the micro

Frames can be defined as “organising principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world”\(^ {33}\), or as “hierarchical cognitive structures that pattern the definition of a situation for individual social actor”\(^ {34}\). Framing is usually used to analyse media discourse but it can be applied for the analysis of the social movement as well since “individual frames can be aggregated for subgroups within social movements that share general cognitive orientations toward events.” Those “general cognitive orientations” or “the high-level concepts” are the one that can

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\(^{31}\) More details about the methodology will be given in the first part of the paper, before providing the results of the research itself.


\(^{33}\) Reese, Stephen D. – Gandy, Oscar H., Jr. – Grant, August E. Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

be studied by the means of frame analysis. Tankard defines function of the "frame" in three-fold way: (1) to isolate certain material and draw attention to it; (2) to set a tone for an event or issue, to supply "the interpretative background by which the story is judged"; (3) a frame can be the organizing idea on which the story is built.\textsuperscript{35}

Somewhat different methodology was used to explore the discourse about Europe in Europe itself. Having done any field studies due to technical reasons, I studied the reports made by other researchers in order to formulate the main peculiarities of discourse of Europe inside Europe.

\subsection*{1.4 Structure}

The structure of the paper is defined by the research project. In the first part I present the results of my study about the discourse of Europe in the pro-European movement in Ukraine. In order to do that, I first explain the methodology of the study, after that I submit the results of the study and my interpretation of these results. The reason for devoting a rather significant part of this section to explanation of the methodology is the need to explain the \textit{research design} which can be defined as the network of steps a researcher takes to conduct a research project.\textsuperscript{36} Explaining the logic behind doing each of these steps makes the research clear and valid for the reader.

In the second part talk about the discourse of Europe inside Europe as it is described in the recent researches.

I end up with conclusions about the compatibility of the two discourses of Europe, how they differ and in what they are similar. I also make conclusions about how it can (or cannot) help Ukraine to join (not to join) the European Union.


2 Framing Europe in Ukrainian Discourse

2.1 Discourse of Europe in Ukraine’s pro-European movement

2.1.1 European movement in Ukraine

Just as all over Europe there are plenty of organizations which support the European idea. Some of them have their representations in Ukraine (“European Movement. Ukraine”37 is one the most prominent examples). However, when it comes to defining the European movement, those branches of bigger all-European organizations take only a small part in it38.

The European movement in Ukraine is not easy to define. In order to classify European movement in Ukraine, we would introduce only one criterion: the support for the idea of the European integration of Ukraine. Thus, if the organization in its statute declares it supports European integration of Ukraine, for the purposes of this work it would be classified as part of the European movement.

There are almost 7,000 non-governmental organizations registered in Ukraine39. Due to the scope of this research it is impossible to analyze the statutes of all of

37 Official web-sati: www.europeanmovement.org.ua
38 Not only NGOs but also some of the Ukrainian political parties belong to the European Associations of political parties, for instance “People Union Our Ukraine” (head – Mr. Yushchenko) and People’s Movement of Ukraine are members of the European People’s party (see http://www.epp.eu/memberparties.php?hoofdmenuID=2); Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists is member in The Alliance for Europe of the Nations.
39 Data from the State Committee on Statistics, http://www.statyst.kyiv-city.gov.ua/docs/07-77_r-10.doc
them. Thus instead of doing that, the resources of a few associations which unite organizations with pro-European views as well as informational resources available were studied. The most useful of them were www.eu.prostir.org.ua and http://eu-directory.ea-ua.info.

The main goal of the web-portal www.eu.prostir.org.ua is “to create a system of informational support of the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine and to give the Ukrainian citizens the information about the activities of pro-European civil society”. In accordance with the main task of this portal is to inform (відображення) of common (consolidating) efforts of pro-European non-governmental organizations of Ukraine in order to find the best answers to the challenges posed by the . The second web-portal, http://eu-directory.ea-ua.info, is the guideline of European integration and among other issues (laws, political situation and other stuff concerning Ukraine’s integration into the EU) also has an extensive list of “analytical and non-governmental organizations that deal with the issues of European integration”.

Having analyzed both lists I could divide the pro-European movement in Ukraine into three main parts:

- research and analytical centres;
- non-governmental organizations (including the youth organizations);
- political parties.

Thus, the idea of European integration issues unites organizations with different types of goals, activities and ambitions. Just to mention a few names, this list includes the organizations like “Фондація регіональних ініціатив” (“Foundation of Regional Initiatives”), Громадська організація Європейський діалог” (NGO “European Dialogue”), Інститут відкритої політики (“Institute of the Open Politics”), Український жіночий фонд (“Ukrainian Women Club”), Центр прав людини „Древо життя” (Centre for the Human Rights “The tree of life”), Молодіжна організація "Пласт - Національна Скаутська Організація України" (Youth Organization “Plast – National Scouts Organization of Ukraine”).

The names of the organizations themselves reveal the differences inside of what can be called “pro-European movement in Ukraine.” What is there that however makes them include the support for the idea of European integration into their statutes?
2.1.2 Methodology of the interviewing

In order to research their ideas about European integration I hold the interviews with the representatives of all the three types of these organizations.

Interviewees:

1. Oleksandr Makobriy, project manager in “Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation” (an independent non-governmental organization working on studying the processes of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine. The Director of the Institute is Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk, ex-minister of Foreign Affairs\(^{40}\));
2. Olga Miroshnyk, head of “Local Democracy Foundation” (non-governmental organization working on projects aiming at social, economic, and political changes, local administration reform. In January, 2006 the Foundation started the project “European integration processes and their influences on judicial and state development of Ukraine”;
3. Tetiana Miroshnykova, head of “Euroclub”, Kharkiv (non-governmental organization, local Kharkiv branch of the all-Ukrainian network of Euroclubs. The main field of activities is European education (trainings for the NGO members, schoolchildren, teachers, students and other target groups about the EU and the European integration; publishing leaflets/booklets and CDs with promoting the idea of the United Europe for young people in the region);
4. Vyacheslav Gusyev, head of Youth NGO “Foundation of Regional Initiatives”;
5. Maryna Bogdanova, project-manager in the “Eastern-Ukrainian Foundation for Developing Democracy”, Kharkiv;
6. Yaroslav Markevych, member of board of political party “People’s Union Our Ukraine” (created in 2005 on the initiative of the newly elected President Viktor Yushchenko. The party programme declares that “Integration into European structures will remain the main direction of foreign policy of Ukraine”\(^{41}\));
7. Natalia Amelchenko, professor, Political Science Department, “National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.”

Thus, those people have been chosen since they represent the three main types of organizations that belong to the pro-European movement in Ukraine. The interviews were held in Kyiv and Kharkiv (Eastern Ukraine), which means I should keep in mind that the results are somewhat biased due to geographical reasons, since Western Ukrainian organizations’ ideas were not represented.

\(^{40}\) From the official web-page of the Institute, http://ieac.org.ua/index.php?id=22&ch_id=34
However, I tried to compensate this by studying the written material of organizations from other parts of Ukraine (mostly their documents, statutes, websites, but also slogans, study materials, speeches).

Since the main purpose of the interviews was to find out the views about Europe among pro-European movement in Ukraine, I was mainly asking for personal opinions, not for information. However, some of the interviewees were trying to generalize and present the more general opinions (especially Mr. Makobryi, due to obvious reason that he is a researcher himself). The only interview held in order to get information and check some of interpretations was the interview with Mrs. Natalia Amelchenko, who does not belong to the pro-European movement, but is an academic, who studies among other issues, the European idea in Ukraine.

The interviews were semi-structured, meaning there was a preliminary list of questions. However, the interviewees were welcome to speak freely in order to make them feel more comfortable but also to see how they themselves would prioritise the importance of different topics. The questions were divided into three groups. The first group only included one question: I was asking the interviewees about the European movement in Ukraine. The idea was to understand how people who are parts of the movement itself, define it. The second part (questions 2,3) was aiming at figuring out what is the European Union for the interviewees, how they see and perceive it and how well they are acknowledged with what is happening in the EU at the moment. The main goal of the third part of the interviews (questions 4-6) was to understand how the interviewees see the relations between the EU and Ukraine.

These were the main questions of my research:

1. Short characteristics of the European movement in Ukraine
2. What is European Union for you personally?
3. How would you describe the main problems the EU is facing at the moment?
4. Why do you believe Ukraine should join the EU?
5. The main obstacles on Ukraine's move to the EU.
6. How well do you think European's position is represented in the Ukrainian political discourse?

As additional question I also asked about the interviewees’ sources of information about the EU.

41From the Official web-page of the party, http://www.razom.org.ua/en/static/about/
2.1.3 Results of the interviews

The results of the interviews would be presented in this part of the paper shortly. While doing that we shall try to identify the main frames for presenting the EU and the European integration of Ukraine among the representatives of the target group.

Answering the question about the European movement in Ukraine, most of the interviewees would speak about the type of organizations they represent as the most important part of the movement. This proves that European movement in Ukraine is at the very early stage of development and hasn’t yet found its identity and understanding of its components and role in the political and social life. Mrs. Amelchenko proved this, saying that “Ukrainian pro-European movement is as weak as Ukrainian civil society in general”. When explaining the difficulties inside of the pro-European movement in Ukraine most of the interviewees stressed mostly the lack of financial resources. However, Mrs. Amelchenko and Mr. Makobriy also mentioned the vagueness of the idea of European Union, which most of the NGO’s have as the main obstacle for uniting into one strong consolidated movement. In this respect it is worth noticing that web-sites of all the organizations, whose representatives were interviewed, do not contain any clear definition the value of European integration for Ukraine. For instance, on the web-page of the “Institute of Euroatlantic cooperation” it is stated that the main task of the organization is “to popularize the idea of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration among the Ukrainian society.”42 So as to deal with the geographical bias mentioned above, web-pages of pro-European NGO from Western Ukraine were checked and they showed the same tendency: declaring the value of European integration without stating reasons for that (See for instance web-page of the Lviv City Youth Organisation „Euroclub“, http://europe.org.ua/ or of a big think-tank “Europe XXI Foundation” http://old.europexxi.kiev.ua/index0.html).

The interviews in a way proved this assumption. The respondents associate Europe (European Union) with the following ideas: high standards in governance (Ms. Bogdanova, Mr. Gusyev, Ms. Miroshnykova, Mrs. Miroshnyk), high standards in business (Ms. Bogdanova, Mr. Gusyev, Mr. Markevych), high living

standards (Ms. Miroshnykova, Ms. Bogdanova, Mr. Gusyev, Mrs. Miroshnyk), market economy (Mr. Makobryi, Mr. Markevych, Ms. Bogdanova), democracy (Mr. Makobryi, Mr. Markevych, Mr. Gusyev), respect to each nation (Mr. Gusyev), transparency of politics (Ms. Bogdanova), good education (Ms. Miroshnykova), economic union (Mr. Makobryi).

A few things should be accentuated here. Firstly, for the pro-European movement in Ukraine the concepts of Europe and European Union are equalized: the respondents were using them absolutely interchangeably. However, this is not a typically Ukrainian phenomena; Laffan suggested that “the EU as an active identity builder has successfully achieved identity hegemony in terms of increasingly defining what it means to belong to “Europe””. Secondly, the keyword for describing the idea of Europe is for surely “standard”: seven out of nine defined characteristics of European Union in different ways positioned it as a standard in different spheres. Thirdly, only two out of nine characteristics actually concern the features of the Union itself (economic Union and respect to each nation) not those of the everyday lives inside the countries.

As for the question about main problems in the EU at the moment the following answers were received: migration (all of the respondents), increased number of member-states (Mrs. Miroshnyk, Mr. Markevych), difference in economic development in member-states (Ms. Bogdanova, Mr. Makobryi), European Constitution (Mr. Makobryi, Mr. Markevych), low level of support among the population (Mr. Makobryi). Thus, the only problem in EU development at the moment mentioned by all the interviewees, migration, is the one that is actually not on the Union but on the member-states level. Other problems were brought up just by no more than two of the respondents, which can be interpreted as low level of awareness of the real problems in Europe. It does not necessarily mean that interviewees have low level of knowledge about the processes going on in the EU (this was not what was checked on the interviews). But it surely demonstrates that the problems of the EU do not constitute the big part of their idea of Europe. Furthermore, big structural problems of the European Union were mentioned by the representative of the think-tank (Mr. Makobryi) and political party (Mr. Markevych), who obviously deal more with Europe on the level of the Union itself. While representatives of the organizations that promote European integration rather stress positive sides in the EU (the idea of “standard”) than problematic ones.

Concerning the last part of the questions about the value of European integration of Ukraine the interviewees were amazingly agreed: for them joining the EU

means joining the club with higher standards in political, social and economic spheres. There is also an understanding that in order to join Ukraine has to carry out a lot of reforms inside of the country. In this sense some of the interviewees said that the process of transformation before joining the EU is the most essential part the European integration. However, this does not imply that formal membership is pointless. Furthermore, the official promise on behalf of the EU to accept Ukraine as a member in case of fulfilling all criteria is seen as the most important incentive for reforms inside Ukraine. The reason for that is that the EU standards are set so as to control the transformation both in time and in the direction the reforms take. Yet, unlike the previously discussed issues, in this one respondents did not simply refer to the European standards when explaining the need for the European integration. Considerations of more *realpolitik* were mentioned by basically all of them. Thus, Mr. Makobryi noted that even though theoretically it could have been possible to without joining the European Union, but Ukraine is too weak on the international scene to hold its own independent policies especially due to specific interest Russia has in Ukrainian affairs. Ms. Bogdanova united both international trends and European standards by saying that Ukraine cannot stay aside from the global integration processes and has just to make choice as to which of the blocs to integrate; since the EU sets higher standards in every field compared to the single other alternative (the possible union including Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan), this is the organization Ukraine should seek membership in. Other interviewees also supported the idea that Ukraine is forced to make a choice between Russia and Europe.

The last question was designed so as to find out how well the European position is presented in Ukrainian public discourse. The question was formulated rather loosely leaving the interviewees room for interpreting it. The answers differed a lot. Thus, Ms. Miroshnykova and Mr. Gusyev noted that media only present the news which might be interesting for the audience; and since the general audience does not have strong background knowledge about the European Union they cannot get really interested in the news and thus they are scarcely offered. Mr. Makobryi mainly agreed such a position, but also added that Europe is only presented in case of some big political scandals but not the everyday routine of the bureaucrats in Brussels. Some of the interviewees (Mrs. Miroshnyk, Mr. Gusyev, Mr. Markevych) have expanded the question and were talking not only about the European Union but also about the Council of Europe, especially in the context of the political crisis in Ukraine which was actively monitored by this organization.

To sum up the results we shall try to identify the frames used for speaking about European Union among the representatives of the pr-European movement in Ukraine. Johnston suggests the frame be represented in a way that shows: (1) what concepts make up the frame; (2) the relations between the concepts; (3) the basis for arriving at the connections; (4) the degree of carryover to other levels
and types of participation, and (5) how interpretations may vary with changing situations. Following this structure we can make preliminary conclusions about the framing of Europe. The main concepts that make up the frame are: “high living standards”, “democracy”, “market economy”, “transparency”, “Europe = European Union”, “EU vs. Russia.” These concepts are not in conflict with, but rather supplement each other, adding up to formulate the general frame. They are connected by the general idea of seeing Europe as a standard in many areas, the Kantian regulatory ideal in a way. In order to trace the two last characteristics of the frames as defined by Tankard, more information than mere interviews are needed. However, before proceeding to the next stage of the research we can make the preliminary conclusion that among the interviewees Europe(an Union) is framed as non-institutionalised, somewhat idealised region, an example of the “wannabe” for Ukraine as by its very existence it sets high standards in political (democracy), economic (free market) and social spheres (high living standards). Thus, “Europe as an example” is the leading frame used by the respondents complemented by the “Europe, not Russia” frame.

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However, since any frame analysis involves a big deal of interpretation, there is always a threat that the researcher will find the frames he consciously or subconsciously is looking for. Thus, the results of the above frame analysis as well as of any other type of analysis of the discourse need to be verified and deepened if possible. The analysis of the discourse of Europe in the media seems to be the most appropriate for that. However, before presenting the results of the research the research design needs to be explained in order to make the research valid.

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3 Framing Europe in Ukrainian Media

3.1.1 Methodology

Since the ambition of this paper is to analyse the discourse of Europe among the pro-European movement in Ukraine the media analysis has to be subjected to the general goal of finding the sources of the framing of Europe in the pro-European movement. Thus during the interviews the respondents were asked what are their main source of information about the EU. The first and most important source of information named by all the interviewees was the weekly newspaper “Дзеркало тижня” (“Dzerkalo tyzhnia” or “Zerkalo nedeli” (from Russian name); “Mirror Weekly”). Since this newspaper was much more prioritized compared to other sources detailed analysis of this single source “Dzerkalo tyzhnia” is the largest and, arguably, the most influential weekly newspaper\(^{47}\) in the country. It was founded in 1994 and first only had a Russian edition; starting from 2002 it has both editions in Ukrainian and Russian. Its circulation is 76,000 copies. The newspaper is believed to be partly financed from abroad. The newspaper can be characterized as being liberally (center-right) oriented however it is considered to be free of any influences by the political forces. The survey made by the newspaper shows that their audience consists of rather young (average age – 39 years) people with higher education (80 %) who reside mostly in the capital and largest cities of the country. The newspaper is widely read by the Ukrainian elite\(^{48}\). “Dzerkalo tyzhnia” attempts to project itself as a solid and objective newspaper even during the times of the strongest censorship in the media in 2000-2004. The newspaper’s position in those years was recognized on the international level\(^{49}\). A free edition of the newspaper is available online at [www.dt.ua](http://www.dt.ua) in Ukrainian, Russian and partly in English.

\(^{47}\)“The Press in Ukraine”, Last Updated 31\(^{st}\) October, 2006, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4073375.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4073375.stm)

\(^{48}\)Ibid

\(^{49}\)Thus, the chief-editor V. Mostovyi received the a few international prizes for his professional activities prize, for instance [http://www.leipziger-medienstiftung.de/2003/02/06/wladimir-mostowoj/?lp_lang_pref=en](http://www.leipziger-medienstiftung.de/2003/02/06/wladimir-mostowoj/?lp_lang_pref=en)
Articles on DT reporting on Europe were collected from the website for the period of three years (May, 2004 – May, 2007). Firstly, the articles only about the EU and Ukraine’s relations with the organization were searched for in two sections of the newspaper: “Topic of the Week” (first and main section of the paper, takes the first four pages) and “International Politics” (the third section of the newspaper, on the fifth page).

The articles containing information about Ukraine’s relations with the EU are quite many: during the period studied during this research there were 7 articles about EU-Ukraine relations in the first section of the newspaper, “Topic of the Week”, and 34 articles in the third section, “International Politics”. It is interesting to compare the coverage of the topic with other main issues in Ukrainian foreign policy, namely relations with Russia and the US: there were only 7 articles which directly concern the relations with the US, and 15 significant articles about Ukrainian-Russian relations in the section “International Politics.” However, relations with Russia are much more covered in the first section, “Topic of the Week”; the number of articles about relations with Russia in this section is over 60. The internal affairs in Russia or country’s role in the international scene attracts more attention from the journalists comparing to both the US (37) and the EU (28). More attention to the US is the reflection of a more important role the US is playing in the international relations in the beginning of the 21st century thus is not that surprising. What is really interesting is the decline of interest towards the Ukrainian-American relations, which could be even seen in the period of these three years but in general indicates a trend in Ukrainian foreign policy.

The data about the number of articles on each of the topics is gathered in the Figure 1:

**Figure 1: Articles covering the EU, the US and Russia and Ukraine’s relations with these three actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Topic of the week</th>
<th>International Relations</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-Ukraine</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia-Ukraine</td>
<td>Over 60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Ukraine</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, this analysis as any other quantitative media analysis only reflects general priorities in international affairs and Ukraine’s role in it. In order to analyse the image of Europe presented in the newspaper a wider set of articles was analysed in order to identify the framing for Europe(an Union) in the newspaper. Since qualitative analysis is to rather a big extent a matter of interpretation by the researcher, in order to give more validity to the analysis quantitative methods were used to collect data for the research since they are believed to be prone to biased judgement.

Thus, the electronic data base was searched for the presence of the keywords ‘€вро’ (“euro”, the root of the words “Europe”, “European”, “Europeanness” in Ukrainian) and „ЄС” (“EU”) anywhere in the text of an article for the period from 1st of May 2004 till the last edition (5th of May, 2007) in the first section, “The Topic of the Week”. Records with the keywords were added to the database which contained the following information: the title of the article, name of the author(s) (in case it is not one of the regular journalists of the newspaper only), date of publishing, number of mentioning of the keywords.

Articles varied in length from short descriptions, containing just a mentioning to extensive and in depth coverage of European affairs. Among over 2000 articles during the studied period, a total of 195 references were identified as those containing one or both of the keywords and after added into the Excel database. The content analysis began by developing an exhaustive list of contexts in which Europe could have been mentioned.

Later the micro-level content analysis was conducted using the basic techniques of *KWIC lists* (key-words-in-context lists)\(^5^1\). The initial list of 13 contexts present in bibliographic references was identified. They included the following: “Ukraine’s integration to Europe”, “European standards”, “Europe in international relations”, “European economics, “gas matters”, “European constitution”, “security”, “Euroatlantic integration”, “values and identity”, “migration”. In case one of the two keywords was found in the article in the contexts which does not suit either of the above-mentioned, it was added to the section: “EU” or “Europe”, depending on the keyword. One more section was formed so as to include references to European institutions other than the EU (OSCE or Council of Europe mostly). After that the frequency of usage of each of the contexts was calculated in order to define the most and least used ones.

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The main methodological problem was the fact that the formulated contexts were not mutually exclusive and sometimes it was not easy to differentiate between economics, gas or international relations. Another problem was that in quite a many cases key-words were mentioned as a general background noise information. However, due to the idea of content analysis those issues were left to the interpretation of the researcher and hopefully haven’t perverted the general results of the research. Furthermore, minor interpretation mistakes could not have changed the general conclusions a lot since the number of articles analyzed is rather big (almost 200) and the number of mentioning the key-words is above 1200.

The next step in the analysis was identification of the main frames used in the media discourse about Europe and comparison it with the frames identified by the interview analysis.

3.1.2 Findings in media research

The micro-analyses of the sampled texts reveal that the most often used context for the keywords were the following: “European standards” (around 300 mentions), “European integration” (around 280 mentions), “gas matters” (around 180 mentions), “Euroatlantic integration” (around 165 mentions). The other contexts are met much rarer: “Europe in international relations” (around 80 mentions), “values and identities” (around 60 mentions), “European economics” (around 40 mentions), “security” (around 20 mentions), “European Constitution” (around 15 mentions).

The methodological restraints mentioned above might prevent receiving the exact numbers (as much as one can speak about the exact numbers in the content analysis at all), however, the general tendencies are visible. The first notion to be made is the usage of the word “European” without necessary connection to the European Union. Secondly, the most important context for referring to the idea of Europe is referring to the “European standards”. In most of the cases it is an empty reference, meaning that the word “European” does not always have any content. In many cases it stands for “normal”, “standard” (for instance, or “there are no such big fluctuations of the electorate in any European country”\(^{52}\), or “good”, “high-quality” (“the main problem is that nowadays we do not see the

\(^{52}\)“What was the mistake of the sociologists?!”, # 12 (591), 1\(^{st}\) of April, 2006, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, http://www.dt.ua/1000/1030/53029/
European model of parliamentary-presidential republic”\textsuperscript{53}, or just in order to accentuate the definition (for instance, “[when talking about the new proportional system of elections] the next step to the triumph of democracy of European type is perceived without any specific excitement by the citizens”).

In this context “European” is mostly used to accentuate the words “democracy” and “liberal” (for instance, “[when discussing the relations between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus] their aspirations for European integration of their countries, their westernization and modernization following European liberal-democratic example\textsuperscript{54}”).

The idea of “European integration” is mentioned among other ideational strategic goals of Ukraine without specification and deep discussion (“the course on European integration among other leads to the prioritization of the national adaptation of kids\textsuperscript{55}”).

European integration is framed rather as a slogan in the political fights between the politicians than a strategy for the policies; as general political discourse in Ukraine, the discourse of European integration is rather about politics than about policies (for instance, “it is unclear why the ministers of foreign affairs and defence, appointed by the President, have to adhere to the policies of the coalition they have nothing to do with. Furthermore, the essence of the policies is unclear as well. What exactly is it about in the sphere of European integration, if the leader of the “Party of Regions” promises in Brussels that there is nothing more important for him than membership of Ukraine in the EU while the leader of the communists [who also constitute the coalition] … stated in the parliament that “it is time to end up all … the populist declarations about European Union”\textsuperscript{56}).

As for the context of “Euroatlantic integration” we should just notice that it takes important part in the discourse of Ukrainian foreign policies discussion. Anyway, since it does not shape the image of Europe significantly we shall not discuss it here.

The last of the most used contexts, “gas matters” can mostly be explained by the current situation concerning gas supplies to Europe. And though it does not shape

\textsuperscript{53} “Who’s the Master in the House? About “weak” President and “strong” government in Ukrainian power model”, #1 (630), 13\textsuperscript{th} of January, 2007, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, \url{http://www.dt.ua/1000/1030/55579/}

\textsuperscript{54} “The Fourth Freedom”, # 32 (611), 26\textsuperscript{th} of August, 2006, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, \url{http://www.dt.ua/1000/1030/54325/}

\textsuperscript{55} “The vertical of senses and meanings by Yuryi Pavlenko”, #17 (577), 17\textsuperscript{th} December, 2005, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, \url{http://www.dt.ua/1000/1030/52086/}

22
the idea of Europe it still adds to the conflict frame “Europe vs. Russia”, which was defined as a supplement frame in the analysis of the interviews. Other contexts were not used frequently enough which signifies that those topics are not of that big importance for the idea of Europe as it is framed in the media.

Thus, we might identify the main frames in the media discourse of Europe: “Europe as a standard (norm)-setter”, “Europe vs. Russia”. These frames coincide totally with those received as a result of the frame analysis of the interviews with the representatives of the pro-European organizations, which means the analysis can be seen as valid and thus correctly reflecting the idea of Europe in the pro-European movement of Ukraine. One more observation, about the prevailing of the politics rather than policies in the discourse of European integration, should be marked. Our assumption is that this is not characteristic for the discourse of Europe only, but also for the public sphere in general (this assumption needs to be verified in further researches).

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4 Discourse of Europe in the EU

In this paper when discussing European discourse about Europe we shall equalise it to the discourse of European identity. This stems from the characteristics of discourse: “any form of linguistic practice can be seen as a constituent of new social structures and identities or a mirror of existing ones.”

This leads us to a very debatable topic of European identity, which is not easy to be defined. The main problem is the size of the Union: 27 members with different history, political and economic structures share different identities.

In order to explore the subject we first of all need to define where such a discourse of European identity could take place. As mentioned in the introductory part of this paper, discourse takes place in the public sphere. The case of European Union issues a challenge for the concept of public sphere since its emergence and development were very closely connected with the idea of the nation-state.

Thus before analyzing the self-identification discourse in Europe we should explore the space where such a discourse could take place.

4.1 European Public Sphere

Trenz suggests a minimum definition of the European public sphere as “an open communicative space that is linked to the approval and criticism of evolving forms of European governance” This sort of definition is logically connected to the vision of the EU as a supranational polity. Such a conceptualization of the European public sphere consistently entails the need for the EU-wide media system or at least some separate from the national institutional arrangements for discussing European issues. In case of such a definition European public sphere

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can be schematically described as just an additional level added to the national public spheres of the member states⁵⁹.

Koopmans and Erbe suggest that when conceptualizing the European public sphere the intergovernmental character of the EU as an emerging polity should be taken into account. Thus this type of the Europeanization of the public sphere would not consist of direct references to European issues, but on increased attention to European affairs in the political debates in other member states⁶⁰. Such interpretation of the European public sphere considerably extends the number of issues which might be the signs of the “Europeanization” of the public spheres, which surely complicates the empirical analyses but on the other hand seems to suggest a clearer and more realistic idea of the European public sphere. Having added this dimension to the EPS, Koopmans and Erbe also suggest the division of such Europeanized public sphere into vertical and horizontal. Vertical Europeanization of the public sphere consists of the communicative linkages between the national and the European level. Horizontal Europeanization of the public sphere consists of communicative linkages between different member states.⁶¹

In case of such conceptualization the European public sphere should not be institutionalised in the European media system but in the Europeanised national media systems, which means that no additional level of media system needs to be added; in this case we rather speak about transnationalization of the national media. Interestingly enough, using different logic, Van de Steeg builds more or less the same structure of the possible European public sphere⁶². What is confusing in both conceptualizations is the usage of different base points of analyses. Koopmans and Erbe focus on the political communication which in their definition is the direct or indirect communication between political actors expressed in terms of political claims. Van de Steeg uses public discourse as a point of departure, which is the “texts” produced by the media in the public sphere in interpreting the political reality. So, we might say that Koopmans and Erbe take the raw material of political communication as unit of analyses while Van de Steeg concentrates on the way how they shaped and depicted in the media. But the emphasis on the media is present in both analyses.

⁶¹ Ibid.
This justifies another seemingly consensual claim that at the moment European public sphere is being conceptualized as a *transnational community of communication in the mass-media*. Thus we can speak about the ideal European public sphere if and when: (1) the same (European?) themes are discussed at the same time at similar levels of attention across national public spheres and media; (2) similar frames of references, meaning structures, and patterns of interpretation are used across national public spheres and media; (3) speakers and listeners not only observe each other across national spaces, but also recognize that “Europe” is an issue of common concern for them.\(^{63}\)

These criteria are being used for operationalization of the theory of the European public sphere so as to create relevant tools for the analyses of empirical data using the three criteria of *similar content, similar frames of reference* and *permeability*.\(^{64}\)

Before returning back to the question of discourse of Europe, it is interesting to analyze the reasons why the topic of European public sphere became so popular among the scientists. The main goal for the European public sphere used to be the democratic deficit. European public sphere was believed to be able to find the solution to the increasing problem of the democratic deficit. This can be identified not only as the goal but also as a characteristic of the discourse about Europe. It means that as it exists now discourse of Europe is *not perceived to be democratic*.

Another reason defined by the scholars, who study the European public sphere is the search for the common European identity. This is again interesting since it proves the lack of it at the moment. The multitude of the scholarship also entail multitude of possible conceptualizations of the EPS, different answers to the questions of whether the EPS exists or not; different focuses and different methods of researches. The usage of different interpretations is complicated not only because there is no agreement about the concept of the EPS itself but also because of the addition of other concepts such as “public discourse”, “political communication”. Furthermore a typical reason for analyzing the EPS – the democratic deficit – has recently lost the status of the single and one more very important issue has been added – search for the European identity (which is

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conceptualized in different terms again – as postnational citizenship, postnational solidarity etc.)

In order to structurize our research we shall first try to answer the question of why the European public sphere is being so widely discussed now, then proceed to the conceptualizations of it in the literature, then give the overview of the empirical research in the field and some critique to it from the point of view of Habermasian theory of public sphere.

4.2 Empirical researches of the European Public Sphere

First of all it is important to notice that theoretical and normative debate on a European public sphere far outpaces the empirical knowledge about these themes. What is important is that all the empirical researches in the field of the European public sphere are basically the content analyses of the media, mostly printed media. However, most of the researches done only investigate the quantitative elements of the European public sphere (for instance Risse’s main approaches for the research of the public sphere are: (1) by counting how often “Europe,” “European institutions,” or “European affairs” are mentioned in the media; (2) by analyzing media reporting on particular European issues)

However, the content research on the discourse of Europe are really scarce. One of the case studies, the constitutional debate or the debate on the future of Europe, has attracted especially a lot of attention of the scholars as a sample of the birth of the truly European discourse. The scientific perception of the constitutional debate was again basing on the media, which are proved to have been playing a crucial role in it. The debate on the future of Europe started with a famous speech of then German minister of foreign affairs Joschka Fischer in the Humboldt


University and the whole debate seems to have been deploying in the same direction all over Europe. The role of the media, especially the quality newspapers was enormous in a way that they did not just reflect the political and intellectual debate but also came out as the principal carrier of the discourse on European unity and collective self-understanding of the EU. Both the journalists and intellectuals shaped the public discourse in the direction of creation of the “ever closer union”. However, general level of support for the idea of European integration remained very small.

Thus we might state that the only characteristic of Europe which is shared by everyone is lack of democracy on the European level. Other characteristics are rather required in order to create the European identity but are not present at the moment.

Another idea that cannot be stemmed from the discussions about the European public sphere but is rather based on scarce quantitative researches (analysis of the “Eurobarometer” surveys being the most important of them) reveals that even as mentioned above, the European Union has monopolised the concept of “Europe”, however, the only probably area, in which the two notions are separated is the area of identity. Thomas Risse states that European and EU identities need to be distinguished

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4.3 National Discourses of Europe

There are still national discourses on Europe which might differ quite significantly in different countries.

German attitude towards Europe very much reflects Thomas Mann’s dictum “we do not want German Europe, but a European Germany”. Having gone through the difficult process of reconstruction of the national idea after the Second World War, Germany put its own past as its own past and projected this view on Europe.71

France has not been able to forge a discourse justifying the process of economic liberalization triggered by EU decisions. Schmidt argues that the adaptation to European policy has been justified in terms of protection from globalization and Americanization, but this makes most EU liberalizing choices (for example in the area of public utilities and culture) difficult to accept72. Other researchers support such an idea stating that France basically “Europeanized its own exceptionalism”73, basically in French discourse Europe is very much framed as discourse of France itself, including the emphasis on the cultural exceptionalism and the US as the “other” for Europe. Schmidt goes as far as to state that it was the belief in the exceptionalism (rather even its inability to meet the reality) that led to the success of the extreme right in France74. Thus France’s strategy in constructing the vision of Europe was totally opposite to Germany.

In Southern European countries (Italy and Greece) the discourses of Europe were framed very differently. In Italy and Greece the discourse on Europe has become equivalent to modernization and normalization – in the sense of making these countries more normal, that is, more similar to the other EU partners75.

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73 Social construction p. 105
Thus, different countries form their own vision of Europe which makes the task of adding more characteristics to the discourse of Europe very difficult.

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Defining discourse of Europe in the EU is not an easy task. Firstly, since each of the 27 nations does not only have their own national identity but very often their own understanding of what is European identity. Thus at least 27 different discourses of Europe are being formulated. The attempts to analyse discourses on the level of Union are mainly coming to discussion the possibilities of such a discourse not its content. Thus, as Thomas Risse puts it, as much as there is not fixed meaning what Europe constitutes positively, there is no fixed European “others”. In the discourse of Europe references to different “others” can be found depending on the context (the US and Japan as “others” to the European social model; xenophobic parties inside Europe itself (the “Haider case”)), however, the definition of otherness stays to be the prerogative of the national discourse no all-European.

The only case when Europe was rather united against common other was at the beginning of the war in Iraq, when both elites and common people were united against American activities. Active manifestation of their position by the intellectuals (J. Habermas, J. Baudrillard, U. Eco and many other) accompanied with demonstrations on the street for some moment created the vision of common European identity against commonly defined “other”. However, the situation got more complicated as new members from Central and Eastern Europe decided to manifest their atlantism. This destroyed the new-born self-ness of European Union. However, changes of foreign priorities by Poland demonstrates that unification on the basis of the same ‘other’ might be possible in future.

However, four common characteristics can be defined: personal attachment to the **EU and Europe are different**; EU unlike the member states is considered to be **non-democratic**; EU (but not Europe) is very much seen as a bureaucracy; EU (or Europe; in this case they are the same again) does not have common ‘other’, instead it is defined on the national level.

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5 Conclusions

5.1 Empirical conclusions

In the thesis two visions of Europe, the one in Ukrainian pro-European discourse and one in the European public discourse were analyzed. In order to summarize different frames for Europe in Ukrainian and European discourse identified during the analysis were compared:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Ukraine</th>
<th>In Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Democratic on the level of the member-states, non-democratic on the Union level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Non-transparent decision-making on the level of the Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market economy</td>
<td>Free market with strong social guarantees (? This claim needs to be verified after Eastern enlargement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe=European Union</td>
<td>Europe≠European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe vs. Russia as the main confrontation on the international arena</td>
<td>Europe vs. the USA as main opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia as the “Other”</td>
<td>“Othering” is context dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No connotations</td>
<td>EU as a bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Theoretical contribution
This research can become the first step in exploring ideational closeness (and prospects for proximity) of European Union and Ukraine. Basing on the social constructivist approach we claim that the construction of images of each other to a big extent determines further interaction. However, in case of Ukraine and Europe totally different understanding of the EU cannot be a solid basement for negotiations. Since clear understanding of images of possible partners can facilitate communication between them. Only getting closer to each other on the level of understanding Ukraine and the EU might get a chance to cooperate on the basis which would be appropriate for both.

If to speak about possible membership which is the official goal of Ukraine politics, the issues of Europeanization and absorption capacity, mentioned in the introduction, need to be brought up again. If to draw an analogy with chemistry, the metaphor of Union’s absorption capacity might lead to two interesting notions. Firstly, in chemistry the absorption process can be intensified by the increase of the absorption surface. In the case of possible European integration of Ukraine it means that more countries would want accept and, preferably, promote Ukraine’s membership in the Union, the more chances for joining Ukraine would have. Secondly, the absorption capacity depends on the characteristics of both absorbing and absorbed elements, the more similar and less rigid both elements are, the more the absorption is possible. The European Union does not have rigid identity at the moment as proved in the second part of this work, neither does Ukraine. Thus they can be adopted so as to approach each other. What needs to be done on behalf of the European Union is simple not defining the edge of Europe. Ukraine on its turn has to go through the process of reforming the political, economic and social spheres, which could only be successful in case of formulating a clear and realistic understanding of what is Europe and European Union. The myth-like image of Europe that prevails in the discourse about Europe among the pro-European parts off the society makes the idea of European integration a very handy a tool to be used in political debates between political opponents. However, it does little for the real transformation of the country.

Ukraine’s membership at the moment is unrealistic firstly, due to objective reasons but also cause the vision of the EU by the pro-European movement even is rather unrealistic and idealized. However, turning from the Foucauldian discourse about Europe, which rather hides certain ideational orientations than tests them, to Habermasian discourse of open and rational argumentation might become the first step in normalizing the relations between two sides.
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