Department of Political Science

Denmark, Sweden and the CFSP
Two similar countries facing different political realities

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Abstract

This study examines which factors on a systemic, domestic, and leadership level are determinants in deciding Sweden and Denmark’s diverging relationship to the Common Foreign and Security Policy sector of the European Union. In the systemic level of analysis, a country’s relative position in the global political system is studied. In the domestic scene, factors such as the governmental structure, public opinion, and interests groups are examined. Finally, there is a leadership analysis of the respective Prime Ministers in order to study their relative impact on the country’s affiliation with the CFSP. The study further proposes that the systemic sector is where the countries differs the least from one another considering their systemic security orientation. The domestic sector is where the more fundamental differences are found due to different governmental structures, laws regarding referendum, and powerful interests groups. In the leadership level, the Swedish Prime Minister is found to have more room for maneuvering and is therefore considered to be more influential than his Danish counterpart on the country’s CFSP relationship.

Keywords: Common Foreign and Security Policy, Denmark, Sweden, Soft Rationalism, Two-level Game Theory
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Cooperation</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1. The Subject of the Study

This study is motivated by a curiosity to study the differing factors deciding Denmark and Sweden’s dissimilar relationship to the second pillar of the European Union (EU), the Common Foreign and Security Policy sector (CFSP). Despite the close geographical proximity and historical association in terms of sociopolitical and economic developments, these two countries have come to assume differing roles in world and European politics. This is a fact often overlooked in the global political arena, where it is frequently assumed that these two countries strive for much of the same political and economic goals. To a certain extent this is perhaps true. However, there are areas where these two countries differ significantly from one another and the CFSP is one of them. The Common Foreign and Security segment is a policy area within the EU which has gained much ground in recent years. This development is quite controversial in the sense that member-states are transferring parts of their autonomy in order to define one common foreign and security strategy in the name of the EU. Yet, due to the intergovernmental nature of the second pillar every member-state still has an individual voice and they are thus able to develop quite unique national relationships to this policy area. This is in fact one of the main challenges of the CFSP – member-states pursuing their own interests and in such a manner make it difficult for the EU to form a coherent frontline.

1.2 The Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate the factors which make the Swedish and Danish relationships differ to the CFSP and in such a manner help explain why these countries have such different approaches. The overarching aim is to present, through the lens of a comparative most similar system design, which systemic, domestic, and leadership aspects in each country contribute in creating this diversion. In addition, the results of this study can be seen as a contribution to the literature and a more general explanation of smaller member-states’ political behavior towards the CFSP.
1.3 Brief Presentation of the Cases

1.3.1 Denmark

Denmark became a member of the European Union in 1973 together with the United Kingdom, which has always been considered an important partner to the country. Denmark is nevertheless a reluctant member of the European Union. This attitude was not an issue as long as the community was understood as an intergovernmental organization based on economic cooperation. However, dynamics came to shift with the treaty of Maastricht in 1991 (Branner, 2002: 199). In a referendum in 1992, the Danish population voted no to the inclusion of Denmark into this treaty due to the disinclination towards increased political integration. Consequently, Denmark had to renegotiate a separate agreement. This accord is known as the Edinburgh Agreement, which gave Denmark four exemptions. These are no to union citizenship, no to the third phase of the European Monetary Union (EMU), no to common justice and police affairs, and no to common defense policy (Hansen, 2002: 72). In the context of this thesis, the fourth opt-out is the main focus and it has come to profoundly shape and limit Denmark’s involvement in such a vital area as the CFSP.

1.3.2 Sweden

Sweden has been a member of the EU since 1995. It joined mostly due to economic hardships and the changing world order due to the end of the Cold War. Sweden, as Denmark, is reluctant towards political integration and is considered quite skeptical towards the EU in general. Sweden has further had a traditional security stance focused around the notion of neutrality, which has for the most part left it outside of international security cooperation (Lindahl, 1995: 163). However, its security orientation has changed quite drastically in recent years. Sweden has gone from being neutral to non-aligned in a very short period of time. This development has in fact run parallel with the developments in the second pillar and it has kept Sweden from becoming marginalized in this sector (Riekker, 2003: 102). Consequently, this reorientation has made it possible for Sweden to become active within the policy area of the CFSP.
1.4 Methodology

The methodological plan for the empirical portion of this project is two-fold. Firstly, the aim is to compare two different case studies through using a most similar comparative system design. Consequently, this thesis is a mixture of the comparative method and the case study method albeit on two different levels conceptually (one theoretical and one empirical) (Lijphart, 1971: 691). Almost generally agreed, it is hard to limit research to one methodological grouping, often it is better to fuse two or more together in order to serve the purpose of the investigation (King et. al, 1994: 105). In this study, the author is using a model provided by Przeworski and Teune referred to as a “most similar system design” (1970). According to Przeworski and Teune, the most similar case method should employ cases with many similar features, so that many variables will be held constant and cannot be adduced as causes of any differences between them. This narrows down the number of potential explanatory variables and facilitates the empirical checking of explanations (Hopkin, 2002: 254). This model is appropriate for this study since Denmark and Sweden are two countries in close geographical proximity with similar history, and political and economic developments.

This system design springs from a positivist view of science. It means that it adheres to foundationalist ontology, which is concerned with establishing causal relationships between social phenomena, thus developing explanatory and predictive models (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 20). However, there are both some strengths and weaknesses with this approach. Advantages are that it gives good validity in the sense that it measures what it is intended for and the model is excellent to test theories. On the contrary, a disadvantage with the model is that cases are never completely independent but influence each other because of historical ties. This is problematic since it is difficult to determine how the cases affect each other. In turn, this may skew the results in a certain direction (Hopkin, 2002: 255). Being aware of this drawback the author attempts to avoid such pitfalls.

Secondly, the organizing concepts for this study need to be clarified. The CFSP represents a constant variable and the countries’ individual relationships with this sector are subsequently examined from three different levels of analysis in order to determine the differing variables. The levels under scrutiny are; a. the systemic - where factors external to the countries are considered, b. the domestic scene - where the countries’
internal context is the focus, and c. leadership - where the characteristics of the national leaders are studied. This part of the empirical research rests upon a foreign policy analysis model presented by K. J. Holsti (1992). The model is further discussed in chapter three.

1.5 Material

The material used in support of the theoretical section is made up of books and articles from leading researchers in the field of international relations theory, and European integration theory. Works by well-known European and American scholars are used throughout the project, and no noteworthy biases have been discovered based on the derivation of the works studied. The material used in support of the empirical evidence consists of books written by academics as well as journalists, newspaper articles, articles from academic journals, and information from official websites such as the Swedish and Danish governmental homepages. Moreover, the majority of the sources originate in the countries under study.

1.6 Clarifications

A few clarifications are necessary in order to frame the investigation that is carried out below. To avoid unnecessary confusion it is important to conceptually distinguish between EU foreign policy and Common Foreign and Security policy. Put simply, the EU foreign policy includes issues stemming from all three pillars of the EU whereas the CFSP is associated solely with the second pillar. Furthermore, CFSP belongs to the Council realm and is thus tied to a higher degree of intergovernmental deliberations (Smith & Petersson, 2004: 197). EU foreign policy is, however, all inclusive and allows for Commission initiatives and decisions as well as other EU agencies to also be part of an external relations framework (ibid, 199).

Moreover, in academia there is the debate whether the EU is a unique actor and therefore demands a different theoretical approach than what traditional international relation (IR) theories can offer. For the purpose of this study, the sector of the CFSP is understood to present a part of an organization, which is perhaps unique in its nature. However, due to the intergovernmental nature of the second pillar the theoretical approach will be based on traditional framework of IR theory.
1.6.1 Delimitations

In this thesis the author will not study these nation-states’ foreign policies in their entireties, nor the countries’ general EU policies. The focus is on these countries’ individual affiliation with the Common Foreign and Security Policy sector. More specifically, the center of attention is on which components are diverging factors in determining Denmark and Sweden’s differing relationship with the previously mentioned policy area. Therefore, the potential areas of similarity, such as their UN affiliation, will not be taken into account. Finally, certain foreign policy doctrines relied upon in the past, prior to any EU membership have played a role in shaping the countries’ current foreign and security roles – hence history in this sense matters and is taken into account.

1.6.3 Relevance

The CFSP of the EU has received increasing amounts of attention in recent years. This is a result of the member-states becoming more politically integrated, which in turn has opened up the prospect for a common foreign policy. The relative novelty of the CFSP makes it an interesting field of study. In addition, this study is relevant since it helps to understand the fundamental differences between two, on the surface, politically close countries and the consequences these differences have in relation to the foreign policy field of the CFSP.

1.7 Structure of Study

Having established the grounds, in the next section the theoretical structure of this study is laid out. Subsequently, in chapter three a close presentation of the analytical framework is presented. In chapter four, the analysis of the systemic level for both Sweden and Denmark is carried out. In chapter five, the domestic level is under scrutiny. In the sixth chapter, the focus is on leadership in the respective countries. Finally, chapter seven provides the conclusion.
2. Theory

A common theoretical application to help explain a research problem is to use a theory constructing study. This is a study where the empirical analysis is thought to result in new ways of explaining the phenomenon under scrutiny (Esaiason et al, 2002: 41). A second approach is theory testing, which means that a scholar has several workable theories, which subsequently are tested on the empirical material at hand. The final result is normally that a theory is strengthened, weakened, or that one theory proves to be more useful than another (ibid, 40). Thirdly, there is a theory consuming approach. In such examination, there is a specific case at the center of the study. The task here is to explain why something occurred or how a particular relationship came to develop through assistance of already existing theories and explanatory factors within a certain subject area (ibid, 41). The aim of this project is to apply the last discussed approach. The author finds this application to be the most appropriate since the goal of the study is to clarify which factors contribute in explaining Sweden and Denmark’s relationship respectively to the CFSP. Hence, theories in this case are of secondary importance as opposed to the choice of the cases. Primarily, the author aims at explaining why the relationships are the way they are and depending on the results, theories are tested.

2.1 Choice of Theory

The two theoretical approaches for the systemic and domestic levels of analysis are soft rationalism and two-level game theory respectively, which both stem from the rational choice school of thought. In addition, rationalism shares an ontological foundationalist position with positivism, since to rationalists the world exists independently of our knowledge of it (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 32). This theoretical choice is based on the idea that the socialization process has not proceeded as far in the context of the CFSP as opposed to other areas of the EU. This notion in combination with the intergovernmental structure of the second pillar guides this study to use a traditional IR approach in terms of theory application. The interpretation of soft rationalism is borrowed from Maria Stromvik’s dissertation “To Act as a Union” (2005). The concept suggests that states can be viewed as capable of at least making fairly conscious choices, and that the strategies chosen can, within limits, be seen as the result of rational
calculations by their leaders (Wallander et al, 1999: 5). In addition, soft rationalism allows for the actors to become socialized in the sense that their interests can be postponed over time due to external factors (Stromvik, 2005: 37). Consequently, rationalism in this context is referred to as soft due to the claimed ability for actors to take other actors’ interests into account.

The domestic level of analysis is based on the two-level game approach. This theory rests on the assumption that leaders engage in what Putnam (1988) calls “two-level games” or what Tseblis (1990; also Starr 1991) refers to as “nested games”. That is, in explaining government choices in foreign affairs, leaders are viewed as coping simultaneously with the pressures and constraints of their own domestic political system as well as with those of the international environment (Hagan, 1995: 117). These games are not simply the decision-making dynamics but may involve a broad array of autonomous actors that influence a regime’s daily governing and ultimately its long-term hold on office, such as parties, factions, and institutions (ibid, 118).

The third section of this project is the leadership analysis of each country’s Prime Minister. This portion of the study demands a slightly different theoretical approach due to its cognitive element. The dissimilarity here as opposed to previous sections is the degree of rationality one can assume these individuals to uphold. In cognitive theory, it is usually assumed there is no guarantee that the actors think in terms of strategy or rationality which is the opposite of rational choice theory (Esaisson et al., 2002: 318). However, Holsti’s model is interpreted to be more concerned with which degree of rationality one can prescribe the actors. For the purpose of this study and due to the empirical material available, the assumption is that these leaders are relatively rational in their thinking process, and that they have access to applicable information before making a decision. The examination of the leaders further rests upon a characteristics model created by Greenstein in his book ‘The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton’ (2000). The aim here is to look at certain personality characteristics in order map out the contribution of the leader in shaping the country’s relationship to the CFSP.
3. Analytical Approach

To explain a country’s foreign policy Holsti developed a three level model which analyzes external, internal, and leadership forces. The model is positivist in nature, which means that it shares the ontological foundations with previously discussed analytical and theoretical tools. The model is useful since it helps to present a fuller picture of a nation’s foreign policy orientation. Moreover, the model is appropriate for this study because it is based on such a broad array of aspects and this is necessary in order to paint a more complete picture of a country’s relationship with the CFSP. In the systemic level of the model, one focuses on the structure of the system itself, a country’s relative position in such a system, and purposes and actions of other actors. In the internal context, the focal point is government structure, the role of the parliament, public opinion, and interest groups (Holsti, 1992: 272). In regards of leadership, one looks at characteristics in a leader and his/her propensity to make certain type of decisions in foreign policy and thus study how this particular personality influences the policy process and outcome (ibid, 300). The study is concluded by a counterfactual analysis, which basically refers to statements which are contrary-to-fact conditionals. It is perhaps simpler to think of it as thought experiments to define causal claims. Since there is no actual physical laboratory in international politics, one can instead imagine situations in which one thing changes while other things are held at constant and then construct a picture of how the world would look (Nye, 1993: 42). Lastly, before embarking to the analytical sections of this project, it is important to acknowledge that no observer or scholar is completely objective in their studies. Even the most experienced scholars are partly prisoners of their experiences, the values prominent in their societies, and traditions (Holsti, 1992: 11). With this in mind, the following chapter presents the systemic level of analysis.
This figure demonstrates the model described in previous section. The model is slightly altered to fit the purpose of this project. This means that the respective factors in each level may vary from the original replica to better display the divergence between the cases at hand. The CFSP is held as the constant variable – whereas systemic, domestic, and leadership factors are viewed as changeable variables.
4. External Determinants

In the following chapter, Denmark and Sweden’s relationships to the CFSP are under scrutiny seen from a systemic perspective. There will be no historical analysis of how the respective countries’ affiliations to the segment have evolved. However, history is taken into account as a determining factor in explaining the countries’ present position in the international system. The focus lies solely on the differing factors explaining their current diverging association to this sector. Firstly, the external factors determining the Danish relationship are presented followed by the case of Sweden. The section is ended by some concluding remarks.

4.1 Systemic Level of Analysis

The overall structure of power in an international system expands or narrows the range of foreign policy strategies available to many members of the system. In a system distinguished by a great variety of states, ranging from superpowers to micro-states, the concerns of the smaller states are not likely to command much attention, unless they band together to press their common concerns (Holsti, 1992: 271). Denmark and Sweden are both small states thought to be working in a global system characterized by nation-states pursuing their own self-interests in a more or less anarchical environment (Hasenclever et al, 1997: 25). The competing propositions of why the CFSP has come to develop over time all rest on the assumption that states can be analyzed as if they are capable of at least making fairly conscious choices, and that the strategies chosen can, within limits, be seen as the result of rational calculations be their leaders (Stromvik, 2005: 36). Consequently, the theoretical framework for this chapter is soft rationalism. The fundamental idea here is that nation-states are rational actors thought to take other actors’ interests and strategic positions into account when setting their own security agenda (Stromvik, 2005: 37). As Duncan Snidal puts it (1986), “no state can choose its best strategy or attain its best outcome independent of choices made by others” (Stromvik, 2005: 37). Based on the empirical information presented below, the aim is to portray which factors determine these associations and to demonstrate how far soft rationalism goes in validating the same.
4.2 The Case of Denmark

4.2.1 Failed Danish Neutrality Policy

Denmark’s geographical position at the gate of the Baltic Sea as an appendix to Central Europe has attracted great strategic attention through the years (Faurby, 2000: 166). Consequently, as a small nation-state with a difficult topography to protect security concerns have been of high priority for Denmark. Most historians would argue that maintaining neutrality was the paramount goal of Danish foreign policy from the end of the Napoleonic wars and up until 1949, when Denmark joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Tonra, 2001: 129). However, the occupation by German forces in April of 1940 became a turning point in the history of Denmark’s foreign policy. The series of events denoted by 9 April could be seen as the final outcome of a long-standing inclination to seek to stay out of European power politics – and that proved an experience traumatic enough to provoke the nation to check, and to begin to reverse, what since the 19th century had been the basic line of Danish foreign policy (Holbraad, 1991: 79-80). Through the occupation by Germany, Denmark’s inability to defend itself and its vulnerability as a neutral and small nation-state were exposed. The solution was to seek membership in NATO and this decision has had major implication for Denmark’s current security orientation. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that when searching for a Danish foreign policy tradition, with implications for present behavior the closest one gets is the policy of neutrality (Branner 2000: 186).

4.2.2 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The decision to join NATO was a difficult one and Denmark would have preferred a Scandinavian solution at this point in time. Yet, Sweden and Norway’s objectives were incompatible which resulted in failure to create a Nordic peace zone. Thus, Denmark found itself left between a rock and a hard place. The dilemma was that isolated neutrality could tempt the Soviet Union to attack Denmark, while full NATO membership might be perceived as a provocation. In this situation, the choice fell on NATO membership (Villaume, 1999: 30). Denmark did adapt to NATO policies and strategies throughout the Cold War era. Yet, this was done in a low-key fashion, with Denmark pursuing disarmament and non-aggressive strategies within NATO (Holm 2002...
cited Riekker 2003). The application of soft rationalism in the security context of failed Danish neutrality during World War II is feasible due to Denmark’s position in the world as a smaller state realizing its vulnerability and therefore dependency on the West for protection. Consequently, Denmark had, for its own defense and with other actors’ interests in mind, to take the least risky route in order to protect itself.

Denmark’s NATO membership has come to shape the country’s security orientation and foreign policy significantly and is continuingly doing so. The defense opt-out obtained by the Edinburgh Agreement have limited Denmark’s international security activism to NATO, and thus led to an Americanized and militarized security discourse (Riekker, 2003: 194). This is an interesting development considering Denmark’s traditional military approach of minimalism or pacifism. However, seen from a NATO perspective the Danish opt-out cannot be seen as an expression of reservations towards taking part in international military operations. The opt-out is an expression of reservations towards taking part in military operations in an EU context (Larsen et al, 2000: 101).

### 4.2.3 The United States

Through joining NATO, Denmark initiated a transatlantic relationship as well. Denmark had turned to the West for security support which in reality meant towards the United States. This bilateral relationship is one which has affected Danish foreign and security policy significantly. However, there is a current understanding in Denmark that the US and NATO are the cornerstones of hard security, whereas the EU represents its softer needs (Larsen 2004: 101). There are numerous reasons for this compartmentalization. At the most general structural level the US’s position as a unipolar power places pressure on Denmark to adapt to the US. In addition, according to the Danish view there is still a need for the US and NATO to tie down a reunified Germany and to prevent an overly powerful Europe (ibid, 102). A strong link to the US is also seen as necessary if Denmark wants to punch above its weight in its foreign policy. This is actually how the Danish – US relationship is perceived by the previous and current Danish government. Moreover, in regards of one of the most difficult problems facing the West today – terrorism, Denmark is a staunch supporter of US policies in its war on terror (Larsen 2005: 90). The debate about possible military attacks against “axis of evil”
countries as part of the war against terrorism led to a split between the US and parts of Europe. Denmark did not distance itself from the US. They viewed alliance, loyalty, and dialogue with the US to be the overriding concerns and those aims did not allow for explicit criticism (Moller, 2002: 15). This relationship complicates Denmark’s relationship to the CFSP even more, since the US has a tendency to split the EU members in two camps, preventing them from forming a coherent foreign policy. Denmark has in this case sided with the UK and the US, which is to take a step away from the other member-states (Faurby, 2000: 167). When looking at Denmark’s relationship with the US the idea portrayed in soft rationalism of practicing national interests simultaneously as taking other actors’ interests into account comes into play (Stromvik, 2005: 37). This relationship works to demonstrate the impact of other actors on a nation’s foreign policy agenda.

4.2.4 Summing Up

The occupation by Germany during the Second World War left a lasting impression on Danish foreign and security policy. The failed neutrality policy resulted in NATO membership, which in turn created a strong bilateral relationship with the US. The experiences from the Second World War in combination with Denmark’s relative lack of individual power in the European/global arena makes it rely on the US for security purposes and be wary of European military and defense powers. These trends are especially visible in the exemption from the Maastricht Treaty obtained by the Edinburgh agreement of December 1992 (Faurby, 2000: 187).

4.3 The Case of Sweden

4.3.1 Sweden’s Successful Neutrality Policy

History and continuity are important in understanding the Swedish security context of today. Hence, the starting point here is World War II. The European situation in 1945 did propel Sweden into a role of some strategic significance due to its ability to remain neutral during the War (Huldt, 1988: 248). Sweden’s security doctrine of neutrality actually date back to Napoleonic times, thus Sweden had been pursuing such a security policy long before the Second World War erupted or the Cold War followed in its place (Dahl, 2002: 141). When the Second World War broke out the government
declared that Sweden would observe strict neutrality – a choice based on the belief that the belligerents would be tied to continental European battlegrounds and have very little interest in the Nordic area (Ojanen et al., 2000: 160). However, less flattering is the image of Sweden actually pursuing a less-than-neutral policy during the war, smoothly calculating to keep the country out of war and changing loyalties as the war progressed. Nevertheless, it is neutrality – not the diplomatic skills behind it – that is and has been credited as the exceptional force that has kept the country out of war for more than two centuries (Dahl, 2002: 141). When the war ended Sweden declared it would pursue a continued policy of neutrality backed by a strong national military defense (Huldt 1990 cited Riekker 2003). Scandinavia thus came to be known as the Nordic bloc in terms of security arrangements, a buffer zone between the east and the west where Sweden played a special role as the military backbone (Huldt, 1988: 249). Yet, while Swedish security policy aimed at being credible, continuous, and independent, it was at the same time based on an unofficial assumption that the other Western countries would assist Sweden militarily, if necessary (Riekker, 2003: 239). During this era Sweden relied on a soft rational approach to its security policy since it unofficially expected the West to step up in case of an emergency, meanwhile maintaining a neutral stance officially. This strategy shows that Sweden in fact took other actors’ interests into account.

4.3.2 Undercover NATO Affiliations

Neutrality became the logical and necessary foundation for the Swedish government’s claim to represent an independent third way between the superpowers. As opposed to Denmark, Sweden was thus able to practice an active foreign policy throughout the era of the Cold War (Dahl, 2002: 141). However, in defense of its territory Sweden was anything but independent. Many would actually argue that Sweden conducted a double security policy during the Cold War. Simultaneously Sweden prepared for a Soviet invasion, which included seeking military help from the West, and officially the country claimed to be neutral (Eriksson, 2003: 112). In the early 1990s, a commission was appointed to present a study of Sweden’s relations with NATO. The findings stated that the official doctrine of neutrality in fact had been combined with an elaborate scheme of cooperation with NATO throughout the Cold War (Dahl, 2002: 142). The relationship between NATO and Sweden is still a controversial one, where Sweden
has the role of an observer and is part of the Partnership for Peace Program (pfp). Again, Sweden is performing a balancing act in order not to be marginalized in the case of increased cooperation between the EU and NATO within the area of the second pillar, at the same time as adhering to the current security doctrine of non-alignment (Miles, 2005: 286).

4.3.3 From Neutral to Non-Aligned

In order to become a member of the EU Sweden had to reformulate its security doctrine, which was done in 1992. It then stated that Sweden should be able to remain neutral in the situation of war in close geographical proximity (Halvarsson, 2003: 111). Moreover, Sweden was quick to acknowledge that they would become active and full members of the CFSP as part of their wider acceptance of the Union’s *acquis communautaire* during their accession process (Miles, 2000: 195). Additionally, in 2002 there was another reformulation which further softened the former line of neutrality and officially Sweden is now viewed as a non-aligned country. This progress has gone sideways with the development within the second pillar and the CFSP (Halvarsson, 2003: 112). The government continues to insist on the continued validity of non-alignment. On several occasions, it has been argued that this policy is consistent with Swedish participation in the European Security and Defense Policy sector (ESDP). The argument is that European security dimension is not about collective defense but about international crisis management (Riekker, 2003: 116). As a result, Sweden has shifted from historical security logic of exclusion to one of inclusion directed at securing a greater measure of influence on the design of post-Cold War European security (Ferreira-Pereira, 2006: 110). Finally, it could be argued that the country has shifted from a more subtle form of soft rationalism to a stronger and more open one, in which they pursue their agenda more openly and with a greater degree of freedom not so restricted by the doctrine of neutrality.

4.3.4 Summing Up

Successful neutrality during the Second World War left Sweden with a different set of cards to play internationally than Denmark. Neutrality became the dominant tool of Swedish foreign and security policy, which paved way for an active foreign policy.
Sweden could act as an honest broker between the power blocs, which gave Sweden some influence. However, through the end of the Cold War the security doctrine of neutrality was outdated and the demands for Sweden to be able to be more flexible in its international relations increased. Hence, a security reorientation was needed to avoid marginalization from European security developments. In terms of pursuing a soft rational security approach, Sweden has and is attempting to pursue its national interests. Yet, this is done with other actors agendas in mind which is demonstrated in the case of Sweden’s security doctrine reformulation.

4.4 Conclusion

Seen from a systemic level these two countries are similar in their security orientation due to their situation as smaller countries in the same geographical region. The theoretical framework of soft rationalism is applicable due to the tendencies for both of them to strategically calculate other actors’ motives before or simultaneously as setting their own security strategies. Concurrently, the two countries’ were and are preoccupied with pursuing their interests to the fullest degree possible considering their relative size in the European system. This is particularly demonstrated in Sweden’s undercover affair with NATO, and Denmark’s low-key affiliation with the same. A more current proof of such behavior is Sweden’s reformulation of its security doctrine and Denmark’s reliance on NATO in order not to become completely marginalized in the international and European sphere.

In regards of security policy one can see a breaking point between the two countries after the Second World War when the two embark on slightly differing routes. The opposing factor is their degree of public openness towards NATO and the West. Denmark became a member meanwhile Sweden had undercover relations, which actually show they shared much of the same security concerns. However, this seemingly slight difference has had significant consequences in shaping their individual security orientation in general and towards the CFSP in particular. Denmark’s security position today is most notably shaped by its NATO membership, close relationship with the US and its general reluctance towards a strong European defense and security sector. These inclinations are especially noticeable in the exemption from the Maastricht Treaty obtained by the Edinburgh agreement of December 1992 (Faurby, 2000: 187). As for
Sweden, the relative success of the neutrality doctrine has come to overshadow Swedish security discourse till this day. The maintained policy of non-alignment is held alive through the government frequently emphasizing the humanitarian and conflict preventive nature of the operations through the CFSP. Additionally, the reformulation of previous doctrine has kept Sweden from becoming marginalized in the development of the CFSP. It is however becoming increasingly difficult to uphold a position of non-alignment due to the development of ESDP, and the increasing cooperation with NATO (Miles, 2005: 288).
5. Internal Determinants

In the following chapter, Denmark and Sweden’s domestic contexts are under scrutiny. This section should be seen as a continuation of the findings in previous chapter. The same reasoning applies here in the sense that the differing factors in the domestic level are examined in order to present a more complete picture of their affiliation to the CFSP.

5.1 Domestic Level of Analysis

Even though it is often assumed that foreign policy should be above a nation’s internal squabbles, the general significance of domestic politics is profound (Hagan, 1995: 118). The focus here is the countries’ governmental set up, the role of the parliament, public opinion, and powerful interests groups. At the heart of domestic political explanations of foreign policy is the idea that leaders engage in what Putnam calls “two-level games” (1988). In explaining government choices in foreign affairs, leaders are viewed as coping simultaneously with the pressures and constraints of their domestic political system as well as with those of the international environment (Hagan, 1995: 117). At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions amongst those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments (Putnam, 1988: 434). Consequently, the aims are to demonstrate which factors at the Danish and Swedish domestic level influence the respective countries’ CFSP connection, and at the same time look at the applicability of the two-level game approach.

5.2 The Case of Denmark

5.2.1 The Governmental Structure

At the heart of the Danish constitution is the fact that the government acts in all external matters, but is simultaneously constrained by specific provisions related to the Folketing’s (parliament’s) ratification of international treaties, the delegation of
sovereignty to international organizations, and sending Danish troops overseas (Hansen, 2002: 72). Furthermore, the Danish government has since the First World War always been composed of several parties, which is a composition referred to as minority government (www.folketinget.dk, 03/22/06). The prominence of minority governments has helped to increase the influence of the parliament due to the dependency of the government on the former for cooperation (Faurby, 2000: 171). Hence, the Danish parliament practices a substantial amount of influence over Danish EU policy and thus the foreign policy process (Tonra, 2000: 231). The strength of the Danish parliament was proven already in Danish accession negotiations to the European Community (EC) in 1973, where the parliament’s Market Relations Committee was a key influential factor (ibid, 137).

5.2.2 The Committee of European Affairs

The working group in the parliament in charge of EU matters is nowadays referred to the committee of European Affairs. This committee has a unique position in comparison to European Affairs committees in other EU member-states, since the government has to present their agenda and receive a mandate from the parliamentary committee before negotiating in the Council of Ministers (Branner, 1996: 57). Another source of limitation for the Danish politicians is the Edinburgh Agreement of 1992 including amongst other things the defense opt-out. This exemption has resulted in the government pursuing a passive and low-key role in the areas of CFSP involving the opt-out (Larsen, 2005: 109). In the last couple of years this opt-out has become an increasing obstacle for the Danish government as the developments in the CFSP are progressing (Forsvarsministeriet, 1999: 71). That the government perceives the situation of the opt-outs as extremely difficult was clearly illustrated by the resignation in December of 2002 of foreign minister Helveg Petersen. He resigned after the no vote to the EMU, referring to the difficulty of working as a foreign minister when convinced of the need for an active Danish policy but constrained by the exemptions (Holm, 2002: 95). Previous situation is a rather clear example of decision-makers having to play a two-level game: one with their domestic constituency and another with the external pressures (Branner, 2002: 51). The complex situation for Danish politicians is further stressed below.
5.2.3 The Frequency of Referenda

Within the areas of the exemptions the government has little freedom to maneuver. The political parties in the parliament cannot renegotiate a solution to the opt-outs. The Danish constitution states that in the situation of ratifying certain international agreements and/or delegating sovereignty to international organizations, a binding referendum must be held (www.folketinget.dk, 03/22/06). Consequently, only through the process of a referendum can a new political foundation be formed that can reestablish governmental freedom of action in foreign policy (Holm, 2002: 94). Due to this law, Denmark has held numerous referenda since their accession into the EU in 1973. In turn, these referenda trigger public debates, create grass root organizations, and demands information access for the public (Knudsen, 1992: 276). The parliament’s homepage and the homepage of the government present an almost unlimited amount of documents, forums, and general information about Danish EU policy and the implications it may have. Furthermore, the law of binding referendum is a strong, if not the strongest, creator of the current two-level game situation present in Danish foreign policy due to the Edinburgh opt-outs. The overall Danish approach of causation towards the area of the defense opt-out very much reflects elite level fears that anything too ambitious on the foreign, security, and defense side might provoke the Danish electorate into another and potentially immutable no-vote (Tonra, 2001: 160).

5.2.4 Public Opinion

The regularity of referendum results in a highly aware population. The Danes are supposed to be the most knowledgeable population in Europe in terms of EU matters (Carlsen & Mouritzen, 2005: 119). Many groups actively work for or against the opt-outs or the EU membership altogether such as Folkbevaegelsen or JuniBevaegelsen. Another consequence of the law of referendum is that it diminishes the gap between the masses and the elites. Through the referenda the population has in fact become an important player in shaping major changes in Danish EU and CFSP policy (Larsen, 2003: 100). Consequently, the politicians are very sensitive to the trends and demands on the part of the citizens (Hedetoft, 2000: 288). The Danish people together with their parliament
practice a substantial amount of influence over Danish foreign policy. Again, the presence of a two-level game is visible, where the domestic forces highly influence the outcome of external political dealings.

5.2.5 Summing Up

At the core of Danish concerns in regards of the EU is the development towards a political union in a direction away from intergovernmentalism and state sovereignty. It is now the CFSP, common citizenship, and a common currency which are perceived as the largest threats to Danish sovereignty (Hedetoft, 2000: 288). This fear is very much mirrored in the opt-outs. In addition, the law of binding referenda and the strength practiced by the parliament add to create a very delicate situation for the Danish politicians and it also makes them very sensitive to public opinion. The situation which has emerged in Danish CFSP formulation is one where a clear two-level game is persistent between the public and the government. It can further very well be argued that the two-level game approach is appropriate in explaining the Danish domestic scene vis-à-vis the CFSP.

5.3 The Case of Sweden

5.3.1 The Government Structure

The Swedish parliamentary system has through the years been featured by both minority and majority governments, with the Social Democratic Party (SAP) as the dominant player (Halvarsson, 2003: 98). Hence, the role of the riksdag (parliament) has not been as consistently strong as in Denmark. Yet, it still plays a central role in the Swedish system overall as it checks the government (Hegeland, 1999: 95). Moreover, the parliament’s role in foreign policy has changed with Sweden’s membership of the EU. Through the establishment of the Committee of European Affairs, it regularly receives information about Swedish foreign policy. A reasonable conclusion is therefore that the parliament is better informed nowadays about Sweden’s external relations than what it was prior to Swedish accession to the EU (ibid, 108). However, it does not have the same amount of influence on foreign policy as the Folketing in Denmark, since the Committee of European Affairs does not practice any direct influence over the negotiating roles of the ministers. This means that the ministers do not receive a mandate from the committee
stating which approach they should sustain in Council of Minister negotiations (Beckman & Johansson, 1999: 122). Consequently, the government has substantial room for maneuvering in dealing with the CFSP.

5.3.2 Referendum

In the Swedish constitution it is stated that referendum should be held if a majority of the parliament vote for such a proposition. This form of direct democracy could be practiced in the event of constitutional changes or signing international agreements which may affect individual fundamental rights (Halvarsson, 2003: 95). Yet, in Sweden a referendum is only consultative in nature, which means that the result is not binding (www.riksdagen.se, 03/24/06). Consequently, the voting form of referendum in terms of the EU has not been as frequently practiced in Sweden as in Denmark. It should however be noted that Sweden has been a member much shorter than Denmark. Nevertheless, the Danish people together with their parliament practice a substantial amount of influence over Danish foreign policy, a feature which is not present in the Swedish system.

5.3.3 Public Opinion

A consequence of the inability to directly influence Sweden’s relationship with the CFSP is a population who is less aware and less involved compared to the Danish public. Judging from the web pages of the government and the parliament only a fraction of the information available in the Danish counterparts is presented in the Swedish ones. This is not to say that the population is without opinions. Sweden is in fact, according to the Eurobarometer, consistently the only EU country where the majority of the population still oppose membership (Miles, 2005: 143). In effect, the government has problems convincing the Swedish population that the notion of neutrality is no longer valid as a national security policy (Ojanen, 2002: 169). An extension of the lack of public involvement is perhaps a creation of a bigger gap between the elites and the masses, which may very well be a reason as to why the government has difficulty convincing the public of Sweden’s new security strategy of non-alignment and active participation in the CFSP. In terms of the two-level game application, such a situation is not as obvious in Sweden as in Denmark at this stage. However, politicians do experience tensions between
different loyalties. The subsistence of domestic pressures is elaborated on in the section below.

5.3.4 Bureaucracy

Bureaucratic politics generally play an important role in the formulation of Swedish foreign policies. As Hart, Stern, and Sundelius have emphasized, “many important decisions and developments in foreign policy are shaped by relatively small groups and informal face-to-face interactions and there is clear evidence that Sweden’s reorientation towards the EU have been elite-led and driven by small coalitions of policy makers intent on ensuring that policy takes a specific path. In fact, the responsibility for directing Swedish EU policy has remained within a number of firm hands since accession, namely the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs Minister (Miles, 2000: 192-193). In addition, the SAP has been the dominant party in Swedish politics for decades, it is therefore reasonable to believe that the ideals of the party have influenced Sweden’s CFSP affiliation. Yet, there is an ideological problem for the party vis-à-vis this sector. The SAP tries to combine support for the EU at the same time as the party is against federal developments. The party aims to protect national independence especially within such sensitive areas as the CFSP. Concurrently, the government realizes the importance of Sweden remaining active in this field to avoid marginalization (Johansson, 1999: 155). The SAP reluctance towards transfer of sovereignty is very much supported by the public, and this ideological dilemma results in the government stressing the humanitarian and conflict preventive nature of the CFSP operations.

5.3.5 Business Elites

No study of Swedish CFSP relations would be complete without looking at the role of interest groups in the formulation and implementation of government policy. They remain indispensable elements of Sweden’s consensual democracy (Elder et al. 1998; Hadenius 1997; Milner 1989, Petersson 1994) and investment politics (Pontusson 1992). Their importance also applies to EU policy; authors such as Biel (2000) claim that they were significant in influencing the government’s decision to join the Union in 1990-1991 (Miles, 2005: 156). A group of particular interest in the CFSP context is the national defense industry, which has traditionally been strong in Sweden (Ojanen, 2000: 185).
This industry has important links to the government and can therefore practice influence. In fact, this industry started to adapt to Europe before the Swedish security policy changed. Hence, defense industrial co-operation has had effects for the national security development in Sweden, since it implies a choice between European and trans-Atlantic frameworks (Riekker, 2003: 121). However, this is not to say that Sweden excludes the US from its security strategy. Sweden is for instance dependent on cooperation with the US in the area of defense technology, although it aims to avoid unilateral dependency through an active partaking in European defense developments (Ojanen, 2000: 187).

5.3.5 Summing Up

Sweden’s domestic scene is also overshadowed by the traditional security doctrine of neutrality. The population is continually being apprehensive towards CFSP developments and Sweden taking an active stance in this context due to the general belief that Sweden should still remain neutral. The division between the masses and the elites further help reinforce public hesitation towards Sweden’s security reorientation. The fact that Swedish referenda are consultative in nature and more rarely practiced make a tremendous difference in regards of public awareness and knowledge of the CFSP. The bureaucratic feature of foreign policy and the impact on the same by business elites further assist to reinforce the split between the elites and the public. One can distinguish a two-level game, where the government publicly pursues a low-key CFSP approach. Yet, in reality this affiliation is quite active (Stromvik, 1999: 264). One further sees the two-level approach in terms of business elites and bureaucratic groupings, where the politicians have to accommodate for many loyalties. Nevertheless, the two-level applicability is much weaker in the case of Sweden.

5.4 Conclusion

In the domestic level of these countries one notices some rather substantial differences, which help explain the different relationship the countries have come to acquire to this policy sector. The most fundamental distinction is the countries application of binding versus consultative referenda. The nature of binding referenda gives the Danes a substantial amount of influence over the country’s CFSP agenda. It also stirs debate, creates grassroots’ movements, and makes the politicians wary of public
opinion. In Sweden, the population is further away from the decision-making process which results in less awareness. There is not as much public information and government homepages are sparse with information regarding Sweden’s security stance towards and within the EU. Business elites and small bureaucratic groupings do practice a substantial amount of influence in this sector. Moreover, the lack of public information is perhaps a strategic approach from the government, since the security orientation is a controversial issue and the less debate there is over a topic the easier it is for them to maneuver more freely. The bottom-line is that the Swedish government practices a much greater degree of freedom in terms of second pillar policy-making than the Danish counterpart. In terms of the two-level game application, this theory goes a long way in explaining the working conditions for Danish politicians. In the case of Sweden the application is not as strong, and the applicability of the theory or the shortage thereof can instead be interpreted to further demonstrate the domestic differences between these countries.
6. Leadership Analysis

In terms of foreign policy and leadership, what may make a difference are personality traits such as capacity to memorize, or ability to weed out essential information from trivia. Hence, personality characters may in certain situations provide compelling explanations of foreign policy objectives or actions (Holsti, 1992: 301). The aim of this chapter is to perform a leadership analysis of the Prime Ministers of each country through using a characteristics model constructed by Greenstein in his book “The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton” (2000). This model is based on five personality characteristics, which are organizational capacity, political skills, visions of public policy, cognitive style and emotional intelligence. In the context of Holsti’s model and for the purpose of this study in relations to the empirical material available, the assumption is that these leaders are relatively rational in their thinking process, and that they have access to applicable information before making a decision. The goal is to present how each of these individuals influence their respective countries affiliation with the CFSP.

6.1 The Danish Prime Minister - Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Anders Fogh Rasmussen became the Danish Prime Minister in 2001 and he represents the right-wing party Radikale Venstre. Fogh is known to be very liberal in his political orientation, a political approach which he has softened slightly in recent years. In the 1980s he was a parliamentarian in the Danish Parliament. Subsequently, he was the minister of taxation from 1987-1992 (Kragh, 2004: 36). From 1992 until 1998 he held the chairman position for his party. In 1998, he was selected to become the leader of the party, a position he evidently still holds today (Larsen, 2000: 45).

6.1.1 Organizational Capacity

Most journalists and colleagues describe him as a perfectionist with an enormous need to control every detail of a project (Kragh, 2004:137). During his time as minister of taxation he carried out, what has been referred to as a revolution of the taxation ministry. Up till that point the taxation ministry had been, to use Fogh’s words, the cash register of the government. He wanted to change this perception and make the taxation ministry an influential body of its own – which he managed to accomplish (Larsen, 2000: 188). During Fogh’s time as taxation minister the ministry was frequently referred to as SS, an
abbreviation for the security police in Nazi Germany. The reason for this was the ministry’s new profile as an interfering department. The notion of Fogh Rasmussen as taking control is quite appropriate to describe him as Prime Minster as well. He is part of every stage and detail in a project. Moreover, he is known to be extremely goal oriented and does not quit until his goals are met (Kragh, 2004: 32).

6.1.2 Political Skills

Fogh has been politically active since his early teens and is thus a very experienced and sharp politician. However, he is known for his authoritative and controlling working methods and he does not leave much room for maneuvering for his colleagues. He showed proof of his political skills already early on his career when he managed to make the taxation ministry a central part of the government instead of a periphery unit (Kragh, 2004: 62). During his time as Prime Minster he has moved much of the power of the foreign ministry to the government itself, for instance the dealings of the EU are no longer the sole responsibility of the foreign ministry (ibid, 146). This transfer could perhaps also be seen as a consequence of Fogh’s control need.

6.1.3 Vision of Public Policy

Fogh is strongly liberal, supporting the notions of individualism and freedom. He believes individuals to be capable of making their own decisions and stresses the importance of individual liberty. In that sense, he is a bit of a rebel in comparison to his fellow predecessors of whom many were social democrats with very diverging ideals (Kragh, 2004: 193). Yet, his liberal attitude has softened through the years and he does not oppose the Danish social welfare system. His aim is however to combine the notions of social change and safety in order to create a society where people are less dependent on social welfare. Additionally, Fogh’s goal is to make his party the “little man’s” party as opposed to its voter profile of upper middle class. This strategy has succeeded if one looks at the party’s recent reelection (Larsen, 2000: 159).
6.1.4 Cognitive Style

Fogh is known for his ability to rapidly process a large amount of information. He is very ambitious, well informed and educated. However, he is not very receptive to other peoples’ opinions, but relies to a large extent on his own capabilities and ideas (Kragh, 2004: 142). As a politician this characteristic sometimes causes him problems due to the fact that colleagues feel over-ridden by him. In terms of work ethics, he is said to always be extremely well prepared for whatever he has on the agenda. He often knows the material better than the person who is outmost responsible for it (Larsen, 2000: 109).

6.1.5 Emotional Intelligence

A reoccurring depiction of Fogh is a portrait of him as a machine. Many view him as inhumane. He expects everyone to always perform at their highest level. Hence, he expects nothing less by himself either. He is known not to allow for his ability to perform to be negatively affected by stress or some external turbulence. However, he has quite a temperament, which makes people afraid of him. Fogh is further known for his way of harshly telling people off. In addition, this behavior results in his colleagues not letting him know about issues they are experiencing since they are afraid of repercussions (Kragh, 2004: 119). Fogh is strong in the sense that he does not allow for external factors to influence his own work performance. However, his temper and attitude towards colleagues result at times in lack of communication and discomfort in the government.

6.2 Fogh Rasmussen and CFSP

Leadership is generally of little importance in the Danish political system, in which minority governments are common and broad solutions are sought especially in foreign policy and European Affairs (Pedersen, 1996: 95). However, the current government is composed only by two parties. Fogh’s Radikale Venstre is in coalition with Danske Folkeparti (right-wing nationalist party) and the latter is actually against EU membership (www.folketinget.dk, 04/12/06), which makes this party prone to NATO solutions. Fogh is also locked by the Danish opt-out. Yet, due to this two-party coalition the Prime Minister seems to have some rather substantial room for maneuvering in foreign policy, since the two parties manage to form majority in the parliament. In addition, there is a rather recent development in Danish politics towards “bloc politics”.

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Fogh has been harshly criticized in the Danish media for practicing bloc politics in foreign affairs, which goes against the tradition of consensus seeking conduct (see for instance Sovndal, 2006). This sort of behavior could be a consequence of Fogh’s need for control and influence in the policy-process, and his inclination towards following his own advice.

In the case of Denmark taking on an Americanized security orientation in regards of the CFSP, Fogh has some responsibility. The Danish support of the US attack on Iraq was for instance formed by Fogh’s *Radikale Venstre* together with *Danske Folkeparti*. The remaining parties were very much against such a development and would have preferred to support the EU stance. Fogh nevertheless went with US line, which was to step away from traditional consensus seeking behavior. Fogh and his government are actually continuously supporting the US despite internal criticism (Kragh, 2005: 212). His inclination to follow his own lead is shown in this decision. He goes with his own strategy despite of harsh domestic and political criticism. However, as the rest of the government Fogh desires for the opt-out to be removed. But after the Danish no to the EMU in 2002, the government is wary of hosting an additional referendum regarding the opt-outs since it is afraid of another no vote (Riekker, 2003: 210). Consequently, the Danish Prime Minister is just as locked in this respect as the rest of the politicians. Nevertheless, it could be argued that Fogh looks to the US to make up for lost ground in the EU, which helps to reinforce the Americanization of Danish foreign policy.

### 6.3 The Swedish Prime Minister - Göran Persson

Göran Persson’s ideological perspective was decided by the Swedish class society (klassamhället) and his belief in the traditional welfare system, which is a rather typical political approach considering his own background mirrored by economic hardships during his upbringing of the 1950s and 1960s. The step to join the Social Democratic Party therefore came naturally. Moreover, Persson claims that politics is about generating results as opposed to his predecessor Palme who was of the conviction that politics is based on will (Svenning, 2005: 28). Persson’s political career started as a county politician, and he has since then been appointed minister of education and finance.
6.3.2 Organizational Capacity

Persson’s organizational sense is based on action and presence, his trademark as Prime Minister is therefore attendance. He wants to be informed, aware, and present in all levels of a debate or project. Consequently, he does not leave much room for independent maneuvering on the part of the ministers. They know what they are expected to accomplish and he anticipates nothing less of them (Berge, 2005: 148). Moreover, he is also known for his ability to carry out large reorganizational tasks. During the time as minister of finance, he managed to achieve perhaps the largest concentrated effort to resurrect the Swedish economy in modern times. However, he is at times criticized by his colleagues for being too controlling and authoritative (Svenning, 2005: 63).

6.3.3 Political Skills

Persson is frequently described as a realpolitiker, referring to his focus on tactics, power, and interests. As a politician he is very action-oriented, persuasive in his way of seeing things through, and authoritative. These features are frequently stressed by his colleagues when describing him. However, there is also another side to his political approach, where he promotes the core ideals of the SAP, which are social welfare and the collective good (Svenning, 2005: 203). Political accomplishment on his behalf is for example the relative success of Sweden’s EU presidency in 2001. He has, however, experienced some political hardship with the Swedish labor unions and to some extent with the women in his own party. He is at times understood in patriarchal terms, not treating men and women equally and this has affected his reputation negatively amongst women in particular (ibid, 156).

6.3.4 Vision of Public Policy

Persson is at times accused of balancing on a middle ground without taking sides. In regards of the EU, he was unconvinced for a long period. He does not however, reject a Swedish membership, but he is firm in his conviction that the EU and in particular the CFSP should remain on an intergovernmental level of cooperation (Ruin, 2002: 49). Svenning in his book “Göran Persson och hans värld” claims Persson is without visions and that he is too ambivalent in his leadership as a result of never clearly vouching for one of two sides (2005). Other states the opposite through claiming he is a strategic
control freak with authoritarian and patriarchal leadership characteristics (Demker, 2005: 52). Ironically enough, the truth is probably found somewhere in between the two strands.

**6.3.5 Cognitive Style**

Persson is said to be a good and intensive listener, a trait which has been useful to him as a politician. He also has a well developed ability to process information and knowledge rapidly. He synchronizes this competence with a large portion of strategic thinking. He further claims to be fond of unessential knowledge and he is said to have an instrumental relationship to such information, meaning that he turns it into action and uses it in order to practice influence and power (Svenning, 2005: 51). He has also shown great stamina and strength in the public debate, partly as a result of his well developed speech giving skills and in part due to his cognitive receptiveness.

**6.3.6 Emotional Intelligence**

In particular at the beginning as Prime Minister, he had the reputation of being a bit of a bully. Many have speculated about how the social hardships he experienced as a young adult, has influenced his current self-esteem and emotional life. Some argue his bullying attitude is a consequence of him attempting to make up for grievances and social awkwardness in the past (Svenning, 2005: 145). Persson has actually gone through some training and the purpose of this was for him to learn to be more tentative and cooperative (Berge, 2005: 150). His manners, at least in public, have altered and he has become more cautious of how he acts in the eye of the media and the public (ibid, 45). Nevertheless, emotional intelligence is still not one of his strengths.

**6.4 Persson and CFSP**

Swedish foreign policy in the light of the CFSP is often criticized in the media and from opposing parties for being ambivalent and quite pale. Additionally, it is frequently pointed out, by for instance Olofsson (2006) and Svenning (2005) how Persson has systematically moved the power from the foreign ministry over to his own ministry. There are also voices, for instance Ekdal (2006), claiming he appoints weak ministers in order for himself to more easily maneuver the ship. The criticism put forward
could very well be seen as an extension of Persson’s controlling, and at times rather ambivalent nature. When looking at Sweden’s affiliation to the CFSP, few would disagree with the statement that Persson is highly influential - especially considering that Persson has been in office for the last ten years and has thus had the opportunity to influence the Swedish direction quite substantially. However, prior to the Swedish EU Presidency in 2001 Persson paid little attention to the CFSP. Yet, this attitude altered during his period in the EU spotlight (Tallberg, 2001: 11). Persson then held a central position in relation to the CFSP, which turned out to be an area of great activity during the Swedish presidency (Stromvik & Bengtsson, 2001: 165). In the aftermath of the chairmanship, Persson summarized the experience by stating that he was in fact relatively positive towards smaller member-states’ ability to influence the direction of the CFSP (Ruin, 2002: 201). In addition, many would argue that Persson’s strive for control, and power in combination with his strategic thinking made him take on such an active role in the CFSP during the Presidency. Simultaneously however, he is held back due to the ideological dilemma of the SAP vis-à-vis the CFSP, which is also a dilemma present in him considering he is an SAP traditionalist and concurrently a strategic thinker realizing the need for Sweden to be part of the CFSP developments.

In the event of the Iraq-crisis, Sweden placed itself on the ‘European side’. Yet, Sweden was very careful with criticizing the US and Persson has in fact continuously been criticized for holding a friendly US stance (see for example Nilsson, 2004). The balancing act preformed here very much goes along with Persson’s personality and with the criticism he has received in the past for being cautious. Persson, for the most part, plays it safe and frequently holds the approach of let’s wait and see before taking a stand in order not to marginalize Sweden in the realm of the CFSP (Svenning, 2005: 209).

6.5 Conclusion

The differing domestic scenes in the two countries present the Prime Ministers with different cards to play. Fogh Rasmussen is locked in his role in terms of the CFSP since the Danish affiliation is determined by a referendum. He is however partly responsible for reinforcing an Americanization of the Danish security stance. In addition, Fogh can quite easily form a majority in the parliament with the Danish National Party; this gives him more influence than his predecessors whom were more constrained due to
three or four party minority government formation. Consequently, Fogh can practice some substantial influence on Danish foreign policy in general. Yet, due to the opt-out he is just as locked as anyone else of the Danish politicians. Persson, on the other hand, has more room to play. It is however more difficult to obtain a full picture of his involvement. The information access and the national debate are more limited than on the Danish side. However, Persson’s ambivalence together with the dilemma of the SAP leaves the government in an awkward position. Consequently, a feature present in the Swedish security participation is one of caution, yet activity (Stromvik, 1999: 256). This notion in of itself is contradictory, but so is the SAP situation of safeguarding national sovereignty at the same time as realizing the need for Swedish involvement in order not the face the same faith as Denmark. This is also a personal dilemma for Persson, who is an SAP traditionalist at heart at the same time as his portion of strategic thinking tells him that Swedish participation is necessary.

Moreover, the Prime Ministers share an awareness of American presence in the global political system and take that into account. They further come from opposing political camps, which is most clearly shown in Fogh’s proneness to follow his own lead and not bother too much with consensus seeking measures. Quite on the contrary, Persson is much more subtle in his ways, often applies the wait and see approach, and practice more often than not consensus seeking measures in terms of Swedish foreign policy (Svenning, 2005: 188).
7. Counterfactual Analysis

A counterfactual analysis is based on contrary-to-fact conditional statements, which provide a way to explore whether a cause is significant or not. Counterfactuals are especially useful in international politics because there is no laboratory setting such as in physical science. Counterfactuals thus help us to relate history to theory and make better judgments as we try to understand a world where there are no controlled experiments (Nye, 1993: 45). In the following section, I manipulate one factor in each constructed potential scenario assuming all other factors remain constant.

7.1 What If – Scenarios

Suppose that Sweden had been occupied by German forces during World War II and that Denmark would have escaped and therefore was able to rely on its security policy of neutrality. In such a situation, a NATO membership for Denmark would not necessarily have come about and Sweden would probably have been more prone to take that route. However, there would also have been the possibility of a Nordic peace zone since Norway and Sweden’s security goals probably would be more similar than what they in fact were. Denmark’s tricky topography would still be the same and therefore their security concerns would remain on top of the agenda creating a need for security confirmation. A Nordic peace zone could have developed backed by a strong defense which could have kept NATO at more of a distance than what was the case. In turn, the Nordic bloc could have obtained a more central role in the world system during the Cold War. This would however most likely have been under the pretense of Western security reliance. Yet, the US influence would be less strong without any direct NATO affiliation.

In terms of strong domestic business elites, they would most likely still exist in Sweden as a consequence of the strong defense needed to uphold credibility of the Nordic Bloc. It is therefore believable they would practice influence on the government and thus the policy process. Further, considering the presence of strong business elites in the Swedish system, one could argue that it is likely Sweden would have joined the EU earlier if it would not have been for the neutrality doctrine; at least under the affectation that the EU was an economic organization based on intergovernmental ideals. Denmark in this case probably would have joined the EU later due to the neutrality doctrine. In addition, the lack of a stronger transatlantic link and perhaps then also less closeness to
the UK would further add to the idea of a delayed EU membership. If the roles had been reversed at that point in time perhaps Sweden and Denmark would have been more in tune seen from a systemic level in regards of their current CFSP relationship.

Now, suppose that Sweden practiced the law of binding referenda in combination with the Danish directives of when a referendum is necessary to be held, and that Denmark would follow Sweden’s consultative referendum policies. In such a scenario it is reasonable to believe that the Swedish population would be much more aware and feel closer to the policy-making process. In addition, the gap between the masses and the elites would be less apparent. It is also rational to assume that there would be a smaller amount of apprehensiveness towards the CFSP than what is now the case, due to the closeness and influence the public would be able to practice on the foreign policy. In terms of the Danish opt-outs, there is still a chance that Sweden would end up in the same boat due to the traditional belief in the neutrality policy. Further, the influence of the business elite on Swedish CFSP relations would diminish considerably and the Prime Minister would also find himself to be in a locked position as opposed to his current role. In the case of Denmark, the Danish politicians would probably be very happy with the Swedish referenda regulations, since they would be able to practice a substantial amount of influence and be much more present and flexible vis-à-vis the CFSP. The population, on the other hand, would be less knowledgeable and the situation would in large be similar compared to Sweden’s current condition with a bigger gap between the masses and the public in terms of foreign policy making. Due to historical wars with Germany and Denmark’s geographic vulnerability the population would probably still be cautious towards close ties to the CFSP, a reluctance they share with the Swedes yet the skepticism is based on different reasoning. The Danes see the CFSP as a potential threat to Denmark and Danish sovereignty, whereas Sweden views the CFSP as a less satisfying security solution as opposed to the doctrine of neutrality, in combination with reluctance towards transfer of state sovereignty.

Lastly, assume that the Prime Ministers switched countries, and that Fogh Rasmussen was Sweden’s Prime Minister and that Göran Persson represented Denmark. Fogh Rasmussen’s radical approach to decision-making would steer debate in Sweden due to the tradition of consensus-seeking behavior in foreign policy matters. The criticism in the media of Sweden practicing a pale and ambivalent EU foreign policy is
likely to have disappeared. Due to Fogh’s liberal political orientation a NATO membership for Sweden would perhaps not be so far fetched. A close and more open stance towards the US is likely to have emerged, as well as a more openly active part-taking in the CFSP. In turn, there would be no ideological tie for Fogh in this regard as there is for Persson. However, the traditional stance of Sweden’s neutrality doctrine would still overshadow the Swedish political scene and strong business elites would be present. Yet, it is very likely that the business elites would find much support for its agenda in Fogh, more so than in Persson due to their ideological differences. Göran Persson, on the other hand, would probably seem a bit pale in current Danish politics. Persson’s tendency of ambivalence would not go very well with the strength of the Danish parliament. He is however also ‘US friendly’, therefore it is believable he would attempt to maintain and highly value this bilateral relationship. Yet, it would be done in a less controversial manner and he would probably not have taken a step away from the CFSP in this regard. Additionally, Persson would almost certainly practice consensus seeking behavior in terms of foreign policy decisions to a larger extent than Fogh. Persson is strategic in his ways of seeing things through, yet he is less radical than Fogh and more of a safe player. Therefore, he would practice less influence in the Danish system than what Fogh currently does. The way the Danish system is presently unfolding with the opt-out at the forefront, the Danes need a Prime Minister who is a bit radical in order not to disappear off the European security map.

7.2 Conclusion

Through examining all the differing factors put forward in previous chapters in combination with the counterfactual reasoning, some factors have proven to be more pivotal. Hence, the tools of discussion here are necessary and sufficient factors in creating the countries’ dissimilar CFSP relations. For Denmark, the failed neutrality during WW II was a sufficient factor for the country to eventually embark on an Americanized security orientation. The necessary factors present for Denmark to pursue this route is the country’s geographical location with its vulnerable topography, and its NATO membership, which further helped to initiate the bilateral relationship with the United States. For Sweden, on the other hand, the ability to remain neutral during the Second World War is seen as a necessary factor as to why Sweden has been able to
uphold the validity of this doctrine, which is also continuously shaping the country’s security stance. It could further be argued that Sweden’s undercover NATO affiliations served as a sufficient factor for Sweden in terms of security confirmation in case of a Soviet invasion.

In terms of domestic factors, Denmark’s frequency of minority governments is a necessary aspect, which has contributed to create a strong parliament. A strong parliament is in turn a sufficient factor for a strong Committee of European Affairs to form. In addition, regarding public involvement and the small gap between the elite and the masses, the constitutional law strengthening the Danish parliament and stating under which conditions to hold binding referenda is a necessary feature in creating Denmark’s current CFSP situation. In the case of Sweden, the mix of majority and minority governments are seen as a necessary factor, which has helped to create a less strong parliament leaving more room for the government to maneuver. A second necessary condition is the constitutional law of consultative referendum, since it results in less frequent popular votes and less influence by the population. This law creates a gap between the masses and the elites, and places the population further away from the policy-making process. It also helps to create reluctance and distrust towards the elites and their motives. The business elites and the tendency for small group bureaucracy are thought to represent sufficient causes in this regard, because that sort of influence is dependent on a less strong parliament and a distant population. The respective Prime Ministers are viewed to be sufficient causes in this context as well. They both influence policy outcomes, but are not believed to be necessary to explain the two countries’ current statuses. It could be argued that Persson in this case is more influential than Fogh. However, it is a stretch to say that Persson is a necessary factor in explaining Sweden’s current CFSP relationship. The affiliation is more shaped by the neutrality doctrine and the SAP ideological dilemma rather than Persson’s personality characteristics.
7.3 Future Research

In the case of Sweden, depending on the outcome of the election in the coming fall, it would be interesting to study - if the right-wing bloc wins – how their CFSP strategy differs as opposed to the left-wing political bloc. As for Denmark, it would be exciting to conduct a similar study looking at the current right-wing governmental approach to the sector and compare it to previous left-wing governments’ CFSP application. More generally, it would be interesting to study the countries’ approach to a potential European Constitution.
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