“It's Not All Roses”

Georgian Defence Reforms since the Rose Revolution

Hedvig Lohm
Abstract

As a consequence of the Rose Revolution in November 2003 a new, energetic government entered office in Post-Soviet Georgia. This thesis takes the case of recent Georgian defence reforms to analyse the problematic sides of reforming a weak state. The theoretical starting point is Kalevi J. Holsti’s conclusion in *State, War and the State of War*: that legitimacy is the most decisive factor for why reforms succeed in consolidating the state and its democracy in the long run. If there is a lack of vertical legitimacy (transparency and accountability) and horizontal legitimacy (socio-political cohesion) the state ends up in a state strength dilemma, where reforms carried out become counterproductive. The vertical dimension of legitimacy in civil-military relations is analysed by assessing the state’s monopoly on violence – is it a professional, directly and indirectly controlled monopoly on violence that is transparent and accountable to the citizens? The horizontal dimension of legitimacy is understood as socio-political cohesion around the civil-military norms being developed; if all citizens are wilfully included and tolerated. It is concluded in the thesis that ongoing defence reforms lack legitimacy, and that Georgia therefore is facing a state strength dilemma.

*Key Words:* Weak states, legitimacy, state strength dilemma, democratic revolutions, civil-military relations, Georgia.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe.</td>
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<td>CFE-treaty</td>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CIPDD</td>
<td>The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development</td>
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<td>EAPC</td>
<td>The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<td>GAF</td>
<td>General Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEL</td>
<td>Georgian Lari (national currency in Georgia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Dispersed Person</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group (international think tank)</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IPAP</td>
<td>Individual Action Plan for NATO aspirants (the step prior to MAP).</td>
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<td>ISAB</td>
<td>The International Security Advisory Board.</td>
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<td>IWPR</td>
<td>International War and Peace Reporting. (News Service)</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan for NATO-aspirants.</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence.</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace programme.</td>
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<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.</td>
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<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review, carried out partly by ISAB.</td>
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<td>SSOP</td>
<td>The Sustainability and Stability Operations Program. American training program for the Georgian Armed Forces.</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
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Many thanks to the Swedish Institute that financed my first field trip to Georgia.

I would also like to thank George Tugushi, Levan Tavartkiladze, Nina Dadalauri, Alexander Rondeli, Robert Larsson, Anders Petersson, Christopher Holmbäck, and Rakel Chukri.
Comment: Note that the UNOMIG region is not a geographical region, but a Restricted Weapons Zone according to the ceasefire agreement between government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Georgia from 1994.
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1 Introduction

In the 21st century we have gotten accustomed to reports on peaceful ‘democratic revolutions’ in the post-communist world; in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003) and the Ukraine (2004).\(^1\) Although it is important to acknowledge the fantastic fact that dissatisfied citizens managed to overthrow the stagnated, cheating regimes of Slobodan Milosević, Eduard Shevardnadze and Leonid Kuchma by non-violent means, it is just as important to bear in mind that so far no change of executive authority has been a both transparent and rule-based process.\(^2\) It is obvious that these ‘revolutions’ have given an impetuous for change – a possible democratic break-through – especially in Georgia and the Ukraine.\(^3\) The fuel for continued change comes from inside a disenchanted population and from positive external attention. The goal is improved socio-economic realities, and the aspiration is membership in both NATO and EU. But if there is a real, long-term move towards a consolidated democracy in these respective countries is a matter that needs constant scrutinizing.\(^4\) It is naïve to think that holding elections is sufficient to make a regime both democratic and stable.\(^5\)

So far, reflections on these ‘democratic revolutions’ have tended to be more euphoric than adequately critical.\(^6\) Western media coverage is fragmented, only covering the actual, glorious revolutions and not understanding the fragile every-

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\(^{1}\) Notice that Kyrgyzstan is not mentioned since what took place there was more of a coup than a revolution, and does not really have common traits with the others. According to Michael McFaul (2005:7) Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine have a common point of departure in fraudulent elections. The development also contains the following elements: 1) a semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime; 2) an unpopular incumbent; 3) a united and organized opposition; 4) an ability to quickly drive home the point that voting results were falsified, 5) enough independent media to inform citizens about the falsified vote, 6) a political opposition capable of mobilizing tens of thousands or more demonstrators to protest electoral fraud, and 7) divisions among the regime’s coercive forces.


\(^{3}\) The development in Serbia has lacked behind since the murder of Zoran Djindjic in 2003.

\(^{4}\) Here democracy should be understood as what Linz and Stephan call an ‘effective state’ where 1) a strong scrutinizing civil society exists and officials are held accountable to their actions 2) a rule of law is established 3) homogeneously over the entire territory and 4) everyone is treated exactly the same. See Linz and Stephan 1996:37-38. Important to note is also what Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998:31-32;64) concluded: the ideal starting point for democratization is an oligarchic regime with a pre-existing “Rechtsstaat” and a vital civil society.

\(^{5}\) Larry Diamond defines a ‘pseudo-democracy’ as a country that has elections but lack the rule of law. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998:32-34) use the term ‘electoralism’, while Fairbanks (2004:114) discusses the “underlying illegitimacy that plagues pseudo-democracy”.

\(^{6}\) See for example Niklas Ekdal’s (2005) editorial article on Saakashvili’s police reforms, that he describes as perfect when they are in fact far from implemented all over the country and local NGO’s worry about what the former policemen are busy with.
day situation that makes it ever so easy for these countries to fall back into their deep structural problems and previous ‘pseudo-democratic’ reality.\(^7\)

Rather, democratization is an unstable, undetermined process that constantly risks tilting towards ‘populist authoritarianism’ or the like.\(^8\) Neither does a transition towards democracy imply peaceful and non-military solutions.\(^9\) Statistically, a democratic transition can even create more aggressive and war-prone states.\(^10\) One important reason is that elites in weak democracies exploit their power over imperfect institutions to control political agendas, and shape the content of information media in ways that promote belligerent pressures. Snyder even argues that transitions to democracy may create aggressive nationalism and ethnic and international conflict.\(^11\)

This was the case in the former Georgian SSR. Historically, the Caucasus has been a region characterised by shifting power balances, contested borders, unstable neighbours and different imperial warlords: Byzantines and Persians from South, Huns, Mongols and Ottomans from East and, more recently, Russians from North.\(^12\) In order to survive the Georgians had to develop strong ethnic-cultural identities, based on the unique Georgian language and Georgian orthodox belief.\(^13\) During the 19\(^{th}\) century the Russian empire got control over today’s Georgia. Georgia has since then been subdued to Russian (later Soviet) influence, apart from a short period in 1918-1921.

Following a national referendum Georgia declared independence in 1991. The autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia saw the nationalist politics by the president and ultra-nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia as a great threat and declared independence from Georgia.\(^14\) After a war of declarations armed conflicts occurred, firstly in South Ossetia in January 1991. A putsch replaced Gamsakhurdia with a military council in the winter of 1992. The council invited former USSR foreign minister and former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze to rule the country. In parallel, one of the Georgian warlords started an armed conflict in Abkhazia.\(^15\) With blatant help from Russia, the Abkhaz elite managed to push the untrained and unprofessional Georgian militia

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\(^7\) See Anatol Lieven’s (2005) article on this phenomenon where he compares these colour revolutions with the “people’s revolution” in Pakistan or Latin America in the 80s.

\(^8\) O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986:3 discuss the risks of populist authoritarianism.

\(^9\) Carlos H. Acuña and William C. Smith showed that many of the new democracies in South America continued to invest in costly and sophisticated weapons and thus continued an arms race; in particular Chile and Brazil. See Velázquez 2004:40.

\(^10\) Mansfield and Snyder 1996.


\(^12\) On Georgian history in general see for example Gachchiladze 1995:18-43; van der Leeuw 1999; Cornell 2002; Ascherson 2004; Richards 2005.


\(^14\) In the South Caucasus at large history is used as ideological weapon in order to claim absolute historical right over disputed territories. Cornell 2002:225-227; Karlsson 1999b:10-13;25 and Karlsson 1999 describe how different ethno-national identities came into play in the unrest.

\(^15\) Nanava 2003; Soner 1998:165.
troops out of Abkhazia in 1993.\textsuperscript{16} Just like in the case of South Ossetia (cease-fire agreement in 1992), Georgia had to accept Russian help to withdraw from Abkhazia and establish a cease-fire agreement (1994).\textsuperscript{17} The price was continued presence of Russian military bases on Georgian territory, and membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS. These conflicts were about ownership of territory, but just as much about fear and the Soviet legacy of ethno-territorial identity.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, during the post-Cold war era Georgia has experienced several civil wars, more than 10 000 people died, around 250 000 people became refugees in their own country (IDPs), the economy collapsed, the private savings evaporated in pyramid games, immense social polarisation occurred, the streets were run by paramilitary gangs, the rouble died and the continental power grid blacked out.\textsuperscript{19} Around 25 percent of the population, or a million Georgians, left the country (now they create some of the most important dollar inflows to the Georgian economy).\textsuperscript{20} The Georgian state is still unable to provide social services and half of the population lives at or below the poverty level.\textsuperscript{21} Today South Ossetia and Abkhazia are ‘de facto’ states building their unacknowledged 'sovereignty' on a primordialist discourse of fear and insecurity, expecting no agreements to be kept by the metropolitist state Georgia.\textsuperscript{22} Apart from the frozen relations to South Ossetia and Abkhazia the relations to other regions in Georgia are also tense.\textsuperscript{23} The then president Eduard Shevardnadze's goal turned out to be keeping status quo by not upsetting the US or Russia.

But on November 23 in 2003 a massive public protest against fraudulent parliamentary elections culminated in the resignation of the then Georgian president, Eduard Shevardnadze. This was the first bloodless coup in the

\textsuperscript{16} The support was two-folded; firstly some warriors from the so-called "Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus" voluntarily participated in fighting for Abkhaz independence. Among them Circassians, Chechens, Ingush and North Ossetians. Secondly, Russian authorities provided both air support and naval vessels, maybe even detachment of Russian forces; something they officially denied. Cornell 2002:142; 181; 231-232; Aves 1996:27.

\textsuperscript{17} The bases were situated in Vaziani (outside Tbilisi), Gudauta (the separatist region of Abkhazia), Batumi (Adjara) and Alkhakalaki (Samtskhe-Javakheti). During the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999 the Russian Federation agreed to close down the bases. As a consequence Vaziani was handed back in 2001, the status of Gudauta is unclear, and the remaining two bases should be closed down before 2008. See Cornell 2002:171; Richards 2005.; Cornell 2004:31; Lynch 2002:846 and Larsson 2004a:409-410. Within the CFE-treaty Russia also made agreements to reduce heavy weaponry in the South Caucasus in general.


\textsuperscript{19} Ascherson 2004; Utrikesdepartementet 2004; Aves 1996:50-57; Blandy 2005.

\textsuperscript{20} Ascherson 2005; Richards 2005; Starr and Cornell 2005:93.

\textsuperscript{21} Swibel 2005; Utrikesdepartementet 2004; Dudwick 2003:228.


\textsuperscript{23} It can also be noted that there are big differences between Tbilisi and the other regions when it comes to carrying out reforms, human rights and free media. See Utrikesdepartementet 2004.
country’s history. The so-called ‘Rose Revolution’ was given massive external attention and important support by an international democracy lobby.\textsuperscript{24} On January 4, 2004 36-year old Mikhail Saakashvili obtained more than 96 percent of the votes in the presidential election. Saakashvili’s top priorities have been the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, continuous fight against corruption and rapprochement with the European Union and NATO. And his time in office has indeed brought some positive results, among them reforms of the patrol police and in the educational sector. Two of the brightest feathers in Saakashvili’s hat are that he managed to regain control over the semi-seceded Adjara in May 2004 without any armed confrontations, and that Georgia managed to agree with Russia on quick removal of the last two Russian military bases in May 2005.\textsuperscript{25}

Generally, it can be said that the international community has been positive to the development in Georgia (albeit not the Russian Federation). Subsequently, the will for economic aid and support has returned – and augmented – since Shevvardnadze stepped down.\textsuperscript{26} Among others the European Neighbourhood Policy, ENP, has embraced Georgia, creating a special rule-of-law mission and devoting more than 28 million dollars of aid in 2004-2006. However, since EU does not offer membership negotiations to Georgia and thereby no security guarantees against the Russian Federation EU matters less than NATO.\textsuperscript{27}

The president and his young government has however also been criticised for using ‘revolutionary methods’ and setting human rights and rule of law on the side; especially when it comes to fighting corruption.\textsuperscript{28} Council of Europe concluded in January 2005 that “the post-revolutionary situation should not become an alibi for hasty decisions and neglect for democratic and human rights standards”.\textsuperscript{29}

This thesis will look into the problematic sides of the Georgian democratic revolution, and thereby operationalise an analysis of ongoing reforms towards democratic entrenchment. After having discussed methodological (Chapter 2) and theoretical (Chapter 3) and operational considerations (Chapter 4) for this study, Georgian defence reforms will be assessed (Chapter 5) and summarized (Chapter 6) from a legitimacy point of view.

\textsuperscript{24} The U.S. Agency for International Development for example spent 1.5 million dollars to computerize the voter rolls, while the National Democratic Institute appointed domestic monitors to conduct parallel vote tabulation. While the Open Society Institute funded ‘study visits’ to Serbia and confer with young activists there. See Fairbanks 2004:114-117; McFaul 2005:16.

\textsuperscript{25} Fuller June 24, 2005; Socor August 1, 2005; Ascherson 2005.

\textsuperscript{26} The World Bank for example arranged a big donor conference in 2004. See TI 2004:147-150.

\textsuperscript{27} Cornell et al 2004:22.

\textsuperscript{28} Among other things, the arrest and alleged torture of the former chief of the state audit agency, Sulkhan Molashvili, has been brought to international attention. Freizer 2004; TI 2004:147-150. See also Freedom house 2006; Freizer 2004; HRIDC 2004:3; Ascherson 2005; CoE 2005a, Mushkelishvili 2005; Amnesty 2004; HRIDC 1004:4.

\textsuperscript{29} CoE 2005b.
2 Aim and Methodology

In this chapter the aim of this study and its methodological implications will be briefly noted. Additionally the material used to perform this analysis will be described, and the problems that were encountered along the road.

2.1 Aim of the Study

Strengthening and reforming a weak state is not a linear process towards an entrenched democracy. Rather, it is a complex balancing act that can progress or tilt backwards. This thesis is written within the Copenhagen school of Political Realism, and gives importance to the constructivist/affective dimensions of reforms – to the construction of norms within the state and to the 'idea of the state'. The theoretical starting point is Kalevi J. Holsti’s conclusion in State, War and the State of War: that legitimacy is the most decisive factor for why reforms succeed in consolidating the state and its democracy in the long run. It is assumed here that the stability of a state is reinforced or weakened depending on the degree of legitimacy in the reforms. If there is not enough legitimacy the state ends up in a backlash, a ‘state strength dilemma’: whenever it wants to become stronger it actually becomes less legitimate and thereby weaker. Thus, a strong state is not built on a successful monopoly on violence, but on the perceived legitimacy of the reforming state.

Today’s literature on weak states has a descriptive tendency. Holsti's theories will be used in this thesis since he is one of few researchers who actually discuss what happens when states try to become stronger. This theory is however not so easily operationalised in a qualitative field study; Holsti just lays out eight foundations for making Buzan’s state triangle more legitimate. These foundations are very encompassing, and sometimes even overlapping. (See Figure 1 in Chapter 3.) To narrow the analysis down, one of Holsti’s eight foundations;
civilian control over the military was chosen. Here it is interpreted the consensus on democratic governance of the defence sector that has developed mainly within NATO. Of course it is possible to argue that the Western liberal conception of civil-military relations is sensitive to history, experience and prejudice and is problematic to apply to a Post-Soviet country such as Georgia. In order to operationalise this study these concepts will be used since it enables to bridge the theoretical assumptions on weak states with Georgian defence reforms.

This thesis aims to operationalise a way of assessing vertical and horizontal reforms in the defence sector. Indicators will be developed, based on standard NATO analysis of democratic governance of civil-military relations. (Figure 2 in Chapter 4 offers a summary.) This operationalisation will then be applied to defence reforms in Georgia since the Rose Revolution in November 2003, until the end of 2005. This enables an assessment of the horizontal and vertical legitimacy in Georgian defence reforms, and a concluding analysis of a potential state strength dilemma.

The main research question is: Do recent defence reforms in Georgia create vertical and horizontal democratic legitimacy?

My hypothesis is that the Georgian defence reforms initiated so far lessens both horizontal and vertical legitimacy. The consequence is that Georgia enters a so called ‘state strength dilemma’ where the long term stability and opportunities to develop democratic consolidation get affected negatively.

2.2 Georgia as a Qualitative Field Study

How can we assess what happens when a window of opportunity is created in a weak state? Today, most states are weak states and instable democracies. If we guided by a legitimate rule, how should we discuss change? I wanted to study the transformation after a ‘democratic revolution’ in Eastern Europe. These are specific cases, but they are relevant for one of the most pressing issues in Political Science – statebuilding and democratization. To my mind the Georgian case is better to analyse than other countries where democratic revolutions have occurred. Georgia has developed during a longer period of time than the Ukraine, and the development has not been disrupted (as the Serbian case where the 2003 murder of the most progressive politician, Zoran Djinjic, halted progress). Patton argues that the selection of a case should be directed by what is extreme, typical,

34 Merriam (1994:26-7;19) describes case studies as heuristic, inductive and particularistic. It describes a specific situation but can be relevant for a general problem. See also Devine 1995:138.
maximal, politically important or sensitive.\textsuperscript{35} I argue that the area of defence is the most extreme indicator and symbol of state strength – the monopoly on violence is at the core of what a strong state should be. Compared to other reforms the Saakashvili government has initiated, I also perceive defence reforms as having high risk of creating a ‘state strength dilemma’.\textsuperscript{36} This conclusion is partly based on secondary information, partly on interviews conducted in July and September 2004, plus January and May 2005.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, this is an extreme and politically important case (not the least since there were several civil wars in Georgia recently, which affects the international community, as we saw in the introduction). The study is limited to defence reforms, and does not concern reforms made by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The importance of external actors to domestic developments in weak states is acknowledged here (see Chapter 3.2.3 on security referent objects). There is no clear definition of national security that all actors on Georgian territory can agree on: inhabitants in Georgia proper and in its separatist regions have diametrically opinions on who can guarantee their security.\textsuperscript{38} Still, focus here is on domestic foundations for state-making. This is because domestic public support determines the long-term success of reforms. If reforms are not legitimized from within, the reforms easily become counter-productive. And this can occur even if the ‘ownership’ of different reforms is grasped by elites. The entire society has to be involved in the process, and share the same goal.\textsuperscript{39} Additionally, it is important to look at the Georgian actions and responsibilities: the solutions to Georgia’s problems lie within Georgia – and not only on the global game of chess taking place on Georgian territory.

2.2.1 Sources

There is not so much relevant, easily available information on defence reforms in Georgia. It is often stated that written sources are the most reliable ones.\textsuperscript{40} However, in this case Georgian Ministry of Defence documents are almost non-existing. Partly this is due to that documents are classified. Partly it is a cultural legacy: within typical Georgian informal patronage relationships there is not

\textsuperscript{35} In Merriam 1994:62.
\textsuperscript{36} This is supported by others discussing the reforms. See for example Civil Georgia November 28, 2005b where Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is commenting on Georgian defence reforms or Sepashvili’s interview with Zengo Baran (November 22, 2005).
\textsuperscript{37} See list of interviewees at the end of the references’ list.
\textsuperscript{38} South Ossetia and Abkhazia relies on the Russian Federation for protection, while Georgia strives to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community.
\textsuperscript{39} Bertrand Badie (2000) wrote insightfully about how problematic imported models of reform are. One example of this worrisome alienation of the people from the state and its politics is the adoption and implementation of the EU acquis in Central Europe that involved certain short cuts in the democratic process. See Batt and Lynch 2004:5.
\textsuperscript{40} According to Esaiasson et al written sources are better than interviewees. Sources should be independent, adequate and impartial. See Esaiasson et al., 2004:304-311.
really a tradition of writing things down systematically. Therefore this analysis is based on written documents, interviews and observations. Qualitative interviews were conducted with local politicians, analysts and NGO-workers using a semi-structured interviewing method. This is a less systematic method, which makes it more difficult to create a high external validity. However, flexibility was more beneficial in this case, since it gives more access to unexpected information compared to a more systematic approach and, more importantly, allows for an understanding of how different actors perceive the situation with their own words.

When it comes to interviewing effects it is important to acknowledge that observer bias is impossible to eliminate in every study, i.e. different interviewees get different answers. But since multiple types of sources were used the tendency of the results should be the same for another researcher. Repeatedly I experienced that different sources have fundamentally different views on current developments. These information discrepancies make analysing more complex. At the same time they constitute an important dimension: There is a lack of a common understanding of the development in defence matters in Georgia. Several interviewees made the same comment: “I do not know anything about what is really happening”. Even though the perception of the reforms differs, this thesis will scrutinize the tendency of defence reforms. Let us now turn to the theoretical points for departure.

41 Authors interview, Khutsishvili May 2005.
42 See Lohm, May 2005.
43 Merriam's (1994:179-180) recommendations were followed. He is arguing that using many sources is an important way of validating results. His term for it is to 'triangulate'. He is recommending to cases observe during a longer time period and to be explicit with assumptions. I made interviews in two rounds, which improved my understanding.
44 A 'snowballing' method was used, which signifies an inductive approach with conversational interviews where one interviewee leads to another. Patton (1987:109) and Devine (1995:145) recommend this approach to interviewing. See also Esaiasson et al 2004:286.
45 Esaiasson et al 2004:185 argues that an interview is the best way of understanding how the public discussion, the discourse, is perceived. According to Patton “the fundamental principle of qualitative interviewing is to provide a framework within which respondents can express their own understandings in their own terms”. Quoted in Stenelo 1984:29. See also Johansson (1997).
46 When it comes to external validity it is a complex matter in a qualitative study. It is impossible to draw general conclusions from a small sample of information. Rather it is relevant to discuss whether there exists an “intersubjective understanding”, i.e. if another researcher could have gotten the same results. Esaiasson et al 2004:293 and Eckstein 2000:152-4.
47 This is ranging from analysts stating that the Georgian political elite might be creating a national guard with allegiances to the ruling party rather than to the state, to a member of parliament arguing that the biggest problems in the defence sector are already solved and the most pressing remaining issue is the lack of competent personnel for setting up adequate military budgets. Author's interview, Darchiaishvili and Rurua, May 2005.
3 Theoretical Points for Departure

In this chapter the idea of the state, its vertical and horizontal legitimacy and the 'state strength dilemma' will be outlined. In addition, the concept of security will briefly be discussed from a constructivist standpoint.

3.1 Stateness and the Importance of Legitimacy

The German sociologist Max Weber defined a state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Thus, ‘stateness’ is in essence enforcement; people should comply with state regulations. Basically, it is assumed that political stability — democratic or otherwise — needs an army and a police force to be sufficiently organized, equipped and mobilized to establish law and order in the country. But then, as Larry Diamond pointed out, internal trust and legitimacy must exist.

Theories on weak states often stress the importance of a monopoly of violence; of order and security. However, if the political elite focus on subordination and control it easily gets an antidemocratic overtone. Chiefly the worst violence is perpetrated by, or with the approval of, these elites. Strengthening their power is therefore not an obvious solution. Instead we should concentrate on the legitimacy of coercion when discussing the strengthening of weak states: there has to be democratic governance over coercion.

Often Barry Buzan’s state triangle is referred to in this context. (See Figure 1.) He drew the state as a triangle, arguing that all three parts are interlinked, if one edge is failing the others could back up for it. But if all three of them are distorted the state is almost non-existing, even though the state as such is internationally recognized, exists on the map, has a flag and a seat in the UN. On the top of the triangle Buzan placed ‘the idea of the state’. This encompasses the affective as-

49 Diamond 2005:15; 22.
50 See for example Migdal 1988:262-263.
52 Leander 2005:606.
53 According to Holsti (1997:82-3) state strength should be understood as “the capacity to command loyalty – the right to rule – to extract the resources necessary to rule and to provide services, to maintain the essential element of sovereignty: a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territorial limits, and to operate within the context of a consensus-based political community.”
Buzan's state triangle meets Holsti's fundamentals for legitimacy.

1. Implicit social contract. The state needs a balance in the bargain between the state and the political community; in the extraction comes provision of services and participation in decisions. Here the role of the leadership is important. This changes over time, can be seen as fair at one point in time and exploitive at another.

2. Consensus on the political rules of the game; no systematic violations of the constitution, of the social, economic, or political fundamental basis.

3. Equal access to decisions and allocations.

4. A clear distinction between public service and personal gain. Corruption should be illegitimate for all.

5. The state is the internally sovereign provider of security and order, i.e. have legitimate monopoly on violence.

6. Ideological consensus-pragmatic politics. Politics should be instrumental rather than fundamental. If it is fundamental, i.e. concerning ways of life, decision or the community or nature, an ideological crusade it leads to zero-sum situations with 'passion politics' that 'frequently create violent conflict within the state'.

7. Civilian control over the military. Holsti argues that it is 'only in time of war does a military dictatorship have some reasonable prospect of gaining popular consent'.

8. International consensus on territorial limits and state legitimacy. The state has to have an 'international personality' that makes all other states accept its territorial dimension, otherwise the domestic legitimacy is undermined too.
pects of the state: nationality, ideology, history and tradition. The second edge of
the triangle is the institutional expression of the state, i.e. the laws and norms that
the government and its regime are based on. The last part of the triangle is the
physical basis: its territory, population, resources and wealth.54

The idea of the state is the most important factor for its fate, according to
Holsti: “It is in the realm of ideas and sentiment that the state is primarily
determined”.55 Strong states are made up by strong, united ideas on what the state
is. It has a distinct ‘personality’, even.56 The moral authority of the state to
subordinate its citizens is based on the idea that it is legitimate, according to
Holsti who uses Rodney Barker's definition: legitimacy “is precisely the belief in
the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands so that those
commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are
believed in some sense to have moral authority”.57 Holsti’s concept of legitimacy
is based on eight foundations.58 The foundations take a grip on the most important
measures of democracy, rule of law and sovereignty. In Figure 1 the foundations
are listed and linked to Buzan’s triangle. Thus, it is not just a fixed, minimalist
notion of democracy – a periodic electoral procedure – that should be
incorporated in the legitimacy concept.59 Rather legitimacy is a constantly
changing variable with two interconnected dimensions: vertical and horizontal
legitimacy. And this legitimacy should exist both vertically (that changes are
made in a law-abiding transparent, and accountable way within state structures,
and not only by a strong leader) horizontally (that there is high socio-political
cohesion). If both dimensions are distorted the state is lacking a united idea where
affection and loyalty can converge.

3.1.1 Vertical Legitimacy

The first dimension of legitimacy is the vertical one. Or, in other words: the
principles on which the right to rule is based. Historically, the right to rule has
been legitimized by many principles: force and might, religion, heredity,
leadership, ethnicity, ideological task, consent/contract, task achievement. Still,

54 Buzan 1991.
55 Holsti 1997:84.
56 Buzan (1991:97-107) describes a united idea of the state as high socio-political cohesion. Buzan
et al 1998:119-122 is describing an all-inclusive self-conception of individuals within a
community as a factor of high ‘societal security’. The united idea of the state is also close to
Tönnies concept Gemeinschaft (emotional community) in comparison to a Gesellschaft (rational
community). Additionally, it is close to the concept of a democratic ‘political culture’ that is used
by Dahl, Diamond et cetera. See Miller, White, and Heywood 1998:3-4. Or, as Robert Putnam
(1993) calls it: ‘civic traditions’. One could also call it a collective identity; or with Benedict
Anderson’s (1991) words: an inclusive imagined community. It thus has to do with collective
59 This definition goes farther than Weber's or for that matter Rousseau's (1978), who mainly saw
legitimacy as the most basic rule for the democratic game: the electoral process.
legitimacy is often based on a mixture of these principles, and this mixture changes and is more or less weak under turbulent social conditions. Today most Western analysts argue that a rule based on explicit consent through periodic elections is the only enduring basis of vertical legitimacy.

This thesis argues that a high vertical legitimacy exists when citizens consent and have loyalty to the ideas of the state and its institutions. The executive of the state has to earn and maintain its right to rule through periodic elections, but also through trust. Vertical legitimacy is therefore indirectly interwoven with the concepts of transparency and accountability. By transparency I mean that there must be a pre-established, understood and respected set of rules that are transparent and respected by the citizens, while accountability requires democratic checks and balances where the rulers are continuously under a ‘culture of scrutiny’ by the parliament, media and the public. One important distinction is however that a high vertical legitimacy for a democratic state is not the same thing as a popular government. The stability of the state institutions cannot be based on individual leaders. Then the state becomes personalised. The personal state is a patrimonial state, based on patron-client relationships and personality politics rather than rational relationships. Founding father myths often develops, like in Mobutu’s Zaire or Banda’s Malawi. The authority of the state comes from the ruler, like in hereditary times. “The patron is the state.”

Thus, vertical legitimacy is extremely low. Additionally, the horizontal legitimacy gets eroded since patron-client relationships only concern the allies. In-groups and out-groups are created.

3.1.2 Horizontal legitimacy

As we already noted the second dimension of legitimacy is the horizontal one. This should be understood as the intellectual and emotional basis for the political community. It refers to attitudes and practices of individuals and groups towards each other and ultimately also towards the state. With a high horizontal legitimacy all individuals within the jurisdiction are wilfully included in a tolerant way without hostility, domination and systems of injustice. If not all citizens feel included or want to be included they can go in exile, organize resistance, secede

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60 Holsti 1997:91. Partly Holsti started off from Max Weber’s division in legal-rational, traditional and affective (charismatic) rule in these distinctions.
66 Holsti 1997:82-3.
and form their own state or capture the state through a coup.\(^7\) One mechanism to create a stronger loyalty among the in-group is to deflect criticism on the out-group; to create **internal scapegoats**. Thus, minorities in weak, divided states are often made into an enemy to blame for misfortunes and problems.\(^2\)

### 3.2 The State Strength Dilemma

What happens if there are low levels of horizontal and vertical legitimacy? Well, if the rulers of the state try to make it stronger they run high risk ending up in a **state strength dilemma**. Then the state is caught in a vicious circle: “Many of the steps governments take to strengthen the state and to enhance vertical and horizontal legitimacy bring about unintended consequences that actually undermine the coherence of the state.”\(^3\) Often actions turn discriminatory, short-range and self-serving and difficulties are overcome with coercion. As a consequence certain citizens might feel excluded and their sense of loyalty erodes; the right to rule is undermined. For Holsti this unintentional backlash is the fundamental problem for states that want to become stronger.

#### 3.2.1 Other Researchers Who Agree with Holsti

Batt and Lynch also conclude that it might be internally destabilising to change the dynamics in weak states. According to them weak states are stronger than expected due to ‘strong societies’: cohesive dominant classes and informal power networks that redistribute resources and work within large unregistered sectors of economic activity. Efforts made to improve the state’s performance may therefore have unpredictable knockout effects for the neighbourhood.\(^4\) While Schmitter is arguing that too radical changes during the democratic transition may invite a backlash from groups that feel threatened which might have gone along with a slower approach.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Holsti 1997:89.
\(^2\) Holsti 1997:88. Soner (1998:165) is also discussing this, arguing that if certain groups dominate the state, the less the state is independent an can adhere to rules. This dependency leads to long-term instability. He also concludes that it is difficult to verify when this moment occurs.
\(^3\) Holsti 1997:183.
\(^4\) Batt and Lynch 2004:3.
3.2.2 Holsti, the Constructivists and the Concept of Security

Holsti uses a mix of realist and constructivist strands, inspired by Buzan’s and the Copenhagen School of Political Realism, but he takes the constructivist strand a bit further. Within the 'state strength dilemma' Holsti gives a lot of weight to citizens’ perception of reforms – if reforms are perceived as legitimate from inside and from the outside world. This of course differs in time, space and ultimately depends on the observer. Constructivism rejects the existence of objectively given preconditions and circumstances. Perception, consciousness, memories and myths are most relevant since reality is socially constructed and constituted in discourse and speech-acts. The main constructivist within International Relations, Alexander Wendt, gives legitimacy a crucial role in a democracy since it creates norms, rules and principles that establish identification with the state functions. However, he also adds that if there is a history of illegitimacy social change is more difficult. The explanation is twofold:

1) The systemic reason: Constituted social systems reinforce certain behaviours and discourage others. Egoistic, self-help systems based on realist perceptions punishes altruism, rewards competition and easily end up in security dilemmas.

2) The psychological reason: practices and information that challenge existing social roles create cognitive dissonance and might be perceived as a threat. As Robert Jervis argued: “one tends to see what one believes”.

Still, competitive and egoist identities can be over won by developing cooperative identities. By “planning its character” a radical leadership can make a significant change to other actors’ negative perceptions. Wendt exemplifies with Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ that ultimately led to the end of the Cold War.

3.2.3 Securitization and the Machiavellian temptations

There is a big difference in a-political issues, “normal” political issues and security concerns. For security concerns (threats) the state apparatus have possibilities to use special powers – including the use of force. But what constitutes a threat is relative and based on perception. Buzan and the Copenhagen School of

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82 Since the Cold War ended constructivists have developed theories on security. Security is not viewed as something that can be studied objectively. Rather, perceptions of threats, risks and vulnerabilities are studied as a political practise. Thus the study of risk is synonymous with the study of construction of risks. By that a broadening of the security concept has occurred: non-military realms such as the economy, society or the environment are studied. Security has also deepened, the referent object of security (i.e. what is to be secured) is not just the territorial state,
Political Realism are using the term **securitisation** for describing how politics turn into “security issues”, and thereby grant the right to politicians to use violence.\(^8\) Additionally, it is important to note what Buzan concluded on weak states: the weaker the state, the more ambiguous the concept of national security gets. Strong states have clear “referent objects” for security; they know what needs to be secured. For them the concept of national security is mainly about protecting state independence, political identity and way of life from external threats. But if a state has problems with all three corners of the state triangle\(^8\) the so-called ‘referent of security’ – by which I mean what should be secured, by whom and for whom – is much more complex.\(^8\) Domestic and external security is often intermingled in weak states, since it is in the interest of neighbours and the rest of the international community to create order. Securitization is more easily achieved if a history of aggression exists, especially if weapons are easily available. Thus, a securitisation lessens vertical legitimacy since it lessens the transparency of political action and accountability.

If it comes to the extreme, a “securitisation of non-existing threats”, it leads to paranoia, waste of resources, aggressive policies and serious distortions of domestic political life since it creates an “orthodoxy of military logics” where democratic checks and balances are set aside.\(^8\) Then again complacency, “non-securitisation of existing threats”, can also be a threat.\(^8\)

A securitized society does not necessarily experience more violence, but it creates a sense of insecurity and more militarization.\(^8\) Gros is one researcher that goes so far as to say that “the military is perhaps the biggest threat to stability and nation-building in the developing world today”. Massive investments into security structures are especially dangerous because of the absence of countervailing democratic civil society institutions. “In fact, it would appear that the more militarized a country, the greater the intensity of its failure.”\(^8\) And indeed, the weaker the democratic institutions and practices are, the more tempting it is for a government to rely on coercive measures, which undermines the “right to rule” and deters discriminated groups and individuals.\(^9\) This is especially imminent if a government is facing a hard opposition.\(^9\) One solution to rising unpopularity is the classical **Machiavellian ploy** where a foreign policy crisis is created in order to enhance legitimacy at home. Holsti gives the examples of Paraguay (1966)

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\(^8\) Military can be defined as the propensity to use force or the threat of force for settlement of conflict. See Dreze 2000:1171-1172 and Leander 2005:612.
\(^9\) Holsti 1997:117.
Argentina (1978 and 1982).\textsuperscript{92} Another way of improving political coherence is, as we already noted, finding a scapegoat.

Just like Holsti’s state strength dilemma, Buzan argues that building a strong state might have negative consequences internationally through the establishment of a security dilemma\textsuperscript{93}: when one actor tries to become more ‘secure’ the consequence can be that other actors feel less secure, especially if there is a high threat level existing between them. If both actors want to keep up with each other’s defence improvements the situation turns into an arms race. One important explanation for this dilemma is that the ambiguities of military means often make it difficult to distinguish between offensive intentions and defensive intentions (a wish to maintain status quo by continuously improving weapon performances).\textsuperscript{94} This escalating tension can also occur in domestic group conflicts, a so-called internal security dilemma.\textsuperscript{95} The best thing according to Buzan is to aim for a de-securitisation: “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere”.\textsuperscript{96}

### 3.3 Theoretical Summary

In order to strengthen a weak state, it is necessary to carry out reforms that are legitimate both in a vertical (accountability) and a horizontal (socio-political cohesion) sense. If there does not exist a cohesive political community who perceive reforms as legitimate a state ends up in a ‘state strength dilemma’ and is incapable of becoming strong in the long run. It is likely that politics get securitized and use of coercive means increase if focus lies on military strength. This yet again lessens the level of legitimacy. Instead it is important to build democratic governance of the military sector, to ‘plan one’s character’, in order to avoid realist perceptions and develop cooperative identities. We will now turn to the field of civil-military relations and thereby operationalise the analysis of the legitimacy in Georgian defence reforms.


\textsuperscript{93} John Herz coined the term ‘security dilemma’ already in the 1950’s. Back then it was a realist concept referring to state-to-state security. Since realists see the international system as a zero-sum game they argued that if states tried to become more secure in the international anarchic system, this altered the status quo and unintentionally created more insecurity for others. When one state’s relative strength and power rose, the neighbouring states’ security decreases relatively. See Herz 1950, Wolfers 1962, Jervis 1978, Buzan 1991:1-27 and McSweeney 1994:14,32.

\textsuperscript{94} Buzan 1991:294-298.

\textsuperscript{95} Internal security dilemmas in a post-Soviet context are discussed by Kolstø 2002:252-255.

\textsuperscript{96} Buzan et al 1998:4.
4 Operationalising the Case

One of the foundations for a strong, legitimate state is democratic control over civil-military relations. As stated before this thesis will analyse the potential for a state strength dilemma by using civil-military relations as an example. The indicators of a state strength dilemma are low horizontal and vertical legitimacy.

To outline operational tools we need a checklist of what constitutes a democratic and legitimate governance over the defence sector; and how the civil/political and military/professional sectors relate to each other.

Here, a division is chosen that is based on a type of Western/NATO consensus of civil-military relations. Partially this ‘checklist’ originates from recommendations given by international defence reform expertise. Above all, the divisions are in line with scholars devoted to civil-military relations; not the least Samuel Huntington’s ideas.

The balancing act between military autonomy and civilian control is of course complex. If the professional cadre becomes too strong it elevates the risk for a creation of military regimes, like in Latin and Central America. At the same time the civilian authority should not have opportunity to seize the coercive mechanisms for their private purposes.

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97 See Figure 1 and Holsti 1997:95 for the different foundations.
98 One such expertise board is the International Security Advisory Board, ISAB, which has prepared annual evaluations and recommendations on security and defence matters since 1998 for Georgia. The board was created from a Baltic example.
100 Huntington stressed the need for institutional autonomy: an independent military sphere where the armed forces are professional and a-political. It is important with a protection from arbitrary, civilian use of the military as well as a civilian supreme control over the military. Ideally, there should be a centralized civilian control of the armed forces and a protection from the arbitrary use of the military by the civil authority, this was dubbed ‘objective civilian control’ See Herspring 1999 and Huntington 1957:57; 64. See also Goodpaster and Huntington 1977. Two other scholars based on Huntington’s ideas are Roman Kolkowicz (1967) and Eric Nordlinger (1977).
101 According to Clapham and Derek (1985:4-8) the risk is especially high if the armed forces are isolated professional units (not with conscripts) and if there are no autonomous civic organizations capable of controlling the armed forces. External relations is another factor.
102 See Heper et al 2000 for a discussion on how several Latin and Central American countries had to demilitarize politics, the so called ‘third wave of democratization’.
4.1 Components for Analysing the Case

In order to estimate vertical and horizontal legitimacy of defence reforms the indicators civil-military relations has been divided into two sections:

a) direct and indirect control by civil institutions on military structures.

b) civil-military norms, the invisible 'uniting idea', inherent in the defence structure, i.e. if there exists a professional, democratic governance of the military sector adhering to rule of law and with a socio-political cohesion.

The division is illustrated in Figure 2.

When it comes to direct democratic control of civil-military relations (section a) three factors can be regarded as most important: 1) separation of security structures 2) separation of civil authority and military staff and 3) professional defence structures. Indirect democratic control (last part of section a) is exercised by 1) parliamentary oversight 2) domestic actors and 3) external actors. In terms of norms three dimensions will be discussed: 1) the framework established for governing the defence sector 2) the rule of law and 3) the culture around the defence sector. These direct and indirect control mechanisms corresponds with vertical legitimacy within civil-military relations, since they are related to whether the state has managed to develop a professional, directly controlled monopoly on violence that is transparent and accountable.

Section b) concerns the civil-military norms; the socio-political cohesion around the issue of defence and national security – i.e. if all citizens are wilfully included and tolerated. This is the horizontal dimension of legitimacy.

This exercise makes it possible to estimate the levels of vertical and horizontal legitimacy and test my hypothesis. By doing this we, in a rather experimental way, operationalise a way to measure the ‘strength’ of a state according to Holsti's and Buzan's theories on weak states. Each component will be further elaborated on in the upcoming chapter. There the development in Georgian defence reforms will be analysed, the order of the chapter will follow the outline in this operationalisation. Finally this will enable us to analyze the tendency of reforms in Chapter 6 – are they accumulating legitimacy vertically and horizontally?
Figure 2:

Democratic Control over Civil-Military Relations.

■ CONTROL MECHANISMS < ---- > VERTICAL LEGITIMACY

Direct control
1. Separation of security structures.
2. Separation of civil authority and general staff.
3. Professional defence structures.

Indirect control
1. Parliamentary oversight.
2. Domestic actors: Oppositional politicians, media, auditing bodies, NGOs.
3. External actors: auditing bodies, INGOs, NGOs, donor countries.

■ CIVIL-MILITARY NORMS < ---- > HORIZONTAL LEGITIMACY

1. Development of a framework for democratic governance.
2. Rule of law.
3. Establishing a culture of professionalism and political neutrality that fosters peace.
5 Civil-Military Relations in Georgia

Already in 1990, before Georgia had declared independence, a Georgian National Guard was created. Relatively to other USSR republics, few Georgians were high Soviet officials, so little internal expertise existed that could create an army.\footnote{Darchiashvili 2005b:4.} Initially Russia promised to help build up military capabilities, but this was not accomplished.\footnote{In 1992 some of the Russian armaments were however transferred to this formation according to the so-called CFE Tashkent agreement. See Pataaraia 1998.} Instead Georgia came to rely on lingering Soviet military practice; with its corruption, low morale, ‘dead souls’,\footnote{‘Dead souls’ are soldiers that do not exist in reality, only on paper. This situation emanates from the Soviet doctrine, where the armed forces should be as numerous as possible. Accordingly a tendency for exaggerating the actual soldiers developed, and it was common that the conscripts bribed their superiors to be able to leave their brigade.} terrible living conditions and public disapproval.\footnote{See Peterson Ulrich 1999; Cornell \textit{et al} 2004:50-52; Larsson 2004b:406-7.} Between 1996 and 2002 military expenditure fell by approximately two-thirds in real terms.\footnote{See Bailes \textit{et al} 2003:12-14} In 2001 the first armed revolt fell by due to the poor conditions among the conscripts.\footnote{Cornell \textit{et al} 2004:10; Darchiashvili and Nodia 2003:11.} These revolts have continued during the Saakashvili government.\footnote{See for example Civil Georgia December 23, 2004; Civil Georgia August 30, 2005; Civil Georgia November 17, 2005.}

Initially, the new Georgian state failed to establish a proper monopoly on violence. Different paramilitary formations were fighting during the civil wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the military coup.\footnote{Apart from the National Guard (governed by Tengiz Kitovani that led the coup against Gamsakhurdia) the most important group was Jaba Ioseliani’s Mkhedrionis (“The Knights”).} Arms were easily available, and allegiances shifted. The main paramilitary groups were disarmed in 1995, but other formations/corrupt networks still carry out low intensity warfare in and around the separatist regions (both on Georgian and the separatist sides).\footnote{ICG 2004b; Darchiashvili and Nodia 2003:11; van der Leeuw 1999:154-155; Gachechiladze 1995:41-2; Aves 1996:50-57.} Since 9/11 the international community has started addressing threats emanating from porous borders of separatist regions since they offer easy transport routes for organised transnational crime as well as potential terrorist hideouts. Georgia is also important for international energy security, as a transit-country for Caspian hydrocarbons.\footnote{Mainly through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) which makes it possible to transport Caspian hydrocarbons from Azerbaijan to a Turkish oil terminal in the Mediterranean and thereby to Western markets independently from the Russian Federation. Among many others Starr and Cornell (2005) wrote extensively about this project.}
Another consequence of 9/11 is the growing aid and international interest for reforming the Georgian defence sector. Geopolitically Georgia enables connections between NATO territory and staging areas in Central Asia or potential conflict zones in Afghanistan, Iran and Chechnya.\textsuperscript{113} Thereby the interest of becoming NATO-members shown by Georgia and its South Caucasian neighbour Azerbaijan is taken more seriously. As part of the Partnership for Peace programme, the PfP, both countries are active members of the ‘anti-terrorist coalition’.\textsuperscript{114} Georgia is a faithful ally, with troops in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and deploys around 850 soldiers in Iraq.

Greece, UK and Turkey have given defence related aid to Georgia.\textsuperscript{115} But the dominant actor and donor in Georgia is the US. The first significant step was to help Georgia cleaning up Pankisi valley (on the border to Chechnya) from suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists.\textsuperscript{116} Nowadays Georgia is in fact the country receiving most bilateral aid per capita from the US apart from Israel.\textsuperscript{117} In May 2005 George W Bush even granted Saakasvili the honour of a state visit, gathering the biggest crowd “ever seen in Georgian memory”\textsuperscript{118} at the former Lenin square, nowadays called Freedom Square. Most importantly in this context: the US has trained and equipped four Georgian ‘anti-terrorist’-battalions at the cost of 64 million dollars, via the Georgian Train and Equip program (GTEP).\textsuperscript{119} In 2004 a follow-up program, entitled the Sustainability and Stability Operations Program, SSOP, was launched. SSOP will train four additional battalions for multilateral ‘peace stabilisation programs’ at a cost of 60 million USD.\textsuperscript{120}

Today, two competing “integration visions” exist in the South Caucasus.\textsuperscript{121} On the one hand a NATO vision of the supportive anti-terrorist allies Georgia and Azerbaijan anchored and eventually integrated in Euro-Atlantic security and economic systems.

On the other hand it is the Russian vision of the ‘near abroad’. For the Russian Federation – and its allies Armenia and Iran – the South Caucasus is still part of its sphere of interest.\textsuperscript{122} A NATO country on Russia’s southern border would

\textsuperscript{113} Cornell et al 2004:5; Bailes 2003:8-9.
\textsuperscript{114} Georgia became official aspirant at the Prague summit in November 2002, and Azerbaijan in April 2003. See Cornell 2004:20. This move towards Western security structures was initiated in 1999 when they both left the Russian Collective Security Treaty, CST, which strived for military cooperation. This treaty (nowadays called the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO) is still in effect for Russia’s strategic partner Armenia. See Bailes et al 2003:30.
\textsuperscript{115} Turkey pays for the Georgian NATO delegation and the KFOR troops salaries. See Larsson 2004b:77; Cornell 2004:55.
\textsuperscript{116} Before the US stepped in Russia wanted to launch a military operation in the Pankisi valley, allegedly filled with militant islamists supporting the Chechen cause. Freizer 2004.
\textsuperscript{117} Approximately 1,3 billion dollars have been spent on Georgia the last decade. (Swibel 2005). Recently Georgia also got part of the American Millennium Challenge project; a major aid program. See Georgian Presidency 2005:5 or visit www.mcg.ge.
\textsuperscript{118} Ascherson 2005.
\textsuperscript{119} The trainings are approximately 100 days per unit and consist of light infantry tactics, counter insurgency and platoon-level offensives. Freizer 2004. Cornell 2004:62; ICG 2004b.
\textsuperscript{120} Georgian Presidency 2005:36-37.
\textsuperscript{121} Cornell et al 2004:16.
\textsuperscript{122} Freizer 2004; Theisen 1998:152.
“prompt very obvious concern”, as the former Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov expressed it.\textsuperscript{123} Even though the big powers disagree on the future of Georgia, Georgian politicians have been firmly devoted to reforming the Georgian Armed Forces to comply with NATO requirements.

The combination of a global ‘war on terror’ and the Rose Revolution offered both a domestic and international momentum for significant change in the defence sector. Suddenly, NATO membership emerged as a protection opportunity from Russian dominance. We will now look into how this reform process is proceeding, according to the outline in Chapter 4.

5.1 Direct Democratic Control

Clearly separating security structures, dividing functions between different civil and military staff, as well as creating professional armed units are the three basic components to exercise direct democratic control over armed forces. In this context, Georgia has changed markedly since the Rose Revolution in 2003.

5.1.1 Separation of Security Structures

In order to create a state dominated monopoly on violence, and avoid double chains of command, the separation of border guards, military formations and a civil police force is important. In a Georgian context this had been an evident problem during the Shevardnadze era. Paramilitary and civilian armed formations existed at seven different government institutions. However, power was concentrated to the Interior Ministry and the Department of State Security in an amorphous manner with extensive links to organised crime.\textsuperscript{124} In 2004 the new Georgian government simplified security structures. This thesis does not deal with the reforms within the Interior Ministry, but it can still be said that it is less influential than during Shevardnadze’s time in office.

The centres of armed forces have been reduced from seven to three:

a) Ministry of Defence (ruling over the troops from the former Interior Ministry and a redefined National Guard that carries out reservist training, mobilisation and emergency assistance)

b) Ministry of Internal Affairs (now governing over a civilianised Coast and Border guard element and civilian police forces, a small counter-terrorist unit and the internal intelligence agency)

\textsuperscript{123} The statement was made in December 2003 and quoted in The Economist 2004a:44. Newer, similar statements were for example made by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Treaty, CIS CSTO in November 2005. See Ziyadov 2005.

c) Special State Protection Service (5,500 men protecting the president and key government officials plus the Georgian section of the BTC-pipeline). Additionally, the foreign intelligence service is subordinated to the president.\textsuperscript{125}

5.1.2 Separation of Civil Authority and General Staff

There must be a clear-cut division of labour between civil and military sectors in a system of democratic control. Only then can political abuse of military power by insecure and incompetent politicians be avoided. Thus, military activities should be politically neutral, and not interfered with by political (executive or legislative) structures. The top authority should be civil – most commonly a civilian Minister of Defence who has unrestricted access to all documents, plans and decisions within the defence establishment. Defence law should delineate a chain of command, where the Chief of General Staff is the direct link between civilian authority and military organisation. At the same time the political authority must be separated from the military staff: the minister should have control over the planning, decisions and budget process so that there are no secret funds allocated to the military, but he/she should be restricted by law from selecting and promoting any member of the military except on the recommendation of the Chief of General Staff.\textsuperscript{126}

In February 2004 president Saakashvili appointed the country’s first civilian Minister of Defence. However, the command structure and respective powers of the President, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff are still not properly defined.\textsuperscript{127} The National Security Council is influential and at the same time beyond democratic control.\textsuperscript{128} In early 2004 the Saakashvili government made constitutional changes giving the president additional powers.\textsuperscript{129} Not only is he the Commander in Chief who chairs the National Security Council, he can also dismiss the Minister of Defence without prior consent from the Prime Minister or the cabinet. The President can even chair the cabinet of ministers. There is an overall tendency for the president to rule through presidential decrees.\textsuperscript{130}

Additionally, political reshufflings frequently take place. Since February 2004 Georgia has, for example, had three Ministers of Defence. (See Table 1 below.) The ministers who get reshuffled bring their former colleagues and friends with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} ISAB 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Bland 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{127} ISAB 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Darchiashvili and Nodia 2003:9. See also http://nsc.gov.ge/
\item \textsuperscript{129} The constitutional changes were voted through in the parliament in February 2004, partially ignoring the constitutional provision. See Fairbanks 2004:118; Amnesty 2004; HRIDC 2004:3; CoE 2005a; CoE 2005b; Muskhetishvili 2005; Sepashvili January 24, 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Darchiashvili 2005b:16-17.
\end{itemize}
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cabinet Minister</th>
<th>Post in First Cabinet</th>
<th>Post in Second Cabinet (June 10, 2004)</th>
<th>Post in Third Cabinet (Dec 14, 2004)</th>
<th>Currently (if changed)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Giorgi Baramidze</td>
<td>Interior Minister</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
<td>State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gela Bezuashvili</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
<td>Secretary, National Security Council</td>
<td>Foreign Minister (since Oct 2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irakli Okruashvili</td>
<td>General Prosecutor</td>
<td>Interior Minister</td>
<td>Minister of Defence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Changes to Defence Ministers in the Georgian Cabinet 2004-2005

them, which lessen continuity even more. As a Western diplomat puts it: “as soon as we start to know who to talk to, this person has shifted position”. Analysts argue that the present Minister of Defence, Irakli Okruashvili, replaces even Western educated military cadres with former colleagues from his previous jobs, such as policemen and prosecutors. The Georgian social scientist most familiar with defence matters, David Darchiashvili, describes the leadership at MoD as “volatile and potentially disturbing”, working in “revolutionary chaos and quasi legality”, and adds that the current minister even requested all directors of the general staff, including its chief, to resign when he entered office. The former headmaster of the Georgian Military Academy argues that the defence system is now in the hands of amateurs that have not separated the tasks properly: the Minister continuously interferes with the purely military affairs and manages the army according to his own whims; among other things has he appointed a new head of the General Staff himself. In autumn 2005 several scandals were revealed which related to procurements and top officials around present Minister of Defence, Irakli Okruashvili. A “civilianising” of the minister post has been carried out, but the Minister is perceived as pretending to be a commanding

131 Author's interview, May 2005.
132 Irakli Okruashvili has previously been Prosecutor General and Minister of the Interior. Anjaparidze November 3, 2005.
133 Darchiashvili 2005b:17. His view gets support from other domestic monitors, such as Tamara Pataria, Irakli Sesiaishvili, and Temuri Siradze. Irakli Sesiashvili is arguing that around 60 persons from the Ministry of Internal Affairs got new jobs in the General staff of Ministry of Defence, without prior experience in the defence sphere.
134 See Anjaparidze October 14, 2005. This is a subjective opinion from a disappointed man, the current Minister of Defence has abolished the Military Academy, but in my interview sessions I got the same overall impression by for example Pataria, Darchiashvili, Meskhedlishvili et cetera.
135 Rumours have it that Saakashvili owes too much of his own success to Okruashvili to kick him out of his cabinet. See Anjaparidze November 3, 2005 and Fuller November 4, 2005.
officer rather than a civilian. He has for example been seen wearing a uniform while visiting military staff during several occasions. The Vice Minister of Defence David Sekharulidze’s explanation is that it gets so dirty on the field that the Minister has to wear a type of ‘field uniform’, which is a civilian uniform, even if it looks military.137

In summary it can be said that the political authority is inadequately separated from the military staff in the Georgian defence structures. The political authority has on several occasions interfered in the military activities and the chain of command is opaque. Constant reshufflings take place at all levels; manpower policies are based on loyalty rather than competence.

5.1.3 Professional Defence Structures

A professional army is “a military organisation that accepts its role to fulfil legitimate government demands and is capable of efficiently fulfilling specific military activities”.138 Regulations of soldier’s disciplinary code must be according to the constitution and to basic human rights. The armed forces should also be properly equipped, dressed and fed. A National Security Concept and a new military doctrine are also needed as overarching principal documents on priorities and values. To enable NATO integration planning, programming and budgeting systems must be interoperable with NATO standards.139

Georgia lacks one of the most important assets when it comes to creating a professional army: sufficient domestic expertise to be able to plan, carry out and inform about budgets and democratically sound reforms. This shortage is something Georgia has in common with both the old communist and Latin American states.140 The new government considered experienced personnel to be “dangerous” for the Georgian state. During 2005 the government therefore got rid of more than 2/3 of the old personnel in order to break old corrupt pyramids and procedures, among them 35 Soviet-experienced generals.141 “We are now waiting for the young, talented people to ‘learn-by-doing’”, as the Vice Minister explained the current situation.142 The question is however exactly what the new employees will learn-by-doing. Georgia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world,143 and even though the old personnel has been fired, it is reasonable to believe that

136 Author's interview, Tamara Pataraia and David Darchiashvili, May 2005.
137 Author's interview, David Sekharulidze, Deputy Minister of Defence, May 2005.
139 This is called PPBS in NATO vocabulary. See Zulean 2004:60-65 on this process in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia.
141 Georgian Presidency 2005:36-37.
142 Author’s interview, Sekharulidze May 2005.
143 “The power structure [in Georgia] has always been stitched together by corruption and nepotism,”, as van der Leeuw (1999:155) argues. Since independence the corruption has grown much worse, Transparency International (2004:148) estimates Georgia to be on the 133rd place of 146 countries in total. See also Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998:67 and Cornell 2002:87,142.
the corrupt structures remains even though the faces have changed. As one researcher in the field commented: “Well, they have moved a lot of people around, but the problems remain intact.”\textsuperscript{144} NATO, mainly through the American SSOP-programme, is partly improving this deficit in human capital.\textsuperscript{145} But this programme is not problem-free either.\textsuperscript{146} The Vice Chairman in the Committee for Security and Defence Matters, Nikoloz Rurua, argued that the lack of expertise in defence budgeting is the major problem for Georgia. Other than that, however, he argues that “Georgia has the most important reforms behind of her”.\textsuperscript{147} In one sense this statement is true: the new Georgian government has carried out a lot of reforms. Since 2003 the budget has skyrocketed, and important strategic documents have been created: a National Security Concept,\textsuperscript{148} a threat assessment and a military strategy. Still, it should be compared with a comment from a senior artillery officer: “Not so long ago we had a training session. Everyone was there; the president and the Minister of Defence. In the exercise we were using an artillery set that is supposed to destroy moving targets on more than a 20 kilometres distance, but the commanding officer blew up an object standing still a couple of kilometres away. Of course it exploded, and everyone applauded. As with everything else this was a show to make the politicians happy. And no one dared to say that this is not adequate. [...] In Soviet times we had a doctrine. Of course it was fiction, but it still gave us something to relate to. Now everything is in chaos and no one says anything, because then they will be fired.”\textsuperscript{150} Even though new strategic documents exist the Georgian government has not managed to finish the most important guiding document: a Strategic Defence Review, SDR, which was one of the things recommended by ISAB, an international monitoring expertise board.

During 2004 and 2005 the defence budget substantially increased. The fiscal year 2005 Georgia’s defence budget grew from 0.7% to 3.1% of GDP (from 35 to 220 million USD).\textsuperscript{151} This expansion has however been problematic. For starters, the money spent was almost triple compared to the budget approved by the parlia-

\textsuperscript{144} Author's interview, Pataria, May 2005.
\textsuperscript{145} Among other things NATO offers visit programs, fellowships, and conducts trainings at the Defence College in Rome. Zulean 2004:78.
\textsuperscript{146} During 2004 “the Cubic organisation”, a San Diego-based defence service contractor, that was overlooking defence bureaucracy reforms, was for example criticized for its vague and compliant priorities towards the Georgian authorities. See Owen June 16, 2004.
\textsuperscript{147} Author's interview May 2005.
\textsuperscript{148} The question of a National Security Concept has been discussed for years. In 2002 ISAB even helped to prepare a draft, named “Georgia and the World. Vision and strategy for the future”, even though the intent was to give it official status, Shevardnadze hesitated. He was too scared of upsetting the Russian Federation, Darchiashvili (2005b:13-14) argues. Yet another draft was created in 2003.
\textsuperscript{149} www.mod.gov.ge displays these documents.
\textsuperscript{150} Author's interview, May 2005.
\textsuperscript{151} Georgian Presidency 2005:36-37. In addition, the substantial American training programs for the Georgian military are not included in this budget.
ment; a fact that was neither properly discussed in parliament nor in public. The extra allocations were to a large extent used for purchasing new equipment and armament. Who actually sold the weapons, and what they charged the Georgian state was not made public, since the information could get in the hands of the “ill-wishing neighbour” up North. The substantial arms purchases have also been criticised from Western military advisers.

Thus, arms purchases got securitized; since the politicians were claiming that it was a matter of national security and that normal political procedures should not apply. “There is not really a practice of spending money in a transparent way in Georgia”, as the researcher Tamara Pataraia benevolently describes it. Think tank chairman George Khutsishvili refers to patronage traditions in Georgia where deals are struck through “informal personal relations without written documents”. However, the opposition managed to bring the Minister of Defence to a parliamentary hearing in October 2005, where he informed the parliament on the secret and substantial expenditures.

Another matter of worry was the “special expenditure funds for urgent matters” that the Saakashvili government established after an incident in South Ossetia in the summer of 2004. In this extra-budgetary fund secret donations were made from individuals that had “patriotic or business reasons”, as the Vice Minister of Defence explains it. He also argues that the procedure was OK since a small group – consisting of the Minister of Defence, the Vice Minister (i.e. himself), the chief of the procurement policy, the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Committee on Defence and Security in parliament – checked the donations and they only “accepted money from people that were OK”. Around seven million dollars were donated during 2004 and 2005. Analysts claim individuals were forced to make donations. Exactly how the money in the fund was used is also unclear: if there were tenders; who for example supplied the ammunition and cars. Cornell and Starr describe it as a “new form of corruption”.

According to a PR-folder from the President’s website states the general strategy for 2006 is to a) improve combat capabilities of armed forces b) create support for NATO integration and c) improve management capabilities. The priorities are problematic: first comes the improvement of combat capabilities, then

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152 According to Tamara Pataraia the defence sector was initially allocated 76 million USD (138 million GEL), in April 98 million USD were added (176 million GEL) and in May 26 million USD (46 million GEL) was added. Finally 20 more million was added.
154 Author’s interview, Sekharulidze and Pataraia, May 2005.
156 Author’s interview, May 2005. Meskhedishvili and Zakareishvili describe it the same way.
157 Author’s interview May 2005.
158 Temuri Siradze, author’s interview May 2005, argued that the funds were created in relation to the South Ossetia crisis.
159 Author’s interview, David Sekharulidze, May 2005.
160 The approximate numbers comes from the Ministry of Defence. In Georgian Lari it was 9,9 million in 2004, and 3,5 million 2005. A fund for the Ministry of Internal Affairs was also created.
strategic and management issues. Thus, the president's wish is many armed men, not a democratically accountable defence structure – which is the recommendation from ISAB and NATO. Today, Georgia has 26,000 men within the armed forces, the GAF.\(^{163}\) ISAB has recommended 13,000-15,000 active duty personnel. In its latest report ISAB stresses the lack of affordability and continuity in Georgia. Among other things the report criticises that there is still no formalised annual training system for the GAF.\(^{164}\) Instead, a quite large force is created, along with the goal of 15,000-20,000 reservists.\(^{165}\) “I don't understand why they have this focus on a big army, what NATO wants is a small interoperable force that is adequate and well trained.”, defence expert David Darchiashvili argues.\(^{166}\)

As for now the Georgian state cannot afford to properly dress, feed, equip and train its chronically under-financed army.\(^{167}\) Oppositional politician Ivlian Haindrava comments: "the new Georgian government prioritizes the purely military aspects at the expense of political, legal, economic aspects and in the end at the expense of the democratic compatibility with the NATO standards, let alone the standards for the European Union."\(^{168}\) Several incidents have made the poor state of the army obvious, especially when it comes to the ordinary conscripts and employees who are not part of the American GTEP/SSOP personnel system.\(^{169}\)

Revolts and fistfights are common, even among the US-trained personnel.\(^{170}\) There is no code regarding soldiers’ rights and responsibilities. Instead old unwritten Soviet types of bullying ‘laws’ are still in use, where conscripts for example are punished so severely that they catch pneumonia.\(^{171}\)

Regular soldiers within the American GTEP and SSOP-programmes get one hundred days of training, and then they often go directly to serve in Iraq. The 'normal' conscripts have to spend 18 months in an army that is nothing like the glorious army showed in the commercials sponsored by the government that run daily on all Georgian TV-channels.\(^{172}\) “What I want to know is what happens when these TV-watching boys go to the army and end up somewhere without food and heating?” another oppositional politician asks rhetorically.\(^{173}\)

The issue of reservists was top priority on the political agenda during 2005. During the annual speech of the president in early 2005 fifteen parliamentarians

\(^{163}\) http://intranet.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=69&kan_det=det&kan_id=1661. However, in this calculation around 6,000 reservists are included. Compared to the MoD website the armed forces comprises of 3,747 officers, 10,860 NCOs and corporals, 6,113 conscripts and 748 civilian personnel. See www.mod.gov.ge.

\(^{164}\) ISAB 2005.

\(^{165}\) In May 2005 the soldier’s rights organization “Justice and Liberty” estimated the number of trained reservists to be slightly over 600. See also Fuller and Giragosian 2005.

\(^{166}\) Author's interview, May 2005.

\(^{167}\) Gularidze 2004; Civil Georgia February 16, 2005.

\(^{168}\) Haindrava 2005.

\(^{169}\) Devdariani 2003.

\(^{170}\) Anjaparidze October 14, 2005.

\(^{171}\) Author's interview with Irakli Sesiashvili, May 2005. See also Civil Georgia November 28, 2005b and Jibladze 2005.

\(^{172}\) Anjaparidze October 14, 2005.

\(^{173}\) Author's interview Usupashvili, May 2005.
were even standing in parliament wearing their reservist uniforms. Oppositional politician David Usupashvili comments: “it is to 100 percent inconsistent with any idea of being a legislator”. Vice Minister of Defence describes it more positively: “When the public sees parliamentarians wearing uniforms the moral goes up”. At one point the president even argued that no one could get a high position in the government if he or she is not a reservist.

Reservist trainings have been conducted in camps in the South Ossetian conflict zone where no armed men are allowed, apart from joint peace keeping troops according to the 1992 peace agreement. This was something that triggered protest from the South Ossetian side until the camp was closed down in April 2005. “I don’t know any single military that believed in the reservist reforms, it bears elements of a party force and it is only created to scare Ossetians.”, defence expert David Darchiashvili comments.

To summarize, this sub-chapter has shown us that Georgia does not have a professional defence structure. Even though substantive resources have been put into the defence sector there is a lack of human capital and experienced personnel who can carry out strategic planning and create concrete links between principal overarching documents and the planning, programming and budgeting at the Ministry and among the General Staff. There is no updated disciplinary code that function in line with the constitution and with basic human rights. The armed forces are not properly fed and taken care of. Instead of focusing on strategic planning and management the government purchases arms in secret and creates dubious 'special expenditure funds' and tries to maximise the amount of armed men and patriotic reservists.

5.2 Indirect Democratic Control

Previously the direct control of civil-military relations has been discussed. Now the indirect control mechanisms will be assessed: the function of the parliament as well as independent media, oppositional politicians and non-governmental organisations and think tanks.

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174 This speech is a Georgian version of the State of the Union speech in the US. Author's interview, Political analyst Paata Zakareishvili May 2005.
175 Author's interview, May 2005.
176 Author's interview, May 2005.
177 Claimed by the journalist Temuri Siradze, author's interview May 2005. Allegedly, approximately 2 million USD has been allocated to training reservist forces. See Civil Georgia November 28, 2005b.
178 Civil Georgia April 22, 2005.
179 Author's interview May 2005.
180 UNDP 2002:90.
5.2.1 Parliamentary Oversight

Within the Western consensus on civil-military relations the legislature is seen as a democratic mechanism of oversight; of checks and balances over the executive decisions on defence policy and budget. There should also exist an appropriate legislative committee, with parliamentarians and bureaucrats able to monitor an executive budget that is limited both in purpose and period.

In practise, the principle of separation of powers does not work today in Georgia. As we already saw power is concentrated in the hands of the president and his inner circle, and their decisions are subsequently adopted by the parliament without much discussion. The efficiency and the credibility of the parliamentary control over the executive is lessened by the fact that the ruling National Movement has an almost absolute control over parliament. When it comes to the budget the parliament cannot amend it, only adopt or reject, and large-scale procurement transactions are not approved by parliament. So far, the budgetary oversight has been very limited; the Defence and Security Committee has not even been had access to policy documents. The 2005 military budget to be approved was a one-page document, based on the previous year's expenditures. Such a budget makes it impossible for the parliament to control the executive. Neither has the Defence and Security Committee been trusted to have access to information about procurements and tenders. Instead a special ‘group of trust’, consisting of three parliament members, monitors classified defence executive decisions. However, the oppositional politician supposed to be present was disapproved by a majority of the parliament. Thus, it can be argued that securitization has occurred in the parliament too. Only three parliamentarians belonging to the National Movement are informed about the actual procurement procedure. The monitoring role of the Georgian parliament and the Defence and Security Committee “is still inadequately developed”, writes the normally moderately critical ISAB in its report from 2005.

5.2.2 Domestic Indirect Control Mechanisms: Media and Opposition

When it comes to media as an indirect control mechanism, Georgian outlets still fail to “credibly perform their role of democratic watchdog”. The media

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182 Since there is a seven percent threshold to enter the parliament only one opposition party is represented there, the Rightist Opposition. CoE 2005a; Welt 2004.
183 Author's interview, May 2005. See also Darchiashvili 2005b:11.
184 Information from parliamentary committee member David Bazghadze. Darchiashvili 2005b:6-7. In Sweden the same procedure also exists, the trust group is called Försvarsunderrättelse-nämnden. The composition of the group is however different, among other things it is chaired by an oppositional politician. See Stenberg 2005.
185 ISAB 2005.
186 CoE 2005b.
situation has deteriorated since the Rose Revolution, with an augmentation of both self-censorship, and government pressure. The president has been accused of wanting to silence critical voices and for establishing an ‘authoritarian tone’ in the way he is governing the country. Georgian media is especially self-censored and patriotic when it comes to defence and security matters. One example was when a defence affair reporter was denied to interview defence personnel. According to the press secretary he was a 'problematic journalist' who no longer was welcome there.

Since almost all politicians united against the old president in 2003, there is not much of an opposition to speak of in today's Georgia. The most influential parties are the Republican Party, the Rightist opposition and the Labour party. The opposition lack both popular leaders and constructive ideas, which makes them quite desperate. At the same time the government is 'demonizing' the opposition, which makes constructive dialogue even more difficult. One example of this demonizing was when oppositional politicians and civil society members made a common statement against the human rights situation for soldiers in the Georgian army. According to current Minister of Defence this “mass-attack against the Defence Ministry […] will only destroy fighting spirit in the army”. All criticism seems to be regarded as something negative.

Several NGO’s and think tanks have been established to monitor the Georgian defence sector. One is the Justice and Liberty Association (mainly for soldier’s human rights). In addition an advisory Civil-Military Forum has been created, where the NGO-sector can meet officials from the security sector and ask questions. How much the officials take their opinions into account is not evident yet. Some other influential NGO’s/think tanks are the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, CIPDD, the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, GFSIS, Georgian Young Lawyer's Association, GYLA, and Liberty Institute. These four institutions have existed for several years, but do not monitor the defence sector specifically. Most of the NGO’s is functioning on ad hoc basis and is highly dependent on external funding. Just like with media, a lack of influential NGOs has been created since the Rose Revolution.

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187 In Reporters without Borders’ annual press freedom index Georgia’s position has fallen from the 73rd place out of 167 (2003), to the 99th in 2004. This can be compared to the improved development in Ukraine; from 138th to 112th. http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=554. See also Freedom House Press Freedom Index 2005.
188 Utikidesdepartement 2004; Amnesty 2005.
189 Author’s interview, Kvesitadze and Nergadze, January 2005. See also Lohm, May 2005.
190 Sakevarishvili 2005.
191 Nodia 2005 has good examples of this tendency. The newly sacked Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili might turn into a constructive opposition leader. See Bochorishvili 2005.
193 Civil Georgia April 6, 2005. Another good example is an open critical statement on government intolerant methods from leading Georgian NGO-people. See Civil Georgia October 18, 2004.
5.2.3 External Indirect Control Mechanisms

External actors also monitor security structures. The most obvious and important in the Georgian context is of course NATO. Its ‘Partnership for Peace’ programme, PfP, has become NATO’s main instrument for security cooperation. Both political and military dimensions are incorporated to increase stability and diminish threats through deeper cooperation, exercises and operations under the authority of UN or OSCE.\(^{195}\) The PfP also strives for facilitating transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes; and ensures democratic control of defence forces.\(^{196}\) For countries that wish to become NATO-members there exist Individual Action Plans, IPAPs, and at a later stage Membership Action Plans, MAPs.\(^{197}\) These agreements are intended to organise all aspects of the partnerships as well as indicate the necessary changes that the aspirant countries have to abide to.

When NATO initiated the PfP in 1994 the alliance argued that it wanted to avoid a security vacuum in the former Warsaw pact, promoting democracy, political stability and market economy in Europe.\(^{198}\) Attention turned towards Central and East Europe, and gradually NATO enlarged.\(^{199}\) This reorientation to the East was justified by the belief that NATO should stabilize this region through an expansion of ‘democratic peace’.\(^{200}\) Cornell argues that the prospect of NATO membership was a major stimulus to reforming post-communist European countries. According to him NATO is the sole actor that offers the potential to foster and maintain conditions of “genuine security” in the South Caucasus and Georgia.\(^{201}\) One researcher disputing that NATO really does promote democracy is Reiter. He claims that these new Central European NATO members were committed to democracy anyway.\(^{202}\) If we put trust in ‘democratic peace’ we fail to understand and change the domestic political uncertainty that characterizes

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\(^{196}\) NATO 2001.

\(^{197}\) Georgia was the first country that got an IPAP-agreement with NATO in December 2004. Followed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while the Ukraine, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia have the more advanced Membership Action Plans, MAPs.


\(^{199}\) The original NATO (or North Atlantic Treaty) members are: Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, followed by West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. In March 1999 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were included while Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia became members in 2004. On http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm there is a list.

\(^{200}\) Theories on democratic peace state that democracies do not wage war against each other. There is a strong support from advanced statistical material (as well as case studies) showing that democracies engage in higher levels of trade with each other, democratic governments are less likely to violate the human rights of or commit genocide against their populations, in addition democracies are less likely to experience famine. See Reiter 2001:46 and UNDP 2002:85. The theory does however not take into consideration that democracies do wage war against non-democracies and kill non-democratic citizens in Vietnam, Korea, Iraq et cetera.

\(^{201}\) Cornell et al 2004:3,79.

\(^{202}\) Reiter 2001:59.
weak states like Georgia; for example how easily military power can be abused by insecure politicians.\textsuperscript{203}

The fundamental problem is that NATO is a security and defence cooperation organisation. Thus NATO's accession procedures and cooperation programmes are not promoting democracy \textit{a priori} – rather they are enabling integration in Western security structures.\textsuperscript{204} It might be the case that membership in the PIP or commitments with IPAPs and MAPs might even be counter-productive in terms of fostering democratic governance of the defence sector, because its programs builds military rather than civilian expertise, which in turn may actually undermine possibilities for civilian control of the military.\textsuperscript{205} It remains to be seen if this is the case in Georgia. So far, NATO states that “the door is open for Georgia” when the Georgian government utters its goal to become members already in 2008.\textsuperscript{206}

The second most important external actor is the International Security Advisory Board, ISAB, which is an external advisory control mechanism. The EU is rather irrelevant since ENP does not support or specifically demand democratic control of the military.\textsuperscript{207} The opinion of EU and other influential organisations, NGO's or think tanks however makes a difference; such as Council of Europe, or Amnesty International but mainly on the level of influencing donor countries/organisations who are cautious of Georgia’s actions and reputation when deciding on future funding and loans. Western pressure is seen as the key to successful reforms from within Georgia. Domestic NGO-activists claim that foreign observers can push the Georgian government much more than domestic NGOs could.\textsuperscript{208}

5.3 The Norms of Civil-Military Control

The institutional reforms and control mechanisms discussed above are not enough to capture the entire spectra of civilian-military relationships. The framework of ideas, principles and norms for behaviour is just as important. Douglas Bland describes the ideal as “the normative civil-military regime of a Westminster-based, liberal democracy where the people are sovereign, and where the legitimacy for any action or decision of government rests with the people, and individuals rights are paramount, and the rule of law provides the fundamental

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{203} Democratic peace theories both assume stable civil-military relations and \textit{pacta sund servanta}, i.e. that treaties will always be observed. See Velázquez 2004:33;39-42;51 and Holsti 1997:145-6.
\item \textsuperscript{204} Cizre 2004:115; 118.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Reiter 2001:60-1. See also Krebs 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Lobijakas December 3, 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{207} Neither is it mentioned in the Copenhagen Criteria, which were developed for accession countries at the European Council meeting in 1993 and encompasses implementation of institutional stability, complete freedom of expression, the entrenchment of human rights, respect and protection for minorities and an efficient market economy. See Cizre 2004:109.
\item \textsuperscript{208} Author's interview, Darchiashvili and Pataara, May 2005.
\end{itemize}
basis for relationships between individuals, other persons, and the government". What is necessary is thus to develop a culture of professionalism and political neutrality within the security forces. Additionally UNDP reminds us of that the military structures should foster civic principles, as well as internal and regional peace (see Figure 3 below). It can generally be said that Georgia puts a lot of effort into reforming the defence sector. "The pace of change has increased markedly and there is no doubt that the general situation has greatly changed for the better", as ISAB summarizes the development. They also argue that the need to apply democratic principles and NATO compatible standards is understood. But it is not all roses: even if this need for democratic principles is understood in theory it is not put into practise. As we saw in previous chapters professionalism, political neutrality and adherence to rule of law are not appropriate wordings to assign to the Georgian MoD. Georgian analyst Ghia Nodia describes the current type of decision-making like this: "the government is driven by young radicals whose instinct is always against compromises, long deliberations and consultations. These are revolutionary ideologues, who want to write the new, beautiful democratic rules of a new Georgia on a clean sheet of paper." In this big mission systematic, transparent and democratic governance of the defence sector is put aside. Rather a revolutionary way of governing is

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**Figure 3:**

**Principles of Democratic Governance in the Security Sector.**

- Ultimate authority on key security matters must rest with elected representatives.
- Security organizations should operate in accord with international and constitutional law and respect human rights.
- Information about security planning and resources must be widely available, both within government and to the public. Security must be managed using a comprehensive, disciplined approach. This means that security forces should be subject to the same principles of public sector management as other parts of government, with small adjustments for confidentiality appropriate to national security.
- Civil-military relations must be based on a well-articulated hierarchy of authority between civil authorities and defense forces, on the mutual rights and obligations of civil authorities and defense forces, and on a relationship with civil society based on transparency and respect for human rights.
- Civil authorities used to have the capacity to exercise political control over the operations and financing of security forces.
- Civil society must have the means and capacity to monitor security forces and provide constructive input into the political debate on security policy.
- Security personnel must be trained to discharge their duties professionally and should reflect the diversity of their societies— including women and minorities.
- Policy-makers must place a high priority on fostering regional and local peace.

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211 See Figure 3 for a summary on UNDP's view of democratic governance in the security sector.
212 ISAB 2005.
used, which influences democratic procedures, respect for human rights and rule of law negatively. In addition there exists a potentially destabilising nationalistic discourse. Already in February 2004 when the first Cabinet of Ministers was declared, president Saakashvili mentioned defence reforms in his own expressive way: “We intend to form the armed forces, which will terrify the separatists.”

While the president often emphasises the need for unification of Georgia by peaceful means, the current Minister of Defence, Irakli Okruashvili, was quoted saying: “We are a warrior nation and if not for this ability we would have been destroyed. We have no right not to unite Georgia”, at a summer patriot youth camp with 11,000 participants in 2005. The patriotic and militaristic discourse is thus common within the leading party, the National Movement, and this 'militarization' of Georgia has created public discussion. The propaganda for the strong military is extensive. Reservist and other military exercises are shown in the news; popular Georgian personalities support the idea of reservists and a strong army on TV; patriotic commercials and posters are everywhere. There was even a specially made up “boys-band” actively involved in recruiting to the new, strong Georgian army. As a power manifestation a military parade was carried out on the National Day in early autumn of 2004, while the situation with South Ossetia was very tense (see below). Evidently, this manifestation sent a quite aggressive message to the separatists that arranged their own military parades in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The parades have also been followed up by extensive military exercises by Georgian, Ossetian and Abkhaz sides. Georgian TV even broadcasted military games with scenarios where Sukhumi (de facto capital of Abkhazia) and Tskhinvali (main city in South Ossetia) were mentioned.

It can be argued that NATO-adopted defence reforms and the rhetorical need for territorial integrity create internal security dilemmas. The most imminent sign was the development in South Ossetia after a failed anti-smuggling operation in the summer of 2004. When the armed Georgian units entered South Ossetia the Ossetians responded with aggression instead of gratefulness. They disregarded the fact that a civil war took place there as late as in the 1990’s. Since there is a previous experience of war, it is seen as a legitimate and probable mechanism

213 Nodia 2005.
214 Civil Georgia February 13, 2004.
215 Civil Georgia September 11, 2005.
216 Author’s interview, Asatiani, May 2005. Militarization is defined here as the propensity to use force or the threat of force for settlement of conflicts. See Dreze 2000:1171-1172.
217 Author's interview Asatiani, May 2005.
218 Civil Georgia May 26, 2005.
219 Author's interview, Zakareishvili May 2005; Civil Georgia September 20, 2005.
220 For example a large-scale exercise was held in Abkhazia in August 2005 where more than 6,000 men participated according to the separatist authorities. See Devdariani 2005; Civil Georgia September 22, 2005. In total more than 16 exercises have been held in the South Ossetian zone of conflict with the help of Russian instructors. See Socor October 26, 2005.
221 Anjaparidze February 22, 2005. Another example is the exercise that Georgian authorities conducted in Javakheti, pretending that a fictional enemy had temporarily seized a Georgian region. See Anjaparidze July 28, 2005.
222 Haindrava May 5, 2005.
from Georgia proper and the separatist regions, even though Georgian officials stress the need for peaceful conflict resolution. In general, Ossetians have no trust for Georgians, and the patriotic project of starting a strong army, with military exercises close to the conflict zone, followed by aggressive propaganda did not make them calmer. Since then, relations to South Ossetia have been teetering between war and peace, with killings, kidnappings, tank manoeuvres, Russian military assistance to the separatists and militant statements. Tensions have increased partly also because of the Minister of Defence and former Minister of Interior Irakli Okruashvili’s hawkish stand on South Ossetia (himself an ethnic Georgian born in South Ossetia). This instability can be traced in relation to Abkhazia too. Negotiations between Georgian authorities and Abkhazian de facto officials constantly risk backlashes because of the unstable and unpredictable situation. Abkhazian separatist 'officials' sometimes stress that they also are strengthening their armed forces for “strictly defensive purposes” after having seen the Georgian military build-up. The separatist build-up is supported by 'voluntary' Russian instructors, and probably by using Russian armaments.

In the Georgian understanding the separatist regions are just acting in the interests of the Russian Federation. What happens in Tskhinvali is not a Georgian-Ossetian problem, but a Georgian-Russian problem, according to Saakashvili. The Russians are responsible for the conflicts, not the Georgians themselves. And the separatist leadership is merely Russia’s fifth columnist smugglers, so there is no need to take them seriously. Georgian authorities are not concerned with internal confidence building, rather solutions are identified as coming from the outside; from international negotiations, condemnation of Russian policies, peace proposals made in the UN, the CoE or the OSCE. The dominant discourse in Georgia complies with the neo-realist motto: para bellum; i.e. if you want peace, prepare for war. Even if this realist analysis is wrong, it will have impact if policy makers believe in it. “The fact of the matter is in our country, even if an apple dropped from a tree, Georgians would say; didn’t Russia cause this?”, as one influential politician argued. Thus, according to constructivist terminology both Georgian politicians and separatist representatives have egoist identities that create security dilemmas with its patriotic, zero-sum military regime.

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224 Fuller and Giragosian 2005; see also Radio Free Europe July 29, 2005.
226 Fuller August 15, 2005.
227 Civil Georgia August 17, 2005; Civil Georgia August 18, 2005.
228 See for example Civil Georgia November 20, 2005.
229 Civil Georgia August 17, 2005; Civil Georgia August 18, 2005.
233 Roman Gutseridze, Chairman of the Budget-Finance Committee in Blandy 2005:1.
6 Concluding Analysis on State Strength

At this point it is time to assess vertical and horizontal legitimacy of Georgian defence reforms, along with a discussion on why defence reforms might lead Georgia into a state strength dilemma. Finally, further research will be discussed.

6.1 Vertical Legitimacy

Vertical legitimacy is referring to what the leadership’s right to rule is based on: if there is a pre-established set of rules; a separation between the state and the ruler (and in this case civil authority and military staff) and if there exist trust, accountability and transparency. In this thesis it has been assumed that an indirect and direct control over civil-military relations creates vertical legitimacy.

As we saw in chapter 5, the Georgian government is spending a significant share of its budget on defence matters. Partly this is due to financial and administrative demands from NATO. Progress has indeed been made since January 2004. The overall security structure is cleaned up; most armed men are under the command of the MoD, and strategic documents are being created to create a long term planning (among them a National Security Strategy). Funding for defence matters have skyrocketed. Nonetheless, progress is accompanied by extreme solutions: constant reshufflings, disorganised leadership, secret funds, and a tendency for securitizing defence budgets, strategies and purchases. These are negative signs of a governing norm that has not prioritized domestic transparency and accountability – rather conforming to requests from NATO. The separation between civil authority and military staff is still insufficient, and manpower politics are based on loyalty rather than professionalism. Defence policies are often non-transparent. To improve transparency and accountability is therefore difficult, since this secrecy is closely related to national security. At the same time temptations for corruption increase the risk of securitization. An indirect democratic control monitoring is thus of utmost importance. However, the Georgian parliament, media and opposition are not able to hold the Georgian government accountable for the reforms in the defence sector.

Instead, the Saakashvili government is focusing on radical leadership methods, militarization and symbolic strength rather than on stability and transparency. When radical reforms are carried out, the importance of leadership is high. Saakashvili was elected by 96 percent of the Georgian voters, and according to an
opinion poll from December 2005 he still had approval from 63 percent of the population (down from 84 percent in 2004).²³⁵ Saakashvili’s moral authority is based on his energetic (bordering to populist) charisma and radical reform rate.²³⁶ But if the leader becomes the state, it affects the development negatively. During the Socialist years there were few constraints on rulers, and de facto protection of individual rights was almost non-existent in the Soviet system. As a consequence, very strong leaders developed, like Stalin (himself born in Georgia).²³⁷ Dogmatic Orthodox beliefs and traditions also reinforce an ideal of a strong leader.²³⁸ The current Georgian ‘founding father’ Michail Saakashvili has a tendency for equalling Georgia with himself, and so do the citizens. It is up to the president, to 'Misha', if Georgia succeeds or not. A leading NGO-figure described Saakashvili’s position like this: “Shevardnadze was never loved by the people. Initially he was respected, but not loved by a single person. Saakashvili is loved by the people, and as we know it is easier for love to turn into hate.”²³⁹ As long as the founding father is popular enough there is legitimacy for the state. But the minute Saakashvili falls out of grace, Georgia risks even deeper problems than before since there is no difference between the state and the ruler. To recall Holsti's reasoning, it is dangerous with this 'personalisation of the state'. Vertical legitimacy has seemingly not increased from 2003.

### 6.2 Horizontal Legitimacy

Horizontal legitimacy signifies to what degree everyone within the state's territory is wilfully included in a tolerant way; the socio-political cohesion. There should be no hostility, systematic injustice or scapegoats. This has been related to civil-military norms in this thesis.

Georgia has always been a multi-ethnic country, but the definition of what is Georgian remains exclusive: Georgians speaks Georgian and are Orthodox Christians. Other groups residing on Georgian territory are not included.²⁴⁰ In terms of the around 70 percent of the population who are ethnic Georgian, Saakashvili is popular. They believe that NATO-membership is the best protection against Russian aggression. For the most part, they do not believe in a peaceful resolution of the separatist conflicts. “Georgia is still on an emotional stage, we understand that we should get back the separatist regions in the same way as we lost them – by force”, the political analyst Paata Zakareishvili explains.²⁴¹ The national security that should be safeguarded is the security of ethnic Georgians,

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²³⁶ Blandy 2005.
²³⁸ Karlsson 1999:69;83-4.
²³⁹ Author’s interview Burduli, GYLA. June 2004.
²⁴⁰ Cornell et al 2004:14; ICG 2004b. Ethnic Georgians in Adjara are traditionally Muslim.
²⁴¹ Author’s interview. May 2005.
rather than the entire population living on Georgian territory. Evidently the relations to the separatist regions – and implicitly also to their patron, the Russian Federation – are the most tense. Georgian central authorities also have tense relations to other minority groups, for example ethnic Armenians who live compactly in Javakheti.242 These out-groups are dealt with as scapegoats. Thus there is no cohesive political community in Georgia, and the government is not including its 'out-groups' in a tolerant way into its referent of security. Rather, the tensions between the Georgians and the 'out-groups' are intensified by the big attention paid to defence reforms, a 26,000 man army and a patriotic reservist force which aims for scaring the separatists. The previously low level of horizontal legitimacy becomes even lower because of the Georgian (as well as the Abkhaz/South Ossetian) inconsistency and impatience; sometimes sable rattling and emphasising military force, and sometimes stressing the need for peaceful resolution and economic cooperation.243 With the existing orthodox military logic an internal security dilemma is emerging. As the Georgian armed forces grows stronger, with the help of the American SSOP-programme, there is an actual risk that tensions could escalate from today’s low-intensive ones.244

6.3 Conclusions

The main question for this thesis was: Do recent defence reforms in Georgia create vertical and horizontal legitimacy? It can be said that both vertical and horizontal levels of legitimacy were low in Georgia to begin with. It is tricky to assess levels of legitimacy, since it is not possible to verify or falsify; it cannot be measured in absolute figures. It is always dependent on how it is perceived. But given the previous discussion it is possible to state that the tendency of defence reforms weakens legitimacy both vertically and horizontally. Does that mean that Georgia is entering a state strength dilemma where the stability and democratic processes get affected negatively in the long run?

Since the Rose Revolution in 2003 Saakashvili’s reforms have gained momentum. But maybe Saakashvili’s goal is progress – not democracy. The strongest symbol of development is the new, Georgian army: a well-trained, disciplined army Georgia will no longer be humiliated by the separatists and the Russians, as in the lost civil wars of the 1990s. It shows that Georgia is progressing and getting closer to NATO.245 What has come along with NATO aspirations and the professionalizing of the defence sector is a revolutionary ideology that dislikes dissent, with rulers who do not fully realise the value of a transparent and stable democratic governance of civil-military relations. Moral

243 Anjaparidze February 22, 2005; Parsons 2005; Fuller August 15b, 2005.
244 Cornell 2004:9.
245 It was the sociologist Salome Asatiani who pointed this out to me.
authority and power lies with the president since the state is personalised; while the democratic civil society institutions are not strong enough to be a countervailing force.

Georgia\'s defence reforms are above all constantly fed by the wish of the political leadership to become a NATO-country and thereby distance themselves from Russian influence. At the same time reforms are just as much enforced due to the wish of the Georgian population to regain control over the two separatist regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Simultaneously, Saakashvili promises Euro-Atlantic integration and a united Georgia. Territorial integrity is even the \"goal of his life\". This double-sided aim of the reforms makes defence reforms a high risk, Janus-faced project. The militarized activities and discourse make the future path for civil-military relations in Georgia opaque: is it a NATO-interoperable defence structure that is being created or is it a mechanism for taking back separatist regions by force? Aggressive propaganda and patriotic rhetoric on a united Georgia are not creating opportunities for developing a better communication with the separatist regions. The separatist regions have no real wish to be re-integrated with Georgia. This pushes the Georgian revolutionary democrats to a point where there is little societal cohesion and no legitimacy. Thus, I argue that recent defence reforms threaten the stability and the future consolidation of democracy in Georgia and consequently Georgia is facing a state strength dilemma, as the hypothesis stated.

If the zero-sum confrontation game with the separatist regions would escalate into a new civil war it would be evident that the defence reforms have backfired. But a state strength dilemma does not have to be this radical. Defence reforms use a lot of resources, which could have been spent for development of civil structures, peaceful reconciliation or poverty reduction. Even if Georgia has urgent needs in the security field, democracy might be \"sacrificed on the altar of territorial security\", as Robert Larsson describes it. Huntington argues that \"[d]emocracy is tested by the way in which political leaders respond to their inability to solve the problems confronting their country\". If Saakashvili\’s ratings fall there is a risk that he or his hawkish Minister of Defence might try to stage a Machiavellian ploy by pleasing the general wish territorial unity by using their US-trained troops in finding a solution to the frozen conflicts.

Georgia has a history of illegitimacy and all groups, chiefly Georgians, Ossetians and Abkhaz, have real perceptions of the situation with an inherent

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247 Among others Cornell et al 2004:77 is mentioning this.
248 This is something that several researchers pointed out before me. For example the director at the security and energy programs at the Nixon center, plus the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. See Anjarparidze November 29, 2005.
249 Buzan (1991:270-291) calls this a \‘defence dilemma\'. See also Ball 1988:163-7; Larsson 2004c; UNDP 2002; Reiter 2001:51.
250 Larsson 2004b:73.
251 Huntington 1991:258.
fear of the other. According to Wendt this makes it more difficult to create societal change. Indeed, the greatest challenge for Saakashvili is to start long term planning, and to change the radical character of his leadership so that democratic governance is encouraged and confidence-building measures can be initiated with the out-group. Transparency and fear reduction is urgently needed. Not a realist understanding of a strong state that equals a strong army to scare off the enemy with NATO’s help. With Buzan's terminology: to make issues political, instead of securitizing.

6.4 Future Research

In this thesis tools have been operationalised for analysing vertical and horizontal legitimacy in a weak state reform process. Leaving a minimalist notion of ‘democracy’ behind, and focussing on legitimacy as the indicator of long-term opportunities for change helped us to analyse structural obstacles and threats. This is a step away from the descriptive theories on weak states; a step that is useful in analyzing the delicate balancing act of state strengthening, which might backfire at any stage. This thesis analysed defence reforms, but other reforms might have been just as interesting to analyse from a legitimacy point of view (for example local governance or fight against corruption). It seems that this type of analysis is useful in assessing a weak state facing a window of opportunity for change. It can for example be used to look more adequately critical at other ‘democratic revolutions’ that have taken place in post-communist states. It would also be interesting to compare the militarizing tendencies of the Georgian Rose Revolution with 'the third wave of democratization' in Latin America where formal democratic structures were constructed from militarist states, but an 'illiberal democracy' was created, and power continues to be exercised in authoritarian ways with popular leaders bypassing the parliament, ruling through decrees, often at the expense of human rights and the rule of law. The democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe could also be compared with the totalitarian tendencies of Central Asia. Is the NATO-type of conditionality mechanisms and reforms creating opportunities for a less illegitimate rule after all?

252 This is what Zakaria 1997:48; Dodson and Jackson 2004:3 and Muskhelishvili 2005 argues.
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Interviews

This is a list of most of the individuals I interviewed. Some of them are actively quoted in the thesis, some of them are not. Some of the individuals I met are not mentioned in this list even though they might have contributed to my understanding.


Former teacher at the Military Academy, and senior officer in the artillery interviewed anonymously. May 2005, Tbilisi.