NATO and ESDP – Roommates or Rivals?

Björn McClintock
Abstract

Are NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) destined to be roommates or rivals? The transatlantic relationship between the EU and the United States permeates this question, which is examined by three theoretical approaches.

Firstly, a realist perspective is used to answer: What are the national interests of the four pivotal states regarding the ESDP and NATO? For France, the ESDP strengthens the EU’s military muscle and acts as a counterweight to US hegemony. Britain favours a more Atlanticist approach with NATO as the prime military actor. Germany lies between the two, and the US, which first made restrictive demands on how the ESDP should develop, is now increasingly sceptical about the results.

Secondly, a liberal perspective is employed to find out what results have been achieved: Which institutions and economic concerns are involved? Institutionally the ESDP has developed its Battle Groups, while NATO has established a Response Force; but economically there is still a capabilities gap between the EU and the US.

Thirdly, a constructivist perspective is used to examine the security strategies of the EU and the US: How do they differ? They identify the same threats, but differ considerably in the way they plan to counter these threats. The EU emphasises soft power measures, while the US emphasises hard power measures.

Keywords: ESDP, NATO, USA, EU, security policy.
“The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”

Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), which came into force in November 1993.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHOD</td>
<td>Chiefs of Defence</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congress Report Service</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defence Cooperation</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Initiative</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>LI</td>
<td>Liberal Institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Members of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>MILREP</td>
<td>Military Representatives (to the EUMC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;T</td>
<td>Research and Technology</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Social Constructivism</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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1 Introduction

The armed forces of a nation are among its highest moral institutions; they are the school of the noblest military and civic virtues. Their banners are the reminder of past glories and the pledge of future sacrifices. If we are to require the armed forces of the different countries to merge together in a permanent and constitutional organisation and, should the need arise, to defend a greater fatherland, that fatherland must be visible, solid, and alive; even if its construction is not entire and perfect, the principal walls, at least, must be raised to view without more delay, and a common political will must be always on guard, in order to bring together the purest ideals of the associated nations, that they may gleam in the light of a common flame.1

These words were not spoken by Tony Blair or Jacques Chirac at the founding of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in St-Malo in 1998 (see Gnesetto 2004:13)2. They were spoken almost 50 years earlier by Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi in 1951 – three years before both he and the effort to build a European Defence Cooperation (EDC) went to the grave. After the collapse of EDC, the integration project in Europe came to focus on economic issues in what is today known as the European Union3 (see Brimmer 2002:xii).

1.1 Roommates or rivals?

The question of creating a more independent European defence capacity, outside NATO and thus separate from US influence, has been a problem for the EU since the end of the Second World War and especially since the end of the Cold War (see Föhrenbach 2002:3).

Since the ESDP has the potential of redefining the transatlantic relationship militarily, politically and economically (see Smith 2003:41), primary focus in this

2 For more information, see Joint Declaration on European Defence.
3 For a more thorough account of ESDP’s historical development in recent years, see Appendix A.
essay will be on that relationship: To what extent are the ESDP and NATO to be seen as rivals or roommates within the international security chamber?

Three theoretical approaches from the research field of international relations (see Baylis & Smith 2005:159) are used to examine the issue:

- First, a realist perspective is applied to the security interests of four pivotal states – the US, Britain, France and Germany – regarding the ESDP and NATO.

- Second, a liberal institutionalist perspective is employed to identify the institutional structures and economic issues that surround the ESDP and NATO.

- Third, a social constructivist perspective is used to examine possible differences between the EU and the US in their security assessments.

As the new contender and potential challenger to NATO, the ESDP will receive more attention. Furthermore, it is the military and not the civilian aspects of the ESDP that will be examined.

### 1.2 The concept of security

Since this essay will be dealing with the concept of international security it is essential to define what is meant by the term. Although published as early as 1976, the first issue of *International Security* still offers a relevant definition:

> Nations are increasingly defining their security not only in the conventional modes of military strength, economic vigor, and governmental stability, but also in terms of capabilities previously less central: energy supplies, science and technology, food, and natural resources […] Today, global interdependence has forced transnational concerns – such as trade, terrorism, military supplies, and the environment – to be essential elements in the security considerations of any prospering society … International security embraces all of those factors that have a direct bearing on the structure of the nation state system and the sovereignty of its members, with particular emphasis on the use, threat, and control of force (International Security 1976:2).

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4 Institutions are hereby defined as structures with a certain function, which are organisational delimitations of EU and NATO (see Winnerstig & Oredsson 2005:3). Institutions can, however, be defined in broad terms as sets of rules and practices that prescribe roles, constrain activity, and shape the expectations of actors. Institutions may include organizations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties and agreements that states view as binding (see Haas, Keohane & Levy 1993:4f; Mearsheimer 1995:8).

5 For criticism of the ESDP’s military development, see Sangiovanni 2003.

6 Even though it has been said that “[t]he concept of […] security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimly perceive” (Schultze 1973:529f).
The solutions to the transnational problems mentioned above require regional and even global cooperation and coordination, since today’s “threats to national security cannot be resolved by national means alone” (Allison 2000:84).

Europe of today can be labelled a *security complex*. The original definition of a security complex, presented by political scientist Barry Buzan, is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link them together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991:190).

1.3 Three theoretical approaches

To avoid drawing theoretical boxes and filling them with data, the three theoretical approaches should be treated as convenient sorting devices for the analysis, not as strict categorizations. No theory is an island: Throughout this essay there will be spill-over effects between the different theories.

Each theory is included for a reason – not just for the sake of appearance. However, the challenge of bringing together theories with different ontological and epistemological bases should not be underestimated. In the tension between traditional methods of security policy analysis and more critical social constructivist methods I take an open stance. By studying individual and collective actors’ subjective perceptions about security policy, I aim to draw conclusions about the contents and direction of these policies. All along references will be made to events in an empirical reality, a reality which directly or indirectly is presumed to influence the actors’ perceptions.

1.3.1 Realism – there is virtue in simplicity

There have been several spin-offs from classical realist theory. This essay will focus on a shared set of assumptions, common to all realists.

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7 Does this then not contradict the realist supposition of an anarchic international system? Not necessarily, since “strong local security dynamics almost always exist in an anarchically structured international system” (Buzan 1991:200). Just because some states have peaceful relations this does not mean that all is good and well, or that this is always the way it is going to be.

8 “Realists also recognize that states sometimes operate through institutions” and liberal institutionalism does not “challenge the fundamental realist claim that states are self-interested actors” (Mearsheimer 1995:13).

9 Methodologically, the more subjectivist constructivist approach differs from the more objectivist traditional approaches (realism and for the most part liberal institutionalism) in the sense that it analyses the construction of threats (see Buzan et al 1998:207).

10 For a comprehensive overview of the different realist strands, see Dunne & Schmidt 2005:166.

11 As Robert J. Art concludes: “In domestic politics force has been subjected to central governmental control; in international politics it has not. Consequently, states in anarchy cannot dispense with something that even national governments cannot do without” (Art 2004:6). John J. Mearsheimer argues that “[i]ndeed, their [the states] ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s own...
Realists do not deny the existence of international cooperation, but see it as happening mainly in the economic sphere. When military issues are at stake, states are more reluctant to cooperate. The one step backward, two steps forward logic of economic cooperation does not really work on defence issues, since one step backward could mean destruction (Mearsheimer 1995:19). “Political Europe, and military Europe even more, is still a sum of sovereign nations that wish to remain so” (Gnesotto 2004:19). A security alliance, such as NATO, is merely a way of creating a power balance between rivals; states have no friends, only interests (Christiansson 2004:56). Like most theories, realism presents a simplified reality, but sometimes simplification is necessary in order to achieve understanding.

The realist approach aims to highlight and analyse which state interests Britain, France and Germany have in creating the ESDP and in preserving NATO. The Big Three all represent different traditions in security policy and occupy different power positions on the international stage. Furthermore, the US reaction to an emerging ESDP is highly important since “NATO is a huge element in European defences and America is a huge element in NATO” (Brown 2001).

1.3.2 Liberal Institutionalism – institutions matter

Liberal Institutionalism (LI) is considered to be one of the most convincing challengers to realism (see Keohane 1993:271) and tends to be more optimistic: International institutions can help to mitigate international anarchy13 (see Dunne 2005:185; Roberts & Kingsbury 1993:30).

LI acknowledges that cooperation is not without problems, but maintains that states will pool their sovereignty if the institutions are “mutually beneficial and if they provide states with increasing opportunities to secure their international interests” (Lamy 2005:214). Institutions help regulate and transform world politics from being a jungle to becoming a zoo: “Institutions exert a causal force on international relations, shaping state preferences and locking them into cooperative arrangements” (Dunne 2005:195, see also Christiansson 2004:36, 57). Today’s threats cannot be dealt with unilaterally. Pandemics and terrorism are not contained within state borders; they are global threats that must be fought multilaterally (see Allison 2000:84).

The LI-approach seeks to emphasise the prominence of the institutions involved – NATO and the ESDP – and the economic issues that surround them.

12 Both Liberal Institutionalism and Social Constructivism have voiced significant critique against Realism. The most important being that since anarchy is what states make of it the creation of regimes (rule patterns, norms and procedures) have helped to make the state system more predictable (see further the other two theoretical approaches below).

13 There has been considerable realist criticism of the alleged importance of institutions: “What is most impressive about institutions, in fact, is how little independent effect they seem to have had on state behaviour” (Mearsheimer 1995:47).
1.3.3 Social Constructivism – anarchy is what states make of it

In the 1980s Social Constructivism (SC) arose as a counterforce to realism and liberalism. At the end of the Cold War, SC gained ground and has been on the march ever since. SC contrasts with the other two theories in that it views ideas as powerful in shaping our social construction of reality. In contrast to realism and liberalism the assertion is that individuals are influenced by their cultural environment (Barnett 2005: 251, 259; Buzan et al 1998:204). There is no reality, only perception, and perception is a human construction. SC highlights the importance of existing beliefs and values that make the world what it is. And if they change, so will the world.

These ideas, values and beliefs are manifested in speeches and documents about national security and form a security framework, or security mindset. By contrasting the EU’s European Security Strategy (ESS) with the US’s National Security Strategy (NSS), the aim is to compare which socially constructed threats, challenges and countermeasures the EU and the US create.

1.4 Why these three theoretical approaches?

First of all, the state has remained the primary security actor in the EU, and no other actor comes close to replacing the state monopoly on violence in the Western world. This is why the realist, state-centred perspective remains crucial to security studies, and the traditional realist perspective remains central to examining the security interests of states.

Second, focusing solely on the state would be presumptuous. The reality of today’s international security is also made up of economic concerns and international institutions. To take these elements into consideration we need a second perspective: Liberal Institutionalism.

Third, Social Constructivism widens the very concept of security and seeks to examine the actual construction of security threats and ways of dealing with them on a more comprehensive scale. Do these security issues differ or are they the same on both sides of the Atlantic? If the results indicate a divergence in security assessments, future transatlantic security cooperation could be jeopardised; a convergence would clearly point to stronger cooperation.

The point of including these different approaches is eclectic. They provide different answers to different questions, but they all relate to the main question of the ESDP and NATO as roommates or rivals.

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14 Some scholars argue that the monopoly on violence is what characterises the state: The state is defined by its monopoly on violence (see Dahl 1989:38ff).
1.5 Material and method

Source material studied includes primary sources such as official speeches, debate and press conference transcripts, US Congress reports, security strategies and secondary sources such as other relevant research. The material has first been systematically surveyed, then structured with consideration to the theoretical framework.

Telephone interviews have also been conducted with German, French, British and American military representatives and civil servants. On account of their extensive experience and special interest in security policy, the expertise of the interviewees can hardly be held in doubt. For reasons of confidentiality, however, the names of the participants will not be included in the bibliography.

As a first step, all Swedish members of the EU-parliament were asked to fill in a questionnaire. The results of this survey should primarily be regarded as a complement to this essay, since the representative validity of 16 Swedish members of the EU-parliament cannot be extended to the EU-parliament as a whole.

The analysis gravitates towards a state-centric perspective in the sense that it is presupposed that states and their main institutions, leading politicians and civil servants have a decisive influence on the shaping and making of security policies. The starting point of the analysis will be that states ultimately decide their own security policies: “States themselves must choose to obey the rules they created” (Mearsheimer 1995:9). But states can decide to pool their security sovereignty into common institutions – as in the case of NATO and the ESDP. This pooling of security sovereignty occurs only when states interests converge.

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15 For more information on these interviews, see Appendix H
16 See Appendix F
17 Even if the analysis to a large extent will be state-centric, in the sense that the national political elites are in focus, there is not a state monopoly on security issues in the EU, nor in the US for that matter. The organizations of NATO and the EU are evidence of this. Within the EU there is a complex web of networks and institutions – often termed European governance – which to some political scientists implies the illusion of state autonomy (see Wessels 1991:149, Rosenau & Czempiel 1992).
2 The Realist perspective

Historically the United States has played a special role for European security ever since the end of World War II. Today, the US is – in terms of military expenditure – the largest member in NATO. Analysing the US position on the development of the ESDP should thus be useful in providing guidance on future US-policy towards the EU.

Why have France, Britain and Germany been cherry-picked as “the Big Three” when the EU consists of 25 members? The Big Three have the largest defence budgets in the EU, and combined they have the power to make or break the ESDP (Interview with French official). Furthermore, the Big Three are all members of NATO and therefore highly relevant to the question: What are the national interests of the Big Three and the US with regard to NATO and the ESDP?

2.1 Britain: putting NATO first

The Conservative British position on the ESDP during the John Major era was reversed when the newly elected Labour leader Tony Blair threw his full weight behind the ESDP with the St-Malo agreement in 1998. But Blair still emphasised the importance of NATO:

Far from weakening NATO this is an essential complement to the Transatlantic Alliance. We Europeans should not expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder in our backyard […] To retain US engagement in Europe, it is important that Europe does more for itself (Blair 1999).

The British Anglo-Saxon identity is reflected in its close ties to the US, further manifested in British membership of NATO. Britain’s transatlantic bond is greater than with any other European nation and is forged from the two states fighting shoulder to shoulder, first against German National Socialism, then Soviet

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18 See Appendix C.
19 See Appendix D and E.
20 The term national interest is hereby defined as expressions of a state’s preferred policies and actions, projected into the international and domestic arenas (see Lansford 2005).
21 John Major’s foreign secretary Douglas Hurd (1991) stated that “[t]he best, the cheapest, the safest way to organise the defence of Europe is in close alliance with the United States. We have a successful, stabilising structure in NATO which it would be foolish, indeed impossible, to replace and very expensive to half replace.”
Communism (see Blair 1998), and now Islamic fundamentalism. Winston Churchill’s remark about Europe – “we are with them, but not of them” (Forman 1989) – is still highly relevant.

The commitment to NATO is also confirmed by a British official: “NATO, of course, remains the absolute cornerstone of UK security – a role that the ESDP can by no means take over” (Interview). The ESDP is more about looking for ways in which the EU can do more on international crisis management. For the time being, this will most likely involve peace-keeping operations, but since the ESDP is also about improving European military capabilities, peace-making operations will be more relevant in the future. A potential clash between NATO and the ESDP is not likely in the future; the rational thing will be to see where the best assets for a certain operation lie (Interview), thereby echoing the US statement that “the mission determines the coalition” (Rumsfeld 2001a).

What is it then that makes Britain hesitant about the ESDP? NATO has traditionally been a pact of stability with the US hegemon, and British bandwagoning with the US is an important way to promote British interests (see Clarke 1998:142f).

Britain’s dual national interest is manifested in its foreign policy: A close Anglo-American bilateral relationship and intergovernmental foreign policy cooperation with France and Germany. This duality results in a somewhat ambivalent policy where Britain is trying to keep the US happy and at the same time show France and Germany that Britain is seriously committed to cooperation on European security (see Aggestam 2004:154).

A British embassy representative (interviewed) maintains that the EU-states and the US do have similar security interests: Both want good governance, the rule of law and democratic elections to flourish. Ultimately the political will is going to decide who gets involved where. A conflict on the EU’s doorstep demands action on Europe’s part. The same thing applies to instability in Central America, where the US would probably be more willing to send troops than the EU. Even though the goals are the same in both cases – peace and stability – it is not a question of going against the US, but of judging who is better suited to deal with a certain conflict, or of using both the resources of the ESDP and NATO. “There will be some divergence on what means to choose to reach these common goals, but it

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22 The British official found the distinction between peace-making and peace-keeping operations misleading since crisis management operations is about both making and keeping the peace (Interview with British official).

23 Taking Iraq and Afghanistan as examples, both the US and the EU want stable democracies. Their overriding goals are the same But when Britain is dealing with countries such as Turkey or France, the broader common interests will doubtless lead to some divergence (Interview with British official).
makes sense for the US and the EU to work together, so as to make best use of our shared assets” (Interview with British embassy representative).

2.2 France: dreams of greatness

Although Britain and France may share some historical similarities, when it comes to European politics they are often at odds. In France, as opposed to Britain, political elites and public opinion in general are more supportive of the EU (Mihalka 2005:296). While the British dream of a transatlantic Europe, the French dream of a united and independent Europe.

There is an underlying tension expressed in France’s foreign policy: on the one hand, a supranational, idealistic desire to build a strong Europe; on the other hand, a nationalistic, realist desire to maximise French influence on world politics. These goals have been merged by using the EU’s CFSP in order to increase France’s influence on the world stage. A US Congress report concludes that “French officials have long argued that the EU should seek to counterbalance the United States on the international stage and view the ESDP as a vehicle for enhancing the EU’s political credibility” (CRS 2006a:14). Since the ESDP is thought to strengthen the backbone of the CFSP, an EU military capacity is a natural step in promoting the French national interest and counterbalancing American hegemony.

French aspirations can to a large extent be traced to Gaullist trains of thought; the bipolar superpower era of the Cold War was considered a straitjacket, since it hindered France from playing its historically rightful leadership role. This conception of French grandeur also helps to explain France’s decision to – albeit temporarily – leave NATO in 1966 (Pauly Jr. 2005:3). The end of the Cold War meant that France could step out from under the US security umbrella and forge a new European security order. As former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine has said: “Europe is the best answer to globalisation and the predominance of one single superpower – the United States” (Aggestam 2004:97).

The US-French rivalry, clearly manifested during the Iraq War, can be explained by looking at the similarities between the two states: both see themselves as the chosen one in world politics and are characterised by a

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24 It is worth noting that the Big Three have expressed a clear will to keep their own freedom of action in security policy – thereby demonstrating that national interest comes first (see Aggestam et al. 2000:85).
25 For more information on how and why the CFSP has developed, see Strømvik 2005.
26 But even if France is the most outspoken of the Big Three in committing itself to a common ESDP, its track record in the CFSP paints another picture with regard to France’s commitment to European solidarity. For example: France’s last-minute mediation attempts in the Gulf War, President Mitterand’s sudden peace trip to Sarajevo in 1995, President Chirac’s mediation attempt in Lebanon in 1996, and most recently President Chirac’s statement during the Iraq War concerning the pro-US position taken by the Eastern European states: “They missed a good opportunity to keep quiet” (CNN 2003).
missionary zeal in their foreign and security policies\textsuperscript{27} (see Heuser 1998, Moisi 1998).

Gaulist influence on French security policy is far from dead. Even today political dreams of France’s great power are very much alive. This was clearly shown in President Jacques Chirac’s public reprimand to Eastern Europe during the Iraq crisis in 2003: “These countries have not been very well behaved and rather reckless of the danger of aligning themselves too rapidly with the American position” (CNN 2003).

The idea that France inherits a natural leadership role in the EU and that French national interests coincide with European interests serves to explain France’s reluctance to accept American leadership within NATO. Hence the continual pressure for an autonomous EU military capacity (see Appendix F).

Franco-British relations are somewhat strained due to Britain’s close ties with the US, which feed French suspicion of Britain’s being a US henchman, determined to assert American hegemony in Europe (see Aggestam et al. 2000 69ff). Even if St-Malo in 1998 indicated otherwise, the Iraq War of 2003 widened the gap across the English Channel. However, a return to more cordial relations may occur as the EU unites against Iran (see Winiarski 2006b:17).

France’s close ties with Germany, cemented in the wake of the Cold War, cannot be disregarded in the European context. The Franco-German partnership resembles the Anglo-American partnership in that it is seen as a provider of European stability and security. During the Iraq crisis France and Germany joined forces against Britain and the US (Woodward 2004:346). Having said this, it is worth noting that the Franco-German relationship has been based on the premise that Germany assumes a low profile in the international security arena.

2.3 Germany: the dark legacy

After reunification in 1989, Germany’s security policy has focused on demonstrating more political self-confidence by shouldering a greater international responsibility, primarily politically but also militarily. In this respect the CFSP and in particular the ESDP serve Germany well: Supporting them helps downplay accusations of German aspirations to European hegemony (Brunstetter 2005:20).

Its historical legacy makes it difficult for Germany to take the role of major player on the international security stage. Instead several politicians have been

\textsuperscript{27} Another interpretation is that the rivalry stems from a French \textit{Perrichon complex} towards the US. \textit{Le Voyage de Monsieur Perrichon} (1859) is a French play where the lead character, Perrichon, is rescued and then comes to hate his saviour – much as France was saved by the US in the Second World War (see Roger 2005:301-339).
attracted to the German author Thomas Mann’s idea of a *European Germany* as a way out of the dark corridors of German history. This idea of a European Germany shows itself in its security policy aspirations: To reconcile with former enemy states, notably France, by bonding over a common European security identity and repudiating the unilateral use of military force (see Mihalka 2005:292f).

The German case, with its humble security ambitions, is somewhat incompatible with the realist idea that all states seek to maximise power. While both France and Britain seem to fit nicely into the realist mould, Germany’s crippled international identity seems more susceptible to a social constructivist analysis. As stated earlier, no theory is perfect in terms of explaining security policies.

However, according to a realist paradigm it could be argued that Germany is adopting the same strategy as France: masking state interest under a cloak of European solidarity. After all, Germany is trying to become a more influential international player, as was demonstrated during the Iraq crisis in 2003 (see Brustetter 2005:29).

The German position has been one of both transatlanticism and Europeanism. Germany has declined US encouragement to assume European leadership because it could seriously damage its relationship to France (Aggestam et al. 2000:72ff). In trying to accommodate both the US and France, Germany has wound up playing on both teams during the 1990s (see Aggestam 2004:108f). This changed with the Iraq War when Germany sided with France against the US and Britain (see Woodward 2004:346). The severed transatlantic bond is now being patched up through cooperation between the Big Three and the US in countering Iranian nuclear ambitions (Winiarski 2006a:24).

In contrast to the British and French views of an international scope for the ESDP, German officials envisage a regional area of responsibility: “It is just for Europe, not for the world” (Interview). The Germans are moving more towards a Eurocentric security position, convinced that Britain will in time fully embrace the ESDP. “We see the ESDP is viewed as becoming much stronger in the future and therefore NATO, in other words the United States, will think twice before competing against the ESDP. Even though the EU and the US do not always have the same security interests, there is a theoretical possibility of a future clash between the ESDP and NATO. But, since there will always be a discussion about which organisation that is going to be engaged in a certain conflict, a future clash

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28 France by advocating an ESDP in order to strengthen its own international position and Britain by bandwagoning on the US power carriage in order to strengthen its own international position

29 For example by analysing how Germany’s historical identity has been constructed into an international security straitjacket.
is highly unlikely” (Interview). A majority of Swedish members of the EP, however, see a potential future clash between NATO and the ESDP (see Appendix F).

Given its size and its wealth, Germany has played a rather minor role in developing the ESDP so far. Up to the Iraq War Germany has tiptoed around the ESDP so as not to antagonise the US. After the Iraq debacle some analysts believe that Germany has become “increasingly receptive to French efforts to forge a European defense arm independent of NATO” (CRS 2006a:20). However, German defence spending continues to be low, and Germany is a long way from matching the British level in European defence capability (see Appendix D).

2.4 Transatlantic relations

Even though the Bush administration has made it a top priority to improve transatlantic relations during its second term, a US Congress report concludes (CRS 2005:6):

- “Nevertheless, transatlantic tensions have not disappeared and resolving differences will require a sustained political commitment from both sides.”
- A “potentially more confident EU may seek to rival the United States and could weaken the transatlantic link.”
- A “more unified EU would likely lessen Washington’s leverage on individual members.”

These fears were confirmed when former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder proposed that the EU should play a more powerful role in transatlantic policy-making. He stipulated that NATO is “no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies,” and that the transatlantic dialogue “in its current form does justice neither to the Union’s growing importance nor to the new demands on transatlantic cooperation” (Schröder 2005). Schröder’s proposal is also being backed by the French (see CRS 2006b:3) and the EU’s high representative Javier Solana has expressed a similar view, albeit more implicit (see Solana 2004:9).

The other side of the coin, the official US position, is that this could be beneficial for the US. An EU that is able to speak with one voice could also be able to shoulder more responsibility in terms of security and become a viable partner for the United States. This is the point of view that has been publicly

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30 Taking Iraq as an example, the EU would never undertake a mission there, since the EU was not involved in the first place. NATO, however, could very well be involved in Iraq if the organisation so chooses (Interview with German official).
31 The current German chancellor, conservative Angela Merkel, has not carried on Schröder’s legacy. Instead, the pragmatic Merkel is viewed as President Bush’s favourite EU-politician after Tony Blair (see DN 2006:1).
expressed by President George W Bush: “[T]he United States wants the European project to succeed. It’s in our interests that Europe be strong” (Bush 2005).

In fact, the ESDP is in many ways a response to Washington’s calls for the EU to get its act together in boosting its military capabilities. But when it became clear to the US that their prayers had been answered and the ESDP was becoming a reality, this produced an ambivalent reaction.

2.5 The US: distrusting European capabilities

During the 1990s both the (first) Bush administration and the Clinton administration pursued the same ambivalent security policy regarding the ESDP development. Officially, the US saluted the ESDP idea and its presumed military boost. But the US attitude was also fraught with conditions about ESDP development – the primary condition being that NATO’s role as a supreme security actor was by no means to be undermined (see Hamilton 2002:147). This resulted in Madeleine Albright’s \(^{32}\) three D’s formula for keeping the ESDP in the box:

- \textit{No Decoupling} between the US and the EU
- \textit{No Duplication} \(^{33}\) of NATO resources
- \textit{No Discrimination} against NATO’s European members who are not members of the EU.

The three D’s served to guarantee NATO’s right of first refusal, thereby keeping US influence in European security affairs intact (Gnesotto 2004:23; Hunter 2002:34f).

With the Bush administration’s takeover of the White House in 2000, a more openly hostile rhetoric was initiated. John Bolton \(^{34}\) proclaimed his discontent in a debate as follows:

\begin{quote}
I think if the European Security and Defense Identity really did come into existence, it would be the end of NATO, as we know it. I think it is something that the United States can no longer simply passively accept [...] because I think we should say unequivocally that ESDI \(^{35}\) is not in the best interests of the United States (Bolton 2000).
\end{quote}

\(^{32}\) Former US Secretary of State under the Clinton-presidency.

\(^{33}\) In other words: “not to spend scarce resources on trying to create a second set of capabilities that they could just as easily obtain from NATO” (Hunter 2002:41).

\(^{34}\) As former Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and currently serving as US ambassador to the UN, John Bolton is a leading conservative in Washington (Lierman 2005).

\(^{35}\) In order to strengthen European military capabilities the concept of an European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) was created under NATO in the mid-1990s. This was before the launch of the ESDP at the Cologne European Council (see Gnesotto 2004:23). It is unclear whether Bolton just had a slip of the tongue or if he meant to degrade the ESDP by mentioning its predecessor instead.
However, this quote is not representative of the Bush administration as a whole. Officially George W Bush remained committed to Clinton’s policy on the ESDP:

- NATO’s primary role in European security cooperation cannot be undermined.
- All ESDP troops must be separable, not separate from NATO.
- NATO must have the right of first refusal before an EU force gets involved in a conflict.

But this is not the whole picture. The Bush administration’s attitude towards the ESDP has changed significantly: pre- and post- 9/11.

In the spring of 2001 the US policy towards the ESDP contained several conditions – such as the four points previously mentioned – in order to ensure NATO’s primacy. The official policy was followed “by an informal strong critical view of the ESDP that according to Washington had gone too far in a French Eurocentric direction at the expense of NATO and American influence over future European security” (Dörfer 2003:8). This all changed, however, and the sentiment in Washington today is that the ESDP can hardly be taken seriously (see Moens 2003:35). The US concern over increased European military competition has been replaced by a concern over decreasing European military capabilities. In the years after the Iraq War a common sentiment in Washington is that “the effort to build a European force has so far been an embarrassment to Europeans” (Kagan 2003:53).

Why then this US-policy change? First of all, 9/11 threw the cards of the table. A new hand is now being dealt, and the Middle East seems to be the most interesting card. In terms of US national security Europe has become fairly uninteresting compared to the Cold War era.

Second, the Iraq War in 2003 proved that the US has staunch allies in Europe, prepared to promote transatlanticism rather than Eurocentrism. US bilateral agreements with European allies will most likely be the most favourable approach even in the future. Future coalitions of the willing can effectively obstruct CFSP decisions and ESDP missions, impairing French Eurocentrism.

Third, a continuous decline in European military expenditure means that eventually Europeans will not be able to participate in military operations together with Americans even if they should want to (Dörfer 2003:8).

And fourth, the ESDP is increasingly viewed as a project for low-intensity conflicts, for peace-keeping operations and for humanitarian aid (see Brown 2001; Lindborg 2001).

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36 This economic Capabilities Gap between the US and the EU states will be dealt with more closely in the second theoretical approach: Liberal Institutionalism.
Even so, a recent US Congress report states: “The United States remains concerned, however, about possible NATO-EU competition and worries that France and some other EU members will continue to press for a more autonomous EU defense identity” (CRS 2006a:23).

2.6 Summary

There are two dimensions to the ESDP and NATO. One is the internal European debate among the Big Three and their national interests. The other is external and strongly influences the internal dimension – the US position.

- Britain insists that the ESDP be secondary to NATO, giving US concerns precedence.
- France continues to favour a more independent EU-defence capability. Acting on the vision of grandeur, the French would rather see a weakened NATO.
- Germany is stuck in between Britain and France, but is increasingly leaning more towards the French standpoint.
- The US openly distrusts ESDP military capabilities in relation to US military force and wants to maintain NATO’s primary status.

The fact that the US prefers NATO-security cooperation, without having to deal with the EU as a security actor under the ESDP, indicates that the Americans view the EU and its ESDP as a complement to NATO rather than as an equal security partner. Although the US policy towards the ESDP has changed into a distrust of European military capabilities, the US is still the only state identifying a potential clash between the ESDP and NATO.

The national interests of the Big Three are diverging. This difference is fairly natural from a realist perspective, but in terms of increased security cooperation this is not a positive outlook for either NATO or ESDP. A key player in the transatlantic relationship is Britain – the US’s natural European bridgehead. If this cordial transatlantic bridge should collapse in the future, it could lead Britain to turn towards the European continent instead. This would strengthen the ESDP, since there would be nothing holding back British commitment to an autonomous ESDP.

It is important to say that current ESDP development points towards increasing agreement among the Big Three. Since the end of the Cold War their national interests in terms of security policy have been increasingly cohesive – leading to the creation of an ESDP and culminating with the implementation of ESDP operations.

This is also a significant weakness of realism: the inability to consider the actual increase in international security cooperation. Thus, in order to view the progress that has been made, we need to move on to the next theoretical component: Liberal Institutionalism.
3 The Liberal Institutionalist perspective

The realist proposition that the role of international institutions is minor – since institutions are “limited by state power and the importance of military force” (Keohane & Nye 1977:37) – is not sufficient to explain the pivotal role of NATO, and the emergence of an ESDP in the European security chamber. We now live in a world of complex interdependence where international institutions play an important role in terms of agenda-setting, coalition formation and as arenas for political action (see Keohane & Nye 1977:36f). The end of the Cold War did not trigger a renationalisation of security policy among the Big Three. Instead, multilateralism37 through international institutions became the name of the European game; “The European security scene has a distinct character that places it apart among other regions of the world. It is unique for the high degree of institutionalization among international players on the continent and the central importance of the transatlantic link” (Otte 2002:35).

In this section the institutions and the economic concerns relating to the ESDP and NATO will be investigated. Since LI also focuses on economic issues (see Mearsheimer 1995:15f), the capabilities gap between the EU and the US will be of particular interest to the analysis.

3.1 The EU and NATO

According to the Berlin Plus38 agreement, the EU is allowed to borrow NATO assets for ESDP operations, i.e., US military assets, even in situations where the US would choose not to be engaged (Hunter 2002:18f). However, NATO has not given the EU guaranteed access to the alliance’s military assets. Rather, an EU request will be considered on a case-by-case basis and requires a North Atlantic Council (NAC) consensus decision. Thus, a non-EU state has the opportunity to veto an EU operation with NATO assets (Terriff 2003:47). For the EU, the access to NATO capabilities is essential to fulfil the promise of avoiding unnecessary duplication. A NATO refusal could thus increase pressure for an autonomous European capability, separate from NATO, and lead to a process of duplication and decoupling (Otte 2002:51). In order to prevent this and maintain close ties

37 The term multilateralism has almost become synonymous with institutions: “‘the term multilateral is an adjective that modifies the noun institution [...]multilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct’” (Mearsheimer 1995:8).
38 The NATO Berlin agreement in 1996 was intended to strengthen the European pillar in NATO by releasing NATO assets to ESDP operations (see Otte 2002:45).
between the EU and NATO, Javier Solana and Lord Robertson have for some time been engaged in informal meetings to coordinate courses of action taken by the two organisations (see Moens 2003:34).

A US Congressional report states that the evolution of the EU and NATO has “generated some friction between the United States and several of its allies over the security responsibilities of the two organizations” (CRS 2006a). The Kosovo intervention was a defining moment for NATO and resuscitated the alliance. For the EU, the Balkan experience became a wake-up call as the necessity for the Europeans to take on greater responsibility for their own security became evident (Lansford 2005). The EU has a unique capability in that it possesses a toolbox for dealing with international conflict: using economic, political and civilian instruments. This one-stop shopping for conflict management is something NATO cannot compete with and is the EU’s trump card (see Tertrais 2002:125).

3.2 NATO: dead or alive?

Two opposing schools of thought have dominated the debate over NATO’s future: One is ready to use coffin nails, while the other salutes the new-born alliance (see Howorth 2003):

The NATO-is-dead school. Realists argue that “NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe. NATO cannot remain as it was during the Cold War” (Mearsheimer 1995:14). Meanwhile, NATO’s expansion towards the east merely creates more problems than solutions, since it only increases the capabilities gap between the US and Europe. The EU members currently spend 160 billion dollars on defence (EU 2005), a waste of money if it is not spent collectively and rationally (Bonnén 2003:125). Since the US inclination seems to be that “the mission determines the coalition” (Rumsfeld 2001a), there is no need for a permanent alliance – certainly not with today’s transatlantic differences: different policy priorities, different military capabilities and different security cultures (see Cornish 2004).

The NATO-rides-again school. Divorce is not an option; the only choice for NATO is to reinvent itself. There are currently three paths that the alliance might follow (see Howorth 2003:238):

- NATO should return to its roots as a transatlantic security community, with the US as the dominant security guarantor.
- NATO should continue to work as a regional security guarantor in its traditional zone. Over time, the Europeans, through the ESDP, will begin to dominate the alliance.
- NATO should become a global alliance and fight terrorism without any geographical limits. The EU and the US will work together, the US developing its soft power and the EU working on its hard power (see Nye 2006:4).

The first two suggestions are not likely to be embraced by either the EU or the US, since an equal partnership is the ultimate goal. NATO has to go “out of area...
or out of business” (Howorth & Keeler 2003:14). Thus the last suggestion is the most credible one, though it depends crucially on the success of the NRF.

3.3 The NATO Response Force (NRF)

The NRF is estimated to reach a full capability, with over 20,000 troops, by the summer of 2006, and has been declared the “engine for NATO transformation” (NATO 2006). Even though the NRF is generally regarded as a success39, problems can be seen on the horizon. European governments are reluctant to increase defence spending, and Germany has even reduced military expenditure in order to invest in pension programmes (CRS 2006a:7). NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), General James Jones, has been advocating that costs should not lie where they fall, as is the case today. Instead, more NATO assets should be funded jointly; otherwise NATO risks failing to develop appropriate forces, such as the NRF, since governments decline to contribute troops because they might be used for expensive operations (Dempsey 2005).

Meanwhile, the EU is developing its own battle groups. Since some of these troops are double-hatted and can also be used by NATO, some analysts worry about NATO and EU competing for the use of mobile, battle groups in the future (see Oredsson & Winnerstig 2005:33f). The counter argument is that most countries and organisations do not compete to go to war – more likely the opposite. Besides, EU officials are keen to point out that the battle groups are intended to complement NATO, not compete with it (CRS 2006a:22).

3.4 ESDP: results and challenges

The EU has reached some impressive results with the ESDP since its launch in 1999. It has both implemented a structural base of institutions (see below) and reached a consensus on a European Security Strategy. Furthermore, the idea of a common ESDP is gaining support among the European public. And most important of all: Several successive missions are now being conducted by the EU – both in the Balkans and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)40 (Gnesetto 2004:11).

And yet future challenges still remain. The tensions from the Iraq War in 2003 were not prevented despite the progress made in the defence area. There is no obligation to take part in ESDP operations, and military missions that are

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39 “Even France, which has been outside of NATO’s integrated military command structure since 1966, has committed 1,700 troops to the NRF” (Gordon 2004:217)

40 Ranging from the civilian police mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, to military operations such as Artemis in DRC and Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (see Lindstrom 2005b:2). However, these missions have also been criticised for being “small-scale missions [that] all could have easily been done without involving the EU” (Gordon 2004:216).
undertaken are financed solely by the participating states\(^41\) (Missiroli 2004:68). Besides, the success of future crisis management depends among other things on the institutional structure that has recently been created (see Oredsson & Winnerstig 2005).

3.5 The ESDP’s institutional framework

The EU has created a number of new institutions\(^42\) to help direct and implement its ESDP (Missiroli 2004:63f; Smith 2003:46; Bono 2002:23ff; see Appendix A):

- **The Political and Security Committee (PSC)** consists of senior national representatives and acts as both a crisis monitoring and crisis management entity. When a crisis situation arises, the PSC will examine all available options in close cooperation with the Military Committee (see below), and report back to the Council.

- **The Military Committee (EUMC)** is composed of the member states’ Chiefs of Defence (CHOps) or their representatives (MILREPs). The EUMC provides military advice and recommendations to the PSC on all military matters within the EU.

- **The Military Staff**, consisting of 130 military experts, will provide early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks\(^43\) (i.e. rounding up the necessary forces) and last but not least: implementation of the chosen EU-policies regarding military action.

- **The EU Situation Centre** is connected to the Military Staff and the high representative’s policy unit, processing information and coordinating the EU-response in a crisis.

All in all, the ESDP staff in Brussels numbers just over 200 officials, which is negligible in comparison with national defence institutions.

3.6 The ESDP’s military capabilities

This section identifies three main institutions which the EU can draw from when conducting its ESDP missions:

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\(^{41}\) As opposed to the civilian missions, which are financed by the EU budget (Missiroli 2004:68).

\(^{42}\) Criticism has been expressed that institutional development of the ESDP is not democratically accountable, since “non-elected military experts are playing a key role in shaping the political doctrine underpinning ESDP” (Bono 2002:3, see also Wagner 2006).

\(^{43}\) The ESDP is supposed to carry out the Petersberg tasks which include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, using combat forces in crisis management and peacemaking (see Lindstrom 2005b). The Petersberg tasks were named after the German city where they were formulated in 1992 (http://europa.eu.int).
3.6.1 The European Rapid Reaction Force

The decision to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was taken in December 1999. The ERRF consists of 60,000 soldiers drawn from the EU members, most notably from France, Britain and Germany, which together contribute 35,000. These units are not a standing EU army, but are deployed when required by the EU member states. Although the scope of responsibility ranges from all the duties specified in the Petersberg tasks – from humanitarian assistance to peacemaking operations – the ERRF has hitherto only been engaged in peacekeeping operations in Macedonia and Bosnia. Since it takes up to two months before the armed forces are fully operational in the area of conflict, the ERRF is seen mostly as a long-term instrument used – at least for the time being – for low-intensity conflicts (see Brown 2001; Lindborg 2001; CRS 2006a:22).

Nonetheless, these ERRF troops may have to be brought in from forces currently assigned to NATO, “thus potentially depriving NATO of forces it might need if a larger crisis arose subsequent to an EU deployment” (CRS 2006a:23), as a US Congress report notes.

3.6.2 The EU-Battle Groups

Several European and American military experts view the battle group concept as “more sustainable and practical than the EU’s 60,000-strong rapid reaction force” (CRS 2006a:22).

In May 2004, EU’s defence ministers agreed on developing seven Battle Groups to be ready for deployment by 2007. A single Battle Group consists of 1,500 combat soldiers (one battalion) and additional support. The larger EU states will contribute with their own groups, while the smaller states will team up and create common groups. Somewhat confusingly, the EU Battle Groups are to be deployed faster than the ERRF: They are supposed to be in the area of conflict within 10 days. Since the Battle Groups will only be sustainable for 30 days (with possible extension up to 120 days), they are likely to be preparing the ground for a more long-term solution – probably the ERRF or NATO. Another ESDP component will be the EU Civilian and Military Planning Cell, currently under creation. This institution is meant to coordinate the military instruments with civilian aid. It will also work as a planning headquarters for future military operations within the ESDP (EU Factsheet).

3.6.3 The Eurocorps

The Eurocorps consists of 60,000 soldiers from France, Germany, Luxemburg, Belgium and Spain. This force can only be deployed under EU command if the five governments approve of the action. As opposed to the Battle Groups, the Eurocorps’ main purpose relates to low-intensity conflicts and peacekeeping operations. The corps has already been engaged in missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and, until recently, Afghanistan (see Eurocorps 2006). If the Eurocorps succeeds
in increasing its number of member states, it could become a future key player on the operational side of the ESDP.

3.7 The Capabilities Gap

The transatlantic gap in the ability to conduct and organise large-scale expeditionary operations – obvious during NATO’s Kosovo intervention\(^{44}\) in 1999 – is known as the capabilities gap between the US and the EU\(^ {45}\). The gap in capabilities refers to several military disparities between the US and the EU, such as gaps in technology, investment and procurement. When added up, the US stands as superior to the EU, both in quality and quantity: “The United States is currently superior to any combination of its European allies in its ability to plan, conduct and sustain theater-wide expeditionary operations” (Yost 2003:83).

The capabilities gap has been a constant source of irritation throughout NATO’s history, most notably during times of crises. It emanates from the Cold War structure when Europe was expected to hold the fort against an attacking Red Army. This scenario forced the US to develop highly mobile military assets for transoceanic expeditionary operations (Tertrais 2002:117). Due to this military evolution the EU-countries are superior to the US in one way: “that of unusable and ultimately unaffordable manpower” (Heisbourg 1999). The situation has lead to a growing divergence, manifested in an inability to conduct joint military operations (see Schake 2003:107).

If the EU is not able to close the gap, it will become increasingly dependent on US support in military operations. But how should the capabilities gap be resolved?

3.8 Increased spending

It has been said that three things about the ESDP interest the Americans: capabilities, capabilities and capabilities. In other words, it is time Europeans put their resources where their mouths are. For 2004 the US national defence outlay

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\(^{44}\) The Kosovo War in 1999 “highlighted the importance of Europe’s armed forces” (Kagan 2003:46f), proving to be a shocking blow to European honour. European embarrassment over its military impotence was evident.

\(^{45}\) The difficulties in counting military contingencies should not be underestimated, however, mostly because the crucial question in all military operations is: Who will show up? Even though the US has almost ten times as many tanker aircraft as the NATO European countries put together, it is highly unlikely that all of them would be available. And for the EU countries, Petersberg task missions are only volountary and no state is likely to commit all of its military forces (see Yost 2003:82).
was $453.6 billion – more than twice the combined defence budgets of the EU-25 in 2004\textsuperscript{46} (Lindstrom 2005a:80).

A US Congress report recently concluded that the “overall levels of European defence spending are insufficient to fund all ESDP requirements” (CRS 2006a:16). The report also says that “the EU’s success in establishing defense decision-making bodies has not been matched by capability improvements, potentially leading to a situation in which the EU gets bogged down in a conflict and requires the United States and NATO to bail it out” (CRS 2006a:24).

But increased European defence spending could entail breaking one of the three D’s: No Duplication\textsuperscript{47}. Another problem is that increased defence spending is not realistic: European governments have other priorities (health care, education and pension programmes) and there is not the same public acceptance as in the US to increased military budgets (see Yost 2003:103; Thiele 2002:79).

3.9 Specialisation

Another way of bridging the capabilities gap is by spending less, but spending more wisely. By pooling resources the EU members could replicate the high-end capabilities of the US in a cost-efficient way. This \textit{constructive duplication} would mean that the EU avoids unnecessary duplication and instead focuses on capabilities in where it can enhance its ability to act autonomously\textsuperscript{48} (see Schake 2003:119; Föhrenbach 2002:12).

German officials consider it important to empower the European military forces in order to create a better partnership with the US. This will not be done by increasing Germany’s defence spending, rather by spending more wisely and through European specialisation. One German official also opens the door to a more organised form of burden-sharing. States should do what they are best at: The US is better equipped to handle air transports and some EU countries are better at human intelligence. This will make duplication and increased defence spending redundant (Interview).

According to British officials, specialisation is definitely something worth looking at: “By working together, we can actually provide something that is useable” (Interview). What benefits the EU, in terms of better capabilities, will also benefit NATO. The requirement of today is no longer for large-scale armies to be waiting for the Red Army to come over the hill: It is about going to failed states and implementing order. “The lesson learned from Afghanistan is that if we

\textsuperscript{46} See Appendix C, D &E.

\textsuperscript{47} Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that: “Actions that could reduce NATO’s effectiveness by confusing duplication or by perturbing the transatlantic link would not be positive. Indeed they run the risk of injecting instability into an enormously important Alliance” (Rumsfeld 2001b).

\textsuperscript{48} This entails \textit{strategic lift}: the ability to move troops by air but also by sea, rail and road. But also intelligence, reconnaissance, strike capabilities, mid-air refuelling, research and development (Schake 2003:119).
do not do something, there is a security implication and also a humanitarian implication for the Western world” (Interview).49

The path of specialisation is favoured by Javier Solana as well: “Through the ESDP, the Europeans are determined to develop the tools the EU needs to become a stronger and more equal partner for the U.S. [...] That does not mean trying to equal the U.S. military build-up. But it must mean Europeans spending more or spending better – and spending better means integrating more” (Solana 2002).

European military forces must rationalise their defence expenditure by restructuring and specialising in a coordinated effort within the EU. This is the best way to promote a common military crisis management capacity (see Moens 2003:27). In this process a newly formed institution within the ESDP could play an important role – the EDA50.

3.10 The European Defence Agency (EDA)

The EDA has been created to “help EU Member States develop their defence capabilities for crisis management operations under the [ESDP]” (EDA 2006). The means of achieving this goal are diffusely formulated as “helping them [the EU’s member states] to identify common needs and promoting collaboration to provide common solutions” (EDA 2006)51.

What this means in reality is a harmonisation of defence budgets and coordination of defence spending within the EU. The Chief Executive of the EDA, Nick Witney, says: “A more systematic and comprehensive approach to identifying ESDP’s capability needs will contribute to better-defined future requirements on which collaboration – in armaments or R&T52 or the operational domain – can be built” (Witney 2006). Witney here specifies a broad field of responsibility for the EDA. A crucial ingredient in this is encouraging cross-border competition in the European armaments industry with the hope that keener competition will lead to lower costs and improved capabilities. This has been agreed on in a voluntary code-of-conduct document that came into effect in July 2006 for those countries that decide to take part. Critics say that since this is just a voluntary document, it will be difficult to uphold it (see CRS 2006a:17).

49 American and French officials declined to answer questions concerning the capabilities gap and are therefore not mentioned in this section.
50 However, the ESDP has been accused of aggravating the capabilities gap. While the EU concentrates on peace-keeping operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum under the ESDP, the US is developing its high-end and high-tech military warfare by integrating air and ground troops on its own (see Schake 2003:116).
51 Expectations for this new-born agency were high right from the start in June 2004. The high representative and head of the EDA, Javier Solana, stated that “[t]he need to bolster Europe’s military capabilities to match our aspirations is more urgent than ever. And so, too, is the need for us to respond better to the challenges facing our defence industries. This Agency can make a huge difference” (Solana 2006).
52 Research and Technology.
There is an ongoing debate as to what extent the EDA should be involved in harmonising EU defence spending. Critics say that this would erode national sovereignty: “European defense ministries will […] be slow to move away from their trusted national suppliers” (CRS 2006a:17). National defence industries create national jobs. But there are those who advocate the EDA as a necessary integration step: By pooling military assets, the EU will ensure that national military forces are used in the best possible way.

3.11 Summary

Institutions are not ends in themselves. They are determined by the member states’ agenda, political will and the resources made available. The US faiblesse for bilateral cherry-picking among the EU-members could be detrimental to the ESDP. Institutions need to be used. If not, they will become irrelevant.

This section has highlighted the developing institutions in the ESDP and NATO. By building the necessary structures, the EU and NATO ensure that these institutions can be used, if the member states so choose. ESDP institutions have only just been born and not really put to the test yet. What remains evident, however, is that:

- NATO assets (i.e. US assets) are crucial to the ESDP in terms of high-end warfare capabilities and mobility.
- Closing the capabilities gap between the EU and the US will be crucial in creating an autonomous European military capability, and thereby the future success of the ESDP.
- An effective way of closing the gap is through coordinated defence spending and specialisation.
- Even though the military capabilities of the ESDP have to come from the states involved, the coordination must be done by institutions at the EU level. In this task, the EDA can come to play an increasingly important role.

Since crisis situations are seldom alike, the institutions must be equipped with a large measure of flexibility in order to be successful. The institutions in the ESDP and NATO are therefore likely to keep on moving towards new developments.

But the very fact that US military expenditure is so much higher than EU levels begs a basic question: Are there fundamental differences between the EU and US security assessments?
4 The Social Constructivist perspective

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world or even that they occupy the same world (Kagan 2003:3).

Robert Kagan\textsuperscript{53} has famously proclaimed that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus\textsuperscript{54} (Kagan 2003). Kagan’s statement is used as a starting point in analysing the US National Security Strategy (NSS) – issued by the Bush administration in March 2006 – and the EU European Security Strategy (ESS) – approved by the European Council in December 2003. The analysis aims to answer the following question: Do the EU and the US differ in their security assessments? If this is the case, increased security cooperation within the ESDP would be a matter of course. If, on the other hand, the results show that the ESS and NSS converge considerably, this would indicate a continuation of security cooperation within the NATO framework, possibly reducing the future role played by the ESDP.

The ESS is the EU’s first and only common security strategy for its member states, and the NSS is the most important strategy document on US security policy. The time gap between the two strategies is a trifle wide for the analysis, but since the EU has not updated its security strategy, we have to take the ESS as it stands. Another disparity is that the NSS is almost three times as long as the ESS\textsuperscript{55}. Given its size, the ESS is the less extensive document of the two. Nevertheless, considering that the ESS is a compromise by 15 states, the strategy is as good as it gets (see Berenskoetter 2005:72f).

Security problems are not self-evident; rather they are constructed by a security actor – in this case the governments of the EU and the US – to become a security concern: The issue thus becomes 

\textit{securitized} (Mutimer 1999:94). Ergo, “something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” (Waever 1995:54). This process of \textit{securitization} often evolves in the formulation of a security strategy.

\textsuperscript{53} Robert Kagan is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a columnist in the \textit{Washington Post}.

\textsuperscript{54} A paraphrase of Dr. John Gray’s bestseller \textit{Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus}, in which Gray goes to considerable lengths to prove fundamental biological differences between men and women. Kagan concentrates on the American emphasis on hard power and unilateralism, predominant since 9/11, while the EU has chosen the path of soft power and multilateralism (see Nye 2002).

\textsuperscript{55} Most likely because as President Bush states in the first sentence, “My fellow Americans, America is at war” (NSS 2006).
4.1 The five sectors

The analysis\textsuperscript{56} starts with “disaggregation but must end with reassembly. The disaggregation is performed only to achieve simplification and clarity. To achieve understanding it is necessary to reassemble the parts and see how they relate to each other” (Buzan et. al 1998:8). This will be done in the summary.

The following security sectors\textsuperscript{57} will serve as analytical instruments in order to categorise the main threats, challenges and countermeasures described in the NSS and ESS:

- **The Political Sector** concentrates on ideology and sovereignty. Threats to this sector tend to be directed towards the present form of government, in this case the democratic rule of government. Political countermeasures to these threats include legal action and diplomacy, wherein concepts such as multilateralism and unilateralism are central.

- **The Military Sector** represents a traditionally state-centred view of security. The threat is identified as enemy forces – terrorists with WMD or conventional armies – taking over or eradicating a state. The countermeasure involves the use of military force, either with the state acting alone or in an alliance.

- **The Environmental Sector** is sometimes described as the ultimate security issue; if we do not take care of our environment, we will undermine our own survival. Disasters know no borders, a truth that has become painfully obvious via Asian tsunamis, American hurricanes and European floodings. Preventive measures via warning systems are crucial.

- **The Economic Sector** underlines that a state’s economy is crucial to the welfare system and thus the survival of the population. Threats are often cross-sectoral and linked to state failure and terrorism. The prime economic challenge is to eradicate world poverty. Countermeasures include the use of sanctions, pursuing trade and development policies against other states and the freezing of terrorist bank accounts.

- **The Societal Sector** covers national and religious identities. Abilities to maintain and reproduce language, customs and ethnic purity are closely linked to the survival of the population. Threats often require the construction of an other threatening the we, thereby contributing to the construction and reproduction of us. These threats can be African pandemics or Islamic terrorism. Countermeasures include upholding the national character and the preventing social maladjustment.

These sectors will overlap to a large extent simply because “[t]he securitizations in different sectors are connected [and] sectors insert themselves into each other”

\textsuperscript{56} After the end of the Cold War a new security perspective was developed by a group of scholars, known as the Copenhagen School. This perspective widened the concept of security and emphasised different sectors of security: the military, the political, the environmental, the economic and the societal (see Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998).

\textsuperscript{57} Borrowed from Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998, the sectors have been modified to fit this particular analysis better.
(Buzan et al. 1998:188), making it all the more important to synthesise the sectors in the end in order to discern eventual sectoral overlappings.

4.2 The Political Sector

**ESS**

The transatlantic relationship is described as a “core element of the international system” and NATO as “an important expression of this relationship” (ESS 2003:9). According to the ESS, democracy provides “freedom and prosperity” (ESS 2003:2) and the “best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (ESS 2003:10). State failure can be considered a political threat since a state fails because of bad governance and the collapse of state institutions. As a countermeasure to state failure on the Balkans, the EU has been trying to restore good government, foster democracy and help local authorities to tackle organised crime (ESS 2003:6).

The ESS declares that the EU states “are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperating through common institutions” (ESS 2003:1). The ESS displays great confidence in multilateralism, the UN, international organisations and international law (see ESS 2003:9).

Because the EU wants to enforce international treaties, the member states “must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken” (ESS 2003:9). Exactly how they should act is left undefined. States that repeatedly violate international norms “should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union” (ESS 2003:10), but the price is once again not specified.

**NSS**

The NSS leaves no ideological doubt: “[F]ree nations tend toward peace; the advance of liberty will make America more secure” (NSS 2006). Democratic, well-governed states are seen as the best insurance for American security and therefore promoting democracy is the ultimate way to create security for the American people (see NSS 2006:1;3).

Since the US seeks to “shape the world, not merely be shaped by it” (NSS 2006), international institutions are important in enabling the US to promote freedom. However, it is important that the UN organisation is not “shackled by obsolete structures” (NSS 2006:46). The US way of policy-making is “oriented toward action and results rather than legislation or rule-making” (NSS 2006:46). This could be interpreted as a taunt to both the UN and the EU. A prime goal in promoting democracy is to end tyranny, and the NSS implicitly criticises the EU

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58 However, the importance of democracy as a superior way of creating peace is not mentioned as frequently as the democratic gospel is preached in the NSS (see below).

59 A whole chapter is also devoted to “building the infrastructure of democracy” (NSS 2006:31).

60 “Tyranny is the combination of brutality, poverty, instability, corruption, and suffering, forged under the rule of despots and despotic systems” (NSS 2006:3).
by saying that “it needs more adversaries” and tyranny only survives with the silent tolerance of other nations (NSS 2006:4). Another remark, possibly directed towards the EU, is that some “nations provide rhetorical support for free markets and effective democracy but little action on freedom’s behalf” (NSS 2006:36).

Iran and North Korea have been designated security priorities and if diplomatic efforts do not succeed, confrontation will follow: “Taking action need not involve military force. Our strong preference and common practice is to address proliferation concerns through international diplomacy” (NSS 2006:23). The NSS refers to this as transformational diplomacy: “We will encourage and reward good behavior rather than reinforce negative behavior” (NSS 2006:33). In the short run, the War on Terror involves a military campaign, but in the long run, it is about a battle of ideas (see NSS 2006:9).

4.3 The Military Sector

ESS

Traditional military threats play a non-existent role in the ESS: “Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable” (ESS 2003:3). The possibility of a WMD arms race in the Middle East is a more traditional security concern that could endanger Europe. But at the same time the ESS maintains that with the prospect of terrorist groups attaining WMD, the state is no longer a prime actor (see ESS 2003:3f).

Throughout the entire strategy document the ESS stresses the interconnectedness of the threats it identifies: “[N]one of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (ESS 2003:7). In countering these new threats the EU has adopted a European arrest warrant and policies against proliferation.

It emphasises that “the first line of defence will often be abroad” (ESS 2003:7) and thus stresses the need for a global security strategy that focuses on threat prevention. On how to counter terrorism, the ESS declares that “[c]oncerted action is indispensable” (ESS 2003:3), without defining what exactly this means.

Instead, the instruments that are chosen are derived from the political, economic and societal sectors: “Regional conflicts need political solutions [...] Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government” (ESS 2003:7)61.

NSS

The No. 1 threat identified in the NSS is the combination of WMD in the hands of terrorists. The preemption doctrine from the NSS of 2002 has been toned down,

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61 Linking up with the LI perspective, EU-NATO cooperation is important for the EU and represents the common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century. The EU’s aim is “an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence” (ESS 2003:13).
but is still mentioned: “[T]he United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense” (NSS 2006:18). Only this time with the addition: “The United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions succeed” (NSS 2006:18). The NSS goes on to stipulate: “If necessary, however, [...] we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack” (NSS 2006:23).

The US can use the full array of tools at its disposal, but will not hesitate to use military force (see NSS 2006:6). Promoting democracy is a goal closely linked to the military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan: “[O]ur approach is idealistic about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them” (NSS 2006). Instead of playing defensive, the NSS plays offensive: “The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run” (NSS 2006:8). In order to do this, the US “must maintain a military without peer” (NSS 2006). Certainly, the US wants peaceful solutions to security problems, but the threat of military force explicitly looms in the background.

4.4 The Environmental Sector

ESS

Competition for clean water is labelled a prime security concern, leading to large-scale migration and war. The EU’s energy dependence will increase and by the year 2030 the EU will import 70% of its energy needs, compared to a current 50% (ESS 2003:3). Countermeasures to deal with environmental security issues are, however, not specified in the ESS.

NSS

It is hard to find environmental security concerns in the NSS. When they do appear, they are mentioned with the economic sector in talking about enhancing energy security and clean development (NSS 2006:25; 27). Towards the end of the NSS the problem of natural environmental destruction is said to “even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response” (NSS 2006:47): This is the lesson learned from hurricane Katrina.

62 The US equivalent to EU-conflict prevention is marked by the 9/11 trauma: “We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country” (NSS 2006).
63 The ESDP is only mentioned implicitly in the NSS: “NATO must deepen working relationships between and across institutions, as it is doing with the EU, and as it also could do with new institutions” (NSS 2006:38). This can be seen as a taunt to the EU that it should get moving on institutionalising the ESDP, or that the US does not consider the ESDP worth mentioning. Instead, what is mentioned is the US’s special relationship with Britain – but no mention is made either France or Germany (see NSS 2006:39).
4.5 The Economic Sector

ESS
In countering terrorism – considered a prime threat to economic welfare (ESS 2003:3) – the EU has attacked terrorist financing and tightened export controls (ESS 2003:6). By declaring its extensive economic power “with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), the [EU] is inevitably a global player” (ESS 2003:1). The ESS underlines the importance of “flows of trade and investment” (ESS 2003:2) in helping to fight poverty and disease, two pressing security concerns intimately linked to the economy. Economic failure is in turn linked to political problems and violent conflict (i.e. the political and military sectors). The ESS states that “trade and development policies can be important tools for promoting reform,” since the EU is the world’s largest trading entity and provider of official assistance (ESS 2003:10).

NSS
Since economic development leads to democratic reform (NSS 2006), a whole chapter is devoted to fostering global economic growth through free markets and free trade: “History has judged the market economy as the single most effective economic system and the greatest antidote to poverty” (NSS 2006:25). Economic tools – such as economic assistance, development aid and trade – are important in helping new democracies prosper (see NSS 2006:4).

The NSS indirectly criticises China by saying that: “Some regimes seek to separate economic liberty from political liberty, pursuing prosperity while denying their people basic rights and freedoms” (NSS 2006:3) and “[s]ome regimes have opened their economies while trying to restrict political or religious freedoms. This will not work” (NSS 2006:4). Criticism is also directed against undemocratic development in Russia with a “diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms” (NSS 2006:39). This criticism stands in contrast to the ESS, which does not mention any countries by name in any negative sense.

4.6 The Societal Sector

ESS
With its “interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields,” (ESS 2003:1) European society is considered to be increasingly vulnerable. Outside Europe hunger, malnutrition and AIDS contribute to the

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64 The ESS instead mentions that “we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with [...] China [...] as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support” (ESS 2003:14). And regarding Russia: “We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity” (ESS 2003:14).
breakdown of societies, destroying the “social infrastructure [and leading to] a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty” (ESS 2003:2).

The terrorist threat “seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies” (ESS 2003:3). Terrorism arises out of “pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our society” (ESS 2003:3).

Regional conflicts “threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights” (ESS 2003:4) and organised crime undermines “both the rule of law and social order itself” (ESS 2003:4). Dysfunctional societies with exploding populations and organised crime at the EU’s borders both pose a threat to European societies (ESS 2003:7).

NSS

Terrorism is the main societal threat, even though AIDS is also judged as a security issue in the NSS (NSS 2006:31). It is interesting to contrast the NSS view of the root causes of terrorism with the ESS view (see NSS 2006:10):

• "Grievances that can be blamed on others. [...] [P]erceived injustices from the past [work as] motivation for revenge and terror.
• Subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation.
• An ideology that justifies murder, [...] [where] [a] proud religion – [...] Islam – has been twisted and made to serve an evil end.

Compared to the ESS (see above) the lack of self-criticism is evident. And the terrorist antidote is to promote democracy: “Democracy is the opposite of terrorist tyranny” (NSS 2006:11).

The NSS tiptoes around the religious part of Islamic fundamentalism, something not mentioned at all in the ESS, and makes it clear that this is not a war on Islam. But the NSS still states that “[r]esponsible Islamic leaders need to denounce an ideology that distorts and exploits Islam for destructive ends and defiles a proud religion” (NSS 2006:11). In countering these threats, the US will continue to speak up “for freedom and against violations of human rights and allocating resources to advance these ideals” (NSS 2006:2).

4.7 Summary

The threats, challenges and countermeasures stipulated in the two security strategies are to a large extent cross-sectoral. Terrorism and WMD are examples of threats that can affect all sectors. Interesting to note is the lack of emphasis on the environmental sector, while promoting democracy is frequently mentioned in all sectors – both in the NSS and the ESS.

For an overview of the security strategy analysis, see Appendix G
There is a transatlantic consensus on new common threats, but a transatlantic difference over how these threats should be tackled. This divergence is evident in the political and military sectors. The NSS puts large emphasis on military force in countering new threats, while the ESS’s countermeasures largely consist of non-military means. These differences in countermeasures can prove to be detrimental to the future of the transatlantic alliance. But the Iraq debacle has also proved that the ties that bind are strong and not easily severed. Europeans may seem to be from Venus and Americans from Mars, but they still inhabit the same planet.
5 Conclusion: a schizophrenic security solution?

– I seem to recall that it was only in the arms of Venus that Mars found peace. And was their beautiful daughter not the goddess Harmonia?

The current state of the transatlantic bond resembles that of an old, unhappily married couple: the love has receded but they remain together because of their common history. The EU-wife stays in the marriage because her husband pays the military bills, but she dislikes his rough manners and her dependency. Meanwhile, the US-husband doesn’t like to be taken for granted and is getting tired of his wife’s constant nagging and lack of contribution. The only reason he stays in the marriage is because she at times can be a good companion to bring to international parties and a divorce would not look nice in the neighbourhood. History binds them together.

The question of how to marry European military autonomy to NATO primacy is first and foremost about empowering the ESDP, without weakening the Atlantic alliance. By cutting the military umbilical cord, the transatlantic bond will very well grow stronger.

Strengthening the EU should strengthen the US. Strengthening the ESDP should strengthen NATO.

At the heart of the matter lies the transatlantic relationship. The ESDP is not about throwing the United States out of Europe or trying to counter US hegemony. It is about the EU becoming a viable international security actor and an equal partner for the US. Not for the sake of the US but for the sake of the EU itself – to show the international community that Europe is a force to be reckoned with. But a partnership works both ways: The US must be prepared to acknowledge that burden-sharing means power-sharing, and the EU needs to get its act together and improve its military capabilities.

The point of the three theoretical approaches was not to declare a winner, but for the three to complement each other in order to promote as comprehensive an examination of the research area as possible. All three approaches point towards the ESDP and NATO as roommates – but not without reservations:
The realist analysis shows that even though a fundamental divergence exists between Atlanticists (US and Britain) and Europeanists (France and Germany), the Big Three rule out potential rivalry between the ESDP and NATO. The US position is ambivalent, however, in making demands that the ESDP-development should not undermine NATO, and at the same time displaying distrust about the ESDP becoming anything more than sweeping rhetoric and minor military missions.

The LI analysis shows that it is highly unlikely that the ESDP and NATO should clash in the future. They may not be roommates yet, but they are cohabitants: The two institutions have acknowledged that they live under the same roof and are working together. The problem is the capabilities gap. It affects transatlantic relations in a negative way by strengthening the image of the US pulling the military wagon with European free-riders; it also makes NATO assets crucial to conducting expeditionary warfare.

The SC analysis shows that the US and the EU identify the same basic security threats, but they differ on countermeasures – the EU emphasising soft power, the US resorting readily to hard power. This divergence could prove to be negative in the NATO kitchen, leading to burdensharing with the US as the hard-power cook and the EU as the soft-power dishwasher. But the dichotomy between soft and hard power is not absolute: Military strength need not necessarily be equated with hard power. A well-run, capable defence with transnational military exercises can create international networks, possibly strengthening the EU’s soft-power image even more.

The realist and LI approaches also highlight a constant tension between the state (national sovereignty) and the institutions (EU-integration). Even if the LI-approach has shown that much progress has been made on the institutional side, the fact remains that the ESDP has not led to any merging or pooling of sovereignty. Since the state has remained the primary security actor, the whole ESDP process can still be reversed. Even if this scenario seems unlikely, the state’s supremacy as a security actor is as valid as ever.

Nevertheless, the future for the ESDP and NATO looks bright: all five security sectors show potential for further cooperation. The security challenges of the future will have to be countered at an international level. That is why the EU members will gradually have to give up some of their diminished sovereignty in order to gain common sovereignty. If the member states are prepared to pool sovereignty (i.e. their military assets) into the ESDP, the Union’s military capacity would evolve significantly. This is not a far-fetched idea: Member states stand to gain from such a development. Defence budgets are minimal in the EU today. But together the member states spend 160 billion dollars on their military forces. If the members want value for their money in terms of increased operational capabilities, they could decide to spend the money wisely on specialisation, rationalisation and creating a coherent military force. This can be done since the EU is a security complex: No threats exist among the EU members.
Boosting European capabilities would in turn influence the US policy towards the EU. Suddenly a credible and viable partner— in terms of military capabilities— would emerge on the international scene. Just as the US cannot rule the world through its own military might, the European nations can only exert military influence together, regardless of their separate national ambitions.

If the US sees significant improvements in EU military capabilities, the Americans are more likely to turn to NATO for help in the future. And NATO would then perhaps turn to its new roommate— the ESDP.

Possibly the EU will travel full circle with its security and defence policy, and end up where it all started— with a European Defence Community. As was expressed at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, on the 11th of August 1950:

In all that we do and say here, we must not belie the hopes and faith of millions and scores of millions of men and women not only in the free countries of Europe but in those which still lie in bondage.

We should make a gesture of practical and constructive guidance by declaring ourselves in favour of the immediate creation of a European Army under a unified command, and in which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part.

Courage and unity must inspire us and direct the mighty energies at the disposal of our Governments to solid and adequate measures of defence. Those who serve supreme causes must not consider what they can get but what they can give.

Let that be our rivalry in these years that lie before us.

— Winston Churchill (1950)
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Appendix A

Chronology of the Development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)\textsuperscript{66}

December 1991: The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU)
Article J.4: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”.

June 1992: The Petersberg Declaration
The Petersberg tasks are defined to include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

June 1996: The Nato Berlin Council
An European Security and Defence Identity is created within Nato. Nato structures and assets shall be made available to the Western European Union (WEU), which today is merged with the EU.

December 1998: The Anglo-French Summit at St-Malo
Prime minister Tony Blair and President Jaques Chirac issue a joint statement that calls for autonomous European capacities and credible military force.

May 1999: The Franco-German Summit in Toulouse
The Eurocorps are made available for EU crisis management operations.

June 1999: The Cologne European Council
WEU is merged with the EU, Javier Solana is appointed to be the EU’s High Representative and the EU’s military capability is agreed to entail the Petersberg tasks.

\textsuperscript{66} This is by no means a complete review of the evolution of ESDP, merely a simplified overview of official milestones that have contributed to the development of ESDP.

\textbf{Sources:}


43
December 2000: The Nice European Council
The new ESDP body, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) is enshrined in Article 25 and guidelines for EU military operations are agreed upon.

January 2001
The first meeting between the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC)

May 2001: The EU-NATO Budapest Summit
First joint-summit ever of EU and NATO foreign ministers.

June 2001: Franco German Defence and Security Council in Freiburg
France and Germany commit themselves to achieve further progress on ESDP.

June 2001: First meeting of EU and NATO Military Committees

were the EU decides to take over the International Police Task Force’s mission in Bosnia from the UN. The first operation of its kind undertaken by the EU.

November 2002: NATO Prague Summit
Seven East European countries are accepted by the alliance and NATO-members agree on creating the NATO Response Force (NRF).

December 2002: EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP: Berlin-Plus
The EU receives access to NATO-assets for crisis management and the EU agrees to involve non EU-members of NATO in ESDP as much as possible.

December 2002: The EU Police Mission (EUPM) is launched in Bosnia. The EU’s first ESDP operation consists of 531 police men and 400 civilian staffers and is mandated until the 31 December 2005.

March 2003: Operation Concordia is launched in FYROM
The first ever EU mission that utilizes NATO-assets in agreement with the Berlin-Plus arrangement, consists of 350 lightly armed troops.

June 2003: Operation Artemis is launched in DRC
The first EU operation outside Europe and without NATO-assets involves 1800 troops, mostly from France.

December 2003: The Brussels European Council
The European Security Strategy (ESS) is adopted.

February 2004: Franco-British-German Proposal on EU-Battle Groups
The Big Three propose the creation of 9 battle groups, 1500 soldiers each, to be deployed urgently at the request of the UN.
Appendix B

Figure 1 below sheds some light on the divergence of US vs European defence Research and Development (R&D) spending. This is by some considered the nexus of the capability gap, since the European investments have a history of lagging behind the US, with the result of further aggravating the gap in military capabilities (see Bialos & Koehl 2004:6f). Especially since 9/11, the US R&D spending increased significantly while the European countries have remained on the same spending levels.

NATO Europe does not include the new Eastern European countries, but since Germany, France and the UK are by far the largest European countries regarding R&D (see Bialos & Koehl 2004:8), this should not effect the European levels in any substantial way.

Figure 1. US vs European Defence R&D Budgets, 1992-2004

Appendix C

Table 1. NATO Common Funded Budgets 2002 (in $ millions)\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NSIP(^6)</th>
<th>Military Budget</th>
<th>Civil Budget</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>47.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>89.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>268.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>103.6</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>16.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>52.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
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<td>Total EU member states in NATO(^7)</td>
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\(^7\) NATO Security & Investment Programme.

\(^7\) EU member states in NATO in 2002.

\(^7\) Grand total includes contributions by all NATO members.
Appendix D

Table 2. US and EU member state defence budgets (in $ billions)\(^{72}\)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004(^{73})</th>
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\(^{73}\) Figures for 2004 are for the EU25.
Appendix E

Table 3. US and EU defence spending as a percentage of GDP 1997-2003

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Appendix F

Overview of answers from Swedish Members of the European Parliament (MEP’s) concerning ESDP and Nato:

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<td>1 &amp; 3</td>
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Due to requests of anonymity two of the MEP's are referred to as parliamentarian A and B.
16 out of 19 MEP answered.

Key to codification of questionnaire

1. Member of European Parliament’s (MEP’s) view on the development of ESDP:
   1. Positive
   2. Negative

2. MEP’s attitude towards Nato:
   1. Positive
   2. Negative
3 MEP thinks that:
   1. ESDP can complement Nato in a positive way
   2. ESDP is basically redundant

4 MEP thinks that there could be potential conflicts of interest between ESDP and Nato in the future:
   1. Yes
   2. No

5 Further development of ESDP, in a direction that means increased European military autonomy:
   1. Will hurt the transatlantic link (EU’s relations to the USA)
   2. Will not hurt the transatlantic link (EU’s relations to the USA)

6 Which member states in the EU have been pushing for further development of the ESDP?
   1. France
   2. Germany
   3. Benelux
   4. Austria
   5. No state, liberals and conservatives in the EP (European Parliament)

7 Why do you think the EU is developing its own military capacity, when Nato already exists?
   1. To counterbalance the USA
   2. To strengthen the CFSP and be able to handle military conflict in neighbouring areas
   3. Since Nato has other member states than the ESDP, the ESDP is a way to involve the EU’s neutral countries in military cooperation
   4. To create an EU-state like entity
   5. To accommodate the former great powers of Europe: especially France and to a certain extent Germany
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Countermeasures</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Threats</th>
<th>Countermeasures</th>
<th>Differences</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| **Political** | Democracy promotion               | Failing states, States violating international norms. | European Arrest Warrant, Policies against proliferation. | Promoting democracy and ending tyranny | Lack of freedom - North Korean and Iranian regimes in particular | Military measures, Transformational diplomacy. | **NSS: Military measures**  
**ESS: Non-military measures** |
| **Environmental** | Increase in the EU's energy dependence | Competition for clean water | Not specified | Promoting energy security and clean development | Not specified | Large international response | No apparent differences |
| **Economic** | Not specified                       | Economic failure  
Poverty  
Disease  
Terrorism | Trade investments  
Development aid | Helping democracies survive economically | Not specified | Free markets and free trade  
Economic aid | No apparent differences |
| **Military** | Not specified                       | WMD in the hands of terrorists, Regional conflicts | Conflict prevention  
Political solutions  
Civilian conflict management  
Economic instruments  
EU-NATO cooperation | Democracy promotion | WMD in the hands of terrorists | A military capacity without peer  
Non-military measures backed up with military threat | **NSS: Military measures**  
**ESS: Non-military measures** |
| **Societal** | Democracy promotion                | Terrorism  
Regional conflicts  
AIDS  
Dysfunctional societies | Not specified | Freedom and democracy promotion | Terrorism, Human Rights violations, AIDS. | Not specified | No apparent differences |
Appendix H

The following officials have been interviewed by telephone and via e-mail:

- One middle ranking British civil servant, 17 May 2006.
- One high ranking German officer, 10 May 2006.
- One high ranking French officer, 28 July 2006.
- One middle ranking French officer, 16 May 2006.
- One middle ranking US civil servant, 28 April 2006.

The following questions have been asked to all interviewees:

- What kind of an ESDP does France/Britain/Germany/the US want? Close European cooperation with the US or a more autonomous European approach?
- Do you think the EU and the US have identical security interests? Why? Why not?
- Why is the EU developing the ESDP when NATO already exists?
- Do you see any potential clashes or conflicts of interest in the future, between NATO and the ESDP?
- Do you welcome a division of labour between the EU and the US?
- My last question concerns the capabilities gap between the EU and the US. Do you think efforts should be made to close this gap? How should this be done without duplicating US military forces?