Private Military Companies and the Effect on the Control of Force in the Developing World

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Abstract

With the privatisation of war and the increasing importance of non-state actors in conflict, the need to study their effects on governments is increasing. This thesis’ purpose is to analyse the effects on the government’s control of force in the developing world, when contracting a Private Military Company (PMC). By applying a Civil-Military Relations model, focusing on the functional, political and social control of force, with a comparative case-study methodology conclusions are drawn. In the study the four cases of Angola, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea and Colombia are analysed. The research has been conducted using secondary material.

Furthermore, the study also focuses on the PMCs Executive Outcomes and Sandline, as well as those companies that in one way or the other have been involved in the cases analysed. Hence, the impact of other transnational commercial enterprises’, in the mining and oil industry, on governments control of force is also touched upon.

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations, Mercenary, Private Military, Control of Force, Private Security
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### Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
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<td>AMF</td>
<td>American Mineral Fields</td>
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<td>BRA</td>
<td>Bougainville Revolutionary Army</td>
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<td>CCB</td>
<td>Civil Co-operations Bureau</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civil Defence Force</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
<td>Civil-Military Relations</td>
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<td>CRW</td>
<td>Counter Revolutionary Warfare</td>
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<td>DSC</td>
<td>Defence Systems Colombia</td>
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<td>DSL</td>
<td>Defence Services Limited</td>
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<td>ECOVAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Outcomes</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Angola</td>
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<td>GSG</td>
<td>Gurkha Security Guards</td>
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<td>IDAS</td>
<td>International Defence and Security</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>Jupiter Mining Company</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Popular Movement for the Libeartion of Angola</td>
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<td>MPRI</td>
<td>Military Professional Resources Incorporated</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPRC</td>
<td>National Provisional Ruling Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNGDF</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSLMF</td>
<td>Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SL</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Strategic Resources Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
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They know no country, own no lord.  
Their home the camp, their law the sword.
-Silvio Pellico  
(1788-1854, Enfernio de Messina)

1 Introduction

A lout and a boor is the description of the professional soldier, given by Machiavelli in his Art of War. In his view the mercenary was at all costs to be avoided and the citizen-soldier to be preferred. On the other hand it was right reason that made Hobbes; argue for the use of mercenaries by the state in all but the direst circumstances of national survival. The efficiency of the mercenary in waging war and guarantying state authority, without involving the public thereby avoiding general and civil war, was Hobbes argument for the soldier of fortune.  
(Dolman 2004 p.32-33)

Once more, these questions have become more important than ever. During the 1990, several companies deployed private coercive force in numerous countries throughout the developing world. Due to the US war on terror, the industry supplying private force has grown tremendously. The war in Afghanistan and in Iraq has contributed to this. A reliance on private military companies to supply security seems to be the order of the day.

1.1 Statement of Purpose

The PMC-phenomenon opens up a number of questions relating to the relationship between military power and civilian authority, both in democratic and non-democratic states, and in functioning as well as in failed states. As the character of conflict has changed, since the end of the Cold War, into a network-based warfare, where the line between war, organised crime and humanitarian violence is erased, the importance and emphasis on non-state actors has risen. Furthermore, violence has gone from state induced to being privatised. In such an environment, the actions of a private company, with the ability to deliver coercive force is important to study. Especially, when considering that PMCs in many instances have large advantages in relation to many state armies (Howe 1998 p.308). The purpose of this study is to research the relationship between PMCs and governments in the developing world, focusing on the control of force. The study will examine the effects on the states control of force by the contracting of PMCs and private financing of PMC operations. The questions to be answered are:

- What role do PMCs have in relation to the actors of a conflict they are involved in?  
- How is a government in the developing world affected by contracting a PMC?  
- How does a PMC affect society’s control of force?
The purpose and questions have been chosen to carefully examine how the control of force affects society. A shift in society’s control of force has the ability to severely change the political scene of any state, whether it is democratic or not. In a democratic state the accountability and transparency of military force can come in question when this public good is outsourced to private enterprises. Within non-democratic states, as well as less stable democracies, the risk of a coup could also be enhanced with the contracting of a PMC.

1.2 Theory and Methodology

The choice of theory for this study has fallen on Civil-Military Relations (CMR). In the democratising world, CMR is seen as an integral part of the democratising process. It constitutes the theoretical framework for how to, among other things, approach the reformation, control and reorientation of the armed forces in a newly democratised society. In some ways it can be seen as a branch of democracy theory.

The central problem of civil-military relations research concerns the basic need of society to be protected from threats to its continued existence both external and internal. The problem includes how society’s security can be assured through an agent with the right to exercise the legitimate monopolised coercive force without turning on its own principal and client. The principle-agent problem refers to society as the principle and the military as the agent, in which the agent is stronger than its principle. Therefore the agent can be a potential threat to its principle, through the occurrence of a coup. Society is also both the agent’s client and superior, referring to the double-role problem. In being both superior and client, society is expected to both give order to its client and take the recommendations from it. Thereby, society risks ending up in hands of the military, or the military risks not being heard due to other political considerations. The problem of regime control is dualistic as it incorporates both democratic and undemocratic rule. With democratic control of the military the questions mainly focuses on transparency and accountability. Concerning undemocratic control of the military, the studies coincide with the research of authoritarian regimes. Some of these questions all apply to the study of the military’s role in the transition from authoritarian to democratic governance. Contemporary studies argue for an expanded view on the CMRs actors and a more holistic approach to society’s security. The recent additional areas of study are: The Military and Security establishment apparatus; Human security; Non-state armed formations; the role of civil-society; State failure; foreign military intervention. (Abrahamsson 1971, p.17-20; Bolin 2004, p.8-11; Cawthra – Luckham 2003, p.8, 10-11,15, 21-25; Danopoulos et al 2004, p.4, 6-12; Donnelly 2001, p.8-9; Feaver 1999 p.214; Huntington 1957, p.11-18, 80-97; Finer 1962, p.3-5; Kaldor 2001, p.6-9; Koonings – Kruijt 2002, p.16-19, 22-23, 30-32; Singer 2003, p.9, 17-18)

As an operational theoretical model, Deborah D. Avant’s work in The Market for Force (2005) will be applied in this study. The model examines the control of force through three different perspectives: functional control, political control and social control, thereby merging the perspectives of Huntington, Finer and Janowitz and applying a more holistic theoretical approach. The operational model will be discussed in chapter 2.

The use of a comparative case-study methodology has been chosen to yield general assumptions on the use of private force in the developing world. The research has been
conducted through a literature-study mainly using secondary material. Originally, the study was to include interviews within the trade. Three interviews were conducted, but were not very useful to the research. Avant uses three cases in her study: Croatia, Sierra Leone and USA. Only one of these cases is clearly from the developing world, i.e. Sierra Leone. In order to focus on the developing world, this study examines Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Colombia in the empirical part in chapter 3. The case has also been chosen as to have a good geographic spread. The use of several cases is hoped to generate complementary results in reference to the control of force in the developing world. In chapter 4 the application of the operational model will analyse the empirical findings. Finally in chapter 5 the results of this study will be presented in the conclusion.

1.3 Definitions

In a study of PMCs, it is impossible not to define what is meant by the terminology Private Military Company. The categorizing of these companies have foremost focused on the services they provide, such as direct combat, military training and advice, logistic support, intelligence, reconnaissance, kidnap and ransom, hostage rescue, guarding, demining and electronic security.

To avoid a normative determination Singer presents a “Tip-of-the Spear” typology, consisting of three broad categories Military Provider Firms (MPF), Military Consultancy Firms (MCF) and Military Support Firms (MSF). The MPF focuses on the provision of services closest to the battlefield, e.g. direct combat and command. MCFs provide advisory and training services of strategic and operational importance, but are not in the actual battlefield. Finally, MSF provide logistics, maintenance, technical support, supplies and so on. They are also furthest away from the battlefield. The benefits with “this typology is that one can then explore not only the variations within the industry but also the variation in firms’ organization, their operations and impact” (Singer 2003 p.91). This typology focuses on the services and level of force a firm can offer. It is to be regarded a conceptual framework, were one firm can move between the categories depending on the services provided. (Singer 2003 p.91-100)

The distinguishing feature of a PMC is that it is a corporate organisational entity and not an ad hoc mercenary unit. In this study Singers typology will be used, with the addition of Avant’s use of contracts, rather than firms as the unit of analysis (2005 p.17). The use of contracts as a unit of analysis is better since, as both Avant and Singer states, a firm may change category depending upon the service provided (2005 p. 17; 2003 p.92).

Furthermore, the label Private Military Company (PMC) will be used rather than Private Security Company. No distinction is made between the two acronyms, since there is a difficulty in telling the traditional military services and traditional security services apart, in today’s conflicts (Avant 2005 p.1 note 3). Furthermore, the shift from state security to human security also blurs the distinction, and also the services required to deliver greater security to the citizens of the state (Cowthra – Luckham 2003 p.320). Thereby, the requirements on both security and military services to gain human security are the same, hence no separation is needed. The use of the word ‘military’ becomes in the context more inclusive and implies a broader range of services than the word ‘security’.
In the study the term, private operator will be used to designate a person employed by a PMC. This is used to avoid the negativity implied in the word “mercenary” and to avoid the term “private contractor”, a label usually put on those doing security in Iraq.
2 A Theoretical Model of the Control of Force

2.1 The ‘New Wars’

The end of the Cold War changed the character of conflict, these ‘new wars’ are conflicts were the lines between warfare, organised crime and humanitarian violations are blurred (Kaldor 2001 p.2). Although, often called ‘low-intensity’ wars, there is a clear transnational connection of the parties involved. The conflict is both local and global at the same time. In the ‘new war’ “the privatization of violence is an important element….in practice, the distinction between what is private and what is public, state and non-state, informal and formal, between what is done for economic or political motives, cannot easily be applied” (ibid p.2). The forces of the ‘new wars’ are mainly regular armed forces, paramilitary groups, self-defence units, foreign mercenaries (inc. among others PMC) and regular foreign armed forces. The new warfare is characterised by political control over territory and counter-insurgency techniques making the environment unendurable, for those not controllably by political means. (ibid p.92-98)

The political control is based on a feeling of affinity to a label, rather than an ideology or ‘higher cause’. The economies of these wars are characterised by rampaging inflations, very high unemployment, tax erosion and even currency collapse. Funding in these conflicts resorts to grey trade and ‘asset transfers’, e.g. robbery, pillaging and market pressure through check-points controlling food supplies, ‘protection money’ and drug sales. The economy becomes dependent upon external assistance via remittances, direct transfers, economic aid and humanitarian aid. This results in a fragmentation as well as an informalisation of both the conflict and the economy. (ibid p. 101-04; Duffield p.157; Jackson 2003 p.144-46)

The ‘new wars’ are network based in which the ‘Western’ security establishment shares the same security terrain with organised crime and failed state elites. In this environment organised violence becomes a privatised non-territorial network enterprise. The traditional process of state-based warfare cannot be expected in the transnational network enterprise war, where exhaustion of the conflict can not be expected, due to its adaptability and rejuvenation. (Duffield p.157-58, 162)

2.2 The Control of Force

The central issue of CMR is how the control of the legitimate force is to be achieved. The control of force by the state is multidimensional and highly variable (Thompson 1994 p.9). According to Avant, the debate on civil-military relations shows three dimensions: Functional, Political and Social control (2005 p.57). A focus on the deployment of effective coercion to defend the interests of the state emphasise functional control. The political control of force emphasises the need for functional control within the political structures of the state.
By viewing the armed forces fidelity to social values in a larger context the social control of force is emphasised.

The functional control of force is advocated by Huntington, through what he calls the expertise of the military (1957 p.11). The expertise of the military is the management of violence utilising training, equipping, planning and the direction of combat operations of the military force. This expertise requires a high level of professional competence in the specialisation of the skills in the management of violence (ibid p.13). In an authoritarian regime the control of force is to varying degrees spread between the ruler, the ruler’s cronies and agents (Huntington 1996 p.4).

Desch, argue that the political control of the military is highly dependent on the political structure, both internally as well as externally and links it to the maximal or the minimal state (1996a p.243-44). External threats to the state helps maintain its coherence and produces a maximal state (ibid p.243). Internal tension within the state gives a low cohesion and a threat of a collapse of the political structure (ibid p.244). Hence, the control of force and the military’s mission is dependent on the political structure (Desch 1996b p.13-14). Finer elaborates, arguing, that the troops conducting a coup is a clear loss of political control (1962 p.71). The loss can reach from a view of distancing themselves from the civilian government to outright setting themselves above society (ibid p.63,67).

Force can also be more or less in accordance with social and cultural values. According to Keegan, culture is the defining factor in a society’s warfare (Keegan 2003 p. 416). Society’s norms in reference to democracy, international values and human rights reflect upon their warfare (Avant 2005 p.42). Abrahamsson concludes that the military has a normative social influence on society and has the means to preserve and disseminate their values to the population (1971 p.127).

2.3 A Model for the Control of Privatised Force

The control of force can either be state claimed or left to the whim of non-state actors (Thompson 1994 p.8). There are three instances were privatisation matters for the control of force: State contracting of private force; Non-state financing of private force; Regulation of military services exports. The case of regulation of military services exports is not of relevance for this analysis, as this mainly refers to the developed world, and will be excluded. The other two situations have a potential to affect a developing country in many ways. Presented below are theses and arguments for how the control of force could be affected by privatisation.

2.3.1 State Contracting of Private Force

Effects on Functional Control: The state contracting of private force can potentially have a number of effects on developing countries, e.g. create a stronger military with the capacity to defeat an opponent. Thereby function as a centralising power and acting as a rational legal authority. The privatisation of force may also lead to a decrease in public services by having a negative effect on the state military’s effectiveness. Furthermore, privatised force can also potentially create multiple parallel security structures having negative effects on state-
building. The opposite may occur, when the PMC threaten to make the national military obsolete and a risk of dismantling the armed forces. (Avant 2005 p.59; Singer 2003 p.198, 203; Schreier – Caparini p.63)

**Effects on Political Control:** Contracting privatised force can lead to a loss of direct state authority over the armed forces. The government’s control mechanisms only extend to the choice of company and are economically motivated. Budgetary control of the armed forces is still retained, but control over the individuals who exercise the legitimate use of force is handed over to the company. There is also a difference in the process of contracting a private supplier of force, than the workings of the government machinery in dispersing funds. Furthermore, it can be expected that there are differences in the oversight of a private option and the government armed forces. This may indicate a redistribution of power from the legislative assembly to the executive power. Potentially in weak states a more extreme redistribution of power is to be expected. However, if the private supplier of force can be controlled by the regime it can work to their advantage, but if the supplier is difficult to control it may be to their disadvantage. There could even be the risk of a coup, a regime shift or at least the risk of maintaining an authoritarian regime and protect private interests. With non-state financing of the private force, the security policy of the state may be changed. (Avant 2005 p.59-60)

**Effects on Social Control:** The social control of force has the potential to increase in weak states as a result of hiring a private supplier of force. Most often the individual contractors hired by PMCs are former members of the armed forces of states with a stable security establishment, bringing international military values with them. Furthermore, the company supplying the services will most probably have an interest in sticking to international norms and professional behaviour, with future contracts in mind. Training of the contracting state’s armed forces by a private supplier has the potential to filter out international and professional values. However, if the private operators are kept separate from the local military destabilizing effects on the control of force may occur. Furthermore, the local military’s prestige and social standing may be threatened by a PMC. (Avant 2005 p.61; Singer 2003 p.198)

However, the interest of the supplier to keep a contract and make maximum profits to the company could lead to the “cutting” of corners and low wages. Thereby, it could have a negative effect on the professionalism of the employees.

### 2.3.2 Non-State Financing of Private Force

**Effects on Functional Control:** The effects on the functional control of force when the private force is non-state financed are probably highly dependent on the paying costumer. The need for a non-state actor to finance a PMC for its security indicates that the host nation already is in a state of weakness. The existence of non-state financed control has the potential further weaken the state and its influence over the armed forces operating in its territory. On the upside, the provision of an efficient and professional entity to provide force could have the potential to consolidate a weak state’s control if accompanied with appropriate behaviour and legitimacy. (Avant 2005 p.71)

The loss of functional control will come into existence if the PMC chooses to act in opposition to the host state’s government, on the demand of the financer. The diffusion of control or the consolidation of control by the government will be at stake. There is also a risk
of resources being funnelled to parallel forces if they exist, thereby, weakening a central security bureaucracy. Potentially this can lead to increased tension between competing parallel forces. There might also be a risk of double principals if the government formally has control of the armed forces, but the armed forces are paid by a private financer. These forces risk becoming less effective and direct their efforts towards non-public goals. (ibid p.75-76)

**Effects on Political Control:** There may be a risk of PMCs corrupting weak states political practices and of supporting an authoritarian regime through direct investments. Furthermore, the state may risk becoming dependent on foreign investors, and the domestic allies of the investors. If financed by INGO the issues of the financer may by prioritised in front of other issues. The pursuit of TNC’s and INGO’s goals may replace those of the state and force local actors to support them. Redistribution of political power from the government to INGO’s, TNC and other transnational actors may occur in this way. There may also be a risk of untrustworthy local actors to use the financer’s funds to unwanted ends. (ibid p.71-73)

**Effects on Social Control:** The financing of private force by INGOs has the potential to positively affect the social control of force. Generally INGO represent sound humanitarian and international values that can be expected to be promoted by those they finance. Even TNCs may have the potential to promote international values to the area in which they operate. If the financers encourage the international norms on the use of force and tying financing decisions to proper behaviour the effects have the potential to be positive. Without proper ties and expertise the non-state financing will probably not improve social control. (ibid p.74-75)
3 Cases of PMCs and the Control of Force

3.1 Angola

In 1993 Angola was engulfed in a civil war between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Jonas Savimbi’s, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Although a peace accord had been agreed on in 1991 and elections held in September 1992, in which UNITA’s leader Savimbi disagreed with the results and returned to violence. Very soon after the fight commenced UNITA controlled somewhere around 80% of the country. MPLA were desperate, no help from the former allies Cuba and the Soviet Union were to be found. Help was sought elsewhere, enter the modern private military company did. (Howe 2001 p.198-99)

However, the history was not to start here and be as simple as a besieged government fearing loss against a belligerent insurrection, saved by a private military force. The appearance of Executive Outcomes (EO), largely depended on a business deal struck in 1991 between Ranger Oil (a Canadian oil company), SONOGAL (the Angolan state oil company) and Anthony Buckingham. This deal gave Ranger Oil the rights to some offshore oil concessions with a product-sharing agreement where Buckingham and his Branch Energy Ltd. was given a 10% interest in the deal, later to be transferred to Heritage Oil(also a Buckingham company). Furthermore, Ranger Oil and Heritage Oil and created an offshore company, Ranger Oil West Africa Ltd, who worked as an advisory service and technical consultant to SONOGAL. This company made it possible to shield Ranger Oils operations from scrutiny, as well as Heritage Oil’s involvement. (Drohan 2003 p.200-01)

In January 1993, the Soyo oil facilities, the base of operations for the offshore oilfields, were overrun by UNITA. The facilities harboured an oil company owned US$ 80 million computerised pumping-station. Through Simon Mann, a former Scots Guard as well as SAS-member and EO financer, Buckingham was put in contact with Eeben Barlow, founder of EO and former member of the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) Special Forces Civil Operations Bureau (CCB). The company had been set up in South Africa in 1990, doing training for the CCB and SADF, but was to evolve through the contact between Buckingham and Barlow. (O’Brien 2000 p.49-51; Howe 2001 p.199; Rosen 2005 p.165-66; Cleaver 2000 p.139-140)

In March 1993 the 80 man EO strike force launched its offensive to retake Soyo and Kefekwena (also an important oil town). After a helicopter insertion in Kefekwena, retaking the town, the strike force moved on to Soyo. As the Soyo oil facilities were retaken by the EO outfit, FAA forces moved into defensive positions in Kefekwena. The operation was a success and showed the world that a PMC had a role to play in modern conflicts. In mid-April the EO outfit withdrew from Soyo, since their operation and contract was finished and the expensive equipment had been retrieved. As a result, and to further the point of PMCs’ role, Soyo was once more lost to UNITA. (Howe 2001 p.199; O’Brien 2000 p.51; Drohan 2003 p.210-212; Singer 2003 p. 108-09)
In July, EO was contacted by the MPLA for a larger force. In September a US$40 million one year contract was signed between EO and the MPLA. However, it was only after Heritage Oil and Gas had guaranteed US$ 30 million for the operation. Furthermore, it required Buckingham and Mann to introduce the Angolan President Dos Santos and Armed Forces of Angola’s (FAA) Chief of Staff João de Matos to the EO’s management for a go ahead of the operation. (Howe 2001 p.199; O’Brian 2000 p.51)

The contract stipulated that a force of 500-600 EO soldiers help the Angolan government to train 5000 troops in tactics, artillery, signals, reconnaissance and sabotage as well as train 30 pilots (Howe 2001 p.199). Furthermore, EO was also to participate in combat missions conducting air-land assaults, long-range reconnaissance and counter-insurgency operations (O’Brian 2000 p.52; Vines 2000 p.173). In its operations EO pushed UNITA back and retook the entire oil-field region of Angola (O’Brian p.52; Reno 1997 p.178). In July 1994 an important victory over UNITA was gained, when a joint EO-FAA force took N’taladonda, creating better bonds between EO and FAA (Howe 2001 p.199, 209). The two had been enemies just a few years earlier, since most of the EO personnel were former SADF who had fought with UNITA against the MPLA in the late 1980s (ibid p.209). The diamond rich area of Cafunfo and the oil installations at Soyo were also retaken with the operational assistance of EO (ibid p.209; O’Brian 2000 p.52; Vines 2000 p.172). The successful contract was to be renewed yearly until their withdrawal in January 1996 (O’Brian 2000 p.52). During their time in Angola up about 1400 EO employees were rotated through the country and the company lost about 20 men (O’Brian 2000 p.20; Howe 2001 p.199). UNITA sources claim that they have killed more than 125 ‘foreign mercenaries’ (Vines 2000 p.173).

In November 2004 UNITA’s leader Savimbi signed the Lusaka Protocol, effectively ending the fighting. The protocol also paved the way for elections and banned the use of mercenaries in Angola. This did however, not stop EO from staying in country at the request of the MPLA, who subsequently won the election. In December 1995 EO was asked to leave, after US pressure on the Angolan government at a state visit to Washington, and the first group of employees left in early 1996. It was rumoured that President Clinton had pressed dos Santos to get rid of EO and hire a US firm In March 1997, the US PMC Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), started negotiating for a military training contract with the Angolan government. However, after 18 months of unfruitful negotiations the contacts were suspended. (O’Brian 2000 p.52,54; Howe 2001 p.200, 213, 233, note 55) As the EO forces left and eventually a UN peacekeeping force took over, the situation in the country deteriorated and violence one again erupted. After Savimbi’s death a new peace accord has been signed with the government, still in control of the resource-rich zones, in a superior position to negotiate (Singer 2003 p.110).

Although EO officially left Angola in 1996, in reality they stayed. Already in 1994 Barlow had founded the Strategic Resources Corporation (SRC), which had been given oil and diamond concessions as a finalisation of EO’s contract (O’Brian 2000 p. 52). The payment through natural resources was common. The Branch Group was also paid mineral concessions to the Yetwene mine that produces US$24 million a year in Angola, as a part of the payment to EO (Howe 2001 p.205). Furthermore, the payment in concessions were so obviously taken for granted that Barlow admitted in an interview that “the diamond fields in many of these operations would be the first natural targets as it would mean that EO would be guaranteed payment by the host government: securing the treasury first appears to be a wise move in many of these very unstable countries”(O’Brian 2000 p.51). The connection between
Buckingham’s Branch Group of companies and EO becomes clear, through the monetary guarantee put up by Buckingham’s company before the September contract and the payment to Branch Group through diamond concessions. Furthermore, EO was a major shareholder in Branch Energy owning 40% in Branch Energy Uganda and Sierra Leone respectively and 60% of Sierra Leone Angola (Musah – Fayemi 2000 p.25).

When EO officially left, these economic interests still remained. To secure these interests EO or former EO-personnel founded numerous spin-off companies in Angola (Reno 1997 p.176). Saracen International a subsidiary commercial security venture to EO was set-up, and employed former EO-personnel. Other commercial private security firms, such as Alpha-5 founded by FAA Chief of Staff de Matos and EO personnel, Stabilco, Omega Support Ltd, Longreach Pty Ltd, Panasec Corporate Dynamics, Bridge Resources, COIN Security, Corporate Trading International, Saracen and Stuart Mills International were also established in Angola (O’Brien 2000 p.52-53; Vines 2000 p.173). These companies supplied services from protect mining installations to conduct demining operations. In August 1996 another EO subsidiary company Lifeguard, was formed in Angola (Howe 2001 p.208; O’Brien 2000 p.53). Lifeguard provided security to Branch group mining installations, owned by Carson Gold later to be renamed DiamondWorks Ltd, a company that General de Matos also have an economic interest in (O’Brien 2000 p.53; Howe 2001 p.208). Together with Portuguese partners EO formed Shibata Security (as part of the SRC), also providing mining site security, but dissolved in 1997. In a joint venture EO and Gray Security founded Teleservices International that General de Matos also helped found (Howe 2001 p.222), to provide security for the Luo and Yetwene mine sites. The company deployed security details to secure these two mines during the 1995-96 hostilities (O’Brien 2000 p.53). Furthermore, according to the Washington Post, General de Matos paid US$ 500 000 a month for a private 300 man force to protect the Catoca mine (Howe 2001 p.240, note 155). The origin of the forces is not established. At the time, General de Matos, was not only Chief of Staff, but head of intelligence and commander of the armed forces, as well as Angola’s ambassador to the US (Vines 2000 p. 185-86).

There was also non-EO affiliated security companies established in Angola at this time. In 1996 Defence Services Limited (DSL) were hired by De Beers to provide security for diamond routes as well as mining and oil sites (ibid p.53). DSL also had a number of other contracts in Angola, including security for four embassies, a cement factory, the main hotels in Luanda as well as the Angolan parastatal oil companies SONOGAL and Endiama (ibid p.53). Endiama is also the principle shareholder in Alpha-5 (Howe 2001 p.222). DSL were also responsible for the security of the Soyo offshore oil platforms, as they were under risk of UNITA attacks (O’Brien 2000 p.53). At its height, in October 1997, DSL had 1000 employees in Angola, but the company was expelled in December 1997, due to accusations of ‘operating illegally’.

However, since 1992, the Angolan government had issued regulations stating that it was illegal for non-Angolans to own and operate PMC in the country. Most EO spin-offs circumvented this by partnering with nationals, mainly politicians and high-ranking militaries. To make to situation more complicated, the government also requires companies establishing in Angola to provide their own security at their sites. In 1996, 70% of the countries annual revenue (US$ 1.6 billion) was spent on security. The market is dominated by Alpha-5 and Teleservices who, according to Western diplomats, the government presses foreign investors
to hire for security. The Angolan Interior Minister was given a 25% stake in Teleservices as a reward for expelling DSL. (Vines 2000 p. 186; O’Brian 2000 p.54; Howe 2001 p.208, 223)

To secure oil interests in northern Angola and Cabinda, the Angolan government, hired International Defence and Security (IDAS), a Dutch Antilles company employing Belgians and Israelis. The IDAS was part of a blocking operation of UNITA’s supply route from Mobutu’s Zaire, in Luanda Norte in 1996. The contract was for up to 2000 Gurkhas to be deployed to clear out the rebels in exchange for diamond concessions. IDAS also developed diamond concessions, in a joint venture with American Mineral Fields (AMF) and operated diamond mines in another joint venture with Endiama. In March 1998, a Zürich investment newsletter published a report mentioning Endiama hiring a company associated with IDAS to supply a 1000 Gurkhas to provide security for their diamond mines. At this point in time AMF had bought all of IDAS. When EO and Branch-Heritage group left Angola, IDAS took over their contracts in Luanda Norte. (O’Brien 2000 p.57; Peleman 2000 p.162-64)

The South African PMC, Executive Research Associates, started in 1997 to recruit private contractors for operations in Angola. The company is thought to be a front for EO. Furthermore, a number of PMCs were thought to be running supplies and training for UNITA, among them Omega Support Ltd and Stabilco, both founded in the wake of EO. The PMC involvement in Angola has kept on increasing. In 1998, IRIS (reportedly an EO competitor established in 1997, linked to other mining and oil firms) recruited over 300 personnel to do work for UNITA. The majority of the personnel had previously worked for EO. (O’Brian 2000 p.59)

3.2 Sierra Leone

As the fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) poured in over the Sierra Leonean border in 1991 from Libera, they were probably not aware of the events to come. There goal was to topple the Momoh government. In April 1992, the Momoh government was ousted in a palace coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser with the help of units within the army. Strasser created the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPSC) in order to govern the country and keep up the efforts to subdue the RUF. The counterinsurgency kept on growing and although Strasser had motivated his take over with the army being starved of troops, weapons and logistics no military success were forthcoming. Therefore, Strasser increased the army to 14 000 through recruiting city youths and children as young as 12. The RUF also bolstered its forces through the abduction and forced recruitment of children into their ranks. Pillaging and harassing of the civilian population had engulfed the country in 1994. The emergence of Sobels, soldiers at day and rebels at night, made it almost impossible to tell the difference between the belligerents. By the beginning of 1995 Sierra Leone was by all definitions a failed state. (Musah 2000 p.86; Singer 2003 p. 111; Avant 2005 p.83-84; Jackson 2003 p.141)

In February 1995 Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) deployed to Sierra Leone to train the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF), after being approach by J&S Franklin Ltd in late 1994. The deployment of 58 Gurkhas and three managers, was to be a short episode. Originally GSG had been contracted to undertake training for the RSLMF Special Forces unit and Officer Cadets, as well as provide security for Sierra Rutile’s mining facilities. (Musah 2000 p.87; Avant 2005 p.84-85; Singer 2003 p.112; Vines 2000 p. 183; Peleman 2000 p.158; Reno 1998 p.129)
On 24th of February, a platoon of RSLMF with attached elements of GSG-personnel were ambushed by RUF fighters and at somewhere around 20 persons were killed including two GSG-managers. The unit was on a reconnaissance mission and either stumbled into a RUF training camp or was ambushed by the RUF near one of their camps. According to Musah, parts of the RSLMF might have tipped off the RUF that the GSG would be coming, so that they could prepare an ambush (2000 p.87). (Musah 2000 p.87; Avant 2005 p.85; Vines 2000 p.183; Reno 1998 p.129)

Avant argues, that GSG then stuck with the terms of their contract, and kept on training the RSLMF despite not having a secure site and were unwilling to adapt to their environment, as the Sierra Leonan government put pressure on them to partake in active combat (2005 p.85), a point of view supported by Musah (2000 p.88). Singer, however, contends that GSG broke the contract and left Sierra Leone (2003 p.112). If the contract only ran until April 1995 or was broken at that time is unknown, what is known is that GSG left at that point, according to Musah and Avant since the threat level was to high (2000 p.88; 2005 p.85). A GSG representative claims that it was a worry of being seen as ‘mercenaries’ that stopped them from engaging in active combat and also from using arms to protect the RSLMF’s training facilities (Avant 2005 p.85-86). The company had its reputation as a respectable security company in mind and saw to future contracts (ibid p.86).

GSG were, however, not the only security companies active in Sierra Leone at this time. Among the companies on various contracts were DSL, Control Risks Group, J&P Security Ltd, Rapport Research and Analysis Ltd and Group 4. (Musah 2000 p. 88)

As GSG leave the country another company, Executive Outcomes, arrives in April. By May they have between 30 and 100 employees on the ground, their mission is to train the RSLMF forces and also the Kamajors, as well as take part in actual combat, with the aim of gaining a strategic advantage (Musah 2000 p.88-89; Howe 2001 p.200-01; Avant 2005 p.86-87; Singer 2003 p.112-13; Mandel 2002 p.110; Elg 2000 p.20-21). The number of EO-personnel deployed in the conflict differs; according to Singer the original contract stipulated 160 operatives who later were supplemented by more manpower (2003 p.112); Musah contends that there were a total of 300 personnel deployed (2000 p.89); Avant say’s the contract was for 150-200 operatives (2005 p.86); Howe estimates the EO operatives to 200. According to Elg their number were closer to 300 (2000 p.21). Regardless of the exact number of EO-personnel deployed, it can be concluded that 150-300 EO personnel were deployed, a very small force compared to most armies or insurgency groups of the world.

The exact circumstances of the contract are not clear, except for the training and combat support tasks, even the circumstances of the initial contact between Strasser and EO are also unclear. According to Singer, Strasser first heard of EO through articles in as different magazines as Newsweek and Soldier of Fortune Magazine, but it was probably on recommenddation of Anthony Buckingham that EO was hired (2003 p.112). Getting the knowledge of EO through the media shows how publicity worked to their benefit (ibid p.112); Howe agrees with Singer, that Buckingham introduced EO and Strasser and adds that Micheal Grunberg, one of Branch Group’s owners, negotiated the contract (2001 p.200); Avant agrees as far as saying that the contact was initiated by executives of Branch Energy and that the company negotiated the deal between EO and Strasser (2005 p.86); According to Elg, EO was guaranteed payment by Branch Energy to support Strasser, in return Strasser granted Branch Energy mining concessions (2000 p.20). Branch Groups involvement and the payment in diamond concessions is also supported by other sources. According to Singer the government
couldn’t afford the initial contract, so Buckingham put up the first payment in exchange for diamond concessions in the Kono district (at the time of the deal held by the RUF) (2003 p.112); Avant differs and contends that EO gave the NPRC credit, in return for being paid 50% of the tax returns from the Sierra Rutile mine when opened (2005 p.86); According to Howe, Lafras Luiningh (a EO CEO and head of recruitment) that the NPRC couldn’t pay, but were told not to worry and instead pay when they had the money (2001 p.201). However, Howe, concludes that EO was instrumental in helping Branch Energy to valuable diamond concessions and that Branch Energy paid the initial costs for EO. Furthermore, he also contends that the SL government didn’t pay for EO services for the first eight months of the contract. (2001 p.206)

It is however known that the first joint EO and RSLMF operation was a success. The object of the operation was to liberate Freeown from the RUF and retake the Kono district. EO had operational control and supplied intelligence for the operations. Furthermore, they utilised equipment and tactics, such as helicopter assaults and artillery. Since the RSLMF seemed to grow weaker the further away from the capital they got, EO sought support elsewhere. By training and relying on the Kamajors, yet another player entered the scene in SL. By January 1996, EO had led the recapture of the capital and all the major mining sites, both in the east and along the southern coastal regions, including the Kono district and the mines belonging to Sierra Rutile. (Howe 2001 p.201; Musah 2000 p.89; Singer 2003 p.113; Avant 2005 p.87, 90; Vines 2000 p.175; Reno 1997 p.180; Cleaver 2000 p.141; Reno 1998 p.130)

The balance in the conflict was tilted by EO. Singer, concludes that EO had in retaken the Kono district captured “a critical prize as a source of ultimate payment (as in the Angolan operations)” (2003 p.113). EO largely contributed to the making negotiations and the Nov 1996 Peace agreement possible, as well as the following elections. (Singer 2003 p.113; Musah 2000 p.89: Vines 2000 p.175; Howe 2001 p.201; Elg 2000 p.21)

We should however, not jump that far ahead. When EO was hired by the NPRC, there were indications of disagreement among the NPRC-members (Elg 2000 p.20). Upon hire, EO set up office right below Strasser’s deputy and defence chief of staff, Brigadier Julius Maada-Bio. Brigadier Maada-Bio, who was liaisons officer between the government and EO, was also commander of the EO-trained Special Forces unit within the RSLMF and also had more ties to EO. However, According to EO only 150 of the RSLMF soldiers were trained by them, as parts of the RSLMF’s leadership feared their capabilities. This made EO turn to training the Kamajors. (Avant 2005 p.86-87; Musah 2000 p.89; Howe 2001 p.201; Taulbee 2000 p.444)

The Kamajors are an ethnic group from the southeast, mostly consisting of forest dwellers and hunters. The group had previous experience of the RUF and understood the need for protecting their families. Due to their closeness to the land they had an excellent knowledge of the terrain and were a good source of local intelligence. With training in counter-insurgency tactics, they became a useful resource in the campaign against the RUF. Working as a regional defence force they were of key significance in the retaking the Kono district. (Avant 2005 p.88; Singer 2003 p.113; Howe 2001 p.203-04)

Brigadier Maada-Bio had a personal tie to EO through his brother Steven Bio, a soviet trained graduate. Steven Bio was a partner in the Belorussian company Soruss, who leased one Mi-17 assault helicopter and one Mi-24 attack helicopter to EO. (Musah 2000 p.89)
Furthermore, another of Brigadier Maada-Bio’s relatives, his sister, would play an important role in the event to come (Avant 2005 p.88).

In late 1995, Strasser had become dependent on the Kamajors and other civil militia groups, trained by EO. The RUF looted the country side, and as the gap widened between the RSLMF and Kamajors, due to Strasser dependence on the later, the army began rampaging areas around their encampments. In late 1995, Strasser announced that elections were to take place in February 1996. SL civil society and international peace talks pushed Strasser to hold democratic elections. In an interview with Howe, Barlow and Luitingh stressed “that EO insisted that the Strasser government begin a democratization process” (2001 p.201). However, in November 1995, EO, also threatened to withdraw from the country, due to being unpaid. It was Buckingham that personally flew to Freetown delivering the message. By the end of December 1995 the government had agreed to pay and in January 1996 a US$ 3million were deposited to EO account. As 1995 drew to a close Brigadier Maada-Bio had become an autonomous political actor. (Avant 2005 p.88-89, 90; Musah 2000 p.90; Howe 2001 p. 206; Musah 2000 p.89)

In February 1996, Brigadier Maada-Bio acted and seized power in a palace coup. In coup Brigadier Maada-Bio used the EO-trained Special Forces unit under his command to topple the NPRC. According to Singer and Reno, EO preferred Maada-Bio to Strasser (2003 p. 114; 1998 p.134). When Brigadier Maada-Bio took command of the country, the RUF announced that they would only negotiate with him, which they subsequently did eventually leading to the Abidjan Peace Accords (not signed until November 1996). It was, however, soon discovered that Brigadier Maada-Bio’s sister was a member of the RUF, a matter which had positively influenced on the negotiations, and possibly RUF’s demands on the negotiations. Elections were scheduled to be held in February also and were conducted without any complications. (Howe 2001 p.201; Avant 2005 p.89; Cleaver 2000 p.141; Reno 1998 p.131)

However, EO stopped a planned coup, staged against the planned elections, during February 1996, according to Barlow. Apparently, they picked the information up, “reported it, and then necessary action was taken in order to neutralize the coup d’état” (Eeben Barlow interview by South African Broadcasting Corporation, January 22, in Howe 2001 p.234 note 79). It was business pragmatism that determined EO loyalty to Brigadier Maada-Bio’s government, according to Barlow. (Howe 2001 p. 204)

In the successful elections Brigadier Maada-Bio had to step down as Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was the winner. Again it was the international pressure and the pressure from civil society groups that forced him to resign, whether he wanted or not. Kabbah found himself inheriting a country in turmoil and a difficult security crisis. (Musah 2000 p. 90-91)

According to Avant, Kabbah was not aware of EO’s presence in the country until April 1995 (2005 p.89). When EO contract was expiring, Kabbah renewed it in April 1996, for an additional 20 months. The conflict drew on and peace negotiations and violent breakdowns interloped during 1996. EO operations and efforts, in cooperation with the Kamajors, were concentrated to the Kono district. (Musah 2000 p.91)

Eventually, in November 1996, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed. It stipulated that all foreign forces were too leave the country and a resettlement of combatants, effectively calling for a dismantling of the Kamajors. In January 1997 EO left the country, as Kabbah ended the contract early. EO was only paid US$ 15,7 million of the SUS35,3 million contract. (Musah 2000 p.90-91; Avant 2005 p.89-90; Singer 2003 p.114; Howe 2001 p.201)
When EO left SL they warned Kabbah that a coup would occur within 100 days, according to EO intelligence. Furthermore, they contended that they had stopped two coups since the elections. The Kabbah government was also offered a 500-man paramilitary unit and an intelligence detachment to provide security for the civilian cabinet. The offer was turned down. (Singer 2003 p. 114)

On the 25th of May 1997 the coup occurred, 95 days after EO left SL. The coup was led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma (who had been one of the plotters in a former coup attempt) and motivated with the Kabbahs distrust of the army and reliance on the Kamajors that had been turned into a Civil Defence Force (CDF). Furthermore, Kabbah had made the Kamajors Chief Sam Hinga-Norman, Deputy Defence Minister. While modernising the Kamajors, he downsized the RSLMF. To make matters worse, Kabbah had made a arrangement with Nigeria in March 1997, placing Nigeria troops in SL to protect the SL territorial integrity and the countries sovereignty. (Musah 2000 p.93, 95, 100; Avant 2005 p.92-93; Singer 2003 p.114; Spicer 1999 p.190; Mandel 2002 p.111)

According to Musah, a blueprint document for the SL security was drafted and presented to Kabbah, shortly after his election. In that document the Chief of the Defence Staff is considered a ‘time bomb’, a total restructuring of the armed forces is called for and reliance on the Kamajors for security is given strong support. The restructuring of the armed forces, training of the Secret police and the Kamajors is to be done by EO. This restructuring did not come to pass, due to the coup. It was however, too be the blueprint for Kabbah’s hiring of Sandline, according to Musah. (Musah 2000 p.93-95)

After the May 1997 coup, Koroma founded the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Kabbah fled to Conakry in Guinea. It was later revealed that Koromas coup had been made in cooperation between the RSLMF and the RUF. Furthermore, the AFRC was set-up in coalition by Koroma and the RUF. In June 1997 the Organisation for African Unity condemned the coup, the UN soon followed suit. The ECOWAS troops (mostly consisting of the Nigerians) in Freetown were instructed to give the people of SL assistance to oppose the Koroma regime and the Nigerians laid siege to the city’s port. (Musah 2000 p.9-97; Avant 2005 p.92-93)

The Branch group connection in SL would become clear as EO officially left in January 1997. In 1995 and 1996, Branch Group had made a bid for the SL national petroleum company and a maritime surveillance contract, without competitive bidding. Only by pressure from the IMF and the World Bank a competitive procedure undertaken, consequently Branch Group lost the contracts. In the same manner as in Angola, EO and Branch Group affiliated security companies stayed behind in SL after January 1997. The Sierra Rutile Company hired, Lifeguard as its permanent guard force. Lifeguard also protected the Branch Energy mine concessions in the Kono district in cooperation with the Kamajors. Approximately, 100 of Lifeguards personnel had been employed by EO before they left. Among those who stayed behind with Lifeguard, was the former EO local commander. During the fall of 1997, Sandline acquired Lifeguard from EO. This also coincided with the company’s preparations for their appearance on the scene in SL. According to Spicer, Lifeguard undertook security for an industrial plant, a diamond mine and the Bumbuma Dam (1999 p.190). Spicer, also mentions that Lifeguard was a sister company to Sandline, before the fall of 1997 (1999 p.192). (Avant 2005 p.88, 93; Musah 2000 p.92; Howe 2001 p.207-08; Singer 2003 p.117)

How the contact came about between Kabbah and Sandline is in dispute. According to Musah and Avant, Sandlines services were proposed to Kabbah through Peter Penfold, the
UK High Commissioner to SL, by Rupert Brown (Sandline’s West African Representative) (2000 p.98; 2005 p.93). Spicer himself, say’s he called Kabbah, in May 1997, and gave him a proposal, as Sandline had business interests in the country (1999; 190,192). Furthermore, since Lifeguard was on the ground in SL, Sandline offered to supply Kabbah with intelligence with regards to the situation in country (1999 p.192). It wasn’t until the summer of 1997, that things started to get rolling, when Sandline was contacted by a Thai banker, Rakesh Saxena, to conduct a study into a way of restoring Kabbah’s government (ibid p.192). Saxena was also the owner/representative of the Jupiter Mining Company (JMC) (Avant 2005 p.93).

According to Spicer, Saxena had been in contact with Kabbah prior to the coup, discussing diamond concessions. Saxena wanted Kabbah back in power and was prepared to pay for it. Although Sandline only dealt with legitimate governments, according to Spicer, they agreed “to carry out a ‘commander’s estimate’ for Kabbah for an agreed fee which Saxena would pay”(ibid, p.193). The estimate was only to be implemented if the Kabbah government gave a go ahead. (1999 p.192-93)

According to Micheal Grunberg (Buckinghams financial advisor) in a British inquiry, he was contacted by Saxena and passed him on to Spicer. In a letter written by Spicer’s lawyers, it was Peter Penfold, who suggested to Kabbah that he should use Sandline. Saxena’s business partner, Samir Patel, claims that Hinga Norman (Kabbah’s Deputy Defence Minister, and Kamajor) and Bert Sachse (an EO representative) who separately made contact with Saxena, urging him to call Spicer. Furthermore, Drohan contends, that Spicer had approach Jean-Raymond Boulle (a CEO of AMF), who had mining interests in SL to finance an operation, but was turned down. How the contact came about is still unclear. If Kabbah initiated the contact, it was indeed a legitimate regime requesting support, if it however was initiated by a commercial business interest it is another matter. Although Kabbah’s regime is still legitimate the commercial business interests’ ability to affect the regime is of significant importance for the analysis to follow. Spicer and Sandline, had according to Drohan, an interest in given the impression that they were contacted, to legitimacy their involvement. (Drohan 2003 p.229-30)

No matter how the initial contact was taken, a three-way agreement was made between JMC, Sandline and the Kabbah government. Saxena’s JMC was to finance the Sandline operation on behalf of the Kabbah government in exile. JMC had a separate deal with the Kabbah government for diamond concessions. Furthermore, some of the diamond concession held by DiamondWorks/Branch Energy was to be transferred to JMC. (Musah 2000 p.98-99; Elg 2000 p.25; Spicer 1999 p.194; Drohan 2003 p.235)

The contract between Sandline and Kabbah stipulated that the company was to reinstate the democratically elected government of SL through direct means, procurement and delivery. Sandline was to train and equip the Kamajors, approximately 40000 men, plan the subsequent strategy and operations, provide arms, munitions, transports and food. The company was also to co-ordinate their operations with the ECOMOG troops at Lungi Airport in Freetown. The provision of 35 tonnes small arms, ammunition and mortars were bought from Bulgaria and transported by Ibis Airline (partially owned by EO). The weapons were channelled into SL through Nigeria. However, according to Spicer to 35 tonnes of arms were to be sent to the Luingi Airport In Freetown. (Musah 2000 p.98-99; Elg 2000 p.25; Spicer 1999 p.195-6)

On the 23 of December 1997, the go ahead for the operation was given by Kabbah to Spicer. In January 1998 Sandline had deployed a 15 men team and a Mi-17 assault helicopter. In the meantime in Canada, the financer Saxena was arrested in possession of a false passport (he was suspected of financial crimes in Thailand, and was fighting an extradition and had to
report to the local police office in Vancouver every day). As a result only US$ 1.5 million of the US$ 10 million contract had been paid. Since no money was forthcoming the contract was in effect ended. (Drohan 2003 p.236; Spicer 1999 p. 197)

However, Sandline finished parts of the contract when they participated in the February 28th offensive, together with the Kamajors and Nigerians. According to Drohan, Spicer and Elg only the team and helicopter mentioned above fought in co-operation with 8000-12000 ECOMOG forces liberating Freetown from RUF’s and Koroma’s forces (2003 p.239; 1999 p.197; 2000 p.26). Musah, on the other hand, argues that 200 Sandline personnel participated in the offensive to oust the RUF-AFRC coalition (2000 p.99). In March 1998 Kabbah was returned to power in SL (Drohan 2003 p.239; Elg 2000 p.26).

Sandline’s involvement in SL had a significant impact on British politics, referred to as ‘The Arms to Africa Affair’, since there was an UN arms embargo in effect on SL at the time. The involvement of the UK government is dispute, and a UK Customs and Excise inquiry resulted in a dropped investigation. (Elg 2000 p.26; Spicer 1999 p.221)

3.3 Papua New Guinea

London, January 1997 – The final decision to go ahead with Operation: Contravene is given to Sandline Executive, Lt. Colonel Tim Spicer, Ret. (former Scots Guards), after numerous meetings and trips to Port Morseby, Papua New Guinea (PNG). After being approach for a contract in April 1996 Sandline’s operation could begin. With the 1997 elections in April the Prime Minister Julius Chan wanted the Bougainville problem solved, to bolster his votes at the polls. With no international help forthcoming to sort the internal conflict with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) the PNG government turned to the private alternative. With the go ahead, the first detachment of Sandline’s force deployed to PNG, with a mission “to defeat the BRA and bring peace back to Bougainville”(Spicer 1999 p.163), through the use of Special Operations and training of a PNG Defense Force (PNGDF) Special Forces unit. Although peace was not to far away, Sandline’s operation would take an unexpected turn. (Spicer 1999 p.154-167 passim; Singer 2003 p.192-93)

One major economic resource for the country is the massive Panguna copper mine located on the island Bougainville. In 1989 a secessionist movement took hold on the island and led by the BRA demanded the island be separated from PNG. The conflict arose from environmental issues concerning the affect of the mine on the local community as well as economic issues pertaining financial packages to non-local mining groups. At the outset the insurgency was small, but rapidly evolved into a national crisis. During the following decade the conflict between the small BRA (numbering around a 1000) and the PNGDF took the lives of 10000 people and displaced another 35000. Furthermore, the BRA was winning the conflict, which had evolved into an all out bush war, using the jungle terrain to their advantage and securing the Panguna copper mine. (Spicer 1999 p. 154; Singer 2003 p.192)

The contract set out between the PNG government and Sandline included the provision of a Sandline strike force that was to retake the Panguna copper mine, defeat the BRA and supply any necessary follow-up support operations. Prior to this Sandline was to train a PNGDF Special Forces unit (which would take part in the operation) and collect intelligence, through electronic surveillance using fixed-wing aircraft, on the BRA making the operation possible. Furthermore, the operation was to include a psychological operations element using
‘Sky Shout’, a large loudspeaker mounted on a fixed-wing aircraft, broadcasting to the BRA at night, that the conflict situation had changed and that they would be defeated. The ‘Sky Shout’ was also supposed to counter BRA propaganda, since the support of the local people was needed. However, the support was not perceived as a problem since the locals were government friendly and the insurrection therefore didn’t seem to have to much local support. In addition the operation was to have its own medical support team, including two doctors. To avoid being prosecuted as mercenaries the Sandline personnel was to be sworn in as “special constables” as PNG police officers holding military rank. This provision gave Sandline’s personnel “legal authority to carry weapons, arrest local citizens, and act forcibly in “self defense”(Singer 2003 p. 194), although not being PNG citizens. The Sandline team consisted of a 16-man training unit, later to be bolstered up to a company-sized force including two Mi-24 attack helicopters, two Mi-27 assault helicopters and some heavy weaponry. The helicopters and the heavy weaponry were to be handed over to the PNGDF after the completion of the contract. All of this was to be provided for the, $1.3 million ‘discounted’, sum of $36 million, half which was to be paid upfront and half on completion of contract. Furthermore, a sum that happened to amount to 150% of the PNGDF’s yearly budget. (Spicer 1999 p.162-64; Singer 2003 p. 193; Agreement for the Provision of Military Assistance Dated This 31 Day of January 1997 Between the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and Sandline International)

The contact between Sandline and the PNG government was intermediated by Defense Service Limited (DSL), another private security company, who put Spicer in contact with Mathias Ijape, Defense Minister of PNG. Interestingly enough, the initial meeting took place in Australia and included, apart from PNG government representation and Spicer also, Anthony Buckingham (Spicer 1999 p.154), the company’s financier as well as owner of DiamondWorks and Branch Heritage Group (Singer 2003 p.192; Elg 2000 p.17). Reportedly, Buckingham was acting as a representative of Branch Energy Ltd, discussing investments in the mining sector linked to the Sandline contract (Singer 2003 p.192). Although, according to Dorney, Buckingham is also Chairman and CEO of Sandline (Musah – Fayemi 2000 p.25)

The contract negotiations were later to be handed over to Chief of the Defence Staff General Jerry Singirok, as the PNG representative. Originally the contract only included the provision of helicopters, but as the negotiations were underway Spicer realized that further services were needed and offered them to Singirok. A proposal was drafted and presented to Singirok, at a later point in time in London, who was to get back to Sandline after he had presented it to the PNG Defence Committee. As the summer of -96 approached, Singirok and the PNG government was nowhere to be heard from. During the summer the Kangu Beach massacre occurred. In which a large number of PNGDF soldiers were cornered and hacked to pieces by the BRA on a beach on Bougainville. (Spicer 1999 p.150-51, 154-58)

In October 1996, Spicer got the whim of that the Deputy Prime Minister of PNG, Chris Haiveta, was in London. After making contact with him, they met up in Sandline’s office. For the company the meeting didn’t yield anything except informing Haiveta of the proposal drafted earlier that year, which he didn’t seem to know anything about. However, the contact with Haiveta was to set things in motion again. After a phone call from Haiveta, Spicer set off to Port Morseby in November for a discussion with senior representatives including Singirok. The result of this was a decision to have a further proposal ready to be presented to the PNG cabinet in January -97. (ibid p.158-59)
As decided Spicer flew to PNG in January -97, he was however not alone. On this trip he was accompanied by Buckingham again (ibid p.159). Why Buckingham was present when the proposal to the PNG cabinet was to be presented is not disclosed. But it didn’t turn out the way expected. As Spicer and Buckingham was sitting in the hallway outside the cabinet office, Singirok turn up. He was screaming and demanding that they tell him what they were doing there, “talking over his head to the cabinet about a proposal he had not seen” (ibid p. 160). This was strange, as Spicer remarks, since a number of copies of the proposal had been supplied to be circulated among the senior government officials. Furthermore, Singirok had been present at a number of meetings prior to this one. As it was, the meeting never took place and Spicer and Buckingham left the cabinet. The later of them then flew home and the former stayed on for a while to get an apology from the PNG Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, who told Spicer that they would present it to the cabinet. Spicer then flew home himself, almost certain that the deal was lost. However, once more things were not what they seemed and upon arriving in London, the go ahead call was given. (ibid p. 160).

Except for some initial problems of payment and a disagreement with Singirok on what helicopters to use, the operation was well under way after the green light. Still in January, the shipments of arms were starting to arrive, a Sandline training team (mostly former EO personnel) had started to train the PNGDF Special Forces unit and the operational planning for the Bougainville operation had started. The contract was well under way when the story broke in an Australian newspaper. It was in February -97, and the Australian government urged PNG Prime Minister Chan to stop the Bougainville operation. However, PNG was a sovereign and independent state and had no intention of aborting at this point. (ibid p. 168-69)

With the operation ‘blown’ to the press, things were speeded up and the final preparations for the Bougainville operations were to be done in the middle of March. On the 16th of March Spicer was called to Prime Minister Chan’s office as an adviser to a meeting with PNG Foreign office officials. After this meeting Spicer was to attend the final operational planning meeting with Singirok, at his office. However, upon arriving at Singirok’s office Spicer found an armed party putting him under arrest, rather than a planning committee. Furthermore, he was informed that an officers’ coup had been made. All of Sandline personnel had been placed under arrest. (ibid p. 171-72)

In reality, the officers’ coup was not as successful as might be conceived. Singirok had indeed instigated an officers’ coup, however, except for the arrest of the Sandline personnel no other violence was reported. Troops close to Singirok were in on it, including the Special Forces unit trained by Sandline (although according to Spicer, embarrassed to take part in it). (ibid p. 177-79) Publicly Singirok condemned the regime, Sandline’s presence, the contract between them and most significantly the wrongful use of public authority as corrupt behaviour. Singirok also spoke out about he’s fears for the carnage and bloodbath the Sandline operation in Bougainville could result in. Furthermore, he called on Prime Minister Chan to resign. As a counter-move Prime Minister Chan fired Singirok and charged him with sedition. Singirok entrenched himself in his barracks with most of the army loyal to him. The following war of words escalated into violent riots in support of the military. The civil unrest made the civilian regime respond with non-military armed security forces. This practice leads to armed clashes between the two fractions as part of the demonstrations. (Singer 2003 p.194-95)

In the end, Prime Minister Chan and the cabinet stood down and resigned. An interim Prime Minister and regime was put in charge of the state. This move led to the release of the Sandline personnel, who were flown out of the country a.s.a.p., although, Spicer was detained
in country on a weapons charge for carrying a pistol. The fact that he had arranged for
delivery of heavy weapons and armed helicopters was not in question. The reasons for his
detention were to make sure he was there for the official inquiry into the episode. When the
appearance before the Commission of Inquiry was done, the weapons charge was dropped and
Spicer left PNG. The only Sandline related items left in PNG were the heavy weapons and
helicopters that had been delivered, before the coup. These were to be left to corrode and parts
of the equipment were later drop at sea. (Spicer 1999 p. 183-189; Singer 2003 p.195)

All the way through the coup-crisis, Sandline had a forward base in Hong Kong,
specifically set-up to help out the captives. This forward operations centre consisted of
Buckingham, Micheal Grunberg (Buckingham’s financial adviser) and Bernie McCabe (a
fomer Green Beret and also head of Sandlines N.Y. office) who were sorting out “the
extraction/rescue options and details…..and ‘plotting in case’ of trouble”(Spicer 1999
p.183,187).

The aftermath of the PNG incident paradoxically resulted in some of the goals set up
between the Chan-government and Sandline. Due to the coup, moderates on both sides of the
Bougainville insurrection found their way to the negotiation table. The coup showed the BRA
that not all parts of the government sought an armed solution to the conflict. Furthermore, for
Sandline the Operation: Contravene turned out to be an economic success when the company
sued the new PNG government for not fulfilling the last half payment. A case that went to an
international arbitration panel, that Sandline won although the contract had been signed with-
out proper parliamentary approval. The panel found that the new PNG government was bound
to the old government’s commitments. (Singer 2003 p. 195)

The coup-makers were triad and three, including Singirok, were found guilty of mutiny. In
the ensuing investigation it was found that Singirok had took bribes from a competing arms
supplier in London (Spicer 1999 p.187; Peleman 2000 p.162), thereof his insistence on the
use of a different brand of helicopters. The company paying him off was J&S Franklin
(Peleman 2000 p.162). Singirok was barred from taking future office due to the bribes (Singer
2003 p. 196). However, as of 1999 Singirok has once again been appointed Commander of
the PNGDF (Spicer 1999 p. 187).

3.4 Colombia

Colombia is, according to Singer, a perfect example that offers a glimpse of a postmodern
network theatre of war (2003 p.173). It pits complex networks of organisations both in
support of the state as well as oppose to the state. Political insurgents, international mafias
and drug cartels hire legal and economic advisors as well as other affiliates in support of their
organisations (Metz 2000 p.13). Furthermore, transnational companies hire PMCs in support
of their business interests and the Colombian government employ them too. The US has ‘Plan
Colombia’ operating in the country, fighting an anti-narcotics war using private military
operatives.

Yair Klein, former Lt.-Colonel in the Israeli army, and CEO of Spearhead Limited (a
Israeli security company) was rumoured to have established a “survival school” in Antigua.
The operation was financed by Rodriguez Gacha, one of the Mendellin cartel’s bosses, and
the participants of the “survival school” were gunmen who would become the cartel’s private
army. The school never materialised, but the training of the cartels men did. (Klare – Andersen 1996 p.63)

According to Singer, Spearhead provided military training and assistance to the armed followers of Pablo Escobar another Mendellin Cartel boss, to the Cali cartel and right-wing paramilitary groups. Some of the paramilitary units were later linked to at least two assassinations of Colombian presidents. Furthermore, the company is also to have trained Colombian mafia assassins. Spearhead did not only deliver training, they also supplied weapons, according to some sources up to 50,000 small arms. In 1989 Klein was charged for providing arms and training to drug lords in Colombia. He would, however, not be indicted until 1998. Israeli authorities were quicker to charge and convict Klein for illegal arms export in 1991. He was fined US$ 13,400, for the weapons sent to Colombia. (http://www.democracynow.org; Singer 2003 p.220; http://www.washingtonpost.com)

The military capacity of Colombian drug cartels is today estimated to have reached such a level that the Colombian military in some cases is unable to respond to them. Singer, argues that this has led the Colombian military to be unable to enforce sovereignty over certain areas of the country. As an example, the FARC guerrilla has bought enormous quantities of weapons from the former Soviet Union, including an Il-76 transport plane that carried the weaponry. (Singer 2003 p.52-54) Mandel also concludes that effective government control is lacking as a result of corruption and inefficiency almost equivalent to a failed state (2002 p.113) Furthermore, the paramilitary groups in Colombia are today very difficult to tell apart from the drug cartels. The narcotics income for the guerrillas today amount to US$ 800 million a year (Kaldor 2001 p.102).

The capabilities of the Colombian guerrilla groups and drug cartels do not end here. Between 1986 and 1996 there were 985 attacks on oil industrial facilities in the country (Singer 2003 p.81). In 2001 a single pipeline, the Limon Covenas, was bombed 170 times (ibid p.81). 1861 abductions were reported between August 2002 and May 2003 (Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy 2003 p.7). This shows to some extent the capacity of the drug cartels and guerrillas of Colombia.

British Petroleum (BP) in Colombia hired Defence Services Limited (DSL) in 1992 to protect their oil installations against guerrilla attacks. As a result, DSL set up a local sister company called Defence Systems Colombia (DSC). The DSC operations for BP were mostly centred in the Casanare district on the border to Colombia. DSC was also to function as BP’s liaison with the local police. (Mandel 2002 p.112; Vines 2000 p.186)

In 1996, BP signs a contract with the Colombian police to create and dispatch a special unit of the police, assigned to protect oil installations in Casanare. In May, one of BP’s oil rigs was attacked; as a result BP assigned two DSC trainers to the police unit. This unit was later accused of human rights abuses. As the contract was renegotiated in 1998, both BP and DSC had included a Human Rights policy in their company profiles as well as in the contract. DSC has been accused of training the Colombian police in counter-insurgency tactics and of importing arms. (Vines 2000 p.186-87; http://www.guardian.co.uk) In 1997, Singer found, that DSC trained the Colombian military’s 14th Army Brigade, well known for its Human Rights abuses (2003 p.221). Today DSC has become Armor Group Latin America (since Armor Group bought DSL) and employ’s 350 personnel in Colombia, mostly Colombian ex-militaries.

BP is not the only petroleum company to use PMCs in Colombia. Occidental Petroleum and Ecopetrol hired Airscan to provide aerial surveillance and reconnaissance. The company
was involved in the co-ordination of a Colombian military air strike that hit the wrong village, killing 18 civilians (Singer 2003 p.24; Avant 2005 p.151). Other companies, such as Israeli Silver Shadow, has trained and provided arms to the Colombian military (to the 14th Brigade), while at the same time working as security personnel on the Ocensa pipeline together with DSC personnel (Vines 2000 p.187; Makki et al. p.9; http://www.guardian.co.uk).

The full extent of PMCs in Colombia is hard to assess. According to Singer, there are at least 7 US-based companies operating there (2003 p.14). To assist the Colombian government in the “War on drugs”, US government approved Plan Colombia. The plan stipulates that the US is to give aid to the Colombian military. Due to the bad Human Rights record of the Colombian military, US Congress has put restrictions on which units the US Army can train. To circumvent these restrictions, there has been an increase in the use of privately contracted PMC in Colombia. Military Professional Resources International (MPRI) are providing strategic advise to the government; Virginia Electronics are said to hire ex-Navy Seals interdict rebel supply lines using gunboats; DynCorp provides pilot training, technical support and drug crop eradication to the National Police. DynCorp has also been involved in direct combat, search and rescue operations and aerial reconnaissance. The strict legal US restrictions banning military personnel do not apply to PMC-employees, making it possible for them to partake in counterinsurgency operations. (Singer 2003 p.206-209; Bigwood 2001)
4 Effects on the Control of Force

4.1 Angola

**Functional Control:** The EO operations in Angola turned the tide of the conflict into the favour of the MPLA, and UNITA was resolutely pushed back. The military standards and effectiveness of the FAA and particularly the units trained by EO were heightened as a result of hiring a PMC. However, the operations and strategy of EO and the FAA were in accordance with the commercial interests of non-state financers, all affiliated with the SRC. After EO had left Angola, the state’s security reduced. Furthermore, security became dependent on private security providers, whom were required to have links to the government based on personal connections, through partial ownership. The functional control is redistributed to private commercial interests, due to TNCs need to rely on private security.

**Political Control:** The political control of the military was improved as far as their loyalty towards the regime is concerned. Furthermore, democratic elections, which had not taken place for years, were able to be held, indicating an improvement in political control. However, the control mechanisms regarding who has the legitimate right to use force partially failed. When EO employees deployed to Angola, most of them had previously fought against the country. In effect, former enemies were given Angolan legitimate use of force, and Angolan nationals were to rely on their former enemy. There has also been a redistribution of power due to the Angolan government’s official policy to have TNC supply there on protection, and security is no longer solely state-based.

**Social Control:** It is possible to see a small increase in the social control of force in Angola, as the FFA’s standard was increase. Furthermore, EO acted to large extent in accordance with Human Rights than the Angolan insurgencies. The continuous presence of PMC can indicate a shift towards international norms in Angola. This is, however, not established by this analysis.

4.2 Sierra Leone

**Functional Control:** The actions of the PMCs in Sierra Leone briefly improved the performance of the state security apparatus, and drove back the RUF. However, it did not improve the SLRMF rather parallel security forces were created and relied on. Primarily, the Kamajors became a parallel force. Generally national security was achieved during their operations in country. Although, it can be argued that there was a partial loss of functional control. The loss was mainly through the Kamjors but also due to the government’s reliance on PMCs. It is also evident that strategic decisions and military operations were dependent on foreign commercial interests with clear connection to the PMCs. The improved performance of the state’s security establishment only lasted in the short perspective.
**Political control:** The political control of force was in the case of Sierra Leone affected in a number of ways. By the practise of paying for security services with natural resources either directly to PMCs and their affiliates as well as indirectly in a three way agreement, the government became dependent on financing from a non-state actor. The political control of the states armed forces was lost, when both the RSLMF’s Special Forces and the RSLMF, at different times, carried out both successful and unsuccessful coups. The PMC’s involvement in coups at different times show a silent consent, in not acting to stop it, as well as an active part in informing the government of an imminent coup, that was put down. Hence, a PMC can affect the stability of a regime. Furthermore, in the case of silent content, the coup led to a regime that conducted democratic elections. Although, the authoritarian regime lost the elections, they stood by its results, allowing a democratically elected government to take office. The importance of EO’s ability to affect the political control lies in their silent consent to the coup and in that they did not oppose the elected government, even tough they had supported the Maada’s coup leading to the elections in the first place. The political control of force by the democratically elected Kabbah government could no be upheld without PMC assistance. The parallel force, in the Kamajors, was not enough to counter the alienation of the RSLMF. When EO left the Kabbah government fell and it required the services of Sandline to reinstall Kabbah, who after all was the leader internationally recognised government. The loss of political control of the state’s armed forces required the reliance on the private alternative. There is, however, a clear redistribution of power indicating that a transnational commercial enterprise can achieve a high degree of political control over both a state and its ability to use coercive force.

**Social control:** EO’s choice to stand silent during the Maada coup can be interpreted as a sign of professional behaviour in accordance to international norms. Their allegiance through the contract lay with the SL state rather than the regime. Although, it was a business decision as the Maada government presented a better business environment, according to EO’s CEO Barlow. The actions of GSG’s also show the value of business decisions, when they decide to leave. Otherwise, the social control of force is affected in a similar way to Angola. The human rights record of EO and Sandline was by far better than the national belligerents’ record. However, it does not seem like their military professionalism spread to the local force. This could possibly depend on the reliance of a parallel force and the difficulty in integrating with the RSLMF.

### 4.3 Papua New Guinea

**Functional control:** The hiring of a PMC lead to few improvements of the PNGDF, mainly in competence and effectiveness but only of the Special Forces unit. Although, the contract included technological improvements, these fell through due to the events that transpired. The planning of the military operation was influenced by the business interests of companies affiliated with the PMC, this indicates a certain loss of control.

**Political control:** The hire of a PMC was motivated by the need for a political success in ending the Bougainville insurgency before upcoming elections. Furthermore, by deputising the PMC-personnel the government’s control over the individuals with a legitimate right to exercise coercion was affected. Economically, the hire of a PMC for 150% of the PNGDF’s yearly budget is hard not to interpret as a sign of redistribution of power from the parliament.
to the executive power. This was also one of the reasons for the most significant effect on the political control in PNG, namely the coup led by Singirok. The coup was successful as far as the government having to step down. The PNG democracy fortunately turned out to be strong enough to withstand a coup, and survived. However, the hire of a PMC led to a severe political crisis.

Social Control: It was in the social control of force that the reasons for the coup were to be found. The PNGDF’s prestige had been impinged. The Chief of the Defence staff also clearly felt sidestepped and perceived the PMC as a clear threat to his position. Concerning the professional values and norms of the military, this case presents a different view. At least according to the coup leader, Singirok, who motivated the coup partially with a fear that excessive force was to be used to quell the Bougainville insurgency. This emphasises that force is dependent on cultural values.

4.4 Colombia

Functional control: To high extent the efficiency of the Colombian military has been improved. The deployment of numerous PMC, performing both training and operations in the country has made the Colombian armed forces better. However, no defeat of the insurgencies and the organised crime has been achieved. Furthermore, the Colombian case show the risk of an escalation, were the opposition (in this case the drug cartels and insurgents) turns to less scrupulous for training and equipment. Thereby, the conflict risks being aggravated and prolonged.

Political control: In Colombia there is a clear redistribution of the political control of force. To a certain extent the Colombian government has no ability to even control which companies operate in their territory. Whereas, a government is thought to at least have some control through the contracting process, when PMC’s services are supplied by another state the contracting process takes place outside the receivers influence. A number of PMC in Colombia are deployed there as US military assistance, thereby excluding Colombian influence on which company and also in which individuals will wield coercive force in their country. To this the PMC hired by private enterprises, with or without the government’s approval, is to be added. There have also been assassinations of two Colombian Presidents by forces trained by PMCs.

Social control: The training by DSC to the Colombian militaries 14th Brigade, whom had a doubtful human rights record, indicates that international norms are not enforced. Furthermore, the US uses PMCs to circumvent its own legislation, to be able to deploy coercive force in a foreign country. This shows how norms, values and even legislation can be disregarded or circumvented to achieve certain ends and in effect the social control of force is lost.

4.5 Further Findings

The cases analysed has also shown a number of other similar findings. The occurrence of transnational commercial interests is evident in all the cases. In Angola, SL and PNG it is
possible to follow the business interests of two competing natural resources extraction conglomerates. Their actions indicate a perspective more of market share competition, using coercive force, rather than political and military action in a conflict. A certain disregard for the effects of their actions can be seen. There seems to be a prevalence of contracts with PMC involving a wider range of commercial interests linked to the companies’ services. Furthermore, it is possible to see how a network of individuals in key positions can affect the control of force as well as the outcome of a conflict. This ability to affect political outcomes dependent on commercial interests is in need of further research. It does, however, confirm both Kaldor’s and Desch’s view on contemporary conflicts.
5 Conclusions

This thesis has examined the impact of PMCs in the developing world. The ambition has been to show how the control of force is affected by contracting a PMC. The results have shown that PMC in three of the four cases were hired either prior to an election or made elections possible through their deployment. Furthermore, there is a short run improvement of the efficiency, competence and effectiveness of the national army, trained by a PMC. This advantage also makes the defeat of an opposition possible. However, there does not seem to be any longevity in this advantage, as the advances gained with the help of a PMC is most often lost when they withdraw. Therefore, the contracting of PMCs seems to have the goal of creating a political and/or military strategic advantage. However, there is a degree of risk that a coup attempt can take place as a result of the national army feeling resentment towards the PMC. The study has also shown that the contracting governments influence over the PMC is limited and therefore also over the control of force within their own territory. The existence and frequent present of transnational commercial interests in both the contracting process and operational planning and performance of the PMCs, further shows how a government’s control of force in the developing world has been watered down. It can, however, be said that PMC to a small extent improve the human rights values and international norms of the military they operate with and train, but the longevity of this is questionable. However, the PMC themselves, often show a better human rights conduct than the original belligerents. In the table below, the results of each case is summarised:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Functional Control</th>
<th>Political Control</th>
<th>Social Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>- Improved performance</td>
<td>- Partially improved</td>
<td>- Small increase in human rights values and international norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Dependence on PMC</td>
<td>- Election held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Influence of TNC’s commercial interests</td>
<td>- Less control of individuals with legitimate right to use force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Defeat of opponent</td>
<td>- Redistribution of power from government to individuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>- Partial improved performance</td>
<td>- Loss of political control of national armed forces</td>
<td>- Business decisions have priority for PMC over other considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Partial loss of functional control</td>
<td>- Dependence on PMC</td>
<td>- PMC-personnel had better human rights record, than national belligerents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Creation of parallel forces</td>
<td>- Election held</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Influence of TNC’s commercial interests</td>
<td>- Less control of individuals with legitimate right to use force</td>
<td>- No spread of international values to national armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Defeat of opponent</td>
<td>- Redistribution of political power from government to commercial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Several coups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>- Partial improved performance</td>
<td>- Loss of political control of national armed forces</td>
<td>- Prestige of national armed forces impinged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Potential loss of functional control</td>
<td>- Dependence on PMC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Dependence on PMC</td>
<td>- Election held</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Influence of TNC’s commercial interests</td>
<td>- Less control of individuals with legitimate right to use force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Redistribution of power from parliament to executive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Coup</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>- Improved performance</td>
<td>- Redistribution of political control of force to foreign power</td>
<td>- No enforcements of human rights and international values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Escalation of conflict</td>
<td>- Assassinations of two Presidents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Partial influence of TNC’s commercial interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Figure: 5.1
The PMCs are here to stay. Today, there are some 60-70 companies operating in Iraq (Rosen 2005 p.143, Appendix 1). The services they provide spans the whole spectrum, and only a handful has the ability to be classified as a MPF. Most of them, however, are MCF capable of providing training. The involvement of transnational commercial interests in Iraq and their connection to the PMC is still to be seen. It is, however, worth mentioning that Heritage Oil is today active in northern Iraq. The procedure to regulate PMCs, at least in the developed world, is in its cradle but slowly moving forward. Although, regulation is a step toward a better control of force, the developing world still has none. International regulation is not useful as PMCs are not covered by it and even if they were, there is no way to implement sanctions. The effects they can have on states and governments in the developing world require them to act cautiously, hopefully taking other values than commercial interests in consideration when signing on for a contract.
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Appendix 1

Key actors

Barlow, Eeben: Former SADF officer and member of the CCB. Founder and CEO of EO. He is also the founder of SRC. For a time he was also a Director of Branch Energy.

Boulle, Jean Raymond: Founder and CEO of AMF. A former college and friend of Robert Friedland, when they both worked for de Beers. Connection to J&S Franklin through its owner Marc Franklin, who was a member of the board in one of Boulle’s company. As a side note, Boulle had offered in 1990 to come to the aid of President Momoh in Sierra Leone.

Buckingham, Anthony Leslie Rowland: Owner of Branch Heritage Group, including Heritage Oil, Branch Energy and DiamondWorks. A key person within the SRC, financer of Sandline and guarantor as well as financer of EO’s operations. He is a former Special Air Service (SAS) member (British special forces). Furthermore, he is a Chairman and CEO of Sandline.

de Matos, João: FAA Chief of Defence Staff and EO’s main contact in Angola. Has an undefined economic interest in DiamondWorks and established Alpha-5 Security together with EO-personnel. Alpha-5 is an EO affiliated company.

Friedland, Robert: Have been described as a financial guru and wizard. He was the owner of Carson gold and the financial mind behind turning the company into DiamondWorks. One of his companies helped raise capital for mining operations conducted by DiamondWorks and his brother was the companies Chairman and a CEO. He is also a shareholder in DiamondWorks.

Maada-Bio, Julius: Sierra Leonean Defence Chief of Staff and later President. He led the forces trained by EO and later used in the February 1996 coup, which installed him as President. Furthermore, he was the liaison officer between the Strasser government and EO. Through his brother, he had personal connections with EO, as the company hired a helicopter from his brothers company. Maada-Bio’s sister was also a member of the RUF, which made negotiations with the insurgents possible during his regime.

Mann, Simon: Former Scots guard and SAS member. Financer of EO, but was bought out in 1995. He was the initial contact between Buckingham and Barlow. He also functioned as the contact between EO and the Angolan government.

As a side note, Mann was arrested in Zimbabwe in 2004 together with 70 other mercenaries, drawn together in an ad hoc unit rather than a PMC (Rosen 2005 p.165). Apparently, he was part of a plot to overthrow the government of Equatorial Guinea. The failed coup attempt was financed by, among others, Margret Thatcher’s son Mark Thatcher, who was arrested in South Africa when trying to leave the country. Thatcher was later convicted for breaking the South African law on mercenaries and Mann was convicted in Zimbabwe for

Saxena, Rakesh: A Thai banker of Indian origin. He owned JMC who financed Sandline’s operation in Sierra Leone. When he was arrested for trying to leave Canada, while waiting for an extradition to Thailand, Sandline’s operation in Sierra Leone started to fall apart.

Singirok, Jerry: Chief of the Defence Staff in Papua New Guinea and Coup-leader. Was a key person in the planning of Sandline’s operation in PNG. Advocated the use of Bell helicopters, instead of those Sandline chose. Due to being side-stepped led a coup against the PNG government and arrested the Sandline personnel. He was later convicted for the coup and banished from holding office. It was also found that he had taken bribes from J&S Franklin, the company who could supply the Bell helicopters. In 1999 he was once more appointed Commander of the PNGDF and in October 2005 he entered politics running for government office.

Spicer, Tim: A former Scots guard and founder of Sandline. He led the Sandline operations in both PNG and in Sierra Leone. As a result of Sandline supplying weapons to Sierra Leone he was accused of breaching a UN arms embargo. In the following investigation he and Sandline were acquitted.
Appendix 2

EO and Sandline Company Network

Companies Affiliated with EO:

Some of the Executive Outcomes Family of Companies*

**Strategic Resources Ltd** [Pretoria] and **Executive Outcomes** have ties to numerous companies, with financial backing from British companies associated with a former British Special Air Service officer, associated with **Branch Energy**.

**Branch Mining** owns a diamond mining firm in Sierra Leone with 60 percent Branch Energy, 30 percent Sierra Leone Government ownership. **Branch Mining** operates in Angola (Project Luo) and reportedly in Uganda. It is a shareholder in **Heritage Oil**, a firm with Angola interests.

**Life Guard** [Sierra Leone] private security firm guarding diamond mines, trained and armed by Executive Outcomes.

**Afro Mineiro** mines diamonds in Angola with Executive Outcomes security protection. Executive Outcomes holds a 40 percent stake in the firm with Angolan partners.

**Bridge International** is an engineering joint venture with split Executive Outcomes—Angolan ownership.

**Wrangal Medical** operates field hospitals, financial backing split between Executive Outcomes and a South African.

**Ibis Air Ltd** provides air services for Executive Outcomes operations in Sierra Leone and Angola.

**Aqua Nova** drills for water in Zambia; Executive Outcomes partner.

**Double A Designs** is an engineering firm; with Executive Outcomes partner.

**Saracen International** is a security firm operating in Angola; Executive Outcomes partner.

**Advance Systems Communications Ltd** is a British firm. Executive Outcomes operates on their behalf in Africa.

**Stuart Mills** is a mine removal service associated with Executive Outcomes.

**Mechchem** is a mine removal service that is a Denel—Executive Outcomes partnership.

**Shibata Security** firm is owned by Executive Outcomes and Portuguese investors.


Reno 1997 p.177
Figure A2.1
Organisational Chart of Branch Group, EO and Sandline: