The EU in the Congo

Adding Value to the International Community’s Peacebuilding Efforts

Felix Rathje
Abstract

This article attempts to broaden the analytical framework of the EU security policy literature. The wider aim is to provide a conceptual link between the engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), crisis resolution and post-conflict peace-building in general. I develop a context specific analysis of the EU’s role in the DRC, while enabling the extrapolation of generalisable findings concerning peacebuilding and security sector reform. The EU, with particular importance placed on its civilian ESDP missions, has staked out a role of coordinator within the heterarchy of international donor involvement. In line with the new international consensus, the EU employs its missions as vehicles to advance reforms in support of peace by focusing on a multidimensional approach and micro-engagement in the processes of reform along lines of European ‘best practice’. It will be argued that this involvement represents a new ‘civilising’ approach to peacebuilding based on central notions of international neo-trusteeship. This approach adds important value to the international community’s effort to resolve violent conflict, by advancing the peace building agenda conceptually and providing much needed reference points for the wider donor community within the increasingly crowded space of international peacebuilding.

Key words: European Union, peacebuilding, civilian ESDP missions, security sector reform, neo-trusteeship
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<td>CIAT</td>
<td>International Committee for the Support of the Transition</td>
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<td>CONADER</td>
<td>National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>European Union Security Sector Reform Mission</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>FARDC</td>
<td>newly integrated Congolese Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>IPU</td>
<td>Integrated Police Unit</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Congo</td>
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Map of the Congo
1 Introduction

1.1 The Framework of the Study

1.1.1 Building Peace

A number of recent studies have pointed to the bad track record of the international community’s efforts to end violent conflict. A recent United Nations (UN) report estimates that roughly 60 per cent of all peace missions have a chance at succeeding after the signing of peace agreements; in Africa this figure falls to 40 per cent (2004b, p.14). Preventing “a relapse into conflict”, to borrow from Boutros-Ghali’s landmark Agenda for Peace, is the “essential goal” of the international community’s efforts (1992).

The international communities own frustration with this mixed success rate is further evidenced by comments made by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who remarked, that the approach remains “far from perfect” and “as a result, we have peacekeeping operations that succeed, only to lapse back into conflict. Successful operations, as it were, in which the patient dies” (2005).

The establishment of stable and self-sustainable peace anywhere depends on a number of important reforms that have to be tackled to prevent the reoccurrence of war. Amongst the various lessons learnt, that where identified over the years chief amongst them is the need to combine the work on security and stabilisation with the work on governance and development in an integrated strategic vision. This is what Boutros-Ghali referred to as to “the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace” (UN 1995).

Peace-building as a concept then is of more recent origin. It defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflicts to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. It is conceptualised as a post-conflict process, or set of activities that aim to tackle the root causes of conflict, such as disarmament and demobilisation, election monitoring, and reforming or strengthening governmental institutions. Peace-building therefore includes strong elements of state-building, with a central concern resting on notions of good governance (Gueli et al 2006).
Particular focus has increasingly rested on the use of civilian components (including civilian police) in order to address essential non-military tasks, including political transition, governance and democratisation, rule of law, human rights, justice, reconciliation and reconstruction, and socio-economic development. This type of approach has recently become known under the heading complex peace operation.

This approach as it has been developed by the UN over the last decade or so, has been largely focused on the systemic nature of conflict, and by extension has employed a focus that is largely premised on systems. It is all too clear that often the people behind the façade of government are the real problem and that enabling the establishment of systemic structures, such as oversight bodies for effective auditing mechanisms have been largely welcomed as important tools of building sustainable peace. These investments have been crucial, but to quote from the Financial Times “systems are good – but if the people in the system are corrupt, you haven’t got very far” (Stearns & Wong 2006)

1.1.2 Evolution of the European Approach to Conflict Resolution

Since 2003, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has entered into the limelight in a number of conflict areas – in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Since then, ESDP missions have considerably diversified in terms of geography (17 Operations in three years in three continents), quantity (around 10000 persons have served under the Union’s banner (Steinmeier 2007)) and quality.

The conceptual range of these missions is impressive ranging from traditional military peace support¹ and ceasefire monitoring operations² to the deployment of civilian police forces³, border control⁴ and assistance to security sector reform⁵ and the development of state judicial systems⁶ (Council 2007a).

Even if the majority of these civil-military operations were case-by-case demands by the UN or third states, the multitude of different activities the Union has engaged in terms of ESDP since 2003 exhibit a multi-dimensional presence as envisaged in the European Security Strategy:

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¹ EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (since 2004) and EU Support for AMIS-II in Darfur (since 2005) are still ongoing. Two missions in the DRC, Operation Artemis (2003) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006) are completed.
³ EU Police Mission in Bosnia (since 2003), EUPOL Kinshasa (since 2005), EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories (since 2005) and EUPOL Proxima and later the EU Police Advisory Team in Macedonia (2003-2006).
⁴ EU Border Assistance Mission at the Border Crossing in Rafah between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (since 2005), and a Mission on the Moldova-Ukraine Border (since 2005).
⁵ EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Sector Reform in the DRC, or ‘EUSEC RD Congo’ (since 2005)
⁶ EU Rule of Law Missions in Iraq (since 2005) and in Georgia (2004-2005)
“The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund (EDF), military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments […] Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda. […] Greater coherence is needed not only among the European Unions (EU) instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states” (European Council 2003:14).

An increasing number of EU policy statements have enshrined a commitment to broadening conflict prevention and resolution policies. These are to incorporate issues that are seen as intricately linked to the related political and economic causes of conflict. As far back as the mid-1990s, the Commission (1996) introduced the concept of structural stability as a political benchmark for EU engagement in African conflicts. This was further emphasised in 2001, committing the EU to elaborate indicators of good governance and rule of law, all of which were to be reflected in aid programmes and other “crisis related activities” (Commission 2001). Subsequently the Commission (2002) identified a checklist for root causes of conflict that included an extensive range of factors. All in all the strategy for conflict management is increasingly shaping up to be, in the words of former Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Poul Nielson, “not just about peace and conflict management, it is also about laying the foundation for society to function, creating the minimum conditions for governance and stability” (cited in Commission 2003:6).

With the ESDP, the EU endowed itself with a value-oriented international security policy that privileges peace support operation over war fighting. It balances limited but increasingly robust military capabilities to enforce and keep the peace in conflict-prone or war-torn countries with strong civilian capabilities to assist countries in building stable peace (Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006:2). This represents significantly more than a vehicle to further narrow European security interests. It is an expression of the EU’s international mission for humanity.

1.2 The Subject of the Study

1.2.1 The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Three countries have been afforded particular focus by the Unions new crisis transformation capabilities: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the DRC. In the first two cases, the Union’s objective and interests are easily identifiable. Due to the geographical proximity of the Western Balkans to the Union proper, both countries stability is fundamentally and directly important to the security of the EU and its member states. The Union is hence increasingly committed to the stabilisation and progressive ‘adhesion’ of the region and these countries in
particular. This kind of rationality certainly will apply to the Kosovo as well once the Union takes over the responsibility in this troubled region.

In its efforts to develop a more effective and coherent international profile, the EU has accorded major importance to its incipient conflict resolution strategies for Africa. In this regard, an area of particularly visible Union activity has been the Great Lakes region and the DRC in particular. Concerning the DRC then, the above security motivation is weak, especially when weighed against the potential risks of engagement in this area. The size and complexity of its problems, which shall be explained in more detail below, make any outside involvement uncertain at best. Moreover, even with all the horror the DRC has and continues to experience, the strategic reason for the Union to engage remains, on the face of it, unsure – especially if weighed against the more cautious approach the Union took in its other deployments.

Yet, as I will argue, it is precisely these challenges that represent the biggest opportunity for the Union. It can display and develop its unique ability in the realm of conflict resolution, in an area where international community is involved but significant political room for manoeuvre and, potentially, leadership remains.

1.2.2 Aim and Hypotheses

Since 2002 the EU has been involved in a myriad of activities aimed at stabilising the country and building the peace that address the mission gap, as it were, between security and development: effective and sustainable security sector reform, the promotion of good governance and development. Much of the media and academic attention has focused on the EU’s military engagement in the Congo. Both Operation Artemis in Bunia, and EUFOR DR Congo in Kinshasa have attracted considerable attention. I aim to make a contribution to this growing literature by highlighting particularly the valuable contributions made by the Union’s small civilian ESDP missions, EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo.

This thesis concerns itself with the Union’s engagement in this respect in the DRC, in order to develop the central tenets of my hypotheses:

• that the EU approach to conflict resolution is a distinctively new adaptation of an approach that has been developed over the last decade or so, drawing on the lessons-learnt of peacekeeping and peacebuilding experience;
• that it is characterised by multidimensionality and micro-engagement in the processes of post-conflict transformation and finally;
• that this approach offers to add important value to the international community’s efforts to resolve violent conflicts, in particular in Africa and the DRC.

The thesis will focus on context specific analysis, closely analysing what is going on in the DRC, while providing or a wider generalisable conceptual analysis. The wider aim is to provide a conceptual link between the engagement in the DRC, the general crisis resolution and post-conflict peace-building strategy
and the role of the Union within the wider efforts of the international community. Thereby I aim to make a small contribution to a growing literature on European conflict-management policies, by bringing into focus the case of involvement in the DRC and the opportunity for insightful analysis it offers.

1.3 Structure of the Thesis

Having already given an introduction to the development of the ideas of peacebuilding in general and the emerging European consensus in particular, Chapter 2 will give a brief overview of the history of the crisis in the Congo. This approach helps the conceptualisation and ‘putting in perspective’ of the problems faced by the Democratic Republic in order to emphasising how far this country has come since the horrors of the First (1996-97) and Second Congolese War (1998-2003). Furthermore, the chapter will also highlight the multi-dimensional characteristics of the involvement by the international community. Particular focus will be afforded to the structures of governance that have developed amongst donors, in order to further establish the idea of what is referred to as a heterarchy of organisation. In this situation the EU and particularly its civilian ESDP missions have staked out an important role within the wider international community.

Chapter 3, then, will explicitly focus on the role the EU plays within the DRC’s transition from violent-conflict to self-sustainable peace. Realising, of course, that the Union is involved in the DRC in many other ways as well, particular attention will be on the civilian aspects of ESDP. The reasons for doing so are, in my mind, both conceptually and empirically compelling.

As has already been said above, the international donor community, notably the UN during the 1990s, identified governance reforms in post-conflict societies as a principal element in the construction of an order of liberal peace. In line with this new international (read Western) consensus, the EU views its civilian missions as vehicles to advance reforms in support of peace in target countries through the dissemination of ‘best European practices’. With regard to the DRC therefore, the Union’s police and security sector reform mission will be exonerated. In this respect the concept micro-engagement will be introduced in order to help the conceptualisation of the value the Union adds to the international community’s peace-building capabilities.

Lastly, by way of Conclusion, Chapter 4 will deal with a number of issues that arise from the above reading of the ‘new’ role of the EU.


2 Crisis in the Congo

2.1 Complex Emergency in the Congo

“Since the end of the Cold War traditional peace-keeping has often had to combine with peace-building in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-State conflict. Those conflict settings, however, both affect and are affected by outside actors; political patrons, arms vendors, buyers of illicit commodity exports, regional powers that send their own forces into the fray. With such significant cross-border effects by state and non-state actors alike, these conflicts are often decidedly transnational in character” (UN 2000).

The crisis in the Congo, in many ways, represented the archetype of this ‘new’ violent conflict. The sheer size, complexity, multidimensionality and transnationality of the conflict makes it, sarcastically speaking, the poster-child of the flip side of a new globalised world order that is first and foremost defined by anarchical features. “From war to disease to poverty to bad governance, Congo is a prime example of all of Africa’s nightmares” (International Herald Tribune 2005). It is estimated that between 1998 and 2004, four million people have died, and even today the conflict claims the lives of about 1,200 people a day (Goghlan et al 2006).

2.1.1 A short history of Africa’s World War

Colonel Joseph Desire Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the Congo between 1965 and 1997. He systematically used Congo’s mineral wealth to consolidate power, to co-opt potential rivals, and to enrich himself and his allies through an expansive system of patronage, thereby turning Zaire, as it was then called, effectively into a kleptocracy.\(^7\) With the end of the Cold War, the suspension of international economic aid and the global collapse of raw commodity prices at the end of the 1980s, Mobutu began to lose his grip on power. Under strong international pressure to democratise, he reluctantly agreed to restore multiparty politics and hold national elections in 1991.

Following the Rwandan Genocide in 1994, Mobutu attempted to regain international support by providing shelter to the two million Rwandan refugees

\(^7\) “rule by thieves” - the term was essentially invented to adequately describe Mobutu’s rule (cf. McEvedy 1996)
that had fled to the eastern Congo. He effectively sided with the remnants of the Hutu Power génocidaires. In July 1996, he lost the resultant war with Rwanda, Uganda as well as rebels of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo, or AFDL. Mobutu was ousted from power in 1997 as AFDL leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila took over the country.

Subsequently Rwanda and Uganda exerted a vice-like grip on their former allies, effectively controlling the Kinshasa government. Kabila turned against his erstwhile backers in August 1998 in an attempt to role back the influence of these regional powers in the Congo. In response, a rebel group called the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) invaded the Congo from the east backed by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, taking control of the Kivus and the diamond rich town of Mbuji-Mayi and Katanga, the economic lifeline of the country. Other rebel militia groups began to appear, including the Ugandan-backed Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, which took Oriental province and Equateur. The speed of the rebel advance was facilitated by the desperate state of the Congolese national army, which had already proved to be Mobutu’s downfall. Kabila called on Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for help and with their military support managed to stop the invasion, cutting the country through Equateur, the Kasais, and Katanga effectively into two (see Map of the Congo).

In July 1999, a ceasefire agreement was reached, signed in Lusaka, Zambia. Its main parts, disarmament of foreign armed groups, withdrawal of foreign troops and the convening of an inter-Congolese dialogue however failed to be implemented and fighting continued until in early 2001, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard and was replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila in a seamless transition.8

Peace negotiations were re-launched and by the end of 2002, the Angolan, Zimbabwean, Rwandan and Ugandan troops had fully withdrawn from the DRC. In late 2002, all Congolese belligerents, civil society groups and the unarmed opposition signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, also known as the Sun City Agreement, in Pretoria, South Africa.

Characteristic for the later stages of the war was an increasing splintering into sub-groups on all sides. Commanders of the Congolese armed forces broke away and created their own militias, rebel groups split and changed sides, former allies compete for power and turned on each other, turning what was first a ‘simple’ ‘rebel versus government’ war into an all-out ‘everyone against everyone and for their own benefit’.9 Although, due to their rather ‘fluid’ nature their numbers are hard to establish exactly it is estimated that around 20 different rebel groups and

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8 The murder was never solved completely and rumours of western involvement continue to abound. Especially the smooth transfer of power suggest a carefully executed coup d’état.

9 For example, tensions between Uganda and Rwanda in 1999 over access to diamonds and other valuable recourses led to a fracturing of their protégée, the RCD onto a Goma-based (RCD-G) and Kisangani-based (RCD-K) sub-unit. The latter allied itself with Ugandan-backed MLC. Other breakaway factions of the RCD are RCD-National, RCD-Congo and RCD-Mouvement de Liberation.
militias have fought in the Congo on top of the already mentioned six national armies.

2.1.2 The current situation

After more than three years of transition, the peace process remains at risk. Following the successful presidential, national and provincial assembly election, President Joseph Kabila was inaugurated on 6 December 2006, bringing the transition process that was envisaged by the Sun City Agreement of 2002 formally to an end.

The new government has weak and barely functioning institutions. Significant internal political challenges remain, chief among them the problematic relationship with Jean-Pierre Bemba, the opponent of Kabila during the Presidential elections and leader of the parliamentary opposition.

The main reason for the impasse has been the reluctance of the former belligerents to give up power and assets for the national good. They have maintained parallel command structures in the army, the local administration and the intelligence services. Both leaders, themselves former rebel leaders, continue to have hundreds of armed personal guards stationed in Kinshasa, which engage in periodic fighting. During the run up to the elections the EU’s military force, EUFOR, had to intervene to stop the violence (BBC 2006).

The Governments limited law enforcement capacity to deal with such unrest is further undermined by the poor discipline of some of the national police and army personnel, who often respond to unrest with disproportionate use of force and, as in the case of unrest in the Bas-Congo province in late January 2007 with summary executions.\(^\text{10}\)

The logic of the Sun City agreement has brought the problems of governance into sharp relief. State resources were siphoned off to fund election campaigns and private accounts as senior positions in the administration and state-run enterprises were shared between signatories. It is estimated that between 60 and 80 per cent of customs revenues were embezzled, a quarter of the national budget is not properly accounted for, and millions of dollars are misappropriated in the army and state-run companies. The mining sector is particularly prone to corruption, with valuable concessions granted with little legitimate benefit to the state (ICG 2006b).

Furthermore, aided by the weakness of the central government, local conflict is still ongoing in the eastern provinces. Rebel groups, including dissident members of former rebel movements and untamed militias, continue to fight the government and local rivals. Over 800,000 internally displaced Congolese have

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\(^{10}\) In Bas-Congo, serious incidents of civil unrest on 31 January and 1 February between Bundu Dia Kongo, a politico-religious movement, and the Congolese security forces resulted in the death of over 100 people, mainly civilians. Precipitating these events had been allegations of corrupt practices in relation to the distribution of Provincial Assembly seats (cf. UN 2007)
yet to return to their homes because of the high levels of violence and instability (enough 2007).

As a result, the UN identifies the effective retraining and reintegration of all old-ex-combatants in the DRC,\textsuperscript{11} the professionalisation of Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and the Congolese national police as “preconditions for long-term stability” in the DRC (UN 2007).

\section*{2.2 Mapping Donor Involvement in the Transition}

\subsection*{2.2.1 Multi-Party Involvement}

When choosing a particular actor, in this case the EU, and analysing what it is or is not doing concerning the crisis in the DRC, it is easy either to overstate the role it plays or to be overly critical of its deficiencies in the face of the enormous challenges at hand. The truth, whatever it may be, of course, always has to be mediated against the backdrop of feasibility and reality. That is to say, it is easy to suggest that, say the Union’s efforts in peacemaking in the eastern part of the country in 2003, through Operation Artemis in Bunia, where “farcically modest” and “extremely narrow in scope” (Youngs 2004: 318). Without wanting to disagree totally with this analysis or to get into too detailed a discussion of the merits of the mission, it is undeniably important to look at the big-picture and remember that the primary responsibility for security in the east rests with the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC), not the EU.

MONUC is by far the most important international actor on the ground. It consists of 18,000 uniformed personnel, including 16,500 troops, 700 military observers and 1000 civilian police. Furthermore, it has a vast mandate. On the one hand it is asked to “assist” and “facilitate” the reform of the security sector, the re-establishment of a State based on the rule of law. This includes the delivery of civil police protection, promotion of human rights, advice and assistance to the transitional government and investigating illegal weapons smuggling, especially with regards to the widely available Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). On the other hand, within the eastern part of the DRC, especially in the Ituri district and the Kivus, the mission is asked to pursue forceful military campaigns to pacify these troublesome regions. These military tasks include monitoring of the ceasefire, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, and war fighting against renegade militias (UN 2004a)

What this show’s is that, as engaged or not the EU may be in the conflict, it is by no means the only actor involved, and a good deal of sharing of

\textsuperscript{11} This process is referred to as \textit{brassage}. It in effect provides an avenue to turn the old Armed Forces of the Congo (FAC) into a new Army (FARDC), by integrating them with elements of the former rebel movements, as stipulated by the Sun City Agreement.
responsibilities has to be taken into account. Indeed, it is evident that this is the basis, or should be, of the involvement of the international community in the conflict. Moreover, the nature of this involvement is, in the case of the DRC, multifaceted with a large number of independent, external actors.

The situation on the ground is hence characterized by *heterarchy*\(^\text{12}\) with a multiplication of actors involved in the post-conflict transition: the UN and its various agencies as the most experienced actors and primary security provider, the World Bank, bilateral contributors from the region, such as South Africa and Angola, the EU, a variety of Non-Governmental Organisations, or NGOs, and last but not least, of course the Government of the DRC under Joseph Kabila. Indeed, several European member states have their own programmes running alongside the EU’s engagement. Most prominent amongst these is the Congo’s former colonial power Belgium, which is involved in the training of the First Integrated Brigade of the FARDC. Furthermore, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden all have their own programmes, mostly (financially) supporting South African led army reintegration efforts.

Of course, Congolese history suggests that the role of government was never much pronounced as a central, singular and unifying force within the state security and regulatory architecture. The situation was always much more one of competing, virtually autonomous security agents, ranging from different parts of the armed forces, the police, traditional local self-defence forces such as the Mayi-Mayi\(^\text{13}\) and various militia groups committed to the overthrow of the Kinshasa government and control of the country’s rich natural resources.

To conceptualize this cacophony of actors, it is useful to apply the concept of *governance* in order to elucidate the character of post-conflict engagement in the various ‘building-sites’ that is the state of the DRC. Borrowing from Webber et al., governance in this instance is defined as involving “the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the intervention of both public and private actors, […] formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes” (Webber et al. 2004:4). In this case, self-sustainable peace and development in the DRC and the Great Lakes region.

The meaning of ‘coordinated management’ is in this respect premised on a different, ideational congruence, which can be said to exist amongst the majority of actors. When looking at policy papers from the various agencies and actors, all exhibit similar assessments of the present situation and draw similar conclusions from them as to what needs to be done. Politically, that is; ‘in theatre’, to borrow from military jargon here, things often look entirely different as to the cohesiveness of multi-donor involvement.

Coordination on the ground is of course the primary problematique in this respect. I do not pretend that the actions of the various actors in the transition are

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\(^{12}\) Heterarchy refers to forms of coordinated behaviour that are distinct from anarchy or hierarchy (vertical authority). In essence, it is used here, to mean, ‘multiple governance structures without hierarchy’.

\(^{13}\) For an explanatory article about the history and evolution of the Mayi-Mayi see IRIN (2006)
always properly coordinated so as to avoid duplication and contradictions. Far from it, evidence unfortunately exists to the contrary. For example, when Western donors initially established the Great Lakes Contact Group, this was a tacit indication of the weakness of existing coordination structures and the need for more donor unity in dealing with the Congolese. The poorly coordinated donors had routinely allowed Congolese politicians to play them off against each other for their own gains. This had resulted in multiple initiatives, carried out ad hoc and in isolation of each other. Everyone, as it were, was working “in their own corner” (ICG 2006a:27).

The institutional structure of donor coordination

Ideational congruence is in part fostered by the existence of a number of fora through which international donors and the various agencies involved communicate. In varying set-ups and with varying foci, these fora stimulate a certain amount of ‘group think’ about the issues at hand. There are a number of these fora that should be highlighted at this point, that provide important input for the coordination on the ground, which is fundamentally important for the success of the transition.

First and foremost, the International Committee for the Support of the Transition (CIAT) was tasked with overseeing the transitional process mandated by the Global All-Inclusive Agreement and includes an important Security Sector Reform Coordination Sub-committee. As the main coordinating forum it was extremely important pressuring the international community “to harmonise its political and economic strategies by carefully calibrating its political goals and financial and material assistance as a means of encouraging the DRC’s authorities to move the transitional process forward” (UN 2004c) With the successful holding of elections in November 2006, CIAT has been dissolved. Discussions on a follow-on structure to coordinate donor support are ongoing but a new international structure to support the peace process seems all but certain (see MONUC 2006; Crisis Group 2007). The Government of Joseph Kabila and some donors appear to want to replace CIAT with a purely technical structure concentrated on development and humanitarian assistance and to treat most aid and security sector reform support on a bilateral basis. As the International Crisis Group notes, “this would weaken the capacity of the international community to work collectively to support democratic practices and safeguard other peace process achievements” (2007:1). In response the EU, UN and the World Bank have drafted a concept paper proposing to create an enlarged donors group that would both coordinate aid and discuss political affairs.

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14 Chaired by MONUC, its membership was made up of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia as well as the African Union (AU) and the EU, both represented by their respective Commissions and Presidencies.

15 The Governance Compact as the paper is based on the political dialogue envisaged by Art 8 of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.
Other important international and regional fora include, inter alia, the Great Lakes Contact Group\(^{16}\) and the Tripartite Plus One Commission \(^{17}\). On top of that a wide variety of other fora exist that debate and deal with the DRC transition amongst other things. These include the UN Security Council, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the World Bank and its Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and the various UN agencies. All are actors in their own right while at the same time they also represent ways and avenues through which cooperation and engagement in the DRC’s transition is structured and informed.

It is hence possible to speak of a governance of the transition, meaning that the regulation of Congolese society and state has been supplemented by the roles of political actors, such as the UN, the EU, NGOs etc, alongside the traditional role of the government. This *heterarchy of organisation* (Jessop 1999, *op cit*) is consequently characterised by a “modicum of order and routinised arrangements” (Rosenau 2000:7) that transcends the traditional overarching governmental authority.

In many ways, therefore, this *governance* of the transition lacks a former system of rule, unlike for example in the EU which is often described as a system of governance itself, albeit with different connotations. Yet, it is not dependent on vertical authority meaning that “in the absence of compulsion, collective action, while facilitated by institutional mechanisms, remains dependent in the first instance upon a willingness to act and a consistency of view on a desirable end state” (Webber et al 2004:7). Both, at this point, can be said to exist amongst the international community and, at least, central parts of the Kinshasa Government.

### 2.2.3 Governing Heterarchy: The EU’s Moment

In the Congo, or any country in transition from violent-conflict to peace, the absence of an overarching political authority that controls the process of peacebuilding has alarmed a number of scholars and practitioners as to its inability to effectively channel and ‘bring under one umbrella’ international assistance to the transition (cf. Jones 2002; Paris 2004).

Commenting on the UN’s role in former Yugoslavia, Minear et al (1994) noted, that “the United Nations did not respond as a system but rather as a series of separate and largely autonomous agencies. Each had its own institutional dynamics, formulated its own priorities, and moved according to a timetable of its own devising.” Under such a system peacebuilding efforts suffer from overlaps and conflict in the activities of the various agencies. Indeed the UN’s own

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\(^{16}\) Includes Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, Angola, South Africa and the EU, which is represented EUSR Ajello, the European Commission and members of EUSEC RD Congo, MONUC and the World Bank act as observers.

\(^{17}\) The Tripartite Commission brings together Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan and, later, Burundian leaders.
The Brahimi Report acknowledged this fact by calling for a “focal point for peacebuilding activities” (2000:8).

The same analysis can without doubt be transferred to the situation in post-conflict DRC to describe not only the UN system but the whole of the heterarchy of actors. Yet, while the UN’s own recommendation for alleviating this problematic point to a technical-organisational adjustment of the UN system, there remains in the meantime significant scope for ideational leadership. In other words, while the systemic arrangements for a single-headed semi-hierarchical structure, grounded in international law are not available the need remains to make the best out of the current situation. Even without the sufficient organisational enhancements, along the lines of a central international agency\footnote{the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposed the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as a new intergovernmental body at the UN. The PBC will be responsible for addressing a critical gap within the UN by providing a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and facilitating dialogue amongst key actors.} to provide for an integrated approach, work must continue.

The kind of fluid governance without clear hierarchical or institutional frameworks that has been sketched above may well prove to be in the EU’s advantage in the meantime. In search of a second-best strategy a number of actors have to take the lead practically as a reference point for the other actors, so as to provide the necessary integrated guidance that is required. This is best achieved by leading by good example.

Referring back to the above example of lack of donor coordination in the Great Lakes Contact Group, a turning point came with the arrival of the EU Security Sector Reform Mission, or EUSEC RD Congo. Donors were thereafter able to coordinate effectively with the Congolese institutions. This is partly due to the fact that EUSEC has been very effective in liaising with ‘the right people’. “EUSEC owes much of its success to its style, including use of informal and friendly breakfast briefings among a handful of experts” (ICG 2006a:28); ‘the right people, in the right way’, on might add.

Regular networking, that number one European speciality, and cooperation with, amongst others, the ministry of defence, the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration (CONADER) and the Maison militaire\footnote{The Maison is the presidential military office. General Kalume, one of its members regularly attends EUSEC meetings.} of Joseph Kabila has, as the ICG notes, allowed “the development of a more cohesive view across the multiple bodies involved in the [...] process” (2006a:19).

This example shows that in heterarchical situations authority and effective guidance is determined by function, knowledge and skill. Post-conflict situations are always going to be, as we have seen above, an exercise in what we may call simultaneous engineering. This means that different national and international actors develop their programmes concurrently, with a view to a similar goal (security sector reform). There have to be, hence, ongoing efforts to fine tune ones
own projects with a view of all the other project in order to avoid overlaps and conflicts.

The EU civilian missions that will be detailed in the next chapter, have provided one important and in many ways invaluable reference system for the whole of the international community, thereby fulfilling an important functional role. As the British House of Lord noted the mission is “widely regarded as being effective not only in the delivery of support, but also as a means of co-ordinating the international community’s efforts” (2006:15). It is in this light that comments by the ICG have to be see, when it suggested an International Military and Training Assistance Team to be established on the “good basis” provided by an “expanded EUSEC mission” (2006a:20). EU civilian mission provide in a sense a central register against which to evaluate other efforts, while at the same time leaving a door open to innovative mission designs and lessons-learnt from other actors with the process.

The ‘Europeans’, as it were, have hence been able to cleverly stake out a position as central reference point within the donor-locals coordination ‘jungle’. In large part, this is due to effective liaison, micro-engagement in the processes of governance reform and the professionalism of its staff. When assessing the contribution of the EU to the DRC’s post-conflict transition, within the wider efforts of the international community, this kind of functional guidance should be kept in mind – it forms an important part of the EU’s ‘added value’. The other more substantial characteristics of the EU’s civilian ESDP engagement – knowledge and skill – will be treated in the next chapter.
3 EU and the Transition

The EU’s Conceptual Base of Involvement

Peace-building in such a precarious situation as in the DRC, is essentially an exercise in state-building. This means, on the one hand, that where there are no effective state structures to deal with the many problems the country faces, new ones will have to be created to oversee the ‘emergence’ out of the darkness of non-governability. On the other hand, it also means involving the EU in existing societal-power structures in order to mould them according to international ‘best practices’. Such is the role of the EU in the Congo.

There existed a different kind of order before; most notably complex emergency and crisis, laced with non-western, traditional and local notions of power and legitimacy. Embodying the Union’s mission for humanity, it’s different forms of engagement address themselves, in varying degrees, to the improvement of the conduct and subjectivity of judges, prosecutors, police officers and public administrators. They thereby project a particular kind of order, namely a western and European inspired one.

As Merlingen and Ostrauskaité (2006) have noted in their authoritative analysis of the Union’s “intrusive will to improve” with regards to peace-building and police aid, there are three interrelated discourses that inform this messianic behaviour. To begin with, there is the new aid consensus founded upon the new relationship between development and security. It has been noted from many quarters that there cannot be sustainable development in situations of pervasive and chronic insecurity and hence the root causes of conflict have to be addressed before self-sustained development can take place (cf. Commission 1996; OECD 1997). Secondly, the emergence of violence-prone societies to effective and self-sustaining development is hampered by the existence of ‘a regressive developmental malaise’ characterised by illiberal and often corrupt or criminalised economies and state structure (Duffield 2005). Thirdly, the “new humanitarian consensus” (Merlingen & Ostrauskaité 2006:50) that emerged since the end of the Cold War, again pushed the EU in a certain direction. Stating the belief that there is a link between human rights and peace, especially with reference to ethnicity and identity based wars, “human rights and humanitarian violations lie at the heart of many conflicts” (SG/HR & Commission 2000:8).

A failure to address these three relationships threatens any advances in the direction of self-sustained development and a reduction of violence. This thinking
has led to an erosion of the distinction between development and security, meaning that on the one hand, development aid has become more politicised and security policy has become broader in perspective. As the ‘Reflection Paper of the Portuguese Presidency on EU-African relations’ stated: “Being realistic about development means thinking in an integrated manner about politics, security, trade as well as development aid itself” (Cardoso et al 2000:12). This shows the extent to which development policy has been subsumed into a wider strategy of political involvement in Africa and is being rethought in ways that were previously unheard of. As Javier Solana emphasised the new role of the aid programme was to support “a more effective foreign and security policy […] with the political will to use all the available instruments in a co-ordinated and coherent way” (2000).

All three modes of thinking have enabled the legitimisation of EU interventions, and especially through the use of civilian missions under ESDP, stressing the argument that liberal, democratic government are the foundation of sustainable peace. Hence, to transform cultures of impunity and violence in line with best European practices, and therefore to exert massive intrusion into traditional or non-western societies is supported as a way out of misery, violence, poverty and underdevelopment. All the while, it empowers the EU to plan, organise and conduct operations that aim at reordering violent societies and enabling a ‘transition’.

Before turning to the EU’s and especially ESDP’s various missions in the country it is helpful to elaborate this conceptual approach further. All of these interventions reach deep into the ‘objects for improvement’ and the Congolese society. This sort of micro-engagement is vitally important to the Union’s approach, not only to its peace-building in the DRC, but also to its own specific ‘value-adding role’ with the wider international communities engagement in global order and peaceful emergence. As I will show, these interventions aim at the organised adaptation of certain facets or indigenous life in a way so that life becomes something other than what it was. Therefore, the armed forces, police, courts, judges, the whole security sector apparatus, are reorganised and reordered.

**The Strength of Civilian ESDP Missions**

**The Banality of Micro-Engagement**

Robert Kagan (2002) takes the view that “Europe’s strategic culture today places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools […] because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong.” Equating the use of soft-power tools with weakness is as easy as it is deficient in its analysis. More nuanced, maybe, a lot of the policy-oriented literature on European
security often blows into a similar horn, suggesting that the lack of forceful means available to civilian ESDP missions is the main reason for apparent inability of missions to effect change upon their host societies (Crisis Group 2005). As has been alluded to above, the focus will now turn to such civilian missions of the ESDP in the DRC – partly to disprove the apparent ‘truth’ of such arguments.

I challenge the commonsensical view that civilian ESDP missions are ‘weak’ because they often lack an enforcement mandate, are comparatively small-scale operations and lack the means to use big sticks and juicy carrots to affect reform in the security sector. The EU’s two civilian missions in the DRC – the Advisory and Assistance Mission (EUSEC RD Congo) and Police Mission (EUPOL Kinshasa) – fulfil all of these apparent deficiencies. Neither has an enforcement mandate, focusing instead on “monitoring, mentoring and advising” the Congolese authorities (cf. Council 2004; 2005a). Furthermore, both are limited in size, EUSEC consisting of eight seconded experts, EUPOL employing about 30 persons (Council 2005b). Yet as will be shown, both missions are very effective in refashioning, repositioning and reorganising their respective domains of the security sector. Of course the “will to improve” (Rose 2000) that is evidently embodied in EU engagement is often confronted with manifold practices of resistance. Yet by focusing on the ‘banality of day-to-day work’ (cf. Merlingen & Ostrauskaite 2006) it is able to refashion and mould local capacities for action with a view to making the conduct of locals more consistent with EU objectives and best practice. This will become clearer in the detailed discussion below of the two missions and their respective take on the transition process. To do this I focus on certain modes of operational conduct, employed by EU officials that support their quest to transform local governance structures in an improving direction.

Before embarking on the discussion, two perspectives have to be born in mind. Firstly, that existing local structures prior to EU involvement are by definition regarded as inferior and that secondly therefore, ‘improving direction’ and ‘European best practice’ are synonymous in the eyes of the EU.

**Security Sector Reform**

No issue is more important for the DRC’s prospects in peace and development, than security sector reform. At the same time it is the most difficult challenge. The country has been divided by years of war, mismanagement and corruption leaving little in the way of a coherent force behind. For years, even decades, the army, and to a lesser degree the police did not exist to provide security for the public, but were essentially predatory organs of state repression used by politicians and officers to pursue individual political aims and economic goals. This often went hand in hand with grave human rights abuses against the civilian population.

In many cases, soldiers are not paid and hence have to resort to begging and extortion on the civilian populations amidst whom they are based, making them the number one human rights abuser in the country. As a result, insecurity is
prevalent throughout most of the country, even today as the transition process officially ended with the assumption of power by the new democratically elected government of Joseph Kabila in December 2006. Especially the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu and the Ituri District (see Map) remain marred by lawlessness and insecurity as a result of army action (IRIN 2007). With the population destitute and exposed to high rates of criminal violence perpetrated by Congolese and non-Congolese groups\(^{20}\), mortality rates remain staggeringly high.

Real control over the security structures rests with the ex-belligerents who made up the transitional government and include various ruthless ex-militias. Their training consisted of little more than basic infantry drills and the firing of an AK-47 (ICG 2006a).

As a result creating a unified army under civilian command and an independent police force is the number one issue of importance. Transforming military and police structures is an inherently politically challenging process even in the best of environments. For purposes of definition, such reforms can be seen as addressing the core issues of how the security system is structured, regulated, managed, resourced and controlled within the three main branches: the military, police and judiciary.\(^{21}\) At the same time, as the ICG (2006a) lamented, “while the international community spent over $2 billion in the Congo for 2005, the largest part went to health care, education and transport. Moreover, funding for security reform has largely concentrated on providing demobilisation packages rather than building up the army and police”, to become “modern and professional”.

The EU’s involvement provides, in many ways, this missing link. Although small in size, it has positioned itself well in key areas: provision of training and subsequent monitoring, mentoring and advice. The EU’s Security Sector Reform Strategy represents a new approach that addresses the intertwined challenges of development, security and governance outlined above.

**EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC RD Congo**

EUPOL Kinshasa was set up in December 2004, by the Political and Security Committee to provide a framework for and advice to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU). The ESDP mission was preceded by a phase, during which the EU supported the IPU in rehabilitating a training centre, providing basic equipment, and training police forces. The European Commission led these activities, and they were funded through the EDF whereas the Member States offered equipment and 18 experts.

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\(^{20}\) For example, one of the biggest threats to security and stability is Rwandan Rebel group Forces Démocratique pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), formerly Alliance pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR). Largely made up of Interahamwe and the former Rwandan army who perpetrated the genocide in 1994, the FDLR is estimated to number between 8,000 and 10,000 fighters (see ICG 2003)

\(^{21}\) Incidentally, this is also the definition used by the EU.
The IPU is the subject of a project whose aim is to train 1008 Congolese police. Starting from 14 June 2005 with the deployment of mobile units in Kinshasa, the IPU has since been providing eight patrols a day in the city (Martinelli 2006). The objective is to scale up the neutral force currently made available by MONUC to guarantee the security of the government and transition institutions. The seconded officers are co-located to different sections of the IPU chain of command in order to “guarantee that the actions of the IPU are in line with international police best practices” (Council 2005b). Furthermore, the EUPOL mandate is to provide cooperation with international and local partners.

While the scope and resources of EUPOL Kinshasa are significantly smaller than those of other European civilian police missions, in Bosnia and Macedonia, it is novel from a conceptual point of view. Unlike in Bosnia and Macedonia, the mission operates within the framework of EU-UN cooperation in crisis management, as envisaged in the Joint Declaration of September 2003. Unlike Bosnia and Macedonia where the EU took over after the UN left, EUPOL Kinshasa is, therefore a ‘test operation’ of sorts to demonstrate that the EU can contribute effectively within a UN-led complex operations environment.

While slightly different in mandate, EUSEC RD Congo’s mission works similarly. It provides advice and assistance to Congolese authorities in charge of security “while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observance of the rule of law. Again, its officers are assigned to various key posts within the Congolese administration, including the office of the Defence Minister, CONADER and the Joint Operations Committee.

Both missions hence deliberately ‘use’ local staff with strategic and tactical responsibilities to pursue the European ‘ideals’. Using co-location these missions exercise power over local structures without physical violence or material constraints, namely through the use of, what Michel Foucault (1991) calls, hierarchical observations, normalising judgements and corrections. Merlingen and Ostrauskaité (2006) have authoritatively shown how EU Police missions use a three-pronged strategy that approximates Foucault’s observation closely. Firstly, the missions observe what local officials do on a micro-level and report it up the chain of command from a somewhat removed perspective. Then, secondly, the information is evaluated with a view to pointing out all that is insufficient from a “best European practice” perspective. They thereby, thirdly, point out the inferiority of local work, which in itself becomes a powerful mechanism for instilling reform in the subject, premised on good deal of ‘pointing and shaming’ (cf. Martinelli 2006).

An excellent example of how this approach works in practice is the Chain of Payments project that was pioneered by EUSEC in late 2005. As noted, most of the FARDC’s problems relate to political interference and above all rampant corruption. As mentioned before, army soldiers often are not paid, because the

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22 For example, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia employs 500 officers, a vast mandate that includes fighting organised crime and an annual budget of €38 million.
money earmarked for them is siphoned off somewhere along the command chain and army commanders widely inflate the numbers of soldiers under their command to gain political influence and to ensure more money is coming in their direction. EUSEC, as well as a number of other donors, had long observed and lamented this rotten state of affairs. The EUSEC put forward a plan that solves many of these problems, and was finally endorsed by the Congolese authorities at the end of 2005. Under the project the chain of payments, in effect the money flow of the FARDC is separated from the chain of command. Instead, it offers a comprehensive framework for disbursing funds via especially co-located international experts at a brigade level. As the ICG approvingly notes, “this should reduce corruption in the army, ensure that soldiers are paid and train the Congolese in administrative procedures” (ICG 2006a:18).

While the project is technical in nature, it is of course highly politically sensitive for the Congolese, signifying, in essence, the involvement of foreign actors in a basic sovereign state function. Because of this, this project is one of EUSEC’s greatest contributions to the whole of the army integration process, and by extension to the stability of the DRC. Costing only €7 million the project has managed to exert significant influence and maximum effect. As a result of the intimate knowledge the EU obtains this way, EUSEC has become “the best informed security sector reform institution in the Congo” (ICG 2006a:20).

Furthermore, micro-engagement in the day-to-day processes of army reform has proven to be the most effective measure to ensure reform enhancing the EU’s ability to constrain locals according to a clear set of preconceived rules of procedures and best practice. In this regard, micro-engagement should not be misunderstood as micromanagement. While the latter is often associated with a failure to delegate and ‘getting lost in details’, the characteristic feature of micro-engagement is that while these missions immerse themselves in the details of local (reform implementation) work, enable a strategic view on the capabilities, shortcomings and problems.

While the above discussion has mainly focused on the use of co-location as a political ‘technology’ to affect sustainable change, another, albeit closely linked way to promote change is through clear ideas of professionalism. Based on notions of objective behaviour, professionalism in the European sense is conspicuously absent from all of the services charged with the security of the country. Again, professionalisation, as well as co-location, focuses on the conduct of police officers, security agents, army personnel and administrative officials. In order to achieve the level of ‘pedagogical development’ that is needed amongst its pupils (‘the locals’) for the change to be self-sustainable, these have to be mentored in a way that stresses the two basic characteristics of professionalism: a sense of responsibility for the societies that they are supposed to serve, and an ability to resist inappropriate political meddling. This is done through inducting trainees in skills that (foreign) expert know. Drawing on a certain practical knowledge, trainers tutor inductees in what the, as educators, consider the best way to carry out certain tasks. The trainees are thereby forced to revaluate their professional world along European lines of understanding. At the same time they are instilled with a sense of responsibility for the job they are doing and a sense of
Civilians pride in their place within it. Both EUPOL, and to a lesser EUSEC have engaged their counterparts in similar ways, focusing on upgrading their professionalism.

3.2.4 Evaluating Civilian ESDP involvement

Civilian capabilities, as it were, were of course initially created to mediate against the military dimension of the evolving ESDP. They have thus been able to maintain a discourse of ‘civilian power’, permitting the EU to present these new capabilities as a ‘holistic’ approach to security. Moreover, the equilibrium between the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ components of the embryonic European security policy was and is incessantly re-evaluated taking in the ‘lessons learnt’ in the field of crisis management and post-conflict peace-building.

The deployment of civilian instruments in the DRC, as in Balkans beforehand, therefore, illustrates perfectly the discourse on the will to deploy in key regions with the whole toolbox of capabilities. In many ways, their deployment is a sign of the importance the Union affords to this region, incorporating them into a wider regional strategy. This approach combines the use of political dialogue within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (Art 8),

*23* the employment of Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region (EUSR), Aldo Ajello, community instruments such as development aid (EDF), humanitarian aid and emergency relief and financial support to civil society organisations, and finally the deployment of said civil-military missions EUPOL, EUSEC and Operation Artemis (cf. Council 2005c). This approach enables the Union to play a significant role within the DRC through the development and engagement of a whole variety of instruments that all, in one way or another target the security-development nexus.

Operation Artemis aimed to secure the town of Bunia for a short period of time, to stop ethnic violence and allow MONUC to reinforce. Contrary the civilian missions EUPOL and EUSEC contribute in a much more durable way to the security of the post-conflict period in the whole of the DRC*

*24* and legitimise the European presence as a whole.

It may be too early to judge the success of EUSEC and EUPOL, but by conceptualising their work as essentially an exercise in micro-engagement designed to educate and control their strengths are displayed. By focusing in strategic positions along the command line, systemic change in the way of accountability and professional conduct (which in itself is a precondition for accountability) is attempted that is in many ways novel compared to the other various ways in which the international community is trying to help the transition process along. Indeed this ‘European approach’ if I may call it that at this point has the advantage that is enables EU peacebuilders to affect the conduct in the

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*23* The Head of Missions of EUPOL and EUSEC, Superintendent Adilio Custodio and General Pierre Joanna respectively, have already been tasked to propose an effective framework for these dialogues to take place (Council 2007).

*24* Although strictly speaking EUPOL efforts are restricted to the capital Kinshasa.
long-run, and by extension the evolution of the way in which security services work. While it may be early to judge it is not entirely unrealistic to suggest that EU efforts are able to instil the self-sustainable characteristics, without having to submit them to “continuous surveillance” (Merlingen & Ostrauskaité 2006:109).

Furthermore, the European preoccupation with fighting corruption as a means to effect lasting security sector reform is evidenced by both missions (FARDC and IPU). This approach is novel in the sense that it has not been pursued by the international community. So far it has remained a demandeur of anti-corruption efforts by local authorities rather than engaging itself in the process. Even if both missions’ mandate is limited, they show the Unions willingness to involve itself on the basis of an assessment of local needs and realities.

In conclusion, it is worth spelling out a key questions that has implicitly guided the analysis, vis á vis the objective reasons for the Unions’ engagement: is it looking to create better ways to conduct local administrative business or a change in the mentality towards more transparency and accountability? Or to put it differently: Is the basis for involvement the creation of local capabilities or their civilisation? The official political declarations do not provide a definitive answer to this question. But it appears that the Unions attempts to wholeheartedly attack the question of corruption and that this will implicitly and explicitly lead to a redefinition of what is acceptable and what not. In this regard, the European approach offers to add significant breadth to a developing international approach to peace-building, by refocusing on the development of more transparent and responsible administration of essential state services.

The objective of EUPOL and EUSEC is not to regulate all internal problems of security reform and corruption, or to substitute the local ownership, to quote a buzzword from the development community, of state administration. Therefore, it is not surprising that EUPOL, for example, is not invested in defining the priorities for the police forces, but its engagement offers the instruments for a lasting change in their behaviour and the legitimate use of force. The reason is to securitise the transition and anchor and legitimise the European presence in the long-term. As Merlingen and Ostrauskaité have noted with reference to European police missions, this is done through the “recreation, reformation and restructuring of indigenous police forces and the wider justice system of which they are an organic part” (2005:215) through the alignment of social security practices with European best practice. These aspects allow for the establishment of the basis upon which the crucial communication between the security forces and the civilian population can emerge. That, in many ways is the European contribution to the concept of local ownership.

Thanks to EUPOL and EUSEC, the Union has been able to undeniably reinforce the coherence of its actions in the DRC and the legitimacy of its presence in the eyes of local actors and other international donors. It has also been able to advance some of the assignments of MONUC’s mandate. The UN mission shall, in effect: “contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the integrated police unit for Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility and assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas”.

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Furthermore, MONUC’s mandate includes “Security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and internal security forces together with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms” (UN 2004a). The EU decision to assume an important role in the formation of the IPU, through the training, advice and strategic direction provided by EUPOL, therefore substantially aids MONUC to fulfil its mandate, while enabling the Union to benefit from the considerable experience of the Blue-helmets.  

25 Mutual liaison between the EU and MONUC on matters of security sector reform are regarded as crucial to donor coordination and the spreading of experience. Coordination also includes working-relations between the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Council Secretariat.
4 Conclusion

4.1 Learning from the Past

If the peace-building record of the 1990s demonstrated anything, it was that there is no easy, quick and cheap method of establishing stable and lasting peace in war-shattered states. The experience in the Balkans serves as a prime example for this. Had international involvement in Bosnia focused on the difficult task of building an effective state-structure in the relatively early part of its mandate the exercise in stabilising Bosnia in the long-run might be further along than it is now, twelve years after the Dayton Agreement (cf. Paris 2004).

Rebuilding effective governmental institutions, managing a phased and gradual transition to peaceful market democracy is fundamentally important. Equally, ensuring that the rule of law is sufficiently strong to defend the new state against challenges requires a concerted effort not only to strengthen the capacity of the police and armed forces, but to ensure their actions are in accordance with good practice, whether European or other, and are mandated by a sufficiently functioning, independent judiciary.

This requires extensive involvement by the international community; both concerning the length of the engagement and the extent thereof. Peacebuilders should not fool themselves to the thought that following the relatively successful elections of last year, international involvement will or should be coming to a quick end, particularly in conflict-prone and under-institutionalised countries. As successfully executed as they were, the fundamental problems the Congo faces have remained. In essence, the international community has to be a community of, to borrow from Roland Paris, “surrogate governing authorities” (2004:206).

4.2 Adding Value to Peace-building Trusteeship

The key concern with any outside involvement in security sector reform is the sustainability of the change that has been affected once foreign personnel leaves. The projects that where incorporated at the behest of Europeans, especially the sensitive Chain of Payments project, certainly cannot entirely escape this logic.
What hinders army commanders and local politicians from undoing the successful good governance projects and simply falling back into their old ways of nepotism, corruption and official extortion, once European governments decide to turn their attention away from the Congo?

In many ways, the short answer is not much. It would be foolish to suggest outside involvement, weather European or not, would be able to inflict cultural and behavioural change on a societal level that would in effect be nothing less than a revolution. But the vital contributions necessary to start a process of systemic change can be provided by a well thought through and executed mission.

Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė have noted a similar problematique with regards to what they term police aid lite (sic): “Without re-imagining the state-policing nexus in a way that opens up space in which organizational forms of policing that balance the pursuit of security with the pursuit of a participatory policing style can flourish, ESDP police aid cannot hope to ensure a smooth transition from crisis management and post-crisis stabilization to a longer-term re-engineering of police organization and cultures” (2005:234).

The actions of the EU missions are, viewed in this way, much more than the ‘technical assistance’ so decried for its deficiencies in dealing with the DRC’s problems. The EU is able to provide a holistic, all encompassing strategy for security sector reform that is in this intensity and form unavailable anywhere else in the ‘toolbox’ of the international community. Despite criticism, the new security sector reform strategy pioneered here and elsewhere (notably in Bosnia and Macedonia), provides the EU with an explicit framework within which one can address causes of instability that threaten the recurrence of violence in states emerging from violent conflict. The work in the DRC illustrates this par excellence.

This paper has focused in large parts on what I call micro-engagement. This micro-engagement is always meant as a positive attribute of an approach to international peace-building efforts that originated in the halls of the UN and is carried, hopefully, to its logical conclusion by the international community, chief among them the EU. Indeed, I have argued that the Union has been the actor best able and willing to employ such “pastoral power” (Merlingen & Ostrauskaitė 2006).

As a result the international community is, in the case of the DRC, as in other cases such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and possibly Iraq drawn towards what James Fearon and David Laitin (2004) refer to as neo-trusteeship, or more provocatively, post-modern imperialism. The character of much of the European involvement, as exemplified in the Congo, certainly pushes the widely accepted notions of peace-building further in this direction. Involving a remarkable degree

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The choice of words employed by Fearon and Laitin is a reference to the, now obsolete, UN Trusteeship Council, that was set up to assign administrative responsibilities to particular states (Art 73 of UN Charter). With the rise of the decolonisation movement in the 1950s and 60s, the trusteeship system came under increasing pressure and the Council suspended its operations finally in 1994, although it most territories were released into self-government or became part of other countries long before that.
of power over key domestic political developments such involvement risks being labelled neo-imperialist.

The end of the Cold War removed the mask of quasi-stability and opened the view to a new understanding of politico-developmental security. Especially in Africa where governance structures are often corrupt, underdeveloped and weak do we witness a high number of violent conflicts. The strong relationship between the failure of institutions and ‘failure of peace’ has been pointed out in a number of studies (cf. Collier 2003; Esty et al 1998). Hence, it is necessary for the international community to realise the civilising potential of civil-military micro-engagement in post-conflict environments to help them escape the conflict trap (cf. ICG 2006b). Weather or not the ‘imperialism’-label applies to this new sort of commitment is not important to the essence of this thesis. The ‘i-word’ certainly carries too many negative connotations to qualify as an adequate description of what is happening. Indeed, the raison d’être of such peace-building engagement is not a continuation of colonialism but instead an attempt to restore the effective sovereignty of war-shattered states by working to create conditions under which these states could govern themselves independently and peacefully. The DRC certainly descend back into chaos, were the international community to decide to leave.

That said, the micro-engagement strategy being devised by the EU, in coordination with the other relevant international peace-building actors, does represent a form of control over a state that has proven unable to self-govern. In this sense, it may certainly be viewed as a form of neo-trusteeship, with the small difference that the situation today is one of multilateral donor governance, rather than a system of management by a single state or singular authority. In any case, this type of neo-trusteeship has historically proven paramount to prevent the recurrence of civil and ethnic conflict that devastates livelihoods and potentially threatens regional and international security. There may be no other way.
5 Bibliography


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