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THE DILEMMA OF JAPAN’S CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN CHINA

-- A CASE STUDY OF JAPANESE MANGA AND ANIME

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**FOREWORD**

Firstly, I would like to express my deep appreciation to my tutor Monica Braw for her tremendous patience and invaluable guidance and advice.

My fieldwork in Japan was favored by Prof. Sakutaro Tanino, and without his kindly suggestions and support, the fieldwork and research afterwards would not proceed smoothly.

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In order to conduct the interviews and questionnaires, it was necessary to have enough respondents in Chinese colleges. Thanks to my friends Dai Ningning and Tian Lei’s help, the questionnaires were successfully distributed and answered in Shanghai Normal University and Heilongjiang University.

Thanks must also be extended to my parents, Jonatan and Wu Yifan for their overall support in encouraging me at all times.

However, no one but myself should be responsible for the thesis results and for any mistakes in the pages that follow.
ABSTRACT

Sino-Japanese relations during late Koizumi period has been widely considered having dropped to the lowest point since the two countries started normal diplomatic relationship in 1972. As a substitute strategy, cultural diplomacy thus became more important to smooth resentments and strengthen common interests on private citizen’s level. This paper’s purpose was to look at the outcome of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China, and it paid special attention to results brought by popular cultural flows based on the case of Japanese manga and anime. The paper used questionnaires to find out how Chinese college students connected their favorable opinion of Japanese popular culture to their attitude towards Japan, and the questionnaires were distributed in Shanghai and Harbin. The main result of the paper was that Japan’s cultural diplomacy dropped into a dilemma, which meant on one hand it improved Japan’s image in Chinese people’s mind and on the other hand the Chinese government-led counteraction largely limited its potential power. The main barrier for Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China was still historical issue.

Key words: Cultural Diplomacy, Sino-Japanese relations, Manga, Anime, Chinese censorship, Chinese youngsters
### ABBREVIATION

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>China Central Television</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>NPOs</td>
<td>Non-Profit Organizations</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>the Second World War</td>
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<td>GAPP</td>
<td>General Administration of Press and Publication of China</td>
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<td>SARFT</td>
<td>State of Administration of Radio Film and Television of China</td>
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<td>JETRO</td>
<td>Japan External Trade Organization</td>
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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 General Background

As the third pillar of accommodating international relationship, cultural diplomacy, compared to economy and politics, has not gained enough attention in academic and political fields. Among published materials on the subject of cultural diplomacy, America’s case is frequently discussed because American cultural diplomacy contributes to America’s success and also arouses conflicts. It is believed that, along with economic and political forces, America’s successful public diplomacy and especially cultural diplomacy also contributed to the final triumph in the Cold War. That is to say, American individualism and democratic values have been carried by Hollywood movies and pop music, which penetrated Communists’ bloc and then loosened up Communist society (Schneider 2004). In addition, so-called cultural imperialism inside America’s cultural diplomacy also engenders certain degree of resentments.

The success of America’s cultural diplomacy has encouraged some countries to learn. In Asia, South Korea’s increasing cultural influence is prominent. The “Korean Wave” does not only make big profits for South Korean entertainment industry, but it also succeeds in improving South Korea’s image as a modernized and also a traditional morals preserved nation. During my fieldwork in Japan, I noticed from media and Japanese friends that since Japan imported large numbers of South Korean soap dramas, Korean craze spread among many Japanese youth and they liked to catch South Korean fashion and pop idols. Some women fans even started to learn Korean language for their idol—Bae Yong Jun\(^1\). For Korea’s former colonial rulers, Japanese attitudes towards Korea improved through popular culture which is already beyond politics.

However, what can cultural diplomacy do for the Sino-Japanese relations, the crucial international relationship in the East Asian community? There is no disagreement that in history Japanese culture was profoundly affected by Chinese traditional culture. While nowadays Japan starts to transfer Japanese culture especially popular culture to

\(^1\) Bae Yong Jun is the actor in South Korean soap drama the “Winter Sonata”, which enjoyed highly popularity in Japan. After “Winter Sonata” Korean dramas became popular in Japan, and Bae Yong Jun and his “Winter Sonata” have widely considered as main spotlight of the “Korean Wave”.
China. The outcome of modern transnational cultural flows tends to be neglected, because most discussions about the Sino-Japanese relations are about politics and economy. Indeed, politics and economy basically lead the direction of the Sino-Japanese relations, but cultural diplomacy provides this field with the perspective of long-term cultural influence on private citizen’s level, which can also reflect political and economic connections between the two countries.

1.2 Research Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to look at the outcome of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China, and it pays special attention to results brought by popular cultural flows based on the case of Japanese manga and anime. In the paper China refers to mainland, because Taiwan, Hongkong and Macao hold different attitudes (more open) towards Japan and Japanese culture due to their colonial histories and relatively highly developed social levels.

In order to approach this purpose, a number of sub-questions will be raised. Firstly, what is Japan’s expectation on cultural diplomacy related to China? Secondly, how does the Chinese government react to Japan’s cultural diplomacy? Thirdly, has Japan’s cultural diplomacy helped improve Japan’s image in Chinese youth’s mind? Next, which factors do play major roles in China’s reaction? Finally, how can we look at the future of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China?

1.3 Methodological Considerations
Considering the research purpose and research questions mentioned above, the primary and most important methodology applied in this paper is the inductive approach and method. However, in the part of the questionnaire, since my former observations have already given me the preliminary impression that Chinese college students held an ambivalent attitude towards Japan and regional differences was supposed to appear, the deductive approach and method are also indispensable in this thesis. The paper thus is basically a combination of both inductive and deductive approaches.

The following methods are also applied to this paper. Firstly, documentary research was the most important way to know the governmental policies such as Japan’s
policies of cultural diplomacy and China’s counteractive policies to Japanese manga and anime. Secondly, in order to know how Chinese youngsters connect their favorable impression of Japanese popular culture with their attitude towards Japan, interview research was necessary in order to collect relevant information and useful data. Interview research also gave me an opportunity to know directly how Japanese diplomats and scholars considered Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China.

Meanwhile, both primary and secondary data are reflected in the research. The primary data was collected and summarized through statistic analysis based on the choices made by the Chinese respondents to given questions. The secondary data was mainly used for basic fundamental information and theoretical context, such as Japan’s investment in public diplomacy and China’s import of Japanese manga and anime.

1.4 Disposition
In Chapter 2 I lay out the theoretical framework in terms of certain concepts and theories of cultural diplomacy’s academic field, and the cases of the United States and South Korea will be introduced as background for cultural diplomacy and comparison for Japan’s cultural diplomacy. Chapter 3 will mainly discuss the feature of Japan’s cultural diplomacy, including its general contour, weakness and the expectation and efforts that Japan’s cultural diplomacy has made in China. In Chapter 4 I examine how China reacts to Japan’s cultural diplomacy based on the case of Japanese manga and anime. This part consists of the counteraction from the Chinese government and the actual effect concerning Chinese college students. Finally, conclusions on the basis of above discussion will be presented in the end of this paper.
Chapter 2. Discussion about the Theory of Cultural Diplomacy

“There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run, the sword is always beaten by the mind.”

--Napoleon

2.1 The Concept of Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy, which emphasizes “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their people to foster mutual understanding” (Cummings 2003:1), is generally considered as a component and linchpin of public diplomacy². Compared to public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy requires long-term relationship building, as discussed by Kevin Mulcahy and Harvey Feigenbaum (Mulcahy 1999:3-7, Feigenbaum 2001:8-10). Furthermore, since American scholar Joseph S. Nye coined the term of “Soft Power” in 1990 (Nye 1990), cultural diplomacy has usually been connected with soft power, because the soft power theory provided a general theoretical interpretation for the validity of cultural diplomacy.

Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals” and hard power on the other hand is the ability to “use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will” (Nye 2003). The theory highlights the huge function of soft power, which influences people and creates a favorable atmosphere overseas to help get desired outcomes in the long term rather than conquer or coerce people. According to Nye, seduction is always more effective and cheaper than coercion, and especially values like democracy and individualism, which are deeply seductive, requires to be rooted in mind by mild power (Nye 2004). Therefore, countries who fully utilize their soft power in their foreign policies tend to win hearts and mind relatively easier, particularly in a global information age. The theory moreover postulates that one country’s soft power primarily arises from its attractiveness including three resources—its culture including high culture³ and popular culture; its political value;

² According to Michael McClellan presented in 14 October, 2004 in Vienna Diplomatic Academy, public diplomacy is “the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of advocate country's foreign policy objectives”. See here http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/45.htm.
³ High Culture refers to knowledge that leads people to broad and deep understanding of life. Literature, philosophy, fine arts, religion etc. are parts of high culture.
its foreign policy (Nye 2004), so cultural diplomacy is a prime example of spreading the country’s soft power in the world.

Cultural diplomacy, with its peaceful cultural interaction, has been in favor of cultivating an atmosphere of tolerance and respect, which consequently leads to eliminate prejudice and strengthen common interests. In promoting mutual understanding, it seeks to provide a context within which certain country’s interests and policies can be understood by foreigners. And through diffusing culture with certain values, cultural diplomacy is also involved in the process of shaping people’s ideology and viewpoints. Cultural diplomacy’s major difference from traditional diplomacy is that it targets individuals rather than governments. Moreover, it is uniquely able to reach out to young people, to non-elites, to broad audiences (U.S. Department of State 2005), and then helps foster a favorable public opinion. Particularly if youth appreciates the culture of a certain foreign country, they may someday implement favorable decisions towards that country if they come into power. Similarly, Former Secretary of State of the United States George Schultz’s comment on diplomacy is particularly applicable to cultural diplomacy, “You get the weeds out when they are small. You also build confidence and understanding. Then, when a crisis arises, you have a solid base from which to work” (Schultz 1997:9). Therefore, popular culture plays an important role because of its prominent attractiveness to young people, as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso said, “I think we can safely say that any kind of cultural diplomacy that fails to take advantage of pop culture is not really worthy of being called ‘cultural diplomacy’” (Internet Source: MOFA 2006).

Primarily, government, private sector and NGOs consist of the main actors in cultural diplomatic field. I would like to underscore the function of government, which in principle draws a contour of cultural policy and provides institutional support for cultural exchanging projects. Programs in cultural diplomacy are often strongest “if they have a firm institutional base, grounded in legislation, and when they have strong support at the top of the federal government” (Cummings 2003:14). Moreover, successful cultural diplomacy ultimately must focus on equal and two-way communication with foreigners, so if one country implements one-way propaganda, the attractiveness of that country will be discounted.
In the conduct of modern diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is certainly gaining new ground, because globalization has brought a new atmosphere for cultural flows. Firstly, advanced technology facilitates information transportation and communication, which doubtlessly provides technological possibilities for cultural diplomacy’s further involving in international affairs. At the same time, any culture and its cultural agenda are confronting unprecedented challenge from the outside world in the globalized era, and the cultural products can not help increasingly participate in the transnational cultural flows to survive in fierce competitiveness (Bélanger: 1999). In this sense, under the background of economic liberalization and cultural diversification, cultural diplomacy will be less efficient since the attractiveness of a certain country’s culture may be reduced due to worldwide competition. On the whole, globalization has produced both opportunities and pressures for cultural diplomacy.

2.2 The Limits of Cultural Diplomacy

In spite of the abovementioned advantages of cultural diplomacy, the limits of cultural diplomacy also have to be realized here. Firstly, from the perspective of time, investment in cultural diplomacy is a long-term involvement, and it may take many years or even several decades to bring into effect. That is to say, cultural diplomacy will not be a wise choice for certain policies that are intended for immediate outcome.

Secondly, with regard to the extension of cultural diplomacy’s influence, it is particularly relevant to realize “milieu goals”\(^4\) that cultivate favorable public opinions for other specific goals. Cultural diplomacy is more likely to have an impact on the general goals that a country seeks (Nye 2004:16).

Thirdly, public perception may change quickly, so it is hard to capture changes in public opinion brought by cultural diplomacy. Even if opinion polls are essential ways to measure the changes, Nye nonetheless points out that such volatility of opinion can not be caught by any one ephemeral poll, unless the same questions are asked consistently over some period (Nye 2004:18).

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\(^4\) The concept of “milieu goals” was coined by Arnold Wolfers. “Milieu goals” aim to shape the environment in which one state operates in order to create conditions conducive to its long-term strategic and economic interests.
Above all, cultural diplomacy is not omnipotent, and its power depends on context—who relates to whom under what circumstances, so we have to take the existence of willing interpreters and receivers into consideration (Nye 2004:16). Moreover, military and economic power sometimes reinforce cultural diplomacy and sometimes interfere with it, so if cultural diplomatic strategies get proper assistance from military and economic forces, cultural diplomacy could largely increase its efficiency. So to speak, wise diplomacy will not neglect any one of the three types of diplomacy strategically, and it makes them cooperate well, as Nye said, “smart power is neither hard nor soft. It’s both.” (Nye 2004: XII)

2.3 The Case of the United States

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the success of America’s cultural diplomacy is prominent. In a broader sense, the triumph of the Cold War in terms of winning hearts and minds was reached by cultural diplomacy as well as military and economic power. Currently, American cultural products have become the top export of the United States instead of aerospace products (Schneider 2004). Moreover, since cultural activities overseas during the Cold War were sponsored by the government, the efforts made by American government for strengthening cultural diplomacy were obvious (Schneider 2003:4). In a word, the history of Cold War cultural diplomacy “proved both the potency of American culture and the ability of the U.S. government to deploy it” (Schneider 2003:18). However, after 9.11 terrorist attacks, the United States has been criticized to the extent that the severe anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world is the failure of cultural diplomacy, because importance of cultural diplomacy after the Cold War was neglected and the strategies of cultural diplomacy were inaccurate (U.S. Department of State 2005). Another consequence caused by ignoring cultural diplomacy is that, opinion polls showed that the recent Iraq War and Afghanistan War resulted in the increase of mistrust and diminishing American credibility in the world (Nye 2004). In order to avoid paying short-sighted costs for increased animosity and terrorism, cultural diplomacy has to return under the spotlight of foreign policy. It exposes the fact that active involvement in and funding for cultural diplomatic programs by the American government have “most often been stimulated by a perceived foreign threat or crisis” (Cummings 2003:12).

2.4 The Case of South Korea
Different from American popular culture’s long-term predominance, South Korean popular culture has gained popularity in Asia and even in the world in recent years, and Korean films and TV soap dramas are appreciated by numerous Korean fans among foreign youth (Onishi 2005). Furthermore, the “invisible hand” behind “Korean Wave” is the firm support from South Korean government, which provided direct investment in the entertainment industry since the late 1990s, jumping “from $8.5 billion in 1999 to $43.5 billion in 2003” (ibid). The investment ensures Korean popular cultural products’ high quality and cheaper price in the competitive market, and it certainly helps spread the Korean culture as widely as possible. Besides direct investment, governmental policy support is also indispensable for the popularity of South Korea’s popular culture. For instance, for decades South Korean government “imposed a total ban on the import of Japanese cultural products” (Katzenstein 2002:35), and South Korean local popular cultural industry benefited from the less competitive domestic living conditions. South Korea’s case actually suggests that successful cultural diplomacy can not live without strong support from government.
Chapter 3. Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy and its Expectation on China

In order to know the outcome of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China, the concept and expectation of Japan’s cultural diplomacy should be taken into consideration. Consequently, this chapter firstly concerns the concept of Japan’s cultural diplomacy, and the function of the Japanese government will be in focus. Secondly, the weakness of Japan’s cultural diplomacy, which limits its potential power, will be presented. Thirdly, based on documentary studies and interview with a Japanese diplomat, I would like to discuss Japan’s expectation with regard to cultural diplomacy especially with the case of China.

3.1 The Transformation of the Concept

The Former Minister for Foreign Affairs Ohira Masayoshi put cultural diplomacy as one of four important points of Japan’s diplomatic policies in a speech to Diet in January 27, 1973, and it meant that the government started to emphasized the importance of cultural diplomacy in postwar era (Ding 2006:2). American cultural output in Japan starting with the Occupation actually gained popularity for the United States and has had tremendous influence on Japanese viewpoints as well as lifestyle, which provides Japan’s cultural diplomacy a reference to use (Internet Source: MOFA 2006). The interpretation from the former Minister for Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono in a speech to the Diet in January 2001 can give a general point of view of Japan’s cultural diplomacy:

“in building trust among people and among countries from a long-term perspective, we must endeavor to find common values and forge a path towards mutual understanding, while maintaining a deep respect for the cultures and histories developed by other peoples and for our differences. Abundant cultural contact serves as the driving force in the construction of a peaceful and dynamic human society. We will proactively provide opportunities for such contact and in particular, we intend to further promote among youth, in whose hands the future of our world is laid, and we will also promote grass-roots exchange.” (Internet Source: MOFA 2001)

Japan’s cultural diplomacy has also showed Japan’s unique features. Japan’s postwar cultural diplomacy had two turning points as Katzenstein analyzed, one occurring in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the other in the early and mid-1990s (Katzenstein 2002:11). Katzenstein further explained that the first turning point occurred because of the rising economic friction between Japan and foreign countries at that time, so cultural diplomacy served the purpose of creating abroad a supportive climate for
Japanese entrepreneurs and interpreting Japan’s uniqueness through Japanese culture and values (Katzenstein 2002:10-13). After the first turning point cultural exchange programs focused overwhelmingly on high culture to raise Japan’s worldwide attractiveness, because high culture “intimately connected to the idea of fidelity to a tradition of deep study……best reflected Japan’s uniqueness” (Katzenstein 2002:11). Generally speaking, Japan’s cultural diplomacy during this period succeeded in assisting the commercial sector by smoothing business tensions. For instance, current Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso’s speech was also in line with the conclusion that, Japanese comics like Astro Boy and Doraemon helped shift the meaning of “robot” from negative to positive, because their images were benevolent friends who helped human being (Internet Source: MOFA 2006). According to him, this helped that countries with an affinity for the comics did not have workers who rejected industrial robots, and Japanese-made industrial robot certainly sold well (ibid).

The second turning point occurred under the background of Japan’s economic stagnation since the 1990s while its Asian neighbors’ economy arose rapidly. Meanwhile, the increasing trend of globalization forced the concept of Japan’s cultural diplomacy to be modified to adapt to the new environment. Since then cultural initiatives emphasized cooperative and balanced relationship with other countries. As Hirano pointed out, after many decades of being subordinated to economic considerations by the end of 1980s the cultural elements in Japan’s foreign policy have acquired a more independent standing (Hirano 1988). The new trend brought the rise of new actors involved in cultural diplomacy instead of central government’s domination, for example new actors like prefecture governments, NGOs, NPOs and corporate philanthropy started to actively participate in cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, since the cultural diplomacy moved away from serving Japan’s narrow economic interests, Japanese popular culture became a more important part in Japan’s culture diplomacy strategy. In the 1990s the export of Japanese mass culture to Asia-Pacific actually increased sharply as well as a burgeoning popular cultural industry gradually came into being. The progress however, was closely intertwined with politics, because in the early 1990s the state was “quite self-conscious in announcing that Japan was on its way of becoming a ‘life-style superpower’ that would find new and creative ways of using leisure time” (Katzenstein 2002:31). Hereby, even if Japan was suffering from economic
difficulties, the modification of policy directly assists the quiet growth of Japan’s global cultural influence, which is called “growing national cool” by McGray (McGray 2002).

Furthermore, the development of Japanese popular culture successfully interacts with cultural diplomacy’s new emphasis--Asian regionalism. As a transmission belt for American popular culture, Japanese popular culture neutralizes Western specific features and creates similar modern life-style of cosmopolitan consumerism in a Japanese way. This meets Asian people’s yearning for modernity, especially among middle-class and youth. Iwabuchi argues that fans of Japanese popular culture are drawn to the depiction of a lifestyle that resonates with their desires, if not real experiences, in life (Iwabuchi 1999). Japanese popular culture has no trouble being understood and is easily accepted by Asian people due to their geographical and cultural proximities, so Japanese popular culture is becoming Asian popular culture, especially in East and Southeast Asia. In East Asia, “More and more young people have joined the so-called ‘Japanophile tribe’ by mimicking Japanese fashion and enthusiastically following Japanese anime and TV dramas” (JETRO 2005:4), and the phenomenon might help a positive image of Japan instead of its negative image because of wartime history and smooth the resentment to influence political negotiations. In the context, the image of Japan contributed by popular culture is modern and cosmopolitan, which is effective in “penetrating throughout the general public, to be ally in diplomacy” (Internet Source: MOFA 2006), so “taking popular culture seriously” (ibid) is an important strategy in Japan’s cultural diplomacy.

In fact, MOFA takes major responsibility for cultural diplomacy, which is implemented primarily through Japan Foundation. Japan Foundation was established in 1972 as a special legal entity under the auspices of MOFA and became an independent administrative institution on October 1, 2003 (Internet Source: Japan Foundation 2006). The aim of setting up Japan Foundation was to “combat both the misunderstandings of Japanese foreign policy and Japanese business practices overseas and to counteract an underlying fear of isolation that remains a constant theme in Japan’s cultural diplomacy” (Katzenstein 2002:14). Japan Foundation’s main responsibility consists of the following four categories:
1) Promotion of cultural and arts exchange;
2) Promotion of overseas Japanese-language education and intellectual exchange;
3) Promotion of overseas Japanese studies and intellectual exchange;
4) Support of collection and provision of international exchange information and international cultural exchange standard bearers.

(Internet Source: Japan Foundation 2006)

According to Japan Foundation’s Annual Report 2004, its government subsidies were 13,786 million Yen, taking up 82% of total revenues--16,747 million Yen (Japan Foundation Report 2004:38). Meanwhile, there is no sign showing that the state has funded popular cultural industry directly as South Korea did in the end of 1990s, but the government still exerts political influence by assisting the industry. For instance, the government encourages professional education specializing in this field (Internet Source: MOFA 2006); invites foreign journalists to access manga and anime industry and modern Japanese culture (Internet Source: MOFA 2005); organizes popular culture’s exhibitions overseas; establishes worldwide manga and anime awards to promote their production and influence etc (Internet Source: MOFA 2006).

Considering popular culture’s diplomatic effect, in the future the Japanese government intends to connect popular cultural industry with government closer, but so far no detailed projects and budget had been made (Interview: Tokyo, August 3, 2006).

Above all, the Japanese government plays a vital role in cultural diplomacy in terms of drawing a general contour and regulating the direction of its development, as Katzenstein said, “both times policy change resulted from the central government’s self-conscious attempt to reshape its international image” (Katzenstein 2002:11). In a word, cultural diplomacy is an integral part of Japanese foreign policy.

3.2 The Weakness of Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy

Not only is the progress contributed by Japan’s cultural diplomacy prominent, but also the indigenous weakness in it which harms its potential huge power will be mentioned. Based on other scholars’ research and my own understanding, I conclude four general points of weakness.

Firstly, the historical issue has always restricted Japan’s attractiveness because of its ambiguous attitude towards repudiate the past aggression and atrocities in WWII.
Until now MOFA and Japan Foundation have stayed deliberately clear of the controversial issue (Katzenstein 2002:14), and this reversely arouses repulsion in other Asian nations. Since the anger caused by the historical issue is still widely existing among people in the victim countries (especially in China and Korea), it pushes Japan into an inferior position in political negotiations. That’s why Japan insists on cultural exchange targeting youth and grassroots to smooth folk resentments. Yet without dealing with the historical issue properly it would never really resolve problems. Joseph S. Nye concludes that Japan’s unwillingness to deal frankly with the history continues to “limit its ability to transform resources into soft power in the sense of obtaining the policy it desires” (Nye 2004:88).

Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 2, cultural diplomacy underscores equal and two-way cultural exchange rather than single direction’s propaganda, and in the long term unequal cultural exchanges would arouse antipathy in receiver nations. Even after the second turning point Japan’s cultural diplomacy pays attention to relatively cooperative, balanced and non-hierarchical exchanges, but still inside Japan’s cultural exchange programs only a minor part focuses on sending Japanese people overseas to study other cultures while the efforts inviting foreigners to Japan are overwhelming (University of Tokyo Study Group on International Cultural Relations 1997). Katzenstein refers that cultural relations between Japan and Southeast Asia remained “hierarchical rather than egalitarian” (Katzenstein 2002:15). In the context, even though Japan’s cultural diplomacy has evolved along regional lines since 1980s, it still constructs a position of “similar but superior” and “in but above Asia”, so the “imaginary distance” between Japan and Asia has been firmly maintained (Iwabuchi 2002:11). Therefore, what is perceived as cultural imperialism tends to hurt Japan’s appeal and the efficiency of Japan’s cultural diplomacy.

Thirdly, the increasing emphasis on cultural diplomacy in Japan has been impressive, but if we look at it in a comparative context we will have an all-around and comprehensive understanding. Table 1 compares investments in public diplomacy with investments in defense of the five leading developed countries. As discussed in Chapter 2, cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy (U.S. Department of State 2005), so this table also indicates the environment of investment in cultural diplomacy. Postulating that there’s not much difference between the year 2001 and
2002, Table 1 clearly shows Japan’s investment in public diplomacy ranks the lowest among all the five countries, especially compared to its huge investment in defense, which ranks as the second one only after the United States. In addition, Japan’s expense in public diplomacy is only 0.5% of its defense expense, a little more than the United States’ 0.32% rate, while far behind France’s 3%, Great Britain’s 2.6% and Germany’s 0.79%. The comparison suggests that the Japanese government gives overwhelming priority to defense, and this emphasis will not help improve domestic environment for Japan’s public diplomacy and accordingly cultural diplomacy.

Table 1. Comparative Investment in Soft and Hard Power

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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>$ 1.05 B</td>
<td>$ 33.6 B</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>$ 1.00 B</td>
<td>$ 38.4 B</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$ 218 M</td>
<td>$ 27.5 B</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$ 210 M</td>
<td>$ 40.3 B</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The fourth one points to the weakness of cultural product itself, and I would like to mention two visible aspects. First of all, large amounts of Japanese popular cultural products tightly relate to the kind of metropolitan and Western way of life which could exist anywhere in the world. That is to say, Japanese popular cultural products express an ambiguous national identity, which on the one hand must be favorable for the worldwide market, while on the other hand subconsciously causes difficulty in connecting the products to Japan. Secondly, the prevalence of Japanese popular cultural products also exposes their violent, pornographic and other aspects, which in many places are seen as doing harm for youth, leading to certain degree of negative image of Japan. However, within the so-called liberal economic and political system, cultural products’ features are basically determined by markets, and the Japanese government can do little about the how and what to make and export, so the filtering
duty has to be left to receiver countries (Interview: Tokyo, July 28, 2006). This in itself actually creates barriers for Japanese cultural diplomacy.

### 3.3 The Expectation on China

Different from the relations with Western countries, close traditional cultural ties and mutual deep-rooted resentment nevertheless bring Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China to an extreme complexity. Since the two countries normalized diplomatic relationship in 1972, Japan’s cultural diplomacy towards China became significant, especially after China’s economic reforms in 1978. For instance, in 1980 Japan Foundation established a Japanese Language Research Center at Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages (Japan Foundation Report 1995:128); in 1985 Japan Foundation established the Beijing Center for Japanese Studies (The Japan Foundation Overview of Programs 1991:57). However, the good beginning froze because of Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and cultural exchanges supported by the Japanese government was not restored until 1992 (Betzler&Austin 1997). The office of Japan Foundation in Beijing which is the second largest branch office (after the United States) opened in 1994 to promote further cultural exchanges in China (Internet Source: Japan Foundation’s Office in Beijing 2006).

Considering Japan’s negative reputation related to wartime atrocities in China, the initiative of Japan’s cultural diplomacy towards China basically pays attention to the improving relationship with Chinese grassroots and youth (ibid). In 1990s the spreading of Japanese popular culture and high technological products in China cultivated large numbers of *harizu* among youth, which could be regarded as a progress. However, during former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s tenure from year 2001 to 2006, Sino-Japanese relations dropped into the five-year-long political stalemate seemingly due to Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and the textbook issue. Anti-Japan protests and even riots spread in cities and cyberspace, and then the public opinion of Japan in China fell into the worst after 1972. In order to reduce the mistrust in Japan among Chinese youth, MOFA increased the budget for Japanese propaganda in China in 2006 with 1.16 billion yen to a total of 3.11 billion yen, and the increasing part of the budget was

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5 *Harizu* (哈日族), a group of people who has craze for Japanese culture and catches Japan’s fashion.
mainly used for broadcasting Japanese pop music and anime in Chinese radio and TV (Guo 2006).

In face of the fluctuating situation in China, an interview with Senior Regional Coordinator of MOFA Kiyomi Seno (Interview: Tokyo, August 3, 2006) showed me the official expectation on cultural diplomacy in China. The diplomat considered that popular culture could have profound influence that economy and politics might not have. Yet the Japanese government did not expect to change Chinese people’s negative attitude towards Japan during short periods which would be impossible, so a long term strategy was necessary. Implementing cultural exchanges, especially popular culture, is a potential way to ameliorate relationship with Chinese youth separately from politics and economy. And more cultural activities would be organized by MOFA and other Japanese organizations for Chinese youth in the future. From my understanding, the expectation is relatively low, but when political communication dropped into bottom, cultural diplomacy has to be a substitute strategy. In the context, with regard to China, even if cultural exchange will not bring instant outcomes, Japan will still fully utilize the function of cultural diplomacy. In a word, it’s better than do nothing.
Chapter 4. China’s Reaction to Japan’s Cultural Diplomacy

In this chapter I would like to find out how China has reacted to Japan’s cultural diplomacy from the points of government and private citizens. Among Japanese popular cultural products, I choose Japanese manga and anime\(^6\) as the targeted research object. Japanese manga and anime have been highly favored in the worldwide market, and particularly in the Asian market they are one of the most prestigious Japanese cultural products. According to a poll concerning how Chinese youth born after 1980s regards Japan, 82.81% of the respondents say that Japanese manga and anime are the major Japanese cultural genres they accept in daily life\(^7\). That is to say, the influence brought by Japanese manga and anime in China can be the most representative among Japanese popular cultural products.

In the first part of the chapter, I will trace how the Chinese government counteracts Japanese manga and anime and their harming influence in Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China. Then the last part will reflect the statistic results of questionnaires and their analysis and interpretation.

4.1 The Chinese government’s Counteraction

Japanese manga and anime’s dissemination in China actually has been kept in the background of China’s economic reforms and the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, which need cultural import for both economic and political considerations. The materials listing below will indicate the dissemination’s start.

In 1979, as Casio Calculator’s brand representative, the image of *Astro Boy* was first imported into China;

In 1980, Osamu Tezuka’s anime *Astro Boy* was broadcasted in CCTV;

In 1982, Osamu Tezuka’s another anime *Janguru Taitei* went into China. And Shanghai People Publishing Company published *Astro Boy* and *Janguru Taitei*, which were the first two Japanese manga books publishing in China;

In 1984, Guangdong TV Station imported *Hana no Ko Lunlun* and *The Wonderful Adventures of Nils*, and Shanghai TV Station imported *Smart Monk Yixiu*;

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\(^6\) In Chinese, manga and anime are usually represented by one word--dongman (动漫).

\(^7\) The Magazine Globe and SINA online media company co-released the poll in August 12, 2005, which was concerned how Chinese youth born in 1980s regard Japan and Japan’s image in their mind, and totally 8742 respondents replied their questionnaires. See here: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/globe/2005-08/12/content_3343839.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/globe/2005-08/12/content_3343839.htm)
In 1991, two classic anime *Doraemon* and *Saint Seiya* were introduced into China; (Wang 2006) Japanese manga and anime’s attractive stories and delicate production, which made a sharp contrast with Chinese sermonizing and dull entertainment for youngsters, suddenly caught high popularity in China. Through to 1994, Japanese manga and anime overwhelmingly dominated Chinese market and Chinese youngsters’ entertainment.

**4.1.1 The Counteraction to Japanese Manga**

With regard to Japanese manga, both legal and illegal versions appeared in the market, and especially pirate and smuggled Japanese manga flooded. Chinese youngsters’ great interest in Japanese manga books gradually drew the government’s attention. In 1995 the Chinese government firstly confiscated the most popular manga journal *King of Manga*, which mainly published Japanese manga at that time, and then carried out “China’s Manga Publishing Project” (5155 Project) in the same year. According to official voices, the purpose of “5155 Project” was to counteract foreign manga’s unhealthy influence in Chinese youth and advocate publishing local manga books that represented Chinese native patriotism and collectivism (Internet Source: China Cartoon 2006). With the command from central government, the “5155 Project” aimed to establish 5 Chinese local manga production bases, publish 15 series of large manga books and found 5 manga journals. Moreover, in order to keep domestic manga books’ prior position in market, GAPP controlled the import of foreign manga strictly, so since then foreign manga have had much difficulty in entering Chinese market in legal ways. Even if the Project did not clearly claim to go against Japanese manga, considering Japanese manga’s high popularity beforehand and its dominating market share, Japanese manga has been the victim of the Project. My informant who worked in a Tokyo-based publishing company said, in principle from setting program to ultimate publishing it took approximately 1-2 years to publish one Japanese manga book in China, because imported Japanese manga were requested long procedure of censoring (Interview: Lund, November 11, 2006). Actually a very limited amount of manga works could survive the censorship, so this publishing company almost gave up Chinese market.
The Chinese government peremptorily limited Japanese manga’s spreading influence in China with its autocratic political power, and the essential motive was to keep youth’s ideology under control. Hereby, it was obvious that the Chinese government also paid attention to the “threat” of Japan’s popularity among youngsters. That’s why the government almost totally banned official import of Japanese manga and sponsored Chinese domestic manga books to cultivate youth. After limiting the import of Japanese manga, China-made manga books led the market, but the sermonizing content and low level production were not accepted well by the Chinese teenagers who have experienced the attractive Japanese products. Consequently, the potentially huge market has not blocked the illegal trade, so the pirate and smuggled Japanese manga exists in Chinese underground market all the same.

4.1.2 The Counteraction to Japanese Anime

Likewise, Japanese anime has also been counteracted by China’s anime censorship. Actually since Guangdong TV Station imported *Hana no Ko Lunlun* in 1984, the monopolization of foreign anime’s intake by CCTV had been broken, and local TV Stations became able to import anime under the central government’s instruction. However, in 1994 the Ministry of Radio Film and Television constituted rules of law for importing and broadcasting foreign TV programs, which aimed to strengthen central government’s censorship and limited the proportion of broadcasting imported TV programs, including anime (Liu 2004). Yet Chinese domestic anime’s small amount of production did not match market requirement, so Japanese anime still dominated the market. Furthermore, in 2000 SARFT’s new regulation required extra censoring when local TV Stations imported overseas anime and it also restricted foreign anime’s broadcasting on TV (Beijing News Newspaper 2006). Accordingly, considering the development of Chinese internal anime industry, the era of Japanese anime’s domination in Chinese TV ended. In April 2004 SARFT regulated that in any TV Station at least 60% of the total amount of broadcasted anime shows had to be China-made. This notification was actually under the instruction of “The Opinion for Strengthening and Improving Young People’s Mentality and Morality” from the central government (Internet Source: SARFT 2004a).

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* The Ministry of Radio Film and Television was reorganized in 1998, and its new organization is the State of Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT).
After the economic reforms, Chinese media actually has also taken the economic factor into consideration rather than only political consideration. Since popular Japanese anime could bring in more advertisements for TV Stations, a few TV Stations disobeyed SARFT’s regulations and broadcasted Japanese anime which has not officially imported. For instance, in 2004 one channel of Dezhou TV Station went against SARFT to play Japanese anime *Crayon Shin-chan* which has not been officially imported, and then SARFT severely punished the whole TV Station (Internet Source: SARFT 2004b). The case suggests that counteracting Japanese anime results in the contradictory between the government and local media, and the government still dominates the whole situation.

Furthermore, SARFT promulgated in August 2006 that since September 1, 2006 no TV channel would be allowed to broadcast foreign anime within prime time (17:00—20:00), and only homemade anime could be available for audiences. Even anime co-produced by domestic and foreign companies must request certain administrative approval before being permitted to broadcast during prime time (Beijing News Newspaper 2006). In fact, over 60% of the animated cartoons broadcasted around the world are made in Japan (JETRO Report 2005:2), so objectively speaking the regulations largely limit Japanese anime’s popularity in China.

Under abovementioned policies, from April 2004 to 2005 no new Japanese anime gained official permit to broadcast in China (Zhang 2005), so currently old-imported Japanese anime have been repeated broadcasting. The only official way of accessing newly released Japanese manga and anime is through international cartoon exhibitions. The policies indeed deprived of youngsters’ right to choose their favorite entertainment, so it aroused argument in the society. (Internet Source: Law Evening Paper 2006) This led to some Chinese youngsters expressing their anger in ways of rejecting local anime and watching Japanese anime before and after prime hours.9

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9 Chinese youngsters widely expressed their anger in online forums and blogs (internet diary). For instance, since SARFT released the regulation, Tianya Forum, one of the most famous online forums in China, widely discussed the issue. Basically, people were extremely critical to SARFT and they would like to prefer to watch Japanese anime after prime hours or download. See some discussions here (Chinese only):
http://www.tianya.cn/New/PublicForum/Content.asp?flag=1&idWriter=0&Key=0&idArticle=781326&strItem=free
When VCD, DVD and Internet were not popular in China, TV was the only way to watch Japanese anime, but now Chinese youngsters can resort to illegal version of new Japanese anime by downloading from Internet for free or buying pirate. Particularly, since broad band spreads quickly in China, downloading Japanese anime becomes convenient and popular. In the context, Japanese manga and anime still exert appeal in a semi-underground way. Yet large amounts of violent and pornographic manga go into the illegal market without surveillance, which have resulted in parents’ antipathy, so this also provides the government an excuse for criticizing and quarantining Japanese manga and anime. For instance, SARFT declared that prohibiting TV channels to broadcast foreign anime during prime hours was based on choices of youngsters and their parents (Internet source: China News Agency 2006).

4.1.3 Analysis and Conclusion

Nevertheless, the government counteraction to Japanese manga and anime is not only for the consideration of politics, it is also aimed at the profitable industry. For instance, China is the biggest anime receiving market, which potential market is estimated to be 100 billion Yuan (Tian 2006). Hence counteracting the biggest rival, Japanese manga and anime, can be regarded as an unavoidable strategy for protecting Chinese local industry, especially within the so-called half-market mechanism. Similar to South Korea, China provides the industry with both direct investment and political support. The abovementioned policies with the purpose of promoting domestic manga and anime and blocking foreign products are typical supportive actions. As a result, the state-led industry enables Chinese local manga and anime entrepreneurs to emerge quickly these years, and total 5473 entrepreneurs made 42700 minutes anime products in 2005 which almost equaled the total output from 1993 to 2003 (Bai 2006). Yet the success they have achieved is still hard to catch up with Japanese anime. This new trend suggests that a multilayer consideration should be taken into China’s counteraction to Japanese manga and anime.

The case of manga and anime is a typical example of the background and instrument of the Chinese government-organized counteraction. Firstly, since China recognizes that Japanese manga and anime may harm the Communism value system and

http://www.tianya.cn/New/PublicForum/Content.asp?flag=1&idWriter=0&Key=0&idArticle=792799&strItem=free
cultivate interest for Japan among youngsters, the government fully exerts its political power to limit the influence of Japanese manga and anime. Secondly, in spite of governmental actions, illegal distribution still gives fashionable Japanese manga and anime an underground way of presentation which is popular in China now, so Japanese manga and anime’s incomparable attractiveness and high quality are still assured of its popularity. Thirdly, the economic factor also plays an important role in limiting Japanese manga and anime. Fourthly, considering the worsened Sino-Japanese relations during Koizumi’s tenure, the gradually tightening policies actually are coincident with the changes of bilateral relations these years. Besides Japanese manga and anime, the official import of other Japanese popular cultural products such as pop music and TV dramas has also been sharply reduced these years. Yet since Sino-Japanese relations relatively improved with the beginning of Shinzo Abe’s tenure, more Japanese TV dramas started to appear in Chinese TV in last half part of 2006 (Qian 2006).

4.2 A Case Study of Chinese College Students

4.2.1 Design of the Questionnaire

One of the thesis’s main concerns is to explore how Chinese youngsters connect their favor of Japanese popular cultural products with their attitude towards Japan. I thus designed questionnaires about Japanese manga and anime which targets Chinese college students in Shanghai and Harbin. Prior to introducing the questionnaire, one general background should be taken into consideration. Opinion poll¹⁰ shows that 57.85% of those respondents declare that the main image of Japan in their mind come from Chinese news media. That is to say, government’s orthodox propaganda largely determines how the respondents consider Japan.

The design of the questionnaire can be summarized in two points. Firstly setting Chinese college students as the respondents is because this group of youth aging from 19 to 23 fully accessed Japanese manga and anime since childhood, so the familiarity makes the questionnaire doable. Particularly, they were born after China’s economic reforms and come into contact with more Western values, so their views of Japan are

¹⁰ The Magazine Globe and SINA online media company co-released the poll in August 12, 2005, which was concerned how Chinese youth born in 1980s regard Japan and Japan’s image in their mind, and totally 8742 respondents replied their questionnaires. See here: [http://news.xinhuanet.com/globe/2005-08/12/content_3343839.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/globe/2005-08/12/content_3343839.htm)
going to represent a new opinion trend in China. Meanwhile, their attitudes towards Japan are important parts of public opinion and may influence the bilateral relationship when they come into power. Secondly, Shanghai and Harbin’s different historical situation in WWII and huge developmental gap at present are presumed to make students from the two cities hold different attitudes towards Japan and Japanese popular culture. Also, considering China’s complicated domestic politics, in richer regions people’s anti-Japanese sentiment is relatively easily influenced by the government, while in other poorer regions people’s anti-Japan sentiment is usually intertwined with their dissatisfaction with domestic rising inequality (Interview: Tokyo, August 2, 2006). The complexity of China’s domestic politics also suggests that we should differentiate the outcome of Japan’s cultural diplomacy by regions.

The questionnaires were delivered and returned in Shanghai Normal University and Heilongjiang University in September and October 2006. The respondents were 40 (20 each) local students (aging from 19 to 23) from different undergraduate schools and faculties, and eventually total 38 valid feedback were received, 18 feedback in Shanghai and 20 in Harbin. All the respondents have received Japanese manga and anime for more than 9 years, and they enjoyed reading and watching them. Even if 38- respondents is not a large number for questionnaires, the respondents’ selected background still made statistic data based on their choices representative. The questionnaire basically consisted of 10 compulsory choice questions, and students were also welcome to write any further comments on each single question or the general topic. This design was to provide respondents enough space expressing their points of view, and accordingly their free comments broadened and deepened my horizon of the topic. Therefore, the analysis is based on statistic results, and also the free comments from respondents will be reflected.

4.2.2 Questionnaire Statistic Results

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11 Harbin was part of Manchukuo, Japan’s puppet regime in 1932—1945. Japan still has a notorious reputation because of testing germ weaponry on humans by Unit 731 in Harbin, which is important to visit in order to inspire students’ patriotism and nationalism in the city. And the Northeast city’s economy fell behind other coastal cities especially after the economic reforms. On the other hand, Shanghai is one of the richest cities in China and embraces a multicultural atmosphere. Due to geographic and historic cultural connection with Japan, Shanghainese hold a relatively friendly attitude towards Japan and Japanese culture.
In order to make the statistic results more explicit, the data will be reflected in the following tables. The tables consists of three rows, the first for respondents in Shanghai, the second for respondents in Harbin and the third is the sum of the total 38 respondents in both cities. Furthermore, the first number in the cells indicates how many respondents choose that certain answer, and the number in brackets indicates the percentage of respondents in the respectively area. The numbers indicating the percentages for respectively cell has been rounded to the nearest integer.

**Question 1.** In general, which kind of attitude towards Japan do you hold? Please write your reasons in key words.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Positive</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>10 (56%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>9 (45%)</td>
<td>9 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 (16%)</td>
<td>23 (61%)</td>
<td>13 (34%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the key words they wrote down:

- The main reason for choosing A is that they adore Japan’s unique cultural feature.
- The main reason for choosing B is that on one hand they like Japanese culture and on the other hand they dislike the Japanese government and Japan’s wartime history.
- The main reason for choosing C is that these respondents hate wartime atrocities, unfrank apology and current conflicts between China and Japan such as territorial entanglement in Diaoyudao Island (Senkaku in Japanese).

**Question 2.** Have Japanese manga and anime helped improve Japan’s image in your mind?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>10 (56%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>17 (85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11 (29%)</td>
<td>6 (16%)</td>
<td>21 (55%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Question 3.** Do you think only Japan and Japanese can produce those Japanese manga and anime?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>3 (16%)</td>
<td>11 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>3 (15%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>17 (85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7 (18%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>28 (74%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 4.** Do you think Japanese manga and anime reflect Japan’s creativity?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>17 (94%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>9 (45%)</td>
<td>4 (20%)</td>
<td>7 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26 (68%)</td>
<td>5 (13%)</td>
<td>7 (18%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 5.** Do you think Japanese manga and anime reflect Japan’s economic power?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>6 (33%)</td>
<td>8 (44%)</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>8 (40%)</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
<td>7 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>14 (37%)</td>
<td>13 (34%)</td>
<td>11 (29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 6.** Will the creativity and economic power mentioned in Question 4 and Question 5 make you change your attitude towards Japan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
<td>8 (44%)</td>
<td>8 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>14 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>8 (21%)</td>
<td>8 (21%)</td>
<td>22 (58%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question 7.** Does the globalized and modern way of life in Japanese metropolitan manga and anime influence your lifestyle and thinking?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>11 (61%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>6 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>13 (65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>17 (45%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>19 (50%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question 8. Are Japanese manga and anime able to make you neglect the negative aspect of Japan’s image from what you learn in textbook and news media about Japan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
<td>14 (78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>19 (95%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>33 (87%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 9. Through accessing Japanese manga and anime, do you want to know more about Japanese culture and visit Japan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>12 (67%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
<td>5 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>10 (50%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>10 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22 (58%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>15 (39%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 10. Do both of these two feelings co-exist in your mind, enjoying Japanese manga and anime and other Japanese popular cultural products (such as dramas, idols, fashionable costume and makeup, music, movies, etc), and condemning Japan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A. Yes</th>
<th>B. Neutral</th>
<th>C. No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>17 (94%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbin</td>
<td>16 (80%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>3 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33 (87%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.3 Analysis
Statistic results from Question 1 suggest that the respondents in general held neutral attitude towards Japan. The key words show that the main obstacle for the respondents was historical issue including both WWII history facts and Japan’s current ambiguous stance to history. And both economic friction and territorial entanglement also involved in the negative aspect of their attitude towards Japan. Yet the respondents from Shanghai were more positive to Japan than those from Harbin, and free comments from Harbin’s part appeared much more patriotic.
More than half of the respondents to Question 2 chose that Japanese manga and anime had not helped improve their image of Japan in their minds. But the difference between what the respondents answered from Shanghai and Harbin is very sharp and it makes this case very interesting. That is to say, while Japanese manga and anime were more effective in improving Japan’s image amongst the respondents from Shanghai, the indigenous understanding of the respondents from Harbin was hard to be modified.

*Question 3, Question 4, Question 5 and Question 6* actually fractionize *Question 2*, and their results indicate that most of respondents admitted Japan’s creativity and economic power were reflected in manga and anime, but these two key factors were still not able to shifting their attitude towards Japan to a more positive side. Providing certain economic background, respondents thought other countries could also produce excellent manga and anime as well as Japan. Likewise, respondents from Shanghai appeared more acceptable to Japan’s strength than respondents from Harbin related to Japanese manga and anime.

*Question 7* suggests apparent divergence between respondents from the two cities. The life style and thinking of the respondents from Harbin seemed to be less influenced by Japanese metropolitan manga and anime, because they were aware of the huge gap between their daily life and the metropolitan life that the Japanese manga and anime portrayed. While respondents from Shanghai commented that multicultural atmosphere and modern ways of life also existed in their lives, so they tended to be affected.

Statistic results from *Question 8* obviously do not show much regional difference, and respondents’ views about Japan were still firmly dominated by media propaganda and school education. Japanese manga and anime were not capable of making them ignore orthodox ideas, where Japan's historical atrocities and current political conflicts were highly critical parts.

Statistic results from *Question 9* indicate that more than half of total respondents wanted to visit Japan and experience more Japanese culture because of their access to Japanese manga and anime, particularly respondents from Shanghai. Furthermore, in
free comments some of respondents choosing Option C expressed that they would not want to visit Japan only because of Japanese manga and anime, and 5 respondents from Harbin said that they have no interest in accessing Japan.

Statistic results from Question 10 suggest that up to 87% respondents on one hand enjoy Japanese popular cultural products and on the other hand express loathe towards Japan as a country. The contradictory emotions coexist peacefully in mind. In the sense, Japan’s image in the respondents’ mind is double-fold.

From the above statistic results and free comments, three points of conclusion could be drawn. Firstly, Japanese manga and anime and other popular cultural products open a door for approaching modern Japan, which arouses interests in Japan among respondents. To a certain extent, their indignant attitude towards Japan influenced by history and politics has been softened, because enjoying Japanese popular culture is based on personal interests, which are able to revise Japan’s negative image described by textbook and media. Double-fold image is anyway better than one-fold image which only represents wartime militarism. Furthermore, the respondents basically treat Japanese manga and anime as entertainment, which has not been endowed with much political significance. In this sense, Japanese popular cultural products are to a large extent separated from their original background, and the respondents don’t really think that caring for Japanese popular culture is against Chinese patriotism.

Secondly, the respondents’ considerable amounts of mistrust in Japan is mainly induced by the historical issue and sharpened by the current political frictions. For the respondents, history and politics are fundamental for their consideration of the Sino-Japanese relations, and they would like to accept Japan if not touching upon the principle of history and politics. Yet when these historical and political principles are threatened, the respondents’ favor of Japan cultivated by Japanese manga and anime and other popular cultural products collapses very easily. In a word, national principle including history and politics is beyond personal interests.

Thirdly, from the questionnaire results, the different attitude towards Japan and Japanese culture respondents from between Shanghai and Harbin is obvious. The respondents from Shanghai tend to show a more positive and open attitude towards
Japan and Japanese popular culture, because of both the relatively closer social atmosphere and higher developmental level. Due to historical reason and less developed social economy, respondents from Harbin would like to tie their attitude towards Japan and Japanese popular culture relatively closer to Chinese nationalism and patriotism, so the antipathy is hard to get rid of by any single cultural interaction. In spite of the different acceptance to Japan and Japanese popular culture, respondents from the two cities in general express similarly high loyalty to the state’s authority, which firmly controls Japan’s image in their mind.
Chapter 5. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis is to look at the outcome of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China, and it pays special attention to results brought by popular cultural flows based on the case of Japanese manga and anime. On the basis of above discussion, the outcome can be described as a dilemma. On one hand Japanese manga and anime provide Chinese youth with a new perspective of knowing modern Japan and Japanese culture, which is distinguished from what they learned from Chinese textbook, news media and movies’ portrayal sticking to WWII history. In the sense, as a carrier of Japan’s cultural diplomacy, popular culture has begun to neutralize Japan’s wartime-based image and planted the seeds of a potential favorable public opinion among Chinese youngsters. The positive effect brought by cultural diplomacy is obvious and worthy of increasing concern in cultural diplomacy.

However, on the other hand, the diplomatic function of popular culture is still limited, because the respondents’ favor of Japanese popular culture can not go beyond Chinese nationalism. This point is well in line with Iwabuchi’s standpoint, “transnational cultural flows neither fully displace nationally delineated boundaries, thoughts and feelings, nor do they underestimate the salience of the nation-state in the process of globalization” (Iwabuchi 2002:17).

Furthermore, the reason for this dilemma to large extent is determined by the Chinese government-led counteraction to Japan’s culture diplomacy. The Chinese government certainly does not want Chinese youth to be utilized by the political rival, so a series of policies to counteract Japanese manga and anime and other popular cultural products have been carried out. Since China’s political system empowers the government’s potency in dealing with domestic affairs, all the counteractive policies have been imposed regardless of market-operating principle. Actually, the most effective and direct way of counteracting Japan’s cultural diplomacy is limiting the import of Japanese cultural products, and the indirect way is emphasizing the conflicts in Sino-Japanese relations continuously by Chinese media. The two ways undoubtedly make the function of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China weaken. Particularly anti-Japan sentiment has been an important and effective way of inspiring Chinese nationalism, which can both transfer domestic disharmony and give pressure to Japan, so the situation worsens. Moreover, China’s counteraction to Japan’s
cultural diplomacy has also inextricably intertwined with the fluctuant Sino-Japanese relations. This confirms that peaceful and stable political background is essential for an effective cultural diplomacy.

However, a new perspective of viewing China’s counteraction has to be introduced in new era, because besides political consideration the attraction of popular culture’s profitable market also makes the counteraction unavoidable. Hereby, both political and economic factors have resulted in the counteraction, and it is motivated by politics and accelerated by economy.

The Chinese government is not omnipotent with the counteraction. After banning the import of Japanese popular cultural products, the government has not provided high quality entertainment for Chinese youngsters, so the huge potential market results in large amounts of pirate and smuggled Japanese popular cultural products. This actually exposes the contradiction between government and market. The inability in controlling illegal business has given Japanese popular cultural products an opportunity to exert their influence in a semi-underground way. The contradiction between government and market also appears in Japan. The Japanese government has not the capability of restricting the flows of violent and pornographic cultural products, so Japan’s image will be discounted by receivers.

In the case of China, Japan actually does not put much expectation on cultural diplomacy to change Japan’s negative image during a short time, and cultural diplomacy just need to do as much as it can. The questionnaire results suggest that Japan’s cultural diplomacy works better in Shanghai than in Harbin. Under current atmosphere of media propaganda, China’s history and domestic politics lead to the result that people from different regions hold different level of attitude towards Japan, so the outcome of Japan’s cultural diplomacy in China should be discussed within certain context.

China’s counteraction harms Japan’s cultural diplomacy, which would have had a more broad and profound influence in improving Sino-Japanese relations on private citizen’s level, but Japan’s official interest in organizing cultural exchange activities has not been totally frustrated. When China and Japan summit meeting stopped
during Koizumi’s tenure, cultural diplomacy had to be an alternative way to communicate to Chinese. When Shinzo Abe started the ice breaking trip to China at the beginning of his tenure, cultural diplomacy even becomes more important to strengthen the political progress. According to Chinese official media, Shinzo Abe’s trip has brought a series of cultural activities to celebrate the 35th year of China and Japan normalizing diplomatic relationship in 2007 (Liu 2006). So under the background of relatively improved political relations, cultural diplomacy is being expected to exert more power in the coming future.

Sino-Japanese relations are so complicated that any a single dimension of diplomacy can not improve it. Manga and anime alone can’t help change Japan’s image in Chinese people’s mind, but as a long term strategy cultural diplomacy should not be given up with the consideration of strengthening mutual understanding on private citizen’s level. And in Sino-Japanese relations the aspect of modern cultural communication, which can reflect the change of public opinion, should draw more attention in the academic field.
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