Humanitarian Relief in a New Context

Empirical Consequences of the Complex Humanitarian Emergencies in Great Lakes and Afghanistan

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the political implications of core traditional humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. With the end of the cold war the phenomena of “new conflicts” have largely replaced traditional inter-state wars, hence the context of humanitarian emergency situations are no longer the same. Based on case studies of two humanitarian emergency relief operations evolving from fundamental different contexts, this thesis shows how humanitarian relief easily becomes integrated into the dynamics of a conflict. This was the case during the cold époque as well as in today’s “new conflicts”. Despite the contextual change, I argue that many of the dilemmas confronting humanitarian relief workers are essentially the same today as they were before the end of the cold war.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Great Lakes, Humanitarian Emergency Relief, Refugee Camps, Conflict
Acronyms

CHE    Complex Humanitarian Emergency
DHA    Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council
ERC    Emergency Relief Coordinator
FAR    Rwandan Armed Forces
GA     General Assembly
IASC   Inter-agency Standing Committee
ICRC   International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP    Internally Displaced Person
MONUC  United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MRNDD  Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement
NGO    Non Governmental Organisation
OAU    Organisation of Africa Unity
OCHA   Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDPA   Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PSC    Protracted Social Conflict
RCD    Congolese Rally for Democracy
RPF    Rwandan Patriotic Front
SG     Secretary General
ToR    Terms of References
UN     United Nations
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S.   United States
U.S.S.R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP    World Food Program
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1 Introduction

Images of war, famine and severe poverty are daily flashed on our television screens, reminding us of the latest emergencies of Sudan, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia, to mention but a few. Humanitarian emergency relief delivered in contexts of conflict and disaster by governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has contributed to the savings of hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of lives. It can therefore be argued that the supplement of provisions and medical supplies to refugees and displaced persons in conflicting areas constitutes one of the most heroic and lifepreserving performances of our time (Smock, 2000).

1.1 A Contextual Change

Among academics, military and humanitarian practitioners, there has been a largely unquestioned acceptance of a fundamental change in terms of proliferation, nature and impact of today’s conflicts (Watkins, 2003). New waves of serious violent behaviour have replaced the previous battlefields of the underdeveloped world due to the superpower tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States (Macrae–Zwi, 1994). With the end of the cold war, the number of intra-state wars have increased severely; state supremacy has declined; traditional long-established front lines do no longer appear as clear as before; militia and rebel groups have replaced traditional armies and hence it is more complicated to identify the warring parties; chains of order are less clear; regulations of warfare have ceased to exist; conflicts are protracted; and crucially, it is civilians who have become the major victims of war - rape, ethnic cleansing and other atrocities are nowadays common characteristics of “modern” wars (Watkins, 2003).

Previous research indicates that this changing nature of conflicts has had a significant impact on the contextual framework in which humanitarian relief organisations nowadays operate. In parallel to this, there has been an increased moral imperative to help and provide assistance to the victims of humanitarian emergencies (Parry, 2002).
1.2 Problem

“As a neutral, independent and impartial humanitarian organization whose history is intimately linked to the creation and development of international humanitarian law, the ICRC has an abiding interest in seeing that humanitarian law norms are observed. Our mandate under the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols includes ensuring assistance and protection to all persons affected by war based on the values underlying those treaties — humanity and respect for individual dignity. Together with the other components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, we will continue to pursue our mandate with those principles in mind” (Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC, presented at the 58th Annual Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva 26 March 2002, cited in Parry, 2002).

As stated by Kellenberger above, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), together with several other NGOs, promotes a strict adherence to the traditional humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence.

It may appear obvious that humanitarian relief must be neutral as well as impartial and hence directed at all victims of a humanitarian catastrophe. It may also seem easy to declare that relief should be politically independent and not configure as part of the donors strategic imperative. However, like most principles, those of impartiality and neutrality are difficult to realise (Väyrynen, 1999).

Emphasising the changing pattern of conflicts and increased complexity of crisis, critical observers have noticed that NGOs basic mandates and founding principles have in numerous cases led to undesired consequences. It may be argued that traditional principles, embodied in the Geneva Conventions as well as the Code of Conducts of the Red Cross Movement, are no longer appropriate for the patterns characterising conflicts in a Post-Cold War era (The Feinstein International Famine Center, 2004).

However, as the concept of humanitarian relief has greatly evolved during the past decade, it is not a surprise that quite a small number of studies of this problem have been carried out. The literature outlines some examples of how humanitarian relief can be used as an apparatus of war. It has also been argued that humanitarian relief today in an increased manner should be considered as part of the conflict. Although several indications, this relationship is outlined in a rather unclear manner in the current literature and more evidence is required (Väyrynen, 1999). There is inadequate verification showing that humanitarian relief actually sustains conflicts (Goodhand, 2001).
1.3 Purpose

Emanate from the discussion above, I formulate the research question which this thesis attempts to answer:

- What are the implications of traditional humanitarian principles on a conflict-situation?

This thesis attempts to explore the relationship between humanitarian relief and conflicts. The purpose is to examine the negative impact of traditional humanitarian principles that can result from well-intentioned humanitarian relief operations. I hope to demonstrate a causal connection between the context in which the complex humanitarian emergency (CHE) has evolved, and the negative spill-over effects from the humanitarian response implicating a prolongation of the conflict.

Acknowledging that there has been a change in the patterns of warfare, I formulate two hypotheses that I hope to either verify or falsify:

1. Traditional humanitarian principles are no longer accurate.
2. Humanitarian relief operations can easily become a contributing factor in the continuation of a conflict.

1.4 Delimitations

To be able to finish this thesis within the limit of time and space, adopting a quite narrow purpose is necessary. My intention is to bring the research down to an empirical level and hence to analyse the empirical impact of traditional humanitarian principles. Emanate from the conclusion of this thesis it would be interesting to bring up a constructive discussion outlining alternatives to the traditional framework. This is however not the major purpose of this thesis.

I have chosen to exclude any debate of the United Nations (UN) charter of human rights contra the principle of sovereignty and non-interference.

A normative discussion on whether it is an obligation or not to provide humanitarian relief assistance, is not within the scope of this work.
1.5 Methodological Considerations

Is it possible to acquire any absolute and objective knowledge or should research rather be seen as the subjective thoughts and analysis of individual scientists? This question, illustrating the origin of the positivistic and hermeneutic debating schools, is considered as the most fundamental within the field of Social Science (Bjereld ed.al, 2002).

I believe that the result of this theses have been coloured by my personal assumptions, reflexions and interpretations, and hence a hermeneutic viewpoint is taken. The evaluations and analysis I have carried out during my work, relies on my previous knowledge, experiences and understandings of the world. However, by consciously acknowledging this, I am confident that I have adequately been able to keep the distance required for obtaining a scientific validity (Ibid).

This thesis attempts to explore the relationship between humanitarian relief and conflicts. According to Jacobsen this type of research problem is of “explorative” character and best suitable for “intensive” research conducting. In order to best explore the problem, the scientist is required to enter deeply into the analysis and thereby acquire diversified data (Jacobsen, 2002). Considering the limitation of time intended for this thesis, it is advisable to examine a limited number of objects. Accordingly, a quantitative method is the most adequate for this purpose. This method allows me to undertake a deep penetration of the research problem and thereby facilitating a nuanced description. A negative aspect of this chosen method is that qualitative research does not allow any generalisations. This because the result only reflects the reality of a certain research object. Although the result of a case study may not necessarily be valid for other cases, I would argue that the result can serve as an indicator for shortages in a theory. In order to endow the research with a high level of reliability, it is important to choose appropriate cases to study which are suitable for the specific problem of research (Alvesson - Sköldberg, 1994).

In order to obtain the purpose of this thesis, a case study of two different cases has been chosen; “Great Lakes” (1994) and “Afghanistan” (1979). Both cases illustrate the situation of a complex humanitarian emergency resulting from an enormous refugee flow due to a conflict. However, the emergencies I am illustrating through the two cases are different in the way that they have emerged in fundamentally different contexts. The “Great Lakes” case is a typical example of a “new conflict” emerging within a country due to ethnic rivalries. The second case “Afghanistan” is chosen to illustrate an example of a classic interstate cold-war conflict. Hence a method of “most different design” is used. By analysing two cases different in terms of the contextual conflict initiating the humanitarian
emergency, I hope to be able to verify a causal connection between the contextual conflict, humanitarian response and its negative spill-over effects.

Although the first case covers the CHE evolving in former Zaire and its spill-over effects, due to the flow of Rwandese refugees, I have chosen to refer to it as the “Great Lakes” case. This is because the conflicting history and ethnic heritage of the whole Great Lakes region is so closely interrelated (Nabudere, 2004). The CHE had its origin in the Rwandan genocide but caused serious spill-over effects onto the neighbouring countries. The second case will be referred to as “Afghanistan” although it covers the Afghan refugee camps situated in Pakistan.

When conducting research, it is also vital to reflect on the actual relationship between empery and theory. I believe that an inductive approach, “starting in empery when approaching the theory” should be seen as the model for this kind of research. Through this manner it is possible to approach reality without expectations, and hence a minimised risk of restricting the collected data due to unnecessary boundaries. However, adhering to the hermeneutic school, I believe that it is difficult to disregard anticipating theories. It is indeed very useful to rely on certain analytical frames, in the meeting with reality. Accordingly, an adductive approach, advocated by Alvesson and Sköldberg, implying an alteration between theory and empery, will be taken for this thesis (Alvesson – Sköldberg, 1994).

1.6 Material

“Authors of a well performed dissertation are required to demonstrate an awareness of the contribution of knowledge they wish to present.” (Knutsson, 1998:3, my own translation) In order to do so, it is vital to obtain an understanding of the present knowledge within the domain. Hence, I have done an extensive search for information within various databases; Libris, Lovisa, Elin, Artikelsök as well as internet search engines such as Google.

The theoretical part of this thesis is based on secondary material. I have studied an extensive number of literature and articles in order to create a theoretical framework relevant for my research problem. The empirical part is based on primary as well as secondary material. It has appeared to be difficult to find primary sources, such as UN documents, for the Afghanistan case and accordingly I have had to rely on articles and other secondary material. A good selection among the available information has been a necessary element in order to obtain a high level of validity.
1.7 Central Concepts

1.7.1 Humanitarian Relief

Before reviewing the academic discourses of humanitarianism it may be helpful to look at the significance of the word “relief”. In the Oxford Dictionary there are primarily two usages that relate to the concept. Firstly it applies to a sense of mitigation and ease derived from some cause of distress, pain or discomfort. Secondly, the concept relates to some form of aid or assistance in a context of poverty, conflict or other distress (1989). Thus, relief concerns a situation of need for mitigation.

1.7.2 Humanitarianism

According to most dictionaries, humanitarianism is defined broadly as the concern for human well-being, and a humanitarian is a person who actively promotes human well-being (Weiss-Collins, 2000).

This definition is problematic in the sense that “well-being” and “welfare” are two highly subjective concepts. Each humanitarian has an individual opinion of what actions that increase human welfare.

Looking into the literature for a further subjectivist conceptualisation, it is evident that there is no clear consensus on a standard definition of or principles for humanitarianism.

By many practitioners it is however the three major principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, held by the ICRC, which are still considered to demonstrate the actions of what is indeed humanitarian (ibid.). These principles will be examined further in chapter two (2.2).

1.7.3 Complex Humanitarian Emergency

The CHE has been used to describe “what are essentially hybrid conflicts that combine transnational and internal characteristics”. It represents an expressive category presenting a short hand expression for numerous, often divergent conflicts in terms of nature, extent and intensity (Goodhand, 2001:7, Miall ed. al 2001).
According to Miall, the word “complex” should be used in order to distinguish these emergencies from traditional interstate territorial and resource conflicts (Miall ed. al 2001).

Minear and Weiss refer to the concept in a rather broad sense and describe complex emergencies as “situations that may be triggered by natural disasters such as droughts or floods, by intercommunal violence with roots in ethnic or religious tensions or exclusionary politics, by economic or environmental stress, or by a combination of these factors. Whatever the specific cause, complex emergencies are characterised by a high degree of political or military conflict, which complicate efforts to provide humanitarian assistance” (Minear-Weiss, 1995:17).

Väyrynen bases his definition on a quantitative empirical study of countries suffering from humanitarian crisis during the first half of the 1990s. By examining humanitarian emergencies on the basis of four different criteria; war, displacement, hunger and disease, the study identifies twenty-five of the most serious cases for each. It concludes that humanitarian emergencies involve two main dimensions; Violence and poverty (Väyrynen, 1999).

1.7.4 Conflict

“Conflict is a struggle, between individuals or collectivises over values or claims to status, power and scarce resources in which the aims of the conflicting parties are to assert their values or claims over those of others” (Goodhand and Hulme, cited in Goodhand, 2001:7).

Although a study in 1999 concluded that armed conflicts within as well as between states have declined during the 1990s, many cases of persisting armed violence in Africa and Asia demonstrate a different reality. Following the standard definition of war; one thousand battlefields per year, more than fifty percent of the African countries can be categorised as “conflicting countries” (Goodhand, 2001).

The end of the cold war is today considered as a major marking point for the occurrence of a new type of wars of which a majority have been internal rather than interstate (Kaldor, 1999, Galperin, 2002).

The literature uses a wide variation of terminology when describing these new types of conflicts taking place in the past decade; “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999), “contemporary conflicts” (Miall ed. al, 2001), “violent conflicts” (Anderson: 1999), “internal conflicts” (Brown ed. al:1996), “post-cold war conflicts” (Zartman ed. al, 1997), “post-modern conflicts” (Greenaway, 1999), “ethnic conflicts” (Stavenhagen, 1996) and “new type of conflicts” (Azar in Miall, 2001). In order not to exclude any causes of relevance, for example by qualifying conflicts as “in-
ternal” and thereby exclude external causes. I prefer using a rather neutral term such as “new conflicts”.

To further explore the phenomenon of complex humanitarian emergencies, I will in chapter two (2.1) look at the way in which “new conflicts”, has been analysed.

1.8 Disposition

The following chapter outlines my theoretical framework, comprising of three parts. First, a review of the literature on “new conflicts” in order to point out causes and characteristics. Secondly, I outline the core humanitarian principles held by the ICRC, comprising “traditional humanitarianism”. Thirdly, I survey the present literature discussing empirical consequences of humanitarian relief. Chapter three and four cover my empirical part presenting the two case studies. My intention is to present the cases in a similar manner starting with a historical background to the context of the CHE. The following section of the case-studies describes the humanitarian response due to the crisis and the last part provides a review of the continuation of the conflicting situations. In the fifth chapter I will sum up the previous sections with the aim of outlining the causal-connection between humanitarian relief and conflict. Chapter sixth comprises my concluding remarks. Lastly, I will briefly review the steps taken by the humanitarian community and by the UN in particular, in order to improve effectiveness of the humanitarian response.
2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 "New Conflicts"

Depending on the school of analysis, conflicts relates to a number of different causes. An international relations theorist, for example, looks for causes due to power structures of world order; Conflicts have been restrained by the cold war bi-polar power structure, but when this external impending threat suddenly vanished at the end of the 1980’s, the internal conflicts sprang forth again (Zartman ed. al, 1997).

Galperin argues that conflicts have emerged in the post cold war era partly due to the disengagement of prior superpowers; Heavy cuts in military and humanitarian relief assistance for developing countries have contributed to a declining capability of the state, implying complications in terms of sustaining previous extensive and centrally controlled armies. Consequently, decentralised war- strategies and low-cost war technologies have replaced previous superpower-backed centralised and cost-intensive military strategies. New strategies of warfare have emerged including the increased use of militia, the mobilisation of armed forces along ethnic lines, the forcible deployment of adults as well as of children, and the serious looting and harassment of the local population. The state monopoly for organised violence has moved into the hands of local leaders (Galperin, 2002).

Kaldor argues that it is the rapid expansion of globalisation that has generated conflicts that cannot be understood through the “old rules”. While the goals of “old conflicts” referred to issues of territory based on presuppositions of sovereignty, those of “new wars” revolve around an “ideological cleavage”. “New wars” are further related to “identity politics”, meaning the claim to power on the basis of ethnic, racial or religious identity, hence the geopolitical or ideological goals of earlier wars are of less significance (Kaldor 1999). Kaldor’s theory has many similarities to Creveld’s “low-intensity wars”. He argues that it was the end of the Cold War politics that gave rise for these new types of conflicts, as millions of soldiers were left unemployed with large quantities of arms produced during the Cold War époque (Creveld, 1990).

Several approaches to conflict analysis have tended to focus on the international macro-level dimensions which are relevant in order to understand some of the contextual and structural sources of post cold war conflicts. However, as claimed
earlier, today’s conflicts are in an increased manner protracted and ethnic in nature, rather than strategic, and therefore require a further analysis by looking at the more specific local political and cultural complexities (Macrae ed. al. 1994).

Goodhand primarily draws the parallel between protracted conflicts and the economic situation of the country, claiming that “[p]oor countries are at a greater risk of falling into no-exit cycles of violent conflict” (Goodhand, 2001:7). His argumentation doesn’t go further than this; however the analyst Edward Azar offers an alternative framework of analysing patterns of conflict. He focuses on the causes, effects and international implications of ethnic and other forms of communal conflict (Miall ed. al, 2001). Azar argues that these “new type of conflict” also referred to as “protracted social conflicts” (PSC) represents the “prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation” (Azar cited in Miall, 2001:71). Unlike traditional disputes over territory and economic possessions, these conflicts “revolves around questions of communal identity” (ibid: 72).

He emphasises on different clusters of variables as the preconditions for protracted social conflicts; communal content, needs, governance and the role of the state, and international linkages (Miall ed. al, 2001). It is the relationship between politised identity groups, sharing ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity characteristics, and states which have to be seen as the core of the problem. He argues that it is the colonial inheritance, which artificially imposed European ideas of statehood onto multi-communal societies, which should be considered as the origin of numerous conflicts. The running leaders of these countries seldom represent the interests of other groups in society. Consequently, conflicts are more likely to grow in societies with a multi-communal composition (Miall ed. al, 2001).

Secondly, Azar focuses on the lack of individual human needs as an fundamental cause of conflicts. The lack of security needs, development needs, political access needs as well as desires linked to the identity of individuals such as cultural and religious expression, can easily promote and exaggerate a conflict (ibid.).

A third critical variable is the governance and the mediating role of the state in terms of fulfilling these individual and identity group needs. Protracted social conflicts are more prone to arise in countries where the political power is weak and monopolised by a dominant identity group which use the state to maximise its own interest at the expense of others. This crisis of legitimacy tends to grow in developing countries characterised by a rapid growing population, an inadequate resource base as well as a limited political capacity (ibid.).
2.2 Traditional Humanitarian Principles

The seven traditional and fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement were officially proclaimed at its 20th international conference, held in Vienna in 1965. The consistence of these principles; humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality has since then been considered as a universal criterion for its members (Discover the ICRC, 2002). In 1991 the General Assembly approved resolution 46/182, affirming that “humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality” (A/RES/46/182). It is however the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence which by most humanitarian practitioners normally are considered as being the truly humanitarianism (Weiss-Collins, 2000). Therefore, the focus for this thesis will be on these three principles).

The “humanitarian imperative” compromises the principles of neutrality and impartiality and underpins the obligation to limit unnecessary human suffering independently of where, how and for what reason it appears. Assistance should be based solely on accurate needs, without any discrimination whatsoever among recipients (IRINnews.org 2005-06-16) “In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature… It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress.” (Discover the ICRC, 2002:9)

Thirdly, the principle of independence, stresses the belief that humanitarian action should be free from all political, religious, or other influences and that all sides in a conflict are equally entitled to humanitarian assistance: “The movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement.” (Discover the ICRC, 2002:9) Accordingly, humanitarian actions should not interfere in the conflict.

Adhering to these traditional humanitarian principles as a humanitarian framework is however viewed by many as problematical. It is in particular the traditional principle of neutrality which has proved morally repugnant to maintain in situations of atrocities and human rights abuses (Anderson, 1999). Furthermore, apart from some NGOs such as ICRC, there are few donors who would meet the criteria under the principle of independence. It is considered as difficult to identify other contributing actors operating solely in order to relieve suffering, but with other motives such as political, military, religious or organisational (ibid.). This question has particularly evolved due to an increased military contribution by do-
nor countries in regions where donor governments have geopolitical interests (Terry, 2002). Despite problems, Minear and Weiss (1995) indisputable address the importance of humanitarian principles in the work of humanitarian relief.

### 2.3 Humanitarianism in the Context of CHE

When international humanitarian aid is given in the context of a complex humanitarian emergency situation, it both affects as well as becomes affected by the conflict (Anderson, 1999). I will in this section outline a number of ways in which aid and conflict interact.

According to Prendergast, there are three major ways in which aid causes negative externalities and thereby sustains conflict; Humanitarian relief can be used directly as an instrument of war; it can be integrated indirectly into the dynamics of a conflict; and it can exacerbate the underlying causes of the conflict and thereby increase the level of insecurity. Warring parties frequently attempt to directly control and benefit from the access routes, used by aid workers, to areas of contested control. There are several examples of warring parties attacking food trucks as well as production. The number of attacks on humanitarian personnel, often involving hostage-taking, has increased rapidly (Prendergast, 1996).

During conflicts, food serves three main functions; political, economic and military. Politically, it is commonly used as a mean to render communities and populations dependent on the state and thus politically compliant. It is claimed that merchants and other groups, often allied to political and military interests, frequently make substantial profits out of scarcity. The military function is connected to the argument that warring parties often considers the civilians on whose support rebels depend, as targets (Macrae ed. al, 1994).

Prendergast points at a number of situations where humanitarian aid demonstrably “feeds” conflicts by bringing more resources to warring parties. He claims that this often contributes to the financing of a war by stimulating military authorities such as governments, rebels and militias (Prendergast, 1996).

Humanitarian agencies can exacerbate conflicts through economic aid and structural adjustment policies, by widening differences in terms of income as well as contributing to increased gaps among resource competitors (ibid).

An other negative effect, identified by Prendergast, is aid’s impact on competition. A perception of unbalanced aid provisioning, whether accurate or not, is in many cases likely to increase competition between governments, rebel movements and neighbouring communities. Consequently, using a targeting approach – helping vulnerable populations rather than giving general distributions – can inflame tensions and the survival of one group can burden another (ibid).
Anderson recognises these negative impacts but also points at a “substitution effect of aid”. She argues that external aid in many cases fill an immense proportion of civilian needs for food, shelter, safety and health services, that local resources thereby becomes available for the pursuit of war. Consequently, the international relief workers take over the responsibility of civilian welfare and the local government comes to define their role solely in terms of military control (Anderson, 1999).

Macrae and Zwi pessimistically conclude that humanitarian aid should not be considered as a neutral phenomena but a political and economic resource which is often distributed, manipulated and fought over by the same people initially responsible for violence and oppression. This process often sustains conflicts and increases inequalities in terms of power and wealth, through the control of food resources (Macrae - Zwi, 1994). Prendergast goes further with this argumentation and stresses that aid can have a severe impact on the structure, quality and balance of power in a community as well as among warring parties (Prendergast, 1996).

How do humanitarian values apply to the new types of complex humanitarian emergencies? According to Prendergast (1996), a debate of the appropriateness of neutrality is of crucial importance. Macrae and Zwi point out several dangers with “active neutrality”. Giving aid through local relief agencies in rebel areas could politically legitimise associated rebel organisations by providing them with the means to feed the populations they try to control. By restricting the access to aid, the rebel groups may come under harsher pressure and, accordingly, sooner accept a peace agreement (Macrae - Zwi, 1994). An other complicating factor, within this debate, is the fact that mandates of neutrality often conflict with human rights advocacy as human rights abuses is a frequent dimension of “new conflicts” (Prendergast, 1996). It can be argued that “independence” or “detachment” should be used rather than the term “neutrality” (Macrae - Zwi, 1994). Minear and Weiss don’t expressible reject the notion of neutrality, but prefer to talk about the principle of “non-partisanship”, which they define as “humanitarian action responds to human suffering because people are in need, not to advance political, sectarian, or other extraneous agendas” (Minear - Weiss 1995:68).

The validity of claims to impartiality has also been convincingly dismissed. To distribute relevant economic resources into conflict situations, without causing any impact on the consisting power balances, is an impossible task (Terry, 2002).

The lack of adherence to traditional principles in today’s emergency situations causes severe problems. A consequence has been an increased level of attacks aimed at relief workers. The attacks on the UN as well as the ICRC compounds in Baghdad in 2003 are clear evidences of the vital political importance of humanitarian relief (Feinstein International Famine Center, 2004). Civilian installations, refugee centers and cultural sites have in today’s conflicts increasingly become
war targets, impeding the humanitarian efforts as part of the actual conflict (Miall ed. al, 2001).

Väyrynen addresses the fact that humanitarian operations today increasingly have come to rely on the protection of military. This leads to confusion about the incorporation of military and aid operations and accordingly the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence become objects for questioning. According to Väyrynen, “military and humanitarian operations may coexist, but on the ground they have to be separated from each other” (Väyrynen, 1999:178). Anderson goes further in this argumentation, claiming that armed guards with the purpose to protect aid workers implicitly send out an ethical message saying that it is legitimate to use arms in order to achieve access to resources and that safety is achieved through weapons (Anderson, 1999). In addition to above mentioned ethical message, Anderson identifies several other ways which aid implicitly reinforces the war environment in a negative manner. Due to the diversity of aid agencies in terms of long- and short-term goals, political agendas, religious stance and other differences in outlook, field workers often fail to cooperate with each other. Accordingly, these attitudes of nontolerance, mistrust and disrespect signal a message to the local people, saying that it is unnecessary to cooperate with people with whom you disagree (ibid.).

An other dilemma is the question of aid workers and impunity. Aid workers operate under very difficult and often dangerous circumstances. In order to relax it is crucial to find ways to enjoy themselves. Parties, beer, nice food and music are often considered as necessary means in order to maintain psychological and physical health. However, by local people having no or very few resources, this behaviour may be seen as acting with impunity. Relief agencies also adopt policies that apply differently to international and local humanitarians. International aid workers receive higher salaries, greater benefits and higher security protection motivated by the dangerous and abnormal circumstances. This implicitly sends out a message of inequality between local and expatriate staffs, a message which in many ways is likely to diminish the legitimisation of the work (ibid.).
3  Great Lakes
– An Empirical Overview

“Rwanda, that’s somewhere in Africa, isn’t it?” (Dallaire, 2005:42) LT. Roméo Dallaire, force commander of the UN assistance mission to Rwanda 1993-1994, posed this question when he first learned that he was to be deployed in the region.

In my view, this question quite describes the rest of the world’s ignorance and unawareness when it comes to this seriously troublesome part of Africa. The protracted conflict taking place in Africa’s Great Lakes region is often referred to as “Africa’s first world war” (Nabudere, 2004) causing, according to Jan Egeland the head of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the “[w]orld’s largest humanitarian catastrophe” also described as "the biggest, most neglected humanitarian emergency in the world today" (Egeland, cited in Afrol News, 2005-03-16).

“Africa’s First World War” is a culmination of a series of protracted conflicts, decomposition, as well as crisis due to the European economic and political order, imposed on Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1885. The continent was divided between the European powers with no regards for the cultural, religious, or linguistic divisions between the native populations, implicating incredibly powerful tensions throughout the continent. Cycles of violence have brought an increasing number of refugees fleeing over the borders between the countries. This is why the destinies of Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have come to be so closely interlinked (Nabudere, 2004, www.essaydepot.com 2005-06-21).

3.1  Background to CHE

Since independence from Belgium in 1962, Rwanda has regularly been the playground for interethnic rivalry effecting the stability and security of the region. The origin of the country’s contemporary ethnic division dates from the fifteenth century, with the arrival of the Tutsis from north-eastern parts of the continent. The social structure, which came to be established, was based on the feudal overlordship of the Tutsi minority over the Hutu peasantry. In comparison to other countries in the region, this ethically based social structure tended to be amazingly sustainable, with very few examples of intermarriages (Macqueen, 2002).
Ethnic tensions between the two groups have been further exacerbated by the governance structure that was imposed by Germany and Belgium during their rule of colonisation. The Tutsi population became the colonial elite, which was granted special privileges in terms of education and jobs in the administration (Boutros-Ghali, 1996).

After independence, democratic elections allowed the power base to shift drastically. Naturally, it was the Hutu majority that was the “winner” of the new democratic order, and the Hutu-dominated Democratic Republican Movement under the presidency of Grégoire Kayibanda came to rule the new state. The Tutsis were unwilling to accept the shift in power and deep tensions remained. (Macqueen, 2002).

After a coup d’état, President Kayibanda was replaced by the northern Hutu General Juvenal Habyarimana. Rwanda was now under dictatorial rule, but in order to achieve a degree of legitimacy, Habyarimana placed himself as the head of the newly established party Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND). Habyarimana and his “Hutu-power” regime remained in control although facing serious challenges by the opposition. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) mainly composed by Tutsi exiles based in Uganda, allied with the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, appeared in the early 1990s as a forceful challenge to the government (ibid).

After coordinated attacks on the Kigali government launched by the rebels in October 1990, the first “peacekeeping” intervention was attempted by a multinational force composed by Burundi, Uganda and Zaire\(^1\) under the support of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU). However, the war continued throughout 1991 and 1992 (ibid).

Due to pressure from the OAU and the Tanzanian government in early 1993, President Habyarimana was persuaded to start a negotiating process taking place in Arusha in northern Tanzania. The UN Security Council was now increasingly involved, calling for comprehensive negotiations, although its presence was in the capacity of observer rather than participant. The final “Arusha agreements” was reached in August 1993, and its main cornerstone was the creation of a “Broad-Based Transitional Government” consisting of representatives of the Kigali regime, other more moderate Hutu in the opposition and the RPF. This transitional government would sustain until elections for a new Rwandan government could be organised before the end of 1995. The opposing military forces also agreed to undergo a process of disarmament followed by either demobilization or by integration into a new national army. The implementation of the peace agreement was

\(^1\) Zaire was renamed Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997, due to the replacement of Mobutu by Laurent Kabila.
disturbed by continued violence. The informal Hutu militia “Interahamwe” were forcefully opposed to the agreement, allowing Tutsis a shared powerbase (ibid).

The Arusha agreement reached its final stage on the 6 April 1994, when a plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, was shot down. Everyone on board was killed and the responsibility of the attack has never been located. Thus it is commonly agreed that the purpose of the attack was to destroy the peace process and this was certainly what came to be the consequence.

The massacre of what would eventually be about 800,000 people, led by gangs of Interahamwe and extremists of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), started almost immediately after the death of the president (ibid). During the following two days, 250,000 refugees fled into Tanzania and an additional 500,000 made their way out of Rwanda during the weeks to come (Weiss-Collins, 2000).

The genocide continued over a period of three months and ended with the defeat of the government and FAR by the RPF. An estimated 1.2 million people fled Rwanda to the neighbouring Kivu region of Zaire (S/1994/1308). Consequently, this gave rise to a sudden humanitarian emergency situation of enormous dimensions. Within only a few days, cholera had broken out, claiming the lives of 30,000 people in a period of two weeks time. This number is the highest mortality rate ever recorded in a humanitarian emergency situation (Buchanan-Smith, 2003). The refugees came to live in overcrowded, chaotic and highly insecure camps, completely dependent on UN and relief agencies for basic needs assistance (S/1994/1308).

### 3.2 Humanitarian Response

If the humanitarian response was weak during the genocide, the international humanitarian operation dealing with the refugees outside of Rwanda became one of the largest humanitarian projects ever seen, with costs rising to over a million dollar per day. Humanitarian aid became the substitute for the earlier political inaction seen in Rwanda (www.africaaction.org 05-06-08). In early 1995, forty-five NGOs and about 1 600 international relief workers were operating in the Goma area alone (S/1995/65).

The practical implication of the operations succeeded quite well, while the humanitarian organisations did not have the power, authority or mandate to deal with major political issues and accordingly fundamental problems remained. It was in particular the repatriation of the 1.4 million refugees, which proved to be a long-lasting issue (S/1995/65, Väyrynen, 1999).

It was in the camps of the Goma area, where the situation was reported as the most explosive. The refugee population in this area tended to include the largest
number of political, military and militia elements of the former Government and their hostility towards the new Government in Kigali was reflected in numerous actions (S/1995/65).

This crisis illustrates the problematic consequences when adhering to traditional humanitarian principles. The largest number of refugees in need of emergency aid were the Hutus and hence the perpetrators of the actual genocide. However, the principle of neutrality and impartiality made it impossible for relief workers to make any judgement or disregard legal and moral equality between victims and perpetrators (Terry, 2002).

Consequently, many of the refugee camps came to provide the Hutu ex-FAR militias and Interahamwe with the territorial base on which they could re-establish their power and create a highly organised military structure. A hierarchical governing structure, similar to those existing in Rwanda, was created by the refugees. Accordingly, several leaders were exercising authority, holding the same position as before the war. Relief-workers used this structure initially to facilitate the delivery of aid. Leaders were called upon to co-operate, but seriously misused the responsibility in order to enhance their interests (S/1995/65).

According to the guidelines of the UNHCR, refugee camps should be strictly unarmed, but the actuality of the camps in Zaire was another. Rearmament and military training in the camps was facilitated and numerous counterattacks could be launched on the Rwandan government and infrastructure. In view of that the government became very suspicious of both the refugee camps and the international humanitarian society (Väyrynen, 1999, French, 1997).

However, the most imminent security terrorism posed by the Hutu militants in the camps was their attacks on the local Tutsis. During the month of June 1996 alone; eleven Tutsi genocide-survivors were killed by Hutu ex-FAR militiamen crossing Lake Kivu by boat from the camps in Zaire, nine witnesses expected to give their testimony at genocide trials were killed, and twenty-eight returning refugees were murdered (Adelman, 2002).

It was the attacks against local Tutsis as well as against Rwandan targets which came to serve as a catalyst for the collapse of the Mobutu-regime in Zaire. The earlier U.S. backed Dictator Mobutu had been in power since independence from Belgium in 1960. As an ally of former Rwandan president Habyarimana, he welcomed the Hutu Interahamwe refugees. By supplying the camps with arms and military training and thereby irritating the new government in Kigali, he contributed to its own downfall (S/1995/552, Terry, 2002, Väyrynen, 1999). With help of the Tutsi-governments in Rwanda and Uganda, Laurent Kabila succeeded to overthrow Mobutu in 1997. When in power, desperate to find new allies, Kabila started to distance himself from Rwanda, and made dubious alliances with the genocidal Hutu-refugees (Fischer-Onishi, 2000).
In November 1994, in response to the increasingly violate situation in the camps, The UN Secretary General (SG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali, proposed a military solution. However, a separation of the political leaders, former Rwandan government forces, including troops and militia, from the rest of the camp population, was not considered as an option. Such attempt would have been “a risky, complex and very expensive endeavour” (S/1994/1308:7). An estimated number of 10,000-12,000 troops were required for the operation. Hence, a diplomatic solution was proposed declaring a political understanding between the genocidaires and the new government of Rwanda (S/1994/1308). On November 30, military initiatives were precluded by the Security Council. Consequently, the refugee camps continued to provide a sphere in which women were being raped, refugees being robbed of their rations and aid workers being threatened (Adelman, 2002).

Concern was raised for the prospect of potential long-time spill-over effect; “The situation is also potentially destabilizing for the host countries and for the sub-region as a whole. The only effective solution to this problem remains the safe and voluntary repatriation of the refugees” (S/1995/65:1).

Rwandese officials emphasised the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of the genocide. This was considered as vital in order to end impunity but also to increase security and facilitate reconciliation (S/1995/552). However, many humanitarian aid workers were reluctant to forward information of violations in the camps to war crimes tribunals and human rights organisations. They feared that such activities would limit their access to affected individuals (Cohen-Scholar, 1999).

Documents found in the camps have provided a good insight into the re-empowerment of ex-FAR and showed ways of how they used humanitarian aid as an integrated part of their operations (Terry, 2002). Due to the capacity of the Hutu leader to de facto direct much of the humanitarian aid, their power position as well as legitimacy were reinforced (Väyrynen, 1999).

The crisis in Great Lakes also show how the humanitarian aid campaign managed to “feed” the ethnic conflict by bringing more resources to the different warring parties and thereby “helping to fan its flames, rather than damp them down” (Väyrynen, 1999:186). The refugee camps provided various ways for the militias to generate revenue for their activities in exile. Some income was gained directly from the humanitarian relief effort by inflating population numbers, stealing aid supplies, and taxing local employees of humanitarian organisations (S/1995/65). Mobutu’s as well as Kabila’s troops frequently stole UN-chartered airplanes and fuel from the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR) and thereby facilitated their transports in the vast era (Väyrynen, 1999). Substantial profits were also derived from the refugees as consumers. Transports, cinemas, bars, restaurants, health centers, import and export offices, moneychangers, and commercial shops were established in the camps. Many of the refugees had also managed to bring assets such as household goods, money and other property with
them. All these different kinds of resources effectively fed the camp economy, controlled by the camp leadership (Terry, 2002).

3.3 Continuation of Conflict

Since the first Rwandese invasion of DRC in 1996, the Congolese frontier with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda have been under frequent guerrilla warfare and instability (Snow, 2004). Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda became involved in the conflict after accusing President Kabila for giving his support to the DRC-based rebellions attacking their borders. Many of these DRC-based insurgents are the re-empowered refugees which effectively learned how to take advantage of the internationally sponsored refugee camps.

Following the assassination of President Kabila in January 2001 and the succession of his son Joseph Kabila, new hopes for a re-emergence of the peace agreement, signed in Lusaka 1999, were raised. Although a withdrawal of the foreign troops during 2003, these countries are still giving extensive military support to several Congolese rebel groups, such as the Rwanda-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) (Armed Conflicts Report, 2004).

Despite various attempts of mediation, demobilisation and peace-agreements, the long-running hostilities between the Tutsis and Hutus remain and massacres continue. The Hutu Interahamwe fear repercussions if returning to Rwanda and remain in the forests of Eastern DRC, preying on villages for provisions and money. In May 2005 severe accusations of mass executions, beatings, rapes and hostage-takings endorsed by the Rwandese Hutu rebels towards civilians, were reported by the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The Tutsi-governments of Rwanda and Burundi have several times made new threats of retaliation, if not more is done to protect the ethnic Tutsis (www.newsvote.bbc.co.uk 2005-06-09, www.globalSecurity.org 2005-06-10).
4 Afghanistan
– An Empirical Overview

“The story of Afghanistan is a parable about the hazards of outsiders’ good intentions in an environment which seems unable to support them: when wars sour and emergency aid continues for too long; when political agendas change but the victims of war remain; when the viability of domestic political discourse is risked by the devastating effects of war on civil society; and when neighbouring countries become protagonists in a proxy war while international assistance actors try to plan for a country whose future seems frightfully insecure.” (Newberg, pp 3)

4.1 Background to CHE

Due to Afghanistan’s strategic location, it has been at the crossroad of a number of empires and conquerors, the latest by the USSR in 1979. Its ten year long occupation can be explained as part of the cold war rivalries; because of the strong influence by the U.S. in other Gulf countries, the U.S.S.R. felt obliged to increase its regional presence (Lederach, 1997).

The modern state of Afghanistan was established in 1880 by Amir Abdul Rahman and since then the Afghan population has been under a monarchy rule for ninety-three years and five years (1973-1978) under dominance by President Mohammed Daoud, a secular Paschtun nationalist. These centralised regimes could sustain in power primarily due to external military and financial backing from Soviet as well as from the West (Lederach, 1997). Some attempts of liberalisation were taken, which were however abandoned during the rule of Daoud. Political parties were illegalised and the political activists, the Islamic Movement in particular, experienced rigorous suppression. Most of its leadership was imprisoned, while some managed to escape to Pakistan where they were military educated and armed. At the same time the leaders of Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) were provided some protection by the U.S.S.R. (Zia, 2000).

In mid-1975 the Islamist resistance, operating from Pakistan, began organising clandestine missions into Afghanistan in order to stimulate a popular rebellion against the government. However, their mission failed primarily due to lack of support by the army. After the Soviet invasion, bringing the PDPA into power, the opposition groups based in Pakistan re-emerged and came to play a crucial role in the Islamic resistance movement (Terry, 2002).
Domestically, the Soviet presence was met with popular revolts and internationally encountered with a substantial flow of arms and funding from the U.S. and Islamic countries. This contributed to the creation of seven Mujahidin Sunni parties in Pakistan fighting the Soviet forces (Zia, 2000).

The U.S.S.R. forces destroyed villages, hospitals and terrorised and killed civilians as well as resistance combatants. They also dropped napalm and explosive devices resembling of toys in order to hurt children (Terry, 2002). This terror aggravated the flow of Afghan refugees crossing the border into Pakistan. It has been approximated that an average number of 4,700 refugees left the country every day (Zia, 2000). This large flow of refugees has also a contextual explanation. According to Islamic teachings - when a Muslim territory comes under occupation during which the free practice of Islam is forbidden - the population is encouraged to flee the country (Terry, 2002).

4.2 Humanitarian Response

During the Soviet occupation, the humanitarian assistance programs became integrated into the Cold War context. Superpower rivalry made it very difficult for relief agencies to work legitimately in Mujahidin-controlled areas. The UN and other multilateral and bilateral organisations were constrained to act due to considerations of national sovereignty. Therefore, most of the relief work was performed in camps, based in Pakistan, assisting Afghan refugees fleeing the communist regime. NGOs had a freer hand and attempted to provide relief in contested areas, through illegal cross-border programmes. Until 1988, NGOs were the principle means for providing assistance to both sides of the conflict and hence following the principles of neutrality and impartiality (Feinstein, 2001, Eade, 2000).

Despite this, the independence of many NGOs has been questioned. Most western NGOs received their funds indirectly or directly from national governments. The cross-border operations became part of the political and ideological Cold War battle against the U.S.S.R.. NGOs helped with the reinforcement of rebels while acting as the “conscious agents of political interests” (Eade, 2000:96).

Through the protection provided in the refugee camps as well as through the diverse sources of resupply figured as mechanisms through which to exert influence over the civilian population, the guerrilla movements effectively learned how to take advantage of the presence of the NGOs (Terry, 2002).

In order to carry out the cross-border programs, NGOs faced themselves with two options; either to co-operate with civilian authorities, or to develop ties with some commanders. Consequently, by co-operating and thereby legitimising some com-
manders in favour of others, NGOs had a real impact on the local balance of power. This strategy may even have contributed to local conflicts (Eade, 2000).

The Afghan refugee camps based in Pakistan served as to legitimise the resistance movement; “Refugees constitute a legitimizing population for the warriors. The presence of a large population in exile is taken as a physical testimony of support for the warriors, at least in the sense that they represent a rejection of the other side in the conflict.” (Zolberd ed. al cited in Terry, 2002:63) Subsequently, this legitimisation justified the continued active support by the West for the guerrilla war.

The Mujahidin was provided with a ”safe haven”, where they could rest and recuperate with their families. Without these camps, and hence without the large population of refugees, it is doubtful that Pakistan could have contributed to the Afghan resistance in such a large manner (Terry, 2002).

Further on, the humanitarian assistance in terms of treatment facilities for wounded Mujahidin warriors enabled the warriors to return to battle. Consequently, the result was a prolongation of the conflict (ibid).

The Pakistani President, General Zia, saw his chance of gaining “good-will” from the international society. As host to millions of refugees, Pakistan’s public image improved enormously and Zia became conceived as a respectable statesman. Accordingly, earlier criticisms for Pakistan’s poor human rights record and developing nuclear program seem to have been forgotten. Further on, Zia achieved great loyalty among his hosting “refugees” and several Afghan leaders assured their commitment to assist if conflict with India would arise (ibid).

This case also illustrates how humanitarian aid contributed to the war economy in Afghanistan. Millions of dollars of funds, aimed for the refugee programs, came into the hands of resistance parties as well as by Pakistani officials. Stolen material supplies by rebels have also been frequently reported (ibid).

The independence of NGOs can be questioned bearing in mind the withdrawal of most of the western players after the end of the cold-war. Afghanistan had lost its strategic importance (Eade, 2000).

4.3 Continuation of Conflict

After the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, facilitated by the Geneva peace accords, the communist government remained in Kabul. No attempt was made for reconstructing the country, demobilising the wide spectrum of anti-Soviet Mujahidin-based rebels, or organising any programs of post-conflict relief. Hence, the war continued until 1992, when a western-backed plan overthrew the communist
head of state Najibullah Ahmedzai in favour of a rotating cast of Mujahidin commanders (Newberg).

The years to come experienced a deterioration of security and stability across the country. Rebels led by a changing group of commanders looted and plundered the countryside and devastated the capital. A significant part of the maintenance of the Afghan conflict can be traced to the architecture of earlier international humanitarian involvement (Ibid.).

In November 2001, when Afghanistan was invaded by the U.S. as a response to the September 11th attack on World Trade Centre, the Taliban insurgent movement was in control more than ninety percent of the country (www.fathom.com 2005-06-15). Ironically, many of the Taliban were born and educated in their fundamental kind of Islam in the internationally sponsored refugee camps in Pakistan (Terry 2002). The Taliban, often described in the past as “the lackey” of Pakistan and the U.S., have become well known for its diligent ideological goals and for its humbling human rights record (Newberg).
5 A Summary
-Humanitarianism in the Context of CHE

The focus of this work has been on the refugee camps and the spill-over effects due to the humanitarian response. My attempt is now to outline this causal connection in a clearer manner, using the theoretical framework.

Zartman (1997) claims that many conflicts have been kept under control due to the power structures of the cold war. The case of Afghanistan is however an example of a conflict existing due to this power-structure. The U.S.S.R. occupation was a strategic move in order to defend strategic geopolitical and ideological interests (Lederach, 1997). When the threat of the occupant power vanished, an internal and long-lasting conflict emerged. This case study illustrates ways in which the international humanitarian project became part of this dynamic. The humanitarian response contributed to this evolution by providing the Mujahidin rebels with food, protection and treatment facilities for wounded warriors (Terry, 2002).

The protracted conflict taking place in Great Lakes shows a typical example of Kaldor’s (1999) “new wars” generated by “identity politics”. The international humanitarian response failed to recognise an appropriate response to the deep-rooted cleavage between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic identities; a cleavage which was broadened during the Belgian and German colonial rule (Weiss – Collins, 2000, Miall ed. al 2001). This case is also showing illustrating examples of how the international response became integrated into the dynamics of the conflict. The neutral and impartial humanitarian response was primarily directed towards the Hutu refugees, which were considered as the most vulnerable individuals after the genocide (Terry, 2002). By using a “targeting approach” towards this group, it may be argued that the cleavage between the ethnic groups enlarged further. During the actual genocide, the humanitarian response to assist the Tutsis had been practically absent (www.africaaction.org 05-06-08). Thus the perception of the Tutsis was that they were excluded from the aid provisioning. According to Pendergast (1996) this perception of unbalanced relief is likely to inflame tensions and increase competition.

Common features of “new conflicts” include an increased use of militia as well as the mobilisation of fighters along ethnic lines (Galperin, 2002). Hence, the internationally sponsored refugee camps served as to provide the militia with food and shelter and accordingly facilitated a remobilisation (S/1995/65, Terry, 2002). In the Rwandese case it was the Hutu ex-FAR and the informal Interahamwe taking advantage of the camps to organise attacks on Tutsi targets (Adelman, 2002). This
leading to a climate of increased suspiciousness and hostilities between the ethnic groups – a climate that has made a repatriation of the refugees to seem like an almost impossible task. Thus, the Hutu ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia remain still in the forests of Eastern DRC and the violent conflict has been allowed to continue (www.newsvote.bbc.co.uk 2005-06-09).

The second case shows how the Afghan camps became an effective environment as to train and indoctrinate refugees and in the fundamental brand of Islam (Terry, 2002).

In accordance with Goodhand (2001) and the “needs theory” of Azar, (in Miall, 2001) the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan as well as in Great Lakes are the consequences of a lack of security, a lack of religious expression, a lack of participation in decisions as well as a lack of a sufficient economic situation of the country. Both cases are showing evidence of how the humanitarian project became an object for manipulation (ibid, Väyrynen, 1999). By co-operating with warring parties, in the Rwandese case the same parties initially responsible for the genocide, it may be argued that an increased legitimisation of their activities was taken place (Macrae ed.al. 1994). It can also be argued that it was the international relief projects which further legitimised rebel groups and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Eade, 2000, Terry, 2002) both of whom humbling human rights records are to be associated with (Terry, 2002, Newberg). It is likely that the humanitarian response facilitated for these parties to use this legitimisation to increase their interests at the expense of others (Miall ed.al 2001). Consequently, the lack of necessary “needs”, in order to establish a stable society free from violence, was a continued phenomenon.

The cases that have been studied show how Mobutu, Kabila as well as General Zia took advantage of the camps and the presence of the refugees in order to provide themselves with reliable allies (Väyrynen, 1999, Fischer – Onishi, 2000, Terry, 2002). One should not neglect the humanitarian project’s impact on the structure, quality and balance of power among the warring parties (Prendergast, 1996).

Most humanitarian and development organisations working with affected populations do not engage in human rights protection activities, primarily because they fear that such activities would conflict with their impartiality and neutrality. This was many times the case after the Rwandese genocide (Cohen-Scholar, 1999). By acting neutrally and thereby protecting the perpetrators of these crimes, a continuation of their activities was allowed to take place (Adelman, 2002).

Both cases give an illustration of the substitution effect of aid (Anderson, 1999). The humanitarian workers in the camps took over the role as provider of food and other basic needs, hence the rebels did not have to worry about food-provision for their families but could commit themselves to act as “warriors”.

26
6 Conclusion

Two cases of complex humanitarian emergencies have been examined; one evolving in a context of a “new conflict” and the other evolving in a context of a classic interstate “cold-war conflict”. Both cases illustrate how the international humanitarian operations have benefited the militarisation of refugee camps and have caused negative spill-over effects. A causal-connection between the context in which the emergency evolves and the negative spill-over effects due to the humanitarian response can be seen in both cases. The conclusion that can be drawn from the two case studies is that many of the dilemmas confronting international relief workers are essentially the same in today’s “new conflicts” as they were during the cold war époque.

The indiscriminate supply of food, security and medications leads to non-desirable consequences and the humanitarian relief workers come to face difficult dilemmas. Should homeless refugees be left to die of cholera in order to avoid situations where the humanitarian response may contribute to the protection and remobilisation of perpetrators of genocide and other atrocities? As the cases studied have indicated, the humanitarian imperative to provide aid wherever it is needed can easily come into contradiction with the responsibility to ensure that the relief given does not cause further harm.

A military solution was considered as to make an end to the unsustainable violate situation in the Rwandan refugee camps. It may be argued that such an operation would have undermined the neutrality, impartiality as well as the independence of the whole humanitarian operation, leading to an increased vulnerability of the aid workers. If aid workers are not perceived as impartial, neutral and independent, they may be seen as targets. On the other hand, aid workers may feel insecure by operating in environments such as the militarised Rwandan refugee camps. Obviously, the question of armed protection raises a large dilemma. Should aid workers be subject to unnecessary risks in order not to send out any ethical messages that might exacerbate a conflict? While on the other hand the armed guards, due to diminish the risks, may in a longer prospect worsen the security situation.

So does this mean that traditional humanitarian principles are no longer accurate - or should my hypothesis be reformulated to rather claim that these principles may never have been an accurate framework for humanitarianism? However, despite the several difficulties, demonstrated in this thesis, the adherence to traditional humanitarian principles is still considered as vital by many NGOs. It may even be argued that the dissolution of the bi-polar power structure has made it politically easier for humanitarian relief organisations to work in adherence to these princi-
ples. My point is however not to reject this humanitarian framework. My point is rather that it is naive to believe that aid workers can provide their humanitarian services without causing any impact on the dynamics of the conflict. As the case studies have indicated, humanitarian assistance not only delivers a large inflow of money and jobs, but also provides a region with links to the outside world. This influences a conflict in several ways such as politically, socially, economically and morally and hence it is inaccurate to call this impartial. Thus, this does not mean that humanitarian relief workers should declare their allegiance to either side, but it is impossible not to avoid becoming integrated into the dynamics of a conflict.

Based on the empirical material analysed in this thesis it may be too strong to argue that humanitarian relief operations exacerbate conflicts. However, as I have outlined there are several ways in which humanitarian projects become integrated into the dynamics of a conflict and hence a contributing factor in the continuation of a conflict. This was the case during the cold war as well as today in the new context of humanitarian emergencies.

This thesis has focused on the negative side effects of the humanitarian response. However, my intention is not to reject the importance of humanitarian emergency relief, but rather to problematize and highlight the complexity of this phenomenon. My point is to illustrate the consequences which are likely to occur when there is a lack of a thorough understanding by aid workers of the history and culture of the region.

What can research based on two case studies tell in terms of generalisations? As pointed out in the methodological discussion, it is indeed difficult to make any generalisations based on such a limited number of cases. However empirical evidence from other crisis, such as the ongoing and long-lasting humanitarian emergency in Sudan, suggests that the result of this thesis may be applicable to other situations as well:

“In the context of Sudan, questions about the use of aid to underwrite Khartoum's war efforts remain unanswered. To what extent is the international community assuming the public welfare responsibilities of the Sudanese government, thereby freeing resources for the war? Are aid flights from Khartoum to the south supplying soldiers in the government garrisons rather than civilians in need? Is money spent in the pursuit of aid projects providing the government with a source of hard currency used to prosecute the war, and are donated food stocks in the north freeing Sudan production for export (reports say up to a million tons of northern Sudanese sorghum may be exported [in 1995] alone)?” (Prendergast, cited in Smock 2000:2).
7 Discussion -Towards Coordination and Long Term Strategy

Today, the serious and indiscriminate fighting continues to escalate throughout the Darfur region, causing burning of villages, killings and looting as well as a high level of violence against women and girls. The World Food Programme (WFP) has estimated that as many as 3.25 million people in the region are in need of humanitarian emergency relief this year (2005). According to UNHCR, tensions are raised between the 225,000 Sudanese refugees currently displaced in Chad, and host communities as they compete for provisions and grazing land (ECOSOC, 2005).

I introduced the investigating problem of this thesis by citing the President of the ICRC, Kellenberger, proclaiming a strict adherence to core humanitarian principles. Thus, despite acute needs for humanitarian assistance in situations such as the one present in Darfur, the following statement by an internally displaced person (IDP) suggests that humanitarian emergency relief, in order to limit immediate human suffering, cannot replace a long-time political solution:

"We do not need food...we are not starving to death. We are being persecuted and we prefer to be hungry for a week than not to sleep every night, in fear of being beaten, raped or killed" (IDP cited in Cohen-Scholar, 1999:1).

It is beyond the purpose of this thesis to suggest any constructive solutions on how to limit future negative spill-over effects. Within the international community, there has however been an increased acknowledgement of the risks associated with humanitarian emergency relief and steps have been taken in order to avoid future mistakes (Smock, 2000).

In order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN’s humanitarian operations in the field, resolution 46/182 was adopted by the GA in December 1991. Hence, the creation of the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) as well as the post of an Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The following year, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), was established by the SG, with the ERC serving also as Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs. In 1994 the IASC approved terms of references (ToR) for Humanitarian Coordinators. These were further revised in 1997 and as part of the 1997 reform programme of SG Kofi Annan, the DHA was replaced by a new office: OCHA. The purpose was a more streamlined mandate focusing on coordination, advocacy and policy development. By the year of 2001, this model was implemented in fourteen complex
humanitarian emergencies. However, there is a call for an increased involvement in the analytical process of NGOs, the Red Cross Movement and UN political and military actors and analysts (Reindorp-Wiles, 2001). These are steps which I believe has and further will enhance the understandings by humanitarians of the specific needs associated with the history and culture of a conflicting region. But these are also steps which will indisputable have a severe impact on the traditional humanitarian framework.
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