The European Security Strategy

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A European Securitization Strategy?

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Abstract

In this report I aim at establishing whether or not the European Security Strategy (ESS) of the EU is a securitization move by the EU and whether the EU is a credible securitizing actor in relation to the contents of the ESS. The first question will be answered through a discourse analysis of the ESS based on the constructivist theory of securitization. The answer to the second question will be based on the same theory and will include relevant observations and considerations concerning the functioning of the EU in the security sphere. The conclusions of the report are that the ESS is not a securitization move, but has elements of securitization in it, and that the EU is a realistic securitization actor of the ESS. I will then consider what could come from a securitization of the ESS and why the ESS is not within the discourse of securitization.

Key words:
Securitization, European Union, Foreign Policy, Threat, European Security Strategy

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**Abbreviations:**
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy  
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy  
ESS – European Security Strategy  
JHA – Justice and Home Affairs  
TEU – Treaty on the European Union  
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

**Chapter 1.0. Problem definition:**

**1.1. Introduction**

The European Community (now EU) was formed as a means to ensure peace, security, and prosperity in the conflict-ridden Europe which had just survived two devastating wars on its continent. However, the nature of the community was not a military or defence organisation such as NATO. It was based mainly on a concept of peaceful cooperation and trade titled the European Coal and Steel Community. Over the years, however, the role of the EU has changed from being primarily economic to also covering political and security issues, and as of the Maastricht Treaty the CFSP was created to take care of the Union's foreign policy. (Hix, p.342) The historical events which unfolded, the Kosovo conflict in particular, bolstered the desire for a common defence policy (Wallace, p. 448) which led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy. A product of this, the European Security Strategy - “A Secure Europe In a Better World” was drafted and approved on December 12th 2003. It is the first joint security formulation of the EU. In the strategy paper the EU expresses its view on the current security concerns for the Union. The formulation of security issues can be a powerful tool in politics. The ability to set the agenda and shape the opinion of the public is crucial in a democracy. Securitizing an issue, the act of elevating an issue from the political realm to being a matter security for which conventional norms and rules do not apply, can have a strong influence on the policy of a political entity. According to the theory of securitization, the actor which securitizes successfully can stand to gain much from it. The ESS deals with those threats which, according to the EU’s judgement, are the most serious threats the EU is currently facing. I therefore find it interesting to investigate how the EU addresses the security issues; whether the ESS can be said to fall within the discourse of securitization. It is, as will be explained, not all actors which are equally likely to be able to securitize an issue successfully. I shall therefore also investigate whether the EU is an eligible candidate for this undertaking.
1.2. Definition of concepts:
For the sake of clarity I shall first make a definition of the technical terms which will be used frequently in my report, and which call for a brief explanation.

Security:
The term security has been used in many ways through time and can cover a wide array of issues. In my report I shall use a broad definition of the term security encompassing all areas of society. For my analysis I will maintain the division from “Security, A New Framework for Analysis” (Buzan et al.) of security into 5 main sectors of society: the military, the political, the societal, the economic and the environmental sector. The theoretically constructed division is not clear-cut, as the sectors may well overlap. However, for the sake of simplicity I will refer to these 5 sectors in my analysis.1

Securitization:
Securitization as a speech act2 is when “…the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure…” (Buzan et al., p. 23-24).
The securitization of an issue is the act of elevating an issue from being merely a political issue, or even a non-political issue, to being an issue of security and therefore of utmost importance. It is, in other words, a conscious speech act performed by an actor. Whereas a politicized subject can be discussed, and many different measures can be taken in relation to dealing with a politicized subject, something which falls under the security category becomes an issue of urgency and importance which justifies a different response, beyond the norms and rules of action usually applied to the subject. (Buzan et al., p. 29)
Securitization is thus a powerful tool if one can master it. It is however a two party affair between the securitizing actor and the audience. Securitization can only be successfully achieved when the audience accepts the arguments and agree that the issue must take precedence. Thus, the deliberate speech act of the securitizing actor can only be a securitization move. Whether it is successful depends on the reception of it by the “audience” to whom it is addressed. All issues may in theory be securitized, although not all issues are likely to become securitized. It depends on whether the audience finds it credible, and here several factors can have an impact. First of all, in spite of the constructivist approach of the theory it helps if the security concern is not too unrealistic for, or far from, the minds of the audience. Also, the level of institutionalization of a sector may have an influence on this. I shall return to how this may be relevant for the EU later. The extent of the threat is also a factor. If it affects several security relations of the EU (with other states or organizations for instance) it is more likely to be a sufficiently serious threat.
In conclusion, establishing a case of securitization depends on the existence of an existential threat to an important referent object, a suggestion for rule-breaking and

1 For details about each sector see appendix
2 “An act of communication performed by the use of language, either in speech or writing…” (Widdowson)
the effects on security relations there would be by breaking free of these rules. (Buzan et al., p.26)

**De-securitization:**
The opposite of securitization; the act of making something un-threatening, and is therefore either politicization or a complete neutralisation of the subject.

**The audience:**
The audience, on whom the success of a securitization depends in a democracy, is the public because the power to choose a political course of action (in theory) lies with them. In a state without democracy the need for securitization would be different as would the specific type of securitization. As my project will be about the EU I shall only use the definition of the audience as mentioned here. The critical reader might argue that it might in reality be the governments that constitute the audience, as they are the ones with the “real” power, and can make decisions over the heads of the public. I have chosen, however, to build my analysis on the assumption that democracy works in the sense that it is the public who decides the policy of their governments, which admittedly somewhat simplifies the analysis.

**The referent object:**
The referent object of securitization is something that is considered vital for society and deserving a continued existence. Its existence is claimed to be threatened and therefore it must be protected. The state has often been portrayed as a referent object, but in theory any subject can be securitized. (Buzan et al., p.36)

With these concepts as my basis my cardinal question is as follows:

**1.3 problem formulation:**

**Cardinal question:**

Does the EU make a securitization move in the ESS and is the EU a potential securitizing actor in the issues of the ESS?

**Sub questions which my analysis evolves around:**

**Sub questions concerning the analysis of the security discourse:**
- What are the referent objects of the ESS, and which ones are eligible for securitization?
- What measures does the EU argue are needed to counter the threats, and how does this affect whether there is securitization?
- How grave is the security scenario which is drawn by the ESS? Is it securitization?

**Sub question concerning the EU as securitizing actor:**
• Is the EU likely to succeed in a securitization of the contents of the ESS, and why?
• What can a securitization of the ESS lead to?

1.4. Theoretical considerations:
The seemingly straightforward constructivist foundation of the theory of the speech act of securitization is not as simple as it may seem. The claim of the theory is simply that it does not matter whether or not the speech act is based on “reality”. It is a discourse which aims at being persuasive, not accurate and factual. (This is not to say that securitization is based on the intention of dishonesty.) However, beneath the surface of the theory lies a somewhat realist perception of society: antagonism is a constantly present reality, with changing constellations of allies, which the states or other security actors may deal with in many ways. And the way an actor speaks of a threat may be more or less accurate; there is such a thing as a “real” threat, however hard it is to define and measure. (Buzan et al. p.30-31) This becomes important when evaluating the possible success of securitization which I deal with in chapter 3. Focus, however, primarily remains on the perceived or constructed threat and the discourse of securitization.

The analysis which I make of the ESS is not a linguistic discourse analysis. I do not go as much into linguistic details as may be done. The discourse of securitization can be identified in a less detailed level (Buzan et al.). However, the theory of securitization in places rests on some fluid definitions and boundaries. It will therefore be my own evaluations that determine the answers to my cardinal questions. There is no absolute formula by which to measure securitization. There are, though, certain pointers one can hold to - elements of a speech act which will make it more likely to be a securitization move. These are included in my analysis.

My approach to the subject is from a rationalist angle. I investigate the discourse as a conscious speech act by the actor, and the mutual influence of and inter-action between the actor and the public. I do not take an institutionalist approach to the discourse, nor do I go much into how the various implications of the institutional setup of the EU might influence the actor and the audience.

1.5. Delimitations to my area of investigation:
As my aim is to establish the EU’s way of presenting security matters, I will not investigate to which extent the ESS has actually led to a successful securitization, or if that is indeed what was attempted. I will, however, discuss what possible consequences the EU may expect from a securitizing move in the chapter on “perspectives”, and also the likeliness of success for the EU as a securitizing actor. I will look at the ESS from the EU’s perspective, what the speech act means for the EU as an entity and what it might stand to gain from securitization. When dealing with the actor I will not focus on the individual states, but accept the ESS as a result of the aggregate desire of the member states. I will elaborate further on this later.
will not include other referent objects elsewhere discussed by the EU, nor other EU documents of security. My point of departure and the defining line of the content will be the ESS. As I am interested in the speech act in itself I will not look at whether there has been a development through time of the way security is addressed by the EU.

1.6. Structure of the project:
I answer the questions I have posed as follows:
Firstly, in chapter 2, I will analyse the chapters of the ESS which deal with the threats against the EU to find out whether they are within the discourse of securitization. Thereafter I shall look at the measures which are suggested in the ESS to deal with the threats.
This leads to a conclusion as to whether the ESS can be seen as a securitizing move.
In chapter 3 I will investigate whether it is likely that the EU might securitize the issues of the ESS successfully.
Chapter 4 will be a discussion of what might come from a securitization of the ESS and what might hinder the securitization of the EU, followed by the conclusion in chapter 5 and a look at further perspectives in chapter 6.
Chapter 2.0 Analysis of the ESS

2.1. The ESS – a brief outline

In the ESS there is mention of several types of security concerns, which consequently defines several referent objects. These threats are not separate from each other, but overlapping and mutually dependent on each other. As I will return to later, this has consequences for the securitization of the issues (if it indeed takes place).

The ESS mentions the following key threats, requiring attention and action:

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Regional conflicts (possibly encourages action outside EU’s borders)
- State failure (likely encourages action outside EU’s borders)
- Organised crime

The threats here cover elements of all the 5 sectors previously mentioned. Some aspects of the sectors are more common for the EU to deal with than others. Dealing with defence and the military aspects, which comprise a large part of the threats, is a fairly novel role for the EU. It involves taking on a job which is normally primarily ascribed to nation states (Buzan et al., p. 49-50), and which the member states have been reluctant to hand over to the authority of the EU (Smith, p.4).

The concerns of the EU are, however, divided into different levels of urgency and seriousness. Some are described as posing direct and serious threats to the security of the EU. This mainly involves terrorism, proliferation of WMD. Other issues, such as regional instability outside and distant from the EU’s borders are regarded as a concern for the EU, and finally, the ESS states that certain EU interests may be threatened. Hence several levels of urgency can be found in the list of threats in the ESS.

In addition, the fact that other countries in the world are troubled, can lead to troubles for the EU, and thus threats need not be direct in order for them to require action by the EU.

The ESS also describes what action the EU should take to counter these threats. This involves intensified multilateral action, cooperation at the global level and that this action should be as varied as possible, using “the full spectrum of instruments” (ESS p.11) including military action. This should, however, be within the limits of the EU’s relationship with NATO. I will return to this in chapter 6.

2.2. The referent objects of the key threats

Overall the EU is the referent object. Although the member states are the actors who approved the ESS, they are not mentioned or dealt with individually. Instead the more detailed referent objects which the ESS describes as being at risk in the EU, and which need to be protected by a united EU, are listed in different categories according to which type of threat it is that endangers them. The ESS describes the targets at which the EU should direct its efforts in both combating and pre-empting the threats.
For the sake of clarity I will deal with the referent objects following the same above mentioned division of categories used in the ESS.

2.2.1. Terrorism
Terrorism is the first point mentioned in the section of “key threats” in the ESS. The paragraph begins with the phrase: “Terrorism puts lives at risk”. (p.3 ESS) This points to the very survival of the population of the EU and as such it is a threat within the military sector. This referent object might be considered the superior of all referent objects and could therefore render other referent objects superfluous mention. But another aspect of importance should be considered: According to the same section terrorism also: “…seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies…” (p.3 ESS).

The “openness and tolerance” can in theory be placed under both the societal sector and the political depending on how one construes the terms. If one refers to a shared identity of the EU population it would fall under the societal sector. One might argue that these concepts might be the largest common denominator the EU could produce. However, in the TEU (Article 6, section 3) it is stated that: “The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.” Considering this, along with e.g. the cultural variety of the member states and the ongoing enlargement of the EU, establishing a common European culture still seems a rather ambitious project. I do not find it likely that this is what is referred to in the ESS. Conversely, one might interpret it as being part of the constitutional foundation of the EU, being small representatives of the ideological basis of the EU, e.g. the principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms; principles which the EU treaties are based on. (TEU, Article 6, sections1 and 2, and Craig and de Burca p.359) Based on this the political sector will be the appropriate category to deal with. I thus find it likely to be part of the political sector.

The threat of terrorism can be found both within and outside the EU, and: “Concerted European action is indispensable”. (p.3 ESS) Thus, terrorism is, as I show throughout this report, the most explicitly expressed issue of security concern to the EU. The risk of terrorist attacks is described as greater than the proliferation of WMD and it is much more unpredictable than the threat of war between states. However, when the threats of terrorism and WMD are combined the most perilous situation occurs.

2.2.2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:
The proliferation of WMD is seen as: “…potentially the greatest threat to our security” (p.3 ESS), which is not a surprising perception, given the destructive power held by those in possession of such weapons. The EU gives credit to the international treaties and their influence on world order and governance (ESS p.3) and their help in controlling the spreading of WMD. However, the EU claims that they can no longer be of as much help as previously, and that an arms race of WMD is a possible future development. (ESS, p.3)
It is not the general notion of states possessing WMD that poses the threat. Indeed, the EU has stated that: “Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable.” (ESS p.3) The concern of a proliferation of WMD is especially grave regarding the Middle East and, as mentioned above even more so in the hands of terrorists. Uncontrolled actors in possession of WMD pose an immediate threat to the survival and physical wellbeing of the inhabitants of the EU – and world society in general. This again renders the state level superfluous, both as referent object and as suitable actor of security. There will neither be a state vs. state conflict, nor a nation vs. nation conflict, and so it is our civilization, the lives in the EU which must be protected. The state-threat is being de-securitized in the ESS. It is stated several times that it is a “potential” (ESS, p.3) threat which “could” (ESS, p.4) be a risk to the EU. However, there is much emphasis on the danger of this threat; furthermore, it is claimed that international treaty regimes and other measures intended to guard against the proliferation of WMD are now no longer enough to ensure a peaceful development in this matter (ESS, p.3). This makes it count as an argument in favour of the ESS being a securitization move.

2.2.3. Regional conflicts:

“Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime”… and “…can fuel the demand for WMD”. (ESS, p.4) It is a comprehensive threat which, as the basis for some of the other serious threats mentioned in the ESS, endangers the same referent objects that they do. The threatening of the EU interests, which is also mentioned in this section, is not as serious as the other threats. It is not specified what this category involves and it does not seem to be something which is existentially threatened and which must be protected by all means possible.

The securitization of the concepts of human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries outside the EU’s borders is part of the protection of the EU, as they will otherwise be a danger to the EU. In overall terms this threat does however permeate both the military and the political sector, and it will affect many different external relations of the EU which makes it a likely subject for securitization. I shall return to the relevance of this aspect later. That, I would argue, carries more weight than the fact that the threat is of a more indirect nature, as it is not an internal EU matter. Therefore, this threat, as the two above, has a strong appeal.

The section on regional conflicts legitimises involvement, including pre-emptive action, in conflicts which have no immediate connection with the EU. The EU then would take a more active and offensive (as opposed to defensive) role in foreign policy, for instance in protecting human rights and promoting good governance (ESS, p.7, 10). These lines of argument carry weight in favour of securitization. Regional instability and conflicts are, however, all mentioned as possible threats to the EU, even the conflicts which “persist on our borders” (p.4, ESS). The ESS is rather vague both concerning the immediacy of the threats, and about the measures

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3 Here the term is used in a broad, overall sense, encompassing the lives, values and political ideological foundation of the population of the EU.
which should be taken to avert them. No radical action or rule-breaking is suggested. This suggests that the threat is not as urgent as is required according to the theory of securitization for it alone to fall under the category of securitisation.

2.2.4. State failure:
The danger of failed states refers to states outside the borders of the EU. In spite of their failure not being linked directly to the EU it can lead to organised crime and terrorism, which as mentioned is an existential threat to society. If terrorism is to be prevented it is therefore important, according to the ESS, to act against the failure of states which must accordingly make it a top priority for EU security actions. (ESS, p.4)
Because of the way the ESS refers to its own statements in previous sections to prove its points, the conclusion as to whether this section is a securitizing move depends on the conclusions in the other sections.

2.2.5. Organised crime:
“The Union shall set itself the following objectives:… to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime…” (TEU, Article 2)
Organised crime is a serious internal threat to the EU in relation to several sectors. Firstly, it threatens the internal security of the EU, which is a military sector issue. It also undermines the rule of law and social order (although it is not completely clear whether this refers to EU-territory or other states or both). Furthermore, it can have links with terrorism which also makes it an existential threat to the survival of the EU (cf. above section). Organised crime also influences the political sector as it undermines law and order which is part of the founding principles of the EU (TEU, Article 6, section 2). Trafficking of women (sex trade) for example is part of this concern. (ESS, p.4)

Arguably the societal sector is affected as the “we” feeling is threatened when the population experiences immigration (Immigration alters the constellation of the population). However, as argued above, it seems more likely that immigration would be a problem due to other factors such as economy.

2.2.6. Energy dependence:
Another threat mentioned in the ESS is that against the EU’s dependence on oil and gas imports.4 (ESS, p.3) This threat lies within the economic sector and can be said to be sufficiently serious to threaten the function of the states of the EU, and it therefore qualifies for securitization. It will also influence the military sector - the ability of the EU to defend itself will not be possible if the EU does not have enough resources. The

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4 A proportion of the entire EU energy consumption which is expected to increase from the present 50% to 70% in 2030 (ESS, p.3).
referent object here is then the EU, both concerning the survival of the population and as a practically functioning entity.

2.3. De-securitisation:

There are also certain passages of de-securitization to be found in the ESS. In the introductory phrases the ESS, as mentioned, draws the broad picture of a Europe which is stable, an area of peace where there used to be conflict and war, and a place where the threat of invasion is in the past. (ESS, p. 7) The ESS does away with the threat of intra-union military disputes. The sovereignty of the EU is both internally and externally safe. This removes the most basic security concern addressed in International Relation-studies, namely the need of nation states to defend themselves against aggression from other states. (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2004) This could seem to render the need for an EU military machine somewhat superfluous.

However, as mentioned in the section above on regional conflicts, there are other types of threats which call for military action, some of which are not directly linked to the EU. Furthermore, the EU is not rendered superfluous with respect to providing peace in the Union and around its borders: The second section of the ESS describes how the EU has been a key player in the process of creating peace, and one can therefore conclude that the EU is a necessary provider of peace, and therefore indispensable if one wishes to avoid repeating the history of pre 1945 Europe. Also the political sector is mentioned. “...the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy... [has been achieved by the enlarging EU]” (ESS, p. 1). It is therefore a de-securitization of the political security sector of the member states and internally in the EU.

2.4. Overview of referent objects

The referent objects of the ESS are many and varied, and not all of them qualify for securitization. The EU is the overall referent object, as opposed to for instance the member states, but various aspects of it are threatened. The “Sub-referent objects” which carry sufficient weight for securitization are, here listed according to sectors:

Military: The lives of the population of the Union. Stability outside the EU’s borders and within them. Energy supply.

Political: The ideologies and values of the EU, the rule of law, human rights etc.

Economic: Energy supply.

Environmental: The proliferation of WMD can also - with reservation - be placed in the environmental category. I shall return to this later.

In chapter 3 I will return to this division of referent objects when investigating which issues can be securitized by the EU.

Societal: I do not find any issues within this sector suitable for securitization.
2.5. Means and measures - answering the threats:
In many respects the ESS still resembles the civilian power model of previous times. But a substantial dose of military force has been added. In spite of the primarily military threat scenario drawn by the ESS, sectors than the military sector of security are in need of EU action and other things than military intervention are needed to combat the threats mentioned. In dealing with these key threats to the EU the ESS mentions many possible means that can be used. This includes action as varied as e.g. military, diplomacy, trade, democracy and human rights. (ESS, p.7)
Part of the concept of securitization is that the threat described is so serious that it calls for exceptional action beyond what is normally the rule in such matters. If the very existence of the referent object is indeed threatened all means are justified for defending it. If the performer of the speech act only addresses the importance of an issue within the normal framework of rules concerning that specific subject it only keeps the issue politicized – making it a subject which must be dealt with, but not in an extraordinary fashion. Therefore the examination of whether a text contains securitization must also entail a scrutiny of the measures which are suggested should be taken. In chapter 3 of the ESS several points are laid out which describe the necessary future strategy of the EU member states.
The EU: “need[s] to be more active, more coherent and more capable.” (ESS, p.11)

2.5.1. More Active:
In this section the ESS urges more activity in all possible spheres of foreign policy action - such as diplomacy and military. It thus aims beyond the role which has so far mostly described the foreign policy of the EU, namely the role of a (however strong) still solely civilian power. (Smith, p.3-4)
When deploying EU troops the EU must still have the consensus of the member states, and it has only limited possibilities for action as the member states often have great difficulties deciding on a common course of action in the matters of security. (Hix, p. 355, Smith p. 4) Also the EU must act within the boundaries of international regimes and many of the member states’ obligations to NATO. (ESS, p. 9)
It also urges “early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.” (ESS, p.11)
This entails pre-emptive missions both directly and indirectly beneficial for the EU. Also, the ESS mentions explicitly that this will be beneficial for the image of the EU as a strong player in the field of foreign policy.
These proposals in the ESS, however ambitious they may be, are still within the limits of the previous agreements by the member states. That is to say that the ESS does not encourage member states to overrule procedures or agreements already in place - instead it urges the EU to add new possibilities for action to the old ones. But they should not collide with these, or with other international agreements which the member states or the EU as a whole are a part of.
One could interpret the suggestions for pre-emptive strikes abroad as a potential rule-breaker as this action might conflict with other states’ sovereignty, but it cannot be read from the ESS that this will be the case.
Urging the EU to take on a more military-oriented role is something which the member states must agree on in common. It is thus a political process and not a “state of emergency” to be attended to here and now.

2.5.2. More coherent:
The many different foreign policy initiatives of the EU should be coordinated so that they work in the same direction and thereby enforce each other. Both at EU level, at member state level and at regional level the different activities should be coherent.
The various programmes, e.g. of the European Development Fund, should be part of the plan for ensuring security. This is a continuation of the thought mentioned in the section about threats - namely that security problems arise from a variety of causes - and thus the means applied to solve them should also be variable.

2.5.3. More capable:
Creating a more “capable” Europe is described as a process which will happen over time. It entails the improvement and effectiveness of the combined military forces of the member states of the EU.
It says that: “To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary”. (ESS, p.12)
Here the ESS encourages a stronger focus on military defence, and points to the threats as the reason for this. Later in the same section concerning diplomacy it says that the resources of the member states should be combined with the institutions of the EU. From the text it becomes clear that the EU wishes a more centralised defence, and also a stronger one. It also maintains the positive aspect of the EU’s relation with NATO.
This would classify as politicization rather than securitization. The EU links the defence of the member states to the EU, pointing to the advantages of a united common defence. The phrase concerning the need for the EU institutions in a common diplomacy expresses the need for a more politically active EU on this subject. The ESS politicises a subject which is already a political subject in the member states, but not so much yet at the EU level. I therefore classify it as politicization because it politicises it in the EU policy-domain. It is not securitization as it only encourages more cooperation and more military action, and this over a period of time. It does not claim that there is a situation of such urgency that the EU or the member states individually must take radical actions to defend themselves.

2.5.4. Working with partners:
In this section it is written that the EU cannot deal with the security problems alone. Only through “multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors” (p.13 ESS) can the EU hope to achieve its goals of security. It is thus not only security action at EU level that the EU promotes. International cooperation is still highly valued. However, a central point here is that
the suggested solutions to the security concerns are to be carried out at EU level - not member state level.

2.6. A measure of securitization:

There are of course an infinite number of security issues in our everyday life which cannot be said to be sufficiently serious to qualify as securitization. This might also be the case for the ESS. A case in point could be the common identity of the EU. A measure of whether an issue can be a topic for securitization can, as mentioned, to some extent be determined by the comprehensiveness of the securitization act – whether it affects many other relations between the EU and other parties. (Buzan et al. p. 26) The ESS is a comprehensive strategy, covering the whole of the EU and not just a single individual or small firm. Furthermore, the actions proposed by the EU will affect much more than just the territory within the EU. In the ESS it is suggested that action should be taken abroad in other states and regions: “With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad” (ESS, p.7). This requires that the EU will influence societies, regions, and states, even if they only indirectly will affect the EU, and it will do so both pre-emptively and in response to topical problems. The implications of the wide scope of the ESS considered, in the overall perspective it will have no problem qualifying as a genuine case of securitization in this respect.

2.7. Is the ESS a securitization move?

The key threats of the ESS do pose an existential threat to certain of the referent objects and they also affect more than one sector. The lives of the population of the EU are threatened - which is clearly an existential threat. Also the civilization of the EU can be said to be threatened due to the threat to the existence of the ideological foundation of its society.
One can say that organised crime, state failure and regional conflicts become existential threats in that they constitute an indirect danger by providing an opportunity for terrorism, even if they by themselves do not constitute existential threats.
Also, the fact that the EU is arguing heavily for military intervention, also outside its borders, seems to be a way of securitizing. The emphasis on “hard security” instead of only civilian power makes the threats seem more severe.
The sentence that “The risk of proliferation grows over time; left alone terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous…we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.” (ESS p.7), is also in line with the theory of securitization (Buzan et al. p.26) - namely that extraordinary action is justified by an argument of a possible point of no return. It can thus be concluded that the seriousness of the threat scenario is sufficient to qualify for a securitization move.

Contrary to this, the ESS also reads: “taking these elements [threats] together…we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.” (ESS, p. 5, my italics) and

\[5\] Not involving military action.
possible threats are mentioned in the text. Nonetheless, there is a predominant tendency towards arguments in line with securitization. Additionally, the above mentioned de-securitization in the ESS does not prevent the possibility of securitization. According to my analysis it actually enables the EU to take on more of the role of security provider as the states inside the EU will not have conflicts with each other while they are part of the EU. The internal solidarity makes securitization of issues threatening the EU in general more probable, and must therefore indirectly be counted as part of the elements of the ESS which support the chance of securitization.

Apart from the visible military aspect, the action which is proposed in the ESS does not match this picture of urgent existential threats. Apart from elevating certain issues to the EU level not much change is proposed for the way the threats are to be handled. The cooperation between EU and other international partners and organisations should, as mentioned, continue and the EU should at some point (no deadline in the immediate future is suggested) take over some responsibility from the member states and also develop new tasks. Nothing extraordinary is to be done; no state of emergency is introduced.
Consequently there are clear elements of securitization in the ESS. However as one of the key elements of securitization is the justification of using measures beyond normal procedures, I do not find that the ESS can be seen as a securitizing move.

Finally, in support of this conclusion, the reasons for terrorism and the other threats presented in the ESS are portrayed in a non confrontational manner. It is emphasized that there are multiple reasons for the bad environments in society which foster enmity and threats. The “enemy” is not demonized as it might have been. On the contrary, the EU stresses that there is a need to spread positive values and social conditions, as it is often the lack of these which leads to terrorism etc. (ESS, p.1, 3 and 7)

As can be seen in this chapter there are elements of securitization which might possibly serve as potential for future securitization by the EU if it should choose to do this. However, securitization arguments are not sufficient for successful securitization. Much depends on the actor making the speech act, and the audience. In the following chapter I shall investigate the properties of the EU in this connection to find out whether it will be realistic for the EU to attempt securitization of the subjects in the ESS in the future.
Chapter 3.0. The EU as a securitizing actor:

3.1. The actor

The ESS was drafted under the High Representative of the CFSP, Javier Solana, and approved by the Council of the EU, so one could say that essentially the member states are the actors behind the ESS. However, I limit myself to an examination of the EU’s potential as securitizing actor with regards to the ESS. Thus it is the EU that needs credibility in the policy-areas of the ESS and the EU is therefore the relevant subject for investigation. Also, the ESS was drafted by an organ within the EU, representing the EU and not the individual member states. The ESS refers primarily to the EU and not the member states. Finally, being a product of the CFSP-pillar and being accepted unanimously one can expect a more united support from all the member states for the policy than if it had been drafted under the Community pillar - and therefore the investigation of the individual member states’ part in the process becomes less relevant. The EU member states, in the Council of the EU, have unanimously agreed to elevate certain security issues to EU level. There is, in other words, a certain pooling of sovereignty in the security sphere, which shows that at government level at least the member states accept the EU as representing the specific tasks outlined in the ESS such as promoting good governance and fighting poverty.

3.2. Criteria for success:

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, there are factors which may influence the likelihood of a subject being securitized successfully. They are, in brief:

- Whether the security issue is institutionalized.
- Whether the threat appears as a “realistic” threat to the audience.
- Whether an actor is a generally accepted voice of security in the specific relevant area.
- To this I will add whether the actor has access to means of communicating its message effectively. (I shall deal with the last two in reversed order)

I shall begin with the first point – institutionalization - which is an “odd character” as it may render securitization altogether superfluous.

3.2.1. Institutionalization:

If a threat is persistent and recurrent, it is common to find that the sense of its urgency and response to it will become institutionalized. (Buzan et al., p.27) The institutionalization of and response to a certain security issue will make it superfluous to include it in a securitization move, as the subject is already an issue of security in

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6 This is based on the notion that, even though there can of course still be many reasons for the member states to agreeing to the policy, many hidden motivations and “group pressure” etc, there is generally less compromise in such a policy-type as the Commission does not influence it, and also the member states have veto-right.
politics and in the minds of the public, and therefore it will be natural for the public 
that the issue is elevated beyond “normal” practice. 
Some of the sectors mentioned above have already been institutionalized at EU or 
member state level. Therefore some sectors will be more easily securitized by the EU 
than others, depending on whether and how they are institutionalized.

The military threats are, despite of some of them being new (terrorism is new in this 
post 9/11 form), institutionalized as this sort of threat often is. (Buzan et al., p.27-28) 
The state has been the natural security actor when dealing with this type of threat. 
One might argue that it would be an easy task for the EU to securitize the 
institutionalized military issues - in fact a superfluous one - as this has already been 
done thoroughly. But in the ESS the military issues are being moved to the EU level, 
and thus it would mean de-securitizing them at the national level where they have 
previously been dealt with, and securitizing them at EU level.

By delineating a form of terrorism which does not aim at specific states, nor their 
internal affairs, but instead at the whole of the EU and our civilization, the EU may 
circumvent the state-institutionalisation and make it a matter under its own authority - 
and still avoid making it an issue of political debate by not changing the notion of it 
being a dangerous threat. It is however, still, primarily institutionalized by other 
actors. NATO, for instance, must also be considered superior to the EU in this respect.

The economic and political sectors may be easier for the EU to securitize. As for the 
economic sector, the EU is already responsible for aspects within it, e.g. in relation to 
energy (see chapter 3.2.4., “The economic sector”) and it may prove very likely that 
the EU has already institutionalized these issues sufficiently and therefore it will 
prove a smaller challenge to successfully securitize these sectors - or be altogether 
superfluous. 
The political sector is also institutionalized regarding the issues mentioned in chapter 
2.2. As the concepts of human rights, fundamental freedoms etc are included in the 
treaties of the EU, the EU has already institutionalized these issues; it is not up for 
debate whether they should be protected by the EU. It is therefore natural that the EU 
should be responsible for handling a threat against them. Is it just as obvious, though, 
for the EU to defend the principles outside its borders? The EU has many 
“cooperation and association agreements” (Smith, p.53-55) with other countries 
which involve the promotion of the same principles, e.g. in the form of the “human-
rights clause”; a deal based on conditionality as “It allows the Community 
to…suspend or denounce an agreement if the third country has violated human rights 
or democratic principles).(Smith, p.57) Hence, this security issue is therefore 
institutionalized in this respect and not an unfamiliar role for the EU.

Regarding the societal sector the protection against illegal immigrants\(^7\) is already 
fairly institutionalized by the EU as the borders within the EU have been opened but 
the collective external borders are guarded by the EU (TEU, article 2, section 4). This

\(^7\) In the section on organised crime in the ESS, p. 4.
is therefore not an issue which needs to be securitized by the EU, nor does this issue take up much space in the ESS.

If institutionalization is not the case then the three other factors mentioned above should be considered when evaluating the potential for securitization.

3.2.2 The credibility of the threat – the historical factor:
Persuading an audience requires that the actor take into account and argue in correspondence with the population’s perception of threats. Though the actual existence of a “real” threat is not relevant for this analysis, and reality can always be said to be up to interpretation, it may however help the securitizing actor to refer to a well known threat as this will make the securitization more credible to the audience. If this is not the case in the ESS the EU would have trouble securitizing successfully. I will therefore include a historical perspective to investigate whether the EU has this perspective into account.
The historical argument is a strong factor in the ESS. The fact that the ESS alludes to threats which have previously been very grave in the history of Europe adds persuasiveness to the arguments of the ESS. Throughout the following sections I will exemplify this.

3.2.3 Can the actor be heard?
The concern of whether the member states would choose to pool sovereignty to the EU in this area becomes pertinent when discussing how the EU might obtain legitimacy as a securitizing actor. As already mentioned, in a democratically structured “political society” the EU would need to communicate its message to the populations of all the member states and convince them of the urgency of the threat. If this fails there will not be acceptance for elevating the various issues to a point beyond the normal rules. This process could be obstructed by national governments and media as the recent rejection of the Constitutional treaty exemplifies. The circumstances surrounding the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty suggests the EU still lacks strength in important areas. The lack of a genuine public sphere and the possible ensuing lack of legitimacy of the EU could hinder the process. The EU could risk simply not getting its message through. In light of this it could be a danger for the successfulness of the securitization if it became more of an elitist project without real potential for success. I therefore find that the debate about the democratic deficit of the EU is central and ought not to be overlooked.

3.2.4 Will the EU be a credible actor compared to the member states?
This question will be answered sector by sector.

The military sector:
According to traditional IR theory it could be seen as peculiar that the member states should choose to pool sovereignty in the military (defence) sector as it has been one of the most central issues, perhaps the most central for nation states. It is, however, nothing new for the member states of the European Union to belong to international organisations which protect them and also have some say regarding their military
operations. Additionally, according to the ESS, the countries are presently confronting a type of military aggression whose targets are not the countries individually, but rather the “West” as defined not by borders but by values and ideology. (ESS, p.3) Terrorism, for example, is a threat with potential for securitization at EU level. After the Madrid 2004 and London 2005 bombings\(^8\), and in the light of the general terror-fear after 9/11, the issue has become a global concern. Terrorists will aim to strike at the values of our civilization, not at the independent state and its internal policy as the ETA or IRA. Thus, it seems, no country would be able to fight the threat by itself and the state is no longer the primary referent object. Seen in this light the problem of terrorism becomes great and pressing at EU level and the task of defending Western civilization is thus more effectively handled by the EU than by the individual states. In light of this terrorism seems a well chosen subject for securitization by the EU. This is particularly so in light of the fact that the population of the EU is historically used to terrorism; it is not an unrealistic threat to them.

During the Cold War the arms race of WMD was a great threat to countries on both sides of the conflict, many of whom are now joined in the EU. It still carries a familiar tone from the not very distant past of cold war rhetoric. This may support the securitization of the threat. It is a threat that is recognisable and tangible to many, and thus potentially the public will be more easily convinced of the seriousness of the threat. No one could likely question the importance of guarding society from a threat like WMD. It is therefore a powerful argument of the ESS. One cannot of course know whether this is a conscious deliberation by the EU. However, making an effort to prevent an arms race of WMD is likely to be an effective argument for the elevation of the issue to a level beyond the normal rules.

The EU is a credible actor since the proliferation of WMD threatens more than the individual country, and also because the arguments of the EU are powerful. As mentioned above the EU can sanction countries by negative conditionality. For example it can freeze funding as it has done recently with the Palestinian government. It might also put diplomatic pressure on countries as it is doing now in Iran, or prevent groups from exercising political influence within the EU by branding them as terrorist organisations. It is thus a more powerful player than the member states individually. It can be discussed whether an actor can be a really powerful actor if it cannot back its diplomacy up with “hard security” measures. (Smith, p.22) Nevertheless the voice of the EU will be more significant than the voice of a single member state.

The political sector:
It is naturally implied in the ESS that the values of human rights and fundamental rights should be upheld both inside and outside the EU to ensure that other problems do not arise (chapter 2.2.3.). I find that the EU is a credible actor in this area as the principles of human rights, fundamental freedoms etc. transgress nation states and are incorporated into the TEU, which is upheld by the European Court of Justice.

\(^8\) This was of course not part of the deliberations when making the ESS in 2003, but it may well have an influence now on how people would receive securitization of the subject today, and thus the EU’s possibility of being a successful securitizing actor.
Furthermore, it has agreements with other countries which encourages them to live up to the principles. The EU can thus be accepted as an actor that maintains these values, especially since it has coined the term fundamental rights itself (Craig and de Burca p. 358).

In spite of the EU not being the only actor dealing with this referent object - there are also other international institutions that represent these internationally recognised principles, such as the UN - the EU represents the same overall values and ideologies as the member states.

Not all the countries in the EU, however, agree completely with these lofty principles. Ireland, for example, is against abortion whereas most of the other countries are “pro-choice”. Ireland is thus in disagreement with the others regarding the principle of the “right to life” (The European Convention on Human Rights, article 2)

In general, however, the ideas and principles are based on member state legislation and international conventions accepted by the member states. In principle it should therefore not be a problem for the EU to address the issue with credibility in what could be called a “lowest common denominator-fashion” and elevate the defence of ideologies and political values to the EU level. Also the rule of law is realistic for the EU to represent with credibility, given the influence of the European Court of Justice and the laws it serves to uphold. Although much in this area still falls under the JHA, there has, on the other hand, also been established a European Arrest Warrant aimed at terrorists, which might support a possible securitization by the EU in this area. (ESS, p. 6).

Still, part of the political sector still needs some standardization before it will work.

**The economic sector:**
The EU is already a key player when it comes to economic affairs. Since the European Coal and Steel Community’s inception in 1957 the population of the EU have been familiar with the Union’s role as a financial forum and it is a strong negotiator in economic relations. (Smith, p.24) Legitimacy therefore does not seem unrealistic in the economic sector. Regarding the credibility of the threat, energy shortage is a phenomenon which most (older) Europeans have experienced personally, as the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 hit Europe very hard. The EU has energy ties with several oil producing countries (ESS, p.3). The EU would thus be a qualified and potent actor in this area. With a credible threat to refer to it is therefore likely that the EU will be able to securitize this subject successfully.

**The societal sector:**
As described in chapter 2 the societal sector carries little weight in the ESS. The notion of identity or culture and a common public identity is not brought up in the ESS. Rather, clearly defined and less disputable concepts such as human rights are mentioned. As it is now, it seems more natural for other actors to represent the “we” within the EU. In the long run it is possible to imagine a change in this tendency. Besides the member states, there are also regional and local centres of “we” in the EU which
might someday lead to a less state bound identity and societal security sector. Also, the EU might be successful in promoting a more pan-European culture. In an extension of this, the lessening of the state as the main centre of identity, one could imagine that the securitisation of the societal sector might boost integration in the EU which would be a strong incentive for the EU to attempt this securitization move. However, as it is now the societal sector remains absent from the security agenda of the ESS and this is probably for the best securitization wise.

**The environmental sector:**
This is a relevant sector for the EU as the environment is a comprehensive issue in many areas of responsibility of the EU (trade, agriculture etc). It is thus not because of lack of institutionalisation that the issue does not play a part in the ESS. In terms of WMD, which is the only environmental aspect which might be associated to the ESS, the EU might be a factor which could play an important part in protecting the environment against a nuclear threat. But this falls under the larger category of dangers with WMD, as environmental damage is just a bi-product of the danger of WMD. Hence, the environmental sector is also insignificant.

**3.3. Could the EU securitize the ESS?**
Due to the nature of the EU there are limits to what the EU can securitize, and it is possible that the selection of the issues in the ESS has been done for exactly this reason. Are the subjects of the ESS then well-chosen? Or could some changes of referent objects or threats - or entirely other initiatives be suggested?

Considering the content of the ESS and the results of the analysis above, in overall terms it does not seem unrealistic for the EU to securitize the contents of the ESS. In the military sector the presentation of the threats is done in a way so that it requires action at a higher level than the state, and the areas threatened are well represented by the EU. The fact that many of the EU countries are already part of NATO does put some restriction on the EU, but it does not inhibit it from securitizing the military sector. I shall return to this in chapter 6.

The political referent objects of ideology and constitutionally founded concepts can be said to be within the sphere of the EU. One could say, though, that when spreading the ideals to places outside the EU there are other actors competing with the EU in this matter, e.g. the UN. Therefore the EU may not have the same legitimacy neither within nor without its borders to act in this field.

Considering the immigration aspect it is more likely to be a subject of successful securitization, as this subject is a point of responsibility of the TEU. The environmental sector is inconsequential in the ESS as it falls indirectly under the military sector. However, if added to the security agenda it would not be a bad element in a securitization due to its institutionalization in the EU-system.

In conclusion it would thus seem that the EU adjusts its presentation of security fairly well to what could be expected to be accepted by the audience.
Nevertheless, to be more certain of a successful securitization, the EU would benefit from improving its communication-channels to the public, and lessen the democratic deficit. And perhaps, hereby, it could institutionalize more of the issues in the long run, as they might gradually be turned over to the EU-domain. This scenario, however, lies well into the future.

Finally, the EU should change its call for action to one of more urgency, and rule-breaking, as this is necessary for securitization. But as this needs to be approved by the audience, and needs to be in line with the authority of the EU, i.e. keep within the limits set by the MS and international organisations etc., this, as well, is a future, not a present possibility.
Chapter 4.0. Consequences surrounding securitization:

4.1. What could come from securitization?

According to the theory of securitization, an actor who successfully securitizes an issue can use it to gain power over that specific area. The fact that the EU claims that the threats are best addressed by the EU, as opposed to the member states (and even international society, in some cases), could bring the security issues to EU level and thereby give the EU more power. (ESS, p.11)

While it might be possible to blame the lack of securitization on the slow integration in the EU, one could take the opposite view and claim that securitization might actually be an effective way of achieving more centralization and integration at EU level. The fact that there is a fair dose of securitization arguments in the ESS might enable the ESS to help the EU to in achieve this.

This is, however, a rather theoretical assumption; substantial further research is needed in order to determine whether there might be a connection between the discourse of securitization and an increase of power for the EU. On a final note in addition to this, with the theory of power-gaining by securitization, it may be interesting to consider whether or not the EU obtains more power by politicizing the subjects of the ESS. By making them an issue of the political sphere, but at EU level, the EU ensures that it will have influence over the subjects, and maybe in the long run could make it generally accepted for the subjects to be dealt with at EU-level. If one adheres to the integration theory of spill-over this would seem a productive course of action. From this perspective it does not seem a discourse weakness that the EU does not securitize - this may be a less risky way of gaining influence for itself.

4.2. Reasons for absence of securitization:

Another possible explanation is that the member states may not be ready yet for a securitizing EU, and that they would not surrender their sovereignty in many of these areas.

There are still many different ways for member states to take part in the European Union, which indicates that the helpful “Europhoria” lacks some energy. The Danish opt-outs, the deliberate absence of some countries in the EMU, and the different constitutions of the member states which still influence their membership (such as national immigrant laws) are examples. Also the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty can be viewed as an indicator of this. The three pillars remain.

If the EU had taken any further securitization steps it might have had the opposite effect, and have threatened the sovereignty of the member states to a degree which
would have made the EU a threat, with the cultural unity and the political sovereignty of the states as possible referent objects. It is however, unlikely that the EU High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy would suggest such a brave and potentially unpopular security strategy as it would then not be accepted in the. However, there is already cooperation at the EU level concerning several foreign policy aspects, and it does not appear that the member states have overlooked the advantages of acting in unison externally (Smith, p.6). It therefore at least cannot be the only reason.

Another reason might be the lack of legitimacy; before the EU achieves more integration and establishes better communication lines to the public there may not be a public desire for a common policy, and therefore the EU cannot make a securitization move as does not speak sufficiently persuasively for the “entity” of the EU. The governments of the states are legitimate and accepted spokesmen for the member states and the EU must achieve a more credible status before it can securitize successfully. The democratic deficit has an influence on the security area.
Chapter 5.0. Conclusion:

The ESS is a major step for the EU in terms of joint security policy. In the ESS one does find serious threats to the existence of various elements of the EU. The EU is no longer in direct peril in terms of attacks from other countries. Also internally the EU is stable and peaceful thanks to the EU. The threats against the EU come from individual, non-state actors, and are aimed at the EU in general, not the member states in particular. The independent national defence policies are no longer neither sufficient nor very important when answering the new threats of our time. Instead there is an increased need for security action at the EU level. However, the action suggested in the ESS is not as drastic as required for it to qualify as a case of securitization. Also, the EU lacks sufficient means whereby to reach and persuade the public. Rather, the action proposed is a case of politicization which serves to emphasize the need for collective member state action that is centralized and institutionalized at EU level.

The threat scenario might change in light of Iran’s new more confrontational course of action. Also, this discourse analysis would become even more interesting and relevant if the EU in the future were to be awarded more authority in the CFSP. As I have described in this report securitization is possible for the EU if certain elements of the current ESS are changed.

The result of my analysis can thus provide insight to what might happen in terms of securitization if such developments occur in the future. Or it can be seen as a (small) partial indication of where the EU stands in security affairs.
Chapter 6.0. Further Perspectives – the power of the EU:

The EU has more military focus in the ESS than it has previously had in its foreign policy, although it is still combined with other foreign policy means. Does the military focus help securitizing? – And how does this relate to gaining more power through securitization?

The ESS mentions several issues as security matters. They are of the political, the societal, the economic and the military sectors. The sectors are artificially created categories which in reality are intertwined, as shown for example in the example environmental sector’s overlapping the military aspect of WMD (chapter 3.2.4.). The ESS does not promote military action above all others. Rather it suggests using the whole toolbox of possible remedies against the various aspects of the threats. However, the military sector of threats is a predominant sector of concern and also many of the other threats are linked to this sector. If the EU claims that the economic, societal, or other aspects are threatened by a military factor, the issues gain a sense of urgency which may help securitization.

The EU might thereby gain more power in these areas, especially if the states’ traditional power no longer qualifies to solve the problems.

In an extension of this, the EU is flirting with the idea of following in the footsteps of the USA, exporting its values and ideas of “good governance” to the rest of the world (ESS, p.10) It could therefore seem that the EU is aiming at changing its role in foreign policy, but that it is doing it slowly, bit by bit, and not going beyond its authority. It continues its emphasis on using alternative measures to military force. However, there is mention of military action in the ESS, something which to this date has not been a big part of EU foreign policy.

How does this military face fit the EU-NATO relationship and the suggestions for change in said relationship?

Within the recent years the EU has obtained access to NATO’s military facilities (www.bbc.co.uk), making it possible for the EU to act more freely on its own, provided that it keeps within the limits of the “3 D’s”.

It could seem that the influence of the EU in the military sector is increasing. It would be interesting to follow this development in the future and monitor whether a complete securitization will follow.

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9 The EU is not to Duplicate NATO activities, nor is it allowed to Decouple from NATO (or the USA) and thirdly it is not allowed to Discriminate against members of NATO who are not part of the EU. (www.nato-pa.int)
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Appendix

- The military sector can be divided in two parts, domestic and external concerns. It is basically about ensuring the survival of the state (or other entity), protecting it against internal and external threats of both military and other kinds. (Buzan et al. p. 50);
- The political sector concerns sovereignty (in terms of recognition, legitimacy and governing authority), ideologies, constitutive ideas, issues defining the state, and rules, norms and institutions (when dealing with supranational referent objects). (Chapter 7)
- The societal sector refers to the cohesion within a society, the sense of “we”. (Buzan et al., p. 120)
- The economic sector - resources for military defence, energy to maintain functioning of society. (Buzan et al., p.116)
- The environmental sector represents environmental dangers at the global, regional or local level, natural or caused by man. (Buzan et al., p.79-80)