Eastern Dimension

Relations With The Eastern Neighbours

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Abstract

This thesis sought to answer three questions: The empirical questions were: What has changed in the CFSP after the Eastern enlargement and why has the Eastern Dimension been initiated? The theoretical question was: Which theories provide an adequate explanation to my argument? After the enlargements in 2004 and 2007, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova became neighbours of the European Union (EU) and Russia’s importance grew. Although the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) included these countries, Poland put further emphasis on them. The enlargement put these countries to a closer axis to the Union and led to the initiative of Eastern Dimension. Since Eastern Dimension is not a formal policy, it can be taken as the intensification of relations with the Eastern neighbours in general, through the ENP and bilateral relations. I utilized rationalism, constructivism and Copenhagen School theory to answer above mentioned questions. According to rationalists (liberal intergovernmentalists), interest in the East originates from instability concerns of the region and economic intentions, notably energy. According to constructivists, the main aim is to export liberal values and norms to the Eastern neighbours. The Copenhagen School showed how the EU leaders tried to justify their security acts towards Eastern neighbours, mainly in their ENP speeches. In benefiting the methodology which uses cases to test theories, I concluded that normative power Europe aspect makes more sense in explaining the initiation of an act towards Eastern neighbours.

Key Words: Eastern Dimension, the CFSP, Eastern enlargement, rationalism, constructivism.

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# Table of Contents

The List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................... 1

1 **Introduction** ........................................................................................................ 2
   1.1 The Subject of the Study .................................................................................. 2
   1.2 The Purpose and the Problem .......................................................................... 2
   1.3 Methodology and Material ............................................................................. 3
   1.4 Delimitations .................................................................................................. 3
   1.5 The Plan .......................................................................................................... 4

2 **Institutional Changes** ........................................................................................ 5
   2.1 The Treaty of Amsterdam ............................................................................... 5
   2.2 The Treaty of Nice ........................................................................................... 5
   2.3 The Constitutional Treaty ............................................................................... 6

3 **Previous Enlargements** .................................................................................... 7
   3.1 1973 Enlargement ......................................................................................... 7
   3.2 1981 and 1986 Enlargements ......................................................................... 8
   3.3 1995 Enlargement ........................................................................................ 9

4 **The Eastern Dimension** .................................................................................... 10
   4.1 The European Neighbourhood Policy ............................................................. 10
   4.2 Poland’s Eastern Dimension Initiative .............................................................. 11
      4.2.1 Poland and the Eastern Neighbours ........................................................ 13

5 **Relations Between the EU and the Eastern Neighbours** ................................. 15
   5.1 The EU- Ukraine Relations ............................................................................ 15
      5.1.1 Ukraine After the Eastern Enlargement .................................................. 16
   5.2 The EU- Belarus Relations ............................................................................ 17
      5.2.1 Belarus After the Eastern Enlargement ................................................... 17
   5.3 The EU- Moldova Relations ........................................................................... 18
      5.3.1 Moldova After the Eastern Enlargement ................................................ 18
   5.4 The EU- Russia Relations .............................................................................. 19
      5.4.1 Russia After the Eastern Enlargement ..................................................... 20
# List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEECs</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro- Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPi</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>LI</td>
<td>Liberal Intergovernmentalism</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland and Hungary Assistance to the Reconstruction of the Economy</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WNIS</td>
<td>Western Newly Independent States</td>
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</table>
1 Introduction

1.1 The Subject of the Study

Enlargement is a form of foreign policy; even the most successful one (Smith 2005 p. 271). For the European Union (EU), Eastern accession\(^1\) was a response to the end of the Cold War as an act to spread economic and political reforms, security and democracy to post-communist countries and to shape the post Cold-War European order through setting norms. Through enlarging, stability is exported to the Eastern Europe (\textit{ibid.}). Yet, it is not only member states that the EU is concerned of. The enlargements in 2004 and 2007 brought Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova\(^2\) to the borders of the EU. Although Russia is already a neighbour since 1995, its affinity and importance has augmented after these enlargements.

The Eastern enlargement raised many concerns on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) mainly, regarding the efficiency of the CFSP to function well, introduction of new issues and interests in the East, and redefinition of borders. The decision making process and convergence of interests with many members have the risk to be watered down; therefore the EU needed to be really prepared (Cameron and Primatarova 2003 p. 2). The accession of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) drew the EU’s attention to the East. Finally, the eastward expansion, drawing new political, economic and cultural boundaries in Europe, created many debates on limits of the Union, security and dividing lines for the neighbours (Sjursen 1998 p. 13).

As Paavo Lipponen put: “Nor is the Northern Dimension a unique invention: The Union has a “Southern Dimension, too - its Mediterranean policy - and also a ‘Western Dimension’- its Transatlantic Agenda -” (Lipponen 1999). The Eastern enlargement highlighted the missing dimension. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), including three Eastern neighbours namely, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, is designed for neighbours to overcome the above mentioned debates. Poland, yet, focused on these Eastern neighbours more and initiated the Eastern Dimension, which covers Russia as well. Yet, the Eastern Dimension can be understood as the growing interest to the East.

1.2 The Purpose and The Problem

Changing dynamics in the East are at the center of attention for the EU since the end of the Cold War. In appreciating generous literature written on the Eastern enlargement

\(^1\) I will take enlargements of 2004 and 2004 together as “Eastern enlargement”. Although my initial intention was to examine solely 2004 enlargement, I covered 2007 enlargement as well, since Moldova became a direct neighbour to the EU after this enlargement.

\(^2\) I will name these three countries as Western Newly Independent States (WNIS). This is how they are defined in the ENP.
and the CFSP, my intention in this thesis is to dwell on a currently evolving phenomenon: The Eastern Dimension. The reason in choosing this subject is twofold: First of all, I find the subject very interesting and exciting due to its up-to-date nature, Poland’s and Eastern neighbours’ growing importance. Secondly, regarding the status of Eastern neighbours, literature on Wider Europe and the ENP provide satisfactory information. Yet, this is not valid for the Eastern Dimension. In this sense, mine is a modest attempt to make a substantial research on the Eastern Dimension and combine it with theoretical explanations in a single document. Since there is no formal EU policy regarding the Eastern Dimension, this thesis will cover the ENP, Poland’s Eastern Dimension initiative and the relations of the EU with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. In order to conduct an extensive analysis, changes undergone in Treaties regarding CFSP provisions to prepare the EU for the enlargements and similar policies created in previous enlargements serve a preliminary analysis.

Thus, the empirical research problem of this study is: What has changed in the CFSP in the aftermath of the Eastern enlargement? In connection to this, my second question is: Why has the Eastern Dimension been initiated? My theoretical research question comes as follows: Which theories provide an adequate explanation to my argument?

1.3 Methodology and Material

This study is a combination of empirical and theoretical research. My intention is to compose a subtle study in complementing both empirical and theoretical data. Secondly, “there is a growing recognition in the discipline that case studies can play a useful role, not only in historical description but also in the development, refinement and perhaps testing of theories” (Levy 2007 p. 197). Levy adds: “[C]ase studies, perhaps even a single case, can successfully be employed to test […] any theory that provides precise predictions” (ibid. p. 202). Thus, my aim in this study is to test whether the initiation of Eastern Dimension justifies theoretical assumptions of rationalism and constructivism.

This study is a blend of books, academic articles, research center publications, reports, and official EU documents such as Treaties, Communications, declarations and press releases. I used the official website of the EU, Polish and Finnish Foreign Affairs Ministry and websites of newspapers. The theoretical part of my thesis rests mainly on literature by Frank Schimmelfennig, Andrew Moravcsik, Ben Tonra, Jeffrey Checkel, Reuben Wong and Barry Buzan et al.

1.4 Delimitations

This thesis studies the Eastern Dimension as a change in the CFSP after the enlargement, and excludes all other changes. I focus on the Eastern neighbours of the EU. Thus, countries included in the ENP, except Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, will not be covered. Especially, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are considered as Eastern neighbours, yet, I aim to put a stress on close neighbours. Besides, I accentuate the impact of other CEECs on the Eastern neighbours, yet, I placed my attention solely on Poland due to its pretentious initiative of the Eastern Dimension. Finally, even though
the subject is on the CFSP, I detach European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) aspects due to the limited scope of the thesis. ³

1.5 The Plan

After the introduction, Chapter II will examine the CFSP provisions that are changed in the Amsterdam, Nice and Constitutional Treaties to make the EU and the CFSP ready for enlargement to serve a complete analysis. Chapter III will examine whether previous enlargements carried new issues and policies to the CFSP agenda. Chapter IV involves the ENP and Poland’s initiative of Eastern Dimension. I will then turn to Chapter V to evaluate the overall relations between the EU and Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia. Chapter VI provides a theoretical explanation with the assistance of rationalism (liberal intergovernmentalism) and constructivism (Europeanization) as well as Copenhagen School theory. The conclusion will end with final assessments, main findings of the thesis and recommendations on future research.

³ ESDP issues are included solely in Chapter I in order not to violate the entirety of Treaty changes regarding the CFSP. ESDP issues will be excluded in the rest of the study, whilst examining relations with Eastern neighbours.
2 The Institutional Changes

Although the intrinsic part of this thesis is devoted to analyse how a new policy regarding the East came on to the scene, the internal setting of the EU has also changed after the Eastern enlargement. In order to strike a balance between the *widening* and *deepening*, critical institutional reforms within the Union are required. The Treaty of Amsterdam, Treaty of Nice and, although not ratified, The Constitutional Treaty carried out fundamental changes to make the EU prepared for the enlargement. Hence, this part will display very briefly the main changes in CFSP provisions in the above-mentioned Treaties.

2.1 The Treaty of Amsterdam

The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999 added a new foreign policy instrument, namely “common strategies”, to existing joint actions and common positions (Hill 2002 p. 10). The European Council is given the right to define common strategies, by consensus, as the areas where the member states have important interests in common.\(^4\) Moreover, although the CFSP decisions are taken by unanimous votes, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced “constructive abstention” mechanism which makes provision for the protection of vital national interest if member states might want to exercise abstention.\(^5\) This does not, however, block the decision. In addition to that, member states should not exercise any action that might conflict with the EU’s action under that decision.

The Treaty of Amsterdam brought the formation of the High Representative for the CFSP, who fulfills the tasks of the Secretary-General of the Council (Winn 2003 p. 152). Javier Solana has been conducting this post since 1999. He is responsible for helping the Council in CFSP-related matters by contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of decisions. The High Representative for the CFSP is also a part of the Troika with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the country holding the EU presidency, and the Commissioner for External Relations. The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which is under the authority of the High Representative of the CFSP, also came into force with the Treaty of Amsterdam (Duke and Vanhoonacker 2006 p. 82). It contains timely assessments, early warning of events, monitoring and analysis of developments in areas relevant to the CFSP.\(^6\)

\(^5\) *ibid.*
\(^6\) *ibid.*
2.2 The Treaty of Nice

With the Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001 and came into force in 2003, enhanced cooperation is made possible for the implementation of a joint action or a common position in issues that do not have any military or defence implications: “If no Member States objects or calls for a unanimous decision in the European Council, enhanced cooperation is adopted in the Council by a qualified majority, with a threshold of eight Member States.” The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is the new name given to the political committee and it is responsible for the EU’s autonomous and operational defence policy (Barbé 2004 p. 50). The PSC is authorised by the Council to take appropriate decisions for political and strategic control of a crisis management operation. Two other innovations are the establishment of the Military Committee of the European Union which is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU being the highest military body established within the Council. Another establishment is the Military Staff Organisation of the EU, which implements the Military Committee's decisions and policies, being the EU’s source of military expertise. The Treaty of Nice has made the enhanced cooperation system more flexible and extended the qualified-majority in decision-making process.

2.3 The Constitutional Treaty

Had it been ratified, signed on 29 October 2004, “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” would have made utmost innovations regarding the CFSP. The Constitutional Treaty offered the creation of the “Minister for Foreign Affairs” who would combine the competencies of the current High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations (Missirola 2003a p. 1). This person would be useful to make the EU speak with one voice and work for the effectiveness and coherence of the CFSP. Being responsible for the whole EU external action, s/he would conduct the CFSP and the ESDP and preside over the newly created Foreign Affairs Council.

One other adjustment is the introduction of a long term Presidency for the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (Vanhoonacker 2005 p. 84). Moreover, all institutional provisions on the EU’s external action would be merged under one Title namely, Title V of Part III (ibid.). The newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) would assist the Minister. A “double- hatted” Minister is considered to be the leader of all the external action in the EU with the support of the PSC (Missirola 2003a p. 2). As far as the decision- making process is concerned, the Commission would not be able to submit proposals in CFSP matters. It could just support an initiative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The creation of new flexibility instruments such as European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency, enhanced and structured cooperation would be other novelties of this Treaty (Barbé 2004 p. 13). Finally, “the common security and defence policy” would be an integral part of the CFSP yielding an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets (Howorth 2005 p. 180).

8 ibid.
3 Previous Enlargements

Notwithstanding previous enlargements were not as salient as the Eastern enlargement, they also brought new problems and opportunities to the EU. It is inevitable that each country brings new policies, new interests, values and perspectives to the EU with their accession. In this respect, I aim to have a glance at previous enlargements and how they moulded the CFSP\(^\text{10}\), with a specific stress on the policies embarked on after these enlargements.

3.1 1973 Enlargement

British, Irish and Danish accession in 1973 raised considerable debates when they joined the EU. Particularly, Britain was regarded as the “awkward partner” of the Union who adopted a rather different stance (George 1998 p. 259). As John Major (1991) once said; Britain joined a community late whose rules were already drawn up by the original members and not them.\(^\text{11}\) After joining the EU, British determination to renegotiate the entry and its will to retain its independent foreign policy made Britain semi-detached which was visible through several opt-outs exercised (White 2001 p. 121).\(^\text{12}\) Britain resisted Europeanization regarding the CFSP, as a case of retarded Europeanization (Wallace \textit{cited} in \textit{ibid.}, p. 119). It paid attention to the convergence of member state foreign policies only if CFSP leaves room for national interests that diverge. Britain did not share the general optimism in Europe in the early 1990s with the instinct of “caution” rather than “euphoria” (Aggestam 2004 p. 85). This uncertainty and anxiety made Britain be attached to the existence of NATO and American forces in Europe. Akin to the Conservative government, Labour Government signalled its role as the “staunch ally and Transatlantic bridge” (\textit{ibid.} p. 89). British foreign policy was highly criticized due to their overt pro-Atlanticism during the Iraq War.

Ireland is regarded as the first neutral country joining the EU (Laursen 1997 p. 2). It accepted the Single European Act (SEA) with a referendum where military aspects were separated from political and economic aspects. The Maastricht Treaty, which added defence policy, was also accepted by Ireland. In IGC 1996, the Foreign Minister of Ireland named the CFSP as a vital step in promoting international peace and stability

\(^{10}\) The predecessor of the CFSP is European Political Cooperation, which was founded in 1970 informally and activated with Single European Act formally, as an intergovernmental network and a forum of consultation of foreign policy issues among the foreign ministeries of the member states, as a coordination of civilian diplomacy. The Treaty of Maastricht led to the shift from cooperation to common foreign and security policy in 1993. The CFSP is created as the second pillar (Wallace and Forster 1996 p. 411, Hix 2005 p. 388). However, I will use the title “CFSP” for the term of these accession countries in order to keep the entirety.


\(^{12}\) Main discrepancies emerged between Britain and the EU in terms of budget, opt outs in Maastricht Treaty on European Monetary (EMU), Amsterdam Treaty on Schengen rules and social policy (White 2001 p. 100).
However, White Paper on Irish Foreign Policy published in the same year, stated the importance of being militarily neutral. In Denmark, referendum on Maastricht Treaty included more “no” votes but turned to “yes” in second referendum (George and Bache 2001 p. 202). The Amsterdam Treaty experienced similar protests, however, was approved later. Consequently, Denmark had to renegotiate a separate agreement namely, the Edinburgh Agreement, which gave Denmark four exemptions. In sum, Britain, Ireland and Denmark retreated from being deeply involved in CFSP provisions and exercised several opt-outs. However, as far as I am concerned, there was no clear policy like Eastern Dimension being put on the table by these countries.

3.2 1981 and 1986 Enlargements

These two enlargements are usually named as the “Mediterranean enlargement”. Due to their relatively poor economic conditions and different culture, Greece participating in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986 did not receive a warm welcome at the first hand. Having struggled with dictatorships for long, these countries’ transition to democracy and market economy was kickstarted by the EU membership. Their accession brought a new dimension to the external policy of the EU. For the first time, the EU became a key international actor in Europe by exporting prosperity and stability, and prepared the EU for its role in the Eastern region (Duleba 2007 p. 14).

Greece finds it difficult to be close to other members due to its geopolitical location and has interests in its subregion, particularly in the Balkans and Mediterranean (George and Bache 2001 p. 203, Baun 2000). Spain and Portugal have interests in the South, too. By the time these countries joined, the EU’s eyes were on the changes in the East. Yet, it is accurate to conclude that the major attention to the Southern Europe and initiation of a new policy called the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (EMP) came with the accession of these countries. The EMP created a framework for cooperation between the EU, and twelve Southern Mediterranean members. It is built on solid Euro-Mediterranean links, aiming peace and stability in the South through political and security dialogue; an economic and social partnership in the region. The EMP is seen as a soft-security projection of the EU in the region (Stephanou and Xenakis 2006 p. 2). The Communication on Wider Europe and the ENP proposed new framework for relations with the EU’s Southern Neighbours, as a complementary of the EMP.

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13 These exemptions are on union citizenship, the third phase of the EMU, justice and home affairs and common defense policy (Hansen and Wæver 2002 p. 72).
14 The EMP is also named as the “Barcelona Process”. The programme was initiated in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ euromed.
15 These countries are Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Palestine; two of which – Malta and Cyprus- became EU members in May 2004. Available at: ibid.
3.3 1995 Enlargement

Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the Union in 1995. Austria expressed its will to retain its neutrality, however started a reappraisal of its neutrality to put it in line with CFSP provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, with the determination not to lag behind. In other words, “neutrality has been redefined in order to enable Austria to conduct a policy of international relations” (Pedersen 1996 p. 83). Consequently, Austrian neutrality has changed. For instance, Austria took a positive stance in supporting the CFSP. An effective EU security policy would also be critical for Austria’s preservation of national security, due to its proximity to unstable regions (George and Bache 2001 p. 206).

Sweden had doubts whether its neutrality would be compatible with the accession (Pedersen 1996 p. 86). However, the changing security climate in the 1980s weakened Swedish neutrality. Sweden deemed that two bloc world would not care about neutrality and the possibility of the CEECs to be members prompted Sweden (Pedersen 1996 p. 86). Prime Minister Bildt that came to post in 1991 was more aloof from neutrality than his predecessor Carlsson (Luif 1996 p. 345). In a speech of Foreign Affairs Minister Ugglas in 1992, the geopolitical situation and the interests in the Baltics and North were highlighted. Sweden soon recognized that the enlargement would strengthen the CFSP, and they would make valuable contributions to the security of the North (Pedersen 1996 p. 91). Finland, similarly, pursued neutrality. Yet, it had many security reasons in its accession in 1995. The end of the Cold War and Finnish border with Russia altered Finland’s neutrality. Finland has interests in promoting stability and security in Northern Europe (ibid. p. 100). It supported Maastricht Treaty and applied for membership without a neutrality clause like Sweden and unlike Austria (Luif 1996 p. 347).

The former Finnish Foreign Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen sent a letter to Jacques Santer in 1997, in which he stated that a strategy that drives the risks and opportunities in the Northern region should be developed. This was how the Northern Dimension is launched. He aimed to prevent dividing lines in “reinforcing positive interdependence between the European Union, Russia and the other states in the Baltic Sea region, thus enhancing security, stability and sustainable development in Northern Europe” (Lipponen 1999). He noted that “the EU has acquired a natural Northern Dimension, and now needs a policy for that dimension (Blomberg 1998 p. 8). The interest in the North included issues on political stability, economic, environment, health, organized crime and border (Jopp 1998 p. 13). Although the Baltic accession placed emphasis on the Northern Dimension, the accession of Finland and Sweden was the very first element that attracted the EU’s eyes to the region. These countries’ formidable efforts put the Northern Dimension in a clear context.

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16 The EU adopted a Communication on “Northern Dimension for the policies of the Union” and in 2001, the first Action Plan on the Northern Dimension is applied. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/index.htm.
4 Eastern Dimension

4.1 The European Neighbourhood Policy

The Communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, issued in 2003, is the background of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Strategy Paper on ENP 2004 p. 2). The Communication on Wider Europe and the ENP led to “the framework for the Union’s relations with neighbouring countries that do not currently have the perspective of membership of the EU” (2003 p. 4). The Strategy Paper on ENP is published in 2004 as a response to opportunities and challenges created by the enlargement and approaching neighbours. The ENP’s core can be summarized as such:

The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned. It is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation (Strategy Paper on the ENP 2004 p. 3).

This cooperation is conducted through Action Plans. The ENP introduced a new instrument namely, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPi) which starts from 2007 and replace TACIS.17 The ENP is based on mutual commitment to common values; the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, the principles of market economy and sustainable development (ibid.). Romano Prodi once said regarding the ENP that, the EU would share “everything but the institutions” (Emerson 2004 p. 16). Among the countries covered in the ENP18, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova deserves more attention since they would share borders with the EU after enlargements. The relations with these countries, except Belarus, are based on Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA).19 Michael Emerson stated that the ENP is designed to mitigate the excluding effects of the enlargement on Russia and the WNIS, then, the scope of it was expanded in order not to leave other neighbours disadvantaged (2004 p. 8). The WNIS are examined similarly to the other neighbours. Yet, Russia and Belarus occupied more space in the document.

Russia is not included in the ENP. Russia is referred to as a key partner in the neighbourhood and its strategic partnership would be through the creation of four common spaces as declared in the St Petersburg summit in May 2003 (Strategy Paper on the ENP 2004 p. 4). However, Russia was not very happy, because it had its own plans in its own neighbourhood and did not welcome “this prospect of intensified competition for influence in the European Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)”

17 Further information will be given on TACIS in the next chapter.
18 The other countries are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm.
19 PCAs will be elaborated on in the next chapter.
(Emerson 2004 p. 8). Besides, the ENP had vague statements on Russia; placing Russia half in, half out (de Wilde and Pellon 2006 p. 127). Concerning Belarus, The ENP stated that the condition of good relations between the EU and Belarus is up to the establishment of a democratic form of government, free and fair elections. After that, the full benefits of the ENP would be possible for Belarus. Meanwhile, the EU would consider ways to underpin civil society in Belarus (Strategy Paper on the ENP 2004 p. 4). The EU pointed out not only common borders but also the common agenda on shared values. In terms of trade, the priority is set as the implementation of the trade-related provisions of the PCA (ibid. p. 15).

Ukraine was also disappointed in the ENP and expected an overt provision on the possible future free trade agreement and visa facilitation. Moldova was happier since Moldova’s first goal was to gain recognition as a full partner in regional mechanisms (Emerson 2004 p. 9). Even though Eastern Dimension is not formally mentioned in the ENP, the importance of a regional cooperation in the Eastern borders, in trade, environment, security and social issues, such as Northern Dimension, is pointed out. Yet, the EU suggested the development of existing bodies rather than creating new ones (Strategy Paper on ENP p. 21).

4.2 Poland’s Initiative on the Eastern Dimension

The East is unquestionably fundamental for the EU since the end of the Cold War and interests regarding the Eastern Europe have not emerged recently. Germany played an assertive role in the region because of its geographical proximity and its experience on Eastern Germany. As Frank Schimmelfennig stated, states who are closer to the region have rational interests (2001 p. 88). In its Ostpolitik, Germany tried to create a concrete policy towards the East and mostly focused on Russia (Debski 2005 p. 9). Eastern Dimension is highly inspired from the German predecessor. Similarly, the Northern Dimension constitutes a very good model for the Eastern Dimension. The Finnish lesson is that “a small and relatively peripheral country appeared to have grasped the initiative of doing away with the old opposition between East and West as the core European signifiers” (Joenniemi and Sergounin 2000 p. 24). The Northern Dimension also stressed Russia. Yet, the scope is extended to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova by Poland.

Poland is the largest country and one of the strongest players among the accession countries. Poland proved that it would be a powerful actor by participating in Visegrad Group\textsuperscript{21}, Weimar Triangle\textsuperscript{22} and Baltic Sea States Council.\textsuperscript{23} These ties paved

\textsuperscript{20} In June 2000, Moscow adopted a Foreign Policy Concept that makes the CIS the first regional priority for Russia. These countries are: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. In the European Security Strategy of 2003, the EU also considers this region as a priority in order to build a safe and secure Europe (de Wilde and Pellon 2006 p. 2).

\textsuperscript{21} Visegrad Group is created in 1991 by Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia as a regional cooperation formation in Central Europe. Available at: http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=1011.

\textsuperscript{22} The Weimar Triangle is founded in 1991 by Poland, Germany and France in order to enable cooperation among these countries. Available at: http://www.msz.gov.pl/Weimer,Triangle,2176.html.
the way for Poland being a “regional leader”. However, the biggest claim appeared with the Eastern Dimension initiative. All Visegrad countries are interested in Eastern dimension, but the strongest interest and the most active policy came from Poland (Cameron 2003 p. 8). Poland saw itself as a trailblazer for the Eastern neighbours in its success in integrating to the West through NATO and EU enlargements. It differed itself from the rest of the CEECs in the sense that, all others turned their back to the East, however Poland never underestimated the East (Kowal 2004 p. 10). Yet, it is debated whether the CEECs recognize Poland as the leader. In fact, Poland saw the CEECs rivals in its aspirations in the East.

Regarding other EU members, Germany is the most prominent country that stated its intentions in the East. For instance, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared “Draft elements regarding a European policy for Ukraine” with Poland in 2004. After the Orange Revolution, Germany and Poland issued a paper for cooperation on Ukraine (Gromadzki et al. 2005: 14). Russia, Ukraine and Germany’s agreement on transit of gas, and the agreement between Russia and Germany in 2005 to build a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine and Poland made Poland very concerned (Paznyak 2003 p. 32). Russia and Germany have close relations on energy. For instance, Russian Gazprom owns 35% of Wingas, a German distribution company and German Ruhrgas have stakes in Gazprom (Economist 2007a). In other words, Poland is in competition for the dominance of the region with the old members, too. This has a lot to do with its material interests in the region. Moreover, it wants to disprove its “Trojan Horse” image. Poland needed a safe haven after the Cold War. Like Britain, NATO and the USA were guarantors of security for Poland. Polish purchase of US military material and its support to the USA in the Iraq War were highly criticized by other members, mainly France. However, Poland soon became aware of the fact that its future is in the EU (Cameron 2003b p. 10). Thus, Eastern Dimension act is a good chance to assert its existence and importance in the Union.

Poland raised the focus in the Eastern Dimension since 1998, when former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bronisław Geremek stressed this end during the start of accession negotiations (Cimoszewicz 2003). In 2001, Foreign Affairs Ministry presented a document about it. However, a more coherent framework came in 2003. In the conference “EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy”, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz made a speech titled “Eastern Dimension of the European Union: The View from Poland”. The speech provided an elaborated concept of the “Eastern Dimension”, arguing the concept should become the EU’s policy tool to develop enhanced relations with its new Eastern neighbours.

The countries of Eastern Europe face a lot of similar problems and challenges due to their common historical experience in the 20th century. Moreover their economies are still dependent on each other and strong political connections exist between them. Therefore it seems reasonable for the EU to have a coherent, comprehensive framework of its Eastern Policy… Poland suggests that this framework should constitute the Eastern Dimension of the EU (Cimoszewicz 2003).

He also stated that, Poland gives utmost importance to its neighbours and preventing dividing lines. Poland argued that they have experience and sensitivity in
mutual perception of Eastern and Western Europe, and Poland shall soon be directly participating in shaping the Union’s external policies \((\text{ibid.})\). In the speech "The Eastern Policy of the European Union", Cimoszewicz referred to the joy of imminent accession but reminded the exclusion of European neighbours despite their Europe aspirations (Cimoszewicz 2004a). Poland stated that the Eastern Dimension should constitute one of the major pillars of the EU global profile.\(^{25}\) He stated the reasons for such an act as such:

First, it is imperative for all of us to prevent potential negative consequences that may result from the growing modernisation gap between the EU and its Eastern neighbours […] It is increasingly the fact that if Europe wants to play a role as a strategic entity in the globalised world it must embrace its Eastern neighbours as legitimate members of its family […] And finally there is the factor of culture, history and common identity (Cimoszewicz 2004a).

He made the same remarks in the speech on “Europe Enlarged But Open” at the OECD Council:

We must not forget about those European countries that are not joining the EU with us. They will be looking at us in the way that Poland has been looking at the Fifteen for a long time. In our opinion, the EU Eastern policy should first of all aim to eliminate the existing divisions, through assisting the neighbouring countries in their further reforms and construction of civil society as well as closer co-operation based on common values and interests (Cimoszewicz 2004b)

4.2.1 Poland and Eastern Neighbours

Poland’s interest in Belarus, Moldova and especially Ukraine can be explained by its relations with Russia. Poland thinks that, with the WNIS, notably Ukraine, Russia is an empire, but without it; it will not be one (Smolar 2000 p. 11). In launching the Eastern Dimension, Poland aimed to mitigate Russian interests and Russian destabilization in the region because Poland still sees Russia as a matter of concern and threat in its interests in the region (Gower 2001 p. 11).

Poland is also afraid of the “Rapallo myth”\(^{26}\), a fear of Russia’s logrolling with the West at Polish expense (Smolar 2002 p. 11). One might say that the Eastern Dimension is launched because Poland wants to prevent the “Russia first” concept. Poland felt offended when the Kaliningrad question and talks about energy are grappled with without its consultation (Makarychev 2004 p. 306). On the other hand, Poland wants to see a stable and democratic Russia. In the case of Kaliningrad enclave, Poland contributed to the further developments with Russia and the EU on the resolution of the problem.\(^{27}\)

Poland is the first country to recognize Ukrainian independence in 1991. Starting from mid-1990s, Poland and Ukraine started up a good neighbourhood project (Wolczuk 2002 p. 172). Ukraine saw its relations with Poland as a facilitating means in relations with the West. However, relations did no go that perfect until 1994, since

\(^{25}\) The new government that took the office in 2005 elections continued to take the East as the priority (Kaczyński 2005 p. 3). Polish Presidency of the Council of Baltic Sea States between 2004–2005 augmented the Eastern Dimension acts. Furthermore, the ENP is included in the Polish National Development Plan for the years 2007-2013 (\text{ibid.})

\(^{26}\) This myth refers to an agreement between Germany and Soviet Russia in 1922 (Karsten 1999).

\(^{27}\) Kaliningrad issue will be discussed in the EU-Russia relations section.
Ukraine wanted closer ties for returning to Europe. Yet, Poland did not want anyone to be skeptical of its own return to Europe, and feared of exacerbating relations with Russia (ibid. p. 173). However, Poland’s accession to NATO ameliorated the relations: “Poland took on the responsibility of europeanizing Ukraine in the pursuit of a secure Eastern border” (ibid. p.175). However, the political and economic instabilities in Ukraine and possible erection of Schengen border between Poland and Ukraine created problems. In 2001, Poland and Ukraine signed an agreement to boost cooperation in borders and increase Ukrainian guards in Russian border (Wolczuk 2002 p. 178). Poland is happy of pro- Western acts in Ukraine and it backed Orange Revolution vigorously.

Poland is not happy of what has been going on in Belarus. In August 2005, Polish Prime Minister announced Poland’s discussion with the prime ministers of Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine on the possibility of overthrowing Belarus President Lukashenko. The same year, Lukashenko dismissed the head of “Union of Poles in Belarus”, which is the biggest NGO in Belarus (Kabalina and Tarasov 2005 p. 8). Poland showed its anger by recalling its ambassador. Regarding Moldova, Poland is against Moldovian rapprochement with Russia. In sum, Poland wants to see these countries with democratic institutions, commitment to common values and close to the EU, not Russia.
5 Relations Between the EU and the Eastern Neighbours

“The door is neither closed nor open” is the accurate expression about EU’s relations with Eastern neighbours (Ferrero-Waldner 2003). Having looked at the ENP and Poland’s Eastern Dimension initiative, this chapter aims to analyse the overall EU relations with Eastern neighbours and to see what has changed in these countries after the Eastern enlargement.

5.1 The EU- Ukraine Relations

Ukraine is located in a strategic position between Central Europe and Russia, retaining main routes of energy and migration to Western Europe (Lewis 2002 p. 7). Ukraine became independent in 1991. During the first President Kravchuk’s term, Ukraine showed that it is prone to have good relations with the EU. President Kuchma was elected in 1994 and improved relations with Russia. Be that as it may, a PCA was signed in 1994 with the EU as being the first post-Soviet state doing this (ibid. p. 8)\(^{28}\). The EU issued a joint communique with the USA in 1997, which stated that Ukraine’s democratization is an utmost precondition for stability of Europe (Kuzio 2000 p. 155).

The PCA is ratified in 1998.\(^{29}\) In 1999, the EU adopted “Common Strategy on Ukraine” which had no remarks on Ukrainian membership. The EU focused on the fulfilment of reforms stated in the PCA. Yet, this was not reminiscent to Ukraine’s “Strategy of Ukraine’s Integration to the EU” which outlined the EU membership as the final goal. This was developed to a “Programme of Integration of Ukraine to the EU” in 2000 (Pidluska 2000 p. 184). Until 2000, when Kuchma was reelected and reformist Viktor Yuschenko became the Prime Minister, democracy and market economy were in slow progress. After the economic recovery and the Eastern enlargement, the EU became more interested in Ukraine (Tedstrom 2002 p. 33). The developments in Ukraine was confirmed in the Commission’s resolution in March 2001 (Pidluska 2002 p. 187). Gothenburg Summit in 2001 put Ukraine in the section of “Future of Europe” instead of “External Affairs” in Presidency conclusions. Ukraine was invited to European Conference in Brussels in 2001 for the first time. In his visit to Kiev in 2001, Javier Solana said that Brussels is satisfied with Ukraine’s aspiration of reforms, Ukraine still has a long way, though.

\(^{28}\) The PCA is a blueprint serving for political dialogue, cooperation in trade, economy, energy, technology, environment and social issues. Available at:

\(^{29}\) In March 2004, A Protocol to the PCA was signed, which extended the PCA to the enlarged EU. It is signed with Moldova and Russia in April 2004. Available at:
5.1.2 Ukraine after the Eastern Enlargement

Ukraine was not included among prospective members such as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia in Luxembourg European Council in 1999 (Kuzio 2000 p. 155). This summit created great disappointment. Ukraine also complained about the Russia-centric bias of the EU; as if Ukraine and Russia were organically linked to each other (ibid. p. 159). The Eastern enlargement aggravated debates on exclusion. Foreign Minister Borysk Tarasiuk stated that:

Indeed, certain western European politicians and political experts still adhere to the idea of throwing European CIS countries out of the framework of integration process in Europe. Supporters of this concept, who like to speak about avoiding new lines in Europe so much, are actually drawing them (Tarasiuk 1998 in ibid.)

Belarus and Moldova are important to the EU, but Ukraine is more important due to its geostrategic terms and size. Moreover, Ukraine’s success in integration with the EU have profound effect on Russia’s transition (Tedstrom 2002 p. 32). Yet, not everyone is positive about Ukraine. The long duration of Communist times, Ukraine’s image as the facilitator of Russian interests and its different culture rise questions about its accession (Zlenko 2002 p. 22). Gunter Verheugen resembled Ukraine’s accession to the EU to Mexico’s accession to the USA (Pidluska 2002 p. 183). Actually, Ukraine approached more to the East prior to 2004 (Vahl 2004 p. 1). Yet, the EU-Ukraine relations changed with a historical event: The Orange Revolution. In 2004, the Prime Minister Yanukovich was declared as the winner of the Presidential elections. Headed by the leaders of opposition; Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko in December 2004, Orange Revolution occurred and put the country in a democratic and pro-EU axis (Karatnycky 2005). Yushchenko became the President and Tymoshenko the Prime Minister. This twist led to the development of democratic institutions and robustness of economy. Orange Revolution is seen as a fact of Ukraine’s Europeanness in embracing key European values (Gromadzki 2005 et al. p. 7). This Revolution opened a new chapter in EU-Ukraine relations and required more ambitious proposals (ibid. p. 18).

In February 2005, a EU-Ukraine Action Plan was endorsed which was designed to “fulfil the provisions in the PCA as a valid basis for EU-Ukraine cooperation” (Action Plan 2005). However, Ukraine expected more after the Orange Revolution (Vahl 2005 p. 20). Moreover, in September 2005, resignations and corruption claims brought this government to an end and ended up with dismissal of Tymoshenko. The parliamentary elections held in March 2006 is observed as free and democratic. As a result, Yanukovich became the Prime Minister again. In April 2007, Yushchenko decided to dissolve parliament and call new elections for May 27. This domestic turbulence is a source of concern for the Union.

31 Available at: www.ieac.org.ua/pics/content/15/1109931048_ans.doc.
32 Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,476078,00.html.
5.2 The EU- Belarus Relations

Belarus is the country that has the lowest-level relations with the EU in Central-Eastern Europe, whilst keeping its importance due to its transit role between Europe and Eurasia and its strategic geopolitical location (Paznyak 2003 p. 3). The EU recognized Belarus when the country became independent in 1991. However, the election of Aleksander Lukashenko in 1994 signalled the future problems. The PCA was signed between the EU and Belarus in 1995, however, did not come into force. Democratically elected parliament was replaced by a president-centred formation in 1996, when the 1994 Constitution is reformed. As the EU did not support this constitution, some measures were taken against Belarus such as the nonconclusion of the PCA, suspension of bilateral relations and Belarus’ membership to the Council of Europe (Jopp and Arnswald 2001 p. 12). The biggest reasons of the EU’s distance to Belarus are Lukashenko’s authoritarian rule and its close links with Russia, which escalated after their agreements on integration in mid 1990s. The situation in Belarus is generally regarded as the reflections of what has been going on in Russia. Belarus is often criticized of pursuing Russian ends in return of Russian assistance in trade or elections (Gromadzki et al. 2001 p. 9).


5.2.1. Belarus After The Eastern Enlargement

Belarus has a closer economic cooperation with the EU. The EU is the second trading partner of Belarus after the WNIS. After two TACIS programmes for 2000-2001 and 2002-2003, a new TACIS covered 2005-2006. Belarus also benefits from Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, the Interstate Programme, Nuclear Safety Programme and European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights Programme (Paznyak 2003 p. 6). However, political conditions remained same after 2004. Lukashenko and his 30 officials were banned again entering the EU countries in April 2006 after the undemocratic elections on March 19.

33 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/index.htm#overview.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4895264.stm.
Belarus did not state its will to be a member of the EU, unlike Ukraine and Moldova. Yet, Eastern enlargement has had big impacts on the country. The extension of the existing anti-dumping rules to new EU members, visa regulations due to Schengen zone and EU-Russia Common Economic Space are the disadvantages of the enlargement. In order to overcome this sentiment of exclusion, the ENP is designed which cover Belarus, even though PCA did not come into force. The EU strives for promoting democratisation, respect for human rights and rule of law in Belarus. The priority is to promote country’s adherence to common values and prevent its isolation from Europe (ibid. p. 32).

5.3 The EU- Moldova Relations

The PCA signed in 1998, is the basis of EU-Moldova relations. According to the Strategy Paper on Moldova published in December 2001, poverty and instability are of major concern for the EU. Moreover, the victory of the Communist Party in 2001 parliamentarian elections, the need for further progress for civil society, public governance and the rule of law are other deficiencies (Strategy Paper 2005 p. 3). One big problem is Transnistria: Transnistria is striving for independence since 1991 with the military help of the Russians. The conflict stopped in 1992, however Russian soldiers did not withdraw. The region is very important as it owns a big power plant and it is a transit area for gas pipelines (ibid.). The European Court of Human Rights decided in July 2004 that Transnistria remained under authority, at least influence of Russia (Popescu 2005 p. 26). The division of the country creates inefficient government, poverty, and political instability. Moldova is the poorest country in Europe and attracts problems of illegal migration, sex slaves, small arms and other illegal contraband into the EU (Haukkala 2005 p. 3).

5.3.1 Moldova after the Eastern Enlargement

Moldova became a direct neighbour of the EU after Romania’s accession in 2007. Moldova and Romania are highly linked to each other, since many Romanian originated Moldovians reside in the country. After the 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections in Romania, relations between Romania and Moldova improved. For instance, Romanian President’s first official visit was to Moldova in January 2005. The EU-Moldova Action Plan of February 2005 and the victory of communist party leader Volonin in the 2005 pro-European parliamentarian elections are courageous developments on the EU front (Dura 2007 p. 1).

Indeed, the accession of Romania in 2007 was a strong factor to make Chisinau feel isolated. The free trade area between Romania and Moldova is exterminated and Moldovans should apply for visa to enter Romania. However, Romania works hard for Moldova’s political and economical rapprochement to the EU as well as its territorial integrity in the case of Transnistria, unlike Russia (Dura 2007 p. 2). Romania lobbies Moldovan interests in the EU. It is similar to Polish attempts on Ukraine. Despite

40 Transsdniestria is a narrow strip land separated from the main part of Moldova by the reiver Dniestra (Popescu 2005 p. 17).
Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tarlev’s speech on the commitment of pro-European stance, in December 2006, Moldova criticized Romania as it is an intervention.\textsuperscript{41}

Transnistria conflict is political and economical, not ethnic or religious. It is backed by some groups in Russia, Ukraine and even Moldova (Popescu 2005 p. 8). Due to its small territory and poverty, Moldova was disregarded by the EU. Yet, positive developments such as Action Plan, Orange Revolution in Ukraine, EU-Russian common spaces agreement and Romania’s accession changed the context positively. The EU has chosen a more active policy towards Moldova. In March 2005, a special Representative for Moldova was appointed.\textsuperscript{42} In 2005, the President of Moldova and President Yuschenko of Ukraine sent a joint letter to the European Union requesting the assistance of the EU in monitoring the Transnistrian section of the common border. The EU Border Assistance Mission helps to prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud (de Wilde and Pellon 2006 p. 132).

5.4 The EU-Russia Relations

Russia became a neighbour to the EU with 1995 accession. The foe of the Cold War turned out to be a strategic partner with the demise of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{43} It is not only the largest neighbour of the EU but also the most assertive one bearing big power characteristics. It has an undeniably vital economic relations with the EU as an energy supplier, and Russia is the strongest neighbour in the region due to its military power and political charisma.

The basis for EU-Russia relations is the PCA that came into force in 1997. The PCA is based on shared values, equality and partnership pursuing political, economic, social, environmental, technological and cultural cooperation as well as the establishment of an EU-Russia free trade area. The TACIS programme\textsuperscript{44} set in 1991 stimulated institutional, legal and administrative reform in Russia (Gower 2000 p. 170). 1999 Common Strategy on Russia is also an important document which set an overview of Russian relations for the EU and specified that “the EU’s main objective is to engage with Russia to build a genuine strategic partnership, founded on common interests and shared values” (de Wilde and Pellon 2006 p. 121).\textsuperscript{45}

Putin’s victory in 2000 in presidential elections proposed many changes. Unlike Yeltsin, Putin is interested in the EU and formed a more stable and reliable partner. However, Putin is aiming to rebuild the power of the state in an assertive way and shows Russia as “not like the others” country (ibid p. 127). After that, the EU-Russia relations continued rapidly: An Energy Dialogue was established in 2000 to cover energy cooperation; the EU granted “market economy status” to Russian exporters in

\textsuperscript{42} Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/moldova/intro/index.htm.
\textsuperscript{43} As stated before, Russia is not involved in the ENP and its relations with the EU are covered by strategic partnership and four common spaces.
\textsuperscript{44} TACIS is a technical assistance programme. The EU have a different policy between the CEECs and Russia. For instance, it is TACIS for Russia and PHARE for the CEECs. The difference also prevails between PCAs and Associate Agreements (Gower 2000 p. 167).
\textsuperscript{45} Russia has responded to the EU Common Strategy with its “Medium- Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)" (de Wilde and Gaelle 2006 p. 3).
2002, four common spaces\textsuperscript{46} were created in 2003 St. Petersburg Summit and Road Maps are decided in 2005 as the instrument to implement common spaces(Karaganov \textit{et al.} 2005 p. 1).

Although Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin stated from time to time that they aim membership in the long-term, Russia’ slow economic and political transition, vast size, poorness and cultural difference do not make the claim realistic. The main reason of these statements is not to show the willingness to be a part of Europe. Russia just wants to show that it is also on the stage and does not want to be ignored (Gower 2000 p. 166).

5.4.1 Russia after the Eastern Enlargement

From Russia’s point of view, EU enlargement is favourable as it contributes to the stabilization of the borders close to Russia. It is a natural process of European integration, driven by genuine economic, social and political interests of the EU nations and transnational entities. However, Russia is still ambivalent on whether the integration would make Russia a junior and isolated partner (Kaczmerzki 2005 p. 2).

Even if the Eastern enlargement was not perceived as a direct threat like NATO enlargement, issues like trade, energy relations and the extension of the EU to countries bordering Russia created sensitive balances (\textit{ibid.}). The enlargement made Russian agenda be occupied with pragmatist and rationalist ends (Flenley 2005 p. 442). Russia is right in worrying about the CEECs accession as they would adopt EU regulations and the trade with them would be cut. A common fear of the enlargement for Russia was that it would marginalize European economies that are left outside (Widgrén and Sulama 2004 p. 307). Yet, one might argue that the accession was beneficial for Russia to expand market terms.

The strategic partnership between the EU and Russia is challenged by the clash of interests in the WNIS. The former Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Andrey Fedorov stated that: “[I]n Yeltsin’s time we were trying to wrap this in a nice paper. Now we are saying it more directly; this is our territory, our sphere of interest”(cited in Klussmann 2007). There are many Russians who are for Ukrainian disintegration, one of which is Putin’s favourite commentator, Mikhail Leontyev (Klussmann 2007). Ukrainian energy debt crisis\textsuperscript{47}, the fate of Yushchenko government\textsuperscript{48} and Kuchma’s tape scandal\textsuperscript{49} are speculations of Russian intervention. The Orange Revolution is seen as 9/11 for Russia (Krastev 2005).\textsuperscript{50} Belarus is regarded as the “the only remaining ally” of Russia in Europe. Moscow uses military facilities of Belarus and provides price reductions in its oil and gas supplies to Belarus (Arnold 2006). Yet, Russia imposes

\textsuperscript{46} These are common spaces on economy; freedom, security and justice; external security and; research and education, cultural. Available at: http://www.eu-visibility.ru/nljuneen.html

\textsuperscript{47} Russia cut Ukraine’s oil in December 1999 as the fifth time since the country’s independence (Sherr in Lewis 2002 p. 162). The cut in January 2007 was also serious. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6240473.stm

\textsuperscript{48} Yushchenko and his Deputy Minister, as being the first government introducing structural changes for “European-choice” were dismissed in 2001 from the Parliament and replaced by a person who is close to Russian oil interests (\textit{ibid.} p. 164).

\textsuperscript{49} This scandal occurred when tapes implicating Kuchma’s murder of a journalist and other abuses of power were published in 2000 (\textit{ibid.}).

\textsuperscript{50} Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europe_constitution/postorange_2947.jsp
energy punishments on Belarus to maintain this (Economist 2007b).\textsuperscript{51} Moldova Strategy Paper recognized Russian political and economic interests in Moldova.\textsuperscript{52} Also, Russia provided the Transnistrian region an aid of $77 million in 2006 as well as free gas, even though Russia raised gas price and pursued economic blockade for Moldova (Dura 2007 p. 2). Indeed, Russia wants to retain its ties with these states in order not to be excluded. Russia thinks as Yalta frontier is only shifted a few hundred kilometres further east (Gower 2000 p. 163). Russia seeks a European continent without a sharp division between the EU and non-EU states (Lynch 2004 p. 104).

Moreover, after enlargement, energy dependency problem grew. The EU became the world’s largest energy consumer with 18% of global energy consumption, while the Union’s oil and gas import dependency will increase from its current 50 per cent to 70 per cent by 2020 (Matthies et al. 2003 p. 2). Kaliningrad is another issue that escalated after enlargement. Even though, it is a region of Russian Federation, Kaliningrad is separated from mainland Russia and located between Poland and Lithuania. With the membership of Poland and Lithuania, Kaliningrad became a Russian enclave within the enlarged EU. Oil, transit, crime and environment issues are of profound importance for both the EU and Russia (Jopp and Arnswald 2001 p. 82). The aspiration of Lithuania and Poland to join the Schengen zone disturbed Russia.\textsuperscript{53} In 2003, Russia and Lithuania agreed on the compromise and creation of “Facilitated Transit Document” (Vinokurov 2006 p. 1). A Joint Statement on EU enlargement in April 2004, confirmed freedom of transit as set out in the PCA and Article V of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.\textsuperscript{54}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[51] In December 2006, Russia imposed new duties on the crude oil it exports to Belarus. Besides, in January 2007, Russia stopped pumping oil into a pipeline network that crosses Belarus and delivers 12.5% of the European Union’s oil needs.
  \item[54] ibid.
\end{itemize}
6 Theoretical Explanations

6.1 Rationalism

Rationalism highlights the importance of power and interest in international life. It is a very state-centric approach and as Stanley Hoffmann (1966) put before, member states are not obsolete at all. Rationalism also argues; what exists is material, measurable and observable. Besides, there is no place for consideration of ideas, norms and culture in rationalism (Tonra 2000 p. 8). Rationalists take the context and interests as exogenously given (Fierke and Wiener 1999 p. 724). Yet, I will now turn to Liberal Intergovernmentalism in order shed light on the solution of my theoretical puzzle.

6.1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) is a variation of rationalist approaches that is developed to explain European integration. According to the founder of this school, Andrew Moravcsik, individuals act in the sense of rationalist action, in which, they choose the outcome that maximizes their utility. It is the “interdependent rational state choices that drive actor preferences (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 77).

LI offers a liberal theory of national preference formation, a bargaining theory of international negotiations, and a functional theory of institutional choice: State preferences are not fixed and may vary across time and issues being based on different constellations of preferences and power (ibid.). Moravcsik claims that state preferences are the consequences of distributional conflict and bargaining power at the domestic and the international level (Schimmelfennig 2001 p. 49). Secondly, a bargaining theory argues that the outcome of international negotiations, which leads to cooperation in the end, depends on the relative bargaining power of the actors. Actors who have more and better information have more bargaining power. They also possess a chance to reach their preferred outcomes by threatening them with non-cooperation (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 77). Thirdly, states establish international institutions to manage and overcome the first and second-order problems of international cooperation, that is, situations in which non-cooperative behaviour is the individually rational choice but in the end leaves all states worse off (ibid. p. 78).

Moravcsik asserted that “economic interests have been the drivers of European integration” (1998 p. 473). Rational preferences are issue-specific; mainly economic and the reason for that is the economic nature of European integration. Governments pursue integration as a means to secure commercial advantages for producer groups, subject to regulatory and budgetary constraints (ibid. p. 38). Moravcsik also allows for the impact of geopolitical preferences. Economic preferences are not enough;

55 LI is mainly inspired by rationalist institutionalism (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 76).
geopolitical preferences are also required to explain the set-up of the Union and the extensive policies covered by the EU integration (Moravcsik 1998. p. 476, Schimmelfennig 2001 p. 79).

6.2 Constructivism

Alexander Wendt (1999) in defining the fundamentals of constructivism, states that the structures of international life are primarily ideational, not material (cited in O’ Brennan 2000 p. 175). Social norms constitute the identity of actors and these identities, in turn, influence interests and preferences (Risse 2004 p. 163). Social constructivism is derived from constructivism to explain European integration. Thomas Risse argued that “social reality does not fall from heaven but human agents construct and reproduce it through daily practices” (ibid. p. 161). There is an ongoing interaction between agents and structures, in the shape of a mutual construction and social learning. Constructivist seek to explain theoretically both the content of actor identities/preferences and the modes of social interaction (Checkel 1999 p. 548). Communication, learning, persuasion and argumentation play important role in this approach. Social behaviour can be understood and interpreted through words, language and discursive practices.

Interests are socially constructed rather than being exogeneously given. National preferences are generated from ideational, cultural and discursive origins rather than rationalist individualist source. Constructivists differ from rationalists in the sense of March and Olsen’s “logic of appropriateness” and “logic of consequentialism”. Constructivists follow the former, in which “actors try to figure out the appropriate rule in a given social situation”. Contrarily, rationalists follow the latter, in which, “actors try to realize their preferences through strategic behaviour [...] to maximize or to optimize one’s interests and preferences” (1998 p. 951).

6.2.1. Europanization

Europeanization refers to the political, economical and social changes on the member states which is triggered by the EU membership (Wong 2005 p. 135). Europeanization is threefold: It takes shape as national adaptation, in which the EU dynamics become a part of the national politics; as national projection, in which domestic policy is exported to the EU; and as identity reconstruction, in which identity is gradually transferred towards a supranational Europe in a way that European identity shapes national identities (ibid. p. 137). In the first example, member states adopt West European state model of democratic institutions and market economy. As Reuben Wong argues, “sustained membership and participation in the EU lead to the convergence of national policy-making, both in style and content”(ibid. p. 135). National projection occurs when member states project their national interests onto the European platform and create a dialectical relationship by Europeanizing their national ends. In the last one, national identities are subject to reconstruction by EU institutions and a European identity is developed (ibid. p. 137, Wæver and Kelstrup 1993 p. 62).
6.3 Copenhagen School Security

In attempting to shed light on how rationalism and constructivism explain relations with Eastern neighbours, I will now try to touch upon Copenhagen School approach. My intention is to use this school as a bridge between rationalist and constructivist premises as they link security with constructivism.

The classical security complex\(^{56}\) theory focuses on the region (Buzan \textit{et al.} 1998 p. 15). International security is originated from power politics and is about survival. The Copenhagen School introduces a new approach in security studies that goes beyond classical political- military, power- oriented complex security approach and takes a social constructivist approach to understand the process by which issues become securitized. In this approach, the security is not just understood as the use of force; it takes human beings as factors having impacts on security. Security does not have a fixed meaning; it is recognized as a social and intersubjective constitution in the form of speech acts (\textit{ibid.} p. 39).

As taking security as a speech act, security is meant for an emergency condition and the right to use any means (Wæver \textit{cited in ibid.}). Put another way, to hinder a threatening development is legitimized, even if it means to break the rules. This legitimization takes place when an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority, in other words, labeled as a security (\textit{ibid.} p. 26). The security issue is taken by the securitizing actor\(^{57}\) as a critical priority, something that must immediately be resolved, otherwise, all else will be unimportant. In fact, the issue becomes a security issue not because a real existential threat exists but because the is issue presented and named as such a threat (Buzan \textit{et al.} 1998 p. 24). Discourse practices are of utmost importance for securitization. Rhetorical structures should have considerable effect on the audience so that they would not object violations of rules that would otherwise be obeyed. Briefly, an issue is securitizing only if the audience accepts it as such (\textit{ibid.} p. 25). Therefore, securitization is seen as an intersubjective and socially constructed process.

Another crucial concept is decuritization. It is “the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as threats against which we have counter measures, but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere” (Higashino 2003 p. 168). This means that an issue is normalized; carried to the normal settings of the political sphere.

6.4 Analyses

6.4.1 The Analysis from Rationalist Perspective

LI served as an appropriate theory in ascertaining the essence of Eastern enlargement. In rationalist school, expected individual costs and benefits guide enlargement preferences (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002 p. 510). As stated above, European integration is mainly moulded by economic interests (Moravcisk 1998 p. 473). This economic

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\(^{56}\) Security complexes are interlinked states whose security concerns are dependent on and in an interaction with one another (Buzan \textit{et al.} 1998 p. 12).

\(^{57}\) A securitizing actor is someone, or a group, who declare the referent objects as existentially threatened and performs the security speech act. A referent object is the thing that is existentially threatened (\textit{ibid.} p. 32).
integration in terms of market expansion is a valuable asset for the EU (ibid. p. 520). The EU, similarly, has economical goals in approaching Eastern neighbours. The mild atmosphere created with Eastern neighbours result in the increase of trade with these countries and access to new markets. The ENP aimed close economic cooperation with the WNIS in order to foster trade and investment. The PCAs cover economic cooperation extensively. The subordination of economic agreements than others namely, prospect of membership, was actually a reason for resentment for the neighbours.

Analogously, Schimmelfennig underlines the prominence of geographical conditions regarding enlargement preferences. In making a distinction between drivers and brakemen, the drivers are mostly the countries that are geographically close to the CEECs (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 88). Moravcsik pointed out that, opportunities for cross-border trade and capital movements would increase with geographical proximity. Thus, in determining to enlarge, national economic interests are taken into account (ibid. p. 50). This observation proves why Poland, as well as Germany, are that adamant in their interests regarding the East. In addition to material gains, these countries, especially Poland uses this act as asserting interests and having a more say in the Union.

Geographical proximity reinforces international interdependence. Inter-border crime, drug trafficking and terrorism emanating from Eastern neighbours strike firstly close member states, then the entire EU. Internal instability caused by wars, domestic crises and turmoil in the region have a salient impact on the EU. Therefore, an action towards Eastern neighbours is regarded as a critical attempt to mitigate instabilities (ibid. p. 50). Romano Prodi (2004) stated that the EU wants to increase stability, security and prosperity for both the Union and its neighbours. Moreover, the mitigation of organized crime, terrorism and immigration problems through the close cooperation with neighbours is of EU’s interest (Verheugen 2003). Another similar remark which shows the security benefits of the EU comes from Benita Ferrero- Waldner (2005): “The ENP is founded on the premise that by helping our neighbours we help ourselves”.

Russia is the EU’s third trading partner, after the USA and China. The EU is by far Russia's main trading partner, accounting for more than 52% of its overall trade.\(^{58}\) Energy products represent more than 60% of Russia’s overall exports to the EU, which is equal to more than €60 billion annually. 60% of Russia’s oil exports go the EU, representing over 25% of total EU oil consumption. In addition, 50% of Russia’s natural gas exports arrive in the EU, representing over 25% of total EU natural gas consumption.\(^{59}\) This statistics bring the question whether their partnership is asymmetrical dependency.

From this side, the main factor driving EU’s interests with especially Russia and Ukraine is energy. Benita Ferrero- Waldner (2006a) stated that: “Energy and energy security have been at the heart of European integration, […] energy is a perfect example of common sense driving integration”. She continued by referring to the ENP as a response to the new geopolitical condition. In doing so, she pointed the crucial location of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as a transit country for Russian energy routes for Europe. The EU is very dependent on Russia in energy issues.

Some member states seek material and rational interests being close to neighbours and their close links with Russia on energy\(^{60}\) rise questions on the

\(^{58}\) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/index_en.htm

\(^{59}\) http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm

\(^{60}\) Russian Gazprom owns 35% of Wingas, a German distribution company, and also has stakes in the Baltic countries' distributors. It has 10% of the interconnector pipeline between Belgium and Britain. Moreover, Gaz de France, ENI of Italy and Ruhrgas of Germany have stakes in Gazprom.
discrepancies of the EU members (The Economist 2007a). Germany appears to be the main one followed by Italy and the UK. The agreement between Russia and Germany to build a gas pipeline shows German interests. Although, Russian will to extend Blue Stream pipeline which supplies gas to Hungary is against the EU’s desire to to build a pipeline called Nabucco (from Turkey to Austria), Hungary backs up Russian plan due to its own interests (ibid.). This shows how member states seek national and material interests.

In sum, LI explains the EU’s economic and security interests on the Eastern neighbours very well. Yet, the questions of extensive financial aid supplied to the Eastern neighbours and the risk of further instability through rapprochment leave the puzzle unsolved. I, then, turn to constructivist analysis to complete the argument.

6.4.2 The Analysis From Constructivist Perspective

Ideational and cultural factors such as social identities, values, and norms play a vital role in enlargement rather than material and distributional consequences (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002 p. 513). The EU is a liberal community of states which are committed to the liberty, rule of law, democracy, human rights and respect for minority rights, and states who declare their commitment to these liberal values can be a part of the EU. 61 The acquis provides the normative basis for enlargement (Fierke and Wiener 1999 p. 722).

Joschka Fischer (2000) spoke of enlargement not only as a “supreme national interest” but also as the “moral duty” of the EU to accept new members. 62 The external action of the European Union is based on the practice of democratic conditionality. Western Europe sent “reunification” signals to the CEECs, as long as they stick to liberal norms and values of the EU (de Wilde and Pellon 2006 p. 5): “To Belarus at the moment, we said, you cannot apply the ENP because of undemocratic nature of the regime there. Even if there is no membership clause, similarly, the EU’s priority is to set democratisation and respect for fundamental values in Eastern neighbours. The core of the PCA with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova is these values. The ENP is based on mutual commitment to common values. 63 In its Eastern Dimension initiative, Poland mentioned that the elimination of division lines should be through construction of civil society and closer co-operation that are based on common values (Cimoszewicz 2004b). The EU constantly emphasized that development in relations with the WNIS depends on the pace in democracy and adherence to common values. Similarly, support for Orange Revolution and suspension of PCA as well as exercise of travel bans in Belarus are proofs of EU’s stress on liberal values. 1999 Common Strategy on Russia stated that “[T]he EU’s main objective is to engage with Russia […] and build a genuine strategic partnership, founded on common interests and shared values” (de Wilde and Pellon 2006 p. 121).

61 According to Article 49 TEU, any European state which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to become a member of the Union. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/facts/6_3_1_en.htm
62 See, for example, http://www.ellopos.net/politics/fischer.htm for the whole speech dated 12 May 2000, Berlin. For further argument see Helen Sjursen’s argument on the “moral duty” of the Western Europe to embrace the “kidnapped West” (Sjursen 2002 p. 505).
63 See, for example, the content of the ENP in Chapter IV.
64 Russia has responded to the EU Common Strategy with its “Medium- Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)” (de Wilde and Gaelle 2006 p. 3).
Verheugen stated:

Our aim is to build special relationships with our neighbours, based on shared values and common interests. The depth, quality and momentum of these relationships will reflect the will of both sides to promote these values and interests, as well as the interest and capacity of partners to meet requirements for economic integration. From our perspective, values such as rule of law, democracy, human and minority rights are fundamental; they constitute the ground for our special relations with our neighbours (Verheugen 2003).

Kenneth Glarbo and Ben Tonra supported the utility of constructivism in the CFSP, arguing that, the CFSP history emerged as social constructs rather than being solely a product of rational interests (Glarbo 2001 p. 141, Tonra 2003 p. 732). As Schimmelfennig (2004) suggested, the normative intersubjective environment at EU level have impacts on member state behaviour. Europeanization, in CFSP means, occurs when national foreign policies are constituted and transformed to the collective European policy making in accordance with membership (Tonra 2000 p. 144). Although these scholars conclude that membership is an important factor in Europeanization, I will argue that Eastern neighbours, notably Ukraine, are also Europeanized. Europeanization occurs also when the EU makes politically difficult domestic reforms under the cover of the EU (Wong 2005 p. 135). Similarly, the PCAs, Common Strategies and Action Plans have had a profound impact on these countries in putting them to a European axis and forcing them undertake serious reforms.

It is actually not wrong to agree with Ian Manners. The EU sets an order to the East through the dispersal of EU norms, as a norm promoter, where power senders’ ideas penetrate and shape the power recipients (Manners 2002 p. 235-8). The EU moulds its external policy on the basis of norms, however, the recognition of norms is as important as their diffusion (ibid. p. 241):

The EU exports models of governance, applies conditionality in its policies to effect “soft governance” and uses the instrument of access to the system as a whole as a means of managing its relations with the outside (Friis and Murphy 1999 p. 228).

Hiski Haukkala defined the EU as a “regional normative hegemon” that employs its economic and normative powers to set asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help dissemination of its norms and values. He thinks that the EU is normative since its foreign policy is driven by values and norms, and norms are successfully diffused. Meanwhile, it is a hegemon since it enjoys a monopoly in defining what these norms, boundaries of normality and Europeanness are. It is regional since it is viable in Europe (Haukkala 2003 p. 11). All the partners accept norms voluntarily. He agrees with Manners that projection of normative power is not only about coercion, but also the legitimation of these actions in the eyes of its partners (Haukkala 2006 p. 3). The

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65 Despite the focus on the Eastern neighbours regarding Europeanization, I will put that Poland was actually Europeanized in its foreign policy as after its accession, since it quit pro-Atlanticist stance and became highly involved in European issues. Moreover, I will also suggest that Poland’s Eastern Dimension initiative fits with national projection model of the Europeanization, in which national interests are carried to the European ground. I think, Eastern Dimension is a great example of this “bottom-up” national interest projection.

66 Hiski Haukkala quotes Ole Wæver’s analogy of “EU empire” to refer to the diffusion of norms: The EU does not have to accept new members in order to export its order to others. It does not use conquest like an empire, but as an invitation. However, it is like an empire in creating new borderlines beyond which the EU order is imposed to make the EU secure (Haukkala 2003 p. 8).
voluntarily imposed progress towards liberal values show that the EU is also a “soft power”, as the Eastern neighbours are influenced by the EU values, culture and policies (Nye 2004 p. 2). This theory serves a more convincing explanation.

6.4.3 The Analysis from Copenhagen School Perspective

Eastern enlargement is one of the most evident cases that brought security and geopolitical issues at the forefront of the EU. None of the past enlargements have been that connected to the security debates as Eastern enlargement (Higashino 2005 p. 347). The Eastern enlargement became the most direct and important instrument for extending the existing security community eastwards, through the expansion of norms. It involved the “European peace and security” argument as one of the most important rationales of EU enlargement and security goals are used to legitimize the enlargement.

Enlargement to the East is considered as one of the best examples of securitization and desecuritization moves. The heavy costs of choosing not to integrate, such as the fragmentation of the EU, the rise of nationalism, instability and return to Europe’s previous chaos are mentioned by politicians in order to stimulate integration. “[T]he first and foremost threat articulated in securitisation within the EU is Europe’s own past”, Thomas Diez warned once (Diez 2001 p. 6). The Copenhagen School, therefore, pointed out that nonintegration was labeled as an existential threat, and this led to the continuation of European integration as a remedy (O’Brennan 2006 p. 156).

Securitization and desecuritization moves can be found in several speech acts made by EU leaders. The accession of the CEECs was seen to “lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the European continent” (Helsinki European Council of 1999). Former European Commission President Jacques Santer quoted that “Enlargement represents a historical turning point for Europe, an opportunity which it must seize for the sake of its security, its economy, its culture and status in the world” (Baun 2000: 18). Tony Blair (2000) made a similar remark: “Western Europe will always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass migration on its borders […] [S]hould that happen, we would all lose” (cited in Higashino 2004 p. 351). Likewise, Joschka Fischer (2000) stated that, “the EU had to open up to the East, otherwise the very idea of European integration would have been undermined and eventually self- destructed” (cited in Zielonka 2000 p. 6).

These speeches cluster around one message: The EU’s stability and prosperity. I am highly inspired by Atsuko Higashino and John O’Brennan’s use of enlargement speech acts to reveal securitization. Thus, I aim to extend securitization acts of the enlargement to the Eastern Dimension. Eastern Dimension is not a formal policy, thus, I will use speeches made on the ENP since they refer to the same goal. Gunter Verheugen said:

> We must never forget that European integration is not about milk quotas and customs duties. It is about peace, stability and prosperity for our citizens. Instability in one part of Europe immediately affects the other parts (Verheugen 2004).

In this sense, instability in the Eastern neighbours affect the geographically close members first, and later the whole Union. Benita Ferrero- Waldner (2006) similarly stated that the scope of peace and stability is enabled first through enlargement, then the ENP. By pointing problems like migration, organised crime and terrorism in the affinity of the borders, good relations with neighbours should be reinforced for greater
prosperity, stability and security both in the EU and in the neighbours. Verheugen defined the aim of the ENP as such:

"Enlargement is proving a success in expanding the area of stability and prosperity in Europe. However, this area can only be sustainable if it also extends to our neighbourhood. Enlargement must not create new dividing lines in Europe (Verheugen 2003).

Dividing lines are against the nature of the Union and the ENP is the cure of this. Its objective is declared as the elimination of dividing lines (Strategy Paper on the ENP 2004 p. 3). Finally, Christopher Hill argued that the EU and Russia see each other as real security threats (2002 p. 105). Despite Yeltsin’s relatively weak position in the politics during the enlargement debates, especially Putin’s commitment to reassert Russian power again, scared the EU. Chechen question and interferences in Georgia and Ukraine were regarded as serious threats to the EU’s stability, and EU officials used securitisation moves in the form of discursive interventions and policy initiatives that ended up as the desecuritisation of Russia. The desecuritisation was enabled through putting Russia from a “strategic rival” to a “strategic partner” via intense political dialogue and institutional interaction (O’Brennan 2006 p. 167). In sum, Atsuko Higashino concluded that policy leaders discursively construct and present certain issues in terms of security by naming existential threats and calling for extraordinary measures (2005 p. 348). Securitising moves led to the process of desecuritisation which transformed the external into the internal, the geopolitical into the everyday politics of European integration (O’Brennan 2006 p. 168). A collective sense is created that grasps enlargement as something to be done as a part of the normal practices and bargaining of the EU (Higashino 2005 p. 352). I would suggest that this logic was the same in the ENP."
7 Conclusion

7.1 Fuzzy Borders versus Hard Borders

The boundaries of the EU debate, which is quite controversial since the end of the Cold War crystallized once again after the Eastern enlargement. Boundaries of Europe raise many questions about the limits of the EU, security, identity and exclusion. Romano Prodi (2002) stated: “[W]e cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale” (cited in Haukkala 2006 p. 5). Joschka Fischer’s speech in Berlin was another grave remark on the limits of Europe.

Borders rise concerns for illegal migration, organized crime and trafficking. The EU used enlargement as a remedy for instability and insecurity. However, intentions for further security become tools of exclusion. The formation of Schengen and single market exacerbated this sentiment, notably for Eastern neighbours. The Iron Curtain is turning into a paper curtain, said Leonid Kuchma in 1999. Therefore, Schengen regulation should remember its original purpose of facilitating free circulation of goods, services and people (Grabbe 2000 p. 511).

Borders have to do with identities, with self and the other (Diez 2004a p. 3). A territorial form of governance is linked to a national identity. “Since modern state is based on a territorial entity, the most common processes of othering in international society are geographic in nature” (Diez 2004b p. 325). The outside is seen as a threat and self’s identity is constructed against this image. A national identity within the borders create a “European” against “Russian” (ibid. p. 301).

Yet, enlargement is the deconstruction of borders; borders are destroyed and reshaped to ensure peace and stability (Diez 2004a p. 6). This formation is distinct from fixed, hard borders and clear-cut identity of Westphalian state type. The Cold War era experienced sharp divisions of borders between West and East, which created a dividing line between inside and outside (Christiansen 2005 p. 16). Yet, the EU borders, after the demise of Cold War became malleable. The EU is more prone to be a neo-medieval state with soft borders and multiple identities (ibid. p. 6, Zielonka 2001 p. 509, Diez 2004a p.10). Moreover, border concept has changed: borders now are spaces rather than lines and they bring communities together rather than divide (Christiansen 2005 p. 16). As the concept changed, fuzzy borders now serve for an “ever closed union”.

The act towards Eastern neighbours should be seen more as the blurring of the geopolitical, institutional, transactional, and especially cultural borders (Smith 1996). No matter how exclusion problems may appear, the ENP and the Eastern Dimension are.

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67 See, for example, “22-nation summit in Yalta seeks end to division of Europe” by Roman Woronowycz for the speech. Available at: http://www.ukrweekly.com/Archive/1999/389901.shtml.
68 The accession of the CEECs was a historical event in overcoming sharp borders. Smith’s four border types namely, the geopolitical, institutional/legal, transactional and cultural are exposed be blurry after enlargement (Smith cited in Friis and Murphy 1999 p. 216).
valuable attempts to prevent dividing lines and converge Eastern neighbour values and norms to the European.

In departing from the questions; what has changed in the CFSP after the Eastern enlargement and why the Eastern Dimension is created, I started with the changes set in Amsterdam, Nice and Constitutional Treaties on the CFSP provisions. The undergone changes aimed to make the the EU ready for enlargement and strengthen the CFSP. Secondly, in focusing on the Eastern Dimension, similar policies initiated by past enlargement waves are examined. Although 1973 accession did not really offer a policy such as the Eastern Dimension, Mediterranean and Northern enlargements pushed for successful regional formations. Especially Northern Dimension is a good model for the Eastern Dimension. After 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the EU needed to be wary of division lines in Europe. In this sense, the ENP is a breakthrough that aimed to tackle exclusion feelings of the neighbours without a carrot. Yet, due to their proximity, some member states have had more interest in the Eastern neighbours. The most assertive one is Poland, as a member joining in 2004. Thus, after examining the ENP, the Eastern Dimension initiative is analysed. The EU did not respond this initiative with a formal policy yet, but developments with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia intensified. Relations with these neighbours constituted the fourth chapter of this thesis, just before I utilized rationalism, constructivism and Copenhagen School to test this case. In conclusion, I argued that the Eastern enlargement changed the dynamics by putting more stress on the Eastern neighbours. This stress seems to be continuing with the possibility of initiation of a EU policy in the future. My final remark is that, “soft power” or “normative” power Europe view seems to be the theory that explains the the Eastern Dimension better.

7.2 Further Research Perspectives

As far as I am concerned, this is a very exciting research topic which can be furthered. Among the literature I reviewed, two areas have had high appeal to me: The comparison of the Northern and the Eastern Dimension. Secondly, in connection with this, Noel Parker’s marginality theory could have been elaborated on and applied to the Eastern Dimension:

Both initiatives [dimensions] have to be analysed as parts of “new geometries” of regionalism that link the core powers with Europe’s margins and that relate to EU enlargement. In this context, the cases of Finland and Poland seem to confirm the widely discussed idea that margins may also have a certain power to define the nature of the whole (Parker cited in Makarychev 2000 p. 299).
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9 Appendix

9.1 Table I:

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enlarg/russianis_en.htm

9.2 Table II:

### 9.3 Table III:

The new external borders of the EU after the expansion in 2004:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border</th>
<th>Length (km)</th>
<th>The orientation of the neighbour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia–Russia</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia–Russia</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia–Belarus</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania–Belarus</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania–Russia (K)</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland–Russia (K)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland–Belarus</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland–Ukraine</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>EU/Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia–Ukraine</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>EU/Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary–Ukraine</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>EU/Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary–Romania</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary–Serbia</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>EU/Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary–Croatia</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia–Croatia</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
