The EU and Postmodern Peacebuilding

Bridging the Capabilities-Expectations Gap and Coping with Contemporary Conflicts

Fredrik Kinell
Abstract

After the Cold War the nature and character of international conflict has changed dramatically, from traditional inter-state conflicts to protracted social conflicts. This constitutes a major challenge to contemporary peacebuilders, foremost the UN, but the expanding size and number of peacekeeping missions are threatening to erode UN resources. Peacebuilding scholars have different views on what actually denotes the concept, but the need for a more holistic approach has been emphasised, which requires short-medium- and long-term engagement in different activities.

Democracy, good governance, and economic development have replaced the old, Cold War- notions of conflict resolution, which entailed mainly security and military priorities. In that sense, it is natural that the first post-modern political entity, the European Union, has come up with the ambition and aspiration to intervene in conflicts and crises around the world, and to contribute to peacebuilding. Nevertheless, there are many challenges and risks involved in that endeavour, and the institutional basis of the EU may not yet be sufficient in terms of dealing with short-term crisis responses and the medium- to long-term tasks in conflict zones.

Keywords: Peacebuilding, CFSP, institutions, conflict, ESDP
# Table of Contents

1. Preface ................................................................................................................ 1  
   1.1 Statement of Purpose ..................................................................................... 2  
   1.2 Limitations and Disposition ........................................................................ 3  
   1.3 Methodology ................................................................................................ 4  
      1.3.1 Text-Analysis........................................................................................... 4  
      1.3.2 Case Study ............................................................................................... 5  
   1.4 Material .......................................................................................................... 6  

2. Peacebuilding ..................................................................................................... 7  
   2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 7  
   2.2 Explaining the Development of Peacebuilding .............................................. 8  
   2.3 Defining Peacebuilding: Competing Views................................................... 9  
   2.4 In Search of a Conceptualization: Towards a Consensus ......................... 10  
   2.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................11  

3. The EU and the World ....................................................................................12  
   3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................12  
   3.2 The Significance of the EU’s Institutions....................................................13  
   3.3 The Institutional Basis of EU Foreign Policy .............................................14  
   3.4 Pillar I: The European Community ...............................................................15  
      3.4.1 The EC Model of Policy-Making and Action .......................................15  
   3.5 Pillar II: The Common Foreign and Security Policy ...................................16  
      3.5.1 Coordinating Foreign Policy and Taking Action ..................................16  
      3.5.2 The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding............17  
      3.5.3 Critique against the CFSP ......................................................................18  
   3.6 Conclusion....................................................................................................19  

4. The EU on the Ground: On Mission in the DRC .........................................20  
   4.1 Introduction: The Plight of an African Nation.............................................20  
   4.2 EU Operations and Activities in the DRC ...................................................21  
      4.2.2 Operation Artemis .................................................................................22  
      4.2.3 EUFOR RD Congo ................................................................................24  
      4.2.4 EU CCM: EUPOL-Kinshasa and EUSEC-RDCongo ...........................25  
   4.3 Conclusion....................................................................................................28  

5. Final Comments ...............................................................................................29  

6. Bibliography .....................................................................................................32
## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civilian Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Civilian Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Civilian Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDRRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC-ARTEMIS</td>
<td>EU military operation in support of MONUC in the DRC 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU CCM</td>
<td>EU Civilian Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR-RD Congo</td>
<td>EU military operation in support of MONUC in the DRC 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL-KINSHASA</td>
<td>EU police mission in Kinshasa (DRC) 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC-DRC</td>
<td>EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>The DRC’s Integrated Police Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Multinational Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>The UN peacekeeping force in the DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECE</td>
<td>Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Preface

The challenge of rebuilding societies torn apart by war remains to this day an immense challenge to the international community, not least showed by the contemporary, ostensibly unsolvable conflicts in for example Sudan, the Middle East and Sri Lanka, to name but a few.

Following the end of the Cold War, the nature and character of international conflict has changed dramatically, from the traditional inter-state conflicts over boundaries and territory (Zartman & Rasmussen 2003:3-5:26) to protracted social conflicts: “intense struggles between rival groupings…motivated by non-ideological factors” (Hampson 1996:4). Civil war, often arising from interethnic conflict, has replaced the classic interstate war and, thus, has contributed to the increasing complexity of present-day peacebuilding (Jeong 2005:2); between 1989 and 1994, the world saw 94 armed conflicts, of which only four were considered traditional interstate conflicts. Consequently, the size and number of United Nation’s peacekeeping missions have expanded considerably since 1989, stretching out and eroding UN resources as a result (Zartman & Rasmussen 2003:38).

This new kind of war, Bellamy (2005) argues, “reflects the ongoing erosion of state’s monopoly on legitimate, organized warfare”, which he attributes to contemporary globalization processes (Bellamy et al. 2005:3). According to Bellamy, globalization has transformed the former Westphalian society of states - based on the notion of non-intervention in sovereign states unless a conflict therein threatens international order - into a post-Westphalian conception of the world order that rests on the idea of “the democratic peace” (:2). This new concept assumes that the way a certain state acts in the international community is “inextricably connected to the nature of its domestic society” (ibid.). Liberal relations between states require democratic societies within states, and, consequently, the role of post-Westphalian peacebuilding is not restricted to ensure order and peace between states, but also to ensure peace within them (ibid.).

Some scholars have noticed an emerging consensus around the view of peacebuilding as a long-term engagement that requires wider, more concerted and coherent efforts, in order to achieve a lasting impact and to “overcome the scars and complex legacies of war” (Berdal 1996:5-6). Berdal, for one, emphasizes the importance of long-term commitment and sustained effort to “overcome the legacy of violence” and asserts that “lasting success…depends largely on the extent in which short-term concerns about security and stability [are] reconciled with long-term strategies…” (:8)

Drawing from contemporary peacebuilding and conflict management literature, a view emerges which emphasises an apparent need for a more “holistic approach”, which goes beyond security and military priorities to tackle specific issues of democratic legitimacy and governance (Cousens & Kumar et al. 2001:1); this has been discussed by Jeong (2005) in an attempt to give a “clear, policy-relevant conceptualization of a peacebuilding process” (Jeong 2005:19). According to Jeong it is essential to obtain a “clear understanding of the diverse dimensions of peacebuilding” and the various strategies required to achieve the goal of sustainable peace (ibid.). Identifying and coming to terms with root causes of war and conflict, such as ethnic and religious hostilities, is arguably the method of resolving
protracted interstate conflicts, according to a large faction of peacebuilding scholars. Along with the call for a new approach on peacebuilding, the last decade has seen an increasing reliance on established international or regional organizations to devise and conduct a UN mandate “in conjunction with the security council” (Bellamy et al. 2005:183). According to Bellamy, this is a practical way of closing the “mandate-means gap and fosters greater vertical and horizontal co-operation” (ibid.). Indeed an increasing number of non-state actors are playing significant roles due to globalization processes, not least the European Union (:189). Zartman and Rasmussen (2003) would also like to see a global system which provides for “new actors” in peacebuilding, and, albeit neglecting the role of the EU, recognize that the “complexity of the international environment is such that states [themselves] can no longer facilitate the pursuit of all human interest” (Zartman & Rasmussen 2003:142). Founded from the very start as a project of peace and by many portrayed as the first truly post-modern political phenomenon (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:1), the European Union (EU) is an entity among whose important aims are: Promotion of human rights; the promotion of democracy and good governance; and the prevention of violent conflicts (Smith 2004:152-3). The failures of former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, some critics argue, demonstrated to the world that the Union was not and will perhaps never be, ready to manage violent conflicts and achieve peace in troubled countries. Since then, however, the EU has constantly strived to achieve a “more coherent and integrated approach” (Nowak, 2006:11) in order to obtain the different instruments and capacities necessary for assisting in building peace in war-torn countries (ibid.).

The questions that needs to be addressed, however, is whether the Union has the appropriate institutional framework necessary for demanding endeavours such as the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the essential effective decision-making and policy implementation machinery.

1.1 Statement of Purpose

The purpose and aim of this study is to relate scholar’s ideas on effective peacebuilding in conflict-ridden societies to the efforts of the EU to create the capacity “to act in a coherent and above all effective manner over the whole of its international environment” (Gnesotto et al. 2004:5).

Furthermore, this study discusses and problematizes the EU as a peacebuilder through a two-level approach: the Union in general within the broader context of general peacebuilding and as an international actor; and, more specifically, a case study analyzing the EU’s activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo. On the more general level, this thesis will discuss and problematize the European Union’s increasing significance in peacebuilding operations, bearing in mind the its ambition “to develop…all the instruments necessary for defusing crises” (ibid.). According to the Union’s foreign policy chief, the EU High Representative Javier Solana, “[the Union has] developed these instruments, defined capabilities, undertaken to achieve the goals we set out for ourselves”, and the result has been “successful, collective action” (ibid.).
The purpose of the case study is to assess what the Union, to this day, has accomplished in the DRC, in order to discuss the EU’s strengths and weaknesses. By surveying the Union’s efforts at building peace and assisting the transition to democracy in the DRC, this thesis intends to examine the level of coherence of the EU’s peacebuilding efforts, since coherence by many peacebuilding scholars is considered a prerequisite for a successful operation.

Moreover, this study aims to investigate whether the EU actually fulfils what the peacebuilding literature deem necessary for a modern-day peacebuilder. Consequently, that implies accounting for advantages and disadvantages and plausible impediments of the Union as a peacebuilder, for example the level of coherence when twenty-seven EU-countries are to conduct concerted peacebuilding operations collectively. In that respect, it is necessary to study the Union from an institutional perspective, drawing on the belief that institutions do matter when studying EU decision-making and policy implementation.

The following specific questions delimit the general scope of the inquiry:

- Does the EU fulfil the requirements of a peacebuilder, in line with Jeong’s and other prominent scholar’s peacebuilding notions? What are the Union’s strength and weaknesses in that respect?

- Studying the EU operations and activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, what have the EU operation accomplished, in view of its main objectives and aims in the area? How coordinated, coherent and concerted have the EU’s efforts been?

1.2 Limitations and Disposition

Any scientific work is subject to limitations of some form, be it the amount of time or space or any other line of demarcation which has to be drawn somewhere. Naturally, this study is itself no exception to the rule. Time and space is the main limit setter, and the reason why I have chosen only one case study, which focuses on the EU peacebuilding activities in the DRC. The paper is divided into three sections that consider different aspects in a comprehensive approach, each of which aims to provide a holistic and inclusive analysis of the issues at hand.

The study starts with an introduction and analysis of the theory on peacebuilding, and a definition and conceptualization of the term; this in order to bring some clarity to the ongoing debate over the essence and actual purpose of peacebuilding.

The second part of the thesis portrays the EU’s decision-making and policy implementation from an institutional perspective, presents an introduction to the Union’s role in global affairs, and analyzes its institutional backbone by depicting the two pillars foremost concerned with EU foreign policy. By examining the decision-making process as well as the process of actual action-taking, the second part tries to scrutinize the Union’s possibilities and capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
The third part empirically examines the EU’s past and ongoing commitment in the DRC, in order to assess the Union’s achievements and work in the area. Finally, the concluding chapter revises the arguments made in the paper, summarizes what the analysis has accomplished, and discusses the results.

1.3 Methodology

The purpose of this study is twofold and is composed of a text-analysis and a case study. The nature of the research method is contextually wide, and the approach can be described as theory consuming, since the theories used serve to describe and explain; as will show, this applies for both parts of the study. “The difference between theory-consumption and theory-testing”, Esaiasson argues, “is primarily found in the very purpose of the study” (Esaiasson 2004:41). Naturally, it is difficult to ‘test’ theories of peacebuilding and EU foreign policy and, therefore, this study is not an attempt to test or develop theories; rather, it is an attempt to present a plausible explanation of reality in order to understand and describe. Because of the chosen research design, the aim of the study has more of an ‘idiographic’ rather than ‘nomothetic’ character, i.e. the results produced will not provide a basis for further generalizations, even though some evaluations will be made, possibly with the hope that future scholars of the subject will have further use of the study. The applied research-methods will be outlined more thoroughly below.

1.3.1 Text-Analysis

The first and second parts are based on the text-analysis method, which aims to examine two kinds of theoretical and empirical literature: first, ‘post-modern’ peacebuilding in general, i.e. the ideas on peacebuilding put forward by scholars such as Jeong, Hampson and prominent others; and second, theoretical literature concerning the common foreign policy of the European Union, its institutional basis, organisation and degree of responsibility regarding peacebuilding activities.

The first part, thus, is a thorough investigation of theoretical and empirical literature on peacebuilding, outlining the structure of the term and its conceptual framework; and literature on the EU as an international actor, peacebuilder and its institutional and organizational capabilities. How, then, does the text analyst suitably advance his conclusions? It is certainly possible to assert that one has reached plausible results; the question is how to affirm the viewpoint convincingly and in an unambiguous manner (Esaiasson 2004:249). Unlike the quantitative scholar’s method, there are no straightforward facts or numbers to establish; the qualitative scholar must then do with other means, i.e. to rely on other empirical evidence to support the conclusion. Sometimes the task is an easy one, as the core of the result lies in the accumulated outcome, and, consequently, it is difficult to point to any individually tangible result (ibid.).

Drawing from contemporary peacebuilding literature, the aim is to conceptualize what actually delineates peacebuilding in the 21st century.
Studying contemporary EU literature, the purpose is to examine what scholars consider as strengths and weaknesses regarding the Union as a peacebuilder. The purpose is then to weigh and measure the institutional and organizational advantages and impediments of the EU to the list of criteria of post-modern peacebuilding and its conceptual framework.

The chosen approach is intended to survey the general theories required to answer the specific questions of this thesis: if the EU fulfils the requirements of a “post-modern” peacebuilder, and, on a theoretical level, to discuss and assess the Union’s plausible advantages and shortcomings.

To recapitulate, the first part of this study can be described as a qualitative text analysis. This research method is quiet common in the field of social sciences; it may be accurate to describe it as one of the “core practices” of social science (Esaiasson et al. 2004:233). In a wider sense, all scholars who relate their research to earlier efforts employ this technique. An essential feature in this method is to bring out the significant content through a meticulous reading of the text’s parts, this in order to capture the essence of the text, i.e. the central elements, and to arrange and critically examine the content (ibid.).

In a sense, the list of criteria can pass for normative as it is to contain what actions and efforts are considered necessary and right in order to achieve peace. It can be argued, however, that it may often be precisely norms and principles that govern countries and international organizations in their peacebuilding efforts. These norms and principles, often viewed as ‘universal’, may be incongruent and inconsistent with the recipient country’s norms: “Imposing Western-sourced international norms”, Pugh argues, “is a dubious enterprise since they may be irrelevant and the imposition resisted” (Pugh 2000:6). Nevertheless, it is the present author’s view that it is not feasible to exclude normative statements in peacebuilding theories and ideas. It should be added, moreover, that the list of criteria is also experience based - i.e. based on the actions and tools found wanting - that is, shortcomings which scholars have perceived.

1.3.2 Case Study

The second part of the study consists of an empirical, qualitative case study of EU peacebuilding activities in the DRC, with the aim of evaluating what the EU has accomplished there to this day, considering the restrictions imposed by the UN-mandate, its main objectives, and aims in the area. The case study will focus on arguably essential elements of peacebuilding activities, such as coherence, organization and coordination. The empirical results generated from the study will then serve to examine, or perhaps underline, the discrepancies between theory and fieldwork. Thus, a further aim is to compare the results from the empirical case study with the literature on EU foreign policy and peacebuilding efforts, which analyzes EU strengths and weaknesses. However, one must stress the complications and challenges involved in assessing the impact of ongoing operations.

According to Yin (1984), the advantages of using a case study as a research strategy is that it allows for an investigation to maintain “the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 1984:14), i.e. organizational and managerial processes and international relations (ibid.). When “how” and “why”
questions are being posed, and when the focal point of the study is on a present-day event, case study is the preferred strategy; furthermore, the flexibility of the research method is such that case studies can be both exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Another of the advantages of case study as a research method, Yin argues, is its ability to deal with a broad variety of evidence, for example documents, interviews and empirical observations (:20).

1.4 Material

As regards the chosen material for this study, this comprises of both primary and secondary sources. The difference between the two kinds of material concerns mainly the ability to confirm stories, i.e. the credibility and authenticity of a certain document or paper. Primary sources are more credible than secondary, due to the simple fact that accounts and claims from people who have in fact been involved in events are easier to believe than accounts from people who merely recapitulate what others have said (Esaiasson et al. 2004:309).

The main bulk, however, consists of secondary sources, empirical and theoretical, concerning peacebuilding; the organizational and institutional aspects of EU foreign policy; EU operations in the DRC; the DRC; and methodological literature. At a first glance, the selection of literature on peacebuilding may appear somewhat biased in one direction, from a theoretical point of view, but it is the author’s view that defining and delineating peacebuilding in the 21st century implies accounting for views of scholars who are essentially ‘post-modern’ in their perspectives. Consequently, that involves taking into account the impact of globalization, the changing character of international conflict and embracing the post-Westphalian conception of the world order. With that in mind, there are, however, competing definitions of peacebuilding which mainly concerns the activities and tools of the concept.

Concerning the EU material, the literature have been selected out of a wide range of sources, written by scholars with different theoretical approaches on the subject of the EU as an international actor, peacebuilder, and its institutional and organizational capabilities to act coherently and collectively, to name but the key points. Therefore, it is the author’s opinion that the literature, in that respect, cannot be characterised as biased in any form.

The primary material consists mainly of reports and works from NGO’s and think tanks who have studied and monitored the EU’s operation in the DRC; and reports and materials from the European Commission and other EU institutions.
2. Peacebuilding

2.1 Introduction

“The term peacebuilding refers to all the efforts required on the way to the creation of a sustainable peace zone” (Reychler & Paffenholz et al. 2001:12). Thus describes Reychler the art of peacebuilding, as a way of transforming a conflict by addressing all the major components of it. Through peacebuilding, Reychler argues, the conflict is not only resolved, it shifts entirely (ibid.); “it tries to make the world safe for conflicts” (ibid.).

Conflicts are signals that problems need to be taken care of, and if conflicts are not resolved effectively, they may become destructive and cause enormous suffering; there are today over 200 places in the world “where people kill people” (ibid.). Naturally, conflict leads to physical destruction and human suffering, but it “is also a strong motivation force for peacebuilding” (Reychler & Paffenholz, ed. 2001:3). The term peacebuilding at first surfaced in former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* from 1992, wherein the intention was to map the full range of postwar needs of a certain country and to identify the international resources available to meet those (Cousens & Kumar et al. 2001:5). Peacebuilding thus supposedly takes place after a conflict has finished and the parties have agreed a political settlement, i.e. a settlement “written and enforced by the international society” (Bellamy et al. 2005:236). This approach viewed conflict as “linear”, which implied that peacebuilding was necessary first after the three initial steps of preventive diplomacy and prevention had failed, and after traditional peacekeeping (if it has occurred) and after peacemaking had paved the way by restoring at least some measure of order in the inflicted country (Mason & Meernik 2006:109). Peacebuilding was, according to Boutros-Ghali, to take place after these activities and encompassed a wide range of specific tasks, from disarming the warring parties and demobilizing troops to much broader and “less tangible objectives”, such as fostering democratic institutions, promoting human rights (Cousens & Kumar et al. 2001:6-7) as well as efforts which aimed at altering a “cultural affinity for resolving conflicts with weapons” (Jeong 2005:22).

At odds with theory, as is not uncommon, peacebuilding may not be a linear process and may not always go as planned, but according to Jeong it needs to be “goal-oriented process” (:19). There is always a danger of incoherence, because of multiple actors pursuing different goals lacking consensus on the long-term vision of peace (ibid.).

An effective implementation of peacebuilding policies entails a “compelling definition of peace”, in that the long-term goal of peacebuilding not only lies in restoring order and reducing suffering, but also in achieving self-sufficiency. Simply providing order is not sufficient if the long-term goals are to accomplish sustainable peace (:21). The general aim of peacebuilding is to construct an environment of sustainable peace, i.e. the absence of armed violence; the absence of structural, psychological and cultural discrimination; a constructive transformation of conflicts; and both external and internal legitimacy (:92). The concept of peacebuilding involves the assumption that external actors can exercise both the power and the moral authority to achieve peaceful change, which the local actors evidently have not succeeded in doing. When international
diplomacy has failed to avert a violent conflict, then, presumably, external actors are to make concerted efforts to “pick up the pieces and regenerate societies” (Pugh 2000:3) to prevent further violence. Assumptions alone, Pugh argues, are not enough, however, if external actors are to bring about peaceful change (ibid.). Like Jeong, Pugh criticizes “hard” and inflexible peacebuilding projects, which are seemingly more concerned with integrating war-torn countries in the world economy than with addressing the root problems (.6).

2.2 Explaining the Development of Peacebuilding

The origins of peacebuilding can be found in the changing political environment after the Cold War, which has altered the way war is waged, coined as ‘new wars’ (Bellamy et al. 2005:3). The ending of the Cold War, Mason & Meernik argue, meant a dramatic increase in the number of peacebuilding operations due to the greater will of the permanent Security Council members to let the UN conduct and handle peace operations; the “stalemate” in the Council was broken (Mason & Meernik 2006:125). The wars of the post- Cold War era and, consequently, the threats to international peace and security, are civil wars and failed states, which have greatly increased the demand for peacebuilding operations (ibid.). The human catastrophes in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia as well as numerous failed peace settlements were ascribed to those rather ‘new’ phenomenons in the international community (Bellamy et al. 2005:3;75). These ‘new wars’ were something notably different from earlier wars, which were mainly fought between states rather than within them; the complexity of these new conflicts and the difficulties the peacebuilders faced prompted a serious reconsideration of efforts, tools and overall planning (ibid.). The conditions that generated civil wars, and those that resulted from them, incited a new holistic approach that was to address a wider range of issues, such as democratic governance, legitimacy, economic equity and social inclusion that could thwart war-torn countries from plunging into violence yet again (Cousens & Kumar et al 2001:1).

The normative issue is also important for explaining the emergence of peacebuilding, which Bellamy attributes to a “qualitative transformation” on part of the UN of the way conflicts are evaded: The responsibilities of peacekeepers had to be broadened to include promoting liberal-democratic peace (Bellamy et al. 2005:75). Peacebuilding, one might say, was born out of that notion. The challenges of civil wars was an argument for prolonging the timeframe of international operations and assistance, because even if peace could be forcibly kept for a couple of years after the peace-settlement, it was not likely to “stabilize” and “deepen”, that is, become something more than a short respite and a breather for the suffering population (Cousens & Kumar et al 2001:2). Liberalism, Mason & Meernik argue, is in fact “the guiding force behind peacebuilding operations” (Mason & Meernik:126), which implies the promotion of democracy and market economy with the goal of transforming states to become productive, peaceful members of the international community (ibid.). Globalization, other scholars argue, may also serve as an explanation for the rise of peacebuilding. Bellamy asserts that globalization processes have altered the way states behave in the international community. According to Bellamy, globalization has transformed the
former Westphalian society of states - based on the notion of non-intervention in sovereign states unless a conflict therein threatens international order - into a post-Westphalian conception of the world order that rests on the idea of “the democratic peace” (Bellamy et al.:2).

Globalization, others argue, has also increased the media’s coverage of conflicts and suffering in other countries, and thus augmented public pressure for intervention and action (Mason & Meernik:126-7). In a way, one might view globalization and liberalism as *interrelated* explanations of the development of peacebuilding; a consensus has evolved on the ascendancy of liberalism after the Cold War and “is consistent with the notion of peacebuilding as a set of activities for peaceful conflict management” (:126).

### 2.3 Defining Peacebuilding: Competing Views

Scholars have different assumptions on the definition of peacebuilding, and it has been defined in various ways (Mason & Meernik 2006:55).

Given the difficulties, the differing characteristics and the special circumstances of various conflicts, and the varying means by which the peace is pursued, it is obvious that not all operations will look alike (Mason & Meernik 2006:4), nor be considered success-stories. Rather, the question of what actually determines successful peacebuilding efforts is critical: History reveals some noteworthy achievements, but also some striking failures (Hampson 1996:6).

The challenges of peacebuilding cannot be taken lightly. Indeed, getting the warring parties to the negotiating table can be a grand achievement; an even greater challenge, however, is to have both parts to abide by the agreements and mutual commitments implicated in the settlement. Here the peacebuilding process can break down “like sand castles in quicksand” (Hampson 1996:5).

Drawing on different views, Galtung (in Bellamy et al. 2005:234) views peacebuilding as “the practical implementation of social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development” (Bellamy et al. 2005, ibid.); Ryan argues for peacebuilders to concern themselves with changing the “belligerent and antagonistic attitudes that foster violent conflict at the grassroots level” (ibid.); Lederach stresses the importance of “maintaining a broad conception of conflict and peacebuilding” (ibid.); and according to Miall, peacebuilding is the work of underpinning peacemaking and peacekeeping by “addressing structural issues and long-term relationships between conflictants” (ibid.). Considering these ostensibly incongruent views, the differences, nonetheless, seem to lie more at the ‘micro’ rather than at the ‘macro’ level; that is, a degree of consensus seem to exist on the *general* features of peacebuilding, albeit the methods, tools and efforts differ. Most scholars of peacebuilding emphasise the need for concerted efforts, long-term commitment, a coherent peace-plan, an overall needs assessment and, what is vital, an effective implementation of the plan (Bellamy et al. 2005:3;75).
2.4 In Search of a Conceptualization: Towards a Consensus

Having analyzed a broad range of peacebuilding literature, one might have to agree with Mason and Meernik in acknowledging the improbability of a “single, universally agreed-upon definition of peacebuilding” (Mason & Meernik 2006:108). However, some intersubjective consensus does exist on the dimensions of peacebuilding: Most scholars agree with Boutros Ghali’s notion that the goal of peacebuilding is to “prevent the recurrence of conflict” (ibid.).

Research on peacebuilding has focused more on the assessments of practical experiences and case studies than on bridging the theoretical gaps. Thus, the results obtained has fortified contradictory views, rather than contributed to what Jeong calls an “integrative peacebuilding model” (Jeong 2005:14). To conceptualize peacebuilding and integrate the main themes, one must recognize the uniqueness of every conflict, i.e. the special conditions that distinguish certain countries. Although the vision of peacebuilding and the paths to peace may be multiple, “a clear policy-relevant conceptualization of a peacebuilding process is necessary” (:19). In Jeong’s opinion, peacebuilding is not about writing a checklist of tasks; rather, he suggests a synergetic approach in order for a more concerted strategy (ibid.). Supporting that notion, Pugh argues that the instruments, solutions and planning employed during the Cold War are no longer sufficient: The conflicts of today are not purely military in nature (if they ever have been), and, hence, nor will military solutions alone suffice to build peace. The international community has recognized that protracted conflicts bear with them terrible human costs, and that, owing to a re-conceptualization of security, conflicts may lead to security implications for states, not least problems with large masses of refugees (Pugh 2000:15-16). Pugh would also like to see a “clear, policy-relevant conceptualization of the term” peacebuilding (:16). The means by which peace is pursued is not, however, the most important issue, Mason and Meernik argue, because these means will differ from nation to nation depending on the type of conflict fought. Yet, all operations have a common goal, as Rasmussen (in Mason & Meernik 2006:4) writes:

"Peacebuilding, whether in the post conflict resolution phase or as efforts to prevent the eruption of nascent conflict, depends on the ability to transform the conflict situation from one of potential or actual mass violence to one of co-operative, peaceful relationships capable of fostering reconciliation, reconstruction, and long-term economic and social development (Mason & Meernik 2006:4)."

Thus, specific goals of peacebuilding are only “means to a greater end” (Mason & Meernik 2006:4); if the actions taken produce peace, then the efforts can be judged as a success (ibid.). It should be added that peacebuilding as such should not be confused with regular, longer-term development programmes conducted by NGOs and other organizations; as Pugh argues, “the root causes of violence are in fact apolitical issues” (Pugh 2000:18), for example poverty, resource scarcity and unemployment. Peacebuilding should also not be restricted to or defined by a specific phase of a conflict, such as post-conflict - rather, as the UN Department of Political Affairs concludes, peacebuilding have to be understood as a “continuum of activities which may be present in all phases of conflict” (:17-18).
2.5 Conclusion

The above reading has attempted to conceptualize the broad and multifaceted theory of peacebuilding, considering the vague, elusive and perhaps even abstract nature of the concept. It is difficult to point out certain features that are ‘mandatory’, and to agree around a set of principles that are essential for a successful peacebuilding mission. What is certain, however, is that peacebuilding is a long-term engagement, but that it also consists of various tools and actions according to timeframe. Boutros-Ghali’s notion that peacebuilding is to commence after the conflict, is erroneous, however, as building peace should not be confined to a certain phase of the conflict. Focusing on root causes is an essential part, as these must be addressed if the conflict is to be solved: Peacebuilders must be attentive to the long-term economic and socio-political development, and acknowledge that fostering peaceful relationships and reconciliation is an ongoing commitment. However, perhaps most important of all, the peacebuilders must have the political will and the funding to tackle the problems, a subject which the peacebuilding scholars often fail to appreciate. (Terrie, International Herald Tribune, 2005-01-27).

Scholars of peacebuilding seem to agree on the need for concerted efforts, a coherent peace-plan and an effective implementation of the plan. Thus, peacebuilding is about addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between the conflicting parties. What differs is the role of ‘economic governance’, as some scholars argue that the liberal ideas of forcibly integrating (foremost) African countries into the world market do much more harm than good than development-oriented strategies would (Schmidt, European Voice: 2005-01-27).

Many peacebuilding scholars emphasise that it is deceptive to assume that the ending of all-out war and the signing of a peace agreement will make mistrust, hostilities and suspicion disappear. Disarming, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of former militiamen and soldiers are long-term objectives that need to be addressed if peace is to have any chance of stabilizing; a well-planned and executed DDR is imperative for the commitment of officers and soldiers to the peace process. Berdal (1996) highlights the importance of “public-order institutions”, foremost the national police force which must be widely recognized and perceived as credible and legitimate (Berdal 1996:74); this requires external commitment in order to train and monitor the new force “well beyond the formal end” of a DDR mission (ibid.) [emphasis added]. The security sector, thus, is key for “restructuring the activities” of the elements which seek to destabilise and violate human rights (ibid.). Furthermore, a priority when reforming the security sector is to collect and control small arms, a necessary step to avoid renewed violence (Jeong 2005:74-75).

As regards development programmes and assistance, the recipient countries have far greater chances of success and to avoid donor-dependency if the programmes are designed to promote self-sufficiency and the capacities of the local economy (Berdal 1996:75).

In view of the complexities associated with peacebuilding in ‘failed states’, coordination is essential in order to achieve the goals agreed upon; coordination is also important when “assigning different roles and activities to both external and internal actors” (Jeong 2005:219). Alas, as history reveals, the involvement of various IOs and NGOs in the peacebuilding process, in diverse sectors and with perhaps incompatible goals, is difficult to coordinate and synchronise with the ‘major’ actor’s activities and operations.
3. The EU and the World

3.1 Introduction

The EU may very likely present a perplexing and ambiguous image to the rest of the world. It is more than an international organization, but less so than a state; to conceptualize its identity is a complex task (Bomberg & Stubb 2003:3). As McCormick (2005) argues, however, whereas the EC was once a political exercise of limited scope, it is now a “global superpower” (McCormick 2005: xii).

Outside actors might contemplate whether to think of the Union as a single body, or to conceive of it as a unit of 27 Member States (ibid.) united around a wide range of common interests and normative values. The complexity of the organization is illustrated by its multifaceted character, intricate institutional machinery and the range and width of its policy areas, but also of its significant international influence and, alas, its “frequent inability to wield it” (Peterson & Sjursen 2001:3). Former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, once said that to “understand Europe you have to be a genius or French” (McCormick 2005:1), in a way reiterating Kissinger’s famous remark that “there was no focal point for contact with Europe” (Peterson & Sjursen 2001:41), implying that if he wanted to call Europe, whom should he call (:41)?

One possible reason for the inability of the rest of the world to comprehend and see through the EU, as if it were “shrouded in secrecy” (Bomberg & Stubb 2003:7), might be that it is an entirely new phenomenon in world politics, “the first truly post-modern international political form” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999: 1). In that respect, the Union can be considered to be “the most highly evolved example of regional integration in the world” (:25); rather than working together on a set of issues, the Member States of the Union have transferred significant powers to a supranational decision-making system and bodies of common law (ibid.).

The Union came into existence as a means of ensuring that conflicts such as the World War II would never occur again. Thus, the EU was from the very beginning a peace project and it is difficult to contest the notion that it is also a very successful one (Smith 2004:147).

The success of its now 50 year old integration project has bestowed international legitimacy and authority on the Union, and with it increasing weight and influence in world politics (Smith 2004:148); the EU is indeed a major player in international relations. However, successful integration and cooperation around numerous policy areas aside, crisis situations like the civil war in Yugoslavia, Europe’s own backyard, underlined the EC’s (:47) inability to unite around a common foreign policy, thus accentuating the image of Europe as “an economic giant, political dwarf, and a military worm” (McCormick 2005:212). These events prompted the creation of common EC positions on foreign policy, and the urgent need for joint action to prevent violent conflicts. The EC did not possess the necessary institutional apparatus for such endeavours, however, which led to the creation of the CFSP, following the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in 1993 (:24) which entailed institutional reforms with the aim of extending cooperation around new policy objectives, wherein a common foreign policy was an important issue on the agenda (Peterson & Shackleton 2002:219).
3.2 The Significance of the EU’s Institutions

An attempt at explaining the decision-and policymaking in the EU implies confronting the classical question of structure versus agency. As Bomberg and Peterson (1999) note, the question of what determines what lead to two possible answers. On the one hand, given the complexity of the Union, the range and width of possible decision-makers, structure may very well determine the decision-making process. “There are too many structural constraints in the EU for political agency to matter much often”, Bomberg and Peterson write, but they also hold for likely that agency in fact matters more than structure in the intricate and elusive structure that constitutes Union decision-making (Bomberg & Peterson 1999:31).

The institutionalist approach has brought new insights to the study of EU decision-and policymaking: The EU has a substantial degree of “institutional autonomy”, and so cannot be considered simply the Member States’ political instrument. What will be put forward and stressed later on in this paper is the level of institutional dependency that characterizes EU institutions: Powers are shared between the institutions and not so much separated between them; important decisions that straddle the various institutions’ ‘competencies’ require “broad interinstitutional agreement” (:32). As Peterson and Shackleton argue: “If institutions matter in determining politics in any political society, they may matter even more in the European Union...” (Peterson & Shackleton 2005:7). The EU’s institutions are important “vehicles” deployed by the Member State’s governments to implement the bargains struck between each other, and the Union’s institutions manage the “enormous interdependence” that ties together its members (ibid.) “They are not just cars waiting for drivers”, as Peterson and Shackleton put it (ibid.). Furthermore, the EU’s institutions not just act as the linkage between Brussels and the national capitals, they also connect the Union to the world of international relations, not least the wide-ranging network of IOs that now make up a substantial feature in international politics. In that respect the EU’s institutions are “powerful actors” within the international community, whose affairs until not long ago was completely dictated by sovereign states. The Union’s institutions cannot be studied separately and autonomously, bearing in mind the vast interdependence that exists between the various institutional frameworks (:9-11).

What is important to stress is the EU’s capacity for improvisation, i.e. managing the “internally divided institutions” despite the “lack of mechanisms for interinstitutional bargaining” (Bomberg & Peterson 1999:59). While the Union seems constructed to produce stalemate in decision-making procedures, it is continually “being reinvented” – lacking the advantage of any “grand design”, the EU still has developed a “flexible” but nonetheless “effective set of mechanisms” to solve difficult issues (ibid.). In short, it is the author’s view that an attempt to study Union decision-making without taking into account the impact of the institutional setting must be judged as parsimonious, if not feeble.
3.3 The Institutional Basis of EU Foreign Policy

The Union’s institutional basis straddles conventional categories of political organization, being “less than a federation and more than a regime” (Peterson & Shackleton 2002:3) but not thus far a “Gemeinschaft” (ibid.). It is clearly not a state (2), in view of the fact that the EU cannot levy taxes, does not (yet) command a common military, and does not wield sole power on behalf of the Member States, i.e. the ability to negotiate the full range of agreements on the Member’s account (Smith 2005:10-11). Ultimately, membership in the Union is voluntary, and thus the EU lacks the authority to force its Member States into implementing European policy and law (McCormick 2005:106-7). The Union decides after a process of bargaining, but it is a process involving not so much the Member States, as the EU’s institutions: Institutional objectives are far more important than in other forms of government (Peterson & Bomberg 2002:29).

Many scholars, foremost intergovernmentalists and neo-realists, argue that the Union is merely a forum for intergovernmental bargaining, dominated by national interests, and portrayed as a means of national governments that allows them to escape the “domestic pressures” (Bomberg & Peterson 1999:7-8) which limit their manoeuvring space. That is not entirely true, however. The EU has trough the decades evolved into an entity sui generis, in its own right, wherein decision-making at the EU-level is influential and powerful; power is allocated both to supranational levels, while many of its policy areas remain intergovernmental. Being largely poor in resources, still (it spends less than 2 percent of all public funds in the Union), the EU must raise enormous interest throughout a vast area comprising 459 million people (8).

From an outsiders’ point of view, arguably, the EU may very well present an image of internal squabbling, strife and political quarrels, crippling its decision-making. The logic of its structure gives a different picture, however, in that the Union is attractive to “actors interested in policy change” (22), and because the EU is a “consensual system” wherein antagonism is conciliated and/or minimised; the actors at the Union level are dependent on each other, and need it to be functioning in order for action to be taken (22-23). Thus, far from the notions of neo-realists and liberal intergovernmentalists, the scope of European collaboration and the width of European integration cannot be measured and predicted by general theories of statehood and sovereignty; instead, EU Member States view themselves as co-operators, rather than competitors on the Union stage. In the area of foreign policy, for example, they fear more a lack of coherence and consistency than they worry about increasing “Europeanization” (Sweet, Sandholz & Fligsten 2001:27). The constant search for consensus, however, involves new problems, as it is at odds with the need to solve issues swiftly and effectively (Peterson & Bjursen 2001:172).

The institutionalization of a great many policy areas entails challenges and risks alike, naturally, not least illustrated by the enlargement of the EU, the EMU project, and the “democratic deficit” (28), but also in the sensitive areas of defence, foreign policy, and security. EU foreign policy is a complicated matter, due to its complex institutional basis, spanning over the three pillars comprising the Union (Smith 2005:3). The main problem of outlining and implementing EU foreign policy is not so much one of lack of resources or tools (67), but more in the difficulties and impediments entailed in finding the political will to use the instruments coherently (Hill & Smith 2005:159). In the areas of security and defence, the Member States
have been reluctant in surrendering authority to the EU, which traditionally have been the domains of the nation state. Moreover, an effective implementation of the Union’s ambitious endeavours would require much more effective cross-pillar cooperation than is the case today; decision-making in the areas mentioned requires reaching a consensus across two or three pillars. Competition between the different institutions, the ‘turf-battles’, and between member states, further hampers the process. The question of who speaks for the EU is a justified one, and a matter of subject at hand, of authority and resources, i.e. which institution’s ‘competences’ are involved (Hill & Smith 2005:161-162). Yet the Union still manages to speak with one voice in world politics, but institutional adjustments, such as the much debated ‘Constitution for Europe’, are needed to obtain the coherence and efficiency that is keenly wanted (ibid.). As we shall see, a great deal of the problem lies in the institutional structure of the EU, in which, for example, certain policy domains (trade, aid and development policies) fall under the heading of supranational EC organizations such as the Commission and the Court. Other domains, involving “interaction between EC organizations and intergovernmental forums” (Sweet, Sandholz & Fligsten 2001:174-5) - primarily the Council of Ministers and the Commission- concerns matters that overlap other goals, for example economic aims paralleling political ones, i.e. political stability. The ‘high politics’ domain involves security and defence, which are clearly and inherently intergovernmental (:175).

3.4 Pillar I: The European Community

3.4.1 The EC Model of Policy-Making and Action

The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE), created in 1993 and 2004, respectively, were intended to streamline the institutional framework into a single one. The EU’s activities on the international scene are multiple and diverging, however, ranging from trade policy, environment, and humanitarian aid to peacekeeping and civilian crisis management (CM), reflected in a complex institutional context (Hill & Smith et al. 2005:68-9). The creation of the TEU entailed the formation of the European Union, which was both founded upon and supplementary to the European Community (EC). The Union established a number of political objectives, explicit and overarching, not least

To assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:10).

The TEU generated a new structure that comprised of three pillars, out of which the first, Pillar I, is the most substantial. Pillar I comprises the EC, wherein all the major policy areas are located, including trade, environmental policy and the main areas of ‘cooperation’ and ‘association’ with third parties (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:10). The EC Pillar decision-making is largely supranational, meaning that its decisions and influence exceed beyond national boundaries or governments (Smith
2004:26) and its policies are formulated according to the Community method, whereby the Commission has sole right of initiative, albeit the Council of Ministers ultimately decides on the fate of proposed measures. The Council of Ministers is the principal law-making institution formally in charge of decision-making in the three pillars the Union comprises (Peterson & Shackleton 2002:53). The EC pillar is the most substantial of the three pillars, and importantly, enjoys legal personality, meaning that it can enter into agreements with third parties. In Pillar I, the Commission’s has significant influence over policy areas, and can be said to have a “policy entrepreneur role” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:10-11). The first pillar is by many scholars said to be ‘overloaded’ with work as it includes the main bulk of EU responsibilities. The EC operates according to the ‘Community method’, which assigns a major role to the institutions of the Union, as opposed to the ‘intergovernmental method’, which depends on regular interaction between the Member States and Brussels; and the ‘coordination method’ which places member governments in charge, though “operating in a consortium” (Bomberg & Stubbs 2003:5;154). The EC method of producing policy entails an interdependent process of coordination involving the Commission, the Council, the EP, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). All of these institutions have important roles to play in shaping, initiating, and implementing policies; none of them stand alone or exists in a vacuum, and there are a multitude of links to national capitals and other IOs (:138; 154). As the EU has emerged on the world stage as a global actor and its influence expanded, its foreign policy has become gradually shaped by European foreign policy-makers whom seek to wield Brussels as a means of advancing their own aims – economic or political, national or international - that may exercise a negative influence on the EU’s ability to act as one, with a single voice (:139).

Nevertheless, where powers are allocated to the EU, the decision-making process is quiet straightforward: the Commission initiates a proposal; the Council takes the final decision after thorough consultation with the other Union institutions; the EP’s powers vary according to the policy area in question (ibid.), but it has the power to veto legislations which gives it significant influence (Carlsnaes; Sjursen & White 2004:200); and finally, the ECJ takes action to “reinforce the power and prerogatives of the EU institutions” (Bomberg & Stubbs 2003:139).

3.5 Pillar II: The Common Foreign and Security Policy

3.5.1 Coordinating Foreign Policy and Taking Action

The second pillar of the European Union is the result of the attempts of the Member States to form common positions in order to conduct joint actions in the areas of foreign and security affairs, the CFSP. Pillar II is characterized by its largely intergovernmental decision-making procedure, in which, for example, the EP’s influence is marginal (:5). Since no single EU institution can be viewed as independent and free to act independently (Peterson & Shackleton 2002:350), however, so too is the CFSP subject to the meddling of the Commission (which enjoys ‘full association’ to the CFSP), and the Council which has responsibility for CFSP affairs. The CFSP procedures involve all the Member State’s foreign ministers, who play a crucial role due to the Member States’ right to influence each
phase of the policy-making process, this in order to ensure the conformity of national policies with the common positions. The CFSP, being at the same time intergovernmental and communitarian in its nature, is inherently a somewhat weak institution, largely because of the Member States’ desire to retain influence over crucial foreign and security issues; the notion of foreign policy as a national privilege and prerogative remains to this day an ingrained norm in Europe (ibid.).

3.5.2 The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

The EU has made crisis management and peacebuilding a distinct feature of its common foreign policy, with the aim of projecting the very values and norms on which the Union was founded upon, on IR. That implies promoting these values in international action, wherever needed (Gnesotto et al. 2004: 2). Peterson and Bomberg take a rather negative stand in this issue, asserting that in the foreign policy area EU “common decisions do not…produce effective action or policy” (Bomberg & Peterson 1999:249). They describe the problem with Union foreign policy as one of “lack of policy instruments” needed “to support or enforce policy decisions” (ibid).

Bretherton and Vogler argue that the scope of EU policies is indeed wide encompassing, covering nearly all of the important “issue areas of contemporary global politics, except for strictly military and strategic relations” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:249) [emphasis added]. Being a necessary, if not vital, part of peace-enforcement and peacebuilding, an ostensibly weak military capability is indeed a major drawback. Moreover, many scholars call for better coordination between the Pillars I and II, because the EU’s major muscle resides within the first pillar. The Union’s influence in world affairs is to a large extent predicated upon the strength of the Single Market, and the magnet effect of attraction which it creates and acts as to outside actors and countries (Hill & Smith 2005:254); streamlining the institutional foundations of the EU is thus critical for the success of the CFSP.

According to Hill (2001) the Union has “limited intervention and crisis management capabilities in the short term” (Hill. European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 6, 2001:330), but has a considerable advantage when it comes to medium term and, “particularly”, long-term peacebuilding (ibid. emphasis added). However, the successful operation in the DRC (Artemis) in 2003 provided hopes for a better capacity in short-term activities. It is important to stress the EU’s awareness of its shortcomings, its ability to learn from past mistakes, and to take steps to enhance its capacity through institutional measures (Hill & Smith 2005:172).

The EU’s concern with the long-term aspects of conflict resolution and peacebuilding are put into question as well. Some scholars argue that it is a liberal planning approach that is ill suited for the realities of civil war and humanitarian crises; The Union’s combination of aid, sanctions, and diplomatic links (along with a multitude of other measures), they argue, cannot be expected to prevent conflicts from breaking out again (Hill. European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 6, 2001:332).

That critique seems unjustified, though, as it would entail criticising the concept of conflict prevention and peacebuilding as a whole; doing something must be worth more than doing nothing. Arguably, the case in point is military intervention being, alas, a prerequisite for a successful ending of a conflict. This capability is
thus a precondition for the possibility to curtail violence and, if possible, to build peace. Another prerequisite, Missiroli (2001) points out, is *coherence*, that is, to bring together all means and resources of the EU in order to enhance the efficiency of action. Explicitly, that implies improved coordination between the CFSP, the EC pillar, and the Member States’ activities. It might be the only direction to proceed in, given the absence of a specific and binding Treaty provision (Missiroli. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, no. 6, 2001: 196).

3.5.3 Critique against the CFSP

For a European foreign policy to materialize, three different decision-making modes are generally employed (common strategy, common positions, and joint actions), involving three key Union institutions, and the foreign ministries of 27 Member States; thus making it difficult to reach consensus on a variety of issues, and hence, to actually make policy. Naturally, the EU comes off as a slow-moving decision-maker. Jacques Delors, the former President of the European Commission, illustrated the point by characterizing the CFSP as “a Maserati with the engine of a lawn mower” (Peterson & Shackleton 2002: 217-18; 226-227).

For all the evident limitations (if not weaknesses) of the CFSP, it remains clear to the Member States that they have much to gain by acting as a group, rather than individually. At the same time, conversely, they fear that coordinating foreign policy and further integrating the cooperation in the area will impede upon the Member States’ freedom to act nationally; in a way, EU leaders are being “pulled in two directions” (McCormick et al. 2005:209). This has caused tensions that have served to undermine the attempts at building a common foreign policy. The institutional problems of the CFSP, many scholars suggest, is in part rooted in the flaws of the Union’s policy-making machinery, which the Treaty of Amsterdam was set up to cope with (:209;213).

The critique against the CFSP primarily concerns the so-called *capabilities-expectations gap*, i.e. the notion that the EU, though steadily increasing in influence and impact economically and politically in the world, still cannot live up to the expectations countries and organizations around the world have bestowed upon it. There are continuous calls for Union action in a number of diverse places: the Sudan, the Congolese-Rwandan border, Ukraine, East-Timor etc. Hill and Smith (2005) argue that the root of the problem lies in the significant difference between cooperating on so-called *low politics* issues (economic integration, trade etc) and the domains of *high politics*, which involves security and defence. Decision-making in this area is largely consensus-based and the role of the Commission is fairly limited, albeit it enjoys ‘right of association’. A consensual decision-making mode acts as an impediment to an effective policy-making process and may cripple it entirely, since even the smallest EU-member may block a decision. Hill and Smith affirm, however, that the Union still is an “unqualified success in the history of international cooperation” and that “every assessment of the EU’s performance should acknowledge that fact” (Hill & Smith 2005:171; 194; 403).

The CFSP has at least done a credible job in taking decisions on foreign policy issues, illustrated by the fact that not many national foreign policy decisions and actions are taken without consulting the CFSP, or at least referring to it(:403).
3.6 Conclusion

The European process of integration was born out of the desire to rebuild the continent after the Second World War. It has not been a linear process, rather one marked by compromises and a constant search for consensus. The EU has emerged “as a treaty-based organization founded on the rule of law” (Hill & Smith 2005:98).

Following the successful completion of the internal market, the Union increasingly turned its attention to global issues, and the sheer economic power of the bloc has paved the way for a much more ambitious agenda, that of creating a common foreign policy. The Union’s interests in the world have been defined and are commensurate with its traditions, norms, values, and mission (:95).

The EU presents an ambiguous face to the outside world and many believes the CFSP is “the sole expression of the Union’s external persona” (:94). The aspects of the EU’s external relations are present within all the three pillars, and in that respect the CFSP can be said to be of relatively minor significance: The EC pillar has far more substance and commands more influence. Nevertheless, whatever actual status the CFSP has, its founding illustrates the general belief among European leaders that they need to stick together if they want to attain power and to exert international influence (:94-95). However, a key point is the concept of coherence and consistency, which is crucial for the EU to be able to project its power onto global affairs, not least in order to solve conflicts. In some scholars’ views, the institutional problems are largely a symptom of more fundamental issues: “Uncertainty about the need for a common security and foreign policy, a lack of political will, divergent interests”, and “disagreement over policy” (Sweet, Sandholz & Fligsten 2001:192). What is encouraging, however, is the widely acknowledged view that turning back is not an option, despite the difficulties involved in creating coherent common policies.

Many scholars stress the Union’s lack of military power (Missiroli. European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 6, 2001:331), but judging from its size in manpower (1.9 million soldiers) and military spending (surpassing both China, Japan and Russia combined) the Union still constitutes an important military force in international relations. Compared to the US, the EU is a pygmy, yes, but on the other hand, it has different objectives and other means to achieve its aims. The Union and its Member States send ten times as many peacekeeping soldiers to missions in Africa, Central Asia, and even Central America, than does the United States. Furthermore, EU diplomats strive to reconcile apparently unattainable conflicts in the Middle East or on the Korean peninsula using diplomacy and ‘soft power’ rather than military means (Reid 2004:183; 244; Gnesotto ed. 2004:252).

The Union may not be able to solve or prevent a conflict everywhere, as that undertaking would most probably outstretch its scarce manpower resources - it is the ability to prioritize and discriminate between different issues that matter. In that respect, it is essential that the EU does not allow itself to be carried away by its own rhetoric, but instead focuses on what it can actually achieve (Hill. European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 6, 2001:333). The institutional flaws need to be corrected, as the TECE was intended to do, but in the absence of any binding treaty, the coherence and consistency in the cooperation between the different institutions require streamlining and enhancement. Furthermore, in the field, the Union needs “to ensure synergy between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management” (:193; 196).
4. The EU on the Ground: On Mission in the DRC

4.1 Introduction: The Plight of an African Nation

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has a legacy of violence, suffering, exploitation, and external abuse. The bloody conflicts which have plagued the country since the end of the 19th century have yet to be solved, and it has been dubbed “the messiest and bloodiest conflict in the world” (Bet-El, *European Voice*: 2006-07-27). In a decade of warfare, up to 3.8 million people have died and nearly four million people displaced. Yet the conflict is hitherto a neglected and underreported issue in world politics (Beatty, *European Voice*: 2005-01-27).

In 1885, the area that now comprises the DRC was proclaimed a personal colony of the Belgian King Leopold II, the only colony in history to be claimed by one man alone. The King exploited the colony in a ruthless and cruel manner, forcing Congolese men and women into slavery in the pursuit of the Congo’s riches. It has been established that over ten million people lost their lives because of the King’s brutal management of his private possession; Leopold II has been described as “a man filled with greed and cunning, duplicity and charm…” (Van Woudenberg, 2006). Due to a few courageous reporters and witnesses to the atrocities, who retold the stories to the world, the King eventually was forced to cede his authority over the colony to the Belgian state. The Belgians in turn ruled Congo for a mere half a century, but relinquished the colony in 1960, whereby the Congolese people gained its independence and the DRC was born.

Democratic elections were subsequently held for the first time, which brought Patrice Lumumba to power. A fierce anti-colonialist and a supporter of African nationalism, Lumumba was revered among the Congolese, but his connections with the Soviet Union were ultimately to seal his faith: Belgian agents, with the complicity of the US government, murdered him brutally that same year (ibid.). Thus ended the democratic experiment in the DRC, and paved the way for a former sergeant in the colonial army, Mobutu, to seize power in a coup d’état, supported by the US, France and Belgium; these powers were to intervene whenever Mobutu’s position was in danger. Mobutu’s subsequent crackdown on democracy created a dictatorship in which he was supreme ruler, backed up by the army. Largely due to the world’s guilty conscience following the genocide in Rwanda, Western powers abandoned Mobutu in 1996 - as a result, he was defenceless, and assailed by enemies was forced to flee the country (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004:7-8). Laurent Kabila, an insignificant rebel leader, seized power with the help from Rwanda and Uganda. Kabila was not to renew the democratic experiment, however, but instead entrenched and strengthened the corrupt legacy of Mobutu and Leopold II before him. Wishing to rid himself of his Rwandan supporters, Kabila initiated a campaign of ethnic hatred directed against groups linked to Rwanda. The invaders, in turn, did not want to lose their foothold in the mineral-wealthy country, and fell upon Kabila’s army in 1998; the ‘first Congo war’ drew in additional African countries on different sides, eager to collect the spoils (Van Woudenberg, *Human Rights Watch*: 2006).

The ‘UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo’, which conducted research in the area, concluded that the DRC had been exploited and pillaged of
natural resources by all the parties involved in the fighting. The conflict attracted criminal networks, mercenaries, and multinational companies from all over the world; 35 of the MNCs were European and eight were American (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004:16-17). A Congolese parliamentary report issued that same year stated that the European and US companies had “breached international business norms in their operations in Congo” (Van Woudenberg, Human Rights Watch: 2006); what the parliament had established was uncomfortable for the UN Security Council, whose members were “reluctant to punish or even seriously investigate corporations based in their own countries” (ibid.). The international community has since acknowledged that exploitation of natural resources has been a major factor in the DRC conflict, but has done little or nothing about it (ibid.).

In 2001, Kabila was assassinated by his own bodyguard, and his son, Joseph, succeeded him. The violent end to yet another of Congo’s leaders provided opportunities, however, and a transitional government was established consisting of leaders from the four main rebel groups (ibid.). When the war ended, at least officially, the parties signed the Lusaka Agreement, by many viewed as flawed and insufficient: Allegedly, the agreement fails to acknowledge the actors’ responsibilities for the war and Congolese rebel groups are defined as interlocuteurs valuables (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004:18).

The ‘peace’ that resulted from the accord has nonetheless been found wanted: Since 1998, 3.9 million people have died from war-related causes, described as “a lethal combination of disease and hunger caused by ongoing conflict and displacement” (Reuters AlertNet: 2007-03-26). The UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, underscored the point: “There are few places on earth were the gap between humanitarian needs and available resources is as large – or as lethal – as in Congo” (ibid.). Despite the elections held last year, by many hailed as a success, the current situation in the DRC is not enviable. In a report issued to the UN Security Council, Global Witness (2004) concludes that the country is “fragmented” and “extremely fragile”, a result of “one of the most devastating conflicts the world has ever seen” (Global Witness: 2004). Congo's frail government is now faced with the unpleasant task of stitching the nation back together, as if it ever has existed at all (International Herald Tribune, March 27, 2007).

4.2 EU Operations and Activities in the DRC

Given the harsh conditions and circumstances that distinguish the DRC, it is no surprise that the UN has its biggest force posted there, the MONUC. The contingent comprises around 17000 men, and with a budget of one billion dollars, it is the UN’s largest and most expensive mission to date. MONUC’s mandate centers around four phases: The first phase entailed ‘peace enforcement’, i.e. “forcibly implementing the cease-fire agreement” (The MONUC Website: 2007); phase two involved monitoring the ceasefire; phase three, which still cannot be considered completed, is centered on the so called ‘DDRRR’ (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration); phase four involved facilitating the transition towards “credible elections” (ibid.). The MONUC force has a mandate to
“use all means necessary…to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence…and to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions” (ibid.)

The EU military forces deployed in the DRC operate under UN auspices, and, thus, under the same mandate, chapter VII in the UN Charter (The Council of the European Union, Press Document: 2007-04-26) under the Security Council Resolutions 1484 and 1671 (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007-04-26; The Council of the European Union, Press Document: 2007-04-26). The EU has engaged troops in two different operations, Artemis (launched 12 June 2003) and EUFOR RD Congo (launched 25 April 2006), following the adoption of Common Positions and Joint Actions by the Council. In addition, the EU has sent civilian missions to the DRC: A police mission, EUPOL-KINSHASA (launched 12 April 2005); and the EUSEC DRC, a mission to “provide advice and assistance for security sector reform” in the DRC (ibid.).

Why, then, did the EU intervene in the DRC, considering the small scope of the mission, the risks and dangers involved, and the large costs of the operation? The EU has explicitly stated that it has an interest in the security in its near geographic vicinity, as was the case when the Union took responsibility of the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). However, in the DRC the notion of intervention due to geographical vicinity can be ruled out, and the incentives for EU action questionable. Some possible reasons for the Union to meddle in the chaotic affairs of the DRC could arguably be the concept of human security, i.e. the idea that a safe and secure Africa is crucial for the safety of the EU itself. The weak and frail states of Sub-Saharan Africa can be, and perhaps are, ‘safe havens’ for organized crime, illegal trafficking of natural resources and arms, as well as breeding grounds for terrorism. One can also argue that the involvement in the DRC is part of the Union’s support and endorsement of regional organizations and initiatives, not least the African Union (AU) (Remacle 2006:2-3).

4.2.2 Operation Artemis

The operation named Artemis was launched by the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) under the auspices of the UN in 2003, following a request from the UN. It was, according to Kaldor (2004), “a new type of operation, quite different from classic military interventions in Africa, whether by United Nations peacekeepers or by postcolonial powers…” (Kaldor, International Herald Tribune: 2004-09-30). The immediate background to the military effort was unrest in the Ituri region in the northeast of the DRC, a scene of ethnic fighting and instability since May that same year. Given the intense fighting, fear spread that the unrest would wreck the ceasefire and destabilize the entire region; Ituri had previously seen some of the worst fighting in the whole of the DRC, resulting in 50 000 dead and 500 000 displaced persons (Gnesotto et al., 2004:119).

The sheer size of the country together with “the width of [the DRC’s] internal problems” (Remacle 2005:2) meant that an operation would entail considerable uncertainties and risk-taking (ibid.). As such, the operation provided an opportunity for the Union to test its military capabilities outside Europe (and without NATO support) for the first time. The force consisted of 2000 soldiers under French command and of which the main bulk, 1700 troops, were French. Sweden was the
second largest contributor with 70 soldiers, but apart from the provisions of three non-European countries (Brazil, Canada and South Africa), the other EU countries’ involvement varied from small contingents of troops (Germany and Greece); airlifts and logistic assistance (the UK); to medical aid (Belgium). The objectives of the Artemis force were to “stabilize security conditions and improve the humanitarian conditions in [the Ituri capital of] Bunia”, to “protect refugee camps…and ensure the safety of civilians, UN staff and humanitarian workers” (Gnesotto et al. 2004:120).

A Wide Range of Challenges

Overall, from a military point of view, Artemis was a small-scale operation, intended to secure specific targets and safeguard civilians until the UN had mustered a larger force. The operation officially ended in September 2003, when the EU transferred responsibility back to the MONUC force, which had achieved a “wider mandate… robust rules of engagement and a larger force” (ibid.). Nonetheless, Artemis involved a myriad of logistical, operational, planning, and financial problems, not least the challenge of transporting 2000 troops some 6500 km from Brussels. In the area of communications, the problem was alleviated by the fact that the main part of the contingent was French, and hence did not have to rely on ‘foreign’ material standards. Lindstrom (in Gnesotto et al., 2004), however, stresses the lack of safe communications capabilities in EU operations, and underlines the importance of adequate communicational capacities: Even though Artemis steered clear of serious errors, what would happen if 15 or 20 more EU countries were involved? In addition, the environment in question can without doubt be described as “non-permissive”, which places a heavy burden on the ability to sustain the force; as Lindstrom argues, this was a principal reason why Artemis’ duration was short and its scope limited. Sustainability encompasses a wide range of dimensions, from water supply to “adequate force protection capabilities” (:123-24). The most critical phase prior to an operation is the planning phase, which comprise not only the HQ, but which also have a number of dimensions critical for the success of the operation. In order to conduct a satisfactory mission a few requirements have to be met, not least the preparatory work in areas such as mission objectives, financial planning, ‘procurement’ (i.e. the allocation of resources), cooperation with third countries, and ‘contingency planning’ (i.e. an ‘emergency plan’). When it comes to these areas, a number of weaknesses are discernible on part of the EU operations. Lindstrom points out some deficiencies and insufficiencies, not least regarding Artemis: At first, delays, procurement difficulties – that is, the lack of equipment and infrastructure -, and planning gaps hampered to a not insignificant degree the efficiency of the operation. Furthermore, “limited personnel resources, lack of specialised expertise” and the shortness of “sufficient backup and support” added further thresholds (:127). To recapitulate, one must yet again emphasise that, being a largely ‘French mission’, the worst obstructions and impediments could be avoided. However, when faced with a larger mission, and with more EU Member States involved, the outcome could be another. Moreover, as Remacle reflects, in Artemis the “national efforts” competed with “those of the EU”: Fearing the loss of national sovereignty, the Member States were in fact obstacles to an efficiently conducted operation. In addition, the not irrelevant material difficulties - that is, the problem of working with the different military material from the Member States effectively - should be stressed (Remacle 2006:14).
4.2.3 EUFOR RD Congo

The year 2006 saw the first democratic elections in the DRC in 40 years, in the midst of instability and continued fighting between various militant contingents. It can be safe to say that the conditions were not amicable for elections (Beatty, European Voice: 2006-07-27), in spite of the fact that MONUC had managed to reinforce “considerably in both quantitative and qualitative” terms (Remacle 2006:10). EUFOR-RD Congo was intended, like Artemis, to support MONUC trough the perilous journey from Election Day to that the results had been accepted and stability reinstated. Contrasting with Artemis, the EU Member States were initially reluctant to contribute troops to EUFOR after the Council had decided on a joint action. Germany, though apparently unwilling, decided to lead the 2000 strong force with French support and “a rag-bag of troops from…20 European nations” (Bet-El, European Voice: 2006-01-25). Purportedly, the contributing countries “placed many caveats” on the EUFOR operation: Consequently, the main bulk of the force was posted in the neighbour country of Gabon, and the remainder stationed in the capital “effectively barred from moving outside Kinshasa” (ibid.). This proved “a major drawback” when considering the DRC is three times the size of France, with remnants of militias and rebels scattered all over the country (ibid.).

For the Union, a lot depended on the operation, as it was viewed as a “key test” of its defence and security policy and as crucial for its future involvements around the globe. The significance of the mission was apparent, since the EU for the first time had employed all of its humanitarian, military and political instruments outside Europe. Moreover, since the Union had financed almost 80% of the election costs, trained (and is training) Congolese judges and police, as well as the military contributions to the peacekeeping force, it was indeed a matter of prestige (Beatty, European Voice: 2006-07-27).

EUFOR had its flaws and it cannot be said to be a perfectly conducted operation, but the UN was supposedly satisfied with the EU contribution, as it contributed to heightened international awareness of the crisis in the DRC. According to Bet-El (in European Voice: 2006-01-25), “EUFOR was not an impressive exercise”, however, “and the EU has a lot to learn from it” (ibid.). Especially blatant was the Member States’ unwillingness to partake and the “many caveats”, which illustrate “an example of sloppy politics and unprofessional implementation” (ibid.). “But perhaps”, Bet-El adds, “it is fitting for an organization unwilling to take up its role on the world stage” (ibid.). It is conceivably fitting as well, that the Polish Defence Minister Radoslaw Sikorski saw the job as done: “We are completing the mission after successfully executing it.” (Beatty, European Voice: 2006-11-16).

Haine and Giegerich (in International Herald Tribune: 2006-06-12) argued that EUFOR was in fact a “cosmetic” operation, “more about European form than African substance, comforting rhetoric rather than relevant action” (Haines & Giegerich, International Herald Tribune: 2006-06-12). The mission’s guiding principle, accordingly, was more about “French-German cohesion” and the Union’s wish to boost the ESDP’s credibility after the failure of the rejected TECE; the realities on the ground in the DRC was “only a secondary factor” (ibid.). Furthermore, the mission did not demonstrate the EU’s “willingness to become a relevant peacekeeper”, but instead underlined the Union’s “current incapacity to be a strategic actor”; especially the long time it took to get the mission off the ground is compelling evidence of existing inadequacies (ibid.).
4.2.4 EU CCM: EUPOL-Kinshasa and EUSEC-RDCongo

The ‘civilian’ dimension of the EU’s operations is a result of the Union’s desire to “project stability and lasting peace not only within but also beyond its borders” (Nowak 2006:9). The EU’s presence has been felt not only in the Balkans, carrying out peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and FYROM, but also in the DRC, commencing in 2003. For quiet obvious reasons, the Union can be said to possess unique experience of a wide array of policies and programmes “oriented at stability projection” as well as the “expertise” needed (ibid.). Nonetheless, it is clear that peacebuilding abroad constitute an immensely challenging task for the Union, which has to do with the changing nature of conflict (see the chapter on “Peacebuilding”) after the Cold War, not least experienced in the Balkans during the 1990s. As have been mentioned earlier in this paper, it was the development in former Yugoslavia that paved the way for a European ‘crisis response capacity’, as well as the “political commitment to prevent violent conflicts” (ibid.).

This arduous undertaking represents a massive challenge to the Union, as the ‘projection of lasting peace and stability’ requires not only that the EU deploys a wide range of instruments and tools in a coherent and concerted way, but also that the instruments and tools amount to an “appropriate mix” and are deployed aptly to be able to “address pre-crisis, active crisis and post-crisis situations” (ibid.). The Union has, in line with the ‘post-modern’ peacebuilding literature, acknowledged that the notion of ‘safety’ entails more than military force and the capacity to check violence. In the words of Remacle, the EU “seek to ameliorate coordination and coherence” (Remacle 2006:2-4) when using the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ instruments it has at its disposal. The range of the instruments the Union can employ “allows it to play a very important role” in the entire cycle of violent conflict or crisis: Prior to a crisis, i.e. conflict prevention and mediation; in the midst of a crisis, using military force and humanitarian intervention; and in the wake of a crisis, making use of its “long experience” in “carrying out development projects” and building peace (:2-4).

According to the EU, ‘civilian crisis management’ (CCM) is defined as “the intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis…with the intention of preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution” (Nowak 2006:16). Furthermore, peacebuilding is defined as “another means of preventing subsequent crises…” (ibid.); according to Nowak (2006), CCM “has no equivalent parallel in the lexicons of UN, OSCE or non-European regional organizations” (:17). In the broadest sense, CCM denotes all instruments and policies that are not military in nature, or all the non-military actions of the EU CCM assigned to handle crises.

CCM has four prioritized areas: Police, rule of law, civilian administration (CA), and civil protection (CP) (:19). The police section is supposed to be capable of “performing executive tasks…to re-establish law and order in non-stabilised situations” in a “robust [and] flexible” way (:20). Rule of law implies the deployment of specialised personnel such as lawyers, police officers, and prison staff to ensure the implementation of “fundamental principles of law”; the EU makes a distinction between ‘emergency intervention’ and ‘longer-term actions’ (:21). The rule of law section targets malfunctioning legal systems and state structures in the recipient country, in order to restore public order and security. The CA section covers actions and tasks ranging from ‘registration of property’, ‘elections and taxation’, ‘social and medical service’, and infrastructure functions.
The purpose of CA is to provide a basic form of transitional administration, with the intention of transferring these functions back to local actors as soon as possible. Another function in the EU CCM is CP, a rather vague concept that aims at providing “assistance during and after a crisis”, to cover “the immediate survival and protection needs of the affected populations”, and to channel EC/EU humanitarian aid to concerned countries (23). CP is an EC instrument that has at its disposal the financial assets of the first pillar.

The Union has called for an even more ambitious agenda in terms of CCM activities and for the EU to “draw on the full range of its potential resources”, which include EC, CFSP/ESDP, and Member States capabilities (29). It can be argued, however, that a broader agenda could further widen the gap between capabilities and expectations, as we have seen that the institutional framework is somewhat flawed in many aspects (Hill & Smith 2005:171).

**EUPOL-Kinshasa**
This police mission was a response to the ‘invitation’ from the Government of the DRC, was the first civilian mission of CM in Africa, and conducted within the framework of the ESDP. Launched in 2005 after some delay, the operations’ mission staff comprised of 29 experts from six EU Member States, Canada and Turkey. EUPOL’s initial task consisted in providing support and technical assistance to the DRC’s newly founded Integrated Police Unit (IPU) in order for the unit to function effectively and in accordance with international police standards, practices, and human rights. The IPU was intentionally conceived to be an ethnically mixed unit, responsible for the protection and supervision of the transition to democracy. In that respect, the European Commission has provided the unit with adequate training and equipments. Through theoretical and practical exercises the aim was (and is) to strengthen the police force in a number of aspects, and to prepare the forces for the then forthcoming election. The UN has recognized that “[m]aintenance of order” is “a key element for the success of the electoral process” (The Council of the European Union, Press Document: 2006-10).

EUPOL was, Remacle argues, an operation of “reasonable size” which had set “realistic objectives” (Remacle, 2006:7). The objective was not to come to terms with all internal problems and malfunctions, nor to act as a substitute to the Congolese police force – but to secure the political transition and “to establish and legalize the European presence”, even beyond the timeframe of the elections (ibid.). Remacle raise the question of whether EUPOL has reinforced the coherence and efficiency of the EU actions, and if the Union has contributed to building a “different social order” in the DRC. Regarding the first question, the answer is “surely positive”; as regards the second one, the EU can be said to have “mitigated” the situation in some sense. Albeit expressing himself somewhat vaguely on the matter, Remacle asserts that “the Union has undeniably reinforced the coherence of its actions in the DRC and the legality of its presence in the eyes of the local actors” (ibid.). Furthermore, the EU’s “important role in the formation and supervision of the UPI” has been largely beneficial to the MONUC in its mission (8). It should be added and emphasised, however, that it is complicated to assess the impact of an ongoing mission, and that the result of the operation is difficult to measure. Remacle nonetheless stresses that the EU engagement offers instruments for a “behaviour-change” in the Congolese populations’ minds (ibid.).
EUSEC-RDCongo

The Union’s next CM operation had the aim of “capacity building”, i.e. to provide assistance and advice to local leaders, in order to reform the security sector. The primary goal was to contribute to the build-up of an integrated Congolese army (The Council of the European Union, Press Document: 2006-10), and thus had a rather strenuous task lying ahead considering that more than 330 000 militia soldiers were dispersed in the vast country at the time. In 2004, Western donors gave more than $200 million to Congo in order for the soldiers to disarm with the relatively modest sum of $25 a month and job training – but the money ran out last summer after having helped only a handful of the militiamen. Corruption and neglect has persisted despite the relative ‘success’ of last year’s elections, and the task of creating a credible force out of rivalling ethnic groups seem insurmountable (International Herald Tribune: 2007-03-28).

EUSEC purportedly represents the EU’s “ongoing commitment” concerning the “DRC transition process”: The mission is to end in June this year and thus is part of an assumed ‘medium-term’ involvement. Eight experts together with the Member States and the Union institutions were and are to provide advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities that are responsible for security, while at the same time making sure that the promoted policies are attuned to “human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency”, and “observance of the rule of law” (EU Council Secretariat, Press Release: 2005-05-23). The EU has repeatedly stated that its engagement in the DRC’s political transition process is ongoing and continuous, and that it is to support the process on an economic, political, and security level (ibid.).

Entailed in the task of creating a new, fully integrated Congolese army is the challenge of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), which constitutes prerequisites and are essential for the control of violence. The problem of ensuring the safe return to civil life for hundreds of thousands of fighters is one of financing, however, as well as to maintain attention to the issue at hand. Institutions as the World Bank, the UN Development Programme, and the European Commission are attentive and focused on the challenges of DDR, but often that attention diminishes when former fighters of various militia and rebel groups are to be integrated into new security organs (Terrie, European Voice: 2005-01-27).

Congo’s security problems are of an enormous width, however, and the challenges require enhanced coordination of efforts and coherence in the execution of these. So far, the European initiatives in the country have been mainly bilateral, as for example the agreement between Belgium and South Africa to join efforts to train the new army – this right alongside the present EUSEC initiative - or the French and UN operations to train the Congolese police. “[The European] contributions to peace and security…in Africa are significant”, Terrie an analyst at the International Crisis Group (in European Voice: 2005-01-27) argues, but “the EU still has a long way to go before its ability to respond to Africa’s crises matches Europe’s size and potential” (ibid.). When national efforts compete with those of the Union, the coordination and coherence when conducting joint operations are at risk, as well as the EU’s legitimacy and prestige in the region (Remacle 2006:14).

As sincere and benevolent the Union’s efforts have been to rebuild a national DRC army, the task amounts to a huge challenge. “Our national army is a joke”, Tegera, the manager of an aid organization in Goma, said. "It's a serious problem….We’re building on sand.” (Gettleman, NY Times: 2007-03-28).
4.3 Conclusion

The impact that the EU’s operations and peacebuilding measures in the DRC has generated is difficult to assess, given that many operations are short-, medium-, or long-term processes in a continuous commitment. Artemis has received much praise as supposedly “provided much needed breathing space for the [UN]” and because it by all accounts “saved many lives in the country” (Terrie, European Voice: 2005-01-27). The second military mission to the DRC, EUFOR, did not fare that well according to analysts and researchers. EUFOR has been criticized for delays, lack of coordination, political will and national caveats. According to Haine and Giegerich, it was in fact “a cosmetic operation” which “demonstrates how far away the EU is from effectively fulfilling its international responsibilities” (Haines & Giegerich, International Herald Tribune: 2006-06-12).

Given the small size and timeframe of the above military missions, it could be argued that the DRC has actually constituted a “laboratory” for the ESDP as well as the CFSP in its ambition to ‘test’ the EU’s capacity for short-term peace enforcing operations in a region which has all the typical, cumbersome challenges of a post-modern conflict (Remacle, 2006:13).

The Union has, through its CM and CCM activities EUPOL and EUSEC, stepped up its engagement in CP and post-conflict support in the DRC, but according to some analysts, the question of enhanced coherence and “effective action” remains (Terrie, European Voice: 2005-01-27). While these activities hitherto have been implemented in a satisfying manner, they are long-term activities that involve a great many risks. It needs to be emphasised that the enormous scale of security challenges in the DRC call for enhanced coordination of efforts (ibid.). The EU’s focus on public-order institutions - i.e. the particular attention given to the IPU and the judiciary – is a necessary step in the right direction as it, if the institutions are considered legitimate, can “mitigate conflicts and grievances” (Berdal 1996:75). As mentioned earlier in this paper, a lot depends on the world community’s political will as to finance the creation of a unified national army, a credible, legitimate police force, and to finance the reintegration of former soldiers into civilian life. The question is if the UN and the EU are motivated to stay the course out, a precondition for a successful peacebuilding operation.

This chapter has revealed some obstacles to a coordinated and coherent EU peacebuilding effort, for example the reluctance on part of some Member States’ to partake in EU military and CCM operations and some Member’s propensity to conduct missions and operations bilaterally. The EU need to make every effort to coordinate its activities more effectively, and in so doing synchronise the concerned institutions’ different objectives and goals.

The Community’s development programs are extensive, but nonetheless inconclusive as it “encourages [the DRC] to integrate into the world market” without taking heed to the effects these policies have on the local economies (Schmidt, European Voice: 2005-01-27). The EC aid is channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF), but little of it is spent on basic facilities (ibid.). The notion of peacebuilding entails supportive action and assistance to help the recipient country help itself and to build credible and durable institutions that can create a sustainable development. In that sense, it can be devastating for a country emerging from a civil war to apply macroeconomic reforms to an economy crippled and distorted from years of warfare (Jeong 2005:153).
5. Final Comments

The aim of this paper has been to relate the scholarly opinions and views on peacebuilding to the EU’s ambition and efforts to contribute to crisis management and building peace around the world. The paper has discussed and sought to conceptualize peacebuilding theory in order to bring a measure of clarity to the ongoing debate, and to shed some light on the actual purpose of peacebuilding.

To recapitulate, the above reading has shown that a degree of consensus exists on the dimensions and essence of peacebuilding. The difficulties to point out any ‘mandatory’ features and tools deemed as essential for creating peace notwithstanding, scholars seem to agree that peacebuilding is a long-term engagement and should not be confined to a certain phase of the conflict. Focusing on and addressing root causes is imperative if the conflict is to have any chance of being solved, and the peacebuilders – politicians, NGOs, IOs, peacekeepers etc – have to be attentive to the long-term economic and socio-political development. These have to acknowledge that fostering peaceful relationships and reconciliation is an ongoing commitment; alas, the world have seen to many examples where the third party has run dry of political will and devotion, not least the crucial funding of and assistance to peacebuilding in crisis-and conflict zones. Political will remains the supreme prerequisite when it comes to aiding countries ablaze through war and suffering.

To aid efficiently and contribute to the creation of durable peace and stability in a country, there is a need for concerted efforts, a coherent peace plan, and an effective implementation of the plan. Peacebuilding must be about addressing the structural issues and the long-term relationships between the conflicting parties, through a varying range of tools in the peacebuilders’ repository.

There are, however, some issues left somewhat neglected in the literature regarding the ‘means to the end’. Most scholars do not emphasise enough the need for a political will, that is, the actual determination and motivation of the politicians in third countries, not least the EU. Scholars must highlight the consequences of unfinished peacebuilding projects, that is, refugee crises, starvation, instability, crime and terrorism.

Another case in point is the ‘liberal’ notion of peacebuilding, which entails the near forceful integration of the affected country into the world market. This can do more harm than good as the ‘economic governance’ programs most often are not constructed to promote self-sufficiency and to strengthen the local capacities – the recipient country is sure to have far greater chances to build local capacities if they can avoid donor-dependency. Furthermore, what is important when planning peacebuilding missions is a well-conceived plan for DDR. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former soldiers, guerrilla- and militiamen is a key issue that needs to be met and addressed if the peace process is to succeed; one need not overemphasise the dangers of unemployed and disillusioned ex-combatants left untouched. In that respect, it is necessary to boost the commitment of ex-combatants -foremost officers- to the peace process. However, the third parties must contribute funds to assist financially when the soldiers disband, as many examples have shown that these are inclined to take up arms if they are not satisfied with the situation - war, for many, is a life-style and a livelihood.
The public-order institutions, foremost the police and the judiciary, must be adequately trained, and enjoy wide recognition and legitimacy.

The EU’s Role in Peacebuilding Missions
This paper has emphasised the role of institutions when examining the emergence of an EU CFSP, its role, drawbacks and advantages. Institutions do matter, especially in EU affairs, as they are the determinants and driving vehicles for integration, cooperation and to manage the “enormous interdependence” that ties together its members (Peterson & Shackleton 2005:7). Powers are shared in the EU, not separated, and the institutional framework is characterized by institutional dependency. This paper has presented the view that the Union’s institutional structure is a major determinant of the EU’s capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and the analysis of the institutional build-up gives credible evidence for this argument. As has been put forward in the readings, the issue is not so much one of lack of instruments, but rather in finding the political will to overcome the structural thresholds and obstructions that the pillar system entail. It seems justified to stress the capabilities-expectations gap which the Union’s ambitious agenda and aspirations have given rise to. In order to be able to implement and realize its endeavours the EU will need much more effective cross-pillar cooperation than what is the case today; currently, decision-making on CFSP issues requires consensus across two pillars or more. Competition is still rife within the institutions, as they battle for more influence in the processes. It is still not possible to give a clear answer as to whom actually ‘speaks for Europe’, since it remains a matter of the subject at hand, of which institution’s competences are involved. Given that the TECE was rejected, other methods must be applied to enhance the efficiency of EU decision-making and policy implementation - explicitly that involves improving the coordination between the CFSP, the EC pillar and the Member States. Why coordination between Pillars I and II is so critical for a successful CFSP is because the actor’s muscle, for the near future, resides within Pillar I. As Bretherton and Vogler writes:

“However a more effective articulation between political will and economic presence has been slow to materialize in practice… For the Commission it has been a ‘supreme frustration’ that the full potential of economic presence has not been realized.” (Bretherton & Vogler 1999:255)

As some observers have noted, the EU’s operations have been hampered to a large degree by lack of political will, reluctance to partake (on part of some Member States), a propensity to conduct bilateral missions, lack of coordination, and national caveats. The slow reaction to the UN’s pleas was not done out of negligence or disregard, however, but is more certain a result of the Union’s slow decision-making process: Three different decision-making modes are employed, three key institutions are involved, and the foreign ministries of the 27 Member States. Naturally, it is difficult to reach consensus, and the EU comes of as a slow-moving decision-maker; “A Maserati with the engine of a lawn mower”, as Delors put it (Shackleton & Peterson 2002:227).

Because of the EU’s bold rhetoric, but more so due to its sheer economic power and influence in world affairs, the Union has been bestowed with great expectations in a number of issue areas, not least peacebuilding. However, to contribute to peacebuilding missions in face of the seemingly insurmountable violence and hostility that characterizes modern warfare, is an arduous task, and requires
dedication and *staying power*. Does the EU have it? The operations and missions the Europeans have launched have been fairly well executed, but they have (at least militarily) been small in scope and resources, and the CCM missions are too early to assess. Nevertheless, the EU has shown in the DRC that it is directing its resources at the right institutions, namely the political institutions, the police force, and the judiciary. These institutions need to be made legitimate and durable if peace is to stabilize. In the DRC, the Union has made a grand commitment to aid the UN in the peacebuilding mission, and has stepped up its engagement in the country through various CM and CCM activities. The UN purportedly has been satisfied with the European efforts despite the criticism for example operation *EUFOR* received. Despite this, observers and scholars have called for improved coordination and coherence in the planning and execution of peacebuilding missions; some go as far as saying that it “demonstrates how far away the EU is from…fulfilling its international responsibilities” (Haines & Giegerich, *International Herald Tribune*: 2006-06-12). Others have argued that the EU operations are “fitting for an organization unwilling to take up its role on the world stage” (Beatty, *European Voice*: 2006-11-16).

Apart from the formidable task of reforming the pillar structure (a challenge which is interrelated with a number of issues, not least integration) the short-term crisis response must be made consistent with long-term development assistance. As the situation remains today, “the number and scale of ESDP civilian actions…remain fairly limited” (Nowak 2006:122); what is more, the challenge of promoting “good governance” has been met with “tiny” EC economic assistance.

Finally, it is the authors firm belief that the EU has the key to solving intractable conflicts, and it lies in the economic area: Were the Union to abolish its customs on for Africans invaluable commodities (sugar, coffee, bananas etc), and thus address its trade and agricultural policies, that would mean a large step in the right direction, towards African and Congolese self-sufficiency.
6. Bibliography

Books


Papers


Remacle, Eric, 2006. La RDC, laboratoire pour la politique de sécurité européenne. France: Institut d’ Études Européennes, Université libre de Bruxelles.
Internet


http://www.europeanvoice.com/archive/article.asp?id=22084

http://www.europeanvoice.com/archive/article.asp?id=22077

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/19/congo14495.htm