The EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy
In the Post-September 11 Era

The Utility of a Constructivist Approach

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Abstract

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy has been described as flawed or even non-existing by many critics due to its intergovernmentalist nature. One of the latest incidents illustrating the CFSP’s malfunction came about in 2003 after the US decided to engage in a war against Iraq. The failure of the EU to generate a unified stance regarding the decision on how to act in Iraq was put forward as one of the most striking examples crystallizing the division within the EU due to the member states’ tendency to prioritize their self-interest. This study adopts a different perspective as it makes an analysis of the CFSP developments going back to very beginning of this period, namely 11 September 2001. Moving along a chronological chain of events, it examines the developments within the EU during September 11, the war in Afghanistan and the Iraq War respectively through both rationalist –Liberal Intergovernmentalism– and constructivist –Europeanization Theory– perspectives. By adducing several official declarations issued by the EU and the member states, it concludes that although the post-September 11 period may seem to have sharpened the flaws in the CFSP as it crystallized the division within the EU members; that is not to deny the fact that the EU has achieved integration, to a certain extent, in the CFSP which has moved a long way from its original ‘anti-communitaire’ approach transforming into a more efficient policy since its establishment.

Key Words: The Common Foreign and Security Policy, September 11, War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, Rationalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Constructivism, Europeanization Theory.
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1 Introduction

Acting as a single foreign policy actor by establishing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been one of the main goals of the European Union (EU) for many years. In terms of economy, it has been able to establish a single market, through the introduction of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the ratification of single currency, which has put the Union among major international economic powers (Soetendorp 1994 p. 103). However, the EU has continuously been subject to the criticism that its economic integration could not be accompanied with a common political will which is considered crucial as a result of the expectation to see the Union grab a more effective role in global politics. Consequently, the EU has intensely felt the urge to have an independent European identity and a more unified performance in international politics.

In December 1991 the twelve heads of state and government gathered for a summit in Maastricht. Having adopted the Treaty on the EU (TEU), the Maastricht Summit incorporated the CFSP into this treaty as second part of the three-pillared structure of the newly-established EU. As Hill indicates, this title, “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, implied singularity rather than pluralism and was therefore of symbolic importance (1992 p. 190). That is to say, the aim was to establish a single body of EU foreign policy which would not only present each member state but also show the members’ trust in the Union. Nonetheless, despite the ratification of TEU, it did not create a “European Superstate” by molding national foreign policies into a single foreign policy (Forster and Wallace 1996 pp. 412, 433). On the one hand, it symbolized the member states’ further commitment to implement a CFSP as one unified body. But on the other hand, paradoxically, the national tendency to retain sovereignty has remained the major hindrance on the EU’s way to acting as cohesive actor in international politics (Soetendorp 1994 p. 104). In other words, what decided the ability of the EU to generate an effective CFSP, most scholars argue, has been the eagerness of its member states to pool their national sovereignty for such a purpose (ibid.).

The EU went through plenty of incidents illustrating the tendency of member states to pursue a national foreign policy with the aim of preserving their self-interest. One of the recent examples was in 2003 after the US decision to engage in a war against Iraq. The failure of the EU to produce a united stance regarding the decision on how to act in the Iraq case has been a striking example crystallizing the division within the EU due to the member states’ tendency to prioritize their self-interest.
However, going back to the very first picture of this scenario which began to be written in the morning of 11 September 2001, I believe that the EU was, intentionally or not, more enthusiastic to get rid of this *infamy* than it had ever been up to by then. Having shaken the trust in the American superpower, the terrorist attacks of September 11 exemplified one of the rare incidents where the Union could generate a common stance in its foreign policy. A terrorist action ironically led the EU members to believe that they would be able to walk together through the problems by establishing a common foreign policy which would make the EU a powerful external actor.

However and unsurprisingly, it did not take much time for the Europeans to come back down on earth as the Iraq War, which has crystallized the divergence in the national foreign policies of the EU-15, broke out in 2003. Beginning with the end of the US-led war in Afghanistan, the post-September 11 era proved to be another example of the infamous European flaw where the lack of harmony in the foreign policies of member states got back in control.

### 1.1 Purpose and Research Questions

This study takes a closer look at the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the following period with a concentration on the EU’s foreign policy attitude. There are two main purposes it strives to fulfill:

Taking it for granted that intergovernmentalism has been the most common way to explain the CFSP; the *theoretical purpose* of this study is stressing the importance of constructivism in elucidating the CFSP movements. Therefore, I believe, it is imperative to compare the rationalist school of thought with that of constructivism in order to understand the latter’s contribution to the efforts of explaining the foreign policy attitude of the EU.

Additionally this study also bears a rather *empirical purpose* in itself. Namely, it aims to expose the diverse dynamics behind the cases (September 11, the war in Afghanistan and the Iraq War), which led the EU to act differently. In other words, to answer why the EU was able to talk with a single voice in responding to September 11 while it could not impede its members from following their national paths in Iraq constitute the empirical aim of this study.

Apart from those, using the selected cases, I intend to comment upon whether the EU has made any progress on the way to establish a CFSP or there has been no change in members’ tendency to preserve their national interests. To put it another way, one of my aims is to answer whether the CFSP is more or less a supranational means or it is just a camouflage used by the states to hide their national preferences.

For those purposes, this study tries to answer the following questions:
How did the EU achieve to talk with a single voice in its initial response after September 11?

Why did it fail to sustain this unified foreign policy attitude in the post-September 11 era?

Is it feasible to say that the EU does not have a foreign policy or is it more appropriate to claim that it does not have a successful foreign policy?

1.2 Methodology

As Lijphart defines (1971 p. 691), a study may utilize a combination of the “comparative” and the “case study” method. This paper provides an example for such an effort. Consequently, two theories will be first defined and then compared as both will be tested by several case studies. In addition to that, some of those cases deviate from established generalizations. To put it another way, the CFSP has been characterized as an intergovernmental institution by a majority of scholars. Some of the cases I have intentionally selected, as I will try to prove, swerve from this generalization. Therefore, this study is based on “deviant case analysis” (ibid. p. 692) since some of those cases are selected to serve the objective of underlining the shift from rationalism towards constructivism.

Nevertheless, it may still be argued that this paper, by its very nature, bears the major weakness of any case study: Case studies are not appropriate for generalizations since it is not sure that if the findings are to be proved by every other case (Aggestam 1999 p. 10). Despite the fact that I partly agree with such an assumption, I strongly believe that conducting such a study will be influential both in testing of established generalizations (Lijphart 1971 p. 692) and in comparing two competing theories (Eckstein 1975: 80). Hopefully, it will also lead us to a certain objective which this paper sets as to be able to understand the nature of the CFSP and make additional predictions (Hague et. al 1992 p. 25). Moreover, I use more than one case to “improve the chances of instituting at least some control” over the interpretation of generalization (Lijphart 1971 p. 686).

1.3 Material

The material to be used in this study can be divided into two groups: theoretical and empirical. While providing the theoretical framework, I use Reuben Wong and Andrew Moravcsik as my primary sources. Then, the following part is based on empirical materials where the main sources are academic journals, official papers of the EU (such as declarations, press releases or treaties etc.) and speeches of some EU officials.
1.3.1 Choice of Theories

In the conduct of this study, while deciding on the most appropriate theories, I have utilized the old dichotomy between constructivism and rationalism since those two have been struggling over how to interpret the EU’s foreign policy (Moravcsik 2001). Choosing those theories also serves to one of the purposes of this study: Both of them are wide-range theories and applying such theories on certain cases to see their relevance requires a detailed study. This is what I will be trying to do throughout this paper.

Besides, the choice of theories serves to the theoretical aim of study which is to assess the role of constructivism vis-à-vis rationalism in explaining the EU policy in September 11 and afterwards more efficiently. Accordingly, Liberal Intergovernmentalism by Andrew Moravcsik will embody the rationalist argument whereas the constructivist school will be represented by Wong’s Europeanization Theory. One of the reasons for picking those two is their specificity to the EU although both carry the premises of their respective meta-theories.

1.3.2 The Cases

As previously mentioned, my point of departure for this study is the disunity among the EU members over the Iraq War. Many interpreted that split as the most glaring example of member states’ pursuit of self-interest (Edwards 2005 p. 58). However, looking back at the first sparkle, I would claim that, up to the war in Iraq, the EU showed an unprecedented success in generating a common foreign policy position. Therefore, I thought it would be appropriate to begin with the case of September 11 while analyzing the current dynamics of the CFSP.

Likewise, Christopher Hill argues that the terrorist attacks of September 11 triggered a period during which the EU foreign policy has undergone certain changes. He lists four different periods of the consequential challenge which the EU had to face with: immediate reaction after the attacks, the war in Afghanistan, the conduct of war on terrorism and the Iraq War (Hill 2004 p. 145). I believe using this categorization will make it easier to evaluate the foreign policy developments.

1.4 Delimitations

The primary aim of this study is to answer why the EU was able to generate a single voice in its response to September 11 although its CFSP has been characterized as “flawed” by many critics throughout its history. Therefore, I
focus on what is common in the EU’s foreign policy rather than highlighting the dynamics behind the national policies of member states.

As an outcome of the research question, this study also bears a time limit within itself. Accordingly, my study starts with the terrorist attacks on September 11 and ends as the division among the member states over the Iraq War crystallizes since I believe the selected cases within this time span serve to the purposes of this thesis very well.

1.5 Basic Concepts

This study will cover the CFSP rather than the EU Foreign Policy. There are two reasons for such a preference: First one is to narrow down the research subject as much as possible since the former includes all of what the EU and its member states do in world politics in terms of both economy and politics (Peterson and Smith 2004 pp. 196-7; White 2001 p. 36); but, as White notes, the CFSP is one of three distinct but interrelated systems¹ of European foreign policy (2001 pp. 40-1). Second, due to the intergovernmental nature of second pillar, the CFSP is seen as an outcome of the negotiations in the Council where the national interests of member states are laid on the table (Peterson and Smith 2004 p. 208) and I intend to test the EU’s ability to lend momentum to the integration of foreign policies even in this highly intergovernmental environment. Consequently, the term “foreign policy” used in this study refers to the political component of foreign policy such as diplomacy etc. rather than the elements of economy or welfare.

I also believe there will be a need to distinguish between the concepts of “soft and hard security” at a certain point in order to explain varying foreign policy attitudes of the EU vis-à-vis different incidents. Hard security, or to put it differently, “the traditional conceptualization of security” is simply the absence of war where “the military defense of the state [or an organization which is the EU in my case] [and] seeing security issues in terms of military balance as well as military strategy and tactics” (Archer 1996 p. 190) are the essential descriptive aspects. However, looking at the contemporary dynamics it would not be wrong to conclude that the definition of security has undergone a deepening process out of which the term soft security was born. Referring to non-military aspects of security such as poverty, organized crime, minority problems, political or economic instability or human rights violations (Moustakis 2004 p. 141); soft security differs from hard security in their reference to military aspects. Soft security does not require military or militaristic tools. It rather prioritizes the use of diplomacy and multilateralism.

¹ 1. The system of national foreign policies
2. Economic policy-based Community System (within the first pillar)
3. The CFSP (the second pillar)
1.6 Organization of the Thesis

Having completed the introduction, the next part of this study will be theory-based where I intend to briefly draw the main assumptions of rationalism and constructivism and also uncover their relevance to the nature of the CFSP. In Chapter 3, the selected cases will be briefly presented. Later on, the following chapter will be an analysis of the theoretical and empirical material of the study which will hopefully help us see the utility of a constructivist approach to the CFSP in post-September 11 era. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will conclude with a brief discussion on the findings of the thesis by covering the above-stated research questions.
2 Clash of Theories

In this chapter, I will lay down the premises of selected theories: Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) and Europeanization Theory (ET). For this purpose, I will first touch upon some features of meta-theories which those two theories belong to. My aim in doing so is to illuminate the bridge between both rationalism and LI, and constructivism and ET. Then I will go into the details of those schools of thought. What will follow is another section where the way LI and ET evaluate the CFSP is explained.

2.1 Rationalism

Being one of the influential meta-theories in international relations, rationalism views states as lucid actors which operate solely for their self-interest. Moreover, it asserts, international relations consist of the interaction among states which are in pursuit of national foreign policy objectives.

Stanley Hoffmann (1966) emphasizes the importance of national governments in the global arena and defines their main task as the promotion of interest as much as they are able to. In terms of European integration, he believes the member states are more “obstinate” rather than “obsolete” and they allow integration only to a certain extent due to their tendency for self-preservation. When their vital interests are at stake, he argues, the member states are willing to be compensated for their losses in other areas (quoted in Cram 1999 p. 49). That is how Hoffmann explains the success of European integration in the field of economy and its failure in political integration.

Likewise, one of the leading figures in realist thinking, Hans J. Morgenthau also reserves some place for explaining the willingness of states to transfer some of their sovereignty to a supranational organization as he links it to the aim of mutual recognition of national interests and to the expectation of some benefits in exchange to this loss of freedom (1952 pp. 972-3).

Bearing alike premises, LI of Andrew Moravcsik is one of the forthcoming theories in the field of European integration. The major reason for using LI in my study is that it is regarded as “the most compelling and significant analysis” of European integration. Therefore, it is my assumption that LI is the most

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2 See the fly-cover of Moravcsik’s ‘The Choice of Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht’ (1998) for the evaluation of Robert Keohane and Helen Milner.
promising theory, within the rationalist school, to solve the puzzle this study raises.

2.1.1 Liberal Intergovernmentalism

The central argument of LI is that “European integration can best be explained as a series of rational choices” made by national governments. These choices are the responses “to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments” (Moravcsik 1999 p. 18). Moravcsik relates the assumption that states act rationally in pursuit of national interest to three stages which contemplate the outcome of major EU negotiations. These stages are “national preference formation, inter-state bargaining, and the choice of international institutions” (ibid.). Accordingly, prior to the stage of inter-state bargaining, states formulate a consistent set of national preferences which are definitely independent of any international factor (ibid. p. 20).

Since my study focuses on how the EU decides to implement a foreign policy at the supranational level, how the member states establish their preferences at the national level does not fall within its spectrum. Thus only the second and the third stages are covered below.

Inter-State Bargaining

Following the first stage of national preference formation, in this second stage, states develop strategies and bargain with each other to reach agreements (ibid. pp. 20-51). Being seen as a variant of rational institutionalism (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 75), LI bears several features of the rationalist framework. For instance, negotiations among the member states take place within a non-coercive system of unanimous voting in which governments can and will reject agreements that would leave them worse off than unilateral policies (Moravcsik 1999 p. 60). In other words, actors are rational and they tend to move in a certain way if the benefits they get as they act so exceed the benefits that would be ensured by an alternative form of action.

However, Moravcsik’s LI differs from rational institutionalism at some points. Rational institutionalism proposes that international institutions enable states to pursue their national interests more efficiently and safely by “reducing the transaction costs of international negotiations”, by “providing the necessary information to reduce the states’ uncertainty” and by establishing “rules for the distribution of gains” (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 78). Contrarily, Moravcsik claims the transaction costs are already low and information required for efficient
bargaining is plentiful, cheap and symmetrically distributed among states within the EU. Therefore, the Union’s supranational actors hold no privileged position (Moravcsik 1999 pp. 61-6; 479-80). Moreover, in the EU, it is the institutions that suffer from the scarcity and asymmetrical distribution of information. This is another reason Moravcsik proposes for the low bargaining power of institutions. Therefore, even the institutional choice is driven by the states (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 80) and it is up to them to provide or cut the information going to an institution and they use this capability to favor their own national interests.

Obviously, LI rather concentrates on the national governments as it explains the outcome of international negotiations. In this respect, every actor has a relative bargaining power on which the outcome of negotiations depends. This bargaining power varies among actors according to the relative value that they place on an agreement compared to the outcome of its best alternative policy (ibid. pp. 61-2). This is also what Keohane and Nye (2001) call “asymmetrical interdependence”. Looking at the outcomes of negotiations, Moravcsik draws that outcomes are far away from favoring the supranational actors and rather tend to reflect asymmetrical interdependence: “Those governments that most strongly [favor] the core of each agreement [tend] to make concessions to recalcitrant governments on the margin in order to achieve it” (1999 p. 479). To put it differently, actors who are in a more advantaged position in terms of alternative ways to act concerning a negotiation talk are more capable of manipulating the outcome by forcing the disadvantaged others to make concessions (Schimmelfennig 2004 p. 77).

To sum up, using an intergovernmental theory of bargaining, LI claims that due to the absence of informational asymmetries among national governments, supranational actors fail to influence the outcome (Moravcsik 1999 p. 484) and contrarily the outcomes mirror the relative bargaining power of national governments. This also indicates that supranational actors, such as the European Commission or the European Parliament, are not capable of influencing the decision-making process – although some few minor exceptions which are nothing more than some redundant proposals still exist (ibid. p. 482).

The Choice of International Institutions

In the second stage, LI puts that national governments control the negotiations and the outcomes. Acting with the aim of protecting self-interest, states do not want to pool or delegate their sovereignty to supranational institutions. Consequently, they are unwilling to provide those institutions with information which would mean sacrificing some of the power used for defining national interests. Yet, we witness some incidents where the member states are subject to the decision of supranational actors. The very question LI tries to answer concerning this third stage is “when and why do the EU governments delegate or pool decision-making
power in authoritative international institutions instead of always retaining the prerogative to make future unilateral decisions?” (ibid. p. 67).

LI asserts that the best explanation for the choice of pooling or delegation of sovereignty to international institutions is the member states’ efforts to constrain one another as such a choice enhances the credibility of commitments. “Governments transfer sovereignty to international institutions where potential gains are large, but efforts to secure compliance by foreign governments through decentralized or domestic means are likely to be ineffective” (ibid. p. 9). Accordingly, the possible answer for the question stated above lies in the uncertainty about the future. Pooling and delegation are seen as solutions to “incomplete contracting” which arises when the member states have shared broad goals but they find to costly or difficult to specify all future contingencies in enforcing those goals (ibid. p. 73). In order to be able to do so, the member states use those institutions as a guarantee ensuring that no state violates the supranational rules which in fact reflect the member states’ interests. So, states, especially the stronger ones—in terms of relative bargaining power—use that supranational aspect in controlling the weaker states or in pre-committing those weaker governments to decisions before the costs and benefits become clear enough to generate opposition (ibid. p. 74) and, thus, they preserve their self-interests. The decision to pre-commit, on the other hand, marks a willingness of the weaker states to accept an increased political risk of being outvoted or overruled on any individual decision (ibid. p. 75).

Such an explanation leaves no space for supranationality since what is seen as purely supranational at first glance is even claimed by LI to be nothing more than the member states’ pursuit of national interests in practice. In conclusion, what LI proposes to explain the policy making at the EU level is a theoretical model which believes in the absolute control of member states over the decision-making process. If, LI notes, the EU is able to legislate and implement a common decision, it is because of the fact that all member states are convinced that such a decision will benefit them and, hence, they agree to go for it. However, in some occasions some member states, generally the stronger ones, use supranational institutions to force the other states to comply with the EU decisions which in reality reflect the national interests of those stronger states. So, it is always an intergovernmental account that LI uses no matter what the puzzle is.

2.2 Constructivism

Constructivism was born out of the idea that the dominant institutionalism in studies of integration needed to be supplemented by a more sociological
understanding of institutions\textsuperscript{3} that would stress their interest-forming roles (Checkel 2001 p. 50). What requires more attention here is that constructivism does not strive to dismiss rationalism whose literature is believed, even by the constructivists, to offer too many insights. Yet, rationalism underestimates certain analytic issues such as interest and identity formation. Thus, a constructivist understanding is needed since it allows us to address such questions (Checkel 2001 p. 60; Tonra 2003) as it sees ideas and norms as in part constituting the political realm, rather than being essentially intervening variables as in rationalist accounts (Smith 2000 p. 49). In a way, constructivism proposes that social reality is not a made-in-heaven but rather it is the humans that construct “social reality” through their daily practices. Therefore, it may be the most appropriate way to describe constructivism as “based on a social ontology which insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings” (Risse 2004 p. 160).

March and Olsen (1998) define two different logics of action which are favored by rationalism and constructivism respectively: logic of consequentialism and logic of appropriateness. The initial one, promoted by rationalism, foresees that actors’ main goal is to maximize their interests and preferences. Hence, they take into account solely the consequences of their action rather than their opponents’ preferences. Contrarily, constructivism adopts logic of appropriateness which entails that actors try to do the right thing rather than maximizing their given preferences because social institutions, such as the EU, attach rule-guided behaviors to every actor. Actors are intensely affected by those social institutions which, therefore, can no longer be viewed as “external” to actors (Risse 2004 p. 163) and consequently, this social interaction, constructivism predicts, is one of the determinants for route of international political system.

More specifically, constructivism argues that states’ preferences and interests are shaped by the EU institutions (norms, values, identity etc. of the EU) once those states become members of the Union. In this social process, they draw the importance of the EU’s supranational bodies such as the European Commission or the Parliament. For a more detailed explanation, next part is devoted to a constructivist theory in the EU field: Europeanization Theory (ET).  

2.2.1 Europeanization Theory: Identity Reconstruction

Most of the constructivist attempts to better understand the scope of influence on member states’ choices afforded by the EU utilize the theory of Europeanization

\textsuperscript{3} It should also be noted that the term “institution” used by constructivists includes not only organizations but also ideational factors such as social values and norms (Rosamond 2000 p. 173).

\textsuperscript{4} These assumptions constitute one of the major reasons why I conduct this study: to assess the role of constructivism in explaining the CFSP.
(Checkel 2001; Hill and Wallace 1996; Manners 2002; Tonra 2003). Again, a majority of those scholars argue that “sustained membership and participation in the EU leads to the convergence of national policy-making, both in style and content” (Wong 2005 p. 135). The constructivists define the EU as a community of states with a shared identity, a community of states committed to shared norms and values like the rule of law, human rights, democracy, tolerance etc. (Manners 2002; Risse 2004 p. 172). Those norms not only constrain actors’ behavior or the range of available choices but also constitute their preferences and re-define their interests (ibid. p. 163; Sjursen 2002 p. 501).

One of the most recent studies on Europeanization has been conducted by Reuben Wong who proposes Europeanization as an alternative approach to understanding the EU member states’ foreign policies. In that respect, there is not much new in his work since it is like a continuation of previous studies. Nevertheless, the novelty of Wong lies in his categorization of different schools of thought on Europeanization. This study utilizes one of those categories: identity reconstruction.

Identity Reconstruction

Wong defines Europeanization as the reconstruction of identities in contemporary Europe and stresses the importance of the EU institutions in this reconstruction process (2005 p. 138). In this respect, Europeanization is seen as the extension of constructivist argument to the field of the EU. That constitutes the major reason why this study has chosen to use this school of thought as its point of departure in explaining constructivist premises.

Europeanization theorists predict that the monopoly of the member states on the loyalties of their citizens will perish whereas the EU will benefit from this development in the long run (Hill and Wallace 1996; Smith 2000; Wong 2005 p. 143). In this respect, Europeanization is a process of identity reconstruction where it resembles to neo-functional theory very much as it emphasizes a gradual shift of identity and effective affiliation towards a new Europe which has a more or less supranational character due to the practice of combining the national and federal impulses to create a transnational and culturally integrated Europe (Glarbo 1999; Smith 2000; Wong 2005).

Empirically, the term “Europeanization” refers to the political and policy changes and the “redefinition and negotiation of identities” bred by the EU membership on the member states (Wong 2005 p. 138). Since the values of the community constitute its members, the members undertake a normative obligation towards adhering to its constitutive values and norms (Schimmelfennig 2001 pp. 58-9). Ben Tonra, one of the leading promoters of this school, defines Europeanization as “[the] transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, […] rules are defined and pursued […] in the consequent
internalization of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy making” (2000 p. 229). In other words, this school suggests convergence as “prolonged participation in the CFSP feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy cultures along similar lines” (Wong 2005 pp. 138-9).

To sum up, ET stresses the importance of non-state actors and Europeanized elites in affecting and shaping the national attitudes of the EU member states. In that respect it stands in the opposite direction of intergovernmentalism. Additionally, ET distinguishes itself from a purely integrationist theory as well. It does not favor a purely supranational point of view which considers the member states as subordinate to the EU, but rather regards identity reconstruction capability of Europeanization as one of the most important factors, just like domestic politics, in determining the member states’ preferences.

The premises of both LI and ET covered up to this point are summarized and illustrated in Table 1. Next section of this chapter will be about how those two theories link their arguments to the field of CFSP.

Table 1

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2.3 Regarding the CFSP

Looking at the theories influential on the studies of European integration, it is obvious that there is a large scope of diversity. In that respect, increasing contribution of non-state centric approaches –of which constructivism is an

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5 Once again, it is important to keep in mind that my study will utilize ET not as the one and only explanation of the CFSP movements but rather as an important contributor to this effort.

example— to the integration debate is a solid proof for this assortment. Yet, due to its rigid state-centric nature, explanations on the CFSP, which is “perhaps the most political of all subfields within the EU”, lags behind this development (Glarbo 2001 p. 140).

The realms of foreign, security and defense policy have traditionally been one of the invaluable prerogatives of rationalist school. Rationalism suggests that the EU member states tend to think and act individually when the political agenda is up to the issues of high politics and, unavoidably, these states block the integration within this field unless their national interests are preserved. That is why, rationalist school argues, the institutional setting of the CFSP has been intergovernmental throughout its history (ibid.). Unsurprisingly, even though the Treaty of Maastricht included a paragraph stating that a CFSP was established and incorporated into the Treaty[7], there has been a remarkable distance between the rhetoric of policy formulation and the reality of policy implementation (Forster and Wallace 1996; Hill 1998 p. 36; Tonra 2003 p. 731).

LI of Andrew Moravcsik has taken the power-based regime of realist school where “survival of the fittest” and “the strongest defines the rules” are the fundamental principles, and transformed it into an interest-based regime where every actor has pre-defined objectives and they bargain with the other actors in order to accomplish those objectives (1993, 1995, 1997, 1998). Regarding that interest-based regime, Tonra makes a good analogy: Rationalists consider the EU as like a poker game “where the member states bring their cards to the table and must deal among themselves to construct the best possible hand” (2003 p. 734). Nevertheless, at the end of the day, it is the national interests that write the script for each member’s part in establishing a CFSP.

Constructivism, on the other hand, has recently contributed to this theoretical debate as it criticized this kind of positivist science for making it almost impossible to take into account ideas, norms, values or any other “socially constructed realms” (ibid.). Consequently, one of the arguments inherent to the constructivist school is that the CFSP is not a sole product of the member states’ rational interests but, rather, an outcome of national diplomacies’ communicating their objectives or perceptions, intentionally or unintentionally, to themselves and to each other regarding the CFSP (Glarbo 2001 p. 141). In other words, constructivism does not offer an alternative approach to instrumental rationality. Instead, it stresses the importance of socially constructed realms such as European identity or values in explaining the CFSP developments. Thus, constructivist conception of the CFSP has a Europeanized character where the interests of actors develop rather than being bargained on the EU table and, as a result, shape the route of the CFSP (Tonra 2003 p. 739). In a way, this Europeization approach notes that the foreign policy reflexes of member states have gone under a

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constructivist transformation and this process has begun to prioritize the European reflex which makes the member states listen to the views of their European partners before establishing a national position of their own (Tonra 2001 p. 261). Therefore, Europeanization theorists argue that the CFSP of recent years has proved to be a test-ground in which European integration has been prevailing even though that does not mean to deny the importance of national interest (Glarbo 2001 p. 141).

Having presented the main premises of both theoretical approaches, next part will be a short introduction to the empirical part of this study and later on I will link the CFSP developments in post-September 11 period with the above-discussed theories.
3 A Background

This chapter aims to provide a concise background to each of the selected cases. I believe it is required to note that this part does not promise an in-depth coverage of the cases. My priority is to put down their relevance with the developments in the EU.

Taking it for granted that the terrorist attacks of September 11 triggered a period during which the EU foreign policy has undergone certain changes, Christopher Hill argues that it will be quite handy to group the developments in the era beginning with September 11 into four different periods of the consequential challenge which the EU had to face with: “immediate reaction after the attacks, the war in Afghanistan, the conduct of war on terrorism and the Iraq War” (2004 p. 145). As noted before, same scheme will be used in this study.

3.1 September 11: Immediate Reaction

In the morning of 11 September 2001, the United States faced one of the biggest terrorist attacks in the world history. Two hijacked planes hitting the towers of World Trade Center and causing the twin towers collapse were like the symbols of shaken American trust in their system of prosperity and peace. In less than two hours, September 11 proved to be the most visible manifestation of the ending American dream. It was the wake up call for those who believed in the invulnerability and absolute security of the world’s only superpower. Leading the scholars to question the current world system, September 11 has also turned out to be a test for the EU to assess its CFSP.

The response of the EU to September 11 was immediate and of effective solidarity. It is hardly surprising that the Union was able to establish a common stance so quickly because the member states did not have too many options other than condemning such terrorist acts. In other words, this would have been the case even if the attacks have been carried out in any other part of the world (ibid.). But the EU members not only condemned terrorism and consoled the US but also they managed to publish a declaration giving full support to future response of the US to September 11. Such a commitment was of great significance since the EU “achieved” to establish this pretentious common position despite the fact that there has been a remarkably big wave of anti-Americanism in Western Europe.
(Hoffmann 2003 p. 16; Wallace 2002) and serious unrest with the Bush administration (Hill 2004 p. 145).

### 3.2 The War in Afghanistan

One of the consequences of September 11 was the transformation of American foreign policy in favor of being a more dominant and determined power (Cox 2002). Accordingly, the US would begin to punish the terrorists as soon as possible and would “make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them”\(^8\). The very first response to September 11 was initiated on 7 October 2001 as the US engaged in the so-called “Operation Enduring Freedom” against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The aim was to topple down the corrupted Taliban regime which was believed to harboring Al Qaeda terrorists (McInnes 2003 pp. 174-5).

Despite the strong CFSP position of the EU in its initial response to September 11, the Afghan campaign signed the first cracks, reasons of which will be discussed at length in the next chapter. The war in Afghanistan was the first case in the post-September 11 era where the durability of the EU’s solidarity in the CFSP began to be questioned due to the tension between the national foreign policies and the CFSP. Nevertheless, the EU was able to disguise the discomfort among its members and maintained the image of solidarity (Duke 2002 p. 160).

### 3.3 War on Terrorism: A Long-Term Perspective

“What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning”\(^9\). The ending of the war in Afghanistan, as President Bush notes, exposed the second, and rather a long-term, goal of the US, which was “to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or [its] friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction”\(^10\). Pointing to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’, this speech of George W. Bush was in a way making it easier to predict over the US’s future moves. Obviously, the superpower was paving the way for a long-term combat against this axis of evil with the aim

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\(^10\) *ibid.*
of “deny[ing] terrorists and their [...] technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction”\footnote{ibid.}.

3.4 The Iraq War

The war on terrorism, as briefly mentioned above and will thoroughly be discussed in the next chapter, turned into the core element of the US’ foreign policy, and then later of the UK’s, that culminated in a military operation in Iraq in March 2003 (Wilga 2004 p. 4). The US believed that “the security of the world [would require] disarming Saddam Hussein. [Moreover] peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime [had] failed again and again [...] because [they were] not dealing with peaceful men”\footnote{“President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq Within 48 Hours: Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation - The Cross Hall”, 17 March 2003. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html. Accessed April 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2006.}. Consequently, the Iraq War embodied the promises of Bush administration regarding their dedication in long-term war against terrorism.

As mentioned above, commitment to a larger war against terrorism surfaced the intergovernmentalist character of the member states. That is why it was hardly surprising that the Iraq War, as a scene of the war against terrorism scenario, crystallized the divisions among the Union’s members and indicated an expected shift in their national foreign policies in favor of intergovernmentalism.

To sum up, the first two cases constitute examples of the EU’s ability to implement a successful CFSP whereas Iraq proves just the opposite. The reasons for this shift in the CFSP as well as an in-depth analysis of each case – where I will apply LI and ET to related cases in order to explain the EU’s CFSP preferences – are within the domain of next chapter.
4 An Analysis: The European Ground

LI claims that states are rational actors and they pursue their national interests. Therefore, some states should have acted against the EU decision to support the US just like they have done over the Iraq case. LI is possibly able to explain why there has been a shift in the EU foreign policy in favor of national foreign policies (by associating it with the national tendencies to follow individual interest). However, the initial response of the EU after September 11 was a development which LI would hardly foresee or even if it had been able to do so, it could not have exposed the reason properly. Here constructivism gets into the scene as it promises to elucidate such a foreign policy attitude with the establishment of a common European identity which all the member states are committed to. Yet, constructivists do not prove to be so pretentious in explaining the shift towards the nationalistic pursuit of foreign policy (crystallizing with the Iraq War) in the post September 11 period.

In this part of study, developments within the EU during the selected cases will be covered. Then, I will apply the theories mentioned above on these empirical data, which will hopefully help us better test the premises of both approaches. Finally, I will assess the contribution of constructivism to explain those CFSP developments.

4.1 The Immediate Reaction

4.1.1 The Developments

The EU’s initial response to the terrorist bombings of September 11 was immediate and practical. European Commission, for instance, activated its system for Civil Protection before the end of 12 September\(^1\). The aim was to help the victims of attacks. On the same day NATO declared its full support for the US referring to the fifth article of the Treaty. More interestingly, all NATO members, 11 of which were also in the EU, demonstrated their willingness to make such a commitment (Hill 2004 p. 146).

On 12 September, the European Council, which is regarded as an effective mechanism of the member states to set the foreign policy preferences in national capitals – as the military intervention in Iraq proved – (Marsh and Mackenstein 2005 p. 254), made a declaration extending the deepest sympathy to the Americans and stressing “its complete solidarity with the government of the United States” as it defined September 11 as “an attack not only on the United States but against humanity itself and the values and freedoms [they] all share”. The Council ended this declaration by stating that “[t]he Union would work closely with the United States and all partners to combat international terrorism” 14. Having held an extraordinary summit in Brussels on 21 September, the member states rephrased that September 11 represented “an assault on [the] open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies” and that any necessary action should be taken “against states abetting, supporting or harboring terrorists” 15. Even the thirteen states which were the candidates for accession to the EU also expressed their commitment to these conclusions (Wouters and Naert 2003 p. 29).

On 14 September, the EU made formal statements which represented the views of all EU institutions since the presidents of the European Parliament and the European Commission, the High Representative for CFSP and the Heads of State and Government were the signatories of these statements (Blair 2004 p. 205). Especially the following statements were striking in terms of showing the common EU stance:

Javier Solana, just like the Commission President Prodi 16 did, explicitly stated that the EU would be standing fully behind the US in their future war against terrorism 17. The fact that such a declaration was made by the High Representative for CFSP, which has been one of the most problematic branches of the EU, was also of a further importance in terms of showing the EU’s ability to talk with a single voice.

Besides, the Justice and Home Affairs Council reached an agreement on 29 September on proposals for a European arrest warrant and measures to combat terrorism.

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terrorism (Blair 2004 p. 205). This warrant was agreed in December, and therefore underlined the practicality and decisiveness of the EU on the issue (Hill 2004 p. 147). This development, just like the declaration by Solana, indicates the Union’s unity even on issues of second and third pillars which are characterized by intergovernmentalism and have usually led to serious problems previously.

This list can easily be extended by plenty of other official declarations in which the theme is the EU’s full support for the American response and the stress is on the common values that the EU members and the US share\(^{18}\). Now I will move to the analysis of the EU’s swift response to September 11.

4.1.2 The Analysis:

Referring to Tonra’s analogy of “poker game” (Tonra 2003: 734), according to LI, every national government aims to win the game where national interest is the major determinant. Therefore, the EU is unable to produce a CFSP unless that CFSP decision serves to the individual interests of all member states. Accordingly, in the case of September 11, all states should have benefited from the collective decision to support the US so that they agreed upon such a declaration. It is obvious that some members have been loyal allies of the US, such as the UK, this joint decision might have already favored their national positions. However, some members, like France, have historically been in constant disagreement with the US. So, sponsoring the US position contradicts with their traditional politics.

Nevertheless, one can argue that since the agenda was terrorism, the EU states felt the necessity to condemn terrorism and express their sympathy for the Americans. I completely agree with this idea. But my point is that the member states were not contended with just denouncing terrorism but they also ensured full support for the future response of the US. Such rhetoric can barely be spelled “expected” especially when “the anti-Americanism that is to be found in parts of Western Europe and the undoubted general hostility to the Bush administration” is taken into account (Hill 2004 p. 145; Hoffmann 2003 p. 16; Wallace 2002).

Moreover, Hill also argues that the reason why Germany shifted its position and rejected to support the US in Iraq was directly related to its pursuit of national interest (ibid. p. 153). But then why did they act in accordance with the EU at the very beginning and participated in the EU foreign policy which arguably made it harder to pursue national interests? LI lacks adequate explanation for that.

Due to those reasons, I believe it is much more appropriate to also utilize the constructivist arguments for a better explanation\(^{19}\). According to the assumptions of ET, states’ foreign policy attitudes are the outcome of a social learning process. They are shaped by the social interaction in the upper level rather than taken as pre-determined before any social interaction takes place (Tonra 2003 p. 735). Accordingly, the main constructivist claim is that it is possible to offer a dynamic model of foreign policy far better than those of rationalist school if we look at the role of this social learning in changing belief systems and interests of states (ibid. p. 736). On the other hand, a rationalist would argue that states use such kind of beliefs or ideas in order to pave the way for their rationally calculated aims (Ferejohn 1993). However, this did not prove to be the case as Germany and France had stuck to the EU’s collective decision and had supported the US rather than going after their own national objectives.

Manners believes since the EU was constituted as an elite-driven, treaty based project, its constitutional norms and values are in fact the founding elements of its international identity (2002 p. 241). Constitutionalizing the centrality of this identity, the Treaty of Maastricht lists those common values of member states as “liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law”\(^{20}\) and puts forward several objectives regarding the CFSP pillar. These are “to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence […] of the Union”, to take required measures for the security of the Union, to contribute to international peace and security, to promote international cooperation and to respect democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedom\(^{21}\). Those common objectives and values have been repeatedly mentioned ever after the “Copenhagen declaration on European identity” in 1973 (Manners 2002 p. 241) and, from a constructivist point of view, member states have been feeling increasingly committed to those principles since then. Likewise, as stated by the Treaty of Maastricht, the member states feel the obligation to “support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”\(^{22}\). The significance of this “rhetorical commitment”\(^{23}\) to community identity is that it begins to shape state attitudes and to lead the way for

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\(^{19}\) Here I claim that denying constructivist premises will disable us to see the entire picture. But that is not to say that rationalism is completely irrelevant and should be disregarded. As one of my aims is to assess the utility of constructivism, I test the applicability of the premises of ET, not those of LI. However, stressing the points where LI fails to cover is required for a better understanding of constructivist claims.


\(^{23}\) The Concept of ‘Rhetorical Commitment’ is presented by Frank Schimmelfennig (2003).
members’ foreign policies. Thus, a united foreign policy pursuit becomes inevitable since every member is influenced by the same values and norms.

As we go back to the official EU statements right after the terrorist attacks on September 11, for example the one which belongs to the Council saying that September 11 is an assault to the common values, we see that rhetoric of “common values and norms” has been reproduced while explaining why the EU chose to move along a certain way as one body. So the members felt the obligation to act in accordance with the Union’s identity. This is also in parallel with the constructivist perception that the CFSP is not a forum where state interests are bargained (like LI predicts), but rather a process where not only the CFSP itself evolves but also the attitudes of actors develop and change (Tonra 2003 p. 739). Hill and Wallace interpret this process as a factor which fetches the formation and execution of national foreign policy away from the sovereignty of states towards a higher-level of networking “transformative effects” (quoted in Tonra 2003 p. 740).

4.2 The War in Afghanistan

4.2.1 The Developments

The diplomatic activity mentioned above emphasizes the emergence of a strong collective EU position, a factor that was also reinforced as the EU provided economic and financial support to Pakistan, which had a key role in the anti-Taliban coalition in November 2001 (Blair 2004 p. 206). However, this positive environment began to fade away as the Union’s agenda shifted away from September 11 towards the crises in the post September 11 period such as the war in Afghanistan or the one in Iraq, which increasingly required more action rather than sole diplomacy.

Having swiftly settled down the concerns among the Union members over the legitimacy of the American action and the support for the US after September 11, the very first issue that the EU states dissented over was the extent of the possible military action. Germany, Italy, Ireland and Scandinavian members were among those who shared this concern (Hill 2004 p.147). As the French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine expressed, the Union’s major distress after September was that any legitimate retaliation against Afghanistan might lead to a “clash of civilizations” (quoted in Duke 2002 p. 161). As a matter of fact, this concern led to a division within the EU where some member states greeted the US decision to launch a military operation against Afghanistan with considerable anxiety which was almost confirmed and doubled as the US Ambassador to the United Nations,
John Negroponte, implicitly stated that “the US self-defense [may] require further actions” which was assumed to refer to Iraq (ibid.).

The lack of cohesiveness of the EU position was further confirmed as the UK, France and Germany held their own meeting before the Ghent Council on 20 October because the “EU-3” did not want to “stand politely in the line waiting for the Belgian Presidency” to act on their behalf (Hill 2004 p. 147). On 4 November, Tony Blair invited German Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac to an informal dinner in London to talk over the conflict in Afghanistan. The lack of a wider representative group of member states was met with considerable criticism (Blair 2004 p. 206; Duke 2002 p. 161) and, moreover, the prime ministers of Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, and the Belgian Presidency together with Solana “forced their way, almost literally, to the table” of the EU-3 (Hill 2004 p. 147).

On the other side, in spite of these concerns and so-called cracks in the CFSP, the Union was able to sustain its collective position also in the Afghanistan case. The Commission President Prodi depicted this success of the EU with the following words: “At this difficult […] moment, all Europe stands steadfast with the United States and its coalition allies to pursue the fight against terrorism. […] This is a moment for unity […]. We are united, and will remain united, in this struggle against those who attack the very foundations of civilization”. Obviously, the EU managed to mask the unease among the member states over the nature of the US responses to the attacks of September 11 and its support for the legality of the military campaign against Afghanistan was repeatedly confirmed by several declarations.

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24 EU-3: the UK, France and Germany


Also the list of the countries contributing to Operation Enduring Freedom may help better understand the EU support. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Sweden are among the contributors to Operation Enduring Freedom. More information available at: http://www.afghanembassy.net/nz_recons.html. Accessed March 25th, 2006.
4.2.2 The Analysis

These developments raised several questions about the extent to which a collective EU stance would be possible to maintain due to the strong national positions. In addition to the incidents above, concerning the participation of the Union in the Afghani case, some claim that, despite the initial collective front image, it was the members of the EU individually, not the EU as a unity with a CFSP, that were actively involved in Afghanistan (Den Boer and Monar 2002 p. 16). That is very much in line with LI claiming that national governments pursue their own preferences even in a time when a successful CFSP image dominates the agenda.

However, the disunity within the EU over Afghanistan has only marked the first cracks on the CFSP. As I have already mentioned, Simon Duke puts forward the idea that the apparent solidarity of the EU was able to mask the perceptible unease among the member states over the US responses to the attacks (Duke 2002 p. 160). Moreover, despite the disunity, individual member states of the Union joined the military campaign at the end of the day (Wouters and Naert 2003 p. 29). According to LI, the member states would have aligned with the rules of the EU institutions provided that those rules had reflected the state interests (Moravcsik 1999 p. 73). If that was the case, the member states that have traditionally been doubtful about the US (in this respect France should have taken the lead) would not have supported the American campaign in Afghanistan (just like they did in Iraq). But that was not the case. Therefore, LI fails to account for the power that obliged the member states to stay with the EU’s position over the issue despite their discomfort due to the inability to pursue national principles.

For example, the previously cited statement of Védrine explicitly indicated the French reluctance in supporting a military action in Afghanistan. Apart from that, France has been the leading figure in, as Hill calls it, “the anti-Americanism...
that is to be found in parts of Western Europe” (2004 p. 145). However, both France and Germany acted with the rest of the EU-15 and declared support for the American response (Wallace 2002 p. 113) because they were persuaded that the attack on Afghanistan had two strategic aims which would also serve to the common values of the Europeans: to destroy Al Qaeda and to remove the Taliban regime (Hill 2004: 148).

While explaining why certain states did not simply choose to pursue their national positions instead of agreeing with the others on a common EU position, LI would say that some actors, especially strong states, transfer some part of their sovereignty to supranational institutions in order to make it easier to control the other states, especially the weaker ones. This is how Moravcsik explains the establishment of supranational institutions (1999 p. 74). However, as we witness in Afghanistan case, France and Germany, two of the strongest EU members, did not pursue their national policies – which would mean opposing the US as the Iraq case proved – but stuck to the Union’s common stance. So LI fails to foresee such an attitude since these two are neither weak nor would easily be forced to act in that way by the other members.

On the contrary, constructivists would not change their stance that was elaborated in the previous section of this study and they would successfully stress that the common values, norms and thus the identity created by the EU persuaded the member states to obey, willingly or unwillingly, the collective position of the Union towards the Afghani conflict. In other words, the common European identity suggested the member states strive for their democratic values and fight against terrorism even though this might have contradicted with the traditional national position of some member states.

Under the lights of these developments, we may assess that the EU was able to maintain its collective position which was established right after September 11, although we should not underestimate some tensions between national and collective foreign policies. Despite such tensions, it is still of a considerable importance that the EU as a whole body managed to quiet the opponents of its collective position and that this did not lead to the dissolution of the collectivity at least during the conflict in Afghanistan.

In fact, one of the major reasons for the continued common position of the EU despite several hindrances was that Afghanistan was not a case in which the US showed no respect to the principles of multilateralism and acted unilaterally. If this had been the case, what we witnessed in Iraq (the disunity between the US and the EU; and among the member states) would have been experienced also in Afghanistan. Therefore, the role of a disregarded common European identity would not have been enough to sustain a CFSP which was the case in Iraq. But having acted multilaterally, the US-led force managed to overthrow Taliban regime (Duke 2002 p. 157). Thus, Afghanistan proved to be a success story of the division of labor where the US, with the help of coalition forces of which the EU
member states were a part, had toppled down the Taliban rule and the Europeans put on the responsibility for after-war-reconstruction (Hill 2004 p. 149).

These appear to be the major points where the importance of commitment to common values should not be neglected and, where ET proves to be more capable of explaining the dynamics of foreign policy decision-making and compensate for LI where it lacks. However, further developments in the post-September 11 period, as I will examine in the following two sections, demonstrate that this victory for constructivists has turned out to be short-lived.

4.3 War on Terrorism

The war in Afghanistan was only the first step of the EU on its long-term commitment to a multi-faceted campaign against terrorism. In the post-September 11 era, until the end of Afghanistan crisis, the EU has managed to act with collectivity and flexibility in its foreign policy. Apparently it was “unhindered by the infamous three-pillar system” (ibid. p. 150).

Moreover, one of the fields that the European states have always been doubtful and sensitive about used to be the American requests in any meaning of the word. However, the EU strongly supported the US in its immediate reaction to September 11 and in the military campaign against Afghanistan (Wouters and Naert 2003 p. 28). On 11 December 2001, an agreement between the Europol and the US was signed which aimed “to enhance cooperation [between] the Member states […] and the [US] in preventing, detecting, suppressing, and investigating serious forms of international crime”28. I interpret this also as a consequence of the member states’ commitment in the common values and the EU identity. The members respected the rule of law, liberty, democracy, human rights etc. so intensely that they were ready to cooperate even with the US for this purpose.

Up to this point in the post-September 11 era, the EU had a strong hand in this poker game in terms of diplomacy as it achieved to persuade national governments to use a supranational diplomacy which preceded national preferences. But after the war in Afghanistan, the issue of long-term commitment to fight against terrorism took over and the need of more action rather than just diplomacy began to occupy an increasingly larger space in the agenda. It was not evident whether the EU was ready for this kind of a test.

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4.4 The Iraq War

4.4.1 The Developments

Iraq constituted the first chain of the war against the “axis of evil”. At first glance, the American aims, which spelled the continuation of combat against terrorism—at least in rhetoric—, did not bear anything the Europeans would oppose to. There was a debate within the Bush administration on whether the US should act unilaterally in Iraq or it should seek for the support of the UN. France, as the leading figure, favored the second option due to its belief that this would be the only way for the US to legitimize their action (Blair 2004 p. 206). At the end of the day, the US chose the French-favored way and, on 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to ratify Resolution 1441 which declared that Iraq would be given “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations”\(^{29}\). In response to the resolution, the EU expressed “its full confidence in and support for the resolution” and urged Iraq to accept it immediately and “to comply unconditionally with all the provisions of the resolution”\(^{30}\).

Although the EU and the US agreed that Iraq should remove its weapons of mass destruction, this agreement was not persistent\(^{31}\) when it came to how offensive the way to resolve this problem should be or how much time should be given to the UN inspectors (Wilga 2004 p. 6). Eventually, in early 2003, the US and the UK expressed their dissatisfaction with the Iraqi willingness to comply with the resolution. They believed that Iraq was trying to escape from its obligations to disarm.

Thus the US, backed with the UK and Spain, asked for a second UNSC resolution which would authorize war against Iraq. This was the point where the division within the EU and between the EU and the US became severely entrenched. While the UK and Spain picked to play with the US rules, France and Germany objected the American mind-set and announced that they would vote against a second UN resolution because the UN weapon inspectors had not completed their duty in Iraq by then. The French threat to vote against meant the ruin of the resolution since France was one of the five permanent members. From this point on, the US gave up moving along with the UN route and set its own timetable for the attack (Blair 2004 p. 207). This marked the crossroads in the discussion among the European leaders. On 30 January 2003, eight European


\(^{31}\) This disagreement among the national governments inevitably led to a divergence of approaches between the US and some members of the EU.
leaders signed the (in)famous ‘letter of eight’\textsuperscript{32} which illuminated the “division among the European leaders”\textsuperscript{33} (Wilga 2004 p. 5; Allen and Smith 2004 pp. 95-6) and led its signatories to participate in the US-led military operation initiated on 19 March 2003.

4.4.2 The Analysis

The Iraq War illustrates a case which constructivists fail to predict such a crystallization of divisions or shift in the foreign policy whereas LI is able to speak out in terms of those aspects.

One of the most important reasons for this shift was that the American proposal for a second UNSC Resolution surfaced the historical differences between the US way of tackling such a problem and that of the EU’s. In other words, Iraq has crystallized the historical divide between “the EU [’s] focus on soft power and multilateral solutions and the US emphasis on hard power and possibility of force” (Smith and Steffenson 2005 p. 360). The EU was constructed around a soft notion of power and the inability to play the ‘hard cop’ had been the Union’s essential weakness since the very first days of the European Integration project (ibid. p. 358). Accordingly, the EU would like to solve the Iraq problem through the conduct of soft power and multilateralism, whereas the US tended to go for hard power and unilateralism. That is why the European enthusiasm to cooperate with the US bumped into further obstacles in the wake of Iraq conflict. Apparently, Iraq supported Robert Kagan when he said “Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus” (2002 p. 1).

Moreover, the UK and Spain, who were backed up by Denmark, Italy, and Portugal after a short while, tracked their national positions which prioritized an attempt to act with the US. In other words, some EU members favored the hard cop role of the US due to their self interest-based calculations. Seemingly, not all of the Europeans had been from Venus.

In my opinion, from September 11 until the end of the war in Afghanistan, the CFSP was able to provide the EU-15 with an efficient way of dealing with those crises. I think it had been much easier for the Europeans to act collectively on softer issues like diplomacy or releasing an official statement condemning terrorism, as September 11 illustrated or on issues like cooperating with the US as long as they strive for the same values as we witnessed in Afghanistan. In such

\textsuperscript{32} “United We Stand – Eight European Leaders are as one with President Bush”, 30 January 2003. Available at: http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110002994 . Accessed April 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2006.

\textsuperscript{33} The EU could not receive the support of even some accession countries since Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were among the “eight” which backed the US in its actions against Iraq rather than bandwagoning with France and Germany, who constitute “the traditional heart of the EU” (Hill 2004 p. 153).
issues, common European identity, as claimed by ET, proved to be strong enough to gather the member states under one umbrella.

On the contrary, the Iraq case was just a counter example which LI can better explain. After the US announced to act unilaterally which contradicted with the common values of Europeans, the EU could no longer gather its members together since the European allies of the US decided to support the American action in Iraq despite the lack of a CFSP decision. To put it other way, the EU lost its efficiency in convincing its members to comply with its collective position and, moreover, the internal divisions among the EU members and the continuing primacy of national foreign policies were surfaced in the Iraq War (Dannereuther 2004 p. 3).

For a better discussion of this shift in states’ attitudes, in my opinion it is appropriate to cover the concepts of hard and soft security. Therefore, next part is about that distinction. Meanwhile, I will continue the above-stated discussion in this net part as well.

4.5 The Big Picture: “Hard” and “Soft” Security

4.5.1 Re-grouping “High” and “Low” Politics

Stanley Hoffmann (1966) makes a distinction between high politics and low politics where he bases his argument on realist premises. He calls issues of economy and welfare as “low politics” whereas those of foreign policy, security and defense as “high politics”. In areas of high politics which forms the vital national interests, he argues, states try to compensate their losses in the area of low politics. Therefore, Hoffmann notes, any functional integration in low politics may seem acceptable to national governments. However, when it comes to discussion of high politics, national governments will not accept or be convinced to accept anything less than their self-interest (ibid. p. 883). That is why he believes states are “obstinate” rather than “obsolete” and they allow integration only to a certain extent which is within the limits of low politics.

As a result of this paper, I believe this classification of Hoffmann should be rearranged. Taking Hill’s assertion that the member states consider the CFSP as a means providing agreement to hold a common view or issuing an agreed declaration but not as a means to agree to devote resources or project power (1992 p. 191) as the point of departure, what I claim is that there is also a distinction of “high and low priority” within the field of high politics. What I believe is that, as ET proposes, integration occurs even in the field of CFSP which Hoffmann groups under high politics. However, contemporary constructivists are too hasty to predict that socially constructed factors are strong enough to ensure complete
integration in this field. In order to draw the extents of integration in high politics, I divide issues within the foreign and security policy (FSP) into two groups: soft and hard security issues.

As in September 11, cases that might be handled through the use of softer tools such as diplomacy (or condemning terrorism as September 11 proved) are among the issues of soft security where the EU is able to generate a successful CFSP. That is why the constructivist argument on common values, norms or identity is sufficient to explain the Union’s collectivity in September 11.

On the other hand, hard security issues are those which require not only sole diplomacy but also more or less military action. As we take into account that the inability to play the ‘hard cop’ had been the Union’s essential weakness since the very first days of the European Integration project, it is relatively difficult to generate such a successful collective position in the field of hard security. But it is never impossible since we witnessed the Union’s ability to do so in Afghanistan. I believe this was because of the fact that the American response was perceived as legitimate by the rest of the world and the US respected this multilateralism rather than moving unilaterally. In a way, as ET argues, the US showed its commitment to the common values of Europeans and therefore the EU was able to silence the unease among its members over the US action in Afghanistan.

However, once the US left its multilateral attitude and went along unilateral lines in Iraq without respecting the common European values, an expected disunity between the US and the EU emerged over the legitimacy of action. Therefore, the member states which had cooperated with the US despite their traditional doubts about the Americans chose to quit acting so. Up to this point ET may still claim that the EU decided not to support the American because the US did not respect the values and norms which the Europeans felt committed to. However, as the EU could no more take a collective decision to cooperate with the US, the European allies of the US felt no more constrained with the common European identity and chose to support the US action in Iraq individually. In a way, tendency of national governments to pursue self-interest prevailed over their commitment to common identity, values and norms. At this point, ET fails to sustain its successful position.

To sum up, combating against terrorism, which, in the case of Iraq, required practicing hard power capabilities such as sending military troops to Iraq under the name of ‘EU forces’ (which falls in hard security field), is a role the EU has traditionally been unable to play. And when that inability has combined with the American undermining of common European values, the member states which believe in the importance of common values no more supported the US action in Iraq. From this point on, LI, despite its inefficiency to explain the immediate European response to September 11 or how the EU was able to silence the unease among the members over the US response in Afghanistan, gets in charge and can successfully explain the remaining part of the story. As a matter of fact, the
member states’ who were the allies of the US decided to preserve national interests and moved along their national priorities which suggested supporting the US. Thus, the war in Iraq also marked an incident where constructivist concepts like rhetorical commitment and identity reconstruction at the supranational level did not prove to be as strong as LI’s claim for the prevalence of national interests over the EU interests.

4.5.2 The Iraq War: Marking the Demise of the CFSP?

Departing from the arguments stated above, one could assume that the CFSP was damaged by the Iraq conflict and that conflict indicated the impossibility of integration in hard security issues of the CFSP (Wilga 2004 p. 1). However, even though I agree with the idea that “the failure […] to produce […] a united position […] in Iraq was a severe, although predictable, blow for the CFSP” (Shepherd 2004 p. 19), predicting the impossibility of integration would be a premature assumption due to a couple of reasons:

First, we have a counter-example which this study has discussed: The war in Afghanistan. This case not only has shown us the possibility of integration in hard security issues but also supported Ben Tonra’s arguments that national interests, after they are brought to the negotiating table, can be seen to have evolved over time as an outcome of national actors’ participation in the CFSP. Furthermore, he believes, the rules within the CFSP regime do not simply constitute a regulative framework for problem-solving, but also bear the formal and informal norms within the CFSP, which are the constitutive of an epistemic community where a sense of “we feeling” is created (2003). Both September 11 and Afghanistan support also Reuben Wong’s stating that the CFSP has over the last 30 years moved a long way from its original “anti-communitaire” approach transforming into a more efficient policy day by day and that the future will bring us a stronger CFSP (2005). Therefore, I believe the EU’s collective selection of political attitude which can be best explained by constructivism during the post-September 11 stage until the days of Iraq may be, in my opinion, a good model for predicting the future conduct of its foreign policy or, at least, for evaluating the progress it has made since its foundation up to now. So, although Iraq has shown that the contemporary structure of the EU might not be enough to generate a common stance over such an incident, it will not be realistic to conclude that the EU will stay that desperate forever.

Second, which is closely linked to the first one, some believe that even though that liberal intergovernmentalist assumption may be true, it would not mean that “the process of further development of the CFSP for the EU got stuck” since there is no sign “to question the general tendency that the CFSP is
continuously being developed” (Wilga 2004 p. 1). Moreover, to coin Christopher Hill (2004 p. 161), even the crisis within the EU over Iraq did not lead any members to conclude that the CFSP is out of date and not usable any more. Contrarily, both the Franco-German and the Anglo-Italian-Spanish axes tried to prove that their position was the most efficient way of promoting Europe’s long term leading role in the world and therefore they tried to mobilize the EU in their favor rather than to institutionalize the current divisions. Likewise, Mette Eilstrup Sangiovanni says that none of the member states strived for a “rolling-back of the CFSP” despite such a crisis (2003: 193). On the contrary, it was even claimed that the CFSP was able to adopt itself to this crisis as time passed (Everts and Keohane 2003 p. 167). In the lights of these assertions, I would argue that the Iraq case damaged the CFSP politically but not institutionally. Contrarily, Iraq accelerated the continuous development of the CFSP as it pushed the national governments to think about the necessity and capability of the CFSP and, hence, “created an impetus” for its reform (Wilga 2004).

I would conclude this chapter alleging that as the agenda shifts from issues of soft security to those of hard security (i.e. moving from September 11 to Iraq), constructivist premises weaken dramatically whereas LI is strengthened. I believe its main reason is that, as LI puts it, states are not completely ready to transfer any part of their sovereignty to an upper level when their concern is a hard power-related issue. However, that is not to deny the impact of constructed realms on the development of the CFSP, as ET argues. Iraq may have proved the difficulty of integration in hard security issues and questioned the purpose of the CFSP, but questioning a concept, the CFSP, does not necessarily indicate its non-functionality.

34 I will not go into the details of this argument since it is not among the objectives of this study. However, a detailed argumentation is available at: http://www.sam.sdu.dk/~mwi/Wilga,%20CFSP%20and%20Iraq%20crisis-15.12.04.pdf. Accessed at March 15th, 2006.
5 Conclusion

Acting as a consistent foreign policy actor has recently been one of the most important goals of the EU. For a club which is able to talk almost with a single voice in the global economic arena, it has been of a great significance to back up this economic power with a collective identity in global politics. Despite several attempts towards this purpose, the EU had faced the same kind of frustration in every shot.

The very last example of such frustration has been brought about during the Iraq War in 2003. The 15 states of the Union have once again diverged in their views over the issue. The UK, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain backed the US way of handling the problem whereas France and Germany were the leading figures at the other end of the spectrum while some members chose to stay rather neutral.

5.1 The Rise of the CFSP

However, as we look at the first steps of the EU foreign policy in the post-September 11 period, we can articulate that there has been something quite remarkable about the CFSP, something that could not be sustained very long but nevertheless is worth focusing on because it may be handy in predicting the future conduct of the EU foreign policy.

Despite the rational calculations of member states, which were envisaged by liberal intergovernmentalists, the EU managed to both establish a collective position in its immediate response to September 11 and then silence the different views within its entity and maintained its collectivity in the Afghanistan War, as this paper has argued. These are atypical examples of the dynamics which can not be exposed entirely by any rationalist effort. In this respect, I tried associating the issue with constructivism for a better justification. However, as a characteristic of constructivist arguments, I do not ignore the importance of other factors such as domestic politics which LI proposes. Instead, my assertion is that socially constructed values such as common values, norms or a common identity are additionally needed for a full-fledged justification.

The declaration of the European Council one week after the attacks, for instance, is a good illustration confirming that the EU managed to breed a single
voice in a very short time because all members have been rhetorically committed to the EU values and its common identity and considered September 11 as “an assault to [the] open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies” which the EU is a part of (European Council 2001). As ET argues, this quote includes some of the common norms of the EU, which help to create and maintain a collective identity.

5.2 Failure to Sustain the Unity

Constructivists would manage to sustain their argument until the war in Afghanistan was over. Then, the EU member states could not agree upon a joint foreign policy due to their entrenched national positions. This verity surfaced as the possibility of a war in Iraq increased and the debate over how the Union was to act in such a case heated up. Finally, the member states established different fractions within the EU according to their national foreign policy preferences. This has been a humiliating demonstration of the tension between national and collective interests.

LI proves to be the solid explanation for such a scene as it proposes that states pursue their national interests and choose the path along which they maximize their benefits. The accuracy and significance of this rational assertion becomes crystal clear as we take into account that what we have witnessed in Iraq case was a kind of European disunity not among the peoples of Europe but rather governments (Hill 2004 p. 154). That is to say, despite the will of the people in Europe, some states acted along with their self-interest and undermined socially constructed aspects such as the common will (even that of their own citizens), collective identity or values etc. I believe this is because the CFSP, after a certain point – where I prefer to draw the line between soft power and hard power concerns – fails to generate tools which are strong enough to offer states alternative ways to handle the issues of hard power, to prevent them from getting hurt and to dry up their vulnerability caused by the ambiguity at the European level over how to act collectively. Unsurprisingly, having encountered such a condition in the Iraq war, member states chose to move along their national priorities. Accordingly, the period beginning with the end of the war in Afghanistan leading up to the Iraq crisis, the Union’s foreign policy was shaped mainly by the national governments while the key figures of EU’s supranational character such as External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten or High Representative of CFSP Javier Solana were all sidelined (Blair 2004 p. 207).

This leaves us with a conclusion that “any attempt to capture an image of EU diplomacy has to take into account both the steps that have been made to create a more united EU diplomacy that binds all the members together and at the same time the continuing reality of independent national positions” (ibid. p. 208).
In other words, the reality of national interests is a difficult challenge which has to be tackled with on the way to establish a collective European foreign policy.

5.3 The CFSP: Only a Dream?

The post-September 11 period may seem to have sharpened the flaws in the EU foreign policy. It may have created different camps within the Union. However, that is not to deny the fact that the EU has a CFSP although its limitations should be questioned. Accordingly, I believe the EU’s collective selection of political attitude which can be best explained by constructivism during the post-September 11 stage until the days of Iraq War may be a good model for predicting the future conduct of its foreign policy or, at least, for evaluating the progress it has made since its foundation up to now.

The CFSP has been transforming into a more efficient policy day by day since its incorporation into the Treaty in early 1990s. In spite of the EU’s inability to uphold its collective policy long enough, I believe, September 11 and Afghanistan should be seen as good proofs of this transformation. What is to be kept in mind is that the Union and its every organ, including the member states and the institutions, are still learning and that social learning, impact of which we have witnessed on 11 September 2001, is a long and painful process. Throughout this process, states’ traditional routine of pursuing self-interest will inevitably dominate from time to time. Nevertheless, when we look back where we were at the beginning, we face the impossibility of claiming that nothing has changed up to now. So only time will tell whether the EU will manage to establish a sustainable collective identity in its foreign policy – even in the areas related to hard power –, or ‘it will go down as yet another example of the Europeans freezing in the lights of an oncoming train’.

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6 Bibliography


