Building Democracy in Ukraine
The Role of post-Soviet Identities

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Abstract

This thesis aims to explore the relevance of identities for the support of democracy in Ukraine. It elaborates on the assumption that the identity’s construction affects which ideas are embraced and sets out to test whether a civic as opposed to ethnic identity construction would correlate with the embracing and pursuit of the idea of democracy. Material gathered during a Minor Field Study - interviews with analysts and orange revolutionaries - was analysed for direction of identification using a Self/Other nexus, and this was interpreted using a civic/ethnic dichotomy in order to find out the identity construction. The results showed that Russia was seen as the Other, symbolising the Soviet Union, Europe was object to positive identification, but the strongest self-identification was with Ukraine itself. This suggests that the processes of building democracy and nation are intimately connected and mutually reinforcing in Ukraine, possibly with empowerment as a common and linking denominator. The conclusion suggests a more dynamic than dichotomised view on civic and ethnic identities’ role in democracy building.

Keywords: Ukraine, post-Soviet democratisation, the orange revolution, identity, civic and ethnic nationalism
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Translations of quotes (and any errors therein) from Swedish language sources are my own. The country’s name is written without the article, the Ukraine, unless quoting from a source using another standard. The name of Ukraine’s capital has been transliterated not from Russian, but from Ukrainian to English - thus Kyiv instead of Kiev (c.f. Garton Ash & Snyder, 2005).\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Hereafter abbreviated as NaUKMA from its full name, National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

\(^2\) In English grammar, article is required before plural names (the United States) or those with adjectival or compound forms (the United Kingdom). The Ukraine stems from older writings, allegedly influenced by inconsequent translation between Russian and French languages. (Gregorovich 2005)
Table of contents

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

2 Theory ......................................................................................................................... 3
   2.1 From Cold War Realism to post-Soviet Constructivism ........................................... 3
   2.2 From Primordial to Modern Identities .................................................................. 4
   2.3 Approaching post-Soviet Identities ...................................................................... 5
   2.4 Apparatus .............................................................................................................. 6
      2.4.1 The Self/Other Nexus ................................................................................. 6
      2.4.2 The Civic/Ethnic Dichotomy ..................................................................... 7
   2.5 Summary: Updating a Methodology .................................................................... 8

3 Empirical Analysis .................................................................................................... 9
   3.1 On Democracy .................................................................................................... 10
      3.1.1 The Direction of Identification .................................................................. 10
      3.1.2 The Identity Construction ....................................................................... 11
      3.1.3 Which Democratic Ideal and Why? ......................................................... 12
   3.2 On Stereotypes .................................................................................................. 12
      3.2.1 The Direction of Identification .................................................................. 13
      3.2.2 The Identity Construction ....................................................................... 13
      3.2.3 Which National Ideal and Why? .............................................................. 15
   3.3 On Nation Building .......................................................................................... 15
      3.3.1 The Direction of Identification .................................................................. 15
      3.3.2 The Identity Construction ....................................................................... 16
      3.3.3 Which Nation Construct and Why? ......................................................... 17
   3.4 Summary of Findings ......................................................................................... 18

4 Discussion ................................................................................................................ 19
   4.1 Sketching the Contours .................................................................................... 19
   4.2 Mapping the Content ....................................................................................... 19

5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 22
   5.1 The Role of post-Soviet Identities in Building Democracy in Ukraine .......... 22
   5.2 Suggestions for Future Research ...................................................................... 23

6 References ............................................................................................................... 25
1 Introduction

At the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukrainian independence looked suspicious in the eyes of the West. The country seemed unable to present an identity separate from Russia’s (Kuzio, 1998, pp 227). For creating an identity, Ukraine’s past offered only “the Rada débacle of 1918, the violent, failed heritage of the Cossacks, and even further back, the misty, disputed splendours of Kiev Roman Rus’”3. (Reid, 1997, pp 218) Ukraine’s image in the world was bleak until November 2004, when pro-western Viktor Yushchenko beat pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych in the quest for presidency after attempts at the winning president’s life, alleged and proven voting irregularities and considerable public manifestations4. The orange revolution in 2004, called “a seismic shift Westward in the geopolitics of the region” (Karatnycky, 2005), made Ukraine’s image in the world decidedly more distinct.

This civil movement in the name of democracy, adopted into the family of colour revolutions5, happened to the very same country that had the world’s second largest arsenal of nuclear arms at the break-up in 1991, whose inhabitants make a patchwork-quilt of ethnicities and languages and where the Tartars’ claim to the Crimean peninsula constituted a risk for civil war (Reid, 1997, pp 187, 222). Why has Ukraine not become a new North Korea, a Yugoslavia or a Chechnya? Something is counter-intuitive in the lack of democratic roots in Ukraine and the orange revolution’s embracing of democracy.

The colour revolutions could be regarded as an eastward advancement of what remains of the Iron Curtain. This East-West divide is also described as significantly profound,

a broad cultural commonality, developed during centuries within the Roman Empire and their West-Roman heirs, finally resulting in a number of global varieties: the territorial- and national states in Western Europe, North America and East Asia. Comparatively, the Soviet Socialist system, in spite of all its proud programmes and plans, was never an embodied “model”. Rather was it a kind of society with roots in East Rome and the Mongol Empire that had developed during centuries in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Russian Empire.” (Gerner et al, 1996, pp 103)

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3 The Rada was the parliament of the briefly independent period 1917-1922 in between Tsarist and Soviet/Polish rule (Roshwald, 2001, pp 217). The Cossack tribes, that chose their Hetman (ruler) are said to have emerged as early as the mid-13th century, whereas real impact dates from the 16th century (Hedenskog, 2004). Kyiv Rus’ made Kyiv the centre of the first East Slavic state from 880’s, producing amongst else the first East Slavic written legal code and dissolved as East was divided from West Rome in 1054. (Gerner et al, 1996, pp 111-2)


Ukraine in itself means “borderland” (Reid 1997, passim), a suitable emphasis to the contested issue of whether the country belongs to the East or West. On one hand aiming at membership in the European Union, which is largely regarded as accreditation to the western sphere, historical influence from the East is considered to be profound. Straddling the East-West divide seems to indefinitely decide the Ukrainian political agenda. Any attempt to align with either side needs to look away from geographical matters and focus on abstract, mouldable qualities. A study of the narrative shared by the orange revolutionaries is believed to show how they understand themselves and the place they occupy in between the East and West in terms of identity and ideas in general and with regard to post-Soviet identity and democracy in particular.

Democracy as an idea seems to have found a habitat in the orange revolutionaries. Those people appear as a suitable case study for elaborating on the assumption that the identity construction impacts what ideas that are embraced, and more precisely whether the link between identity and democracy would be a civic identity construction – which is the hypothesis of this thesis. Thus the research question is: what role do the post-Soviet identities play in the building of democracy in Ukraine?

The hypothesis to be tested stipulates that the orange revolutionaries had a civic identity construction. The definition of this identity construction is derived from Shulman (2004). The civic identity builds on common political principles and it is regarded to be dominant in the West, whereas the ethnic identity is united by traditional features and is considered to prevail in the East (ibid, pp 35). Following the hypothesis and latter operationalisation, the research question’s lowest abstraction level will be: did the orange revolutionaries have a civic identity construction? In order to verify the hypothesis, the key actors and demonstrators should largely have a self-understanding constructed along civic lines rather than having an identity constructed along ethnic lines.
2  Theory

The theoretical apparatus underpinning this study draws on modernity, primordialism and constructivism and their implications on identity theory in general and post-Soviet identity theory in particular. Three main lines of argumentation will guide the analysis and, further on, motivate the methodological choices. The theoretical apparatus, even though developed to understand nation building, can be of use also in understanding democracy building. The research does not put enough emphasis on how history has made the construction of identities case-specific. As a consequence, the research has a tendency of being ethnocentric for the western world, thus not taking into consideration the specific construction of the post-Soviet identities.

2.1 From Cold War Realism to post-Soviet Constructivism

The focus on identity is motivated by the last decades’ changes in the political playing field, wherein its pertinence can be found in that it looks to define abstract structures which can be of use when tangible factors change. “The predictions of a wonderful new world following the fall of the Iron Curtain were never realized, and the reasons for this were increasingly sought in identity-related phenomena” (Clark & Petersson, 2003, pp 7). Clark and Petersson describe a reason for why this new focus took such a strong hold as “[d]uring the 1990’s, events [Yugoslavia, Rwanda, neo-nationalism in Western Europe] repeatedly revealed that identity dynamics could have highly tangible and indeed alarming consequences” (ibid). Explanations based on analyses focusing on the state did no longer hold the same explanatory power of the current state of affairs. Following this, holding the understanding of development open to new definitions and openings in new directions became of the essence, motivating resistance to any attempts to limit or detain its reach.

Science’s change of focus from tangible to abstract has bearings on theoretic assumptions. In analysing the effects of the introduction of identity and culture, scholars conclude on changes in epistemology, which can be summed up as having gone from realism to constructivism. This makes identity understandable as constructed rather than as given by the state, suggesting that the characteristics of the nation-state are not physically attached to the geographical place, but also exist as abstract, moveable structures or patterns. (Lapid, 1996, pp 12-14) According to realism, politics and society could be understood by studying the
state and understanding the state as the actor. States were seen as an innate entity creating reality and the perception of reality was not relevant – the state’s economical or security-concerns decided politics and society. (Goldmann et al 1997, pp 237-239) Constructivism opposes realism and builds on the assumption that identity and international norms are what make the state, thus these also serve as underlying reasons for action.

Reality is in accordance with constructivism created and there are for that reason no transcendent realities, which makes only perceptions relevant. Identity is argued to be visible in how the actor describes herself and strives for recognition in relation to others (Featherstone 1995, pp 3). This is relevant to understand what defines an actor, and how this actor carries qualities. In relation to identity, culture would be the qualities that the actor carries, whereas identity is how these qualities are carried, acquired and changed. Culture is thus a framework serving to categorise experiences; a structure. From that the relation between identity and culture can be understood via the process - production, mobilisation and reproduction (ibid).

It is therefore helpful to instead shed light on the ever changing relationships between the actors in specific contexts in terms of space and time, place and historical events. This is fit to be done by understanding self-identification as a practice which positions the subject within a narrative, evading a predetermined framework of nationally defined identities. Anderson’s (1992, pp 21) “imagined communities” must qualify for one of the most influential terms in this field of research. For the understanding of one self, big and small events in the personal day to day life may be as crucial as structural policies imposed by authorities. Therefore, a micro- as well as a macro-perspective perspective appears relevant, since what influences the self-identification can be found on an entirely local as well as internationally spanning scale. Identity is thus understood as essentially a category of interaction.

2.2 From Primordial to Modern Identities

In earlier societies, the social order has been depicted as based on tradition and the identity as given by clear, traditional roles - which were also what primordial identities were considered to stem from. According to Giddens (1991), the modern society would then be where the individual through reflection creates her self-identity, a matter of choosing who to be. He argues that instead of using the word post-modernity, late modernity would be more accurate, since the pre-modern is the traditional and the modern is the post-traditional where identity is a matter of choice (ibid, pp 70). As definitions of modernity and post-modernity appear in abundance, a strategy to restore usability is to focus on the consequences for other key concepts of a certain definition. Essentially, modernity can be understood as a meta-stage of societal development, comparable to an -ism, a paradigm, a discourse - themselves unmistakably inherently abstract.
As a consequence of Giddens’ reasoning, the process of identification could serve to determine at what stage of modernity a society is. This would have significant implications for theories’ applicability, as the stage of modernity would affect the dynamics between processes within the society. Thus a theory developed to understand democratisation or national recreation in one society might not hold true for another.

Many contemporary researchers are critical to approaches that give identity a narrow scope. Featherstone even argues that when turning to the West, post-imperial peoples can develop multiple identities (Featherstone 1995, pp 9-10). The consequence of what Kinnvall (2003, pp 11-12) calls the relational level is that there can be many overlapping identities, as they will not be based on “nation, race, religion, ethnicity or gender”. The same thought is articulated by James & Phillips (2001, pp 32) stating that “it is possible for not only different subjectivities to exist within one individual, but for different ontologies (mystical, sacred on the one hand, and historical, materialist on the other) to operate in and across different social contexts.” In this case, the mere existence of an identity is essentially subjective. It is how the person perceives that she is that is the real identity.

Adding to the multifaceted image of identity, Svedberg points out that the very method that many identity researchers apply (qualitative interviews, e.g. Uhlin, 1995) gives case specific material, producing “merely partial but nevertheless ‘less false’ stories” (2000, pp 14). Whether called metanarratives, as when used to compare globally, or being subjective individual stories, shared narratives are this study’s reality. The process of identification can be argued to place the Self against the Other in a societal context and the reasons for this identity-making thus creates a narrative. As individuals are guided by each other’s understandings of the world, the number of narratives is not indefinite.

2.3 Approaching post-Soviet Identities

Globalisation is argued to make the common reality – the metanarratives - similar world-wide, spanning all cultures (Featherstone 1995, pp 12). The parts of the world unaffected by modernity would consequently not share the same common reality hence they could not be explained using the same theories. Therefore there is a need for context specific identification-lines (c.f. ibid, pp 5-6). By applying western identity theories onto the post-Soviet sphere without recognising the importance of history and the case-specific circumstances, science seems to run a risk of being ethnocentric, and in consequence unable to decode empirical states of affairs in a correct way. In two articles, from 1995 and 2000, Olcott questions how ethnic, nationalist and economic motivations of identity affect the consolidation of the post-Soviet states in general. Also Denison (2003, pp 58) questions the imposing of an identity founded on the western nation-concept and gives empirical support from Central Asia:”[n]one of the indigenous peoples of
the region had had experience of formal statehood in the modern era.” In addition, also Paraszczuk points at “the exoticness in applying ‘traditional’ western social theories to the context of the former Soviet Union” (2000, pp 573).

The very notion of post-Soviet identities is questioned by Danjoux (1998, pp 29), meaning that “there are no Italy post-fascist or Germany post-Nazi identities”. However, the writings on this issue mean that in essence, after the fall of the Soviet Union the basis for people’s Soviet identities was dissolute, without new ones being built (Karlsson, 1998, pp 16-17). Sampson (1998, pp 184) argues that Eastern Europe has developed an identity of its own that is no more only the negative of Western Europe under Soviet occupation.

However, research suggests that ancient constructions of identity influence the more contemporary ones, and that former geographical constellations have influence on not only what the identity looks like, but also how it is constructed. Manz (2003, pp 96-97) argues that identity was made out of different types of bricks in the Habsburgian Empire compared to in “the two great empires which dominated Eurasia – the Islamic and the Mongol” where “the nomadic and sedentary lifestyles” were more important than language and religion. “National republics were created with the help of ethnographers, on the assumption that language and ethnic characteristics were the primary factors to be evaluated. While the justification for boundaries concentrated on ethnicity, it seems likely that the Soviets, perhaps unconsciously, also resembled the Habsburgs in their acceptance of legitimacy based on historical statehood.” (Manz, 2003, pp 92) She is supported by Abazov, Elebayeva and Omuraliev (2000, pp 345), stating that “[t]he disintegration of the USSR brought considerable changes: people were forced to identify themselves clearly with the one or other republic and to choose their citizenship.” Hashimi (2000, pp 166) points at “the will to carry on a part of an inherited past, along with belief, and the desire to feel part of a wider, historical community”. Thus, the openness to context and unadorned motivations seem called for when studying post-empire identity construction.

Subsequently, the theoretical apparatus will take the post-Soviet understanding of identity into account. James and Phillips (2001, abstract) argue “against the one-dimensional modernist conclusion that this process was arrested during the Soviet period, the article sets out to explore the complex weave of historical continuity and discontinuity in the formation of national identity in the new states. [...] Instead of nationality being posted as a one-dimensional form of identity, the article sets up an approach that emphasises the contradictory layering of identity”.

2.4 Apparatus

2.4.1 The Self/Other Nexus

The Self/Other nexus recognises that one identifies both with what one is, and with what one is not. Research distinguishes between positive and negative identification. Positive identification occurs “[w]hen meeting our likes who
confirm who we are” (Petersson, 2003, pp 38), and can also be strengthened further by role models (Wagnsson, 2003, pp 79), whereas “[n]egative identification is a process through which an identity is strengthened by limiting it against a negative “other” (ibid). The part that is target for positive identification is the Self, and the part that is identified with negatively is the Other. It is assumed that the Self represent qualities that the subject wants, whilst the other symbolises unwanted features.

“In all nation states national identity has both a quantitative and a qualitative component. Quantitatively, one may speak of the strength of national identification. This refers to the degree to which people in a nation-state identify themselves as members of the national community and feel positively toward it. Qualitatively, one can analyse the reasons why people in a nation-state feel they form a community. In this sense the content of national identity refers to the traits that simultaneously unify people into a nation and distinguish them from other nations. On the basis of these traits, boundaries between the national in-group and out-groups are defined, thereby creating criteria for national membership.” (Shulman 2004, pp 35)

This study will focus on the qualitative component of identity. The Self/Other nexus will be of use when decoding the material of this field study so as to understand the direction of the identification. As Holmes suggests, ”post-communism is better understood as the rejection of the communist power system than as a clear-cut adoption of an alternative system” (1997, pp 13). When analysing the outcomes, the strength of the respective directions – towards or against – will also be taken into consideration.

Scholars dealing with post-Soviet identities use the Self/Other nexus to discuss dichotomies. Applied to the Self/Other nexus, the parts constituting the dichotomies become each other’s Others. These concepts are, in their turn, loaded with values and meanings (Neumann, 1996, pp xiii). In essence, Europe or the West has symbolised the opposite to Russia or the East in post-Soviet research, wherefore they are the main antagonists also in this study’s Self/Other nexus. Allegedly, “Russians, when they set out to discuss Europe, also discuss themselves” (Neumann, 1996, pp 1, c.f. Said, 1978, passim). Quite possibly, the same phenomena add to making this study’s approach meaningful.

2.4.2 The Civic/Ethnic Dichotomy

Shulman’s formulation of a qualitative and a quantitative component of identity highlights the dimensions of identification: strength and reason. In this study, the first step to understanding the reason is to discover the direction of identification – via the Self/Other nexus – and then explore the reasons. Here, that will be done using a civic/ethnic dichotomy. Shulman’s two nationalisms are here translated into labelling two possible sets of constructed identities.

“With civic nationalism, people in a nation-state think that what can, does or should unite and distinguish all or most members of the nation are such features as living on a common territory, belief in common political principles, possession of state citizenship, representation by a common set of political institutions and desire or
consent to be part of the nation. With ethnic nationalism, the people think that what can, does or should unite and distinguish them are such features as common ancestry, culture, language, religion, traditions and race. [...] One widespread argument is that ethnic nationalism is dominant in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, while civic nationalism is dominant in Western Europe and the United States.” (Shulman 2004, pp 35)

This categorisation is also recognised by, amongst others, Wilson, meaning that, liberty, prosperity, welfare, common social contract of reciprocal rights and obligations and constitutional patriotism underlies civic identity. Ethnicity, language, religion, and mythology are, according to the same author, a minority faith in Ukraine. (2002, pp 31) The ethnic identity echoes of primordialism, whereas the civic ditto represents a constructivist approach.

These tools overlap to a certain extent, ensuring analysis of the material in a way that either verifies or falsifies the hypothesis. The lines of identification should allow for a flexible analysis in which they are rather providing focus than making clear-cut distinctions, allowing for a relevant and meaningful exploration of the link between identity and democracy in Ukraine.

2.5 Summary: Updating a Methodology

This theoretical outline serves to motivate the methodological choices which guide this study. As stated in the introduction of this theoretical part, three main arguments challenge the validity of the underlying assumptions of the established theoretical framework.

Firstly, it was pointed out that the theoretical apparatus, even though developed to understand nations and the building thereof, can be of use also in understanding democracy and the building of it. This suggests an intimate relationship between the processes, nation- and democracy-building, and that an essential part in understanding the political projects in the post-Soviet world may lie in understanding the common denominator of those processes, pointing to the relevance of applying a framework developed to understand nation building to the study of democracy building.

The second argument was that the research does not put enough emphasis on how history has made the construction of identities case-specific and as a consequence, the research has a tendency of being ethnocentric for the western world, thus not taking into consideration the specific construction of the post-Soviet identities, which was the third argument. By using the above described theoretical tools, hopefully the motivations and components that motivate and underlie the identity construction can be captured to some extent, without the seeing being confined by a narrow theoretical approach. Whereas the Self/Other nexus gives the direction of identification, the civic/ethnic dichotomy aids in completing the picture by providing an opportunity to explore the reasons for the relative strength of the Self/Other identification.
3 Empirical Analysis

This material was gathered in Kyiv during June 2005, with the support of a Swedish Institute Minor Field Study-scholarship and research advice from the NaUKMA. Rather than making a comparative study between Ukraine’s west and east centres Lviv and Donetsk – which would be too time consuming considering the length of the study, and too extensive in terms of creating double networks – or attempting the task of making a representative selection in Kyiv, which is better suited for a doctor’s dissertation, focus was on initiated, accessible people in Kyiv. To maximise the efficiency of the interviews and to minimise the use of an interpreter, interviewees were selected on the two criteria of political initiation and linguistic accessibility. They fall into three categories: key actors, demonstrators and analysts, since these are seen as those who can – first or second hand – account for the narrative around the embracing of democracy in the orange revolution. The two first categories obviously need to agree with the orange revolution's idea. This narrative is to be seen as an attempt to synthesise the qualitative study into a relevant and coherent world view (c.f Noblit & Hare 1988 pp 27). As far as the interviewees as such are concerned, this thesis limits its focus to the interface of them as political actors and the political society, searching for the narrative that the applied theories can make out of the material.

The structure of the organisation of the orange revolution was a mixture – between governmental and non-governmental organisations, as an intermixt ure in between the organisations as such. Also the part-taking individuals appeared to be interconnected, thus the roles in the revolution became somewhat flexible. During the time lapsed between the revolution and this study, people had changed places professionally and between categories. In consequence, the ideas were quite well diffused over the strata of interviewees, that is to say that the key actors and the demonstrators held mainly coherent views and conveyed a not all to incongruent picture.

Two principles guide the decoding of the material. The first is to be relevant to the hypothesis, that the orange revolutionaries had an identity constructed along civic lines. For this purpose, identification lines from the ethnic/civic dichotomy are looked for. The second principle is to maintain sensitivity to other relevant lines of identification, since these, still being within the identity's construction - the framework of Self/Other and East/West - can add to clarify the mechanisms between ethnic and civic lines of identification as those do not exist in a vacuum, but are interdependent on those other identity lines. What is looked for is what the group of interviewees agree on, or to present the opinion which brings the group closer to consensus than disagreement – however of course on a gliding scale. Questions are constructed in order to reveal certain lines, the material is presented
3.1 On Democracy

*Interview Question Nº 1: What is the state of the European/Russian/Ukrainian democracy? What in it is good and what is bad?*

3.1.1 The Direction of Identification

Ukraine was the main part of positive identification, the Self. National independence was mainly ranked higher than identification with the West. An awareness of a hierarchy of societal needs was displayed, where the importance of living standards was recognised as a basic requirement before political involvement by the citizen. Ukrainian folklore, the nation's ideal, the church, family, Kyivan Rus', Cossacks and the first Rada were mentioned as constituting components of the Ukrainian self-image. Tolerance was mentioned by several respondents as a central Ukrainian value, and as a defining contrast to the main Other, Russia. Europe was not mentioned as the Other, but not unreservedly as the Self. The respondents were aware of nuances in European democracy and did not accept Europe's democracy as an ideal without reservations. “Ukraine has a third way between Europe and Russia.” The central component attracting positive identification was living standards, individuality, followed by respect for and accountability and in between citizens, the state and the law. Instead of seeing Europe as such as a role model, the respondents saw its living standards as desirable together with specific qualities stemming from the political system.

Russia was generally seen as the Other, in a position where it could be interchanged to the Tsarist Empire, the Soviet Union, the East, Putin and Yanukovich. “We had been going Westwards for 15 years but Yanukovich’s ties to Russia pulled us Eastward with Russian as the second language and double citizenship.” Reasons for negative identification included Putin’s resemblance to a Tsar in his alleged imperialist, militarist and anti-democratic ambitions, and Russia’s underdevelopment and unaccountability. This was contrasted to an image of a peaceful Ukraine. As far as positive identification with Russian features went, the strong leadership-ideal was suggested, although in a way that indicated that it could not outweigh Russia's other, negative sides. “When I ask my students, they want presidential democracy as long as it’s Yushchenko, they still think you need a strong leader but are too patriotic to say nice things about Putin, they want to be different from Russia.” “Putin is seen as a good leader, but since they have Chechnya they cannot be a role-model”. The consensus amongst the interviewees was that Russia is the Other regarding democracy, thus something to identify against and use as a bad example.

In summation, Ukraine or Europe was seen as the Self and Russia was seen as
the Other. The perception of Ukraine as the Self indicates an emphasis on the nation, wherein Russia serves as a defining contrast and Europe as a source of – not unreserved – inspiration. Instead, democracy seemed to be a means to the other end, to Ukrainian sovereignty and empowerment. The relations in terms of identification to Russia and Europe seemed based upon how they in throughout history had come to symbolise opposing outcomes of the Ukrainian ideal to which national independence and improved standards of living appear crucial.

3.1.2 The Identity Construction

Qualities which were at the forefront of the desirable, thus constituting the democratic ideal, were freedom of speech, media pluralism and transparency. A certain hierarchy could be detected. Honesty in itself was seen as more important than Yushchenko, i.e. more important than which president. Living standards' improvement was prioritised over the fulfilment of ideals. “People aren’t interested in European democracy, only in improving own living standards” “Ukraine wants living standards as Europe, wants to get closer to Europe as soon as possible, they don’t see the democracy gap in society and lack of underpinnings in the society, the lack of civil society.” “When the people is [sic!] protected they can think about ideas instead of how to survive.” Damage stemming – in the respondents’ opinion – from the Soviet period included hurting Ukraine and depriving it of international recognition, which was mentioned as one of the nation’s most important goals, together with the importance of the citizen’s political confidence.

Key actors were articulate about that a major damage done by Russia to Ukraine was to damage the trust amongst citizens. “Overusing the positive community language – using it for ideology and spying on people’s minds, the democratic mechanism was used for totalitarianism. […] We had a fractioned society because communism ruined the trust. That it’s low between government and society is OK, between people is not OK.” “We found the community on the internet that was devalued by the communists.” To contrast this, Ukraine’s own democratic roots throughout history were emphasised. “Ukraine is more democratic than Russia due to its historical roots: Hetmans, 18-19th centuries’ Self-governed entities”. It was not Russia's depriving Ukraine of its independence in itself that was seen as the reason for negative identification, but its illegal and illegitimate ways. Other values that were mentioned for negative identification included Russia being a military state and not representative of its people, which indicated a separation between the object of negative identification, Putin’s Russia, and the Russians.

Several elements of the answers echo of democracy: freedom of speech, media pluralism and transparency, as well as a wish for a non-military state and power that represents the people. That these are in favour of democracy is clear, but also a given since support for democracy is a selection criterion when choosing interviewees. In context with the other answers, the positive attitude to democracy can just as well be a striving towards as it was a striving away from something
else, here articulated as poor living conditions. As pointed out by Reid (1997, pp 223), “if the Ukraine’s ethnics is its success story, then the economy is its disaster story”. The stress put on international recognition of the Ukrainian nation paired with the emphasis on own democratic roots in history suggest a complex relationship between nationalism and democratisation in Ukraine. The importance and ability of initiative conveyed via the orange revolution seem to be a key factor in understanding the contemporary Ukrainian identity-construction, as the respondents emphasised historical ties to democracy, and portrayed the orange revolution as the start of a new era.

3.1.3 Which Democratic Ideal and Why?

The results of this question show the importance of investigating both the direction of identification and its construction. As shown, the identity construction does not fit clear-cut into the categories, civic/ethnic. It can be concluded that European democracy is more desired than the Russian type, and that civic freedoms and improved living conditions are fundamental. As the material shows, democratisation and recreation of the Ukrainian nation is symbolised with both Europe and Ukraine, but against Russia and its synonyms. The high degree of positive identification with Ukraine in a question dealing with democratic ideal suggests that democracy is central to the interviewees and that, for them, Ukrainian democracy is an object of pride. In consequence, this suggests the orange revolution as a fundament for national pride and that the national recreation is interconnected with the democratisation.

In conclusion, Europe’s democracy is the ideal and Russia’s the bad example since the Ukrainian identity-construction favours national independence, be it based on civic or ethnic components, which is symbolised by democracy which is represented by anti-Russia, symbolised by Europe. “We took aesthetic inspiration from the South American revolutions […] and the 68-generation. […]we’d never take inspiration from the Russian revolution in 1918 for obvious reasons, the politics stinks. […] Maidan is a journey away from Soviet to an imaginary Europe […] a process of purification.”

3.2 On Stereotypes

Interview Question N° 2: How is the typical European/Russian/Ukrainian? What is important to them?
3.2.1 The Direction of Identification

Ukraine was subject to positive identification regarding national stereotypes, defined against the Russian and on her way to European living standards – but not to become a European. Instead of seeing Europeans that Ukrainians could become, politicians emphasised existing Ukrainian features in the national stereotype, “Ukrainians do see themselves as in distinction to Russia, Yushchenko says Ukraine is in the middle of Europe.” Although the positive identification with the European stereotype seemed less significant, whereas the negative identification with the Russian ditto appears quite forceful, the very process of self-identification was still not an all-Ukrainian affair. “Ukrainian media is dominated by Russian and American values or Ukrainian versions thereof, there is very little Ukrainian self image in the media, little opportunity for them to see themselves in the mirror.”

3.2.2 The Identity Construction

The answers indicated a distinction in several ways between the Ukrainian stereotype before and after the orange revolution. One was a shift from a traditional to a modern identity. “The cultural stereotype is a farmer from central Ukraine who now has become a political key figure.”

Another was a shift from being made inferior by the Soviet Union, to feeling empowered by the orange revolution. Central to this was the hope for better living conditions and the citizen’s impression of having power over her own destiny. “Now it’s someone who’s trying to overcome the consequences of the Soviet Union. […] This inferiority complex gets worse when we fail but gets smaller when we succeed, now we’re more confident on the international arena. […] Tolerance is central, it helped the nation to survive and maintain strong relations to our neighbours.”

The international community’s recognition of Ukraine as a nation was also central to the change in national identity. “Now people internationally know that Ukraine exists and it is good that they know that there is nation which know [sic!] how they want things. With the Eurovision Song Contest, Ukraine became something else than the USSR. The image of the country is better. Now it’s nice to represent Ukraine.” The shift from a traditional to a modern national stereotype would imply a shift also in the identity-construction from an ethnic/traditional to a civic/modern identity. Instead, the traditional national identity features appeared crucial. “The folklore expresses the nation’s ideal. […] The church and the family are important. […] Ukraine built on the Kyivan Rus’, Cossacks and the first Rada has unfortunately not yet been realised.” In sum, a link seemed to connect manifest traditions - such as folklore, religion and the family - and the contemporary Ukraine.

Europe was first and foremost synonymous to good living conditions. When elaborating on what these standards mean to the typical citizen’s character, the factors put forward represent to a considerable extent the interface between the
individual and the society. “Earns money, has job, reliable future, can rely on government, cares about the society, knows where taxes go”. The values underlying this European good-life could also have described a political ideal, suggesting in consequence that the respondent’s view on the European stereotype is that it owes its good standards from its political system. “Respect for others’ ideas and ways of life, respect for the law, higher living standards”. However, it should be noted that the respondents had considerably less to say about the European stereotype, which the majority automatically associated with Western Europe more than the Eastern part, possible due to that Ukraine and Russia were mentioned as in distinction in the question. Some even started off by making reservations about their limited insight. “I don’t know much about Western Europe.” Many had not travelled. The fact that the interviewer was from Western Europe, thus “knew the answer”, could have had an inhibiting impact (c.f. Petersson in Petersson & Robertson (ed), 2003, pp 47-49). The overall impression of the answers conveyed the image that Europe was to a larger extent associated with what the political system gave the citizen, whereas the Ukrainian image focused on the becoming of a politically empowered citizen.

The Russian stereotype was built not only on what per definition is Russia, but also on what it represented to the respondents. As an illustration of the juxtaposing of West and East in the Ukrainian stereotyping of Russians, the historical whereabouts and the modern connections to the West were boiled down to Putin. “Jokingly, I’d say Putin [is the typical Russian]. He sees NATO as an aggressive block which wants to militarize Ukraine. He’s imperialistic.” Russian characteristics, symbolised by their leader who symbolises the history, were portrayed in contrast to Ukrainian ones. “Putin is like a Tsar Ukraine is peaceful, we’re not divided, not even Crimea” “It’s typically Russia to do unreasonable actions, they can lose their minds.” Ukraine was presented as the origin of Russians, which is also a central part in the mythological establishment of the Ukrainian nation (Rothswald 2001, passim). This suggests an image of Russians as not giving credit where credit was due. “Basically all Russians came from the [Kyivan] Rus’, but Russia uses the term “russyski” to not make a reference to it” Regarding the grass-root citizen, poor living conditions were not attributed to the political system as in Ukraine, but rather to the Russians. “People complain but don’t do anything, too lazy and drink too much.” “[Russians are] [l]azy old people being drunk and living without electricity. […] They have no national ideal.” The emphasis on national ideal and the Ukrainian insight of the importance of citizen empowerment shone through when comparing the two national stereotypes. “A common Russian person has no idea that they can change the whole system and win democratic influence on politics.”

To sum up, the stereotype of the Russian made little distinction between the history of the country and the characteristics of the individual citizen. The Ukrainian stereotype of the Russian citizen’s responsibilities was two-faceted. On one hand, the Russians were to blame for their poor living conditions as they were lazy and drunkards. Therefore they had the politics they deserved. Although this implied a power to affect their society, the Ukrainians identify lack of national ideal and lack of insight on possibilities of citizen empowerment as reasons for
3.2.3 Which National Ideal and Why?

The Ukrainian national stereotype appeared to play the most significant role. Europeans were not identified against negatively, but the respondents were cautious about their national identity. Russians were the bad example. The reasons for this negative identification, which appears to be a stronger process than the positive identification with the European stereotype, may hold an inverted image of the Ukrainian self-image (c.f. Wilson 2002, pp 38). The Ukrainians played two cards when distinguishing themselves from Russians. The first was claiming that they have democratic roots in history. As a comparison pointed out by Roshwald (2001, pp 27), the Cossacks have been revitalised by nationalists. The second is that they had understood the citizen’s ability to change the society. This was reflected both in what was said to be bad with Russians, and what was said to be good with Europeans – the emphasis on the interface between state and individual and the democratic values. Thus, consolidating a democratic society and revitalising the national identity seemed crucial to the image that the interviewees had of Ukrainians, Europeans and Russians.

Furthermore, language and ethnicity did not necessarily follow, and the lines of Ukrainian identity appear as ambiguous, multi-layered and under constant reconstruction as Jackson (1998, pp 99) acknowledges. Reid’s (1997, pp 222-3) illustration is coherent: “The typical twenty-something Kievan speaks a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian at work and to his children, Russian to his parents, and Ukrainian to his grandmother down at the dacha at weekends”.

3.3 On Nation Building

Interview Question N°3: How is and should the Ukrainian nation be constructed? Is it more important to unite an ethnic group or people who share the same political ideas?

3.3.1 The Direction of Identification

“The Dniepro river was told to separate Ukraine in two during Soviet times which was stigmatising propaganda. “ The respondent’s way of discussing this suggests
two things. The first is that the possible rift in Ukraine, making for a western and an eastern part, was seen as a threat to those aiming to consolidate a nation. Secondly, that the Soviet Union was blamed made it the Other to Ukrainian nation-building. Directives from Moscow had to some extent served as an outer threat, leading Ukrainian nation-builders to head west for security. Symptomatically, many Ukrainian nation-builders agreed on that “[the western Ukrainian centre town] Lviv has the real Ukrainian traditions.”

As far as the other main part of identification was concerned, Europe was talked about as a ground for nuanced comparison of nation construction. Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Switzerland were mentioned as parts of comparison. The current developments, where Ukraine approached Europe and not Russia, combined with a revival of national pride, suggested positive identification with Europe, implying that Europe strengthens the Ukrainian national ideal. Contemporary Ukrainians related their national identity to Europe in a way that could make a European belonging and a Ukrainian identity viable side by side, and indicating the importance of the revival of the Ukrainian national identity. “Being European should be to firstly be part of your nation and secondly part of Europe, to share values but not forget to represent Ukraine, don’t lose the Ukrainian identity – we just got it.”

In sum, the direction of identification regarding nation-building seemed to be positive towards Europe and negative to Russia. It was likely that the turning to Europe was motivated by a, perhaps stronger, urge to turn the back on Russia, seen as embodying the threat to Ukrainian national sovereignty, which was the superior goal.

3.3.2 The Identity Construction

Regarding the civic identity’s importance to Ukrainian nation-building, the interviewees displayed a consensus on a major change invoked by the orange revolution. “In 1991, the Ukrainian state was born. In the orange revolution, the Ukrainian nation was born in Kyiv. Before, people didn’t feel Ukrainian but post-Soviet and didn’t understand the Ukrainian ideal.” “Today, there is a political citizenship. […] The orange revolution was about civic nationalism, it was talked about explicitly amongst us. Politicians should be nationalistic and not give in to Russia.” “An idea of the future as keeping the country together” […] the future is democracy […] Since the orange revolution, Ukraine is founded on the feeling that people can do something together.“

The articulations around the importance of the civic factor – agreement on a political idea – imply tuning the concept of civic. The consensus on the idea in itself appears central and holds power to the Ukrainians, but the insight on citizen empowerment as such appears to serve as a collecting force, building the nation. “I was really proud that my nation could do that and be together.” “On TV it looked dangerous, on Maidan one felt united and able to change things, that we were one nation.” “Yushchenko provided a focus and conveyed that change is possible, you can make a difference. A lot of Ukrainians didn’t believe in
themselves before the orange revolution, they thought they don’t have what it takes. It was a pleasant shock and no longer was the country only a shadow.” Being recognised by the outside world appeared important, and the more points of similarities found, the further towards developing a civic national identity, it seemed. “Ukraine is like Switzerland, different languages and ethnicities but the same political culture and vision of the future.”

The attitude amongst the respondents to the role of ethnicity in the Ukrainian nation-building suggest two things: that ethnicity is not crucial, and that the distinguishing lines are more of a middle-ground. “Who is who ethnically doesn’t matter – look at the symbolic value of [then (author’s comment)] Prime Minister Tymoshenko who is Armenian and Russian.” Even though building the Ukrainian nation appeared to be top-priority, the stakes of ethnicity were not very high even when it came to the main antagonist, Russia: “There never were any clear borderline between Ukraine and Russia, it’s a cocktail.” “Proclaiming to be Ukrainian or Russian is a matter of choice.”

3.3.3 Which Nation Construct and Why?

The construction of the Ukrainian nation does not rely on the unification of ethnicity. Rather, several ethnicities constitute the nation de facto, and the attitudes to ethnicity reveal a substantial middle ground. The civic identity appears to have become a part of the Ukrainian national ditto via the orange revolution, and affected mainly those who supported it, symbolised by a feeling that the Ukrainian people were politically empowered. This suggests a Ukrainian nation built on a centripetal force – an urge to not be swallowed by Russia – and allegedly induced by history to be democratic and civic as opposed to imperialist and totalitarian. The respondents convey a nation-construction ideal where the Ukrainian nation was an “imagined community” (c.f. Anderson 1992, pp 21) since times eternal. To consolidate the Ukrainian nation, not being swallowed by Russia or Europe, and without having the territory split in an eastern and western part, appear as the superior goal. Russia serves as the Other - not primarily as a bad example of nation-construction, but because of it posing a threat to the Ukrainian sovereignty. Europe was not subject to positive identification as far as nation-construct as such was concerned; that place was overtly occupied by Ukraine itself.

The orange revolution was portrayed as having provided insight on citizen empowerment, and that idea was the defining characteristic of the new, Ukrainian national identity. However, this does not mean that the Ukrainian nation-construct ideal was civic and not ethnic (c.f. Hrytsak, 2000, pp 268). If ethnicity is subordinated democracy, then assimilation will make the ethnicity private and not an official matter. If democracy is subordinated to ethnicity, then the nation will belong to one people and other ethnicities will be minorities. This gives a conflict between the state and the people, where ethnicity shown the person as a biologic species and democracy shows her as a creature of society. (Gerner et al, 1996, pp 170-1, c.f. Hedenskog, 2004, pp 30). Although ethnicity as such plays a minor
role in the nation-building rhetoric, ethnic components as defined in the hypothesis were emphasised – Ukrainian traditions, culture, family. This national identity was a force defining Ukraine against its past rulers from the East, therefore an ethnic identity with new, civic elements appeared pivotal to the revival of the Ukrainian nation.

3.4 Summary of Findings

The three interview questions were designed in order to reveal the respondents’ direction and construction of identification regarding democracy, national stereotypes and nation-construct, and to let those serve to plot a narrative relevant to democracy building in Ukraine.

First, when it comes to democracy ideal, Ukraine or Europe was seen as the Self and Russia was seen as the Other. The positive identification with Europe appeared to symbolise a striving first and foremost to better living conditions, and to a lesser – although significant – extent towards democracy. The negative identification with Russia was motivated by that it symbolised the opposite of Europe, namely “the twin legacies of external domination and totalitarianism”: the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet rule (Kuzio, 1998, pp 38).

Second, regarding the national stereotypes Ukraine was identified with positively, defined against the Russian, and the Ukrainian was depicted as on her way to European living standards – but not to become a European. A link seemed to connect manifest traditions such as folklore, religion and the family and the contemporary Ukraine. The European seemed to a larger extent associated with what the political system gave the citizen, whereas the Ukrainian image focused on the becoming of a politically empowered citizen. The stereotype of the Russian made little distinction between the history of the country and the characteristics of the individual citizen.

Third and last, considering nation construction, the Ukrainian national stereotype appears to play the most significant role. Europeans were not identified against negatively, but the respondents were cautious about their own national identity. Russians were the bad example. The Ukrainians played two cards when distinguishing themselves from Russians. The first was claiming that they have democratic roots in history, and the second that they had understood the citizen’s ability to change the society. Thus, consolidating a democratic society and revitalising the national identity seemed crucial to the image that the interviewees had of Ukrainians, Europeans and Russians.
4 Discussion

4.1 Sketching the Contours

What are then those post-Soviet identities that are argued to be crucial to the building of democracy in Ukraine? As they are in this study understood in relation to constraining Others and defining Selves, the contours of the self-understanding amongst the orange revolutionaries appear relevant.

Firstly, Russia is object to negative identification and functions as a constraining Other. Russia, the Soviet Union and Yanukovich occupy the space as the Other, essentially representing autocracy as opposed to democracy, thus serving as an outer threat that motivates a centripetal process. However, the strong leadership ideal holds some appeal, but Putin’s increased control over Russian power seems to make him unsuitable to serve as a symbol for an ideal leader.

Secondly, Europe as an object for positive identification serves to a certain degree as a defining Self. However, its status as an ideal is motivated more by its desirable living standards than its democracy. For the same reason the United States are also seen as more a Self than an Other. Notwithstanding the apparent subordination of democracy to living standards, a correlation between corruption and bad living standards is recognised by the interviewees, motivating a Western and comparatively less corrupt democracy ideal.

Thirdly, Ukraine appears as an object of even stronger positive identification than the West, making the own titular nation take the lead as a defining Self. The Ukrainian historical claims to democracy were put forward as to give an impression of what an inherited and immovable part democracy was in the country – as long as it was allowed to rule itself. The orange revolution is described as a rebirth of the Ukrainian nation, where the civic democratic features that were inherited via the ethnic traits came to exclaim themselves.

4.2 Mapping the Content

If the contours of the post-Soviet identities are drawn against the East but including certain aspects of the West and making for a safe haven around Ukraine, what are then the reasons? As this study looks for a narrative that can explain the orange revolutionaries’ embracing of democracy, the motivations will be articulated in the terms of civic and ethnic lines of identification that the hypothesis suggests are crucial. Therefore, a reminder of the definitions of civic
and ethnic identity constructions is motivated. Civic lines of identity are unity around common territory, common political principles, citizenship, representation by common political institutions and consent to be part of the nation. The ethnic identification lines evolve around the unifying power of common ancestry, culture, language, religion, traditions and race. (Shulman 2004, pp 35)

From the above analysis of the material, a reflection is first called for. Two of the categories of interviewees’ own identities are object for measurement, whereas the analysts’ views serve as a second hand source for the identity construction of the orange revolutionaries. Having taken that into account, the interview questions captured lines of civic as well as of ethnic identity, and the seemingly more traditional lines – folklore, Ukrainian mythology etc – seemed to correlate with those that had been the most involved in the revolution, the key actors. As this counterclaims the hypothesis in as much as the identity construction would rather be ethnic than civic, looking at this in context with the Self and the Other and their respective connotations, one set of identity lines seem to be a means to the other.

In drawing the border around the Self, to the orange revolutionaries, the orange revolution seems to have been a matter of both nation and democracy. Russia, the Soviet Union and Yanukovich essentially symbolise the past, in which Ukraine purportedly was cut off from its allegedly innate democratic culture, signalled in the interviews by the emphasis on the historical claims to democracy. In as much, the motivation is civic since it draws on a consensus of political ideas; democracy. In 2002, Andrew Wilson saw the “almost total absence of a consolidated political center; the nationalistic right sees the main threat to Ukraine’s independence coming from Russia; the communistic left sees it from Western, usually American, capitalism.” (www.critiquemagazine.com, 1.6.2005) That the orange revolutionaries address both issues may be a sign of a less polarised political landscape.

Even though living standards outweighed democracy as reason for identification with the West, it seems to be of little significance that the Soviet Union actually provided living conditions that were in many cases better than contemporary ones. Alas, when juxtaposing living conditions against democracy in the identification process regarding Russia and its perceived equivalents, something makes democracy more important than the issue of living standards that seemed of great importance. The opposite case seems to hold true for the process of identification with the West. Living standards as a symbol of Europe and the US outweigh democracy - a paradox as democracy was perceived as a stronger reason for negative identification with the East than the living standards that the Soviet Union de facto provided Ukraine. Instead of being a civic motivation, this one is of bread-and-butter disposition. So where to look for an explanation? The emphasis on the Ukrainian historic claims to democracy hints that democracy can mean more than consensus on political ideas to the orange revolutionaries. Subsidiary empowerment could translate into empowerment of the citizen in a democracy, as well as empowerment of the nation as opposed to disempowerment in a union. This could motivate the accent put on ethnic identification lines when sketching the borders of the Self. Defining Ukrainian
identities seem to require certain tact. As, in the words of Hrytsak (2000, pp 265), they seem “ambiguous, in constant flux, multilayered, dynamic and constructed” – not only in terms of ethnicities and languages, but also in terms of ethnic and civic identity constructions.
5 Conclusion

5.1 The Role of post-Soviet Identities in Building Democracy in Ukraine

According to the hypothesis of this thesis, the interviewees – representing those who fought for democracy in Ukraine – should have an identity constructed along civic as opposed to ethnic lines. A civic identity is seen as the reason why the idea, democracy, settles in the habitat, the supporters. Consequently, the orange revolutionaries’ civic identity would be the explanation to why they went out on the streets. Now, let us see how this hypothesis relates to the results of the field study.

The initial theoretical approach stipulates civic and ethnic identity constructions as forming a dichotomy, i.e. per definition two mutually exclusive categories that in addition were theoretically ascribed to respective side of a profound East-West divide. In as much, the hypothesis is on one hand falsified. The ones that were the most involved in the orange revolution also put the strongest emphasis on ethnic lines of identity, thus the answer to the lowest abstraction level of the research question – whether the orange revolutionaries had a civic identity construction – goes towards a negative answer. However, focusing on an inclining level of abstraction, the concepts of civic and ethnic still serve to outline the link between identity and democracy in Ukraine. A dynamic relationship between the categories should be argued for, recognising ethnic means to a civic end. The motivation for putting forward the ethnic identity components – folklore, the Cossacks and Hetmans, the Kyivan Rus’, the first Rada, the church and family – can be argued to be their connotations to independence from Russia and to democracy. A dynamic view of the categories allows an understanding of the orange revolutionaries as having a fundamentally ethnic national identity where the Ukrainian national heritage forms a basis for building democracy. The stress on unity in the orange revolution signal importance of civic traits. Yet, this can be argued to be an introduction of a civic element into an ethnic identity. The civic element seems to have been introduced to this identity motivated by nation building intentions via the orange revolution, which is depicted as a simultaneous rebirth of the Ukrainian nation and a victory for democracy. Russia is perceived as a threat to the building of a Ukrainian nation and democracy, thus defined against. That neither the West - Europe nor North America - is object to stronger self-identification than the Ukraine signals that nation building may be prioritised over democracy building, although the matter is made somewhat opaque by the strength of negative identification with Russia.
In summary, the post-Soviet identities - seen through the prism of ethnic and civic identity constructions - appears to serve as a demarcation between the self and Russia whilst building democracy in Ukraine. The strongest motivations seem to be the desire for better living standards and for democracy. Ethnic lines of identification seem to serve to define Ukraine against the West when letting their living conditions and democracy diffuse into the nation, whereas civic lines of identification appear to be adhered to when protecting the self from bad living conditions and non-democracy by pursuing independence from Russia. Europeans and Russians serve to create inverted pictures of one another. This appears to be a parallel to the resistance against the Tsarist and Communist rule, where “as long as one held on to Christianity, one opposed the Russian state” (Roshwald, 2001, pp 52) Thus different issues are emphasised in defining the nation from the East as from the West, although overall the negative identification with the East appears stronger than the positive identification with the West.

In the words of Ascher (2005): “Like Antigone, they disobeyed one law in the name of another; therein lies their sovereignty, not in the merits of the particular law they defended “.

5.2 Suggestions for Future Research

Following the above conclusions, certain aspects that call for further investigation emerge.

The first suggestion is to compare transitology and modernity theory views on post-empire democratisation (c.f. Karl & Schmitter, 1994) via the interface between democracy and nationalism. Tentatively, comparing and contrasting the two theoretical schools might provide an interesting outlook on the link connecting democracy and nation building (which has here been suggested to be empowerment) drawing on how the meaning of nationalism might depend on how much a country in transit has been affected by modernity.

Suggestion number two is to explore the relationship between the categories of identity construction used in this study, civic and ethnic. To localise this relationship on a scale ranging from mutual exclusiveness to mutual inclusiveness might provide deeper understanding on the motivations underlying the political and historical context in which the identities are studied. As suggested in this study, analytical openness to the character of the categorisation itself – dichotomised or dynamic – may serve to comprehend self-understanding in context. It is meaningful and relevant to discuss democratisation in terms of civic and ethnic, wherefore the relation between those categories must not become a restriction.

Thirdly and last, the Ukrainian middle-grounds, exemplified by the mixed Ukrainian-Russian language Surzhyk which means “wheat and rye” (Wilson, 2002, pp 36), the Uniate church that is orthodox under the Vatican (Reid, 1997, pp 223), the value-relativistic, optional attitude to the role of ethnicities in the
nation (ibid), appear as an interesting field of a research as they both challenge much of the established theory. In the words of Hrytsak (2000, pp 263): “Usually, there are too many theories on national-building but too little empirical studies. The Ukraine case is the opposite. The research shows how the cleavage between languages and ethnicity correlate to political attitudes, hence imply that the Ukraine is on the brink of a crisis. But should theory enter and introduce the idea of multifaceted identities, the picture might become more stable, truer.”
6 References


Committee of Voters Ukraine, www.cvu.org.ua, 4.10.2005


