The Reconstruction of Enemies in Post-reform China

- a deconstruction of the Japanese enemy image

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Abstract

In April 2005 the Japanese authorities approved eight new history textbooks for secondary school which are accused of trivialising Japanese war crimes. Within hours, the Chinese mass media were teeming with anti-Japanese sentiments and Japanese property worth millions of dollars was vandalised by angry protesters during the weeks to follow – the question I seek to answer is how the contemporary Japanese enemy image is constructed and maintained in Chinese media?

Using a Laclau and Mouffe inspired discourse analysis strategy to analyse the Japanese enemy image as it was represented in the Chinese media in April 2005, I have identified several discourses, which by way of demonising Japan and victimising China in concert constitute and maintain the Japanese enemy image. This is achieved in part through the demarcation of self from other, whereby Japan is represented as deceitful, unrepentant, subhuman and cruel, in opposition to China as honest, accommodating, pure and innocent. In part by rendering Japan the enemy by way of the consistently emphasising Japan’s militaristic past and any perceived signs of resurgence of Japanese militarism and by representing Japan as conspiring with the United States, a known enemy of China, against Chinese interests.

Keywords: China, Japan, Discourse Theory, Othering and Enemy Images.
Characters: 78,027
## Abbreviations

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CCCPC</td>
<td>Central Committee of the Communist Party of China</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network (USA)</td>
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<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China (Chinese Communist Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>People’s Daily</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China (Taiwan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea (South Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TARC</td>
<td>Textbook Authorization and Research Council (Japan)</td>
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<td>TSU</td>
<td>Taiwan Solidarity Union (Taiwan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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1. Introduction

On Tuesday 5th of April 2005, the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science approved eight history textbooks for secondary school. One of them was a revised edition of the *New History Textbook* (Nishio et al. 2005) first approved and published in 2001. This particular textbook is written by professed nationalist historians from the *Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform*.¹ The textbook is accused of trivialising Japanese war crimes during World War II and its approval was anticipated by Japan’s neighbouring countries. The official South Korean and Chinese reactions were fast and furious, not unlike when the first edition was approved in 2001, but by comparison, the popular Chinese reactions in April 2005 were massive. In the days following the approval, Chinese media, party as well as semiprivate, covered what quickly became known as “the textbook issue” (jiàokèshū wèntí) rigorously. Popular Chinese internet forums and weblogs were teeming with anti-Japanese sentiments, calls for anti-Japanese demonstrations and boycott of Japanese products. The weekend saw several for China huge demonstrations, the largest in Beijing where 20,000 angry protesters marched on the Japanese embassy – the largest demonstration in China since the tragic pro democracy demonstrations in 1989. The demonstrations quickly spread across the mainland and Japanese property worth millions of dollars was vandalised by angry protesters during the weeks to follow. Where did this seemingly intense hatred of Japan come from and why does it still persevere so many years after the war? Most Western and Japanese media claim the demonstrations to be orchestrated by the *Communist Party of China* (CPC) for foreign policy purposes, whereas the Chinese authorities claim the demonstrations to be spontaneous outbursts of popular opinion beyond their control. In my opinion there is some rationale to both explanations which the coming chapters of this thesis will demonstrate.

Given the focus on the Chinese enemisation of Japan and my personal scientific conviction, I propose to do a qualitative case study in the interpretist tradition, rejecting that social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation of them. Through a discourse analysis of the Japanese enemy image as it was represented in the Chinese media in April 2005, I will reveal how this enemy image is constructed and maintained. The object of this thesis is not to determine the extent or cruelty of Japanese war crimes, nor is it to pass judgement on the actions of Chinese protesters or Japanese revisionists. The purpose of this thesis is

¹ The *Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho o Tsukuru Kai)* was founded in 1997 by a faction of conservative Japanese academics with the purpose of promoting a revised view of Japanese history. The society is backed by Fusosha Publishing, member of the Fuji Sankei Group, Japan’s largest media conglomerate (Nishio 2001: 34).
to reveal how the contemporary Japanese enemy image is constructed and maintained in Chinese media.

As primary empirical material, I have chosen Chinese media coverage on Japan during the month of April 2005 when the textbook issue was at its highest. For that purpose I have chosen China’s leading newspaper *People’s Daily (Rénmín Rìbào)*, a manual search of whose online archives provided me with 174 Japan-related articles from April alone, most of which had already been translated for the People’s Daily English edition, thereby limiting the amount of translation work significantly. In addition to the 174 Japan-related articles from People’s Daily, I will also draw on various theoretical literature relevant to theoretical aspects of the thesis and to the empirical case study as such.

Structure-wise the thesis is divided into three main sections: the first section covering introduction, theory and operationalisation, the second section, the body of the thesis, covering the actual discourse analysis and discussion, and lastly the third section covering conclusions and perspectives.

### 1.1 Research Question

How is the contemporary Japanese enemy image constructed and maintained in Chinese media?
2. Theory and Operationalisation

The purpose of this chapter is to operationalise theory central to the problem area of this thesis beginning with a section on methodology, in which I will adopt a discourse analysis strategy to answer the before mentioned research question, as well as account for my choice of empirical material and ending with a state of the art, discussing contemporary theories on the self/other nexus and the construction enemy images.

2.1 Methodology

In this section, I will briefly discuss the scientific origin and position of discourse theory, followed by operationalising discourse theory into a discourse analysis strategy, and ending the section by accounting for the collection of empirical material. Consequently I have divided the section into the following three subsections: Discourse Theory, Discourse Analysis Strategy and Empirical Material.

2.1.1 Discourse Theory

Social constructivism is a commonly used label for a wide range of recent theories on culture and society encompassing post-structuralism and postmodernism, of which discourse theory is one (Bevir & Rhodes 2002: 137). Common to these theories, is a critical position towards obvious knowledge, believing that we are historic and cultural beings and that the ways in which we understand and represent reality are historically and culturally specific and most importantly contingent (Dyrberg et al. 2000: 9). Discourse theory aims towards an understanding of the social sphere as a discursive construction, in which all social phenomena in principal can be analysed through discourse analysis. The overall idea is that social phenomena are never complete nor lasting, their meaning never locked, but in constant struggle over defining society and identity (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 34). In discourse theory all knowledge, identities and relations are contingent, meaning that everything is in a particular way at a certain time – but that everything could have been different – and that everything will inevitably change (ibid: 49).

Despite different conceptions of discourse, leading international discourse theorists such as French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984), British linguist Norman Fairclough (1941- ), Argentinean political theorist Ernesto Laclau (1935- ) and Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe (1943- ) all agree that our access to reality inevitably goes through our language. They all believe
that it is through our language that we construct representations of reality, which are not mirrors of any objective reality, but rather instrumental in the construction of reality (Hall 2003: 118). Thereby not suggesting that our surroundings are not real, on the contrary, representations are very real, as are the physical objects surrounding us, but it is the meanings which we assign these objects that constitute reality, not the actual objects themselves (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 108).

Some discourse theorists such as Foucault and Fairclough, distinguish between social structures and discursive structures, reserving discourse for text, speech and other semiological systems, believing social structures and discursive structures to be mutually constitutive, constructing reality in a dialectical relationship (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 28). This places Foucault and Fairclough’s narrow concept of discourse within the tradition of text orientated discourse analysis. Laclau and Mouffe on the other hand do not distinguish between social structures and discursive structures, but see all structures as discursive, believing discourse to fully constitute reality (Jensen et al. 2002: 17). This places Laclau and Mouffe’s much broader and abstract concept of discourse within the tradition of social orientated discourse analysis. Laclau has suggested understanding discourse as a kind of social optics – like a pair of social glasses through which we see and understand everything, without which we would not be able to see anything (ibid: 239). The fundamental difference between the two concepts of discourse is whether discourse is only part of what constitutes reality or whether reality itself is discursive (Dyrberg et al. 2000: 323).

Central to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is the concept of discursive struggle, where discourses are in constant struggle for hegemony, each representing a certain way of understanding particular social phenomena (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 15). Laclau and Mouffe define discourses as structural entities of difference where any one discourse is constituted as an attempt to arrest the flow of differences and dominate what they term the field of discursivity (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 111). Although Laclau and Mouffe believe complete hegemony to be unattainable, it is something every discourse strives to attain, which is why there will always be conflicting discourses struggling for hegemony (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 53). Following the metaphysical tradition that meaning is constructed in binary hierarchies, with one discourse more privileged than the other, hegemonic discourses are constantly reproduced by the otherness of opposing discourses and vice versa (Dyrberg et al. 2000: 321). According to Danish discourse theorists Marianne Winther Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, the very purpose with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis is to deconstruct the structures which constitute our ‘natural’ surroundings, thereby revealing that any given discourse is the result of political processes with social consequences (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 61). Danish political scientist Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen agrees, seeing discourse analysis essentially as a political analysis of how contingent relations become fixated in a particular way when they could have been fixated differently (Andersen 1999: 92).

For the purpose of this thesis, I have chosen the social orientated discourse analysis with its broad concept of discourse. I have done so mainly because its broader concept of discourse is in accordance with my own scientific conviction
that all structures are discursive and that discourse fully constitutes reality. Given my own scientific conviction and my focus on the seemingly hegemonic Japanese enemy image my choice of a Laclau and Mouffe inspired discourse analysis seems to me a suitable one.

2.1.2 Discourse Analysis Strategy

According to Andersen discourse theory distinguishes itself by being methodless, not presenting any master method as such. In discourse analysis it is necessary to formulate an analysis strategy dependent on problem area and empirical material on a case by case basis (Andersen 1999: 14). In agreement with Andersen, I see discourse theory first and foremost as a theoretical approach and not as a specific method of analysis, which the coming chapters of this thesis will demonstrate.

Having settled on a Laclau and Mouffe inspired discourse analytical approach in the previous section, the first couple of choices are already made in formulating a discourse analysis strategy for this thesis. Inspired by Laclau and Mouffe I will distinguish between two layers of discursivity: Discourse and field of discursivity, reserving discourse for the individual synonymous signifier and the field of discursivity for everything outside the individual discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 69). Danish discourse theorist Torben Bech Dyrberg further distinguishes between two Laclau and Mouffe discourse analytical approaches; the deconstructive analysis and the hegemony analysis. According to Dyrberg, the deconstructive analysis take its departure in the binary hierarchies and seeks to denaturalise the meanings that they instil by revealing that the privileged discourse is constituted in its relation with the subordinate discourse, which in turn is excluded by its otherness (Dyrberg et al. 2000: 321). Hegemony analysis on the other hand seeks to uncover how a particular discursive strategy is capable of transforming a chaotic, fluid and undecided terrain into a more or less frozen hierarchic structure. The hegemony analysis is essentially an analysis of the totalisation process through which particular interpretations are made universal, the relative made absolute (ibid: 322). Personally, I believe it is counterproductive to separate the two approaches as I see the two approaches as two sides of the same coin, which is why I propose combining the two, a possibility acknowledged by Andersen (Andersen 1999: 155). This will enable me to analyse how the privileged Chinese discourse is constituted in opposition to the subordinate Japanese discourse, which is in turn excluded by its otherness, as well as analyse the totalisation process whereby the Chinese discourse achieve hegemony. According to Norwegian political scientist Iver B. Neumann, discourses have the capacity to achieve hegemony whereby they remain relatively unchallenged although never completely impervious to change (Neumann 2001: 178). From my initial observations I believe the Japanese enemy image to be such a discourse – a discourse which has arrested the flow of differences within the field of discursivity thereby achieving hegemony and freezing the Japanese enemy image.

Basically the discourse analysis I propose to do will reveal how the privileged Chinese discourse is constituted in opposition to the alternative discourses on Japan, which are in turn excluded by their otherness, thereby
rendering the Chinese discourse unchallenged by arresting the flow of differences within the field of discursivity and freezing the Japanese enemy image.

2.1.3 Empirical Material

In this subsection I will account for my choice of *People’s Daily (Rénmín Ribào)* as primary empirical material for this thesis as well as the criteria used in the selection of the collected articles.

According to Swedish political scientist Catarina Kinvall, the mass media not only record and distribute information about reality, but also contribute in the construction of reality (Kinnvall 2002: 12), and in China no newspaper has been as regular and as ubiquitous as the People’s Daily (1948- ). It is published by the *Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC)* and has long served the communist party as conveyor of its ideological position and nationalist rhetoric – in effect it has been the party’s mouthpiece since the revolution and to a large extent it still is (Stenseth 1999: 55). Although times have changed since China’s communist leaders scrutinised every article before press, editorials are still subject to party approval and the paper practices strict self-censorship on sensitive political issues (Hillman 2004: 66). Once the only national newspaper in China, the People’s Daily now competes with more than 2,200 newspapers with a combined daily distribution of 94 million copies and an additional 9,000 magazines and journals according to official estimates. However, with a daily edition between three and four million copies, the People’s Daily not only has the widest distribution of any Chinese newspaper, it is still China’s largest newspaper (Leijonhufvud 2005: 6). With direct censorship long abandoned, the Chinese media today practices strict self-censorship, with the danger of post-publication retribution ever present – under constant pressure to avoid political blunders most journalists and editors have learned to play it safe (Zhao 1998: 21). To thousands of journalists and editorial staff across the country, the People’s Daily serves as a convenient guideline for what can and what cannot be printed, and in that sense the People’s Daily carries substantially more weight than its readership would let believe. The People’s Daily is setting the agenda on a multitude of issues and is cited extensively in other media, be it printed, radio or television (ibid: 18). Even with many semiprivate media pushing the limit of what can be printed or aired due to the increasing commercialisation of the Chinese mass media, the authority of the People’s Daily is still omnipresent in Chinese media today. This level of control over the media has served the communist party as a means to accomplish ideological and moral hegemony by providing the Chinese people with official representations of reality in most aspects of life (Giese 2004: 21).

Given the above, I believe there is good reason to choose People’s Daily for an analysis like this one, but a contributing factor was that the People’s Daily

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2 The *Propaganda Department* is an internal department under the *Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC)*, the highest authority within the Communist Party, traditionally responsible for party propaganda, but also and perhaps more importantly controls the party’s elaborate web of media control and censorship in China (Saich 2001: 85).
translates the majority of its articles for their English edition, thereby limiting the amount of translation work significantly – of the 174 articles collected only nine did not have an official English translation. One of the ever more popular and daring tabloids like Southern Metropolitan News (Nánfāng Dāshi Bāo) or Global Times (Huánqiú Shibào), or increasingly popular internet forums like the Strong Nation Forum (Qiángguó Lùntán), which incidentally is moderated by People’s Daily, would have served my purpose equally well, albeit shifting the focus slightly. All would, however, have entailed months of translation work or the employment of a professional translator, both of which are beyond the scope of this thesis. All things considered, I believe the People’s Daily will serve the purpose of this thesis very well.

The textbook issue took off in the Chinese media on April 6, the day after the Japanese approval of the new history textbooks and died out again soon after the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s (1942- ) public apology on April 22, for the damage and suffering caused by Japan in the past. This is why I have specifically chosen to concentrate on news coverage from that period. A manual search of People’s Daily’s online archives provided me with 174 Japan-related articles from the month of April 2005, all of which are included in the list of People’s Daily Online articles in the appendixes. In addition to the 174 Japan-related articles from People’s Daily Online, I will also draw on various theoretical literature relevant to theoretical aspects of the thesis and to the empirical case study as such.

2.2 State of the Art

In this section I will briefly account for and discuss contemporary theories in the scientific study of the Self/Other Nexus and the construction of Enemy Images which I will draw on in the discourse analysis to follow.

The scientific study of enemy images is often thought of as a subfield within the rapidly expanding field of identity studies, which has gained momentum since the end of the cold war (Harle 2000: 21). Since the collapse of communism, identity studies have emerged as a true interdisciplinary field of study spanning from humanities to social sciences. That the particular subfield of enemy images has its roots in social psychology, further testifies to the interdisciplinary nature of the field (Neumann 1996: 144). Adherents of primordial identity theory are few and far between in contemporary identity studies as are conservative instrumentalists, which place the majority of contemporary studies within the interpretist tradition (Bevir & Rhodes 2002: 135). It is therefore no coincidence that all the theoretical literature to be discussed in this section falls within the interpretist tradition as indeed does this study of the Japanese enemy image.
2.2.1 The Self/Other Nexus

In his most recent monograph *Stories about Strangers: Swedish Media Constructions of Socio-Cultural Risk*, Swedish political scientist Bo Petersson, argues that identities are socially constructed, only meaningful in context, multiple and multidimensional and constructed in the interface between *self* and *other* (Petersson 2006: 124). This line of reasoning is very similar to Neumann who also believes identities to be socially constructed in the boundaries between *us* and *them*, only attaining meaning in context and constitutive for our actions rather than constituted by them. Furthermore Neumann sees the delineation between self and other as an active and ongoing process of identity formation in which the formation of boundaries is not a consequence of integration but a necessary precondition. The issue to Neumann is not that exclusion takes place, but rather how it takes place (Neumann 1996: 168). According to Neumann, studies of identity construction should therefore focus on how these social boundaries come into existence and how they are maintained (Neumann 1999: 35). What I miss from Neumann in relation to the problem area of this thesis, however, is a clearer delineation between the other and the enemy. Finnish political scientist Vilho Harle, for the most part agrees with Petersson and Neumann, believing identities to be constituted in the social interaction where boundaries between them and us are established, however, not merely as instances of abstract constructions of social reality, but as a substantive element in the politics of exclusion where identity is first and foremost a means of political mobilisation (Harle 2000: 4).

Whether studying individual or collective identities Petersson, Neumann and Harle all agree that identities are socially constructed in the boundaries between self and other, that identities are relational, and that the self is only meaningful in contrast to others. Identities imply difference, their existence presupposes the existence of others, other individuals or other nations, who do not belong to the in-group and from whom the in-group must be distinguished. According to Greek political scientist Anna Triandafyllidou, this means that identity has no meaning per se, as identities become meaningful only in contrast to others (Triandafyllidou 1998: 599). The self cannot be constructed as an object of experience without that to which the self is opposed, it’s opposite, the other (Aho 1999: 64). Basically only by identifying that which we are not, can we begin to define who we are – in delineating ourselves from the others we define ourselves.

To Kinnvall, a defining characteristic of the others is that they are always stereotyped as a uniform out-group, whereas the in-group consists of individuals who all share the same fundamental values (Kinnvall 2003: 14). Furthermore, Bulgarian-French philosopher Julia Kristeva, believes that stereotyped others are always represented positively or negatively but never neutrally (Kristeva 1991: 39). Palestinian-American literary theorist Edward Said’s (1935-2003) study *Orientalism* is perhaps the most significant study of this process of *othering* whereby the Orient has been stereotyped as primitive, irrational, weak, and feminine as opposed to the West as modern, rational, strong and masculine (Said 1978: 11). Kinnvall believes this system of constructing self and other is essentially a means to define superior and inferior identities (Kinnvall 2004: 763).
According to Mouffe, only when we recognize that every identity is relational and that the affirmation of difference is a precondition for the existence of any identity can we begin to understand why such a relationship has the potential for becoming a terrain for antagonism. When it comes to the construction of collective identities – the construction of us by the demarcation of them – then there is always a possibility that this us/them relationship will become one of friend and foe, that is, one of antagonism. This happens when the other, who until now has been considered simply as different, begins to be perceived as someone who is rejecting our identity and who is threatening our existence. From that moment on, any kind of us/them relationship – whether it be national, religious, ethnic, economic or other – becomes political (Mouffe 1994: 107), a line of reasoning similar to that of Petersson, Neumann and Harle.

On the national level Triandafyllidou argues that the identity of a nation is constructed and/or reconstructed in opposition to significant others, that is, other nations or ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness and/or independence (Triandafyllidou 1998: 594). A significant other need not be a stronger and larger nation or a community with more resources than the in-group. To Triandafyllidou the feature that makes the out-group a significant other is that it is perceived to pose a threat to the existence of the nation, a line of reasoning similar to that of Mouffe and Petersson. According to Triandafyllidou the history of every nation is marked by the presence of significant others that have influenced the development of its national identity by means of their ‘threatening’ presence (ibid: 600). These significant others become particularly salient in periods of social, political or economic crisis during which the identity of the nation is put into question. In times of crisis the significant other serves in overcoming the crisis by uniting the in-group in facing a common enemy (ibid: 603). At times of uncertainty and rapid change, such essentialised identity patterns often gain predominance in the construction and/or reconstruction of an enemy other (Calhoun 1994: 320).

2.2.2 Enemy Images

Petersson defines enemy images as a particular threatening variant of negative stereotypes of the other which have been cemented in the years of upbringing, through the educational system and through mass media to a degree where they become frozen images (Petersson 2006: 34). Whereas negative stereotypes of the other signify risk, enemy images purport acute threat and danger (ibid: 27). Such enemy images are in turn highly instrumental in constructing and upholding the boundaries between self and other (Petersson 2003: 106). According to Petersson, enemy images are like conspiracy theories in that they cannot be falsified, as all evidence collected from popular wisdom can be used as corroborating evidence (Petersson 2006: 34). Petersson does not only see enemy images as social constructions, but also as inherited and reinforced by successive generations and as such relatively impervious to change (Petersson 2003: 110). Thus Petersson does not leave the subject much room for manoeuvre in the construction of enemy
images, which he sees not only as socially constructed but also inherited and highly change resistant.

Harle identifies a tendency in political thought to portray the other not just as an enemy, but as evil incarnate dehumanised by religious and political ideas, whilst pointing out that the enemy is always the other, not all others are enemies (Harle 2000: 13). Similar to Petersson’s line of reasoning on the reproduction of enemy images through time, Harle sees the tradition of self and other as vehicles of good and evil as reproduced in thought, speech and politics going back to antiquity. Although Harle believes this struggle between good and evil to be socially and politically constructed, he also argues that this struggle never takes place without human actors and their imagination of such a struggle (ibid: 4). Harle’s main interest is not the actual social construction of the enemy and the boundary interaction that constitutes identity and enmity, but rather he maintains that enemy images are primarily products of intentional political processes rooted in ancient religious and political imagery (ibid: 20). Harle clearly leaves more room for the subject than Petersson, but more importantly I find Harle’s insistence on the role of politics in the construction of enemies, highly relevant to the problem area of this thesis. In agreement with Harle, Mouffe argues that a political community only exists through that which negates it, the enemy. The construction of us inevitably involves the construction of them and in politics that involves the designation of an enemy (Mouffe 1994: 108).

Contrary to Harle, American sociologist James Aho, is specifically interested in the social processes whereby enemies are constructed and in addition the social interaction whereby enemies can be deconstructed and enmity overcome. Aho sees the enemy as a collective production, constituted socially by the collective and not as a phenomenon any one individual usually accomplishes alone (Aho 1994: 5). Like Petersson, Neumann and Harle, Aho believes the other is essential in the construction of identity, whereas the enemy is required to blame for all the bad things in life. Aho further argues that the social construction of the enemy rests upon a sense of righteousness, which demands the destruction of the enemy in order to safeguard that very moral righteousness. Aho sees the other as inseparable from the self and evil as inseparable from good, but in line with Harle, questions whether the other, however pivotal to the self, necessarily has to be an enemy (ibid: 116). For Aho, the enemy exists both as a subjective social construction and in many cases as an objective reality. The question to Aho is how to tell the difference between the two (ibid: 184).

The problem of discernment is also central to American philosopher Richard Kearney: “How can we tell the difference between benign and malign others? How do we know, […] when the other is truly the enemy who seeks to destroy us or an innocent scapegoat projected by our phobias?” On these questions, Kearney contends, much of postmodern research remains silent (Kearney 2003: 67). German historian Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, agrees with Kearney in so far that most contemporary research provides no analytical tools to distinguish between threats that are real and those that are imagined, and as such, much of contemporary research is useless in the assessment of enmity (Fiebig-von Hase 1997: 39). On the question of discernment I disagree with Aho and Fiebig-von
Hase in so far that I do not believe there are both real and imagined enemies. I believe there are only imagined enemies, which is why it is not possible to discern between the two. This, however, does not imply that some imagined enemies are not more potent than other imagined enemies, only that all enemies are imagined and as such none more real than the other.

In relation to this thesis I consider Petersson, Harle and Mouffe to be most useful – in particular I find Harle’s insistence on the political dimension in the construction of enemy images interesting. For the purpose of this thesis I will not distinguish between significant others, malign others, enemy others and enemy images, but depart from Petersson’s definition of enemy images as a particular threatening variant of negative stereotypes of the other which have been cemented in the years of upbringing, through the educational system and through mass media to a degree where they become frozen images.
3. The Japanese Enemy Image

The object of this chapter, the actual discourse analysis, is to analyse the Japanese enemy image as it was represented on the People’s Daily Online in April 2005. Through a Laclau and Mouffe inspired discourse analysis I will answer my research question by revealing how the contemporary Japanese enemy image is constructed and maintained in Chinese media.

In order to form a general view of the content and character of the 174 Japan-related articles collected from People’s Daily Online, I began by identifying them as belonging to eight discourses, in concert constituting and maintaining the seemingly hegemonic Japanese enemy image:

1. *The textbook issue*. Articles specifically or primarily about the textbook issue, at the heart of which are the alleged Japanese denial of war crimes committed during World War II.

2. *Sino-Japanese relations*. These articles concern Sino-Japanese relations of a more non specific or less controversial nature than the other categories listed here.


4. *Japanese war crimes*. Articles on a variety of subjects concerning Japanese war crimes such as new evidence, memorials and exhibitions, comfort women, personal accounts, civil lawsuits, chemical and biological warfare and the mass killing of civilians.

5. *The Yasukuni Shrine*. These articles deal with leading politician’s visits to the controversial Shinto shrine in Tokyo dedicated to the souls of those who have died in the service of the Japanese emperor.

6. *The East China Sea dispute*. These articles concern the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the uninhabited Diaoyutai Islands and not least the marine drilling rights in the waters surrounding them.

7. *Sino-Japanese trade and economic interdependence*. Articles primarily concerning Sino-Japanese trade and economic interdependence, but also the race for economic supremacy in Asia.

8. *News coverage*. A variety of short news pieces about half of which are about a disastrous train derailment in western Japan, the other half covering fashion, entertainment, sports and science.

Apart from sorting the articles by way of discourse affiliation, I have also sorted them according to publication date in four intervals and most importantly according to whether they represent Japan in a generally negative, neutral or
positive manner (see table in the appendixes). Out of 174 articles collected, 136 represent Japan in a generally negative manner – more than 75% of the articles surveyed – which alone would appear to support my initial hypothesis that the Japanese enemy image is a hegemonic discourse through which all things Japanese are seen and understood. Although I do not refer specifically to every article in the coming analysis they have all helped me form an impression of the Chinese discourse, that would not have been possible with only the handful of articles actually referred to in the analysis. However, as a means to delimitate my empirical material I have chosen to omit the discourse News coverage from the analysis. I have done so primarily because this particular discourse adds no perspectives to the analysis not already covered by the other seven discourses. The articles comprising this discourse are mainly short news pieces about half of which are about a disastrous train derailment in western Japan, the other half covering fashion, entertainment, sports and science. Although not as negative as the other discourses, this discourse appears to neither support nor refute my preliminary findings from the other discourses, which is why I consider it superfluous to this analysis.

Furthermore, in my preliminary reading of the 174 Japan-related articles collected from People’s Daily Online, I noticed a strong tendency to both demonise Japan and victimise China. The language used in the articles is for the most part bitter, accusatory and emotionally charged - Japan is generally portrayed as evil whereas China is generally portrayed as an innocent victim of international power politics. I believe this rather apparent demonisation of Japan and victimisation of China to be a decisive dynamics in the discursive construction of the Japanese enemy image as they continuously reaffirm one another whilst in a dialectical relationship constituting the Japanese enemy image. In relation to the construction of enemy images, Petersson argues that the media seldom constructs new stereotypes, but rather latches on to and strengthens ideas that are already part of popular wisdom. Moreover, through the consistency of the stereotypes that they peddle, the media have considerable impact when it comes to entrenching certain stereotypes in popular awareness (Petersson 2006: 27). Through the consistent demonisation of Japan and the equally consistent victimisation of China, I believe the People’s Daily is doing just that, entrenching the Japanese enemy image in the minds of the Chinese people. As a consequence of these preliminary observations, I have structured the analysis accordingly, the first section on the analysis focusing on the demonisation of Japan and the second section of the analysis focusing on the victimisation of China. In each section I will analyse a cross section of the articles collected from People’s Daily Online shifting the focus between the demonisation of Japan and the victimisation of China.

For the purpose of this analysis I will consider the articles to represent seven discourses, in concert constituting and maintaining the seemingly hegemonic Japanese enemy image. In accordance with my discourse theoretical approach, when analysing the articles I am in effect analysing the seven discourses (Dyrberg et al. 2000: 326). This discourse analysis of the Japanese enemy image is based
primarily on the articles collected from People’s Daily Online, supported by relevant secondary material and my findings in the previous chapter.

3.1 The Demonisation of Japan

For the purpose of this analysis I will define *demonisation* as the representation of an out-group, in this case Japan, as evil, with the purpose of rendering plausible an imminent threat to the in-group, in this case China. The imminence and seriousness of the perceived threat being what distinguishes the enemy image from other negative stereotypes (Petersson 2006: 27). Demonising an out-group, in this case Japan, usually requires the suspension of all human consideration and respect for the out-group. The demonised out-group is recognised by the consistency with which it is rendered subhuman and evil, thereby legitimating any countermeasures deemed necessary by the in-group. A common purpose for demonising an out-group is to divert attention from the out-groups representation of reality and to discredit this representation of reality. According to British Asia scholar Caroline Rose, the most common and immediate effects of such demonisation, intentional or otherwise, are oppressive behaviour against the demonised out-group, an increased sense of belonging to the in-group and support for the leadership of the in-group (Rose 2000: 170).

In this, the first part of the analysis, where focus will be on the *demonisation of Japan*, I have chosen to concentrate my analysis on the following four discourses: *The textbook issue, Japan’s aspirations in the United Nations, Japanese war crimes* and *The Yasukuni Shrine*. I have chosen these four discourses, because the demonisation of Japan is particularly pervasive in these discourses - all the 79 articles that constitute these four discourses represent Japan in a generally negative manner (see appendixes).

3.1.1 The Textbook Issue

The textbook issue of spring last year was not the first such controversy. In fact the two countries shared history has been an area of recurring antagonism in Sino-Japanese relations. The first row was in 1982 after the Japanese *Textbook Authorization and Research Council (TARC)* recommended that the word *invasion (shinryaku)* be replaced with *advance (shinshutsu)* to describe Japan’s annexation of northeast China in both primary and secondary school textbooks (Nishio 2001: 34). Since then there have been several incidents, one of which was the approval of the first edition of the *New History Textbook* in 2001, however, the controversy over the approval of the second edition in spring of last year represented a new low in Sino-Japanese relations.

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3 The *Textbook Authorization and Research Council (TARC)* is the actual department in the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science charged with checking and approving textbooks for elementary and secondary school. After approving a selection of textbooks it is up to the local *Boards of Education* to determine which textbooks to be used in their locality (Rose 2005: 57).
Whilst the People’s Daily Online did carry a handful of articles on the anticipated textbook approval in the days leading up to the official authorization, the frenzy only really set in after the approval with the editorial: “Written lies can never cover up bloody facts” (PD 2005.04.06f). On April 6, the People’s Daily Online carried a total of 12 pieces on the textbook issue making it their top story. The textbook was described as “packed with lies, contradictions and myths” (PD 2005.04.01a) and “blatantly distorting history and glorifying Japan’s invasion of its neighbouring countries more than half a century ago” (PD 2005.04.06f). At the heart of the Chinese indignation is the textbook’s alleged denial of the ‘Rape of Nanjing’ which seen through the optics of the Chinese discourse is tantamount to German denial of the holocaust (PD 2005.04.21g). The textbook’s alleged denial of the Rape of Nanjing is mentioned in all but a few of the articles thereby serving to emphasise the Japanese dishonesty by repetition. By denying an established truth and defining moment in contemporary Chinese history as “the infamous Rape of Nanjing, in which at least 300,000 civilians were slaughtered by Japanese troops” (PD 2005.04.01a), the textbook loses all credibility. In establishing that the textbook is less than truthful, by implication, so is the Japanese government for approving the textbook (PD 2005.04.21g). Even after the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s public apology, Japan was still represented as deceitful and unrepentant: “Japan’s ‘remorse’ remains merely lip service. In reality, the country keeps breaking its promises and repeatedly violates its commitments” (PD 2005.04.30d). The more deceitful the Japanese government appeared, the more honest the Chinese government appeared, because it stood in opposition to dishonesty. Furthermore, nine out of 43 articles deals with the South Korean indignation over the textbook approval and an additional three, covers the North Korean, Singaporean and Vietnamese reactions. Hereby these four countries are used to lend support to the truthfulness of the Chinese discourse thereby further weakening the Japanese discourse. Another narrative practice whereby authority is lent to the Chinese discourse is the use of nameless foreign experts for support, for example a French China scholar (PD 2005.04.22c) and an American historian (PD 2005.04.21g). Also, the widespread use of definite modalities such as “The crimes committed by Japan’s militarists during World War II are irrefutable” (PD 2005.04.06f) both reflects and strengthens the authority of the Chinese discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 96).

Overall this discourse relating to the textbook issue represents Japan as dishonest and unrepentant in opposition to Chinese honesty and innocence. More importantly to the problem area of this thesis, however, the discourse also represents Japan as hostile and threatening: “Japan’s younger generations are in danger of sliding back to militarism” (PD 2005.04.01a) and “they [the authors] are rightly accused of hoping for the revival of militarism and the expansion of Japan’s military influence. […] their attempt to distort history poses a serious challenge to regional peace” (PD 2005.04.09e). Moreover Japan is also portrayed

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4 The ‘Rape of Nanjing’ refers to the atrocities committed in and around the former Chinese capital Nanjing by the Imperial Japanese Army after the city fell on the December 13, 1937. Although estimates vary from a few thousand to 300,000 civilian casualties in the six week long massacre, it is one best documented war crimes committed by the Imperial Japanese Army (Gries 2004: 80).
as conspiring with the United States, whose hostility towards China is already an established truth\(^5\), thereby making Japan seem ever more hostile and threatening (PD 2005.04.07h).

3.1.2 Japan’s Aspirations in the United Nations

Japan has for the past couple of years lobbied for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, when and if a decision to expand can be reached in the United Nations. Although the Chinese leadership has not officially opposed this, it is hard to imagine that they are thrilled about the prospect of Japan in the Security Council, given that it would shift the current power balance in East Asia in Japan’s favour (Okamoto & Tanaka 2005: 13). Should it ever come to a vote in the Security Council, China could be forced to veto, which would be detrimental to China’s short term economic development. Accepting Japan in the Security Council would, however, be devastating to the Chinese leadership’s nationalistic image – regardless, the Chinese leadership stands to undermine its political foundation – economic development and nationalism.

Instead, China “supports reforms of the Security Council, but objects to setting a timetable for the process”. Japan on the other hand is portrayed as allying with Brazil, Germany and India in scheming to “force through a resolution in the general assembly” (PD 2005.04.07a). On the whole the articles tell a tale of massive foreign opposition to the Japanese aspirations. A few of the articles quote a recent CNN online quickvote where 95% of the 1.5 million respondents were opposed to Japan gaining a permanent seat in the Security Council, whereby the support of 1.5 million individuals are lent to the Chinese discourse (PD 2005.04.13j). As was the case with the textbook articles, foreign countries are used as a means to construct consensus, in this case, the opposition of South Korea (PD 2005.04.01e), Italy, Mexico and Pakistan (PD 2005.04.07a), whilst only the United States, a known enemy of China, seems to support the Japanese aspirations. Only, seen through the optics of the Chinese discourse, US support lends suspicion rather than legitimacy to the Japanese aspirations (PD 2005.04.19e). Also, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s official visits to Europe, India and Pakistan are represented as attempts to solicit support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council. In the case of Pakistan by implying that Japan is trying to buy their support with development assistance (PD 2005.04.30e). Furthermore, a number of the articles also link Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the Security Council with the textbook issue, claiming that the Chinese people “have every reason to suspect whether Japan is qualified to represent Asia in the United Nations Security Council without a correct understanding of history […] and without the trust of the Asian people” (PD 2005.04.14e). On April 13, during an official visit to India, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao (1942- ) told the international press, that only a country that

\(^5\) A circumstance seriously aggravated by the seemingly accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. To date a majority of Chinese still believe the Belgrade embassy bombing to be an intentional act of aggression by the United States (Gries 2004: 21).
respects history and takes responsibility for its past, can take on greater responsibility in the international community, clearly referring to the textbook issue and the Japanese aspirations in the United Nations (Gries 2005b: 255). “How can a country unable to come to terms with its own past and reconcile with its neighbours, be trusted with such an important task?” was the question posed in an editorial by the People’s Daily the following day (PD 2005.04.14e).

As a whole this discourse relating to Japan’s aspirations in the United Nations, represents Japan as conniving, as conspiring with the United States and as trying to manipulate and buy their way into the Security Council. Whilst none of the articles represents Japan as outright hostile or threatening, they do cast serious suspicion on the motives behind the Japanese aspirations.

3.1.3 Japanese War Crimes

Amidst the tensions of the textbook issue, the Chinese authorities announced that they were applying for UNESCO World Heritage status for Unit 731, arguing that Unit 731 should qualify for World Heritage status, with Auschwitz Concentration Camp and Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall already on the list of World Heritage sites (PD 2005.04.19c). I do not believe the timing of this application to be a coincidence – given the extremely strained relationship with Japan at the time, it could be perceived that the Chinese leadership was using history as a weapon, to use Swedish historian Klas-Göran Karlsson’s term (Karlsson 1999: 57). In accordance with Karlsson’s terminology, I believe Unit 731 and other Japanese war crimes such as the Rape of Nanjing, are deliberately used to legitimise the communist leadership and rationalise their policy towards Japan, not just domestically but also internationally, for example in relation to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.

The articles on Japanese war crimes, paints a detailed picture of a variety of Japanese atrocities and in extension, the cruelty of the Japanese Imperial Army. The Rape of Nanjing is as always notably represented, which seem to correspond with Friedman’s belief that the Rape of Nanjing is the very embodiment of China’s anti-Japanese nationalism (Friedman 2001: 108). Also the issue of Chinese, Korean and Philippine Comfort Women (Wèiān fù) in the Imperial Japanese Army is covered by a couple of articles (PD 2005.04.06p). In the articles concerning Unit 731, the laboratories are described as “experimenting on human subjects […] in the development of biological weapons, such as bubonic plague, typhoid, anthrax and cholera” which were used “outside the camp, where thousands of Chinese, estimated at more than 200,000, were killed” (PD 2005.04.19h). A narrative practice used in some of these articles, is the use of

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6 Unit 731 was a medical experimentation unit of the Imperial Japanese Army situated near Harbin in northeast China and the unit was allegedly involved in biological warfare experiments. The number of casualties resulting from Unit 731 experiments is disputed; estimates vary between 3,000 and 200,000 civilians and prisoners of war (Rose 2005: 91).

7 Comfort Women (Wèiān fù) is a euphemism for women who provided or were forced to provide sex in Japanese military brothels during World War II. Estimates put the number of comfort women between 80,000 and 200,000 women of various nationalities (Rose 2005: 87).
personal accounts of the atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army (PD 2005.04.11b). This personification of Japanese war crimes, lends narrative authority to the articles, in the sense that it is much harder to refute personal testimony than more general allegations. Also, one article reveals the uncovering of several barrels of Japanese mustard gas in Qiqihar in northeast China (PD 2005.04.12e), the site of a similar find in 2003, in which several Chinese construction workers were killed and injured, thereby adding chemical warfare to the list of Japanese atrocities (Gries 2005a: 114). Another article deals with a recently rejected civil lawsuit, one in a long line of rejected civil lawsuits brought against the Japanese state, thereby reaffirming the impression that Japan has no remorse for the war crimes committed during World War II (PD 2005.04.20c).

By and large this discourse relating to Japanese war crimes is a narrative of unbelievable Japanese cruelty. Human comprehension generally fails to grasp how such atrocities can be committed by fellow human beings, because that would make us capable of similar crimes. As a defence mechanism the perpetrators, in this case the Japanese soldiers, are constructed as subhuman representations of evil – or in the words of American political scientist Peter Hays Gries: “The dehumanisation of the other serves to exclude them from the moral community of humanity” (Gries 2001: 40).

3.1.4 The Yasukuni Shrine

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (1918- ) was the first serving Japanese Prime Minister to visit the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985. Then followed Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (1937-2006) in 1996 and since then visits have been conducted on a regular basis, not least by the current Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (Dreyer 2001: 378). Each time followed official protests from South Korea and China. The Chinese media tend to analyse the visits from one of two angles: either as indicative of a reassertion of Japanese militarism or as instigated by the United States as part of a strategy to contain China (Dreyer 1999: 332).

To the Chinese leadership “the Yasukuni Shrine is a shrine of war” and the visits by leading Japanese politicians are seen as being purely politically motivated (PD 2005.04.01b). At the heart of the controversy are the tablets of 1,068 convicted war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni, including those of 12 convicted of Class A war crimes against China and Korea (Rose 2005: 112). To the Chinese, the visits present a major obstacle in the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations (PD 2005.04.15g). Chinese diplomats have suggested moving the tablets of convicted war criminals, but so far no amiable solution has been reached (Rose 2005: 117), and as long as the Chinese construe the visits as official worship of war criminals the problem is likely to persist (PD 2005.04.01b). Three of the articles cover the visit of a leading politician from the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), a Taiwanese political party advocating

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8 The Yasukuni Shrine is a controversial Shinto shrine in Tokyo dedicated to the 2.5 million men and women who died in the service of the Japanese emperor, amongst them 1,068 convicted war criminals including 12 convicted of Class A war crimes during World War II (Rose 2005: 112).
Taiwanese independence, which is portrayed as outright treason by the People’s Daily (PD 2005.04.05d). The tacit Japanese support of Taiwanese independence is another difficulty in Sino-Japanese relations that flares up from time to time.

On the whole this discourse relating to the Yasukuni Shrine, represents Japan as unrepentant and sacrilegious in worshipping the souls of convicted war criminals – easily amounting to devil worship seen through the optics of the Chinese discourse in which Japanese war criminals are already established as subhuman representations of evil. Moreover the articles portray Japan as a country dangerously flirting with its militaristic past – the danger as perceived by the Chinese is, that if it could happen once it can happen again, given the right (or wrong) political climate.

3.2 The Victimisation of China

For the purpose of this analysis I will define *victimisation* as the representation of the in-group, in this case China, as an innocent victim of injustice, with the purpose of rendering the in-group uniquely pure and morally superior to the victimiser, in this case Japan.

The claim of victimisation is a cry of pain after the torture lets up. The Chinese are a people screaming for air to breathe, seeking surcease from agony, grateful that the era of persecution has, at last, ended. (Friedman 1997: 89)

However, American China scholar Edward Friedman, also believes that the Chinese perception of being endlessly insulted, this Chinese nationalism of victimisation, is generated by historical and domestic experiences of reality, rather than by contemporary international reality (Friedman 2001: 107). By encouraging this sense of victimisation, the Chinese leadership is, intentionally or not, promoting a ‘negative’ nationalism that is based on humiliation rather than pride (Hillman 2004: 73). Gries argues that the Chinese are increasingly constructing a ‘victimisation narrative’ of the Chinese suffering, at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists during the *Century of Humiliation* (*Bāmiàn Guόchǐ*) and that this has created a strong and widespread desire to restore China to a position of dominance in East Asia (Gries 2005a: 106). American political scientist June Teufel Dreyer, agrees believing that this perceived national humiliation is central to the Chinese construction of Japan as a hostile rival (Dreyer 1999: 322). I have no difficulty identifying this sense of victimisation and national humiliation in the articles and as mentioned earlier I also believe it to be central in the construction of Sino-Japanese enmity. Furthermore I tend to agree with Friedman that this Chinese victimisation is generated by historical and domestic representations of reality, rather than by international representations of reality.

In this, the second part of the analysis, where focus will be on *the victimisation of China*, I have chosen to concentrate my analysis on the following four discourses: *Sino-Japanese relations*, *Japanese war crimes*, *The East China Sea dispute* and *Sino-Japanese trade and economic interdependence*. I have chosen to reuse the articles on Japanese war crimes in this second part of the
analysis, because the question of Japanese war crimes in particular servers in both
demonising Japan and victimising China. Of the 88 articles that constitute these
four discourses, 65 represent Japan in a generally negative manner, 16 in a
generally neutral manner and seven in a generally positive manner – with 74% of
the articles representing Japan in a generally negative manner, these discourses
are predominately negative in their representation of Japan (see appendixes).

3.2.1 Sino-Japanese Relations

The majority of these articles on Sino-Japanese relations are a spin-off from the
textbook issue, in the sense that most of the articles deal with the strained bilateral
relationship caused by the textbook issue. Also, as can be seen from the table in
the appendixes, as the number of articles on the textbook issue decreases the
number of articles on Sino-Japanese relations increases. Whilst some of the
articles represent Japan in a generally neutral or positive manner, the majority of
the articles still represent Japan in a generally negative manner.

The language of the articles is more conciliatory than the language in the
textbook issue articles, however, most of the articles do not fail to mention that
“Japan is the principal cause for the current Sino-Japanese tension” (PD
2005.04.05c) and that “the responsibility for the current situation in Sino-Japanese
relations does not lie with China” (PD 2005.04.11a). Essentially China is
portrayed as an innocent victim of increasing Japanese militarism, thereby
contributing to the victimisation narrative. Even after the Chinese government had
demanded that the media contribute positively in improving Sino-Japanese
relations (PD 2005.04.16f) and focus had shifted away from the textbook issue
towards reconciliation, many articles still gave the impression that whilst China is
sincere in wanting to improve bilateral relations, Japan is not (PD 2005.04.21a).
Even after the Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s public apology on
April 22, some articles still implied that Japan is all talk and no action (PD
2005.04.25e). A few of the articles also mentions the anti-Japanese
demonstrations in passing, although never in any detail and always as reasonable
yet spontaneous outbursts of popular opinion (PD 2005.04.13c). This would seem
to confirm reports, that the Propaganda Department had ordered a media blackout
on this particular aspect of the textbook issue, especially given the media
coverage the demonstrations received outside China (Leijonhufvud 2005: 6).
However interesting this aspect of the controversy is, it is not of primary concern
to the problem area of this thesis – focus is not on how angry the protesters were
or what did and did not happen in connection with the demonstrations, but rather
how the protesters came to hate Japan so intensely in the first place.

What I believe is important, however, is how this discourse represents China
as a country that has had enough and will take no more humiliation, during the
first days of the controversy, a China that is “no longer a weak nation that can be
oppressed and exploited by anyone” (PD 2005.04.09b). Whilst towards the end of
the month the message conveyed was that although China has been unjustly
victimised by Japan, the Chinese people should look to the future and build a
stronger China that cannot be victimised anymore (PD 2005.04.29a).
3.2.2 Japanese War Crimes

When analysing this discourse in the previous section, focus was on the demonisation of Japan, but it became apparent to me, that this discourse is equally important in the victimisation of China. As already established in the previous section the Rape of Nanjing is central in the demonisation of Japan, but I also believe the Rape of Nanjing to be crucial in the victimisation of China. In this regard I believe that the Rape of Nanjing is best understood as a chosen trauma. A term Turkish-American psychologist Vamik Volkan, uses to describe the collective memory of a calamity that once befell the in-group’s ancestors, not just as simple recollections, but as a shared mental representation of the cataclysmic event (Volkan 1997: 48). These shared mental representations are not, as the media so often portray them, primordial feelings of ancient hatred or ingrained hostility waiting to break out. As a concept, Kinnvall believes chosen traumas are useful in understanding how feelings of ‘ancient hatred’ are constructed and maintained. By turning a historic event into a chosen trauma, it becomes a ‘naturalised’ part of the in-group’s collective memory, serving the in-group in the demarcation of self from other (Kinnvall 2004: 755). To Kinnvall such chosen traumas are not only used in constructing, cementing and mobilising the in-group, but also in constructing an other upon whom, these feelings of ancient hatred can be directed (ibid: 756).

Understood as a chosen trauma the Chinese preoccupation with the Rape of Nanjing not only becomes the centre of the victimisation narrative, but also contributes significantly to the demarcation of self from other whereby the Japanese enemy image is constructed. On Tomb Sweeping Day⁹ which fell on April 5, the day before the textbook approval, millions of Chinese spent the day honouring the dead, not least the “300,000 Chinese victims slaughtered by invading Japanese troops” in the Rape of Nanjing (PD 2005.04.06n). The “Anti-Japanese War” (Kàng-rì Zhànzhēng) as World War II is commonly know in China, is commemorated several times a year on various anniversaries of past Japanese acts of aggression, often with very explicit public exhibitions depicting the victims of Japanese atrocities (Friedman 2000: 103). In northeast China alone there are more than 30 sites commemorating the Japanese invasion, together receiving hundreds of thousands of visitors a year, not least school children on excursion (Zhao 1998: 295). These recurring public commemorations of Japanese war crimes and the media’s preoccupation with the “Japanese invasion of Nanjing and the orgy of killing that followed” (PD 2005.04.06q), contributes to the constant demonisation of Japan and victimisation of China whereby the Japanese enemy image is entrenched in the minds of the Chinese people. This process is further facilitated and strengthened through Patriotic Education (Àiguózhǔyì

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⁹ *Tomb Sweeping Day (Qīngmíngjié)* is a Chinese national holiday where people traditionally tend to the graves of departed family members and honour the dead. Recently it has also been associated with commemorating the martyrs and victims of the Japanese occupation (Rose 2005: 109).
at all levels of education from kindergarten to university (Zhao 2004: 66). According to former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (1926- ) the purpose with the Patriotic Education Programme “is to raise national self-respect and self-confidence among the Chinese people, particularly among the youth and the children, and to prevent servile worship of foreign things and obsequious behaviour toward foreign countries and foreigners.” (Jiang 1999: 53). That contemporary anti-Japanese sentiments are stronger among the younger generation than it is among the older generation who actually experienced the war is hardly surprising then, given that the majority of the younger generation has received patriotic education since early childhood (Okamoto & Tanaka 2005: 11). Although the Chinese claim that “patriotic education is not anti-Japanese education” (PD 2005.04.22g) the correlation is hard to ignore. This aspect of the demonisation and victimisation narratives would seem to correspond with Peterssons analysis, that enemy images are cemented in the years of upbringing, through the educational system and through the mass media (Petersson 2006: 34).

In my opinion, the Chinese victimisation narrative permeates this discourse equally as does the demonisation narrative, the two narratives dialectically constructing and maintaining the Japanese enemy image.

3.2.3 The East China Sea Dispute

The East China Sea dispute concerns the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the uninhabited Diaoyutai Islands and not least the marine drilling rights in the waters surrounding them. As with the articles on Sino-Japanese relations, the language of these articles is far more conciliatory than that of the articles concerning the textbook issue and Japanese war crimes.

Basically this is a dispute over the oil and gas reserves believed to rest beneath the East China Sea. Given that China has proposed joint development of the fields with Japan (PD 2005.04.16c), I presume that China is not only desperate for the energy supply, but also has a weak case in their claim to the islands. To the outsider, a dispute over a few uninhabitable rocks in the middle of the East China Sea could seem trivial, but the dispute has proved a very potent cause in both popular Japanese and Chinese nationalistic discourse. As was the case in 1996, when a group of Japanese nationalists, constructed an interim lighthouse on one of the islands following which, a young Chinese nationalist drowned, when a group of Chinese nationalists were trying to reach the islands and raise the Chinese flag in defiance. The young Chinese nationalist who drowned was consequently celebrated as a national hero in the Chinese mass media (Zheng 1999: 131). On April 13, amidst the Chinese demonstrations that followed in the wake of the

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10 Patriotic Education (Àiguózhǔyì Jiàoyù) was implemented at all levels of education in the early nineties, as a direct response to the tragic pro democracy demonstrations in 1989, with the purpose of rejuvenating the national spirit. Japanese critics claim the Patriotic Education Programme to be anti-Japanese in nature (Wang 1996: 15).

11 The Diaoyutai Islands are a group of uninhabited islands currently administered by Japan, but claimed by China. China only officially claimed the islands in the early seventies after potential oilfields were discovered in the East China Sea (Hughes 2006: 147).
textbook approval, the Japanese authorities initiated procedures to grant Japanese companies the right to conduct drilling tests in the East China Sea, according to the Chinese “a serious provocation” (PD 2005.04.14a). The message that comes across is that Japan is violating Chinese territory and seeking to steal what is rightfully Chinese, whilst China is seeking compromise and cooperation “calling for negotiation to solve the issue peacefully” (PD 2005.04.14c). In most of the articles, China is represented as an innocent victim of this “unilateral move by Japan” (PD 2005.04.16c), and it goes without saying that if China is the victim, then Japan is, as always, the victimiser.

I see some signs of discursive struggle in this discourse between the potential acquisition of offshore oilfields and popular anti-Japanese sentiment, but on the whole this discourse does not add any new perspectives to the analysis. Equally important, this discourse serves as support of the other discourses, where Japan is represented as deceitful and out to take advantage of China’s weakness, thereby further strengthening the Japanese enemy image through repetition.

3.2.4 Sino-Japanese Trade and Economic Interdependence

With an annual bilateral trade of 170 billion US dollars (2005), China has overtaken the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner (PD 2005.04.12d). Furthermore, Japan is the second largest foreign investor in China and neither Japan nor China has any interest in disturbing this state of economic interdependence – China is dependent on the Japanese export market and Japanese investments to sustain its economic growth, whilst Japan needs the fast growing Chinese economy to jumpstart the Japanese economy after 15 lean years. To the Communist Party of China the relationship with Japan is strictly a business relationship, so much so that the Chinese even have a proverb; “cold politics, hot economics” (zhènglěng jīngrè) to describe the relationship with Japan (PD 2005.04.27c), thereby further naturalising the animosity through the use of repetitive language.

Needless to say this discourse is the most positive of this analysis, with five articles representing Japan in a generally negative manner, six in a generally neutral manner and three in a generally positive manner. Apart from one article on the most recent Forbes Global 2000 ranking12 (PD 2005.04.04c), all the articles deal with the need for improving the Sino-Japanese relationship for the sake of the economy. The message is one of reconciliation and although four articles still “strongly urge the Japanese government to take measures to deal with the textbook issue”, it is for the greater good of both countries (PD 2005.04.23b). In an editorial, the People’s Daily even warns of boycotting Japanese commodities since many famous Japanese brands are actually produced by Sino-Japanese joint ventures and a boycott therefore “would be detrimental to China’s economic development” (PD 2005.04.27c). Calling the boycott of Japanese commodities an

12 The Forbes Global 2000 is an annual ranking of the top 2000 corporations in the world surveyed and published by Forbes magazine.
expression of “misguided patriotism”, one article suggests that the protesters should rather “put patriotism into work pushing forward economic development” (PD 2005.04.23b). This line of reasoning would seem to correspond with American political scientists Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip Saunders’ argument, that when forced to choose, the Chinese leadership has consistently pursued economic goals over nationalistic goals (Downs & Saunders 1999: 117). This view is shared by Rose who believes that Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism is predominately inward orientated responses to domestic and external changes that will not have any serious affect on Sino-Japanese relations (Rose 2000: 169). Others like Friedman and Gries believes that Chinese animosity towards Japan is dangerously out of control (Friedman 2000: 102; Gries 2005c: 847).

This is the only one of the seven discourses where I see any significant signs of discursive struggle, in this case between economic development and popular anti-Japanese sentiments. It is the only discourse were anti-Japanese sentiments does not have a clear upper hand, and as such the discourse is not part of the demonisation narrative. However, on the whole this discourse is still part of the victimisation narrative, in the sense that although China has been victimised by Japan, Chinese patriots will have to bite their tongue, for the sake of the greater good, that is, economic development.
4. Conclusions

These conclusions are based primarily on the results of the discourse analysis of a cross section of 174 Japan-related articles from April 2005 collected from People’s Daily Online, and secondarily on collected theoretical literature relevant to the theoretical aspects of the thesis and to the empirical case study as such. Given the theoretical focus on the construction of enemy images and my personal scientific conviction, I find the use of a Laclau and Mouffe inspired discourse analysis a scientifically valid strategy for answering the research question of how the contemporary Japanese enemy image is constructed and maintained in Chinese media.

In the collected empirical material I have identified seven discourses, which by way of demonising Japan and victimising China in concert constitute and maintain the Japanese enemy image. This is achieved in part through the demarcation of self from other, Chinese from Japanese, friend from foe. In part through a series of narrative practices, whereby Japan is stereotyped as deceitful, unrepentant, conniving, subhuman and cruel, in opposition to China which is represented as honest, accommodating, cooperative, pure and innocent. The narrative practices I have identified as facilitating to this process of delineating Chinese from Japanese and stereotyping the Japanese other are:

1. Weakening the credibility of the Japanese discourse by pitching it against an established truth such as the Rape of Nanjing.
2. Generating consensus around the Chinese discourses by the use of foreign governments, opinion polls and experts.
3. The use of personal accounts to personify the Chinese discourses thereby making them harder to refute.
4. The use of definite modalities to represent subjective allegations as objective and factual.
5. The use of repetition for emphasis within articles and for authority between articles.

What in turn makes this deceitful, unrepentant, conniving, subhuman and cruel Japanese other the enemy is the consistency with which it is represented as hostile and threatening to China. This is achieved in part by constantly emphasising Japan’s militaristic past and any perceived signs of a resurgence of Japanese militarism and in part by representing Japan as conspiring with the United States, a known enemy of China, against Chinese interests.

Besides generating narrative authority the use of repetitive language and argumentation between the articles can also be seen as an indication of hegemony. This corresponds with the apparent lack of discursive struggle, which I only
identified as significant in the discourse concerning Sino-Japanese trade and economic interdependence. In all the other discourses anti-Japanese sentiments remain relatively unchallenged, which is also an indication of hegemony. Overall my findings in this chapter confirm my initial hypothesis that the Japanese enemy image is a discourse which has arrested the flow of differences within the field of discursivity thereby achieving hegemony and freezing the Japanese enemy image. In discourse theory, when a discourse arrests the flow of differences within the field of discursivity and establishes hegemony, the reality it represents becomes objective. Consequently the Japanese enemy image has become an omnipresent hegemonic discourse through which all things Japanese are seen and understood.

My findings are limited by the relative scope of this thesis, which has refrained me from conducting fieldwork in China as well as from incorporating further empirical material in *Standard Mandarin Chinese* (Pǔtōnghuà) in the analysis which would have strengthened the credibility of my findings. Furthermore, in the spirit of discourse theory it should be taken into account that this is but one of several ways of analysing the problem area of this thesis, other approaches might have produced different but not necessarily truer results.
5. Perspectives

Writing this thesis has raised new questions – the most pressing to me, is whether the Japanese enemy image will persevere indefinitely or whether it is likely to change? According to Petersson enemy images are highly change resistant (Petersson 2003: 110), and by all indications this would seem to be the case with the Japanese enemy image. However, from a discourse theoretical perspective complete hegemony is unattainable, as there will always be conflicting discourses struggling for hegemony (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 53). In discourse theory all knowledge, identities and relations are contingent, meaning that everything is in a particular way at a certain time – but that everything could have been different – and that everything will inevitably change (ibid: 49). Understood as a hegemonic discourse the Japanese enemy image not only has the capacity for change but inevitably will change.

Although I agree with Petersson that enemy images are highly change resistant, from a discourse theoretical perspective I also believe that change is not only possible but inevitable. In the case of the Japanese enemy image I believe the key to change lie with the political dimension in the construction of enmity, not unlike Harle who maintains that enemy images are primarily products of intentional political processes (Harle 2000: 20). In a society like the Chinese where the communist party provides people with official representations of reality in most aspects of life (Giese 2004: 21), I believe the Japanese enemy image can be deconstructed and enmity overcome given that there are both political will and power to do so. The process of deconstructing the Japanese enemy image will no doubt be a painstakingly slow process as all evidence collected from popular wisdom can be used as contradicting evidence – nonetheless, I believe it is not only possible but inevitable.

What I believe is missing for the Japanese enemy image to change is neither political will nor power but incentive. The Japanese enemy image has served the Communist Party of China well and continues to do so in rallying support behind the communist leadership and legitimising the communist power monopoly. The communist leadership quite simply does not have any interest in changing the Japanese enemy image, on the contrary, and as long as this is the case I believe the Japanese enemy image will persevere.
6. Bibliography


## Appendixes

### 1. Table of People’s Daily Online articles

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>1-5 April</th>
<th>6-16 April</th>
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<th>23-30 April</th>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

13 The 174 Japan-related articles collected from *People’s Daily Online* (*Rénmín Wǎng*) covers the period 1-30 April 2005. The articles are sorted according to discourse affiliation, publication date and according to whether they represent Japan in a generally negative (+), neutral (×) or positive (+) manner.
2. List of People’s Daily Online articles

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