A Step 'Not' Beyond Ethnicity in Rwanda
– Political Mythology and Social Identity

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Abstract

Author: Stefan Andersson

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The aim of this work is to study present Rwandan social identities. The aim is made operational by posing the question; how are group identities produced and reproduced in Rwanda? In order to answer this the study uses the bourdieuesian notion of habitus, incorporated products of history that are active principles for unification of practices and representations, as the analytical concept of social identity. The work observes how identities practically reveal themselves in the narration of life stories by Rwandan students that are pursuing higher education; politics approached from below.,

Like many other studies on Rwanda the study sets out by those social identities social sciences traditionally divide the Rwandan social space into, what is labelled ethnic groups; Hutus, Tutsis and Twas. Against the background of the genocide in 1994, where about one million lives perished during one hundred days, it is hard not to do so. In this work ethnicity refers to practices of social division, inclusion and exclusion of groups that are socially and historically constructed. Common to the notions of ethnicity, race and nation is the reference to socially constructed origins, imagined as the natural foundation for social divisions that ultimately have a political foundation.

The signifier ethnicity is however problematic, therefor it must be analytically deconstructed and reconstructed. One such way to enter the social construction of ethnic identities in the Rwandan field is to take off from the present political knowledge. Thus, the study approaches the genocide with Foucault’s notions bio-power and the ‘war of the races’. Colonialism brought about a constitutive imaginary containing the reading of Rwandan history as a ‘war of the races’. At the present, it is not possible to say what were the identities before colonialism in what is now Rwanda. Nevertheless, it is evident that social divisions in Rwanda were not racialised until a constitutive imaginary where the ‘Tutsis’ were represented as a conquering ‘race’ and Rwanda was created as a ‘Tutsi kingdom’ was realised through colonial power. When social change and independence came it was in the name of an oppressed Hutu majority. Instead of a break with the constitutive imaginary displaying Hutu and Tutsi as essentially different ‘races’ it was recuperation, with an inversion of roles within, it of the hierarchical order assigned to them as groups considered.

In the aftermath of this ‘war of the races’ – the genocide – it is not scientifically justifiable to speak of social identities in Rwanda in terms of ethnicity without qualifying the use of it. The study treats ethnicity as a continuum where the meaning, intensity and salience vary. Habitus is engendered in the social world and it is the active principle for possible strategies. If the students in the material used ‘ethnic strategies’ before the genocide it was so because it was made possible to do so, and impossible not to, in a social world containing ethnicity as a principal principle for inclusion and exclusion. One such instance where this was made manifest was schooling. During the genocide ethnicity as the principal for social division was made acute to all by imposing the right of life and death.

By conceptualising an empirical identity, habitus, as a trajectory of subsequently held positions within a social field that is itself in constant change this work argues that ‘ethnicity’ in the present state of the Rwandan field is the tension of rupture and recuperation of ethnicity in Rwanda. Inclusive to the social world is the perception social agents have of it All the students claim above all a Rwandan identity, denying the validity of this would be denying them a part of themselves. At the same time, many of the students do not deny that they also belong to one or the other group that are known as ‘ethnic groups’. Further, the way identities practically reveal themselves in the narration of life stories points to different groups of identities in Rwanda, different trajectories of becoming Rwandan. These groups are engendered in the ethnic identities of the past in the sense that they overlap, coincide with and part from them. This does not imply that ethnicity resides as the principal principle for social identity in Rwanda. As its salience, intensity and meaning has changed it is no longer the same thing. The study points to a step beyond ethnicity, although it at the same time it does not step beyond ethnicity, both concerning the social identities in the present and the social sciences that aim at explaining them.

Keywords: Bio-power, ethnicity, genocide, habitus, Rwanda
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*Stefan Andersson,* Brussels, 25th October, 2001
Prelude

Mom came home and she said, “What’s on the radio, they’ve put on classic music?” We gathered around the radio and we listened to the communiqué, the communiqué that announced the death of the president. My mother immediately had a shock, and she said, “We’re going to have problems.” We asked “Why? Because we were children, we weren’t aware of what was about to happen. Then our mother told us “Go straight to bed!”. We said “Why? At this hour? Why go straight to bed now?” She said “Go straight to bed! Tomorrow morning you’re getting up early.” We said “Why?” She left us and we went to bed. We weren’t aware of what was going on, what was being done. (Patricie, student at the Kigali Institute of Education).

Everything good came to an end, including my studies, my love, my affection, my feelings…in short, my adolescence was more or less inhibited. I even got to detest and question the reality of the sciences that determine the duration of a day to no longer than 24 hours; one thought that one day equalled a century. (Ibrahim, student at the Kigali Institute of Education).

We hid in the sorghum for a long time, we looked for whatever to eat and drink, it was rain season so there was water to drink. One day they found us and they killed my mother. I was there and I saw it. In our commune, many people were killed. But since I was a student they wanted to do things to me, very dangerous things. They brought me around the commune together with the Interahamwe, and I saw it, I watched it. Then afterwards they raped me. But then I got away, I ran away and I hid at a widow’s house who didn’t live far from us. Then when the war ended I was still there. (Félicitée, student at the Kigali Institute of Education).

To a certain extent, the people who were on the barriers or who used the machetes they are victims, but to a certain extent they are guilty. They are guilty because they have killed people that didn’t have a chance, who hadn’t done anything. They killed people they had never met before. But, life is also complicated, they were under the influence of the authorities. In a way they were forced by the authorities. (Gaspard, student at the Kigali Institute of Education).

To me, just after the genocide, ok, it was the worst period of my life. The time that followed these killings, that period was really bad. One saw that people had grief, they were really sad; they missed their friends, their relatives, their neighbours. This period was a time of grief: the survivors were dissatisfied; and the others…well, one was put into groups to whom the survivors said “Now, in the region there were neighbours, and these neighbours are no longer, where are these neighbours? One has killed the other.” The survivors were of course sad, they imprisoned people by saying, “It is you who have killed your neighbours”. Without looking for information they would put you in prison, of course it was due to the grief. During this period, it goes without saying, the population didn’t get along very well, even though the situation resembled of peace and things got into order. At least one didn’t kill one another any longer. (Kayitana, student at the Kigali Institute of Education).
It was all over the media it was in the paper it was on television it was on the radio, you couldn’t miss it, it was that close. When I was in Uganda I didn’t really feel it. When I was in Uganda I thought I felt the grief, the extent of the grief in Rwanda, ‘til I came here and I listened to survivors, visited sites. There is no way what I felt in Uganda could have prepared me for what I would feel in Rwanda. (Jeanette, student at the National University of Rwanda).

I wouldn’t say that it’s justified to talk of a ‘second genocide’. There were attacks from the outside, from those who took refuge in Zaïre. After the return of 1996 there were [members of] militias that didn’t want to return since they were afraid of being brought to justice. They hid in the forests and as they were still armed they began to launch attacks in the frontal regions. There were thus armed confrontations between the RPF and the militias. Since there were quite a few of the militiamen who were born in these regions they came back to their families, they brought their arms with them, and their families gave them to eat, and then they went back to the battlefield. Then afterwards they would either return to the forests or hide with their families. Thus it was hard and these people posed a lot of problems. So, what took place was that there were meetings with the RPF and the population of the region, where the militaries said that one should do whatever to end these contacts with the militias. However this was not the case and then what is called the ‘cleansing’ took place. All men were asked to leave their home region; “Unless you support the militia you will agree to leave your region”, and all the men were transferred to other regions better protected by the militaries. Those who refused to move were killed, even some women who were asked to leave but refused to do so were killed. (Athanase, student at the Kigali Institute of Education).

These are things that I learned in school. I don’t know if this is true or it is all lies: One says that the Tutsis came from the north, from countries like Somalia and Ethiopia. And that the Hutus also came from the north, from countries like Chad and Cameroon They met in Rwanda, but that the Hutu came here before the Tutsi. And there was the Batwa who also comes from elsewhere, but then one may pose oneself the question “who was here before the Batwa?” one doesn’t know. So one may pose oneself the question, ”What was Rwanda like then?” (Benoit, student at the Kigali Institute of Education).
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1. Introduction – After the Storm

1.1 The Politics from Below

The horror of genocide can not be explained as it escapes all sociologic intelligence. This study, which aim it is to observe the reproduction of social identities in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 where in between half a million to a million lives perished, is nevertheless an attempt to sociologically explain the repercussions of it on individual lives. The study, which may be described as an explorative study, is based on the life stories told by Rwandan students during a two months field study in the autumn of 1999. The empirical data collected consists of interviews and essays written on my request. The population sample is made up by Rwandan students at the Kigali Institute of Education (KIE) and the National University of Rwanda (NUR), Butare. In total 27 interviews and 39 essays conducted with 41 respondents, out of these eight are female students, in combination with my field notes constitute the first hand empirical material. All the names that appear in the work are fictive.

As ‘all’ other persons writing on Rwanda, I took off with the ‘ethnic’ identities that have been emblematic for Rwandan society. However, can one do anything else in the aftermath of the genocide? If there is one thing this study shows, it is that it is not scientifically justified to speak of ‘ethnic’ identities in Rwanda, without qualifying the use of it. The Rwandan empirical identities are not but are in becoming, and as active dispositions they represent rupture with, but also recuperation and reproduction of, the political imaginary and power that culminated in the 1994 genocide. The students in the material all, the ones we meet and the ones who do not appear as persons in this work, state their identity as Rwandan, and they all state that all persons living in Rwanda are Rwandans. This is not something we simply can take at face value, just as one should not take the ‘ethnic identities’ of the past at face value. However, denying the very existence of a Rwandan identity is denying them the right to a part of their selves. Equally, denying the existence of ethnicity in Rwanda would be denying those who claim an overlapping ethnic identity a part of their selves. Nevertheless, within the group of Rwandan students I met, there are discontinuities that emerge when one epistemologically breaks down the population into groups. The different sets of stories on genocide and being Rwandan are engendered in social structures that produced ‘ethnicity’ as a dividing principle in Rwanda. The different trajectories lined out in the life stories are different groups of stories of becoming Rwandan. This does not imply the reproduction of the ‘ethnic’ identities as such, in the sense that the social groups that reveals themselves in practice are nothing but the extension of these ‘ethnic’ identities. To the extent this study has managed to capture anything in its limited, momentary picture of a state of the Rwandan field, it is the tension of break and re-inscription of old social identities and new social identities through the reproduction of political mythology.

1 The name of the introductory chapter is inspired by de Lame (1996) whose work is called “Une colline entre mille ou le calme avant le tempête”.
1.2 The Politics from Above - Genocide

On April 6th 1994 president Habyarimana’s aeroplane was shot down over Kigali when coming in for landing after the president had attended a regional meeting. A ‘crisis government’ quickly proclaimed itself and initiated the elimination of political opponents and persons having an official Tutsi identity. The killers were mainly the militias and the army and most of the massacres took place in large-scale killings at stadiums, churches and communal houses etc. Nevertheless, there was also popular participation following various degrees of coercion and persuasion. Despite early warnings the UN and the rest of the world stood beside and let it all happen, preferring to consider it as ‘chaotic tribal warfare’. The lack of will is perhaps best manifested in the fact that the UN apart from 270 troops decided to withdraw. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that since October 1st 1990 was engaged in guerrilla warfare with the Habyarimana regime renewed its offensive and managed to capture Kigali on July 19th, thus putting an end to the genocide. Even though the violence by Western decision makers and media was imagined as archaic and the result of two ethnic groups in conflict since time immemorial, this is far from the case; the link between violence and ‘ethnicity’ in Rwanda is something dated and highly modern (see Vidal, 1995).

Between April and July 1994 at least half a million and perhaps even more than one million lives perished in Rwanda (Chrétien, 1997; Des Forges et al., 1999; Mamdani, 2001). Using the frequently quoted estimate of 800,000 dead (see Des Forges et al., 1999; International Panel of Eminent Personalities, 2001; Mamdani, 2001; Report of the Independent Enquiry Into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 1999) this would grosso modo correspond to 1/9 of the population and it would mean that about ¾ of the Tutsi population perished. Between 1/20 and 1/10 of the persons killed were Hutus. These faceless statistics do however not say much. Or as a Rwandan pointed out to me, “they say it’s one million dead, but how could it be only one million if the whole ground was covered by bodies?” What the figures in their naked absurdity do tell us is that there is remarkable quantitative difference between the number and ratio of human beings defined as Hutu or Tutsi having been killed. Herein lies that the Tutsi were killed qua group and the Hutu were targeted as individuals. To Mamdani (2001) the single fact that the Tutsis were targeted for total annihilation underline a crucial similarity between the Nazi state and its implementation of a ‘final solution’ to the ‘Jewish question’; “this is why the killings of Tutsi [...] 1994 must be termed ‘genocide’” (Mamdani, 2001:5). Some vigilance against too easily made comparisons between the Rwandan genocide and the Holocaust is however appropriate. Very early on, during and after the genocide, some works and

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2 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) report, henceforth referred to as IPEP (2001).
3 More commonly known as ‘the Carlsson Report’.
4 Lemarchand (1998) claims that ¼ of the killed during the genocide were Hutus. This is however a proportion on which he is quite alone and it is unclear from where he has drawn it. The total population was in 1994 estimated to 7.6 million inhabitants. To the perhaps 1 million dead about 2 million were displaced, either as refugees or as internally displaced persons (IDPs), whereof up to 200,000 perished in exile. Most have returned to Rwanda and together with old caseload refugees and their children the Rwandan population has risen to somewhat more than 8 million (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000:18 Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998:20). The 1991 census stated the part of the population having an official Tutsi identity as somewhat more than 8% (a figure which is not very reliable since the numerous advantages of obtaining
articles made the explicit liaison between Rwanda and the genocide. This was done in an obvious attempt to persuade a Western opinion that genocide actually did take place in Rwanda (Vidal, 1998b: 653-654). However good in spirit this may be, one should not obliterate the obvious differences. One such is the collective participation of civilians that was interdicted during the Nazi genocide whereas in Rwanda the authorities not only encouraged but ordered civilians to participate in the killings (Vidal, 1998b: 654, she refers to Hilberg, see also Bauman, 1989 and Goldhagen, 1997). As one of my respondents told me, “I too worked at the barrier; it was the law.”

We do not need a definition written in stone to assert whether or not genocide did take place in Rwanda. The Rwandan genocide fit well with any standard of definition. We may content ourselves with the definition delivered by Chalk and Jonahsson (1990: 23): “Genocide is a form of one sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.” We could then label the killing of the Hutus as ‘politicide’, in the sense that they stood in the way of the execution of the genocide and as such they were enemies of the ‘Hutu cause’ and ‘Hutu Power’ (see Fein 1990 et al. 1997).

Understanding the meaning of an ‘event’ poses a particular challenge. When it comes to a critical event, a moment when the meaning of the social world is standing on the verge of meaninglessness and the social world seems bereft of all its reason it becomes even more difficult. However important it may be to establish the reasons for, the logic of the genocide, the social sciences can not ignore its implications on individual lives. Mere figures, ‘half a million to one million dead in one hundred days’, does not render a genocide and its aftermath comprehensible. Neither do individual experiences render the horror of it tangible. But by combining life stories with an outlining of the underlying social structures we might to a certain extent explain it and its repercussions. This work is not predominantly on genocide but rather on the calm before and after the storm, umuyaga. In social space individuals struggle in their everyday life, trying to render existence meaningful, searching for a narrative where there is a place for them as such. The Rwandan genocide – the event in the present – is something that needs a scientific explanation in order for us to understand the identities of the present. Hence, by making the genocidal logic intelligible we may make today’s Rwandan identities endowed with sense. To do this we have to construct a social space, which is not the social world (‘social reality’) but merely a systematic abstraction out of it. We must however not lose ourselves too high up in the air of abstractions – any understanding must be grounded in the day-to-day experiences of ‘real’ people. We

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a Hutu identity) and the part of the population having an official Hutu identity to about 90%, the remaining part had a Twa identity (see for example Des Forges et al., 1999).

3 She is in particular referring to the works of Destexhe (1994) and Franche (1995).

4 During the genocide there were roadblocks and barriers along every road and path, often mannered by ‘civilians’ who checked the identity papers, stating the ‘ethnic group’ of its carrier (official identity), of people wanting to pass. In case of a Tutsi identity the person would often be detained awaiting the army or the militia, who then would kill the person.

5 A number of scholars have dug into history in order to find the ultimate explanation of the Rwandan genocide, few have cared to put it into a context of similar events. See for example Braeckman (1994 and 1996); Chrétien, (1997); Destexhe (1994); Franche, (1995); Overduin (1997) and the most notorious example Prunier (1997 [first English edition, 1995]). For a critique of this ‘historicist’ approach see Vidal (1999), and for a critique of the lack of relating it to other genocides see Mamdani (2001).
must thus undertake a study which is grounded in experience and practice, we must look at politics from below.

1.3 Scientific Aim – A Question of Practical Identity

The **aim** of this Master dissertation is to study present Rwandan social identities. The aim is made operational by posing the question **how are group identities produced and reproduced in Rwanda?** At the outset of this study my aim was to study ‘ethnic identities’ and the prerequisites for reconciliation in the aftermath of the genocide. As the work progressed there was however a swift in my ambition as well as in the scientific aim. Before addressing the issue of reconciliation, one has to map out the parts that are to be reconciled. In the first instance sociology presents itself as a **social topology**. The social world may thus be represented as a social space where the agents and the groups of agents are defined by their relative positions in the social field they constitute. If social sciences are not merely to be a manner of politics by other means, they must analyse the ambition of the creative world vision.

When the social sciences classify, carve up the continuous space of social positions, it should be in order to objectify all forms of objectification “from the individual insult to the official naming” without leaving out sciences themselves and their pretension to arbitrate in the struggles of naming carried out in the name of ’axiologic neutrality’ (Bourdieu, 1984:9 *et passim*). Inclusive to social reality is the representation of reality that the agents and the groups of agents have, ‘the sense of one’s place’. The struggle over representations (as mental images as well as social demonstrations that aim at manipulating mental images) also make part of this social reality (Bourdieu, 1991: 220–228). An adequate definition of the social positions is what enables the most accurate prediction of practices and representations. But to avoid conferring an essence to the social identity, what was once upon a time called one’s ‘station’ (in French *état* and in Swedish *stånd*), it must be explicitly remembered that status which engenders *habitus* are historical products and as such are prone to be transformed, with more or less difficulty, by history (Bourdieu, 1984:11). Therefore, the **focus of this study is on practical identities among Rwandan students as they are unfolded in the encounter with the sociologist in the field.** That is, identity as it appears in the representation, or production, of ’Rwandan selves’ that take place in the narration of life stories.

The title *A Step ‘Not’ Beyond Ethnicity in Rwanda – Political Mythology and Social Identities* is inspired by Blanchot (1992). In French it would be *Un pas au-delà*, where *pas* means a ‘step’ as well as it may be translated by ‘not’ (as in the negation *ne...pas*). Thus, the title simultaneously signals *a step beyond* ‘ethnicity’ and *a step not beyond* ‘ethnicity’. This both concerning this work’s theorising as well as the identities unfolded in the stories told by the students. The sub-title *Political Mythology and Social Identities* is founded on the theorising of Bourdieu. *Political mythology* refers to *habitus*, bodily dispositions oriented towards practical ends without necessarily being agents of conscious strategies,

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1 I am here to some extent relying on the English translation of the Bourdieu article which appears in Bourdieu (1991:229-251).
which is incorporated political mythology. Social identity signals that any given identity is social through and through: firstly, it is constructed, generated as such in and through social practices; and secondly, as it appears as such it does so in social practices. From this, we may deduce that any given social identity is practical identity and that it is an identity that ultimately has a foundation in the realm of the political.

1.4 Disposition

Before we can look at the life stories of the present we have to make a detour. When studying Rwanda, we must be aware of from which standpoint we enter it, through which prism the social world is reflected. The sociological practice of objectification creates illusion. Bearing in mind that we are looking at a social field where genocide empirically did take place, we realise that there is no place outside the knowledge of the Rwandan genocide from where we may observe the Rwandan social field. We are located in a present that has the Rwandan genocide as one of its constituents; we thus carry the Rwandan genocide in our *habitus*. Hence, *ex post facto* the 1994 genocide seems to have been the only possible outcome of the political evolution. But, in a given ‘space of possibles’ there is a multitude of possible directions for the field to take, in Rwanda ‘race’-discourse has not been omnipresent, apart from in the political field. Vidal (1991) shows that with only stepping back two generations one certainly finds social tensions, but you do not find any ‘Hutu - Tutsi’ opposition as such. Just as ‘ethnic’ violence is not an eternal feature of the continued state formation, it has not been permanent in Modern Rwandan society (see Chrétien: 1986 *et* 1997; Vidal: 1991). In between the outbursts of physical violence there have been tendencies pointing beyond the ‘primordial’ and ‘natural’ (as it is represented and imagined) opposition of ‘Hutu and Tutsi’. A similar development could be observed during the years leading up to the genocide, which was countered with a movement in another direction. An opposition took shape and was articulated within the country, while in addition a number of human rights associations, including both Hutus and Tutsis, were founded and became active throughout the country (Gillet, 1997; Bradol & Vidal 1997). Furthermore, as pointed out by Vidal (1995), most observers would agree upon that the tensions riding Rwandan society at least until the middle of the 1980’s were of regional rather than ‘ethnic’ character.

Nevertheless, empirically violence identified as ‘ethnic’ has occurred on many occasions. Since the ethnified/racialised groups Hutu and Tutsi occupy such an important space within the political imaginary it has been socio-logical to play the ethnic card whenever a group has made an attempt to seize power or defend its power. Ever since the beginning of the independence during the ‘social revolution’ (1959-1961) there have been calls made for ‘racial solidarity’; calls for symbolic ordering of the reality. This was not only the case when power shifted from a ‘Tutsi power group’ to a ‘Hutu counter power group’, but then again with a northbound transfer of power within the ‘Hutu power group’, in the shape of the military coup in 1973. The calls for ‘racial solidarity’ resulted in pogroms and massacres (Chrétien, 1986: 158 *et passim;* and 1997; Lemarchand, 1998; Prunier, 1997: 56-100;
Reyntjens, 1994; Vidal: 1991). None of these however can proportionately be compared to the Genocide of 1994. It also differs in a qualitative dimension from previous violence in Rwanda. As noted by a woman in her eighties who had been witnessing killing of Tutsis since the end of the 1950’s “this slaughter was different because [they] killed babies on the back, children who were beginning to walk, pregnant women, old people” (Des Forges et al., 1999:476). However, not even during the quasi-hegemony of ‘Hutu Power’ was ‘racism/ethnicity’ total. Where there is power there is resistance. On some locations, the targeted Tutsis organised resistance, fighting machetes and guns with their bear hands and stones. In some communes Hutus and Tutsis together mannered the barriers to keep the order and prevent the killing, until their co-operation was broken down by the authorities in place. Sometimes the same burgomaster would first oppose the genocidal government only to later be the ‘good’ civil servant exercising the same genocidal power he before resisted. There are examples of persons who more or less simultaneously let live and let die. Even some militia leaders who were directing killings would save some. There were Hutus who, as civilians or militaries, would risk their own lives in saving lives or refusing to kill. Sometimes the same person who hid someone for a long period could go off and kill someone else (personal information, see also African Rights, 1995a; Des Forges et al., 1999).

One should thus, as states Chrétien (1986 et 1997), bear in mind that the development towards ‘ethnic’ crystallisation was never inevitable, however logical it was indeed. That is, it may be logical but there were other possible and probable developments that never took place, that ex post facto would have seemed just as logical. The challenge of ‘ethnicism/racism’ is not an obstacle that is insurmountable since rather than a theory of the reality it is a theory that has become realised.

Following this introductory chapter, I will continue by discussing how the question above has been put into operation by a problematic using Foucault’s notion of Bio-power and its ‘war of races’ and Bourdieu’s habitus. The first is useful in order conceptualise the Rwandan social field where ‘race/ethnicity’ in the forms of Hutu and Tutsi have been the key political identities since the colonial endeavour. As Wacquant (1992:13-44) states Bourdieu is not the great thinker of the structured structures, the opus operatum. However, as this work to a certain extent is an outline of a grounded theory we would stand short if we were to rely on Foucault alone, therefor habitus, modus operandi. This tool for analysis, which is a concept made for application, enables us to understand the tension of rupture with and recuperation of the political mythology of the past in the practices of the present. In this present, as the results of this study show, many of the components that rendered the genocide possible are still present in Rwanda and thus by extension they are a part of the students’ stories (a part if their selves) we meet in this work. Although it is justified to speak of ‘ethnicity’ in Rwanda today we must admit that it is not possible to speak of it as the simple reproduction of the ethnic identities of the past. It is question of components, not essence. The students all express a will to be Rwandan, but do not deny that ethnicity exists. What they do refute though is that it should be allowed to determine peoples’ life chances. Nevertheless, social reality is something we can not merely wish away, thus ‘ethnicity’ in a sense affects their sense of their places and their anticipated futures, but by no means to
the extent and in the same fashion as before and during the genocide. They are all Rwandans but they have been generated as different groups of Rwandans, their life stories represent different ‘becoming Rwandans’.

In chapter three we encounter some of the fundamentals of this work. We begin by examining the potential, merits as well as shortcomings of a life-story approach; what it means to try and reveal social structures through stories told by empirical individualities. I argue that by constructing a ‘life’ as a trajectory (of successively held objective social positions) through a social space which itself is in constant flux one may unravel social regularities. I argue that also a relatively limited number of empirical individualities do have something to say about the underlying social structures constituting the field as such, because they are particular cases of possible selves. This leads us to the last section of chapter three, the respondents. I present the eight persons that are represented, appear as persons throughout the work. The fact that they do not appear under their ‘real’ names signal that they are persons that come to existence on paper, as between them and the empirical individualities I met in Rwanda lies scientific break and construction. They are scientific constructs and they do not inhibit the ordinary social world in Rwanda, they inhibit an abstracted and simplified social world on paper. This does not deny the validity of the results of this study, it only means that we should take precautions when drawing conclusions and extrapolating the findings.

In chapter four we in a sense negate the very essence of the genocide by reinserting it into a series of events that made it a possible, probable and empirical reality. It is in part in those historical components that the intelligibility of the Rwandan genocide resides. I argue that even though the Rwandan genocide, the present par excellence, was not the only possible outcome of the Rwandan history (there are lateral histories and possibles that we do not know today) the social construction of Rwandan history as a ‘war of the races’ is fruitful approach for a social science that try to render the genocide in 1994 comprehensible. I claim that colonialism was the *sine qua non* for the genocide. To examine this we have to look at the process of statecrafts in Rwanda both before the colonial invasion, albeit briefly, during colonialism as well as observe on what ground the independent Rwandan Republics where erected. We do this not to establish where the belligerents of this war ‘really’ came from, but to be able to see how the nature of identities changed and were constructed, or rather created, through colonial power-knowledge. Thus, in this chapter the emphasis is on the colonial period. This does not imply that the politics during the two Republics were unimportant with regards to the genocide, the Rwandan genocide was not teleological, only that since the genocide was the reactivation in practice of the ‘war of the races’ that resided as a strategic possibility for those in whose interest it was to commit genocide we have to break with the imaginary that display it as an eternal war. Ethnicity as a principle for division in Rwanda is dated and modern.

In doing so I begin with the ‘pre-colonial’ period, which must be treated in itself as a present that could not anticipate colonialism as a probable future; we have to admit that, just as ‘ethnic identity’ today is not something scientifically unproblematic it may not be something we can simply project into
the past as categories for political analysis. Then follows the colonial period, that ironically following
Elias may be thought of as the ‘civilising process’, it is during this period Hutu and Tutsi are installed
as politically salient ‘racialised’ groups. Based on a racist constitutive imaginary the Tutsis were
designated as ‘Hamites’ and ‘faux nègres’ and as such supposed to be the forerunners of ‘civilisation’.
The Hutus were the Other of this history. However, this constitutive imaginary can not alone explain
how the inhabitants of Rwanda became a racialised population, it takes more than just ‘knowledge’. We
must therefor also study how knowledge was put into practice through acts of power, this by observing
the continued state formation and continued rationalisation through institutional reforms and the
education system. Thus the colonial period was the realisation of a theory; an ordering of the social
world in accordance with a symbolic universe. The ‘Social Revolution’ changed the elite, and it did to
an extent change everyday life for the ‘masses’, but it did not fundamentally change neither the
institutional order nor the symbolic order. In a sense it was the inversion of the political imaginary as
anyone now speaking in the name of the ‘majority people’ were socially reckognised as the true masters
of Rwanda.

In chapter five we then turn to the reactivation of this history as the war of the races; due to the
social situation every instance of Rwandan society during the 1990’s turned into a defensive mode,
there was an exacerbating misery for the general Rwandan, furthermore within the dominant group
stakes were getting higher and the country was at war since a new political force came to claim their
rights to a status as Rwandans. Again, we run the risk of negating the very essence of the genocide and
demeaning the experience of those students that participated in the study. Even though one must be
aware of that the genocide in Rwanda to a large extent was popular we can not take this at face value
and simply assert that ‘ethnicity in Rwanda is indeed a colonial construct but the ethnic hatred is real
enough’. We have to line out the reasons for it, which should not be condoning it. We must display both
the politics from above as well as at least try and grasp politics from below and observe power in its
localities, where it produces real effects, where ‘ethnicity’ as a princi ple for the social division of
natural continuity made the difference between life and death.

In chapter six we turn to the respondents. The previous chapters are but a detour, albeit in my
finding a necessary one, but for our understanding we must construct a social space for the respondents
to sit down and tell their stories so that they are given justice and are not perceived as senseless. We
shall see how the respondents may be divided into groups along the lines of how they practically
represent the genocide as they speak it from their standpoint. This is not to say that they should be
‘groups’ or ‘classes’ in the social world, only that they due to identity of conditions have incorporated
dispositions that reveal themselves as virtual groups or classes on paper. Needless to say, how they
group themselves today in the aftermath of the genocide is depending on what was their ‘authentic
ethnic identity’ before the genocide, i.e. their position in the social world where genocide was possible.
The genocide was racism/ethnicity in extremis; it was a watershed for the ‘ethnic identities’ as such. As
we shall see the interviewees can not simply be arranged according to the ‘ethnic’ positions they
allegedly occupied before the ‘event’. However, the identities of today represent the tension of rupture and recuperation of these.

Chapter seven sets out as a temporal leap to the time before the genocide. One may be led to think that this part’s due place should be in accordance with its chronological place, as in a series of cause and effect. However, given that the genocide is an event that organises their knowledge and feeling about this thing called ‘ethnicity’, placing it before the event that has shaped how they relate to it would create an illusion. ‘Ethnicity’ as it exists, to the extent it exists and how it is represented is determined by the genocide experience. Here the practical identities appear, are made present in the narration of life-stories based on the sequence of past, present and future. We will see how the individual selves were identified as parts of essentially different categories within the Rwandan topology, always when having to deal with agents of the State, sometimes also during other aspects of life. Due to the omnipresence of this kind of bio-power ‘ethnic strategies’ were a logic inherent to practice; the ethnicity of oneself and of others was something ‘one just knew’ (because society imposed itself in such a way that one had to know it). We shall also see the how they in order to explain ‘ethnicity’ to the curious foreigner all take refuge to History – ‘I don’t know but we were taught…’ – as well as they present a radical doubt about the validity of this History they were taught. Further, we shall see how their dispositions constituted by the trajectory through Rwandan space direct how they have the sense of their places today and give rise to a will to be Rwandan. Also how they look ahead, the sense of the anticipated future ‘to come’, is engendered in what they have been through, and here the groups that we have observed in a way merge in a common will to be Rwandan, and a modest optimism about the future; after all they are all alive and they are all able to study. This is not to say that we may simply top of with a discussion in the order of ‘once upon a time there were three groups living in Rwanda…then they lived for ever happily together’. Differences remain in from what are the perspectives they see the tensions that ride post-genocide Rwanda. But, we can not simply assert that the problems are in the order of reconciling Tutsis with Hutus, the social world is far more complex than that. Even when juxtaposed, and the differences that are there come out clearly, the stories from Rwanda display a comprehension for the ‘other’ side. Since they are all Rwandan they have overlapping practical identities, they find themselves very close in social space, as well as their are parts of these groups that do not overlap, but in the final analysis they are not that different that within the group of students they are not on speaking terms. The persons standing out the most from the material are those that were born and raised in exile, and have returned after the genocide. This does not imply denying them a Rwandan status, something they were denied before, only that they belong to a different generation, in its sociological sense, of Rwandans. The trajectory that brought them to a ‘being Rwandan’ differs in many aspects from those who have experience the genocide first hand. Judging from the life stories I have gathered it is doubtful if one may sociologically speak of Hutus and Tutsis in the present. In this work there are just as much difference within these so called groups as between them, this is not to say that Rwanda does not have its dominating and its dominated, but it is not
necessarily an ethnic line that is the principal line for social inclusion and exclusion. Further, power is neither dressed nor justified in ethnic terms and the question is how fruitful an approach that enters Rwandan society from merely an ethnic angle today is.

In the last chapter – *Ethnicity and Beyond* – I conduct a discussion on what may be the lessons learned from this study. Many of the conclusions should not come to a surprise to us. It should be rather obvious that genocide experiences mark you for life, and that if you have not experienced it first hand it marks you less, even though the very knowledge of it affects you and fill you with grief. I will also discuss the findings of this minor field study, the tension of recuperation and rupture as the social world is under constant construction as it is being reproduced. In doing so, I will point out some relevant further studies highlighted by some of the pertinent questions this work has enabled posing.

I intermingle the words ‘ethnic group’ and the French *ethnie*. Some English speaking authors like Anthony D. Smith (1990) proposes the use of the French term *ethnie* claiming that this words would simply mean ‘ethnic community’. In my finding there is no basis for this (see Harraps Shorter, 1996: Le Robert, 1982; Fournel & Zancarini, 2000). At the time of the genocide the Kinyarwanda word (together with the French word *ethnie*) mentioned on the identity cards was *ubwoko*. In front of the words Hutu, Tutsi or Twa a square was barred. This signalled the official identity of its bearer. How exactly the term *ubwoko* has come to have its Modern meaning is not easy to find an answer to. The word has over time been given a biological connotation due to the racial/ethnic imaginary and institutions from where it derived its meaning. When I asked the students about the words *ubwoko* and *amoko* (pl.), they explained it in different ways. Some would simply say “*ubwoko* that’s race”, others would translate it by *ethnie*, ethnic group. Patricie was at pains trying to rationalise the words to me. Much due to that she knew that the words before had had a different meaning. Thus, she told me that *ubwoko* today means “*race or ethnie*” but it before meant clan and that Rwanda consisted of many clans (*amoko*). When using words like ethnic and race, and ethnonyms like Hutu or Tutsi, one should arguably use them within inverted commas in order to point out that they have a multitude of ambiguous meanings. Especially since we in this work observe them as signifiers over a long time span. They of course then are not homonymous over time and not even during the life trajectory of the students in this work it is the same. However, I have decided not to do so since I believe that this work show their problematic standing and that they are social constructs that indeed produce real effects in the social world.

9 If the word ‘race’ has ever been mentioned on the identity cards I do not know, none of the literature I have consulted mentions anything about this.
2 The Problematic

2.1 The Social World

As Zygmunt Bauman somewhere has put it, the role of the sociologist is to be a professional cynic. His/Her role is to move beyond the pre-constructed categories that seem non-problematic to the common sense. In other words, by making problematic the what-appears-to-be-non-problematic, the social scientist on the paper creates a problematic; "a rudimentary organisation of a field of phenomena which yields problems of investigation. The organisation occurs on the basis of some more or less explicitly theoretical presuppositions – it is an application of assumptions and principles to phenomena in order to constitute a range of enquiry." (Abrams, 1982:xv). We may speak of problematic as a finite theoretical structure of notions, which enables the posing of certain, specific questions, and render other questions impossible. ‘Finite theoretical structure’ shall thus be understood as ‘limited’ (and hence limiting) as well as ‘insufficient’ (an insufficient abstraction of the social world).

To dismiss the primordialist view of ethnicity is today common place, but the step further to theorise the process of subject formation is often not taken (Nederveen-Pieterse, 1997:367). We need to insert today’s identities into the chain of historically constructed Rwandan identities by a relational sociology. The knot tying this work’s parts together is the assertion that any identities are political identities and that politics should be grasped from below (see Bayart, 1981). Although the work is eclectic in more than one way, it is my purpose to strive for stringency and coherence. The study theoretically places itself in between two research communities. The first is American African Studies, whose drawing on ‘French High Theory’ (Bourdieu, Derrida Foucault et al.) is regarded as snobbism by French scholars (Bernault 1997). The second is the French africaniste community. It does so not in any vain attempt to fill a gap, but in order to combine the merits of two traditions, one prone to constructivism/deconstructivism and another which perhaps is not so apt to embrace theory not directly concerned with its (geographical) area of studies.10 The opposition should not be exaggerated, since there are traditions within the French africaniste community of building on for example Foucault in regarding the social history of the State, considering politics as a total social fact. Notably in the shape of grasping la politique par le bas of François Bayart and as expressed in the review Politique Africaine (see Bourmaud 1997: 52-53). The coherence of the work I try to achieve by making the bricolage of references external to my theoretical cornerstones, related to the foucauldian notions of bio-power and its ‘war of the races’ and the bourdieusian notion of the logic of practice, consistent with the bulk theorising. Hence, although many of the references used may not be in line with the intention of its authors, I have reserved myself the right to use them in a manner that I regard as fit with the main theorising. Any shortcomings are mine.

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10 For a critic of ‘area studies’ and its practice of turning geographical/political boundaries into epistemological boundaries and scholarly work on Rwanda, see Mamdani (2001).
2.1.1 Bio-Power and the Body Politic

What is ‘the political’? Etymologically politics are ‘state craft’, and it is derived from the Greek word for the city-state of antiquity – [polis]. But there is more to politics, it also connotes the Greek [polemos] and thus politics – state craft – is about domestication of antagonisms as well as domestication of the social world that is constructed through acts of power. This implies that any social objectivity ultimately is political, which in turn means that any social identity has a political foundation (Mouffe, 1998:59-63). In this work I intend to use ‘the political’ in a broad sense, it denotes behaviours, ideas and institutions related to the exercise of ‘power’ (Lundquist, 1993:24). If we were to study politics according to a narrow definition we would be restrained to study legitimate politics only, pre-constructed by power itself and as such imposed on us by the order of the social world and we would not be able to study the mechanisms of power (see Bourdieu, 1980a: 225n22). This necessary begs another question. It would be misleading to ask ‘what is power?’ rather we ought to ask ‘how is power?’ Because power exists only when exercised, it is power only in action (Foucault, 1976:123ff; 1980:89). Power is something which is exercised, not ‘owned’ once and for all, and which is immanent in every social relation; because power comes from below (Foucault, 1976:124). Bio-politics and discipline constitute a type of power, a political technology of the body, a power of life, which runs through all societal relations (including the state apparatus in Modern societies – the statisation of the biological). The body politic is the ensemble of material and technical means which serve the power and the knowledge and that are invested in human bodies (what Bourdieu labels habitus), and which out of these bodies makes objects of knowledge (Foucault, 1975:37). Since the discipline (the disciplining of the individual bodies) and the bio-politics (the regulation of the mass of bodies) are not to be located within, and identified with, certain institutions or apparatus I see everything concerning ‘power’ as politics. This power technology takes charge of and is applied onto the population by regularising the species being as such beings, and disciplining the bodies as such bodies. The power over life works through disciplining devices; the political anatomy of the human body (habitus), and the regulating control mechanisms; the bio-politics of the population (groups of habitus) (see Foucault, 1976:183ff). Hence, it regulates the population as such a population. Power is omnipresent in the social field – the micro-physics of power – not because it is all encompassing, but since it emanates from all societal relations, i.e. force relations, constituting it (Foucault 1975: ch.1 and part 3; 1976: 121ff; et 1997:213ff). But, if one is lead to believe that Foucault does not take account also of the centrality of power his treating of the relation state-racism should lead to some reconsideration (see Stoler, 1995:61f). Gilles Deleuze (1986:81) remarks the importance of not reducing the microphysics of power to a miniaturisation of power relations, but to regard it as logic non-reducible to knowledge (savoir) alone.

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11 The views of Bourdieu and Focuault on power are homologous. In the theorising of Bourdieu ‘capital’ – resources that the agent is able to mobilise socially – only functions as such when it in the practices is socially recognised as capital. Because social capital is power if it is socially perceived and recognised (see Bourdieu, 1987:152). Thus, it is not different in nature from Foucault’s notion of ‘power’, which is (power) in and through the relations de force where it is practically exercised (i.e. an action on the actions).  
Thus to Deleuze (1986: 81) the liaison between the microphysics of Foucault and the ‘strategies’ (the logic of practice) of Bourdieu is explicit: “One ought to confront/compare the [system of] thinking of Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology of ‘strategies’”.

The microphysics of power are the strategies, that are more profound than conscious strategies, of habitus which direct these societal relations towards ends unconscious to the agents within the field they constitute.

2.1.2 The Political Body

How is one then, sociologically, to explain the existence of a ‘self’, as anything but an array of passive, individual perceptions? Habitus is this active principle of unification of practices and representations (Bourdieu, 1986). Practices then are the place for the dialectics of the objectified products of history, and the incorporated products of history - habitus (Bourdieu, 1980a:87-88). This gives us a problematic where identity (of conditions and conditioning) – a ‘self’ – is conceptualised as habitus, i.e. as incorporated, structured predispositions; an operative modality of the social world. As such habitus is an active principle for the production of meaning. We are thus dealing with practical identities.

Claudine Vidal (1991) speaks of a ‘sociology of passions’ that more or less imposed itself on her when she set out to undertake research in Rwanda. What is a ‘passion’ in a sociological sense? It is not a ‘concept’ but rather a description (signalement): “I see passion when individuals invest their energies in particular project which is socially recognised” (Vidal, 1991:179). What interests us is not persons of which one in everyday language say that they are ‘passionate’, but rather ‘passion’ is a marker for practices where the agents act in manners that are not distanced, but rather act intensely, investing the major part of the socially recognised resources they dispose. In, brief, they deploy strategies that are not disinterested.

The organising principle for the pattern of these interested strategies is habitus, but as reminds us Wacquant (1992:13-44); to the extent habitus is universal it is so as a tool for analysis to be constructed; one has to make a history of the passions (Vidal, 1991:180). Habitus as practical identity is ‘realised political mythology’, a social necessity become ‘nature’ (i.e. social nature) by its embodiment and incorporation, and as such it is a permanent disposition to feel and think (Bourdieu, 1980a:116-117). Through social practices, bodily experiences, mythical events and collective identities are incorporated to the socially defined body; habitus. “The body is a memory” as Clastres (1974:152) says, the law is not only hard and something no one should not forget, by the virtue of codification it is also made real and authentic as it exists in an objectified form. One such objectified form is the human body into which the law is inscribed, incorporated. In a given field the ‘disciplinary’ is given a particular form, proper to the field within which it is constituted and reproduced. This omnipresent power is in Modern society bio-politics, thus in this sense ‘everything is politics’. The microphysics of

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13 “Il faudrait confronter la pensée de Foucault et la sociologie des «stratégies» de Pierre Bourdieu […]” (Deleuze 1986: 81). This and all other translations are mine unless otherwise stated. Due to concerns of space I do not present the original text in the rest of the work, unless I consider the translation as too much of a transformation/deformation of the meaning.

14 Needless to say, it would be hard to imagine a practice that is not in the slightest manner of interest to the agent who acts, but by observing certain practices one may discern patterns of actions, of strategies that are founded in an interest residing with the individual that may not be conscious to her/him.
power give life to these souls ("âmes") which are not essence, but are represented as such, as substance. What are substantial though are the individual bodies that are disciplined, that are taught; "children, school-children, the colonised"; in brief all who are controlled throughout their existence (Foucault, 1975:38). This soul is the element where the effects of a certain power are articulated and is the reference of certain knowledge. Man as body is subjected by this 'soul', an element of the power matrix exercised onto the body that inhabits him and brings him/her to existence as such a body. "The soul, effect and instrument of a political anatomy: the soul, prison of the body." (Foucault, 1975:38). Thus the reified collective identities are given a metaphysical place in the constitutive imaginary but is given a physical form through its incorporation, habitus. To objectify is to make visible and known to ‘all’ and by its public nature it comes to being under its ‘authentic’ name in an official way. In this sense it is a kind of codification, something that is closely related to disciplinary and regulatory practices that enables the maintenance of symbolic order and ordering. Codification simplifies and enables communication and the controlled consensus that exercises an imperative that makes the difference between otherwise arbitrary possibilities; ‘that’s how it is’. Practices that are given names are made authentic, formal, official, legitimate and even legal. Formality, as do other principles of rationalisation, makes regulatory practices and prediction possible (Bourdieu, 1990: 78-85). ”the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the social world, and, thereby, to make and unmake groups” (Bourdieu, 1991:221, emphasis in original). The basis for the di-visions is the socially magic act that through symbolic decree creates a decisive social discontinuity in natural continuity. 

Habitus are principal generators and organisers of practice and representation that may be objectively adapted to ends without the ends necessarily being conscious, and without the explicit control of the conduct necessary to achieve them (Bourdieu 1980a: 88 and 103-104). ‘As a product of history, habitus produce(s), individual or collective, practices, thus history conform with the schemes engendered by history’. Habitus is not mechanical or teleological, it is however durable and systematic. As an active generator of practices it allows for the external forces, as internally embodied dispositions, to be exercised since habitus makes possible the free production of all thoughts, of all the perceptions and all the actions within the limits inherent to the conditions of the structuring structure, and these only (Bourdieu 1980a: 91-92). Since habitus is engendered by the existing conditions of being and operating towards an anticipated, probable future, ‘the to come’ (l’à venir)\(^{15}\), it is a motor for making present (présentification) a past and the ‘to come’, here and now (Bourdieu, 1980a: 88-89, 104-109, in particular p108n21 and 111-134). Because there is only, and will only be, a present; being is presence or modification of presence (Derrida, 1967:60). Habitus is then the social incorporated and hence the social individualised (Bourdieu, 1987: 43). This is the relation between the opus operatum, the objectified products, and the modus operandi, the incorporated products of the history of practice and

\(^{15}\) This is a play with words. Bourdieu takes off with the word avenir (future) and breaks it down into the preposition à (to) and the verb venir (come), hence we have an à venir, a ‘to come’; an anticipated future as an absolute possibility in the present.
representation. The conditioning associated with a certain class of conditions of existence produces group, or class, *habitus*. Every individual system of dispositions is thus a structural variation of the others within the group. The dialectical functioning of structures and *habitus* may then be orchestrated as a collective without the organising act of a conductor (Bourdieu 1980: 88-109). Hence, we have *groups of political identities*.

2.1.3 On Race/ Ethnicity and the ‘War of the Races’

Instead of speaking of Racism or Ethnicity in general we ought to speak of ‘ethnicities’ and ‘racisms’, and in order to understand a particular ‘ethnicity’ we have to deconstruct and reconstruct it before we use it (Amsell, 1986; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Nederveen Pieterse 1997; Stoler, 1995). To objectively comprehend the signification of an ‘ethnonym’, such as ’Hutu’ or ’Tutsi’ one has to establish an extensive list of social practices related to it. All other usage is by definition essentialist and will only contribute to the reproduction of the ideology from which it has been abstracted. In establishing a series of meanings related to it, one may however put emphasis on a certain aspect of the ‘ethnonym’ (Amsell 1986, 36-38). As “one never writes history in general, but always *the history of something*” (Balibar, 1966:485, emphasis in original) we have to elaborate what this ‘thing’ in the war of the races ‘is’. As (Mamdani, 2001) I argue that ethnic identities in Rwanda are political identities in the sense that they are the outcome of the history of Rwandan state formation and outright political struggles. The social identities of Hutu and Tutsi ultimately have their foundation in the realm of the explicitly political. Some authors have claimed that categories of ‘races’ and ‘ethnic groups’ should be ruled out of social sciences since they are common sense categories and thus can not be employed analytically. Race/ethnicity is indeed a historical, social product that has been discredited. Nevertheless, from a sociological point of view race/ethnicity denotes a particular way collective differences are socially constructed and as such, it can not be erased from the analytical map. Race/ethnicity is one way in which social divisions and practices of inclusion and exclusion are constructed, grounded in an imaginary containing some notions of stock or collective heredity of traits (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992:1-20). It is a ‘natural’ principle for dividing the continuum humanity into those who ‘normally’ can belong and those Others that can not ‘normally’ belong.

Racism, *stricto sensu*, as a ‘science’ did not emerge until the end of the 18th century. The issue can somewhat sweepingly be said to be to prove the superiority of the ‘White race’ following Linnaeus’ principles where mixture means degeneration for the superior part. A clearly Modern scientific form of racism does not emerge until the midst of the 19th century and it is expressed in works like de Gobineau’s *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines* (published in 1852), but corresponding theories prevailed also in the Anglo-Saxon world (see Wieviorka 1998:18-21). It makes part of the Modern *épistémé*. In the *History of Sexuality* Foucault (1976) showed us a shift from the symbolics of blood towards a scientific bio-power technique. It is not question of a replacement of the old power structures, but rather a displacement. It is not rupture proper but the tension of rupture with and the recuperation of
things possible (Stoler 1995:37-39 et 61). It is the coming together of old fears and the grand evolutionary mythologies and the institutions of public health at the service of the body social, promising to master the degenerated and bastard populations. "In the name of a biological emergency it justified the state racisms […]" (Foucault, 1976:73). The racist discourses, racism stricto sensu, were the recuperation in biosocial terms at a certain point in time of something that emerged earlier: the discourse of 'the war of the races'. Until the 19th century, the war of the races was a counter-history where the word 'race' did not have any stable biological sense. The sense of 'race' in this discourse is one where two groups constitute different 'races' when the groups have different local origins, originally have different languages, often different religions and above all do form a political unit only at the price of wars, conquests and invasions; in short – physical violence (Foucault, 1997:57ff et 67ff). When the discourse of the war of the races was about to be transformed into a war of classes by those who were about to theorise the Grande revolution, there in the other camp was a re-coding of this war of the 'races' into a war of the races in a biological and medical sense, the historical dimension in the discourse was downplayed at the favour of what was to be known as 'racism'. Here the state, that was necessarily unjust in the counter-history of races, is to be represented as the guarantor of the integrity of society and the purity of the race and the prime vector in the biological fight against the abnormal, degenerated public enemy. "The racism is literally the inversion of the revolutionary discourse" (Foucault, 1997: 71). To Foucault 'class' seems to be engendered by 'race', but as Stoler (1995: 27ff et 126ff) points out in the social taxonomies of the time, 'race' and 'class' did not occupy distinct spaces in practice. Modern racism is thus engendered in the junction of the purity of the blood and the purity of the race, the war of the classes and the war of the races. They as words both had much looser and richer meanings. Without theories about 'races' and racist practices there can per definition be no racism (Balibar, 1988). To the extent there is a specificity in race/ethnicity with regards to other group phenomena it is the social construction of an origin as the basis for the imagined community, "[g]ender and race, unlike class, relate to a particular representation of a 'biological', 'physiognomic', or 'natural' difference." (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992:112, see also pp 11-13) They here refer to Benedict Anderson's (1991) definition of the Modern nation as an "imagined community", which should also be valid as a definition of an ethnic/racial group. In any case the 'logic is that of

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16 The basic hypothesis is that certain myths and 'historians' opposing the emerging Absolutist State recuperated legends. The aristocracy put forward a historic discourse where they showed that the Prince was the primus only because he had won the war and that the exercise of the law was in fact nothing but an attempt to forever hide the initial conflict between two groups (i.e. Saxons vs. Normands and Gaules vs. Francs) that was at the foundation of society as such. In England, the history was portrayed with the vanquished Saxons as the collective subject of History. The Normands had with force and conquest established an alien domination of the Saxons. Whereas in France it is told from a conquering point of view. The Prince was in reality nothing but a primus inter pares as he in accordance with Germanic laws was an elected warlord among equals, leading the good and democratic savage Franks in their conquest of the Gallo-Roman territories who in a way saved the Gaules from Roman servitude. The term 'race' does in this discourse signify groups that are imagined as having different origins and it is their coming together that founds the political entity as such, but always by conquest, i.e. at the origin their was a 'real' war, not a hypothetical war as in the case of Hobbes (Foucault, 1997). In Sweden the pre-existing Gothic mythology was transformed for the same reasons (see Hall, 1998).

17 For an in my finding rather unjust critique of Foucault (1997) and the notion of the 'war of the races' see Lessay (2000), who claims that the only traces of a war of the races (at least when it comes to Saxons vs. Normands) is in Foucault's own discourse. To me it seems as Lessay in his reading of Foucault (1997) is confusing a 'war of the races' with what may be labelled a 'racial war' (in a quasi-scientific sense).

18 Foucault (1997:74n7) is here referring to above all Augustin Thiers' Histoire de la révolution française published between 1823 and 1827.


As Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) I do not believe that there is reason to make a distinction between race and ethnicity; ethnic groups and ethnicity are nothing but scientific euphemisms for 'race' "which is non the less present in actual practice” (Bourdieu, 1991:220).20 'Race/ethnicity’ should neither be over-intellectualised nor over-theorised. The question is not ‘what is race/ethnicity?’ but 'how, when and where are ethnicities?’. To Bourdieu (1991:220-222), the confusion in debates on concepts like ethnicity and ethnic groups stems from the desire to put the categories of common sense under logical critique and replace the logic of social practices with controlled, scientific logos based on empirical criteria. This gives rise to a tendency to forget that this practical logic is oriented towards the production of social effects. The quest for 'objective criteria’ defining for example an ethnic identity should not make us forget that practically these criteria (such as origin etc.) are objects of mental representations (i.e. acts of perception and appreciation and cognition and recognition) in which agents invest their presuppositions and interests (their 'passions’) and of objectified representations (flags, emblems identity cards, 'skin colour' and other stigmata etc.), or acts of symbolic manipulation (self-interested strategies) that aim at determining the representation others may form of these properties and their bearers. The criteria for the ‘natural’ classifications are more or less based in ‘reality’. Nevertheless, this reality is a social reality through and through. “[T]he most 'natural' classifications are based on characteristics which are not in the slightest respect natural and which are to a great extent the product of an arbitrary imposition, in other words, of a previous state of the relations of power in the field of struggle over legitimate delimitation.” (Bourdieu, 1991:222). So, whenever one observes empirical groups one is doing nothing but recording a state of the struggle over classifications. In this work, we look upon ethnicity as practices that are directly related to the demarcation of [polis].

We could metaphorically think of it as a question of being inside our outside the 'walls of the city', the [zoon politikon]. Etymologically the word ethnic is derived from the Greek words [Ethnos]/[Ethnikus]. With the translations of the Old Testament and the evolution of Christianity, the word [Ethnikus] was used as a label to designate 'those without culture’, what we today would call Others (Nederveen Pieterse 1997: 365). The only steady meaning over time seems to have been to denote those who find themselves outside [polis]. One should then note that [polis] rather than a geographical designator was a political designator; there were people within the city walls (slaves, women, men born outside the [polis] etc.) who did not belong to the [polis], and there were people living outside the city walls who were part of the [polis] (Gaulme, 1997: 121-124). If one speaks of ethnicity, ethnic groups etc. one ought to bear in mind that it is question of exclusion from official,
political existence, being outside [polis] on the basis of ‘natural’ principles; normality. Foucault does not propose a scapegoat theory of race, i.e. theories that posit that under economic and social duress certain parts of the population are nail blamed and represented as intruders. “The habit of considering racism as a mental quirk, as a psychological flaw, must be abandoned” (Fanon quoted in Bonilla-Silva, 1996:465). Racial and ethnical selves, racialised habitus, are a form of selves that are produced by power and power comes from below as it is exercised through us as agents, we thus all have power in our bodies; “we all have fascism in our heads” (Foucault, 1997:27). Rather than a few deviant individuak turning racist it is question of racialised social systems where the social actors are placed in racial categories; ‘races’ (Bonilla-Silva, 1996:469). "For Foucault, racism is more than an ad hoc response to crisis; it is a manifestation of preserved possibilities, the expression of an underlying discourse of permanent social war, nurtured by the bio-political technologies of 'incessant purification'.” Racism does not only arise in moments of crisis. “It is internal to the bio-political state, woven into the weft of the social body, threaded through its fabric” (Stoler, 1995:69). A social field is a field of ‘strategic possibilities’ (Foucault quoted in Bourdieu, 1994:64). In the social field a ‘field of possibles’ (espace des possibles) the field and its objective relations direct the actions of the agents that constitute it. The composition of the field fractures hardship, if society is under stress – anomic – the social effects are determined by the constitution of the social field (see Bourdieu, 1994:61-80). To think of a given social field as a field of possibles implies that it is also a field of impossibles. The strategies of the individual habitus, structuring structures, are in a field where race/ethnicity resides as a principal for dивision can not possibly not be part of the structured structure where ‘races’ exist. In the normal state of the social field this is not always obvious, the ‘ethnic strategy’ of the individual is more likely to be unconscious, if this is not perceived as problematic to her/him. In an extreme situation like genocide (in this work analytically constructed as a war of the races) where the world is not self evident, the deployment of ethnic strategies of the individual agents are more likely obvious, since it is more or less impossible not to reside to ethnic strategies.

In a work called Ethnicité politique – Pour une lecture réaliste de l’identité Michel Cahen (1994:69) states that "class exists in itself. This is not the case for ethnicity in general". Leaving aside the obvious ethnocentrism it is clear that Cahen seems to mean that whether or not the ‘proletarian’ is conscious or not about her/his belonging to a category/class determined by its relation to the means of production is not important. This class exists independently of the consciousness of the empirical individuals constituting it. Its transformation into a state of social power is however dependent of its consciousness; "old debate in itself/for itself. But, the ethnic group does it exist outside the ethnic expression of ethnicity? I assert negatively.” (Cahen, 1994:69). If we following Bourdieu (1984) admit that the representation of the social world and the sense of it the individuals and groups constituting it have of it, is intrinsic to the social world as such we realise that Cahen (1994) is right in his claim to the

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20 If we for example look at Nationalencyklopedins ordbok (1995:389), we find that the word ethnic (etnisk) is explained with "who belongs to a certain people or a certain race (sic)".
extent that ethnic groups do not exist in themselves. However, neither does 'class'. Perhaps class exists *an sich* in orthodox Marxist theory, as a class of positions in the material process of production, but not in the social world. The 'class' just as any other social group (like the ethnic group) only exists as represented in a social field. "One does not go from the class-on-paper to the 'real' class without the effort of the political labour of mobilisation: the 'real' class, as far as it has ever 'really' existed, is never but the realised class; that is, mobilised [...]" (Bourdieu, 1994: 27-28). As Bourdieu (1984:11) reminds us, social groups or classes do not exist in themselves, what does exist is a space of differences where groups exist as virtual groups, not as givens but as virtual classes of existence, as something which constantly has to be made and re-made. To avoid being carried away by the labour of naturalisation that has been undertaken one has in every case to reconstruct the historic labour that has produced the social divisions and the social visions of these divisions. The scientific analysis of the forms of human being takes as its starting point the end products. The societal shape that has turned it into things has then already achieved the status of nature in the social world and these categories are socially valid and effective as they constitute objective cognitive categories in the historically determined society (Marx, 1997: 65-66). By its constitution as 'things', the metaphors Hutu, Tutsi and Twa that inhibit the Rwandan History take on a metaphysic dimension. Their mystical character emanates from that they are the products of society and they relate to one another as things that exist outside themselves. Through this relation the metaphors, the things are endowed with supernatural (i.e. societal) properties. The form of these things are a given societal relation and the relation between people themselves that takes the shape of the fantastic form as a relation between the things themselves. To find an analogy we have to take refuge to the domain of religion where the products of human brains appear as gestalts endowed with life in their own right and that are put in relation to each other and the human beings. This fetishism depends on the particular property that is due to their societal production (Marx, 1997: 62-63). What it is question of is 'racialised boundaries' (Anthias and Yuval-Davies, 1992). Nevertheless, this does not mean that Hutu and Tutsi existed as two distinct groups before the racialisation of delimitation between them.

There is much evidence that ethnicity as a matter that matters in Rwanda is of rather recent date. Before, to the extent it did exist, it was not the referential identity for Rwandans. Catharine Newbury (1988) shows how in the historic region of Kinyaga (today the political region Cyangugu) in the Southwest of present day Rwanda, the term ‘Hutu’ had until the end of the 19th century no signification whatsoever for the inhabitants and it is only with the introduction of the, what-is-now-termed-the-central-court rule that it is established as a politically meaningful category. Equally, neither were Hutu nor Tutsi labels of significance for the inhabitants of the Isle of Ijiwi, Lake Kivu, until at least the late 1960’s (Vidal, 1991). When Newbury (1988) carried out her studies in the region during the 1970’s and 1980’s the inhabitants of the Isle of Ijiwi indiscriminately referred to all Rwandans as Badusi (derived from the Kinyarwanda Abatutsi) and if Hutu and Tutsi were relevant social categories they were only so when referring to immigrants coming after 1960. More so, most Ijiwi inhabitants despite longstanding
contacts with people on the other side of the border and great familiarity with other traits of Rwandan culture would not know or not clearly understand the term Hutu. It would literally be nonsense. When referring to an individual *Umunyarwanda* affiliation they would mention her/his clan. Thus, the terms *Hutu* and *Tutsi* may be very old in Rwandan social discourse (see Newbury, 1988:10). However, it is very doubtful if one should speak about them in terms of ethnicity. Because if we admit that ethnicity is about the political and realise that Hutu and Tutsi historically were not primarily political identities, then we have to face the consequences that speaking of Hutu and Tutsi as politically salient identities before a time where ethnicity was an organising principle of the Rwandan political order brings us close to an essentialist, racialist reading of these identities. We can not exclude that the groups as such, i.e. the boundaries and the di- vision, are just as much a product of the racialisation of society as the existence of the groups brought about racialisation.

Although the nature of the existence of Hutu and Tutsi prior to colonial period is a matter of debate, no one ought to seriously contest the basic assumption that *they were not races/ethnic groups*. To Franche (1995:40ff) the argument that legitimates a reading of the Rwandan genocide as the ‘war of two races’ is that the *habitus*, even if he does not use the word, of the missionaries, the explorers, the civil servants and militaries, in brief the agents of colonial power and knowledge, to reach Rwanda were disposed to establish this war in a colonial context. By implanting a racist system of thinking and acting, the Europeans transformed the nature of identities by introducing a racist ontology. "*Since the belief in White superiority – that is to say, White nationalism – began to move all over the world, no people of colour has been able to develop race prejudice independent of Whites.*” (Cox quoted in Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992:134).

The political ontology bringing about the construction of this imaginary in a Rwandan context is best depicted by the name of de Gobineau (Chrétien, 1997:344). What we have to do in order to analytically understand the genocide – the ultimate political exclusion; ‘once and for all’ – is to follow the evolution over time of political identities in Rwanda. The logic of things social of the Rwandan genocide was ethnicity/race as codified in what Chrétien (1986 and 1997) calls the ‘Rwandan ideology’. I do however prefer to refer to it as a ‘constitutive imaginary’, following Vidal (1991) and Lemarchand (1996) who in their turn draw on Veyne (1983). When Paul Veyne (1983) poses himself the question, “*did the Greeks believe in their myths*” he is actually saying “*did the Greeks believe in their truths?*” since the logic of myths as well of truth is that of imagination. How does one believe in things only halfway? How does one believe in things that are contradictory? If the tip of the icebergs are our political communities in the shape of ‘political institutions’ – the [polis] based on ‘truths’ founded in ‘reality’ – the hidden part of the iceberg is the constitutive imaginary producing ‘truth’. Truth is not a trans-historical invariant but the work of our constitutive imagination that takes place in everyday

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21 Although the way in which Chrétien (1986 ET 1997) uses ideology is in its gramscian sense; ideology is not a ‘false consciousness’ as it is "*operating realities which possess efficacy*" (Mouffe, 1979:185). This is in accord with the view of ‘racism’ as part of the dominant *weltanshauung* one finds with Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992:13-14).
practices, “one actively believes in racism” (Veyne, 1983:126). In this political imaginary, Hutu and Tutsi\textsuperscript{22} has appeared as racialised groups, and as such as essentially different. It is important for our understanding of the war of the races is suspense that we when considering power renounce the opposition violence-ideology (in the words of Foucault), or the opposition symbolic-physical violence (in the words of Bourdieu), as there is more to violence than its purely physical form (see Foucault, 1975:36).\textsuperscript{23} The resuming of the ‘war of the races’ resided as a strategic possibility for those who orchestrated the genocide in 1994.

2.2 The Results – Reproduction, Rupture and Recuperation

What I mean by rupture and recuperation is that ethnicity, as the structural principle underlying the logic that made the genocide a possible, and even an empirical reality, is present in the reproduction of today’s social identities. When different groups of practical identities are revealed by how they experienced the time before the genocide, the genocide, its repercussions and how the students look upon the future; these practical identities appear as such on basis of these structures. This does not mean that ethnicity in Rwanda today is the same thing as before or during the genocide, only that some of its elements are re-inscribed, incorporated in another form (which sociologically is not the ‘same’ thing, identical identity).

Admitting that the concept of ethnicity (referring to the difference between groups with reference to the social construction of different, distinguishing origins) is a continuum that varies widely in terms of salience, intensity and meaning, we realise that this signifier for social identities in Rwanda is both useful and imperfect at the same time (see Nederveen-Pieterse, 1997). If we perceive of a ‘life’ as a trajectory of subsequently held positions we see that there is a fundamental, qualitative difference between the ethnicity of today and the ethnicity of yesterday. During the empirical life of the students that we meet, ethnicity (belonging to the group of Hutus, Tutsis or Twas) has gone from something more or less problematic to a matter of life and death to something which is again problematic. Nevertheless, it poses problems of a different order. During their upbringing the students had to learn what was their official identity, and in their everyday lives the ethnic belonging mattered substantially whether or not they were aware of it as the social world where ethnicity resided as a principal for division determined their life chances. This official, and thus made ‘authentic’, identity was then in turn a fatal part of their selves in 1994. Today it does not directly decide what is possible and impossible, probable and improbable. That is, even if some of them still are proud of their ethnic belonging (as

\textsuperscript{22} As often is the case concerning Rwanda the Batwa are if not totally left out at least heavily marginalised. This is true when it comes to literature on Rwanda (this work is here open to much critique) and it seems to be equally true on the societal level. As one of the respondent told me, “You may live your whole life without ever seeing a Twa” – at least without ever seeing a Twa doing things recognised as ‘Twa-things’. During a conference on the indigenous people of Africa held in Kigali this year the spokesperson of the Batwa stated that they are “denied land rights and evicted from their ancestral homes” (IRIN, September 6, 2001). The Rwandan parliamentary committee on human rights have begun debating a bill seeking to punish the crime of discrimination and segregation, however acknowledging that positive discrimination may be necessary to ameliorate the conditions for those who have suffered the most from previous discrimination, “like in the education of the girl child, disabled persons and Abatwa” (IRIN, October, 18, 2001).
Hutu or Tutsi) they are foremost Rwandans as it as Rwandans they enjoy rights, privileges and obligations. Nevertheless, belonging to a certain group of Rwandans brings about different possibilities/impossibilities and probabilities/improbabilities, social groupings that are engendered in the ethnic politics of the past.

Some of the students say that they are only Rwandan and nothing else, this was the case when asked in a survey-like way through the dissertation tasks, and it was even more obvious when I at KIE distributed surveys in order to get some data that would allow for some quantifying of the givens (see Appendix II, the standard questionnaire part). As the ethnic categories de jure no longer exists it implies the non-existence of ethnic statistics. When I in order to get an overall idea about the ethnic composition of the students at KIE I handed out questionnaires in a number that would be sufficient to cover all the students at KIE. Only 13 were returned (all of the respondents but one had been in Rwanda during the genocide). However disappointing this may seem, the answers still revealed interesting features. On the question of ‘ethnic belonging’ I received answers in the order of ‘I am Rwandan’/’We are all Rwandans’/’Ethnicity does not exist in Rwanda’, and this only. On the question of how the respondent found the question above there were somewhat more variations: ‘Scandalous’, ‘In Rwanda there is today only one ethnic group’, ‘It’s a bizarre question, completely out of date’, ‘Are you kidding?’ etc. It is thus obvious that ethnicity within this group does not belong to the domain of the politically correct (especially not under group pressure). Something that was further accentuated from the interviews where people who in their dissertations had not filled out any ‘ethnic belonging’ revealed it to me when I had gained some trust.

It may be that ‘everyone is now Rwandan’ but there are still different kinds of Rwandans. The persons constituting the material may all readily be classified into different groups of Rwandans (classes of identities) following how their practical identities reveal themselves in their stories. One may trace a group of stories that account for the genocide as a gathering of events with the focus on hiding and struggling to stay alive (‘survivor stories’), those who until the genocide had an official identity as Tutsi and today are socially reckognised as ‘survivors/rescapés’. Then there is a group of students telling another story of survival, but where the major concern is de-centred from the own self to loved ones being targeted, those were born in a ‘mixed’ marriage with a Tutsi mother (Rwanda is patrilinear). A third group is one where the misery of one’s self is somewhat postponed to the immediate aftermath of the actual genocide (‘others’ stories’), those who had an official and ‘pure’ Hutu identity. Finally, we encounter a type of story which is told a bit from a distance as the own person was never directly affected (‘returnee stories’), persons who were born outside Rwanda and ‘came back’ after the genocide. Within these groups of habitus the homology is due to the diversity in the homogeneity, identity of conditions, in the social production of these groups of habitus. That is, the singularities of an individual trajectory are a structural variation of the group. The practical identities all relate to from

23 “A symbolic power is a power which presupposes recognition, that is, misrecognition of the violence that is exercised through it.” (Bourdieu, 1991:209)
which point of view the war and the genocide was experienced, which then of course depends on what kind of identity they were imputed before ‘the events of 1994’.

Considered as a biological generation the respondents belong to the same generation. When it comes to sociological generation it becomes more problematic. One way to conceptualise the findings and still use the term ‘ethnicity’ (with reference to different socially constructed origins) in a meaningful way, is by the virtue of looking at a life as a trajectory through a social field in change. We then understand that if ethnicity as a principle for being recognised a belonging to society was much more intense, produced more significant effects before the genocide. Then during the genocide it was fatal as it was the extreme principal of the right over life and death (at least for those who were in Rwanda). In a sociological sense the notion of ‘generation’ implies more than being born at the same time, it may be conceived as a cycle of historical experiences (Abrams, 1982:248). To Mannheim, generation meant a form of collective identity engendered by a set of similar experiences that give rise to similarity in responses (Eyerman, 1994:70). This definition presupposes a common set of experiences that engenders convergent points of view, a common vision of the social world between social actors. In this sense, ‘generation’ is not different in nature from ‘class’, at least in its objective, statistical sense as in a class of conditions and conditioning. Conflicts between generations do not oppose natural age classes but habitus produced by different modes of generation, i.e. differing conditions of existence by imposing different definitions of the impossible, the possible and the probable (Bourdieu, 1980a:105n16). Therefore, since they have been generated as such in different ways, the respondents in this sense belong to different ‘generations’ (different modes of generation as such). Even if they are all Rwandan, they have incorporated different dispositions, which implies a different becoming Rwandan. I regard the groups of practical identity solely as virtual, they exist in this work only as ‘classes-of-identities-of-conditions-on-the-paper’, if they are to exist in the social world mobilised as such groups is yet to see.
3 On the Methodology – Politics from Below

Stefan: Is it all right for you to talk about it, or is it something that you don’t want to talk about?

Kayitana: Why not talk about it? Are you perhaps a spy?

Stefan: Do you think I’m a spy?

Kayitana: No, I don’t think you’re a spy. [he laughs] I know you’re a student like me.

3.1 A Life Story Approach

All sociological work is confronted with the expression of men and women, the words of human beings. It is in fact one of the particularities of the social sciences to “deal with objects that speak” (Bourdieu et al. 1968: 64). More particularly, it is an ‘object’ that has the possibility to perceive of her/himself, and to speak of her/himself in a reality of which she/he has a certain representation of her/his place; in brief, identity. Since the focus of this work is on the question of identity, and more precisely on the self-perception and representation of identity, the sense of one’s place, I have chosen a life story approach to render this intelligible. However, as a life, a certain ‘identity’, appears in a social field I also feel urged to reconstruct this space where the life, identity takes place.

Although the term ‘politics from below’ borrowed from Jean–François Bayart (1981) designates the study of popular movements and the resistance of socially subaltern ‘classes’, I find the term appropriate to describe what I undertake in this work. There are a number of reasons for that I find the approach fruitful. Firstly, I adhere to the declaration of program whereas it is concerned with considering the social sciences concerned with Africa primarily as social science. Secondly, I celebrate the approach since it does not deny African politics evolving elements in their own right, i.e. African societies and states are not perceived as ‘underdeveloped’ and/or ‘dysfunctional’. Because ‘Africa works’ and it is only a question of making sense out how it functions (see Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Thirdly, the foundational stipulations are based on the works of Foucault (1976, in particular). Thus, the main merit is the broadening of what defines ‘politics’. As I put the methodology into practice, there is thus on my part a constant concern with considering politics from below and to render the logic of practice intelligible.

The life story approach is to a large extent associated with a certain time and a certain ‘school’; the 1920’s and 1930’s and the Chicago school. It has been tied to a certain type of social processes, which may be grouped under the concept of ‘deviance’. This is a kind of sociology that principally has been interested in becoming rather than being (Abrams; 198:267). But not only ‘deviant selves’ become, all ‘selves’ become, or to paraphrase de Beauvoir’s (1949) ‘one is not born woman, one

24 Besides, my population, even though not subaltern, stricto sensu, do not ‘yet, or will not in the probable ‘to come’ make part of a dominant group (as teachers-to-be, many of the students ‘will’ occupy intermediary [in its double sense] positions in the Rwandan field).

25 Like Chabal and Daloz (1999), I do not mean to say that one may treat ‘Africa’ as a homogenous political entity. However, there are recurrent features common to many African countries. Due to European colonisation certain homologies indeed allow the use of the term ‘Africa’ in designating a set of political problems and outlining a research agenda. Just like there are reasons to generally speak of ‘postcolonial’ states (see Sunder Rajan, 1993).
becomes it”: one is not born Hutu, Tutsi or Twa: one becomes Hutu, Tutsi or Twa (or Rwandan or ‘Swede’ for that matter). There is no biological, natural, destiny that defines what is a Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. It is society in its totality that elaborates these social ‘products’. Bertaux (1981:7n1) distinguishes between life history and life story, where the former contains the latter. After all my interest is in bits and pieces of the life as a history, and then calling it ‘life story’ is more correct. To me life story implies parts of a bigger whole – a whole ‘life’. In order for my methodology to deserve the label ‘life history’, it would take a more detailed gathering of data surrounding the varying stages and events in the respondents’ lives. Above all, with a focus so oriented towards ethnicity, it would be tremendously fetishist and ethnocentric on my part to claim to represent the story of a whole life. Like if the lives of Others, as opposed to mine, were all about ethnicity and that there were beings whose whole existence were ethnic. A whole life is not lived as purely ethnic, although many lives in Rwanda have ended for ethnic reasons.

Despite certain modesty, my approach is concerned with structures and structuring and its aim is “to unravel the patterns of sociostructural relations […] to follow their dynamics through historical time” (Bertaux & Bertaux-Wiame, 1981:169). One such way of conducting sociology is the way of Elias (1992:12) who sociologically observes ‘Mozart’, not only by “displaying historical facts” but also by laying out a theory ‘for that special figuration that a human being […] made up through his interdependency with other social figures of his time” is. In doing this Elias (1992) avoids the “retrospective illusion” by which the traces of a life appears as the realisation of an essence (like ‘the genius of Mozart’ pre-existing the production of music in certain fields of music production, i.e. a certain habitus as an agent in various sub-fields [see Bourdieu, 1980a:92]). In other words, a life-story approach is to look at the trajectories of agents through a social space, which itself is subject to transformations and constantly changing.

Keeping in mind that the stories from within Rwanda are tied to a historical present, we may unravel patterns of socially structured relations. The stories are told from a given empirical standpoint, position, within the social field. In other words, the stories are told by habitus, the active disposition, in situ. With story I mean that in and through the interviews and the essays, an underlying practical identity, habitus, speaks and manifests itself (‘its self’). The active principle, modus operandi, for the uniting of practices and representations, strives for the telling, representation of a narrative where its practices, experiences, in short – its ‘being’, seems meaningful. The story telling, the interview, in itself is then to be considered as a practice of sense-making (see Chase, 1985:x and 24-25).

Here we must pose ourselves a pertinent question; how reliable and valid are data on ‘practical identities’ collected through ‘life-stories’? For underlying this notion of ‘life-story’ there is a certain set of presuppositions. Firstly, that a ‘life’ is a coherent and finalised whole, which is organised as a history that unfolds according to a chronological order. Secondly, the interviewer and the interviewee share an interest in adhering to ‘the postulate of the meaning of narrated existence (and implicitly of all existence)” (Bourdieu, 1986:70, emphasis in original). We may thus assume that the life story narrative
always, at least to a certain extent, is anchored on a concern to give meaning, to rationalise and to
display the internal logic of a given empirical life. This concern then is manifested in the attempt to
make constant and consistent successive states that unfolds as steps in a necessary development of
intelligible relationships, such as cause and effect (Bourdieu, 1986:70). “To produce a life history or to
consider life as a history, that is, as a coherent narrative of a significant and directed sequence of
events, is perhaps to conform to rhetorical illusion, to the common representation of existence […]”
(Bourdieu, 1986:70). But if the practical identity only reveals itself in a series of successive
manifestations “the only manner of apprehending it as such perhaps consists in attempting to recapture
it in the unity of an integrative narrative” (Bourdieu, 1986:71). To do this we should use the notion of
‘trajectory’; a series of positions subsequently held by the same agent, or group, in a social space itself
in becoming and in constant flux. But, one may only understand a social surface, a personality, if one
has constructed the different states through which the individual trajectory of subsequent positions are
held, or at least constructed it in a number of pertinent states (Bourdieu, 1986:71-72).

We are here in this work dealing with constructed individuals, who are “defined by a finite set of
explicitly defined properties which differ through a series of identifiable differences from the set of
properties, constructed according to the same explicit criteria, which characterize other individuals”
(Bourdieu, 1988:22). The epistemological individual exists in ‘a space constructed of differences
produced by the very definition of the finite set of effective variables’ (Bourdieu, 1988:22) and not in
‘ordinary social space’. Thus, I urge the reader to take into consideration the ethnic fetishism by design,
imposed by the problematic. Had I had another focus, many of the properties now deemed important
perhaps would have been judged as irrelevant, resulting in that the persons whom we are to meet would
have been represented as different personalities. Between the empirical individuals that inhibit the
social field of Rwanda and the epistemological individuals that appear in this study there lies the work
of scientific break and construction, something which their fictive names signify.

3.2 The Social in the Particular

How does one then dare to claim that the data from 41 respondents, whereof eight interviewees appears
as persons should have anything to say about a whole social field? As a foundation for this claim, which
I do make, I will take off from Susan E. Chase (1995) and bridge it with the theory of the logic of
practice.

Chase (1995) founds her work on Mead’s stipulation that ”[o]ur symbols are all universal. You
cannot say anything is absolutely particular; anything you say that has any meaning at all is universal.”
(Mead quoted in Chase, 1995: 26). From what follows the quotation, it is from Mead (1934) evident
that the precondition for that the symbols of your speech (or any other mean of communication) mean
anything to your interlocutor is that the symbols signify something to her or him. They must have some
kind of existence in her or his experience (Mead, 1934: 146-147). If otherwise (they lack meaning to the
interlocutor) your act of communication, literally, will be considered as nonsense. Nevertheless, it is not
only in direct interaction with others, where the face to face relation is the primordial, that the symbols are common. Also the solitary thinking is per definition to consider as social. "We sometimes speak as if a person could build an entire argument in his mind, and then put it into words to convey it to someone else [...] In a thought process there has to be some sort of a symbol that can refer to [...] meaning, that is, tend to call out [...] response, and also serve this purpose for other persons as well. It would not be a thought process if that was not the case" (Mead 1934: 146). This condition prevails due the ‘the genesis of the self’. The ‘self’ which is a social structure becomes in and through social experience and practice. After a ‘self’ has come into existence, it is in a sense able to provide itself with social experience during the continued becoming; but it is impossible to conceive of a ‘self’ that emerges outside social experience (Mead 1934: 139-146). In order to relate it to the habitus concept, we must understand that the analytical components ‘mind’ and ‘self’ are not synonymous. The ‘self’ consists of the complete pattern of social relations and experiences, a social field, in which the empirical individual operates (and consists of), which thus are reflected in the composition of the ‘self’. "[B]ut many of the aspects or features of this entire pattern do not enter into consciousness” thus, “the mind is in a sense an abstraction from the more inclusive unity of the self” (Mead 1934: 144, n4). Since habitus is a system of shared social dispositions and cognitive structures that generates perceptions, appreciation and practices, we in order to understand the inherent logic of the social world must try and enter by the particular, an empirical reality. Analytically it may be constructed as a ‘particular case of the possible’ (Bourdieu, 1994:16). Hence, a given habitus, possible as such, is a unique empirical manifestation, enabled by the social in the social world. Thus, any given empirical ‘self’ (identity), is the manifestation of something social. Therefor, out of any empirical individual’s life story we may extract something about the empirical society that has shaped her/his being as such. Since there is a society in all human beings we may derive the social out of the particular experience of an individual self. Hence the life stories I will present are valid for the understanding of the common qualities of the Rwandan social field as "[w]e recognize any instance of human action as what it is only insofar as we understand that it is oriented to some common social world [...] the social is always particularized by its embodiment in practice. Because I ground my work in this theoretical commitment, I am not concerned with the question of whether my sample adequately represents some larger population.” (Chase1995:26). Therefore, I claim that my sample to a certain extent is valid for a larger population. Not in the sense that it would represent any Rwandan volksgeist, but in the sense that they are possible empirical individualities, i.e. possible Rwandan ‘selves’ in a social space that by its imposition determines the possible selves.

3.2.1 The Material

The academic year 1998-1999 I spent in France and as my interest in Rwanda grew, I started to plan the research. I had the opportunity to conduct what may be labelled a ‘pilot study’, interviewing two exiled
Rwandan women, one from each ‘camp’ so to speak (see Holme & Solvang, 1997:175ff). This and the fruitful discussions I had with the Dean of Academic Programmes at KIE, Mrs Consolata Kanimba, made me elaborate the question design. Students pursuing higher education at KIE and NUR make up the population constituting this work’s material. The samples from the two institutions of higher education were not done considering statistical representation, but rather it was based on strategic and theoretical assumptions. Via my gatekeepers I was introduced to student bodies who then in their turn spread the word to their fellow students, something that may be labelled ‘snowball sampling’ (see Holme & Solvang, 1997:10ff; May, 1997:88 et 119). The students having participated in the research, either by writing an essay or by being interviewed or both, I consider respondents. Other persons who provided information that does not directly concern themselves (their selves), who some are Banyarwanda and some are foreigners like myself, I treat as informants (see Zelditch, 1969). From KIE, I have 23 interviews and 29 essays, all in French. From NUR, I have ten essays and four interviews both in English and in French. All interviews but one were tape-recorded. The material then consists of 41 respondents (31 at KIE and 10 at NUR). Out of this group, eight students appear as ‘persons’ in this work. These eight respondents have been chosen to indirectly represent the Rwandan field at large, as particular cases of possible selves, but they directly represent the overall sample of students who participated in the research. Since the study is concerned with the rupture, recuperation and reproduction of identities, I took off with the identity categories which have been deemed emblematic for the Rwandan society, ‘ethnic categories’. In booking interviews I, based on what the essays revealed, tried to have an as equal ethnic spread as possible. I also tried to adjust for the biased gender composition of the essay writers.

The interviews are probably best described as something in between semi-structured and focused (see appendix III). I did not want to use a purely unstructured form of interview since I wanted to keep a certain direction and focus (see May, 1997:110-113). However, at the same time I wanted to leave as much space as possible to the interviewees to express themselves (their selves). To not lose track of the focus, I used an interview manual, which I deemed necessary given my inexperience (see Holme & Solvang, 1997: 100-101). I on most of the occasions asked the questions included in this, I also probed beyond these and posed a number of other questions. For example I would ask questions such as if the respondent had a boy/girl-friend and then follow up with if that person was of the same ethnic group as the respondent. In Kigali as well as in Butare I included standard questions (gender age, parents’ occupation etc. see appendices I- III) in an attempt to enable for positioning the interviewees. This part was more elaborated in the Butare task. It was also more reflexive by design: in the KIE-version there was the question "What is your belonging in terms of "ethnicity"?". Indeed, I did ask the students to elaborate also these questions, but there was no explicit invitation to comment the question as such.

26 I also conducted interviews with a Burundian student and the reporter for the French National Assembly Mission d’Information sur le Rwanda, Pierre Brana (99-01-22).

27 I am painfully aware of the gynocentrism of this work (the author has incorporated a male habitus) in the sense that gender issues are not explicitly mainstreamed throughout the work.
Butare, I added the follow up question 'How do you find the question above?'. Some might find changing questions along the way to be scientifically incorrect, but as the problematic was intact and I wanted to augment my chances of finding valid answers and comprehension, I decided that doing changes was appropriate. I think this can be justified in a number of ways. Firstly, I see no value-added in a methodology that embraces the standardisation of procedures for the sake of it, imitating the ‘hard sciences’, and thus echoing scientism rather than science. Secondly, only reflexivity, i.e. reflexive reflectivity (as in reflecting upon one’s own presuppositions), based in a sociological posture, enables improvement of the enquiry itself in the field (see Bourdieu, 1993:1389-1392). Thus, one should not only strive for mastering the different facets of the research situation, but also to explore every possibility that opens up during the course of action. Thirdly, and founded in the above-mentioned, this work represents a ‘learning to research’. Hence, inherent to its limits there lies an opportunity; by being humble and admitting its imperfections there is an opening towards improvement and widening of valid information collected. Thus, as I kept the focus and merely changed the means to obtain the same kind of information, the changes to me represents no lack of scientific rigour.

Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame (1981:186-187) speak of a saturation process where most of what they learned came from a dozen interviews; after a while it appeared to them as they were hearing the same story over and over again. During the stay, based on the interviews in combination with my field notes and the essays, I felt a ‘saturation process’ step in, especially regarding collective traits (“becoming ethnic”), the account of history, chronology of the genocide etc. reveal homologies between all the informants as well as it reveals the existence of cuts within the whole set of stories told, i.e. there are different types of stories that may be discerned. I thus quite early on had an idea of which stories were to be represented in large. From there, following Chase (1995), I made ‘extensive narrative analyses’ in combination with the essays before selecting the persons we will meet as they tell their stories in this work. This does not imply that the results have been self-evident to me right from the outset of analysing the material. The flexibility inherent to the study design gave rise to changes in elements I thought of as already completed in a kind of dialectical process of theory and empiri, researcher and interviewee as I set out to reconstruct the subjects’ utterances in a sensible way (see Davies, 1996: 13-21 et appendix; Demazière & Dubar1997: 67-82).

The encounter between my population and me mainly took place during the highly artificial moment of interview. We may conceive of communication as a continuum where the communication between intimate friends, where everything may be said without anything actually being said, is one extreme, and the police enquiry is the other extreme pole in this continuum (Bordieu, 1986). There is then a certain risk that this work tends towards the official way of representing identity. Or if one prefers - producing, ‘selves’ in the shape of ‘identity card’, ‘official biography’ etc. Especially since the study design contains the question ‘What is your ethnic group?’ This is of course never a neutral or innocent question, in Rwanda less so than elsewhere. However, it is hard to imagine a scientific study on Rwandan identities conducted in 1999 leaving out this question. Me seeing the students on other
occasions, over lunch, over supper, in their dorm rooms etc., do not disqualify the fact that the study
tends towards the interrogation. However, students who had been interviewed, on several occasions,
later on contacted me in order for me to re-insure them that I would not too explicitly present their
trajectory which would have quite unique features (for example due to its geographical movement).
Since the Rwandan sub-fields of KIE and NUR are fairly limited, any given ostentatious singularity
would open up for identification by fellow students. I interpret this as a sign of sincerity and openness
during the interviews. Furthermore many of the students explicitly told me during the interviews that
what they told me was not by any means to be tied to them as persons.

As it turned out, all but one of the interviewees, Jeanette, who appear as persons in this work
pursue their studies at KIE. It may be questionable to mix the population like this, but her story does
well represent others with a similar background also at KIE. Jeanette did not state her ethnicity in the
essay but it was revealed from her life-story, and it became obvious during the interview. The other
respondents all were in Rwanda during the genocide but have different backgrounds. Thus Patricie,
Félicitée and Gaspard have stated their ethnicity as Tutsi, Kayitana and Benoit as Hutu, Ibrahim and
Athanase as Mixed (something possible only in a divided society). It would of course be better if I had
also someone having stated his/her ethnicity as Twa but no such person appeared in my sample (which
does not exclude that one or more persons in the sample had this ‘ethnicity’ before and during the
genocide). Nor does this work contain any explicit ‘female Hutu experience’.

3.3 On the Respondents

Where the stories are presented as extracts from the larger narrative this is usually based on the tape-
recorded interviews. Some parts are however taken from the field notes when and if the respondents
added vital information outside the interview session. To a lesser extent, some information from the
essays are integrated to the extracts presented as a running narrative. Due to concerns to leave as much
space as possible to the Rwandan students, I have as far as possible tried to keep myself out of the
representation of the life stories. I admit that this is somewhat problematic since it does not fully allow
the reader to judge for her/himself to what extent I am directing the conversation, and to what extent I
am contributing to ‘creating’ the Rwandan selves that appear in this work. By de facto denying my
presence the work runs a certain risk of creating what we could call an ‘ethnographic illusion’, that the
picture of the Rwandan landscape painted in this work should be the picture (see Crapanzano, 1980).

**Patricie**

Patricie is 21 years old and studies at KIE. She was born and raised in the countryside not far away
from Kigali. Since her father, who was imprisoned and murdered in 1992, worked for a ministry, the
family lived in Kigali where she found herself during the initial phase of the genocide. Her mother and
older sister were killed during the genocide. Remaining of her family is her younger sister, aged 12.
Both parents were civil servants. She has gone directly from secondary studies to the Institute of Education, where she like the others were doing the first, preparatory year\textsuperscript{28}.

On the question of ‘ethnic belonging’, she has replied Tutsi. In her essay she describes how life in Rwanda during her childhood and upbringing became more and more difficult; her existence did not correspond to the image provided by her parents of how things used to be. This discrepancy and her experiences early on made her pose herself the question of what it means to be Rwandan. It is obvious that she has been reflecting a lot about the issues I touch upon in my questions. For example, she brought with her written questions to the interview that she posed me towards the end of the interview session. That she is a person who was directly touched by the genocide is obvious, she has a direct interest in questions surrounding it and she takes part in seminars etc. Her being bears further evidence of her trajectory. She in a way gives the impression of a mature and strong woman and that of a young girl at the same time. During the interview I felt like a child in front of a wise adult, who knows, has understood and experienced more than I could ever imagine. Then afterwards, when we interacted in a more informal manner, the relation was in a way transformed; I then occupied the role of the ‘senior, experienced student’, and she was transformed into the ‘freshman’.

Despite that we at some times had to shout to make ourselves heard since the Rwandan rain-season made itself reminded against the corrugated steel roof in the class room where we sat, the atmosphere throughout the interview was friendly and warm.

\textbf{Félicitée}

Félicitée was 23 years old during the interview and she is one of the young women I got hold of through a snowball sample. I do not have any essay from her, which means that all the information is from the interview. Félicitée is since one year a newly converted Christian; \textit{“before I didn’t even like God”}, with a strong faith. It is from Christianity that she derives the meaning and explanation of the world around her. It is also from here that she explicitly deduces her moral code. Up until one year ago she was filled with hatred and would hardly speak at all. Now it was she who contacted me, and it was obvious that she wanted and needed to talk about the events.

Félicitée was born in Burundi where she went to school until 5\textsuperscript{th} primary. In 1987 the parents decided to move back to Rwanda in order to take charge of the family property to avoid that the grand parents’ houses left the family after their death. Félicitée, who told me she is Tutsi, was pursuing her secondary studies when the genocide began. During the genocide she lost her parents and her brothers; Félicitée is the only one in the family to have survived. She ought to be seriously traumatised; she not only witnessed her mother being murdered, but since she was ‘educated’ the militia brought her around the commune and forced her to witness the killings of other Tutsis. They then raped her. Her total

\textsuperscript{28} Since the students have very heterogeneous backgrounds and varying levels of knowledge the first year is dedicated to an equilibrating of the differences, and studying English and French.
silence after the genocide wears witness of this. Like if her experiences from the genocide were not enough, she did not feel welcomed at the households of her extended family. She now lives with a Christian family ‘as a child of the house’.

I was feeling very uneasy during large parts of the interview. Before going to Rwanda I had decided not to focus too much on the students’ experiences during the genocide as I deemed myself a too inexperienced interviewer to handle what might come up. Therefore, when some of the misery came up, many of the questions I had prepared seemed like the questions an idiot would write down.

**Gaspard**

Gaspard was 27 years old at the time of the interview that took place outdoors on the campus in an easy and friendly atmosphere. He is one of the few men who stated his ethnic belonging as Tutsi and was in Rwanda during the genocide. He was born in the countryside just outside Kigali, where also his parents were born. The parents both worked with agriculture and cattle breeding. He describes his childhood as very happy, and although the family was not well off, they earned more than enough to barely sustain life from selling some coffee and a cow every now and then. He is the oldest son in the family and the only one who has been able to pursue higher education. Neither one of his parents knows how to read or write. He did not succeed well enough in his national exams after primary school to gain entrance to a state secondary school. After two years the family managed to save up so that he could go to a private secondary school. Later he was transferred to a secondary school staffed by priests. He never used to see any girls during the adolescence. However “he’s catching up now” and he dreams of meeting someone to marry.

The family lost the assets they had during the genocide, so Gaspard knows he ‘ought’ to start working straight away in order to support the family. He has however asked his parents’ permission to finish his studies at KIE first. Then he wants to go back and live with the family; his parents, his sisters and his future wife.

**Kayitana**

Kayitana, aged 27 at the time of the interview, was born in the west of the country, in the same préfecture as his parents who are cultivators. He did not fill in ‘ethnic belonging’, but later during the interview he ‘admitted’ that he and a friend had agreed before the essay not to fill in this information. His parents did not go to school and do not know how to read or write, they are “campagnards” and they only speak Kinyarwanda. He was at his parents’ house when the genocide broke out.

In the beginning of the interview he was talking about his conversations with his mother who is in her seventies, she often tells him about how it was before, in the old days. She enjoys his company

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29 Traumatism was something unheard of in Rwanda before the genocide, and just after the genocide/war the traumatised persons were considered as ‘mentally ill’ or simply as ‘mad’ and one referred to their problems as “The war has made him/her crazy” (Nshimiyimana, 1999:70).

30 Sadly enough this is statistically not very surprising; it was foremost men and boys that were targeted for being killed.
and in between the lines, one can read that she is proud of her son who is at university. It was equally obvious that Kayitana likes spending time with his mother and listen to her stories.

I got to spend quite some time with Kayitana directly after the interview and on several later occasions, eating lunch and dinner together. Our relation loosened up with time, and I realised that what I have interpreted as a certain ‘stiffness’ during the interview probably was due to a ‘strategy’ of the ‘educated young Rwandan’, and hence a concern to appear ‘educated’, produce an ‘educated self’. Perhaps this was founded in the stigma of upward mobility and the fear of revealing his ‘true’ identity, so to speak. At several times he with certain disdain spoke of the ‘non-educated peasants’; their ignorance in general, and from whom it would be hard to de-educate the hatred in particular. This distinguishing strategy might have coincided with an urge to distance himself from ‘his’ ethnie who carried out the mass murders. Both these two ‘others’, in terms of class (in a traditional sense) and ethnicity, were part of his possible selves, inscribed into his habitus by his trajectory. Had it not been for the obvious warmth and affection he spoke of his mother, ‘the illiterate campagnarde’, had I thought of it as pure snobbism.

**Benoit**

Benoit, 24 years old, is a student in sciences and education. He has been working some months, but not as a teacher. Most of the time in-between his secondary education and university studies at KIE, he has been unemployed. He was born in the south-central part of Rwanda in a commune that is said to “have the conducts of the North”. His parents were both born in the same commune (something that was rather common among many of the students). He declared himself a Hutu “who is still proud of his ethnie”. He says that he has basically never had any problems regarding ‘ethnicity’, he has moved across the country on several occasions and has always had both friends and neighbours from both the major ethnic groups. The first time he got in contact with the problems were when he had moved to a region “where the ethnic problems were acute”. There was a large Tutsi population and the Hutu who lived there had moved in from Northwest. The pupils were to elect a class president, it was in 1993, and Benoit apparently did not care too much about that politics, even on this level, should follow ethnic lines of affiliation. The result was that he had problems with his (Hutu) classmates who said, “If you work with the Tutsis it’s because you have many things in common with them”. They told him that he would have problems if he continued with this. He did have some problems but they seem to have ended after a couple of days.

Despite that Benoit at first seemed a bit reluctant to do the interview when I got hold of him the day we had agreed upon, he was occupied with some social engagements, he was not hard to convince. It was obvious that his first hesitations were meant to show the comrades he was with that he did not care too much about the umusungu (the White) who had invaded the campus. Although his comrades pressured him to stay with them and I had given up hope of pursuing the interview, he told me “let’s go”. He clearly had many things he wanted to tell.
Ibrahim

Ibrahim was 24 years at the time of the interview, and was doing his first year at KIE. He was born in the Northwest of the country in one of the prefectures that in the literature is described as the stronghold for the Habyarimana regime and ‘Hutu-Power’. The mother is ‘without profession’ and his father who died in 1990 was a civil servant. In 1990, he gained access to secondary education since he succeeded the exams giving the right to pursue the studies after primary school. Then the ‘War of October 1990’ sparked. Thus, the family was displaced on a number of occasions. In the 1994 tragedy, he lost one sister and his older brother, leaving four children orphans. In his essay he expresses the will to be able to “live in a society without hatred, without any segregation whatsoever.”

He has stated his ‘ethnic belonging’ as “uncertain since my parents are of different ethnies”. When I pushed him on the matter, he ‘confessed’ that he at the time of the genocide de jure was Hutu, given that his father was Hutu and the mother is Tutsi. I would describe the atmosphere during the interview as warm and friendly. I had already begun to develop a friendship with Ibrahim before the interview; I was always happy to see him on the campus and I believe the feelings were mutual.

Athanase

Athanase was 25 years old at the time of the interview. He was born in a small village at the foot of one of the volcanoes in the Northwest of the country. This is also where he grew up in a “fraternal and exemplary harmony between neighbours”. His childhood and adolescence took place in an “atmosphere where everyone was considered as friends or brothers”. This was also the spirit in primary school. However they were taught that Rwanda had experienced terrible violence after the ‘Social Revolution’ where the ‘majority population’ had risen up after having been penalised during the monarchy, ruled by the ‘minority’. The violent history scared Athanase who had quite a few questions to pose the adults in his surrounding; why all this violence? How come there were not any negotiations? No one gave any straightforward answers.

Athanase is the first in the family to pursue his studies, his parents are both cultivators and neither one of them have any schooling. Since he was a good student Athanase succeeded the national exams and went on to secondary school where he dreamed of going abroad to pursue higher education. He believed he had a pleasant future ahead of him. His hopes were however frustrated by the RPF invasion in 1990.

Athanase’s father is Hutu and his mother Tutsi. The fact that his mother was Tutsi whereas he and his sisters and brothers had Hutu ethnicity had absurd consequences during the genocide. His older brother had to work on the barriers but convinced the others that Athanase was too young participate in the ‘work’. Sometimes the family had to fight off neighbours who wanted to kill the mother.

The atmosphere during the interview was easy although Athanase had other things to attend. I thus tried to keep the interview as focalised as possible, which was fairly easily done since Athanase described himself as somewhat limited in his abilities to express himself (something which I do not
Jeanette

On the occasion of the interview, Jeanette was 23 years old and was in the final phase of her education at the National University. She had been studying since the autumn semester 1995. She was born and raised in western Uganda where there following ‘the events’ of 1959 and 1972 were large groupings of Rwandans in exile. Her parents ‘run a company together’. Apart from Kinyarwanda and English, she speaks a “couple of Ugandan languages”. She was in Uganda during the genocide. On the question of ‘ethnic belonging’ in the essay she first answered but later crossed in a way so that one could not read it, however from her trajectory it is clear what her belonging ‘is’. She made her belonging clear to me, by hinting it, but in a way that made it obvious that she would never spell it out clearly to me. Besides, she believes that that question is best if left not asked since it led to the massacres in 1994; "The question was asked so many times that the average Rwandan took it to mean more than what it really stands for”.

The relation during the interview was not very easy and Goffman’s notion of ‘front stage’ and the will to not lose one’s face crossed my mind. It was obvious that Jeanette was curious about my person and presence, something that she was very reluctant to show. Contrary to me she did not have any ‘legitimate’ alibi for her curiosity. After the interview she walked me out of the campus (she and many other Rwandans do not seem to trust abasungu ['whites'] with being able to walk in the dark without stumbling or falling into pit holes, this is combined with a feeling of responsibility towards guests). During our promenade, the tensions disappeared and our conversation was much easier; the feeling was even somewhat elated. As when one has made acquaintance with a new fellow student with whom one would like to, and might, become friends.

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31 This is also how Rwandans themselves keep track of it today.
4. The Social Construction of a ‘War of the Races’

“I am not looking for an alternative ...What I want to do is not the history of solutions and that’s the reason I don’t accept the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problématiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous.” (Foucault quoted in Hekman, 1990).

4.1 Political Mythology and the Fetishism of Ethnicity

Rwandans often refer to les événements when they speak of the genocide, ‘the events’ are also what they use to denote earlier outbreaks of large-scale violence and killings. Understanding the meaning of the social world is not an easy task, when it comes to a critical event, a moment where the meaning of the social world is uncertain it is even more difficult. “Paradoxically, it is no doubt only if we reinsert the critical moments into the series where the principle of their intelligibility resides, negating what in a sense makes for their singularity, that we can understand what is the unique criterion of definition of the critical situation” (Bourdieu, 1988:162). We may conceptualise an event as a ‘transformation device between past and future’ (Abrams, 1982:191). Its occurrence, identity and signification are established mainly via its location in time and social space, i.e. its relation to the chronological course of other events and practices as well as its insertion into the fields of power-knowledge. We may perceive of the event as a point of access to the continuous structuring of the social world through practices. To put it simply, since the social world is complex and far from transparent we need a prism through which we are able to observe it. If we treat the Rwandan genocide as the present par excellence it is from that ‘here and now’ we should take off when writing a history of the present political knowledge. We may thus use the concept of ‘event’ as a prism through which we are able to break into the chain of structuring and structures that make up Rwandan history. However, by this act of imposition of what matters and what does not matter, we constantly run the risk of creating a retrospective illusion, an illusion of the realisation of pre-existing essence, prior to the event, when what we have is rather components than essence, (see Bourdieu, 1980a: 92). By the scientific act of objectification, we on the paper create the illusion of that some parts that are deemed to matter ‘are really the essence’ of the event. This is important to remember since this work's focus on ethnicity may give rise to the illusion that the only thing that has mattered, and matters, in Rwanda is ethnicity.

In order to understand the occurrence of the genocide in 1994 we have observe the process of state-craft, politics, in Rwanda. To do this we do not have to plunge into the Rwandan History and be buried in details and ‘facts’ between the parameters of what Chrétien (2000:31) calls “language, ‘races’ and ceramics”. We do not have to go further back in history than everybody else, we do not have to display more facts than anybody else has done, and thus establish us selves as the judges of historic action by the act of retrospective illusion and transform the end of history into the ends of historic
action (Bourdieu, 1980b). It suffices to admit that all historic action makes present two states of history (i.e. the social): “history in an objectified state, i.e. history that is accumulated over a long time span in things, machines, buildings, monuments, books, theories, customs, law etc., and history in an incorporated state, become habitus.” (Bourdieu, 1980b: 6). To speak of Hutu and Tutsi as political identities means speaking of Hutu and Tutsi agents being capable of producing social effects qua such agents. As I have argued, we should grasp identities as political identities. The foundation of today’s identities is closely related to the process of state building and formation. Therefore, what we then have to do is to look at the Rwandan history and establish when Hutu and Tutsi arose as politically salient metaphors for historic action. In other words, to look at the constitution of a political imaginary, mythology where the history of Rwanda is the history of the ‘war of two races’.

What do I mean by political mythology and metaphors? A metaphor is an old label in a new way; it is a word that originally means something else than what it does when deployed as a metaphor. Often something concrete is used to describe something abstract, which in itself per definition is neither tangible nor observable. The metaphor aims at with words describing the indescribable, it does not say what something is, it says what something is like. So when taken literally a metaphor is ‘false’; a ‘black hole’ is not a black hole, ‘white skin’ is not white, ‘black skin’ is not black etc. The metaphor is also full of myths about everything’s’ beginning and origin and the use of metaphors manages us to move contexts in way that follows neither grammatical nor physical laws (Ringmar, 1996: 68-70; see also Bourdieu, 1980b). In the words of Ricœur “[i]t is no longer question of a simple displacement of words, but the exchange between [systems of] thoughts, that is a transaction between contexts.” (quoted in Ringmar, 1996:70). It should thus not come as a surprise to us that metaphors play a vital role in the distribution of political mythology, being able confer a quasi eternal nature and substance to many of the collectivities that inhabit Histories. History writing contains an intensive use of collective subjects; the people, the nation, the working class etc., and these metaphors are full myths, they are full of political mythology (Bourdieu, 1980b). Thus when a writer like Lemarchand (1970: 30) states that “[a]ll cultures are myth-sustained in that they derive their legitimacy from a body of values and beliefs which tend to embellish of falsify historical truth.” he is right. Where it is more dubious is when he with an explicit address to Rwanda continues ”[b]ut some more than others”. So when I speak of political mythology in a Rwandan context I do not do so in a way that implies that the Rwandan society, or any Other society, should be more, or less, myth-sustained than the society I imagine as mine.32

The prevailing model of Rwandan political organisation has arisen from the attempt of social scientists to explain how societal integration was possible despite the political domination of the population at large (‘the Hutu’) by a ‘minority ethnic group’ (‘the Tutsis’). It was a functionalist model portraying a static, over time unchanging, as well as spatially undifferentiated, traditional Rwandan society. It further claimed that what today goes under the name of centralised authority was politically
effective throughout the entire territory that later came to be defined as ‘Rwanda’ by the colonial state. The implication of the model was that the Hutu had been dominated ‘since forever’ and that ‘ethnic/racial racial groups’ were static and unchanging. According to Catherine Newbury (1988: 56) the model was partially correct in the sense that it was valid for some parts of ‘central Rwanda’ and some features of its assumptions, such as that were competing administrative structures as well as the cattle-clientship did play an integrative role, had a bearing in those areas. Nevertheless, “the functionalist model of “traditional” Rwanda reflects features of both pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda, but it is a valid portrait of neither. Political relations were more complex, and identities less rigid. The structures of Tutsi domination were more recent and less extensive than the model assumed, and they were transformed in important ways during the European colonial period.” (Newbury, 1988:6). At the basis for this lies what goes under the name of the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’; all elements of culture and civilisation in Africa in general is of an origin foreign to ‘Black Africa’, and for Rwanda this means that civilisation was brought with the Hamite Tutsis at their arrival at what is today Rwanda.

Where this work’s approach differs from much of the previous post-genocide, scholarly work on Rwandan history is that it does not consider the ‘real’ origin in social time and space of Hutu and Tutsi. If we treat Hutu and Tutsi as relational and political identities (reality is relational as Bourdieu [1994] puts it) and read the genocide as a war of these socially constructed ‘races’, it is establishing the origin of the constitutive imaginary that interests us. Prunier (1997:19) believes that “[t]he Rwandan society should first be considered as such it was ‘seen’ by the first Europeans”. Why? The answer is simply that there in the political ontology of Prunier is a ‘something’ and a pure origin. “This is a delicate point and we will try not to fudge the dangerous issue of the theories concerning Tutsi origins. Yes, our feeling [sic] is that the Tutsi have come from outside the Great Lakes area and that they were initially of a different racial stock [sic].” (Prunier, 1997:27, my emphasis, see Mamdani, [2001:292] for the English version). The irony, or rather the tragedy, is that Prunier then continues: “They of course did not come from Tibet or Ancient Egypt, but their distinct physical features probably point to a Cushitic origin, i.e. somewhere in the Horn, probably southern Ethiopia where the Oromo have long proved to be both mobile and adventurous [sic]. The physical evidence seems plain enough when one has lived in the area and the whole weight of observations since the 1860’s cannot be entirely baseless.” (Prunier, 1997: 27-28, see Mamdani [2001:292] for the English version). Just like that – there we have it! With a scientific capital endowed with a certain weight it does not help if you use words like ‘feeling’, ‘probably’ etc. It is once and for all established and codified that there is ‘race’ in Rwanda, and a Tutsi is a Tutsi is a Tutsi. Power-Knowledge reproduced by the power-capital of Prunier. It is apparently out of the question that the Tutsis should have an origin in any of geographical areas stipulated by the

32 I think this is the more important since Swedish political mythology allows for treating ‘Sweden’ as an ‘ancient nation’ and sometimes even as ‘homogenous’.
33 In the French edition ‘initially’ is even left out.
34 The ascribed ‘natural origin’ of the ‘Tutsis’ has varied over time, from ‘plausible’ African völkervanderungen theories to more or less fantastic origins as the sunk Atlantis and them being an ‘original red race’ from Asia. The imprint of European aristocratic habitus is rather obvious, so for example was ‘Swedish’ nobility at a certain point in time ascribed an origin at the sunk Atlantis (see Hall, 1998).
fantasies, the political imaginary based upon the ‘Hamitic hypothesis’, but at the same time it is just as evident that there is an essential, ‘racial’ and hence ‘natural’ difference as the very foundation of the different identities within the Rwandan constitutive imaginary. It is then of course rather normal, and outright natural, to have ethnic problems in Rwanda. Furthermore, the ‘weight of observations since the 1860’s’ is deemed a reliable base, without questioning from where and by whom these observations were made. Just as Prunier has a habitus and is an agent within social space his predecessors had habitus. Mamdani (1996 and 2001) represents a more mature vein of scholarly work that take interest in the ‘origin’ of the Hutu-Tutsi divide. To him history is important not because of where the Hutu and Tutsi ‘originally’ and ‘really’ came from, but because of their coming together. Remains the notion of Hutu and Tutsi as distinct, original and pure entities, per se. Let us try to step beyond this.

What is incontestable is that when the first Europeans sat foot in Rwanda in 1896, there existed a state where a king exercised a sovereign authority over the living subjects inside the territory. It is not less contested that this political entity was controlled by a few lineages genealogically close to the royal lineage, and that the sovereign was a machiavellian Prince killing his chiefs at will and for the slightest reason of suspecting rebellion. The circle around the court valorised what may be termed aristocratic values to which were intrinsic the valorisation of richness in cattle (Vidal, 1991:21-22). Lema (1993:39 et 75-76) sets out with the assumption that the social categories of Hutu and Tutsi are the outcome of ethnic management during the colonial and post-colonial projects but have their structural roots in what he calls the zamani period (i.e. the ‘pre-colonial’, see further below). Here the creation of a Tutsi self-identification was an endogamous process and the Hutu identity was an exogamous process imposed by the two successive colonial powers. Finally, Hutu self-identification saw full daylight in the struggle for the post-colonial state to be. This view is echoed by Mamdani (2001:73), who in part draws on Lema, and who claims that it is possible to speak of a Tutsi identity preceding the Rwandan State whereas one may not speak of Hutu identity “with the same historical depth. For as political identity Hutu was constructed as the consequence of the formation and the expansion of the state of Rwanda”.

Where I agree with the two fore-mentioned scholars is on the point that the colonialising process was not planted in unfertile ground. The colonial state did not take off and create the subject identities ex nihilo. In the ‘Sub-Saharan state’ remains structures of the pre-colonial state, because if power as asserts Foucault is an “action on the actions”, it is obvious that there were agents capable of social actions producing social effects before the arrival of the Whites (Bayart, 1996:31). Needless to say, pre-colonial Rwanda was not a society without history and historic action. However, remain the questions of what kind of history, what kind of agents and what kind of actions. As Elias (1991:112) says, we lack “a vocabulary that is fitted to the slowly sliding changes in these [social] processes. […] Our concepts are not enough

35 This is a very paradoxical statement for someone whose whole arguing is founded upon the stipulation that ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ are political identities; how can there be any ‘Rwandan’ identities before any ‘Rwandan’ politics? What allows for Mamdani (2001) to do this is that he distinguishes between ‘race’ and ‘ethnic’ groups – ethnic groups seem to exist in themselves – as cultural entities – in the political ontology of Mamdani whereas ‘race’ is a pure political construct. Thus to Mamdani there existed a ‘Tutsi’ ethnic identity prior to the Rwandan state, then Hutu identity is the amalgam of all the groups and identities that were subjected through the expansion of the ‘Tutsi kingdom’. 35
differentiated, they are to tied to images of material substance.” It is not only question of gradual displacements, of ‘less’ or ‘more’; we are dealing with qualitative changes, changes in the social fabric. And if we do not fully know what kind of agents inhabited what today is Rwanda before the arrival of the Europeans we do know as what kind of agents the historic action was undertaken and produced social effects during the eve of the colonial period and at the dawn of independence.

4.1.1 A Step beyond Hutu and Tutsi

The use of History as a mean to find the explanation to the Rwandan genocide is far from new or unique, there have also been attempts to draw on Foucault or both Bourdieu and Foucault, before the genocide as well as after it.\(^\text{36}\) It is not my intention to present the True History of Rwanda, but to undertake some historical, relational sociology. This can be done archaeologically and genealogically. That is, to write the social history of the present, not in order to be ‘more true’ than other accounts but rather in an attempt to establish how History has been trying to be the history of the Truth and how this Truth has been rendered possible (see Adorno, 2000). All archaeology is a reconstruction of practical systems, i.e. systems of practices, which have their internal intelligibility; it is a reconstruction of the internal logic of discourse and practice. Is this to be done through pure anachronism? “No, if one by that understands it as writing the history of the past in the terms of the present. Yes, if on by that understands it as making the history of the present” (Foucault, 1975:39-40). The genealogy of Foucault is the genealogy of the present political knowledge (which, per definition, implies the present political power as in ‘power-knowledge’); the archaeology of how this power-knowledge is constituted (Foucault, 1975:9-40). The genealogy is a reconstruction of systems of practices that are endowed with an internal intelligibility, from which then the archaeologist distances her/himself, and as such the viewpoint of the archaeologist is one from the exterior (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1984:119 and 351). So far, I have been using the two notions of archaeology and genealogy. Is there a difference between them? The relationship between the two notions are stipulated by Foucault to be two interdependent tools of analysis that complement one another, rather than one substituting the other (Stoler 1995: xi et 60-65). Then, in his own words,”[the] ‘archaeology’ would be the appropriate method of the analysis of discursivities, and ‘genealogy’ would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledge which were thus released would be brought into play” (Foucault, 1997:11-12; for the translation see Stoler, 1995:60). At the end of Archaeology of Knowledge

\(^\text{36}\) First out in the aftermath of the genocide was probably Franche (1995) in an, in my finding excellent, article which appeared in Les Temps Modernes. Despite the title GÉNÉALOGIE DU GÉNOCIDE RWANDAIS. HUTU ET TUTSI : GAULOIS ET FRANCS? it is not arguing that the history of Rwanda should be homologous to the history of France, quite the contrary. He rejects the often made comparison of la Grande revolution and ‘the social revolution’ of Rwanda. “To be true the comparison is not very satisfactory, not only due to differences in culture and epoch, but above all because the France of 1789 was not a colonised country, an important difference.” (Franche, 1995: 27). One who claims to found his work in both the authors is Taylor (1999). However, when it comes to any deployment this is merely lip service. The work is at length treating the so-called ‘Hamithic hypothesis’, and thus inscribing itself in the ‘history approach’, but it is also an eye witness report from the genocide and its outbreak. A work that set out before the genocide is de Lame (1996) who considers the logic of practice at the basis of her enterprise; a field study undertaken between 1988 and 1990. This anthropological work may in a way be described as a ‘globalisation from below’ approach grounded in the life at a rural community; a hill, “a world at the end of the world” (de Lame, 1996:87). It is a solid piece of relational and historical social science and it contains a history chapter providing the basis for understanding of the rupture and recuperation that take place in the life stories in the main parts of it.
(Foucault, 1972) there seems to be a slide towards an emphasis on practice at the expense of theory, and as a consequence archaeology is submitted to the service of genealogy. Although Foucault does not lose sight of how knowledge is one of the main composites through which the structuring practices operate (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1984:152-153). There is thus an obvious kinship with Bourdieu's "généalogie sociale"; a social history of social fields as such fields where the agents are effectively produced and where they as agents may produce effects (Bourdieu 1980:60 et el 1992:83). The archaeology at the service of genealogy should strive for a partial appropriation of the system that makes up the cultural conditions one wants to understand. This integrated system the social scientist should try to shed light on and render intelligible. Thus, it is an approach aiming at understanding how people have become what they are.

To Mamdani (2001:42), Rwanda is a prime example of the complicity of history writing and the imperialist project concerning Africa. Power-Knowledge has worked in tandem. Power proper classified the population of Rwanda into three ‘races’: the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa; and scholars treated ‘race’ as a trans-historical reality and wrote the history of Rwanda as the coming together of three historical collectivities – ‘races’. Already in one of the first written accounts on Rwanda we encounter the basis of the theory of Rwanda that was to become realised through the colonial project. The Count Von Götzen traversed parts of the kingdom in 1896. Based on what he registered at the central court he described the country as inhabited by a large population divided into three groups: hundreds of thousands of ‘Bantu Negroes’ living in “servile dependence” of the “Watussi, a foreign caste” that ruled and ‘exploited the country to the bone’, and finally ‘a tribe of midgets’ (Vidal, 1991:23). This momentary picture contains the proceedings that will establish the vision and di-vision of Rwandan pre-colonial society. Throughout the colonial period there was established the practice to extend to all parts of Rwanda a regional political mode, characteristic of the central dynastic heartland. By extension the despotic attitudes of the dignitaries are attributed to all cattle breeders – termed ‘Tutsis’ – and all agriculturists are designated dependence and labelled ‘Hutus’ (Vidal, 1991:23). This was integrated to a corpus of myths-truths where the Hamite-Tutsis (‘false Negroes’) are seen as a foreign race that conquered the Bantu-Hutu race (‘real Negroes’) and put them in servitude ( Chrétien, 1986 et al 1997). The distinct different racial origin has for a long time remained the a priori for different studies, be it for physical anthropologist or social scientists (Chrétien, 2000). Therefore, what we have to do is to establish a social genealogy of the social construction of Hutu and Tutsi as the collectivities that are the antagonistic subjects of the Rwandan war of the races. According to Chrétien et al. (1995:86ff) no one would today deny that the political imaginary based on racist assumptions of the Tutsi civilising conquest from the north-east of Africa is the product of the colonial and missionary culture. As this part is far too superfluous to deserve the label ‘genealogy’, I only consider it as an
outline to an archaeology. Thus, this parts only points some significant elements of an overarching process.\textsuperscript{37}

\section*{4.2. Breaking It down}

The socio-genesis of the Rwandan political field may analytically be separated into two dimensions: ‘State-formation’ and ‘State-building’ (Berman & Lonsdale 1992: Ch 2; see also Bayart, 1996). The former signifies the conquest of certain area, and as such, a deliberate attempt to establish an apparatus for political control. ‘State-formation is the dimension of the State genesis where the possible and probable social agents and agencies take form. It is the process where the political stakes are defined, and the political imaginary and mythology, \textit{i.e.} what is possible and what is not possible, what is more probable and what is less probable, is lined out. This process is often unconscious to the agents involved in its construction. However, this process of ‘state-formation’ is never fulfilled, \textit{i.e.} there never ‘is’ a State but only state-formation. The state ‘is’ in an ongoing practice, a network of practices of power-knowledge. If the state-form is the nexus of relations of power, it is not due to that fact that power emanates from it, quite the contrary, it ‘is’ due to “\textit{continued State-formation}” (\textit{Étatisation continue}) and power running \textit{through} it (Foucault quoted in Deleuze 1986: 83; see also Bayart 1996). This ongoing state building and formation may be chronologically displayed.

Traditionally African history is divided into three phases: i) ‘the pre-colonial’; ii) ‘the colonial’; and iii) ‘the post-colonial’ periods. The term ‘pre-colonial’ is however misleading and has no analytical value if one wants to gain any understanding of the period in itself, to render its proper logic intelligible. The re-presentation of past presence, ‘memory’, is reproduction of a presence “\textit{even though the product is a purely fictive object}” (Derrida, 1967: 61). To put it simply; “[\textit{w}hat happened before colonialism had nothing to do with colonialism}” (Lema, 1993:15). Lema (1993) proposes to use the Kiswahili term \textit{zamani}\textsuperscript{38} meaning ‘ancient times’, ‘a wider past’. As a term \textit{zamani} is beyond the English concept of ‘past’, as a present in its own right it is endowed with meaning that draws its power from sources before and in anticipated futures of its own here-and-now. For the strategies, that are guided and generated by the pre-existing conditions of existence, of a given ‘past present’ can only be oriented towards a future that seems probable in that present moment in time and space. Because there is only, and will only be, \textit{a present}; being \textit{is} presence or modification of presence (Derrida, 1967:60).

The concept of \textit{Zamani} is an attempt to break away from and move beyond knowledge constituted along certain sets and states of power-relations. As it is question of the Rwandan social field in this work, I propose to use the Kinyarwanda term \textit{kera}. It is a word which is synonymous to \textit{zamani}, and which would be translated by \textit{autrefois} in French and \textit{formerly} or \textit{in the past} in English.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, the

\textsuperscript{37} It is even further away from genealogy in a Foucauldian sense. To Foucault genealogies are ‘anti-sciences’, undertakings to liberate the subjected historical sciences that should be capable of opposition against a coercive, unitary, theoretical and formal scientific discourse (Foucault, 1997:10-11).

\textsuperscript{38} The term was first introduced by John S. Mbiti in 1970 (Lema, 1993).

\textsuperscript{39} I am indebted to Jean-Pierre Nkuranga for the help with this word.
word kera does here signify a time which antedates the colonial process but that does not anticipate it as something to take place in the ‘to come’. For the kera-period I consequently try to avoid using the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa simply because I do not want to confer the mythical meaning onto these collective subjects of history that they are today endowed with.

4.2.1 The ‘Pre-colonial Time’ – Kera

As stated earlier, studies of Rwanda have often assumed that before the arrival of Europeans, Rwandan State power extended uniformly to all or most parts of the kingdom. This is however something scholars have rejected since the early 1960’s. What is Rwanda today does not encompass all of what was identified as ‘Rwanda’ before, as well as in parts that are today integrated to Rwanda kingship did not enjoy any power at all, or merely nominal power. However, what may be labelled ‘Rwandan culture’ give evidence of a profound unity throughout the territory, something which the presence of what is today known as the ‘three ethnic groups’ in all the clans (amoko) testify of (de Lame, 1996:46).

When it comes to ubwoko (pl. amoko), it is one of the most mentioned social components of the Rwandan topology (see appendix X for a brief overview of Rwandan kinship). According to Gasarabwe (1992:227), the word ubwoko traditionally refers to an expanded super-clan. It consists of a cluster of lineages (imiriyango) that do not necessarily know of one another and claim to descend from ‘a common eponymous ancestor. This ancestor is often even fictive or mythical.’ Historically the clan seems to have been a unit loosely connected without any clear leader or any codified rules for the dealing of internal relations, although some clans had symbolic or ritual tasks assigned to them. The function assigned to the amoko seems to have been as a social identification. When someone travelled and arrived in a remote region he would be received by people from his own clan, and if he arrived somewhere where there was none of his clan he would be directed to the ones closest around to be found (Nahimana, 1993:64). An important feature is that all clans in Rwanda consist of members from what has come to be labelled the three ethnic groups (Newbury, 1988:96; Chrétien 1986 et 2000; Vidal, 1986 et 1991). It was a social identity that transcended that of what today is known as ‘ethnicity’; if one was to ask a ‘peasant’ in the 1930’s or 1960’s, ‘what are you?’ the immediate answer would mention clan affiliation (Chrétien, 2000:72). According to Chrétien et al. (1995:85), amoko connoted both the clans and the three social categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and he translates the word ubwoko (referring to a clan by “category”). Nahimana (1993:69ff) basing himself on d’Hertefelt’s numbers from

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40 Nahimana’s academic career seems in retrospective be a highly interested affair and it finds itself as far away from any axiologic neutrality one can imagine. Its aim is to unmake the Rwandan metanarrative as a ‘Tutsi story’. Intrisinc to the strategy to reach this end seems to be to glorify the ‘ancient Hutu kingdoms’ and to put forward regional differences. Nahimana (1993) LE RWANDA – émergence d’un État is almost a schoolbook example of what Foucault (1997) labels a counter-history displaying ‘a war of the races’ and the book’s final part is an attack on the history view of the ‘aggressors who in October 1990 attacked the country’, i.e. the RPF. As such is a defence of the then present regime as the guardian of the interest of the ‘majority people’. To Chrétien et al. (1995:49ff) Ferdinand Nahimana is notorious for his ambition; he has a past as president of the Rwandan Students Association and has studied in Canada and France. In the latter country he defended a celebrated thesis on the ‘Hutu Kingdoms of Pre-colonial Rwanda’ (which was then transformed to the above-mentioned work), when returned to Rwanda he became speechwriter for Habyarimana which gave him the take off for his career as the regime spin-doctor par excellence. Just before the genocide he headed the Rwandan information ministry (ORINFOR). He is now under arrest in Arusha (where the International Criminal Tribunal [ICTR] for Rwanda resides) charged with genocide due to his role as director of RTL (Radio Télévision Libre des Milles collines [see further below]).
1960 accounts for at least 18 clans (*amoko*) present on the Rwandan territory. Most scholars speak of ‘18 major clans’. In Rwanda the five greatest clans contain more than half the population, all of them comprise a proportion of Hutus and Tutsis (85-90% Hutu) that approximate the general number of these categories established in various census and estimates (apart from the clan that has been most associated with power, the *abanyiginya* that consist of 40% Tutsis). Traditionally two hypothesis are put forward to explain the presence of all three groups in the clans of Rwanda, either one speak of intermarriage between the ethnic categories or one speaks of patron-client relationships whereby the client was adopted by the clan of the patron. However, the last centuries’ history does not bring forward any such examples for clan change. Built into such theorising is the anachronistic priority put on the ‘ethnic groups’ at the expense of the clan, that for a long time has been the salient identity with people (Chrétien, 2000:74). Everything concludes us to suggest that it may be power in its centrality that has colonised local modes of domination.

It is of course important to establish what were the identities of the past, or whether or not one at all may establish it. In her from-below approach study of Kinyaga, Newbury (1988:35ff) asserts that there are no data indicating what was the case for people outside central Rwanda (and as we shall see for those in the Rwandan heartland the findings are tremendously biased). One does simply not know if they considered themselves ‘Rwandan’ or if they at all wanted to deal with the Rwandan court. Nor does one know if they forged alternative or other identities, or rather what kind of identities. As concerning Kinyaga there are indications that during the first half of the 19th century there was growing identification with the Rwandan court. Newbury’s (1988) study suggests that with the reign of Umwami Kigeri Rwabugiri (about 1860-1895), it became increasingly politically salient to forge ties with ‘central Rwanda’. At the end of the 19th century “Rwanda had grown, over a period of three centuries, from a small polity to a sizeable state.” (Newbury 1988:38). Key elements in this process were the crystallisation of a centralised military organisation, the elaboration of a royal ideology glorifying the mwami (king) and attributing him strong ritual powers and the growth of a complex hierarchy of political authorities with overlapping and competing jurisdictions. The growth of central power did however not occur simultaneously in all regions and the description does best fit with the Rwandan heartland (Nduga and surrounding areas). In many parts of what is today Rwanda, local forms of political organisation retained their strength. In for example Kinyaga (which at the time was not a political entity), there was no or few authorities creating units stretching further than the individual lineage or localised neighbourhood groups. If such authority existed it was made up by the predominance of one lineage or individual that could claim chronological priority to the hill or some neighbouring hills (Newbury, 1988: 39). The north-west, what is in retrospective labelled ‘Hutu kingdoms’, was for example conquered by the assistance of German troops in the early 20th century. At the time of the, nominal, integration of their territories these were Bakiga (Northerners) and not Bahutu. When referring to the Southerners who invaded them, they did so in terms of Banyanduga, ‘people
from Nduga (Mamdani, 2001:70). As Linden (1977:38) points out, here regional identity had a priority over ethnic identity, if such there was, and it pitted Northerners against Southerners.

Without dismissing the migration hypothesis once and for all we may look at the work of Nkurikiyimfura\(^41\) (1994:45) who states that the in what has come to be known as the Great Lakes region, the “struggle for hegemony did not oppose the chiefs of ‘pastoralists’ with the chiefs of ‘agriculturists’ but the chief of this clan group with the chief of another clan group”. Since, in the words of Linden (1977:17), the “cow hung like a great ikon over Rwandan society” dating its introduction to Rwanda has been and is a major political stake. Just as jurists at the service of the princes of ‘Europe’ based the law in a history of the state where the king was the state, l’Etat c’est moi, and hence the principal character of History (Foucault, 1997 et Chrétien, 2000:21)\(^42\) the dynastic poetry surrounding the abanyiginya dynasty stated that the apparition of big cattle in Rwanda came with the house of nyiginya. It was of course logic to trace the introduction of cows to Rwanda to divinity and time immemorial (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994 passim). The history writing regarding the presence of big cattle in the region has for a long time been superficial despite the weight it is awarded in the literature. Usually it has been dated to between the 13\(^{th}\) and the 16\(^{th}\) centuries, if not even later, and is supposed to coincide with the arrival of ‘Tutsis’ and ‘Himas’ (‘the nomad-pastoralist cousins’ of Tutsis in present day Uganda). However later research shows that different breeds of cattle have been present in the area for at least 2000 years. This does not imply that the role of cattle has been unchanged. Sometime in between the 11\(^{th}\) and the 16\(^{th}\) centuries, important changes seem to have taken place and areas that were before rather densely populated were abandoned wearing witness of a time of movement. Nevertheless, the hypothesis of a ‘Nilotic invasion’ has been abandoned and what took place were movements internal to the region where one trait was an augmenting specialisation into either cultivating cereals or cattle breeding. Something that of course does not exclude neither complementarily relations and mutual exchange on one hand, nor conflicts and competition on the other hand, or a mixture of both (Chrétien, 2000:52-55). So even though the pre-nyiginya ‘Rwanda’ contained groups of people that tended towards specialisation in terms of cultivation, cattle breeding or hunting, where the sense of property was “primitively collective” and any individual appropriation was mediated through the collective instances, there is no scope for speaking about it in terms of a hierarchical specialisation (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994:41). What seems to be clear though, is that the political lines of the time did not put ‘pastoralists’ on one side and ‘agriculturists’ on the other.

The political entities in this ‘obscure origin’ may be classified as three different kinds of clan chieftancies/kingdoms where the chiefs commanded over clan structures where i) the members did either mainly undertake agriculture, or ii) mainly cattle breeding, or iii) where the members were made up of groups of both as well as hunters. For the kingdoms/chieftancies the 15\(^{th}\) century seems to have

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\(^41\) In contrasting the ‘fate’ of Nkurikiyimfura with that of Nahimana we have the genocide in short. Whereas the latter’s career lead him to detention in Arusha, Nkurikiyimfura (a Tutsi) was together with his whole family assassinated during the genocide (Chrétien et al., 1995).

\(^42\) See for example Hall (1998) for how the ‘Gothic mythology’ invented in the 15 century came to serve as what anachronistically may be termed a ‘Swedish’ state ideology (see also Ringmar, 1996).
been a crucial formative moment when political organisation underwent a transformation from ‘lineage democracy to clan monarchy’ (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994:46ff). In what is now the Southeast of Rwanda, violent clashes between kingdoms containing all three groups tending towards respectively agriculture, cattle breeding and hunting (what is in retrospective labelled Hutu, Tutsi and Twa) took place during the late 15th and the 16th centuries. The kingdom centred on Lake Muhazi, under the lead of the abanyiginya emerged as victorious from these confrontations. At the basis for the success of this kingdom was not a particular wealth nor a particular weapons arsenal but a societal organisation that allowed for the central control of the emerging state of the abami abanyiginya. At the origin of the expansion of the territory as well as the political control over it the mwami nyiginya was nothing but a Primus inter pares within a rather loose federation of chieftancies and controlled a couple of hills around the Lake Muhazi (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994:17 et 49ff). From the late 15th century until the early 18th century the king and his men seems to have engaged more and more in cattle raids into neighbouring territories and in doing this they to a larger and larger extent involved their own men and did not mobilise all of the inhabitants in their territories. Thus it became more and more interesting to participate in the cattle raids as the stakes and the possible access to booty grew higher, as well as more and more clan heads saw the advantage of putting their men at the disposal of the king and these raids. At this stage which Nkurikiyimfura (1994:52) proposes to define by “the first centralisation” the result for ‘Rwandan society’ was rather than an augmentation of the number of subjects, a multiplication in wealth for the king as well as warfare separated out from other aspects of the society. After a temporary backlash for the abanyiginya and the restoration of its lead, there also emerged a dynastic poetry glorifying the king as a “great raider and protector of cattle” (Nkurikiyimfura 1994:51). Without taking the analogy too far, we may conceive of it as a time where the monopolisation of violence takes place; continued state-formation. From a point in time when a relatively large number of social units compete with each other they leave the state of equilibrium and move into another state where a fewer number of units are able to compete. Hence a shift towards a state where one unit in society through accumulation of the chances to exercise power becomes dominant (Elias, 1991:131).

From the early 18th century and on the ‘second centralisation’ of Rwandan power takes place (Nkurikiyimfura 1994:54f). Since some time every mwami founds new umuheto groups ‘social armies’ (umuheto means bow) when he ascends the throne. Central to this is the valorisation of the cow in cultural terms proper as well as the heavy use of it as an instrument for governance. Continuous wars with rivalling kingdoms makes for that social armies are based in the frontal regions, these social armies tends towards an institution that is not only destined for combat. “It is a vast corporation, whose members are diffused throughout the territory owing obedience to one chief” (Kagame in Nkurikiyimfura 1994:54). 43 Important is that the continuous wars bring about reformation of the social armies. Not only are they permanently placed in the frontal regions but together with this goes the

43 Kagame then goes on to claim that the social obligations exceeded the warrior obligations, something which probably is true for a later period but not for the social armies in their embryonic state (see Newbury, 1988).
practice of creating a growing number of ‘cattle armies’ (armée bovine), official royal herds, that to a larger and larger extent is tied to a particular social army. Like the herd before confided to an individual stayed with his lineage, the cattle army stayed with its social army. From the 18th century and onwards the positions of army chief and chief of the cattle army tends to coincide in the same person. Once nominated head of a particular army the chief was made the de facto chief of all the cattle held by the subalterns through the position as chief of the cattle army. During this period the strategy of the abami abanyiginya was to replace the autonomous local chiefs or abami by their own men and redistribute their goods, especially their cattle. These new chiefs then owed almost everything to the king and in a sense they became the administrators of the hills awarded and the cattle herds that were found there. At a certain moment in time, there in Rwanda was a basis for the adage ‘there is no cow without a patron’ just as it in Europe was justified to say ‘no land without a seigneur’ and at least in theory all cattle ultimately was the possession of the king.44 Would the chiefs of the social armies be disposed they would be dispossessed also of their ‘own’ cattle, which would then be redistributed to the ones replacing them, or to chiefs in position of little cattle. Just as long as no single chief managed to become too powerful (Nkurikiyimfura 1994:55-64). The process I have just described is of course something that took place over a long time span and it is not possible to say exactly when different shifts took place, especially since the history-writing has not only been a stake in Rwandan politics but also in the scholarly world.45 It may well be that some of the institutions above-mentioned did not have the form in the description until later on and that they in an embryonic form by a retrospective illusion are given the shape we perceive given the continued centralisation during the 19th century and especially under the reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri (about 1860-1895).

To Newbury (1988:40), the reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri marks an important watershed in Rwandan State history. No one chief was allowed to become powerful enough to challenge the king. “The stakes were high; official positions were well rewarded but risky, since the penalty for losing royal favour was often death.” (Newbury, 1988:40). Thus prevailed a monarchical right over life and death. From this time and on the augmentation of chiefly power together with the change in clientship ties resulted in “new forms of social identity among those affected” (Newbury, 1988:95). Since the beginning of the 19th century, the Rwandan heartland was organised into provinces which consisted of several districts. The latter where headed by a land chief and a pasture chief depending directly on the king. The provincial chief appointed hill chiefs from whom payments were collected by the pasture chiefs and land chiefs and then forwarded to the king. This was done on a territorial basis. The Kinyarwanda word for land is ubutaka and the province chiefs were on most occasions referred to as some sort of ubutaka chief and the payments collected by the hill chiefs sorting under them was referred to as ubutaka payments. To this came another form of payment that was based on the belonging to the umuheto group. These payments consisted of locally varying luxury items. When the social armies

44 Although this is a highly dubious statement even regarding central Rwanda (see Linden, 1977).
45 Nkurikiyimfura (1994) is also well aware of this in his account and he is rather modest in his claims.
emerged they implied some form of military service. At the end of the 19th century, their main role consisted of collecting payments. The umuheto chief who sent a client to collect from them selected lineages. Theoretically, the belonging to an umuheto group was not dependent on territorial units (Newbury, 1988:40-44). In parts belonging to ‘central Rwanda’ since a longer period of time competencies and powers seem to have been more overlapping and to a lesser extent concentrated to one single person. Added to the chief responsible for collecting land payments there would often be a chief responsible for collecting payments related to pasturage; i.e. cows, milk and calves. These two different chiefs were responsible for the same geographical area. Thus the land and the pasture chief would often command the same territorial unit and hence represent competing competencies which could then be played upon by those underneath them in the social hierarchy providing some check and balance on exactions (Newbury, 1988:40-47).

Another feature of the Rwabugiri era is the trend towards regionally organised armies, the provincial chief would command troops furnished on a geographic basis. Interestingly enough for the region which Newbury (1988) studied, it is during the reign of Kigeri Rwabugiri the term ‘Hutu’ takes on a connotation of submission, even though there is no scope for speaking of a collective ‘Hutu identity. Her informants date the arrival of the first Tutsi lineages to the same period. Persons and lineages who owned cattle however arrived in Kinyaga already in the 18th century; groups who in ‘Central Rwanda’ socially would have been defined as Tutsi. Newbury (1988) from this draws the conclusion that to many Kinyagans Tutsi is associated with central government and chiefly exaction backed by this central government, and that it is under Rwabugiri’s reign Hutu and Tutsi (at least in Kinyaga) become politically salient categories determining life chances and relations to authorities (see in particular pp. 16-19 et 52). To de Lame (1996:48, explicitly referring to Newbury) this is a sign of how meaning is retrospectively projected into the past. To this one might add that this implies a time where those groups of people who were Tutsis from a merely materialist point of view, leaving out the sense individuals make of the social world, were being Tutsified as it became meaningful to act qua Tutsi. To Newbury (1988:52) this is a process that takes off under Rwabugiri but which is made acute during colonial rule.

Does not the above-stated imply the existence of Hutus and Tutsis to well before the arrival of the European colonisers? Have we not only witnessed an odyssey explaining that ‘the opposition may not be primordial but it existed well before the arrival of the Whites’. No, I would say. Indeed, we see some of the components that are going to be integrated and incorporated further on and thus make up what are the collective subjects that inhabit Rwandan history as a war of two races. These are nothing but elements and are not essence. It is here the play of words and the deployment of metaphors step in as the political mythology of a successive time and field (post-kera) enables the transfer between

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46 If there were six lineages present on a hill perhaps two would belong to one group, two others two other, different groups and two to no umuheto group at all. Belonging to a social army was thus a matter of wealth and prestige (Newbury, 1988:40-44).

47 In regions that were incorporated into the Rwandan State later on, the collecting of this kind of prestations would often lie in the hands of the social army chief who would then also often be the provincial ubutaka chief.
contexts and the production of meaning and the continued reproduction of identities. Colonialism does not mean a clear break with the *kera* period. It is the recuperation of an already existing political mythology, the reification of a symbolic universe in its own right.

Vidal (1991:32-34) who undertook her first studies in the country in the late 1960’s was apart from an active police surveillance also confronted with an epistemological problem consisting of how to avoid her respondents from being accused of favouring feudalism. The answer was to make the respondents develop their genealogies in a way that the reconstitution of pastoral, agricultural, political and economical relations were not censored by the respondents belonging to Hutus, Tutsis or Twas. Vidal then managed to reconstitute the political history since the end of the 18th century. The picture that emerged was one where the respondents born in the beginning of the 20th century and having occupied varied social positions with regards to wealth and proximity to power sharing the common denominator of being remote to Western culture did not give an antagonistic meaning of agriculturists and pastoralists. The years from the end of the 19th century until the First World War, Hutu and Tutsi were neither castes, nor social classes; differentiation within Rwandan society has to be found elsewhere. The demarcation of power was located between the ‘Court’ and the ‘Provincials’ where violence was relentless; there was a great distinction between rich and poor; and the poor were considered, and treated, as dogs. The fights between factions of the dominant group were sometimes so lethal that the persistence of the group as such was menaced. Neither did the second generation of the century peasantry adhere to an ethnic ideology. They would denounce abuses on the part of certain Tutsi chiefs as well as the injustices committed by a privileged Tutsi administration, but there were no generalisations. Where one would find the representation of the Rwandan past as a war between Hutus and Tutsis was in the educated milieus. Here, ever since the 1940’s, one would encounter an idealised view of the *Pax belgica* from which standpoint the pre-colonial era was observed.

Other features that emerge from the literature I have dealt with, and that I find quite overlooked – the only scholar dealing with it directly is Catherine Newbury (1988) – is that until colonial rule and well into it, payments were imposed on collectivities and not on individuals. It was individuals who as agents acted, but always representing a corporate group. Thus when the White Fathers (see further below) installed themselves in Rwanda they by their need for land, labour and cattle became deeply involved in clientship relations. However, these did not implicate individuals as such but “each *umuryango* brought them beer and bananas”, free association of individuals was rare in Rwandan and most occasion activity was made within the corporate group (Linden, 1977:60 et 61ff). Another feature that to my eyes stand out given the problematic I have in mind, is that from at least the reign of Rwabugiri the expansionist strategy brought about an augmentation of people being subjected (cf. Newbury, 1988: 38–52). Where the predecessors had been satisfied with keeping the local authorities in place, making sure that they paid tribute and honour to the *mwami* abanyiginya, it occurred a shift to

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48 This was the term used in early colonial theorising.
replacing them with their own loyal men as the reign of Rwabugiri meant political incorporation of conquest territories.

The above leads us to conclude that, just as Mamdani (2001:73) states, “the search in migrations in dim history for the origins of Hutu and Tutsi is likely to be fruitless [...]” it is not here we find the beginning of the ‘war of the races’. We thus have to look into the colonial ordering of things social and political. Rather than to consider the modern ‘souls’ of Rwanda – racialised habitus – as the reactivated leftovers of an old Tutsi ideology I propose to consider them as the correlate of certain power technologies that are applied onto the bodies (see Foucault, 1975:37-38). The nature of power changed through colonialism. The change from sovereign to bio-power is perhaps best illustrated by that the king’s right over life and death was ended under German rule (de Lame, 1996:49). Of course, the knowledge constituted through colonialism recuperated old mythologies. The main argument of the following section will thus be that colonialism meant the constitution of a Modern Rwanda in the sense that it brought with it statisation of the biological through new power devices and new forms of power.

4.2.2 The Colonialising Time

“It is not a little significative for the structure of Western society that the motto for colonisation is ‘civilisation’.” (Norbert Elias, 1991)

“For it is clear that every victor desires to destroy the vanquished. But men, who by their very nature are hypocritical and false do not say outright. “I wish to conquer in order to destroy”, but say instead: “I wish to conquer in order to civilize”. And the rest of mankind, who envy the victor, but await their turn to do the same, make a show of believing in it and offer their praises.” (Antonio Gramsci, 1977)

4.2.2.1 Situation

One of the fundamental features of the 19th century is that power has taken charge of life, which is the taking power over Man as living creature, i.e. the statisation of the biological (Foucault, 1997:214). At the basis of this, we find the most fundamental attributes of the classic theory of sovereignty, which is the right over life and death. This right of life and death is however already in theory something strange. After all, what does it mean to have the right over life and death? To say that the sovereign has the right of life and death basically means that he may make die and let live, that death and life is not something of a natural order outside the realm of the political. If one draws it to its extreme the subject does not enjoy full rights whether living or dead, it is only through the acts of the sovereign that the subject has the right to be alive, or even the right to be dead. The subjects’ right to life or death ultimately depends on the sovereign’s will (Foucault, 1997:214). This is a paradox already in theory and in practice even more so. What does the right over life and death de facto mean? Of course, it does not mean that the sovereign can make live as he can make die; the right over life and death is always exercised in unequal manner, and always in favour of death. The sovereign’s right over life and death is
only exercised from the moment where the sovereign may kill. Hence it is not the right over life and death, it is not the right to leave living (laisser vivre) and to leave dying (laisser mourir). It is the right to make die or leave living.

The transformation of the political right of the 19th century complements, but does not substitute, the sovereign right to make die and to leave living. The novelty, which is an inverted right, or power, penetrates and modifies the power of the sovereign since it is a right, power to 'make' live and 'leave' dying (Foucault, 1997:214). Simultaneously the power technology is increasingly focused onto the bodies, individual bodies. It is question of all these procedures by which one takes charge of the bodies; their separation, the surveillance of individual bodies as well as the rationalisation and economy of power that should be exercised as efficiently as possible, i.e. a disciplinary technology. The new power form does not exclude the disciplinary techniques, but rather embraces them, integrates them, modifies them to a certain extent and uses them by implanting itself onto the former technology. Thus by the mean of this disciplinary power technology, which in a sense is a prerequisite, it is being incorporated. Bio-power does not take charge of the individual bodies, unless indirectly through existing devices, but life in itself. It brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made power-knowledge an agent of transformation of human life. It takes charge of Man as species being. Thus by these co-existing forms of power we have one individualising and one massifying. The latter addresses the ensemble of processes that are linked to life and the longevity of the population: birth rates; mortality; production and diseases. Thus, demography is the knowledge par excellence at the service of the bio-politics (Foucault, 1997:215-216; see also Foucault, 1976). Thus, simultaneously disciplinary effects and regulatory effects. Generally speaking the element that is present in both power forms is the ‘norm’, a something, which may be applied onto a body one wishes to discipline, or just as well onto a population one wishes to regulate. Thus, a normalising society is a society where the norm of the disciplinary and the regulatory intersects and power takes charge of the body and life. Hence, we have a continuum with the body at one pole and the population at the other (Foucault, 1997:221-226).

Power is inherent to any practice, to any relation (of force), as well as power is productive as it produces ‘selves’. The exercise of power is located in between the parameters of the law of sovereignty and disciplinary mechanisms. These two poles are however heterogeneous, the disciplinary mechanisms cannot be discerned as rules emanating from sovereign power, as the rules of the law, but only as regularities derived from ‘natural laws’; i.e. ‘the norm’. Its codification is that of normality and it refers itself to the field of human sciences and the jurisprudence of its disciplines is that of clinical knowledge (Foucault, 1997:31-35). Given that the population is a collective of bodies the political and scientific phenomena linked to it are only of relevance on a mass level and in the long run. It is not about disciplining this or that body, it is question of regulating the population at large, directing its longevity.

49 Throughout the 17th and the 18th century the jurists were discussing the right of life and death. Why does one establish a social contract? Why does people delegate an absolute power over themselves? They do so in order to survive; hence, life is the foundation of the law of the sovereign. But, then does the sovereign have the right of life and death, the right to simply kill his subjects? Should not life be outside the contract since it is the very foundation of the contract? (Foucault, 1997:215).
productivity and durability. Thus the sovereign power that could make die is complemented with a scientific bio-power that regulates the population as such a population and which is the power to make live. *The sovereign power could make die and let live, the regulating power makes live and lets die* (Foucault, 1997:216-220). But, as power now to a lesser and lesser extent is the right to make die and to a larger and larger extent the right to intervene in order to make live – it intervenes to improve life, to master the menaces to life – then death is ultimately where power ends. Death is in a way outside the power and the population, since power cannot grasp death in itself but only get hold of it in its statistic sense. Thus what bio-power has taken charge of is not death *strictu sensu*; it is mortality. *If death was the point where absolute sovereign power was the most manifest, death is now the point where the individual escapes all power.* Power hence ignores death, strictly speaking power lets go of death (Foucault, 1997:221). How then on earth can a technology of a power that has life as its end be exercised as the right to kill, to put to death? How in these conditions may a political power claim death, give the order to kill; and thus not only expose its enemies to death but also its own citizens? How does the bio-power which objective it is to make live leave dying? It is here racism intervenes (Foucault, 1997:226-227). In the biological continuum of human being the appearance of ‘race’ or ‘races’ is the mean by which power is able to fragment and to distinguish one from the other within a given population and a given territory where power exercises the monopoly of the legitimate life and the legitimate death (see Foucault, 1997:227-229). *“The race, the racism is the condition of acceptability for the putting do death in a society of normalisation”* (Foucault, 1997:228).

Colonisation and Colonialism are derived from the Latin *colère*, to cultivate or design, and basically it means organisation and arrangement (Mudimbe, 1988:1). The colonial project thus implies a certain ordering of things social. Until the late 19th century people living in ‘Rwanda’ did not have much contact beyond the kingdoms within present day Rwanda and what are now its neighbours. For example Islam that is so important in neighbouring Tanzania never had much of a foothold in ‘Rwanda’, and within the pre-genocide population approximately 10 % were Muslims. It was not until the 1880s that ‘Rwanda’ was to be seriously considered by the rivalling European Powers and their ‘scramble for Africa’. The Germans managed to lay a ‘legitimate’ claim on Rwanda based on the fact that a German explorer, the Count Von Götzen, was the first to ‘explore’ the area and to sign a treaty with mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri. Their claims were however contested by the English, already present in ‘Uganda’, who wanted the area in order to link their planned railway stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo. King Leopold of Belgium also thirsted for Ruanda-Urundi given its proximity to his personal Congo Free State. These conflicting claims were settled at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. Most of Ruanda-Urundi was awarded to Germany, whereas parts that were culturally part of the Kinyarwanda/Kirundi speaking sphere in the Northwest were awarded the British. The Ijwi isles in Lake Kivu, also partly Kinyarwanda speakers, were awarded Leopold’s Congo Free State.

Two pillars at the Berlin Conference lay out the ground rules for colonialism: ‘effective occupation’ and the ‘civilising mission’. Any colonial power had to demonstrate that its agents –
soldiers and missionaries – were effectively occupying the given territory and that they were actually ‘civilising the indigenous inhabitants’. This view of a ‘civilising obligation’ was inconsistent with another central aspect of 19th century political thought; biological determinism that asserted that observed differences among different peoples were due to biological differences in terms of moral and intellectual capacities, and as such they were immutable differences (Taylor, 1999:38ff et 68). ‘The racialization of the Tutsi/Hutu was not simply an intellectual construct, one which later and more enlightened generations of intellectuals could deconstruct and discard at will. More to the point, racialization was embedded in institutions […]’ (Mamdani, 2001:87). This ordering may be analytically divided into two domains, one power proper and another knowledge proper. This is of course only for reasons of pedagogy. As Foucault teaches us; power produces knowledge; power and knowledge imply one another. “[T]here is no power relation without the correlated constitution of a field of knowledge, neither is there any knowledge that does not at the same time presuppose and constitute power relations.” (Foucault, 1975:36). This does not simply mean that power chooses or favours a certain science because it is useful or supports it because a certain knowledge serves power, it means that power is knowledge and knowledge is power; thus power-knowledge. These relations of power-knowledge should then not be envisaged from the standpoint of a subject that is free or not with regards to the power system, and who analyses this system of power relations from a completely disenchanted and disinterested position. Quite the contrary, one has to take into consideration that the subject who knows, the objects to know and the modalities of how to know are historic effects of power-knowledge (Foucault, 1975:36). It is the struggles and processes of power-knowledge, whereof it is constituted, that determines the possible forms and domains of knowledge.

Although I will divide power-knowledge into analytically separate categories, we may take on example of the interception of these two in the social world. Basing us on the numbers provided by Linden (1977:18-19) we may assume that the adult male population that was ‘Tutsi’ at the end of the 19th century mounted to 50,000. In total, there were about 2,500 chieftancies and other posts within the court administration. Thus, according to these numbers Rwanda was ruled by about 5% of the adult population, who possessed herds that counted tens of thousands of cows. Then there were ‘rich pastoralists’ who perhaps possessed in the range of thirty to a couple of hundreds of cows. The majority of pastoralists had one to ten cows. In 1917 the German Resident stated that the Tutsis dominated 97% of the population, i.e. a limited aristocracy made up 3% of the population. All the figures from this period speak about an elite making up in the range of 3-5% of the population. The last census during colonialism stated the demographic proportion of Tutsis to 16% of the population (Franche, 1995:44). This begs the question; is it possible to speak of ‘Tutsi’ as if it was one group? As if it at all was a group

50 As Bourdieu (1980:230n26) points out, any analysis of ideologies (in its narrow sense – as a discourse for legitimisation) that is not accompanied by an analysis of the corresponding institutional mechanisms runs the risk of being nothing but a support to the efficiency of the ideology under study.

51 Linden’s (1977) numbers do not take account of that some positions were held by one individual, therefor the numbers based on German census in the range of 3-5% that seem to include women also, even though Franche (1995) does not state so explicitly, do imply that Linden (1977) exaggerate the fraction of the ruling class.
even in a virtual sense in that present? The only objective cause for speaking of that these persons should belong to the same group is to base the argument on an ethnic/racial foundation. It is in this sense Bishop Classe uses it even though he speaks it in another way: “In general, when one speaks of Batutsi, one thinks too much about the great Batutsi chiefs, who do not constitute anything but a very restricted aristocracy” (Frache, 1995:44). If we turn to Reyntjens (1985:107) he states that in the late 1940’s, out of 680 chiefs and sub-chiefs, 28% did not have any chiefs or sub-chiefs among their ancestors, and they could not trace their genealogy more than eight generations. The vast majority could not trace their ascendance more than five generations. A sign of a rather ‘modest origin’. They owed their position to the generalised discrimination that favoured the entrance of young Tutsis to education and the modern administration. Here it is salient to speak of one group in the sense that being identified as Tutsi or not made the difference between life chances.52 But, far from everybody in this group officially identified as 16 % of the population enjoyed power, the Governor General at the end of colonial period estimated the number of persons who held administrative posts, including cadres, to at a maximum 10,000. To be compared with several hundred thousands having an official identity as Tutsi to whom the colonial yoke was just as heavy as for those having an official identity as ‘Hutu’ (Frache, 1995:44). As pointed out by Czekanowski in 1917, below a small fraction of aristocrats one could distinguish autonomous peasants from those who had to carry out the corvée (forced labour), without that this cleavage corresponded to a distinction Hutu-Tutsi (Chrétien, 2000).33 This is significative for how the myth-truths work through political metaphors. Classe ‘knew’ that all, not even most, Tutsis did not belong to any elite, so did the Colonial administrators. Still they acted as if this was the case, and by the realisation of a Hamite theory a discriminatory line through decree and law came to cut through Rwandan society, imposing itself on the individuals, who always were to be found on one side or the other depending on their official identity, who thus had to deploy strategies that were ethnic.

4.2.2.2 Colonial Knowledge

In debating the relative parts of ‘myth and history’ in African ‘traditions’, one tends to forget that these mythologies were structured through the encounter of the oral and the written (Chrétien, 2000:22). The Abbé Alexis Kagame, of ‘the indigenous clergy’ as he staged his identity, is an example of this given body (this paragraph is anchored in Vidal, 1991:43-61). In his person European prejudice and the aspirations of the fraction of Rwandans being favoured by the colonial rule merged. His elitist history writing contained the constitutive imaginary from where “Tutsis and Hutu imagined themselves to find the truth of their ethnic passions” (Vidal, 1991:44). It suffices to look through scholarly work produced in Africa, Europe or America to see the remarkable standing he holds in the history writing of Rwanda, either if authors paraphrase, quote or reject him they one way or the other place themselves in relation to Kagame. His whole literary production was politically engaged and oriented towards the end to

52 As above-mentioned, this by no way means that Tutsis in general enjoyed power (see also further below).
53 Such an account is of course made through the prism of colonial power and knowledge.
defend the legitimacy of the monarchy and turn Rwanda into a constitutional monarchy. Linden (1977:5) states that ‘the court found a talented propagandist when he began publishing in 1938’. Whether or not he acted on behalf of the mwami Yuhi Musinga, as some has claimed, is irrelevant, due to his structural position ‘he would not have acted differently’ (Vidal, 1991:53). He belonged to an aristocratic lineage that placed him close to traditional power, but not too close. If one is to qualify his historical philosophy in one word, it is legalism, he identified pre-colonial Rwanda with a European nation and by the act of codification he turned orally transmitted practice and custom into written law. Being the representative of an aristocracy dispossessed of its prerogatives, having nothing left other than a cultural capital in terms of a glorious past, one of the main ends of his literary production became to show the valour of Rwandan culture and to put it on level with the dominant European culture. Thus he managed to temporally place the reign of the first Rwandan mwami to the same time as Charlemagne, talked of the Nyiginya heartland as homologous to Île de France, and he dressed Rwandan history in a European language and hence he spoke of ‘pasture prefects’ etc. His writing contains reasoning where Rwandan institutions are analogous or homologous to European institutions. When the political evolution of Rwanda disqualified him as history writer and European scholars thought the time was ripe to decolonise history and appropriate a history writing that had been to closely related to the court, he was turned into ‘informant’. Why then this detour by the person of Alexis Kagame? With the reservation for that he acted within a colonialised field there is a certain analogy between him and the history writing of the realm that we encounter in Foucault’s Society must be defended (1997). Ever since the reactivation of Roman law in the Middle Ages the law in the Western world was the law of the sovereign and thus the principal agent in the history writing was the king. Law theory has for ultimate task to delimit the boundaries of the sovereign’s power that serves to hide or diminish the line of domination in society by making appear the rights of the sovereign as legitimate and make the compulsory obedience legitimate. This history writing has as its principle role to strengthen power in its centrality, and as such it does not only speak the glory of power but it is also power as ritual (see Foucault, 1997:23-24 et 57ff). Another purpose of Kagame was to hide the line of dominated and the relations of domination constituting the Rwandan social field, or to represent it as customary, and ‘normal’. Hence, in the legalist vein his history writing personal powers are assimilated to administrative functions, relations of subordination are considered as contracts and royal actions as constitutional laws. In short, practices are described as if they were guided by Law. In the writing of Kagame the ancient Rwandan kingdom had passed all the evolutionary stages from feudalism to an absolutist monarchy which however was tempered by ‘the military code’ that was the ‘saviour of social justice’. The kingdom was only one step on the evolutionary ladder from reaching completion; to become a constitutional monarchy. The myths-truths as supra-individual phenomena may not be understood unless one knows the specific relations and the specific interdependency of the human

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54 Even though Foucault dates the creation of History as a discipline in its own right to the emergence of counter-history and the ‘war of the races’. 


beings in the spatial and temporal setting where they were practised (see Elias, 1991:109). When Kagame for example in 1951 published ‘The Esoteric Code of the Dynasty’, it was clear that he had undertaken his research on behalf of the Belgians for the decade plan. Kagame makes it clear that the institutions studied still are ‘vital’ (in its double sense) and it is not question of some ‘outdated’ elements. ‘The code thus in whole preserves its force as fundamental law of the Hamite Rwanda [...] That is why the political reorganisation foreseen by the decade plan has taken the traditional system that the Code describes as basis [...] The legal content of this monograph will thus be abandoned as Customary in order to be, in its permanent element, reintegrated into the written law, adapted to the new times.” (Kagame in Vidal, 1991:53).

When in Europe a counter-history emerged it did so in terms of a ‘war of the races’, which preceded ‘racism’ strictu senso. After the outset of the colonial endeavours it recuperated the old ‘war of the races’ and dressed it in bio-social terms. By short-circuiting the analysis of power intrinsic to society by bypassing the figure of the sovereign in his central role, it displayed the relations of domination intrinsic to society. The dominated in this counter-history was not the subjected people, which had yet to be invented, but the subject of this history was an aristocracy dispossessed of its ancient prerogatives (Foucault, 1997:57ff). Concerning Rwanda overt racism had already had its heydays and in the aftermath of the Second World War, Western scholarly work was cleansed of the world ‘race’ in laying out their functionalist models of the Rwandan social system. This does however far from imply that ‘race’ as an underpinning notion is absent from this scholarly work (Vidal, 1991; Chrétien, 2001). Just as Europe had its counter-historians Republican Rwanda had its own. However, they staged their history in an era when ‘the people’ had already become an actor on the historic stage, and perhaps even more importantly it did so from a position within the dominant power. Ferdinand Nahimana who presented his thesis in Paris in 1986 which was reworked and published in 1993 as Le Rwanda – Emergence d’un Etat (Nahimana, 1993), had his predecessors, but for the argument here is an emblematic point in case. His work is above all arguing that Rwanda as we know it was not unified and given its shape until colonisation and as late as 1931. It is an attempt to bring forward the hidden history and glory of the north-western mwami-ships, what in retrospective often is labelled ‘Hutu kingdoms’. In doing so he must of course deploy an approach that disqualifies much of the writing of Kagame, inclusive to his arsenal is the use of Western sources. “When the tutsi invaders established themselves as the dominant caste in the country agriculture did not interest them, unless in the way that goods for consumption was provided them without any effort on their part.” (Maquet cited in Nahimana, 1993:105).

55 Although the word ‘race’ is absent from the work, it is present in between the

55 J.J.Maquet’s production may be the most influential on giving a certain view of Rwanda a scientific stamp of authority. He used Kagame as a source on the form of Rwandan society and then proceeded to use standardised questionnaires (‘yes’ or ‘no’) using the data from some 300 Tutsi informants who all levitated around the central court. The study thus produced highly normative results on how the political system was supposed to have functioned. From this Maquet concluded that by three mechanisms social and political cohesion was assured: value consensus, expressed in the ‘premise of inequality’ (all Rwandans were by birth essentially unequal and this view was accepted by those who were born to serve and those who were born to exploit); ubuhake - cattle clientship (a practice whereby a pastoralist conceded cattle to an agriculturist who then cultivated for his benefactor and expected protection from him); and a complex administration (see Newbury, 1988:1-8 et Vidal, 1991). Mamdani (2001:60ff) speaks of a post 1959 wave of writing on Rwanda (the ’social revolution took place that year and
lines, as what emerges from the reading is a ‘war of the races’. Where he attacks Kagame and the *doxa* is the view of the Tutsis as the civilising and organising element of the region. Even if the dynastic poetry and Kagame did not make the *Abanyiginya* the first clan to appear on Rwandan soil they were represented as the fourth clan to arrive and by the ‘custom’ to let *nyiginya* boys marry girls from the first clans to arrive legitimacy and priority was saved (Nahimana, 1993:73ff *et* Mamdani, 2001). By presenting the first four (Tutsi) clans to arrive as the ones who had introduced political organisation, i.e. civilisation, the Tutsis were the civilisers of the region and the true founders of Rwanda. According to Nahimana (1993), this is however not ‘true’—something he means a careful reading of Kagame, whose writing is full of contradictions, shows. There was political organisation before the arrival of Tutsi clans. What Nahimana (1993) does is that he brings the war to the fore of Rwandan history, how ‘feudal Rwanda’ was established by violence at the mud and the cries of the battlefield.

But, as I have argued this ‘war of the races’ did not exist until it was created by the intrusion to Rwandan culture by the colonising powers. Man reifies history but not under conditions he chooses. The two authors above-mentioned are both passionate Rwandans but so from particular standpoints in the Rwandan society, they both deploy ethnic strategies, they are what Vidal (1991) would label a passionate Tutsi and a passionate Hutu respectively. We may now return to Prunier’s (1997) assumption that we have to look at Rwandan society as the first Europeans saw it. Not because their view reflects what Rwanda ‘was’ like but because it reflects what Rwanda was like in a theory that was to be realised. For our understanding of the essence of this constitutive imaginary, a brief odyssey into its myths-truths is in place.

In 1894 the Count Von Götzen entered the territories of Kigeri Rwabugiri. As an explorer he was familiar with the theories of Ham, the son of Noah, that were being reconsidered since some time. The brothers of Ham were blessed by their father while Ham was cursed. In the original Hebrew versions there is no mentioning of Ham and his descendants being black. In later versions of the Talmud and the Bible they were considered as a ‘black’ albeit cursed part of humanity. The view of a single humanity came into question through the Atlantic slave trade. “*The biblical curse – ‘a servant of a servants shall he be’*- was taken to mean that the Negro was clearly preordained for slavery. So, the Negro could be degraded while remaining part of humanity – without disturbing Christian sensibilities formally.” (Mamdani, 2001:81). A second incarnation of the ‘Negro’ as the descendant of Ham came about in the aftermath of the napoleonic expeditions to Egypt. The accompanying archaeologists and scientists were surprised to see that the physical features of the ancient Egyptians made them much more ‘African’ than the imaginary of the time allowed for. “*The answer to this paradox was disarmingly simple: it was
to turn the curse of Noah upside down and to claim that the Hamites (including the Egyptians) were actually Caucasians under a black skin. Rather than Negroes, Hamites were seen as other than Negroes, those who civilized the Negroes [...]' (Mamdani, 2001:82). For the theories concerning this Count de Gobineau played a vital role and for the diffusion of it in the stance towards Central Africa was John Hanning Speke in his quest for the sources of the Nile. In his *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile* he professed to ‘describe naked Africa – Africa in those places where it has not received the slightest impulse, whether for good or for evil, from European civilization’ (Mamdani, 2001:85). “If the picture be a dark one, we should then when contemplating these sons of Noah try and carry our mind back to that time when our poor elder brother Ham was cursed by his father”. When Speke encountered the kingdom of Buganda (in present day Uganda) and its complex political organisation, he attributed this “barbaric civilisation” to the ‘Hamitic Galla from Ethiopia’. “It appears impossible to believe, judging from the physical appearance [...] that they can be of any other race than the semi-Shem-Hamitic of Ethiopia.” (Speke in Mamdani, 2001:300n23). By 1870 fathers of the Catholic Church made a call for to mount a rescue operation for the “hapless Hamites caught amidst Negroes” (Mamdani, 2001:86). The Hamites were thus African Caucasians in need of re-civilisation and re-christening, what Chrétien labels ‘false Negroes’ in contrast to the surrounding ‘real Negroes’ lower down the evolutionary latter. Von Götzen evokes Speke’s theories with regards to Rwanda as if they were Rwandan theory proper, ‘Hamite pastoralists come from Galla to subject a tribe of Bantu Negroes, the sedentary Wahutu’ (Chrétien, 1985:135). Still though some nuances remained and the doxa had not yet obscured all observation. Thus, Von Götzen could state that “In Ruanda masters proper and subjects are already almost assimilated in their ways and customs. On most occasions one cannot tell Mhuma and agriculturists apart, neither in armour nor in clothing” (Chrétien, 1985:135-136). The Hamitic hypothesis had however already become doxa; an a priori built in to all scientific practices concerned with the region. A French anthropologist lines out the scientific task. “One seeks to follow, to ascend the road of the invaders; and the geographical distribution of conquerors and conquered, especially the degree of [race] mixing, that measures the duration of forced relation between the indigenous and the latest arrived [...]” (Chrétien, 1985:131-132). A German administrator in 1910 states, “regarding all traces of culture in Africa one has always to ask oneself whether it does not come from elsewhere, i.e. Asia.” (in Chrétien, 1985:132). At the time no civilisation could possibly be endogenous to Africa as African societies were considered as static, without history and dynamism, capable of producing virtually nothing. Then also social groups had to be primordial and ‘natural’ (see Mamdani, 2001:20). The opposition of ‘real Negroes’ and the Hamites continued as a *leitmotiv* in textbooks of the 1930’s-1950’s. In Seligman’s *Races of Africa* one may read: ‘The civilisations in Africa are Hamite civilisations. [...] The Hamite invaders were pastoral Caucasians that arrived wave

declassified – guacupira – and where many ‘Tutsi’ lineages had an origin as what would be now labelled ‘Hutu’ (Linden, 1977:5-7, see also Mamdani, 200:69).

56 According To De Gobineau, the sons of Noah had left from Asia at different times, Ham leaving first.

57 Mhuma/Muhima here equals ‘Tutsi’, it refers to groups in the north who are/were predominantly pastoral.
after wave, better armed and with a more lively spirit than the Negro agriculturists with darker skin.” (Chrétien, 1985:133). It is thus part of a modern épistémé that to a certain extent still conditions us.

As groups were ‘natural’ there was an obsession with physical traits as markers also of moral characteristics. Léon Classe the future Archbishop of Rwanda in the beginning of the century stated that, “the Batutsi are superb men with fine traits, with something Aryan and something Semite”. Father Ménard wrote in 1917 that the Mututsi “is a European under a black skin” (Chrétien, 1985:137) In 1948 a Belgian doctor who had visited the Belgian trusteeship Ruanda-Urundi published his travel notes. “They are called Batutsi. In reality though they are Hamites, probably of Semite origin, following some hypotheses they are Chamite, read Adamite. They make up about 1/10 of the population and in reality they make up a Master race [race des seigneurs]. The Hamites measure 1.90 m. They are tall. They have straight noses, high foreheads and thin lips. The Hamites appear reserved, polite, fine. […] The women, while they are young, are really beautiful; they by the way have a skin somewhat lighter than the men.” On the ‘real Negroes’, the Hutu, the same doctor said “[t]he rest of the population is Bantu. They are Negroes and they have all the characteristics: flat nose, thick lips, low forehead, brachycephalic. They keep the character of a child, at the same time shy and lazy, and most of the time they are disgustingly dirty. It is the class of servants. The chief race demand a great deal of forced labour from them.” (Chrétien, 1985:133). De Lacger, also a churchman, in his textbook stated that “[t]he physical type of the Muhutu is the most common and the most general of Black. […] agronomic taste and aptitudes, sociability and joviality, unlimited confidence in supernatural medicine techniques and knowledge.” The traits that stand out from this colonial knowledge is thus a mixture of distinct and different physical and moral characteristics where the Hutus in the colonial literature were like the flip side of the coin; Rwanda as a political entity ‘was’ ever since the beginning of the scramble for Africa a Hamite kingdom. So it has ‘always’ been in retrospective since the African völkerveränderungen pushed the Hamites to establish it by conquest.

4.2.2.3 Colonial Power

There was no single Rwandan response to the colonial invasion. Some Rwandans resisted, some collaborated and many manoeuvred to create opportunities from new possibilities the presence of the foreigners created (Newbury, 1988:53). One may thus assume that colonialism brought about changing patterns of strategies and changing selves in a changing social world; space of possibles. The colonial field that emerged was the interaction of two complementary power systems. Even though it must not be forgotten that the Abasungu (Whites) exercised more prestige, more wealth and more effective forms of power that made the incumbent elite co-operate more or less willingly. In a way then these came to be the intermediaries of colonial administration, what may be called a system of indirect rule. Needless to say existing elites were not puppets but forged self interested strategies within the new context, as the

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58 For an excellent article on ‘colour’ and women in colonial imaginary and policies, that has repercussions in a ‘post-colonial’ context see Rachel Bloul (1996).
end result was the tightening of central control over peripheral regions, Newbury (1988:53-70) proposes to call the process ‘dual colonialism’. Intrinsic to it was the struggle between two factions over the central court, the opposition central-local elites and a nascent class-conflict. There was no Chinese wall between these frictions.

One year after having met Von Götzen Kigeri Rwabugiri suddenly died in 1895. Many of the areas that had been subjugated during his reign then ceased to send payments, to pay tax. The designated heir together with his family was killed in the Rucunshu coup the following year. Behind it were one of Rwabugiri’s spouses, Kanjogera, and her brothers, members of the Eega clan who had fallen from grace during the Rwabugiri era59. Yuhi Musinga, her adolescent son was appointed king, but in reality it was Kanjogera and Musinga’s maternal uncles who were in control. The fact that politics triumphed over tradition says quite a deal. It was the abiru, guardians of the ‘esoteric code’, who were to appoint the heir – those biiru who would not recognise Musinga’s authority were killed. The ‘legitimists’ – mainly from the Nyiginya clan were dismissed from their chiefly post and either fled or were killed (Lemarchand, 1970:57ff; Vidal, 1986 et de Lame, 1996:48ff). This was the political atmosphere when the Germans declared Ruanda-Urundi part of German East Africa in 1898, where Von Götzen was the General Governor acting from Dar es Salaam. A full decade had past before the German could make any founded claim to ‘effective control’ over the area as the Berlin Conference stipulated. German rule, in reality never more than a handful of soldiers and administrators, had to adopt and play with the ruling Rwandan aristocracy. There is scope for believing that it was two groups that may have recognised themselves in one another. Almost all Germans on the spot were from an aristocratic background, so the claims from the Rwandan aristocracy “were no less sacrosanct than the privileges of the Junker aristocracy in Bismarck’s Germany.” (Lemarchand, 1970:49). This homology of positions merged neatly with political ends and the ideal of indirect rule. The German plan for Ruanda-Urundi was by the means of indirect rule to impose themselves by ‘degrees and almost imperceptibly to the people […] the sultans would eventually become nothing less than the executive instruments of the Residents” (German administrator in Lemarchand, 1970:48). But before they had the power to realise such a strategy the territory of Ruanda-Urundi was to be taken over by the Belgians.

The largest German direct impact was on how new provinces were subjected and that the areas that had ceased paying homage and taxes to the mwami were politically re-integrated, by force. German auxiliary troops worked in the interest of the ruling class and Rwandan regiments fought for the Germans during World War I (Lemarchand, 1977:47ff et Linden, 1977:3ff). One of the earliest declarations of German policy on Ruanda-Urundi is from a report that dates from 1905. “The ideal is: unqualified recognition of the authority of the sultans from us, whether from taxes or other means, in a way that will seem to them as little a burden as possible: this will link their interests with ours.” (Lemarchand, 1970:49). The German policy was based in the imaginary which displayed Rwanda as an

59 Due to the patrilineal system the heir was always a male from the abanyiginya, but the maternal clans were four and in case of succession turmoil it was due to struggles between these clans (Lemarchand, 1970:22ff et 57ff).
intrinsically Hamite kingdom. However, beneath the surface the two power factions were jockeying for power in the vacuum that had followed the death of Kigeri Rwabugiri in 1895. On one side the Abeega centred on the Queen Mother and her brothers and on the other side the Abanyiginya and other legalists who had not been killed and had sought refuge in the North and the East. To this came the protracted resistance from the Kiga land in the Northwest. In the North the legitimists who had sought refuge forged alliances with the Bakiga and under the lead of Muhumusa (a wife of the late Rwabugiri) who declared herself Queen of Nдорwa the Rwandan kingdom was attacked. Not only the leading kiga lineages rallied to the cause but also what we somewhat anachronistically may call the ‘masses’ as Muhumusa promised to get rid of the ‘colonial yoke’ (with colonialism chiefly exaction was combined with new ones). When she was captured by the British in 1911 the rebellion in the shape of sporadic insurrections continued under the lead of Ndungutse (whose ‘identity’ is a source of controversy) and a ‘Twa’ chief. Even though the installation on the Rwandan throne of his brother, the son of Muhumusa and Rwabugiri was, on his agenda, the local peasantry rallied to his cause since he was seen as “their saviour, as the prophet who would restore peace to the country and free the labouring masses from the corvée (ubuletwa) [...]” (Lemarchand, 1970:59). Key to the cohesion of the instigators, apart from a common enemy, the Eega aristocracy and the Europeans, was the revival of the messianic nyabingi cult on which both Muhumusa and Ndungutse played. According to Lemarchand (1970:60) there “developed a close organic relationship between certain segments of the northern regions and the survivors of the Banyiginya clan.” After some time the Germans could not stand aside and look as the kingdom seemed threatened, but decided to intervene. The purpose “was the punishment of the insubordinate districts and their peoples and their chiefs by causing the greatest possible damage until complete submission: otherwise destruction of crops and settlements, and occupation of the theatre of operations by chiefs appointed by the Resident who are faithful to Musinga.” (in Lemarchand, 1970:60).

Two features stand out from the account above. Mamdani (2001:73) points to that if we were to do a reading of pre-colonial history by an approach guided by the division Hutu-Tutsi this revolt seems paradoxical. Especially since resistance spanned decades. The answer of the paradox lies in the differing of identities that was brought about with continued colonisation. I would also like to point to a second feature. In the situation of war, some things stand out and the social field becomes somewhat more transparent. In the harsh formulation of the German military policy, through the intelligibility made by the reading of social relations as a war, we see rather clearly the nature of colonial transformation of Rwanda. Although Rwandan State expansion had meant change of political leaders in newly conquered areas, the explicit policy had not been the destruction of livelihood for people in

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60 The epicentre of the conflict, that was to last for five decades and had began during the Rwabugiri reign as he tended to favour his favourite wife Kanjogera’s lineage and clan over his own paternal lineage and clan, was more concentrated than so. It put the Abakagara lineage (Abeega clan) against the Abahindiro lineage (Abanyiginya clan) (Newbury, 1988:57-59).

61 With the reservation for that they are conflicting versions of Ndungutse’s identity.
general. Thus, a massifying policy of oppression brought about cohesion. This massifying oppression as device for massifying politics is a feature that is also apparent in other civilising, modernising and more peace-like developmental practices, albeit less obviously, in the civilising mission that was the burden of missionaries.

It was not only European states and kings that set out in a scramble for Africa, also religious movements laid claims to the African souls in a civilising mission. Christians had to reach areas that the Muslims had not yet reached and Catholics had to get there before Protestants and vice versa. British missionaries had already reached Uganda and German missionaries were present in western Tanganyika so "Catholics had every fear that the Germans might send in Protestant nationals to support their territorial claims" (Linden, 1977:31). Given the imaginary of the Tutsis as of ‘Ethiopian’ origin it in a way meant re-christening them and save them from the degeneration resulting from the contact with the Bantu paganism (Gahama & Mvuykere, 1989). It was a veritable battle for souls where alliances between political administrators proper and missionaries took place in an atmosphere of realpolitik. “Catholics moved in heavily armed groups” and it was not easy to tell that it was a team of peace-loving evangelists that was on the move and when they set camp it reminded of a ‘militärpost’ (Linden, 1977:32-33). Although the Whites in the eyes of the Banyarwanda must have formed a homogenous bloc, there certainly were tensions within the colonialist group. A German officer expressed his fears concerning the White Fathers as; if they were given free hands “the Government would go to Hell and they would establish an African Church State” (Linden, 1977:52). Even though the initial strategy of the White Fathers had been to christianise the ‘poor masses’ they had to choose between following the German example of playing with central power and not against it, or suffer the consequences; i.e. the Protestants might move in (Linden, 1977: 37-49).

The Fathers after some time turned to erecting huge churches. For this they needed labour: bricklayers, porters and a permanent staff for cooking and cattle herding. ‘Huge teams of men were required to cut and to transport logs, sometimes from distant forests; forty to fifty carriers were needed for a nine-metre tree, ten thousand men fetched the beams and supports for Zaza church [one of the earliest missions]. Musinga and the court were stunned by such unprecedented mobilisation of manpower.” (Linden, 1977:59). The “exhilaration of commanding a peasant army working for God seems to have blinded the missionaries to the impact that they were making on the king; chiefs too took offence at requisitions which depleted their own work force” (Linden, 1977:59). Moreover, in the eyes of the workers the more or less forced labour was yet another form of ubuletwa (‘traditional’ forced labour) and even more, in some regions ubuletwa was introduced with the White Fathers. Given that the Fathers ‘knew’ that all land in this Hamite kingdom ultimately belonged to the Mwami, they either procured land by dealing directly with the court or by its local representative, the chief (Linden, 1977:60). They would pay a small sum to skilled labour but nothing to unskilled labour that they

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62 The Nyabingi cult was in a way spread as a result of the Rwabugiri interference with ‘Northern’ politics as a vector of resistance. The Nyabingi continued to serve as a reference point for resistance against any intruders, from the outset of World War I, the kiga areas stretching...
required through the chiefs (Linden, 1977:55ff et Mamdani, 2001:71). The result was to reinforce power in its centrality and to sharpen it in its local modalities.

To Linden (1977) the priority of the relation Church-Court is on politics proper. Nevertheless, if we recall our problematic of bio-power an interesting feature emerges in Linden’s account. Never before had such masses of people been mobilised in Rwanda. We thus witness something that is new to the Rwandan social field, the simultaneous involvement of large numbers of people doing the same thing. This was not unique to the Church but also the Germans requisitioned “hundreds of labourers” to build roads and “thousands of days of labour” to make a European style capital out of Kigali (Mamdani, 2001:71). Also here a small fraction was paid and the rest of the labour force was ‘given’ by the chiefs. Colonialism meant the extension of this mode of production – forced labour – to all areas under Rwandan control and also brought with it the beginning of individualisation through the introduction of a monetary system, that allowed for some individuals to forge strategies that circumvented ‘traditional’ lines and where de-centred from collectivities. As a substitute for suppressed modes of social mobility, the Church represented an alternative strategy to many.

For the first two decades following the Rucunshu coup and the colonial invasion, cross-balancing and overarching administrative structures largely survived. With the reservation that many positions that before had been held by different individuals more and more came to coincide in the same chief (Newbury, 1988:61ff). To Mamdani (2001) the critical moment for the development of Rwanda was the Belgian colonial reforms from the early 1920’s and on. Following the German attack on Metropolitan Belgium, the Belgian Congo went to war with Ruanda-Urundi. The German troops made up 24 officers and 152 auxiliary troops. Supported by the British the Belgians rapidly moved on Kigali. Until 1919 the occupied territories remained under military authority. In the Versailles treaty, Belgium was awarded Ruanda-Urundi as a ‘Colonial Mandate’. The regime of colonial mandate territory was based on three principles: i) it was applied onto countries where the people where ‘not yet capable of governing themselves’; ii) the ‘guardianship of these peoples was confined to a prosperous nation with colonial experience in the name of and under the mandate of the League of Nations’; iii) ‘the welfare and the development of these peoples formed a sacred trust of civilisation’ (Reyntjens, 1985:41-47). The indigenous elite, through the person of Musinga, pledged allegiance to the Belgian king and the White Fathers were delighted to see that a Catholic country took over after the Germans.

The Belgians took off where the Germans had left. Had Rwanda remained under German control the rule would not have been different. The Belgians basing themselves on the colonial knowledge that by now was doxa sought to implement the indirect rule the Germans had striven for (Reyntjens, 1985:103ff). That the difference between a trusteeship and a ‘colony’ is nothing but a paper construct is clear from a confidential memorandum from the Belgian minister Franck. “In Rwanda and Urundi we will exercise politics of a colonial protectorate. The basis for these politics is the maintenance of
indigenous institutions. They make the European a guide and a teacher. They exclude direct rule. It is possible to realise in the country since the administration is ancient and remarkable, and the ruling class shows evident political talents. Nevertheless, these politics do not content themselves with respecting and using the indigenous institutions, they tend also to develop them. [...] Our administration will maintain royal authority and will reinforce it in accordance with customs, where it has been weakened. [...] However, we will not too much undermine the role of the grand feudal masters. [...] We will stay between these two elements and keep a rational balance. [...] Besides our general political obligations, we have obligations towards the Wahutu. We should protect them against arbitrary actions, from which they are often victims, to assure them peace. But, we will not go any further: it is not question of, under the pretext of equality, touch the basic political institutions: We find the Watuzi who are established since a long time intelligent and capable; we respect this situation.” (Reyntjens, 1985:66). This text from 1920 contains many of the guiding lines for Belgian rule in Rwanda. Rationality and the maintenance of social order based on the ‘Hamite aristocracy’ is in the interest of a strong administration. However, the rule was to be far from indirect, the Belgian administration was to be a policy of interference.

With Belgian reorganisation of the administration that began in the late 1920’s power was decentralised from the person of the king, the chiefs and sub-chiefs were no longer the subjects of Musinga, they were the subjects of the Mandatory Administration (Reyntjens, 1985:78 et 111-129). The hitherto overlapping jurisdictions had provided check and balance and it had enabled people to play out the grands against one another, both from below and above. When administrative reform in order to ‘streamline’ the structure of local government, and remove the cumbersome trinity of powers, was decided upon in 1926 it was the expression of a direct policy of Tutsification. Not only were all Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs dismissed, but there were active devices in other social domains as well, especially schooling and the judicial system, in order to preserve, or rather to realise, Tutsi monopoly (Lemarchand, 1970:72ff). In order to ‘reconcile the ‘Tutsi monopoly’ and the need for a modern and rational administration, one had to educate the notables” (Reyntjens, 1985:107). The best example are the graduates from Groupe scolaire d’Astride (now Butare) the most prestigious secondary school – the Astridiens, were the prime examples of the évolués (as they are referred to in Belgian colonial literature – that were needed for the rationalised administration. Until 1955 the extension of indirect rule to the realm of education, i.e. it was the local chiefs who decided who was to gain access to education, resulted in a virtually total exclusion of Hutus from the groupe scolaire (the ratio Hutu-Tutsi was in the years 1946-1954 ranging in the order of 1/44 to 1/17). In 1956 the proportion of Hutus enrolled began to increase substantially, and by 1959 the inscription numbers were 143 Hutu students and 279 Tutsi students. This discriminatory practise was not only confined to the most prestigious school, also other missionary run schools practised it (Newbury, 1988:115).
Interestingly Reyntjens (1985) speaks of a “Tutsi monopoly” although he admits that the basis for recruitment was more restrained than so. Still in 1958 out of 45 chiefs (“all Tutsi”) all came from six of the eighteen clans. Lineages from the Abeega and the Abanyiginya shared 80% of these positions. The maternal lineage of Rudahigwa held 30% of them. So what the colonial period meant was not the complete ‘tutsification’ of institutions since a limited number of Tutsis benefited from the ‘Tutsi monopoly’. Rather it was the continued realisation of an Hamitic theory in the sense that colonialism meant that Hutus were more or less excluded from the [zoon politikon] of the Rwandan [polis] whereas having a Tutsi identity at least in theory opened up the possibility of access to it. It is here it was established a politically salient difference between being ‘Hutu’ and being ‘Tutsi’. To the extent there was a difference before, it was not a stratified difference; with the modern educational system Rwandan society was stratified along ethnic lines (Newbury, 1988 passim et Reyntjens, 1985:108ff). The educational system was to be the Rwandan sub-field where colonial power-knowledge had the clearest implications and was the most tangible. Thus from a relatively restrained group of ‘aristocrats’ the notion of ‘race’ came to encompass all the Tutsis and the Hutus then was the Other race. Chrétien (1986:146) points to that the recuperation in bio-social terms of old aristocratic myths, claiming heavenly descent of the royal house, was passionately embraced by the new educated Tutsi elite, the évolutés. With the devotion of Rwanda to Christ there was not much sense of claiming a heavenly origin of the nyiginya house, it was much more logic to forge an identity of belonging to a Master race. “Without a cadre incubated with a Hamitic ethos, it would not be possible to create a local administrative hierarchy steeped in a self-conscious racialized elitism.” (Mamdani, 2001:89). To Bishop Classe the strategy to form an ethnically defined Christian elite was more or less explicit; the Hutus would anyway “take up places in mine-working and industry” (Newbury, 1988:115). This was put into practice in the Church run schools where a two tier education took place, Tutsis received a superior education in French and to the extent Hutus were allowed admission they received education in the Bantu language Kiswahili (Mamdani, 2001:89-90). The Catholic Church was a main vector behind Tutsi supremacy. Bishop Classe expressed it clearly: “Generally speaking, we have no chiefs who are better qualified, more intelligent, more active, more capable of appreciating progress and more fully accepted by the people than the Tutsi.” (Lemarchand, 1970:73). Thus, the Hamitic origin had been erected into a state ideology. It was not an ideology in the narrow sense of a pretext for the order of society, it was a constitutive imaginary that contained the truth about the nature of Rwandan society and the natural differences between its inhabitants. But it was never a de facto realisation, rather it seems to

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64 Actually, as Reyntjens (1985) shows it is not tenable to speak of Rwanda as a feudal society until bureaucratisation of the chief system. However, in my eyes it then rather demands the label ‘neo-feudal’ or ‘neo-patrimonial’ state (for discussions on ‘neo-feudalism’, see Bayart 1991 and Médard 1991).

65 Rudahigwa was the son of Musinga who in 1932 had been destitute by the Belgians and the Catholic Church due to him not being ‘friendly enough to modernism and Christianity’.

66 There are several myths around and then again several versions. They have all been filtered through Christian-colonial prisms and they may serve different purposes. I do not think it is the scope to go over it thoroughly here. What is of interest to us is that as Mamdani (2001:79) points out no one of the ‘original’ myths speak of a foreign origin of neither group, but the Abanyiginya and the Abeega were given sacred, heavenly origin and the body of the mwami was a medium through which deity (Imana) passed as fluid powers (De Lame, 1996:67; see also Taylor, 1999) Imana is today the Kinyarwanda word designating God. Just as principles of domination has been rationalised (in accordance with rational reason) in the West it has too in Rwanda.

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have been a process that was never completed, the Hamite kingdom was a political utopia, a dream that was never realised in any social reality whichever. At least it was not so in that present. As pointed out by Vidal (1991 and 1995) and Chrétien (1986 and 2001) racialised habitus was until the Rwandan Republics and the development towards generalised and obligatory education confined to elite milieus.

We shall now turn to look at the individualising process. To do so we are going to enter the change in the Rwandan social fabric by a particular institution; clientship. In the writing of Maquet – who as we know based himself on the information from some 300 persons more or less close to the court, and the one speaking ‘Rwanda’; Alexis Kagame – *ubuhake*, cattle clientship, was the organising principle of Rwandan society. In this view *ubuhake* was a practice whereby a pastoralist conceded cattle to an agriculturist who then cultivated for his benefactor and expected protection from him. Schematically clientship was portrayed as the institution making up Rwanda as social-political entity. “The umwami was the only patron who was not a client of no one”. His clients were the great Tutsi chiefs, who in their turn were the patrons of less important Tutsis and so on. In this way, all Tutsis were linked to one another constituting “a homogenous unity of individuals” and thus ubuhake provided for the unity and solidarity of the “aristocratic caste”. Then in their turn almost “every Hutu was linked to a Tutsi” participating in the social power by identifying himself with a patron providing him safety (Maquet in Newbury, 1988:73ff et 260-261nn1-3). Others have pointed to the coercive role of patron-clientship ties in the Rwandan society. Newbury (1988:73-94) shows that rather than talking of one type of clientship, we should talk about a multitude of types of patron-client relations. Throughout the ‘Great Lakes region’ it existed in various forms. It differed from one locality to another inside what is today Rwanda, and inside what in retrospective is labelled ‘Central Rwanda’ there was not only *ubuhake*, and not even *ubuhake* ‘was’ what it was portrayed as. More so, in Kinyaga only a tiny fraction of the population was involved in clientship relations until the last part of the 19th century, and it seems as client-patron ties mushroomed only in the beginning of the 20th century, under the process of ‘dual colonialism’ (See also Reyntjens, 1985:111ff). Clientship not only augmented but it also changed in nature. From being relatively limited it went to be more common (I am prone to say popular), and there was an important shift from patron-client ties linking one’s own corporate group to another corporate group. The change in nature of client-patron relations is expressed in both in the way that it in itself, as empirical individual patron-client relations changed and that it came to involve more and more people. Newbury (1988:74) sees ‘clientship’ as an “instrumental friendship” established between two parties of relatively unequal social status. In theory it involves duties and obligations on both parts, but the ratio and form varies with the status of the parties and the political context where it takes place. Apart from *ubuhake* there was land clientship of various forms, most often would a lineage who arrived to a location earn the land where they settled by working for the lineage who had priority on the land. The lineage later arrived would then often marry into the first. Thus relations, client and others, where not directly tied to the territorial unit which was nothing but an intermediary for social bonds. With the extension of ‘central Rwandan rule’, there was a shift in nature. Partly because individuals by colonial
decree became tied to obligations based on where they dwelled, and also because the administrative reforms meant the abolition of competing jurisdictions. Where there before were different chiefs commanding the same territorial area, there was now but one, thus the previous strategy of simply moving to the neighbouring hill, or staying and just changing patron was excluded. Correlated with this was the growing discrepancy in status between those who engaged in client-patron relationships which made it possible for the chiefs to demand more and more and offer less and less in return. As well as the demand of being recompensed was explicit and thus an obvious part of the relation. From being something of an alliance – that nevertheless indirectly imposed itself as a need – cattle clientship, such as ubuhake, turned into something that was imposed by individuals on other individuals that conceded cows to persons whether or not they wanted it. (Newbury, 1988:117ff). Central to all forms of patron-client relations were the ‘gift’, giving something to someone was the symbolic act whereby the relation was established. As the exchange of goods in a patron-client relationship presupposes the relative inequality between the two parts, for it to be experienced as an act of ‘instrumental friendship’ by the two parts it presupposes mis-recognition, individual and collective, of the ‘objective reality’ of the mechanism of exchange. There thus has to be a certain time between the gift and the payment in return, a payment to come in a probable and anticipated future, thus the expectation of an immediate return brutally shatters the social enchantment of the relation. The exchange of gifts is one of those social ‘games’ which may only be played as such a game if the social actors refuse to know or recognise the ‘objective reality’ of the relation (see Bourdieu, 1980a:179-181). With the introduction of colonial knowledge-power this component, ensuring the patron-clientship its existence as such, was removed by the process of codification, which by objectification changes the nature of the relation, as well as the practice us such was changed. With colonialism ubuhake was not only spread, but it was also legally codified as a contractual relationship, the social distance was also widened, as it went from having been an alliance between two lineages, or persons of a minimum of status to encompass individuals with less status (social capital). It was also inscribed into a capitalist mode of production as the economic value of cattle came be to more important, and the symbolic value it was endowed with thus changed. In the beginning of the 1950’s ubuhake as anti-private property archaism was seen as an obstacle to a “sane economic and social development”, and was some years later abolished and the herds were divided between the contractual parties (see Reyntjens, 1985:198-209). Hence, a process of individualising powers and a diminution of the importance of the kinship group as referential point of identification.

Corollary to this process of the withering of importance of kin groups was administrative reform, although the process seems to have been set in motion under the Rwabugiri reign. Before the introduction of central administration lineage heads, whether Hutu or Tutsi enjoyed prestige as representatives of their lineages in local affairs. To some Tutsis there was the alternative of political office in the colonial administration. To those identified as Hutu this alternative strategy was more or less completely blocked with the administrative reforms in the late 1920’s. An alternative strategy was then using the Europeans as an escape strategy, as a wage worker. Work for Europeans was in a way an
alternative strategy filling the same function as clientship had meant before (if tied to someone powerful who in terms of power and prestige could out-triumph someone demanding labour, you could get away from it). Interestingly enough, at least in Kinyaga, and this seems to hold true also for the Northern regions (see Lemarchand, 1970; Mamdani, 2001) it was the younger members of the formerly powerful and prestigious lineages who turned to this alternative. Newbury (1988:114) emphasises the part of history here, “[s]uch young men chafed with memories of past glory, when their fathers or grandfathers had been leaders of wealthy and politically autonomous lineages, free from the harassment which came to be a byword of Tutsi rule in Rwanda”. To this I would like to add that their dispositions based on an upbringing where this past glory constituted them as such, made them less prone to accept a declassified fate since ‘this was not for them’. Hence an appetite for alternative strategies. From the above-mentioned, we may discern two important features. The distinction Hutu-Tutsi as a discriminatory disciplining device is the decisive forger of ‘passionate ethnicism’ here. Take two hypothetical persons from Kinyaga, both from a position where the preceding generation enjoyed prestige, one Hutu and one Tutsi. The one having a Tutsi identity may gain access to the education system and thus make an administrative career. Although his ‘Tutsiness’ may not make sense to him before, it will so as he becomes Tutsi. Firstly by the privilege of being accepted at a school, practice, and then when his privilege is given a raison d’être through the discursive practices of the curricula based on the constitutive imaginary (knowledge). The one having a ‘Hutu’ identity may, or may not gain access to schooling. Whichever way he will head on be confronted with the discriminatory practices as society tells him his inferior status. But, as Newbury (1988:114-116 et 268 nn30-33) states, he is likely to meet others with similar experiences, either at the missionary run school our out on the wage worker market, or by as an individual being tied to the same person as client as others. Thus, a sense of one’s place experienced with others in the same, or similar situation. This latter person, who in a weberian sense is the ideal type leader of the Hutu emancipation to come, is a marginalised person in a dual sense. He was marginalised in a time-depth sense (relative to the status he could have expected in the ‘to come’) and in a synchronic sense (relative to society in general); he had a habitus disposed to expect more, as well as he had incorporated a cultural capital enabling him to address his situation in socially recognisable terms.

I do not think one may enough emphasise the role of the colonial project, and in turn the role of the constitutive imaginary which was the underlying power directing the different states of the Rwandan field as a colonial field. Since Rwanda was imagined as a Hamite kingdom what the indigenous elite said was customary was to be enforced, implemented as rational policies; the realisation of a symbolic universe. The Belgians encouraged (read enforced) the coincidence of two hitherto different, albeit sometimes overlapping, powers networks: clientship networks and the administrative domain. Lack of enthusiasm and non-compliance led to destitution. Thus, chiefs were
instructed to terminate ubuhake contracts with clients who were outside their jurisdiction. With the continued rationalisation of the colonial administration and the more frequent change of chiefs the affective ties that once had linked a patron and a client eroded. To this came the imposition of ubureetwa (corvée), forced labour. As we saw before this was in some parts of Rwanda introduced with colonialism. Furthermore, it was by colonial law made incumbent on all Hutu men, and on Hutu men only. Those Hutus who managed to escape it was those whose lineage, or individually, enjoyed a favoured status with a chief or someone else powerful; “Ubureetwa was a residual for the powerless.” (Newbury, 1988:141). She goes on by saying that one can not enough underline the exploitative character of ubureetwa, services carried out were often of the most menial kind (collecting and drying firewood fetching water etc.) inclusive was often outright mistreatment. It was a non-remunerated work.

The ubureetwa was the customary law to remain its legal status the longest. There were many reasons for this, mainly economic. With colonisation came the policy to provide cheap labour and markets where the new products, such as coffee, could accumulate wealth to the chiefs. To Newbury (1988:142) it was clear that coffee cultivation and other measures exacerbated the burden of the Hutu cultivators, who were not only supposed to care for their own fields, but also had to face increasing demands of labour, as it became more and more interesting for the chiefs to demand this. Belgians at times tried to ‘humanise’ the system which was more or less impossible; it was a colonial construct and it was not to be transformed without the transformation of the system of which it made part.

Rwanda as a developmental State was enforced during the colonial rule, apart from the building and up-keeping of roads this was expressed in the cultivation of famine crops, i.e. resistant but protein deficient crops (cassava, sweet potatoes, ‘European potatoes’), that was made compulsory. They were introduced as a measure against a series of famines that had struck Rwanda since the onset of colonialism. The enforcement, that was carried out through the chiefs, coincided with the introduction of cash crop production (mainly coffee) and were implemented from the 1920’s. It was founded on the structure of forced labour, ubureetwa. The use of direct physical force to promote ‘civilised’ capitalist behaviour had begun already under German rule. When referring to opening up a region to a market economy the previous year a colonial official in 1905 wrote about two European traders who moved in with armed escorts; they “seize the cattle […] take the women hostages in order to force the people to sell or else they steal the cattle and burn the houses” Two decades later under Belgian rule an official described how beans were procured, “the chiefs are ordered to bring their sub-chiefs and subjects laden with food […] it is more or less forced sale”. (Mamdani, 2001:96). Chiefs would be deposed or receive corporal punishment if they failed to meet the targets. Another important factor conditioning the actions

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67 Newbury (1988) uses the example of an old-school chief who at the outset of colonisation managed to deploy strategies that accumulated the his powers, due to an effect of hysteresis – he had dispositions that were of another age (kera) – he did not manage to master the strategies demanded by the new rationalised administration, he was thus destitute from his chiefly post.

68 Mamdani (2001:41-75) claims that this was done under the reign of Rwabugiri, but given his rather flimsy reading of some sources I am inclined to put more trust in Newbury (1988). Mamdani’s (2001) standpoint does however find som support with Reyntjens (1985:1333-134) according to whom ubureetwa did not exist in the beginning of the Rwabugiri reign. Then after a military defeat, the mwami wanted to punish the bad conduct with the ‘Hutus’ and they were to carry out forced labour for the Tutsis. The sources on which Reyntjens (1985) draws seem
of the chiefs was the more or less explicitly stated colonial logic that “requiring Africans to work for Europeans was basically ‘good’ for them in some abstract moral sense” (Newbury, 1988:170). During massive terracing schemes and road projects the overseers would often most be a Tutsi who had the ‘choice’ between whipping or getting whipped (Mamdani, 2001:97).

To sum it up, the sovereign power could make die and let live; the regulating power makes live and lets die. Or, whereas the old right was the power to make die or leave living the new right consists of the power to make live or to reject back into death. Power was now to a lesser extent the right to make die and to a larger extent the right to intervene in order to make live – it intervenes to improve life, to master the menaces to life. In order to master the population and get hold of mortality it is important to identify the population, to officially establish what kind of population one is to master. The first official census took place in 1933-34 whereby every individual was classified as ‘Hutu’, ‘Tutsi’ or ‘Twa’. The prevalent view is that the distinction was made on the ‘ten-cow-rule’. The conclusion has however been rejected on basis of the number of cows in Rwanda at the time and the number of Tutsis the census identified; most Tutsis did not possess many or any cows, and in the 1950’s the average income difference between Hutus and Tutsis was 5%. To this comes that only a few Tutsis were very wealthy. Mamdani (2001:98-99) draws the conclusion that there is a kernel of truth in the ten-cow-rule in the sense that possession of large herds of cows was one of the measures to identify people. The other two were physical measurements and above all the Church as a source of information to ‘who’s who’.

Thus, we have seen how the colonial process changed social relations in two major ways. It both massified and individualised at the same time, by lifting collective consciousness to the level of belonging to an ethnic/racial group, and belonging to this group qua individual. But, as pointed out by Vidal (1991; 1995) the persons with racialised habitus were confined to elite groups.

4.2.3 The Rwandan Republics

4.2.3.1 Speaking on behalf of the ‘Majority People’

The first open revelation of fundamental social disharmony in Rwanda was the Bahutu Manifesto of 1957. Lemarchand (1970:114ff) speaks about four shifts towards a radicalisation of the growing discontent. The first is the above-mentioned Bahutu Manifesto, then in 1959 followed the ‘so-called revolution of November 1959’. This is however better conceptualised as a jacquerie, a peasant revolt which had not for aim to overthrow the monarchical order, insofar there was an explicit aim it was to make evict chiefs and sub-chiefs who by exaction had betrayed their legitimate mandate. Although the revolt often was in the name of a ‘just king’ it was at large an unstructured and anomic manifestation.

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to be based in an outright political mythology, and he concludes that it seems to have coincided with colonialism "when it at least was made general".
The exception seems to have been in the North where the movement put forward claims to have the chiefs replaced by persons from traditional Kiga lineages. The third shift is between 1959 and 1961 where protest starts aiming at fundamental societal changes, as well as violence becomes more and more instrumental, both more widespread and more deliberate as it began affecting more and more Tutsis. The final stage is the ‘Coup d’Etat of Gitarama’ in January 1961. Hereby was a de facto republican regime installed, and more importantly; it gave partial control of the administration. This typology before-mentioned describes a seizure of power from above. The explicit aim along the evolution of revolutionary process was democracy. The result was an on-the-paper democracy for Hutus alone and a quasi-total exclusion of Tutsis from the [zoon politikon]. Lemarchand (1970:116) describes it as presidential Mwami-ship with a centralised authority that top-down flows into the local capillaries of the bureaucratic field where the position of appointed officials is not so remote from that of former chiefs.

If we are to understand what kind of logic underpinned the Social revolution we have to return to the Bahutu Manifesto, its subtitle is here revealing; Notes on the aspect of the indigenous racial problem in Rwanda. The Tutsi are interchangeably referred to as ‘Hamites’, thus underlining their ‘racial’ difference and foreign origin. For the authors of the manifesto the question of a ‘racial or a social problem ‘belong[ed] to the literature’ what it is question of is ‘the political monopoly that becomes a de facto monopoly in the spheres of economy and education’. They go on to denounce the ‘Hamite colonisation of the Hutus’ and proposes to “Bantuify where one has Hamitified” (bantouiser là où l’on a hamitisé”). Throughout the manifesto there is a binary political analysis as a war of two races; on one side the Tutsi caste/nobility/Hamite race and on the other side mass/majority ethn/e/Bantu race (Chrétien, 1986:151ff). The Manifesto contains the guidelines for the founding of the Mouvement Social Muhutu (MSM) which was centred on the person of Kayibanda, the future president. The rather weak and ineffectual organisation, or rather network of young church educated Hutus, did lack contact with the rural communities as its adherents were confined to areas around Gitarama and Ruhengeri (Lemarchand, 1970:151-153). More than anything else the manifesto and the MSM was the expression of a small secondary school educated clique who saw their ambitions frustrated by the discriminatory practices and codes regarding access to higher education and office in the administration. This counter-elite organised itself within the confines of the church. The church media, like the journal Kinyamateka for which Grégoire Kayibanda became editor, well served their interests as they were used to propel their message. The existing co-operation structure gave the opportunity to meet persons with similar experiences and gave body to the evolving network (Lemarchand, 1970:149ff; Chrétien, 1986:154ff; Newbury, 1988:182ff). The experience of this counter-elite was not the same as that for the ‘masses’, the oppression and discrimination they met they did not meet from the same social positions. This is not to say that either groups forged a false consciousness only to say that by a certain homology between

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Many of the students talked about the ten-cow-rule. However, it was obvious that it was not something that they actively believed in. It was something they said when they had to rationalise the existence of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ as official identities in a coherent story. By some it was
fields an illusion of identity of conditions arises, thus those who re-present the group in the field of power do so with good conscience (see Bourdieu, 1987: 197ff). The delegates of the group make the group exist by saying; “I am the group, I am therefore the group is”, at the same time the delegate of the group abolishes him/herself, gives up his/hers own self, by a logic in the order of, “I exist only through the group” (Bourdieu, 1991:209). The ethnicism/racism became a mediating discourse bringing together these ‘rural évolués’ and also legitimised their claims in the eyes of the Church, the Belgians and the population as it gave words, and thus codified, the growing discontent throughout the country. Being Hutu came to mean representing the ‘people’. Nevertheless, one should not obliterate that the leaders “drew on the energies derived from the Hutu experience” there thus was an underlying popular sentiment of oppression. Key to the success for the Hutu counter-elite was the extent to how they managed to direct this political consciousness and how they could claim to represent it and control it in the eyes of the Belgians. Here the aspect of ‘control’ was key to win the Belgian power on their side; decolonisation was not on the Belgian agenda (Newbury, 1988:180ff). The answer from those Tutsis in power was in the same vein of a war between two races. In May 1958 senior officials, calling themselves ‘the court’s grand clients’ wrote a public letter where they denounced any Hutu claims to equal rights. It is a purely ‘racial’ reading of the Kigwa myth underlying their binary analysis: ‘had not Kigwa the ancestor of the nyiginya dynasty conquered the Hutus by force? Had he not slain their small kings?’ Thus by the right of might any power in Rwanda should by customary and hence Tutsi (Chrétien, 1986:153; Mamdani, 2001:118).

As always when dealing with a critical event is the coincidence in time and space of independent histories in dependency, where the outcome is not open, but at least not given beforehand and the strategies the social actors use depends on the different forms and relative values of the social capital they may mobilise. After the World War II ‘Europe’ changed. The horrors of fascism became evident and socially recognised as something that must not happen again, Christians became prone to forge social allies of a new kind and where disposed recognise the demands of the nascent counter-elite (de Lame, 1996:51). As Linden (1977:222ff) states the basis of recruitment of the missionaries had also changed. Even though the background largely was bourgeois, but sometimes first generation well off, it was not any longer men with aristocratic *habitus*.

So what we have is a situation where two elite groups claim to speak for two groups, and they both do so in the name of two different ‘races’. One group deserves their prerogatives because they have conquered them in mythical time and they have been rationally legitimised as the inheritors of reified customary rule. The other group, what we after Weber could call ‘proletarian intellectuals’ (Bourdieu, 1987:60), deserves their right because they represent the ‘people’ who lost that very same war, the colonisation, sometimes in mythical time. However, those with the right to speak in the name of the ‘majority people’ are not that homogenous as one may think in retrospective. The Northerners until 1962 insisted on being referred to as *Bakiga*, like their neighbours in south-western Uganda, not
Hutus (Mamdani, 2001:117). Lemarchand already in 1970 (116-117) expresses an accurate prediction when he states that “Rwanda continues to incorporate within it two distinct subcultures. [...]These polarities are just as threatening in terms of their disruptive potential as the old ones”, and they might well trigger off a counter-revolution. As we saw above the order they wanted to restore was not so much a golden age before ‘the Hamitic invasion’, rather they wanted to restore the power their grandfathers enjoyed.

Last, let us ponder an important point made by Mamdani (2001:105). In 1959, for the first time in Rwandan history physical, political violence demarcated Hutu and Tutsi as such, as the front cut through the social web. Although the Rwandan history has been presented as a war of the races; Bantus vs. Hamites, this is something which made a social reality as late as 1959, and even then it is far from a total war. Every Rwandan was not forced to ethnic strategies as extreme as those in 1994. The antidote to the privilege of a few during colonialism was what Mamdani (2001:269) in an explicit anachronism calls ‘Hutu Power’ as being the common denominator for forging alliances between different groups that faced oppression during the colonial order of things. As such it had an underpinning of a subaltern emancipatory ideology. But, to the difference from other subaltern ideologies of the time, such as Black Consciousness in South Africa or Black Power in the United States, it was largely formulated as its proponents were already moving into power. It thus turned into a discourse of defending power, not taking it. The symbolic capital inherent to the notions of Hutu and Tutsi was already objectified, codified and concentrated to the confines of the state which delegates where authorised to make visible and known what was the legitimate Rwandan taxonomy. What we perceive of as the state is a pseudo-divine creator for the legitimate classifications with the power to impose the dominant vision throughout the whole territory where it exercises the monopoly of the legitimate symbolic violence (see Bourdieu, 1994:101-133; 1991:166ff). In this sense Chrétien’s (1986; 1997) notion of the ‘Social Revolution’ as a the inversion of the ‘Rwandan ideology’ is most helpful; the independence did not bring about the shattering of the constitutive imaginary with its reified history where the two antagonist ‘races’ are at war since time immemorial, it was not the end of history as such. Rather, the Hutu Republic was erected as the primary defendant of the Hutu Nation and its charisma lies in this affinity with its roots; no ‘true’ Hutu Republic meant the take over by the Tutsis and servitude for the great majority people.

4.2.3.2 Violence, Impunity and Injustice

The genocide of 1994 took place in the conjunction of internal political challenge as well as a challenge from the outside. The form of the violence took on a characteristic feature that was recurrent in 1963 and 1973; the fundamental role played by local authorities. “Even though the army is implicated, it is not as in many other African situations, the principal author or agent of the massacres. It is above all a local administration close to the population that plays the essential role in initiating the massacres.” (Willame, 1995:95). A culture of impunity was already established, the massacres of 1963 were
scarcely noted by the rest of the world and were not subject to much international protests. In Rwanda the government, after having totally denied the massacres, officially recognised some of the violence but explained it as the ‘anger and the fury of the people with the interior accomplices of the terrorist attack from the outside’ (*Mission d’information sur le Rwanda*, 1998: Tome I, 59ff). It was hence rather normal that Tutsis were killed, due to their previous oppression. But, important to remember is that it was not only, if even mainly, about ‘popular’ violence affecting people out on the hills, also the quasi-totality of the leadership of the First Republic was physically liquidated or incarcerated. If we leave out this aspect we either reproduce a discourse where Rwandan massacres are about the natural opposition of Hutus and Tutsis, as well as we contribute to the creation of this illusion that easily arises in the aftermath of the genocide; that the front within Rwanda should be purely an ethnic affair. The Second Republic was to a large extent to be a Bakiga Republic more than anything else and no one was ever charged for any of the crimes of the political violence that took place during the two republics (Nsengiyaremye, 1994).

Physical violence along ethnic lines is thus something very dated. André Guichaoua expresses it clearly: “The Burundian and the Rwandan conflicts do not stem from fatality, from a specific barbarism of the people of this African region. The putting in place of independent states and the forms of political power thus installed constitutes the conflicts. Every crisis precisely dated and located [...] may be explicitly analysed through the strategies of the political actors who deliberately play on phantasms and collective fears in order to mobilise people, superimpose ethnic identities on all other forms of belonging and social solidarity.” (Guichaoua, 1995:20). The physical violence of 1994 is of course unique in the sense that its magnitude and form is without precedents. But, the previous outbursts of violence can of course not be removed from an explanation of the genocide in 1994. According to Willame (1995:45), the genocide “is implicitly inscribed in the Hutu revolution of 1959, the 1963 massacres, the turmoil and the 1973 exclusion, and above all the selective killing that accompanied the beginning of the 1990 war”. The 1959 revolt was, however anomic it was, a rather directed story, as chiefs and sub-chiefs more or less solely constituted the targets. In total about 2000 homes were set on fire and some 300 persons were killed. The troubles/massacres continued the following years, which was at the origin of the exodus that commenced of mainly Tutsis to the neighbouring countries. In 1963 some of these exiles launched attacks from Burundi and Uganda that almost reached Kigali. The attack served as a pretext for the authorities that organised a hunt of Tutsis inside the country. Local authorities, burgomasters and prefects who organised ‘local defence forces’ that in practice functioned as death squadrons, implemented an organised scheme of massacres. Radio Rwanda helped mounting the fears among the population and urged vigilance against the ‘Tutsi terrorists - the *inyenzi* (cockroaches) who only attack at night and are supported by their kin inside the country’. The number of victims is estimated to more than 10,000 persons and the testimonies from the period speak a language of popular violence nourished by rumours from the authorities. (Chrétien, 1986; Vidal, 1995; *Mission d’information sur le Rwanda*, 1998:Tome I, 59ff). But, it was nourished by more than rumours,
the repression that was incredibly brutal was centrally directed; President Kayibanda would have a minister sent to every region to instigate the violence (Lemarchand, 1970: 216ff; de Heusch, 1995:12).

Throughout the first Republic the struggle within the field of power more than anything else consisted of Banyanduga (Southerners) opposing the Bakiga (Northerners) who seemed to occupy more and more power positions, and political discourse was not to a large extent dressed in ethnic terms until in 1972 when a cornered President Grégoire Kayibanda played the ethnic card. As he was increasingly under pressure from Bakiga politicians and militaries he sought support and tried to rally people around him by accusing the Tutsis for the shortcomings of the first Republic. The regional context was ‘favourable’ for this end; in Burundi the repression directed towards Hutus produced more than 100,000 dead in 1972. From mid February in 1973 lists of civil servants, employees, teachers and students were put up where those mentioned are asked to ‘clear out’. It is difficult to establish the number of deaths but the majority of the Tutsi elite inside the country went into exile. It was far from any ‘spontaneous’ violence and the ones most receptive to the propaganda and expressing genuine hatred for the Tutsis were students and pupils that were far too young to have experienced any first hand ‘Tutsi oppression’. Furthermore, there was no external threat whatsoever and basically it was about that the Tutsis should not have the right to the same kind of citizenship as the ‘people’. According to some they should not even have the right to live (Vidal, 1995; Mission d'information sur le Rwanda, 1998:Tome I, 59ff). On 5th of July a coup d'Etat brought the Général-Major Juvénal Habyarimana to the presidential post. The new president claimed to have taken over in order to prevent further massacres (Mission d'information sur le Rwanda, 1998:Tome I, 59ff). If we are to make a synthesis and conclude our brief odyssey into the violence of the two republics we could do it with the words of Willame (1995:107); “the political violence is indeed a mode of production of the political at certain times in the contemporary history of Rwanda: it intervenes in moments where the leading stratum feels its cohesion menaced either by external intrusion – that is when violence take on a genocidal form – or by its internal problems proper”.

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70 Bakiga literally means ‘people from the big mountains’ and before the incorporation into the Rwandan state it is not able to speak of an overarching Kiga-consciousness; the clan was "the beginning and the end of political authority" (Lemarchand, 1970:100).
5 Society Must Be Defended

“Before the Genocide?” Patricie rhetorically says to me. “The events did not only take place in 1994 it had already started way before. Because the Genocide of 1994 was, I would say, the peak of everything. But the events, they had already begun.”

Although I have argued that one ought to do a thorough construction of the social field the limited scope of this work does not allow me to do so. This part is a necessary outline that should prevent as from perceiving the stories told as senseless. As pointed out by El-Bushra and Mukarubuga (1995) any attempt to generalise about war is bound to demean the experiences of individuals caught up in it. But, if we are to consider the genocide as the present *par excellence* and as the critical event we need to establish what kind of event it was. To do this we insert it into a chain of similar events and we must acquaint ourselves with the political background antedating the event, as well as look at some of the significant elements of it. One feature that should strike any student of the genocide in Rwanda is the lack of combining the events of 1994 and the research done on ‘genocide’ at large. In much of the literature on the Rwandan genocide there is simply no attempt whatsoever to define or to deploy a genocide concept, rather ‘genocide’ is taken at face value – ‘since the Holocaust was genocide the events in Rwanda was also genocide’. Needless to say, the Rwandan genocide was genocide although I believe that one ought to insert it into a chain of similar events in order to gain insights what exactly are the similarities with other genocides as well as what are the particularities of the Rwandan genocide.

5.1 Genocide as a Modern Possibility

Society is an objective unity and as such it has to us a *sui generis* character. The social constitution of society is ‘individual psyches’. This does not imply that everyone has the abstract conscience of this unity, this relation. It only implies that each and everyone is involved in a number of social relations, having the feeling of living in a social reality which is there imposing itself onto us whether or not we wish it away (Simmel, 1985:63-65; Berger and Luckman, 1966). We are thus at the interior of society and society is in our interiors. One of the main problems for the world to confront and understand the genocide that took place in Europe during the midst of the 20th century is that we are living in a social world, a socially constructed reality, which is a direct continuation of the European Civilisation that gave us Auschwitz (Bartov, 1996: 67-70; Bauman, 1989). In a sense then, Auschwitz is in our bodies, our *habitus*. As there is no exterior from where we may observe society, there is no absolute vantage-point outside society from where we may observe Auschwitz. Even though, due to the complexity of the problem, “general explanations for genocide simply may not exist” as pointed out by Melson (1992:

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71 Since there is a certain risk that a complete list would be a never ending story I shall mention but a few, either since they are ‘standard’ works/much quoted or that they given the title ought to contain some sort of genocide definition: Adelman & Suhrke,(1999); African Rights (1995); Des Forges *et al* (1999); Prunier (1997); Taylor (1999).
17), we must however as Simmel (1981) poses himself the question “How is society possible?” pose ourselves the painful question how is genocide possible?

Before answering the question above we should however have a look into the epistemological problems concerning genocide studies. Fein (1990:24) states that “the specification of groups covered should be consistent with our sociological knowledge of both the persistence and construction of group identities in society”. To Chalk and Jonahsson (1990) the epistemological problem resides in that meaning of group membership differs throughout history. They here take refuge to the dictum that ‘if people define the situation as real, it is real in its consequences’. Thus, ‘any group’ may be any collectivity that is defined as a group by the perpetrator of genocide (Chalk and Jonahsson, 1990: 25).

One might add that ‘group’ not only differs over time, but also differs from one simultaneous context to another. Inclusive to power is the determination of decisive socialisation processes (such as schooling) and therefore the form of the symbolic violence and the power to produce ‘social reality”; world-making (see Berger & Luckman, 1967:137; Bourdieu, 1987:161 ff). There is an ‘official point of view’, i.e. the point of view of the officials, the authorities; the point of view expressed in official and semi-official discourses. This official discourse makes the world by ascribing what kind of body an individual body is to ‘everybody’; thus objectively it designates an identity, tells people what they are. Official power then produces subjects; it produces selves (see Foucault, 1997: 38-39). This discourse in and through administrative prescriptions, directives and orders tell people what to do given what they are. Whether or not a Jew did consider himself a Jew, she/he still ‘was’ a Jew when confronted with the racial laws of a social reality defining her/him as such. The victim as a ‘Jew’ could neither wish away her/his ‘Jewishness’, as codified by law, nor could she/he wish away the racist structures constructing the social reality in which such a law was not only possible or probable, but ex post facto certain and in that present also True. In the same way, a Tutsi was a Tutsi was a Tutsi. Thus even if race/ethnicity does not exist as a natural principle, it as a codified principle for categorising ‘being’ has a bearing in the social world where it produces groups that do exist in the social world.

We may complement our before-mentioned genocide definition with one proposed by Fein (1990:24): “Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or the lack of threat offered by the victim.” (Fein, 1990:24). It is thus clear that there is a ‘someone’ in whose interest it is to implement genocide. Trying to account for the instrumentality of the choice of genocide as a policy means objectively showing the means to reach ends defined by the ideology, cosmology and opportunities of the perpetrators. In doing so one takes the aims and purposes of the perpetrators/planners seriously, while staying outside their moral universe. For it stands clear that the Rwandan genocide was a state sponsored policy organised by the political leaders in power after the downing of the plane carrying president Habyarimana (African Rights, 1995a; Des Forges et al., 1999; Fein, 1997; IPEP, 2001). The organisers of the genocide, themselves conditioned by the reified History used its elements as a driving force in the fear and hatred that made the genocide
imaginable and possible (De Lame, 1996; Des Forges, 1999:31-95 et passim). The followers’ individual motives all fall within the range of human motives, i.e. co-operation out of fear, norms of obedience, beliefs in the legitimacy of authorities, chances of enrichment etc (Fein, 1997). As this is a sociological work, it has to be concerned with social objects of study. The principle for the logic of things social of the Rwandan genocide was ethnicity/race. Thus, it was in this form things political turned into a policy of mass extermination. This constitutive imaginary was the directing power of the genocide keeping the individual habitus in unison and acting as one – directing the genocidal practice of everybody without necessarily being the reason for anybody in particular (see Durkheim, 1930: 71).

A somewhat simplistic answer to the question of how genocide is possible would be Modern society. Extensive research on pogroms, lynching and massacres do give evidence that people are not reluctant to kill defenceless victims of another group, an Other perceived as not fully human. The difference with genocide is that the killers of the past stopped “when they were sated, drunk, or eager to enjoy their booty; genocides on state order press perpetrators to continue” (Fein, 1990:37). It becomes clear to us “why the performance of genocide has always required a high degree of centralized authority and quasi-bureaucratic organization.” (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990: 28). For Bauman (1989:32), the Holocaust is a “rare but yet significant and reliable test of modern society’s hidden possibilities”, and he quotes Hilberg: ‘The destruction machinery did thus not differ structurally from the organised German society as a whole. The destruction machinery was the organised society in one of its specific roles.” (Bauman, 1989:29, emphasis in original). The genocide of (mainly) Europe’s Jews was a kind of civilised, legalised state-sponsored destructiveness without any historical precedents, however there were anticipations, in a mixture of modernity and pre-modern elements (Bartov, 1996:67; Rubenstein & Roth, 1987: 340). The perhaps first genocide of the 20th century was of the Herero people in German South West Africa 1904. In one single year 80 % of the population was killed and the remaining population were put in missionary run concentration camps where they were used as slave labour or sex slaves. Those who survived the camps were christianised en masse before being distributed as labour to the settlers. The link between the genocide of the Herero, the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide is the “race branding” (Mamdani, 2001:9-13). “The race, the racism is the condition of acceptability for the putting do death in a society of normalisation” (Foucault, 1997:228). As pointed out by Chalk and Jonassohn (1990: 27-28) there is “no evidence that a genocide was ever performed on a group of equals. The victims must not only not be equals, but also clearly defined as something less than fully human”. This group ‘outside the people of [polis]’ Rubenstein & Roth (1987:351-353) labels ‘surplus people’. It should neither seen as absolute nor “merely quantitative” but as a concept denoting a social group that qua group is being regarded as superfluous by the dominant in

\[\text{It is not the scope of this work to examine the difference in nature between Modern genocides, and those genocides of the past, nor if any such labelling except on recent cases, per definition, is anachronistic. The ‘nature’ of the group singled out for extermination is highly relevant here. How the perpetrator defines the victim of course has repercussions on the extent of the genocide and on possible strategies for perpetrators as well as victims (i.e. may targeted individuals ‘convert’ etc.). The definition of the political Self and Other has varied through history; this is the history of political identities. What is crucial in Modern genocides is the rise of bio-power, with its insistence on ‘natural’}\]
society - the ones enjoying the power-knowledge to define the social reality. As such a collectivity, they are outside what Fein (1990:36) calls ‘the universe of obligation’ of the dominant group. A concept that she derives from Durkheim and De la division du travail and that is founded in the notions of “rule” and “collective conscience”. Thus we have that “[o]ffences against persons outside the universe of obligation will not be socially recognized and labelled as crime” (Fein, 1990:36). After all what is racism if not a mean for introducing into the domain of life a cut, a division in between what should live and what should die? Racism is the vital condition for having the right, the legitimate power to kill.

The components, the possibilities, of genocide are inherent to Modern society. It is only the combination of variables that are rare; taken by themselves they are (perceived as) ‘normal’, but on some occasions these components coincide in time and space and genocide becomes a logic, possible course of action. To Rubenstein and Roth (1987:18-19), admitting the ‘rationality’ of genocide, as the most efficient mean to solve a ‘problem’, does not mean condoning it, but rather to lead the way to the posing of pertinent questions regarding ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’, since ‘genocide represents the ultimate expression of the revolution of rationality’. As we are fostered to admire and respect efficiency and planning we have in our understanding of the material development brought about by our civilisation to a large extent failed to recognise the potential of it. The growing mastery of logos and reason (i.e. rational reason), what we could call ‘continued rationalisation’, is what Weber designated the most important feature of Modernity. It is this feature of Modernity that enables the posing of a problem that may be rationally solved. Thus the idea, the possibility to imagine a final solution, is inherent to Modern, Civilised societies. It may in certain conjunctures be the final solution to a group of people put in question and whose existence as such is posed in terms of a problem to solve (see Bauman, 1989: 29-40). As genocide is not sense-less one may thus deduce the logic inherent to Rwandan genocide.

The claim that genocide perpetrators were psychopathic, made by earlier scholars, has largely been falsified by later research (Fein, 1990: 44-45). It seems as ‘ordinary’ people seem fully capable of committing devious acts during circumstances that are not ordinary. To return to the Holocaust it was, with the words of Rubenstein and Roth (1987:231-239); “ordinary officials” carrying out “ordinary tasks”. From the work of Goldhagen (1997) it is clear that most men on most occasions voluntarily killed people in the most gruesome situations and ways. Voluntarily should here be understood as that despite the fact that there were options of extricating themselves from the killings without any tangible consequences, very few men opted out from participating in genocidal killings (Goldhagen, 1997:27-163). Thus, it seems that it is ordinary men that historically have carried out genocide, i.e. normally generated habitus become agents of genocide. As previously pointed out many of the components, and intrinsic characteristics, and it is hard to imagine any racist imaginary, stricto sensu, antedating the modern épistémé and the natural sciences (see Foucault, 1976; 1997; and Chalk & Jonasson, 1990).

73 Fein (1990), like many other Anglo-Saxon writers (see for example Bloom [1990]) simply uses the Durkheimian notion of conscience collective/commune without ever explicitly considering the double meaning of conscience collective/commune in French. If we are to translate the French conscience into English we have to use both conscience and consciousness, which for example is important for our further
including the *modus operandi*, inherent to genocide are ‘normal’ in themselves during ‘normal’ conditions, in other words during ‘normal’ situations.

However, “*it is apparent that genocide, in the sense that it becomes a policy of the state, does not take place under ordinary circumstances but under conditions of crisis for state and stress for society.*” (Melson, 1992:15). It is not hardship as such that leads to genocide, “*but rather the collapse of the normative order, the fact that society no longer seems to make any sense*” (Smith quoted in Fein, 1990:50). It seems that the cause is the occurrence of crisis, i.e. “*disturbances of the social and collective equilibrium*” (Durkheim, 1993:202). The *form* of the field fractures hardship. To bring are reasoning back to the fore of social sciences we could label this state of a given social field *anomic*. During anomic circumstances, ‘normal’, ‘ordinary’ individuals will be fully capable of exercising genocidal powers. On the level of meaning the institutional order of things social is a shield against the terror of meaninglessness, and to be anomic thus means to be exposed this terror. During ‘normal’ circumstances the order of things social are perceived as according to rule and law, *nomos*, and order is upheld either by the acceptance – not recognised force, i.e. symbolic violence – of the order of things by the majority or by overt social control recognised as force (see Durkheim, 1993:210-212). Any society has a history and society is a present society from which ‘past’ and ‘future’ and collective events are unified into a meaningful totality. Therefor legitimisation of the order of things social resides in the ongoing process of keeping the anomic terror at bay. Inclusive to this meaningful totality is legitimate and illegitimate death. (Berger & Luckman, 1967:120-121). However, when society loses its ‘equilibrium’ due to ‘crisis’ or other changes, the social control temporarily loses its potentiality to exercise this influence. As long a social tensions and forces have ‘free play’ and have not been brought into an ‘*equilibrium, the social value scale is undefined and social control is more or less non-existent*’. There simply are no rules for what is possible or impossible, right or wrong (see Durkheim, 1993:210-212). To Durkheim (1993:213) “*the struggle becomes more violent and more painful*” partly due the lower social control, but also due the intensification of battle since “*all categories take part in the battle*”. Thus it echoes a hobbesian view of a time where “*men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition that is called Warre*”. To Hobbes war consists not in actual fighting or battle only, but in the “*known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.*” This is ‘the war of every man against every man’ (Hobbes, 1988:64). But of course, since society has a history, any directing power that will emerge and re-install social order does not do so *ex nihilo*, it is bound to be a *possible* directing power which is generated out of the pre-existing conditions in the ‘social space of possibles’. Moreover, society does not consist of men alone but also of socially constituted groups, and therefore there can not be a ‘war of every man against every man’. I would thus argue that there may not be any ‘rules’, however there will be regularities in the practices also in an anomic order of things, and total anarchy will not prevail. Because this anomic state of

understanding of a concept as class-consciousness, which in French then is *conscience de classe*. In this work, I will deploy the term ‘collective conscience’ as it is commonly used in Anglo-Saxon literature. This is justified since Fein (1990) uses it in it s ‘moral’ sense.
politics, the crisis when meaning and the order of things social hang in the balance is not pure rupture, but the tension of rupture and recuperation, as things possible are being reproduced, re-inscribed into a new possible order of things.

With a Modern State, *i.e.* continued state-formation and continued rationalisation, it is not only possible to formulate different problems on a larger scale but it also possible to orchestrate and administer the solving of the problem, even if the solution would mean large scale killings. Thus it is clear that genocide is something that takes place not despite Civilisation and Modernity, but rather these are the *sine qua non* for a genocide to take. For our understanding of the Rwandan genocide we have to admit that it did not take place at the scandalous limit of Modernity and Civilisation; that Rwandans would be uncivilised barbarians or monsters, not enough Civilised/Colonised by Western knowledge. What many studies (Des Forges *et al.*, 1999; Prunier, 1997; IPEP, 2001; Mamdani, 2001) as well as my own research show, many of the components of the Rwandan genocide were things social that were in place well before the genocide and as such they were perceived as ‘normal’. The *raison d’être* of the Republic was as guardian of the interest of the ‘majority people’. Are there any points where Rwanda stood out as an ‘African exception’ it is the extent to which centralised power penetrated the society (De Lame, 1996:45ff). When in 1994 every instance of the Rwandan State was at the disposal at the plans to carry out a ‘final solution’ it to a large extent was the normal administration that organised the killing, from the government via the prefects down to the burgomasters and the *cellule* leaders. The habit to ask ‘what is your ethnic group?’ - *Ubwoko bwawe ni ubuhe?* - was something which every Rwandan grew up with, not the least when having to deal with the State, because in Rwanda it was normal to categorise social being along the lines of ethnicity. It is not by chance our word category is derived from the Greek *katégoresthai*; to publicly accuse. For the students I met this categorising was something they were confronted with ever from the first day at school, on the playground and the classroom they incorporated their ‘official identity’. The identity card mentioning the ethnic identity of its carrier – Hutu, Tutsi or Twa – existed since the colonial days and the obligation to participate in communal work – *umuganda* – was revived in the mid 1970’s. The call to ‘go to work’ by the authorities in 1994 was in a sense then ‘normal’. Also the barriers and roadblocks where much of the ‘work’ was carried out (*i.e.* controlling identity cards, detaining people awaiting the militias or the army *etc.*) was something that belonged to an order antedating the genocide.

The genocide was the coincidence in time and space of several causal series that were independent in dependency. In that present two different utopian political imaginations were attempted to be realised. The first is of a purified utopia cleansed of its unclean elements and second is of a disciplined utopia. These are two analytically different schemes, they are however not incompatible in practice (see Foucault, 1975:228ff). The ‘pure nation’ is an imagined political community where the Tutsis symbolically were excluded from the realm of official life. The disciplinary [polis] was the
developmental state cross-ruling the political territory where the 'seeing' surveillance of power was applied onto the individual bodies. The disciplinary power operated these two political dreams in a dual mode; by the binary di-vision of normal and abnormal citizens, Hutu and Tutsi. As well as the forced assignation of the differential distribution; who is who (what he/she is supposed to be), how a Hutu and a Tutsi are recognised, told apart. The directing power codified in the constitutive imaginary is what renders the actions their coherence by bringing together in time and space, a present here and now, two states of social being, of reified history.

5.2 Purging Rwanda

How then was genocide possible in Rwanda? I hold it likely that the explanation lies somewhere in the insight delivered by Mamdani (2001:195-196). He gives the example of Mbonampeka who resigned as the minister of justice in 1992 since he was tired of the political vacillation of Habyarimana as manifested when Mbonampeka issued a warrant that never was effected for Mugesera, the prime Hutu-power ideologue, after his by now infamous ‘Bugesera speech’ (see further below). He successively held different positions, first he became more and more hostile to the FPR and then finally he ended up as the minister of justice in the post-1994 government in exile, a position from which he stated that “In a war, you can’t be neutral. If you are not for your country, are you not for its attackers?” Thus, it is the ‘story’ of becoming a génocidaire. I further hold it possible that by gathering and analysing the trajectories of a number of people at different levels of the Rwandan social web resides an answer to the question ‘How is genocide possible?’ A number of things indicate this. For example does De Lame (1996:73ff et 293ff) state that ethnicity on her arrival in Rwanda in 1988 seemed to be no more than a purely political instrument for discrimination, and not at all as an essential feature of the ‘peasants’ identity’. True enough ethnicity was there but it was not something more serious than it was the subject of inoffensive jokes during the conversations at the cabaret (a place where you gather for a couple of beers and a few snacks). Most of the students spoke of a materially hard upbringing, where there was not much place for ‘childhood’. Even though you were a child you had to make your contribution to the household by collecting woods, herding the cattle etc. Most of them do however speak about the social bonds between neighbours, Hutu and Tutsi alike, in bright terms. Ethnicity as something acutely problematic is of a more recent date, and then it is problematic only to those whose identity is being put into question. Either because they belonged to the Tutsi minority or they are the result of a mixed marriage. It is not until the events in Burundi that produces an influx of refugees to Rwanda that the ethnic cleavages are being reactivated on the hill De Lame (1996) studied. She then from a distance learnt who were dead, who were alive and who had become génocidaires. It seems that many people,

74 Rwanda was until 2001 administratively divided down to the level of ‘ten households’ – Nyumba Kumi (which remains). The next level was Cell (Sérive), followed by Sector (Segiteri), then Commune (Komine) and finally Prefecture (Prefegitire). The change of names to older, ‘indigenous’ ones seems to be a symbolic cut with previous orders (personal information, see also International Crisis Group, 2001:31ff).
75 The interplay between these two countries seems to have been somewhat downplayed in past analysis. For example does Lemarchand mean that he previously has not enough put emphasis/realised the dependency between them (personal communication).
on different levels, got caught in what De Lame following Catharine and David Newbury calls "double fear". The fear of the State repression and the fear of a restoration of a feudal order identified with the FPR. The constitutive imaginary channelled this fear and aggression in the shape of ethnic passions: pride of being Hutu and fear of the Tutsi that might reclaim his power and belongings and hence his supremacy. Thus, it seems as by some sort of social alchemy normal persons turned into ferocious killers. As Gaspard expressed it to me: "[T]oday when you see them they are normal persons, they themselves cannot explain how this phenomenon could take place like that, they do not know the causes. When you ask them to explain they say that it was something that unexpectedly happened, like a strange force that imposed itself."

Using the notion of the ‘war of the races’ makes us understand the stakes during the genocide; the right to life and death inside the divided population where it is established a positive correlation of life and death, ‘the more you make die the more you will live’. In this binary political analysis, the framework for analysis is that of war; ‘to live you have to massacre your enemies’. You have to defend society (see Foucault, 1997:227). But from whom had the Rwandan society to be defended? It had to be defended against the pawns of FPR, of ‘Tutsi power’. The Tutsis were ‘those that should die’ (the theologian Ntezimana in Chrétien, 1997:311). Or as the former minister Mbonampeka expressed it to a journalist in December 1994 during an interview conducted in Goma: ‘Mbonampeka: The Tutsis that have been killed weren’t killed because they were Tutsis. They are dead because they were pro-FPR. Journalist: Including women and children? Mbonampeka: So women and children can’t be pro-FPR according to you? Journalist: From what age? Mbonampeka: That’s the kind of remark we Africans cannot understand…For us it is the struggle of ethnic groups” (in Chrétien, 1997:311). In this ‘war of races’ which intelligibility is exactly that of war the subject of history does not only live more by killing the degenerate foreign element in the body politic, also by this final struggle of purging society of the unclean will the ‘race’ regenerate itself as it rises up and faces death (see Foucault, 1997:230ff). This final war is not exclusively State business because the right to kill is delegated to the population at large which by its exposure to death and total self-destruction will be cleansed of its unclean elements. Thus one of the ‘representatives’ of the displaced population at the Kibeho refugee camp, one of the foot soldiers of genocide, expressed it in a similar way: No it was not genocide, ‘It was a war’. And the women killed? ‘It’s normal, they were vicious: look at all these Tutsi girls who are having abortions under the pretext that they were raped!’ (in Chrétien, 1997:312). Robert Kajuga76, ‘le Président’, who headed the Interahamwe militia defended his participation in the genocide in a number of interviews in the midst of the events, he did not fear facing an international tribunal: “I will go voluntarily. I am innocent and honest.” When asked if the killings were organised he replied, ‘They are not organised […] you have to see the situation: the President died, and after three hours, the population really did

76 He merits a study himself as he came from a family that had changed its Tutsi identity in 1959 (some authors claim that his mother was Tutsi and his father Hutu, and thus was not in need of any official change of ethnic identity). The fact that many members of his family, including his father, were killed point to the unitary direction of the genocide (a ‘racial war’ where the target was the Tutsis) without any master mind
not understand what was going on. They saw their neighbours next door who had guns to kill everyone – well, they just defended themselves.” On the co-operation with the army he said, “If the army asks us to leave a spot, we leave it, but we help the army to defend the country.” Further on he states, “The government authorises us. We go in behind the army. We watch and learn…We have to defend our country.” (in African Rights, 1995a:114-116).

Thus war is not only the mean by which society is understood, but also the continuation of politics, in the sense that war is not politics continued by other means but politics is the continuation of the war by other means (Foucault, 1997:16ff). Thus the war had never ended, there never was ‘a peace’. Rather there was a state of being resembling of peace where the battle was in suspense residing as a strategic possibility for to be reactivated.

The genocidal powers seem to have been founded in a heterogeneous political imaginary. Given that the state of being was anomic it was possible to make people kill, but as I have evoked above, anomie does not imply anarchy. The law underpinning the genocidal powers was not the law of the legalists, but something more, it was the directing power as founded in the political imaginary, the power-knowledge constituting Rwanda as such. So, the political disorder, the prevailing anomie, paved way for the establishment of a new order that is not law-bound but rather regular as it does not arise ex-nihilo – everything is not possible and anything does not go. Whenever one notices the establishment of what Durkheim (1930:50-51) calls a ‘directing power’ (pouvoir directeur) its first and principle function is to make respect the beliefs, the traditions, the collective practices, i.e. to defend the collective consciousness against all enemies, within as well as outside. It thus becomes the symbol, the living expression of it in the eyes of ‘everybody’. Therefor the life, bio-power inherent to it, communicates itself with reference to itself, as the affinities of ideas communicates with words which represent them; metaphors. It is thus not question of an ‘ideology’ whichever but rather ontology. Thus it is not just ‘law’, it is no longer a social function more or less important; it is the incarnation of the collectivity as such. It makes thus part of the authority that this collectivity exercises on the consciences, and it is in and through this, it has its force, its power. As such, once constituted, without breaking with the source (the nature of the affinity), from where it emanates and from which it nourishes itself, it becomes nevertheless an autonomous factor of social life. Hence, the ‘Rwandan History and its ‘war of the races’ is this official, codified collective consciousness. It is the both the reason and the condition for the imagined political community – ‘the Hutu Republic’ – which is the principal guardian and defender, as well as the ultimate representation, of this collective conscienciousness which is the ‘Hutu cause’ based in the Rwandan constitutive imaginary.

conductor – at the same time as it was not anarchy it was not necessarily any one directing the genocide at all the points (see African Rights, 1995a:115-116).
5.3 A Rwandan Crisis

In this part, we are briefly going to look at some of the components that were the prerequisite for the possibility of the genocide. Instead of making a chronological odyssey I have chosen to subdivide it into different analytical parts. Admitting that this part empirically is rather flimsy – this is due to lack of space, time and material available – I shall outline an introduction to an understanding of the genocide as an empirical event.

The critical event, the Rwandan Crisis, is the conjunction of independent causal series in a historic present. This sort of independence in dependency enables, renders possible the historical event as such (Bourdieu, 1988:174). We could imagine different spheres as separates worlds, sub-fields, that make part of the same universe; ‘Rwandan society’. That the political struggle within the field of power was becoming increasingly intense during the years leading up to the genocide is beyond any reasonable doubt. Be it on the local level, where the patron-client ties could stretch from at least burgomaster level to the top of the Government, in the shape of sector leaders or burgomasters that were “afraid of loosing the few crumbs of power from which they benefited” (Willame quoted in De Lame, 1996:288). Be it on the national level where the ‘multiparty’ system brought with it a fear among elite groups of having to share the, until that present, exclusive access to power and goods. To this struggle a new political force, the FPR, came that violently cut in on the conversation stating its rights to be a part of the Rwandan [polis]. From 1990 and on all aspects of Rwandan politics inscribed itself into a defensive logic. At stake was not only the defence of ones loaf of bread or crumbs, but also the rhetoric and propaganda followed that of war and defence; society had to be defended and all abuses were explained by this need to defend oneself (De Lame, 1996:302ff). To this comes that the elite-pie was getting increasingly smaller and an exacerbating misery for the Rwandan in general.

5.3.1 The Rise and Fall of ‘Development’ – the Misery of Rwanda

Food production increased greatly from the early 1960’s and onwards, much due to the land reforms and following redistribution of land, and turning it from pastureland to agricultural land. Inclusive to the redistribution was handing out land to these who were before land-less or had little, thus the social revolution meant a a de facto improvement of life chances to a great many (Uvin, 1998:53ff et 186ff; Mamdani, 2001: 103ff). From 1973 up until 1994 the “local administrative machinery grew on a steady diet of coercive practices whose means were justified as ‘customary’ and ends as ‘developmental’” (Mamdani, 2001:144). In 1976 Rwanda had a lower per capita income than any of its neighbours, but by 1987 it had a higher per capita income than any of the neighbouring countries, the lowest debt and the highest rate of GNP growth in the region. What if the machinery stalls? In the middle of the 1980’s food production began stagnating and by the close of the 1980’s the World Bank was naming Rwanda as one of the three worst food producing Sub-Saharan countries (Uvin, 1998: 53ff; Mamdani, 2001:146ff). Willame (1995:143) speaks of a “uniform poverty sometimes close to misery” that was
omnipresent within the rural population, *i.e.* the ‘average Rwandan’ already before the 1990 war. The implications are clear if we realise that 95% of the population lived as peasantry (De Lame, 1996:45). To this comes that the war that commenced in 1990 meant the internal displacement of people from one of the regions where food production was the highest in the country, as well as it brought with it demands for emergency food and housing. As most up to one million persons were displaced (Uvin, 1998:56 *et al*). In a field study, Marysse *et al.* (1995:9 *et 35ff*) shows that between 1990 and 1992 the household’s’ expenses for auto-consumption augmented by 30% to reach 65% of the total expenses. This against a background where the *per capita* consumption diminished by 5% a year between 1983 and 1990 and the distribution was becoming increasingly unequal. In 1990 a ‘rich’ countryside household (10th decil) disposed monetary revenue 180 times that of ‘poor’ household (1st decil), in 1992 the ratio was 485 to 1. In less than one day a rich household would earn the amount corresponding to what a poor household would earn in a year! Thus, this unease expressed in a deteriorating environment where more and more of the meagre income simply went to feeding oneself. In other words, to stay alive on a diet that got more and more starch-laden and protein-poor since the households more and more tended to eat what they could grow themselves. Unease also towards the Authorities, although its agents were issued from one’s own group, peasantry, they by the simple fact of working for the State and being salaried did no longer belong to one’s own group. These, businessmen and people salaried by the huge community of development expatriates lived a life as a ‘fourth ethnie’ which distinguishing features were those of a ‘Europeanised’, ‘Modern’ life style. In this symbolic space the elite kept their rural anchoring and used local signs of reified tradition in combination with modern consumption patterns. In a purely material universe they had left the mass of people, the salaried countryside population in 1990 earned five times the medium income, which the great number found themselves below (Vidal, 1991:28; Marysse *et al*., 1995: 83ff; Willame, 1995:146ff).

The situation was the worst for the younger landless generation. They could not ever expect to acquire land or even marrying since it in Rwandan culture is important that a young man marry only when he has enough land or income to provide for his family. The decline in food production *per capita* was steep and the increase in marriage age was rapid. Moreover, in Kigali, mainly, there was the creation of a *lumpenproletariat* of young men wandering around the streets reduced to begging. Also within the population at large their was the existence of a virtual underclass generation, in 1991 57,5 % of the population was less than 20 years old and the conditions of their conditioning were that their anticipated prospects were not bright. Further, land was more and more concentrated in the hands of a few, and to a larger and larger extent these few consisted of state civil servants being the owners leasing land to families that used it to cultivate just enough to make ends meet (Vidal, 1998a; Uvin, 1998:199 *et passim*).
5.3.2 "Do Not Let Yourselves be Invaded!" \(^{77}\)

5.3.2.1 Go Tell it on the Hills – The Enemy at the Gates \(^{78}\)

On October 1, 1990, the RPF\(^{29}\) launched a surprise attack from Uganda that almost reached Kigali. It was mainly, but not solely, constituted of the descendants of the 1959-63 refugees. Despite its few troops, about 4,000, it was a real military threat since it was a highly disciplined and combat-trained force. The nucleus had for years fought with the Museveni National Resistance Army (NRA), and many of its leaders, such as the now president Paul Kagame, had held high posts in the Ugandan armed forces after the Museveni take-over. The advance was stopped mainly due to rapidly flown-in French troops. Despite the initial success the FPR attack ought to be labelled a military failure, after having been pushed back it turned into guerrilla warfare where the FPR controlled small but varying parts of the North-eastern region and some parts of the Akagera National Park area. Initially the war produced about 500 dead civilians and some 350,000 IDPs, and perhaps more importantly it eroded the political middle ground. Contrary to the expectations of the FPR the local inhabitants showed little or no enthusiasm over being ‘liberated’, rather the RPF controlled areas were emptied on people. After the February 1993 offensive, where RPF broke the cease-fire following the massacres of Tutsis inside Rwanda the RPF controlled area was extended and the number of IDPs almost reached the million (Uvin, 1998:61; Mamdani, 2001:185ff).

What triggered the RPF attack in the first place? The first precondition is of course the fact that there were people who considered themselves Banyarwanda outside Rwandan territory and that were not allowed to return to Rwanda. Apart from large numbers of Banyarwanda that had left the country as labour migrants during colonialism there were mainly three waves of (Tutsi) refugees that took off to settle elsewhere. In 1959-61 the Tutsi elite displaced from power positions were involved, the second wave (1963-64) included broader sections and was triggered by the repression that followed the armed attacks from the former refugee group. The next outflow took place in 1973. Existing studies indicate that 40-70 % of all Tutsi refugees fled during the first two waves and that about 400,000 to 600,000 Rwandans lived in exile throughout the Great Lakes region. Within Uganda the Banyarwanda in 1959 actually constituted the sixth largest ‘ethnic’ group and was constituted by different waves of immigrants. The Tutsis who had fled Rwanda in the years 1959-1964 had by 1990 reached a number of around 200,000 (Mamdani, 2001:159ff). The two Rwandan Republics consisted of hard-liners when it came to repatriation; there was no way they could accept any Rwandans coming back – the country was unable to host them. Given the small surface of Rwanda and that much of its cultivated area consisted of steep slopes in addition with a rapid population growth this Malthusian argument at first sight seems reasonable enough. However, contrary to many of the myths on Rwandan overpopulation this was more

\(^{77}\) The same chapter title is to be found in Des Forges et al. (1999).

\(^{78}\) The title of this chapter has Lemarchand (1970) as its source of inspiration (his work contains a chapter named "The inyenzi at the gates").
of a political argument than anything else. Yes, Rwanda was, and is, densely populated but its potentialities for agricultural production was far from reached. As the land available to ‘ordinary’ cultivators actually diminished members of the elite bought out the poor and established themselves as absentee landlords. According to a government study done in 1991 the richest 16% of landowners held 43% of the land and the poorest land-owning household had to make living out of holdings in the order of ¼ - ¾ of a hectares (less than one acre of land). Furthermore, these figures do not reveal the whole truth since they do not show the proportions of land acquired, and lost, on the black market as well as that publicly owned land was appropriated and managed by local officials. To this discrepancy came that it included also a regional and political biases, not only were Tutsis discriminated against but also Hutu others than those from the home region of the political leadership (see Gasana, 1995:214ff; Uvin, 1998 _passim_; Des Forges et al., 1999:45ff). Thus existing land was an instrument used by the powers to be in order to pay as political prebendials and spoils and most likely this was the reason for the continuous denial of any rights of anyone but the people (‘the great majority’) in Rwanda to exercise any rights. Before the rise of RPF as an articulated group, there virtually did not exist any _Banyarwanda_ but the Rwandans inside the Rwandan territory. At least this was the case for the younger generation that had not experienced the previous exodus first hand (personal information).

Why then did repatriation rise as an articulated interest in the late 1980’s? We could here again think of the genocidal event as the nexus of several, more or less independent, causal series coinciding in social time and space. Mamdani’s (2001) main argument is that the creation of RPF at this point in time and space is as the answer to an Ugandan citizenship crisis, i.e. the establishment of the demarcation of the Ugandan [polis]. Hence, in a way the RPF attack was the exportation of an Ugandan crisis. Already in the 1960’s there were pressure exerted on the Ugandan government by former Hutu labour immigrants that they should seek to stop the turmoil created by Tutsi refugees raiding Rwanda. Further, the first Obote period saw and ‘indigenisation’ of Ugandan politics that meant that refugees were stripped of any civil rights including the right to legal employment. In a sense, the Amin coup in 1971 was a salvation for the refugees. During the Idi Amin years the central power’s relation to refugees inside Uganda in general were cordial, much due to that it needed them in the armed forces, thus refugees became recognised as part of the ‘terror machinery’. This does not imply that the foundation of today’s RPF were built on the ashes of the Amin regime, many of the ones to be leading figure heads in the movement were secondary students at the time and joined the anti-Amin forces. For example was Fred Rwigyema who led the RPF forces when they entered Rwanda on October 1 from the mid 1970’s part of Museveni’s forces. At the end of the Amin regime refugees in general were turned into scapegoats for all shortcomings in the country: economic; brutality and terror _etc_. The

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79 I use the term RPF/FPR to designate the _Front Patriotique Rwandaise_ as a political movement as well as its armed branch the RPA/APR (_Armée Patriotique Rwandaise_). This is a deliberate simplification.

80 For any account to be complete, we should have to establish a ‘complete’ account for the sort of refugees in all the neighbouring countries as well as elsewhere in the world. However arbitrarily we have to circumvent it to focus on Uganda, in which after all the roots of the armed attack are to be found.

81 This section is based on (Otunnu, 1999a), (Otunnu, 1999b) and (Mamdani, 2001:159-184).
second Obote regime (1980-1986) started out by heavy reprisals against refugees, including the Rwandans, who had fought on the ‘wrong’ side in the civil war. One of the reasons for more and more Rwandans rallying to the support of Museveni was the need for the protection. When Museveni and the National Resistance Army (NRA) came into power in 1986 much of the backbone of its forces was of Rwandan origin. However, the destiny for the Rwandans inside Uganda was not as bright as one might think. As Museveni had to seek wider support for keeping his forces together and recycle the military victory into a permanent power-hold, tensions inside the central power rose and their were ‘indigenous’ demands that the ‘foreigners’ should be put outside. To this came that the refugees, mainly the Rwandans, again were used as scapegoats for socio-economical problems such as unemployment and access to land and water. In addition, the Rwandans inside the NRA were accused of having committed atrocities during the repression of insurgencies, something which was probably true, but they were not the only ones having committed them. However, they were the only ones taking the blame. After the military victory the Rwandans begun getting more and more overlooked when it came to promotions, it seems as this discrimination made many of the frustrated Rwandans turn to existing networks/organisations of Rwandans that were already politically organised qua Banyarwanda. The first Rwandan refugee organisation in the region was RANU (Rwanda Alliance for National Unity). It was set up in Kampala, but then migrated to Nairobi only to resettle in Kampala in the late 1980’s. More than anything else it was an umbrella organisation hosting various networks and serving as a forum for discussions. In 1987 it was renamed RPF. To the struggle for power positions inside Ugandan State, mainly the armed forces, came that there was also an internal struggle over the leadership of RPF. As late as 1988 the leading view was to settle for peaceful resettlement in Rwanda and work for naturalisation of refugees in their host societies. As the situation for the Rwandans exacerbated in Uganda, they increasingly leaned towards an armed repatriation as the only means. Thus, the rivalling factions wanted to get the upper hand in the internal leadership struggle by being the party leading the military attack on Kigali. Further, more and more defectors from the Habyarimana regime as well as businessmen came to join the RPF something that was seen as a sign of the erosion of the Habyarimana regime’s political ground. The result of it all was that on the night of September 30 approximately 4,000 troops of the Ugandan NRA left their barracks marching ‘home’, and they literally threw away their Ugandan military insignia as they crossed the border of their patria on October 1.

Many of the leaders of the movement were Tutsis, but far from all and it seems as it was a broad-based diaspora political force that took on Kigali. Simply stating that it should be a power-thirsty elite in quest for power, or even restoring ‘Tutsi-power’, brings us dangerously close to the propaganda of the Habyarimana powers to be. Thus, according to Lemarchand (1998), the only reasonable way to grasp the violence is to comprehend it as a discourse. He continues by quoting Richards: ‘War itself is a type of text – a violent attempt to tell a story or to ‘cut in on the conversation of others’ [...]’.

82 Mamdani (2001:168) here says ‘Fred Rugyema’, this must however be a spelling error.
Understanding war as text and discourse is not an intellectual affectation but a vital necessity, because only when ‘war talk’ is fully comprehended is it possible for conciliators to outline more pacific options in softer tones” (Lemarchand 1998: 9). As it is the RPF invasion brought the existence of exiled Rwandans to the fore of the Rwandan field of power, as well as it spread the words on the hills. Before the Rwandans, at least the younger generation, inside ignored the very existence of the refugees, “We who were inside the country we didn’t know that there were other Rwandans who were abroad, when I grew up I thought that the only Rwandans were those who lived in Rwanda” (Gaspard). So even if the RPF attack in a sense initially was a strategic failure in military terms it made an argument on the identity of Rwandans that was heard throughout Rwanda. Given the military victory the argument was even more successful on establishing new modes for producing Rwandan ‘selves’.

5.3.2.2 Party Politics, Militias and Mass Media

I do realise that it may not be correct to speak of ‘mass media’, ‘party politics’ or ‘militias’ as fully constituted as relatively autonomous sub-fields in a strict bourdieusian sense. But I regard it as satisfying heuristic tool for our understanding of the Rwandan field of power, i.e. the political field, needless to say they here solely serve an analytical purpose, in real time and the social world they were deeply intertwined.

The late 1980’s and early 1990’s saw some radical changes in the Rwandan political landscape. There was internal pressure on an opening of the political system in the shape of networks of intellectuals as well as there was international pressure. In 1991 there was a revision of the constitution that would allow for a multi-party system and this year five parties were registered. The MRND (Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour la démocratie et le développement) was born out of the former only legal party in Rwanda; the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement. The change of name did signify more than mere nominalism, they did keep the abbreviation that meant that they could play on an aura of legitimacy and stability. At the same time the party was cleansed of any element of a broad-based party; regionally as well as ethnically. It was a real transition to ethnicism of the party. The MRD (Mouvement démocratique républicain) was the re-birth of the party of the first republic. It enjoyed popularity much due to the legitimacy it could derive from the old MRD-PARMEHUTU as the guardian of the ‘little people’ and the improvements of life for a great number that the first republic had brought about. There were also a Parti social démocrate (PSD) that quite early on was perceived as a (south) regionalist party, as well as a Parti libéral (PL) that was considered a Tutsi party. The four latter parties formed an opposition cartel against the MRND that forged four points. It rejected any ethnic or regional ideology; claimed profound changes of the political regime towards more than nominal democracy; sincere negotiations with the FPR and a national conference on the questions of ethnic and regional divisions. In 1992 the FPR concluded an alliance with the opposition, henceforth named Forces démocratique pour le changement (FDC), with the objective to overthrow the regime with democratic means (Nsengiyaremye, 1995:248-251). Once the process set in
motion a vast flora of smaller parties emerged, many of them rallying to support the president Habyarimana who at this stage also held the posts of Minister of Defence, Prime Minister as well as head of the FAR (Force Armée Rwandaise) and the Gendarmerie. Under pressure from the opposition and Western allies, Habyarimana had to appoint a Prime Minister other than himself. After some bargaining a transition Government was formed where the post of PM went to the ranks of the opposition. Inclusive to the new Government’s agenda was to negotiate a peace with the FPR, evaluate and re-organise the administration, regulate the refugees issue and hold general elections (Nsengiyaremye, 1995:251ff). As tensions rose higher in the field of power the network centred around Habyarimana, the akazu (the little house) as well as others lower down who saw their grip of prestige and power menaced by the tendencies towards a new order, turned to alternative strategies to cling on to power. Apart from blocking decisions that would mean to implement the agreed upon Arusha Accords the creation of disorder in the shape of ‘popular ethnic violence’ that de facto meant a ‘legitimate’ need to by force restore and maintain order was the strategy par excellence (see further below). One of the points where the powers to be were the crankiest was to integrate FPR forces into the ranks of the FAR (Force Armée Rwandaise) (Nsengiyaremye, 1995:251ff). As tensions grew higher and the political competition harsher ‘Hutu Power’ separated out from the other parties. Out of the MRND came the Coalition pour la défense de la République (CDR), and all the other major parties split into two factions; one ‘Power’ and one ‘Moderated’ following the stance vis à vis the Arusha Accords (Chrétien et al., 1995; 217ff; Mamdani, 2001:210ff). One of the domains where party struggle was carried out was literally on the streets, either by organising demonstrations or party meetings to show ones strength and cohesion, or by veritable street fights in between party militias.

At the origin, these militias were not militias stricto sensu. In 1992 the Interahamwe was formed as the MRND Youth section. It was the appropriation of ‘leisure associations’ that were a kind of football supporter clubs. Interahamwe was centred on a charismatic garçon de ville, Robert Kajuga (Chrétien et al., 1995:23-24 et passim). To the open ‘Power branch’ that had broken out from the former single party, the CDR, the Impuzamigambi (‘Those with a single purpose’) Youth group was tied. As these two youth groups early on were deployed to disturb the meetings of other parties than MRND or CDR, other parties soon followed and formed their own youth groups engaging one another in violence. As violence was stepped up the Interahamwe and the Impuzamigambi soon were transformed into militias undertaking military training (Chrétien et al., 1995: passim; Des Forges et al., 1999: 54ff; Mamdani, 2001: 208ff). To this came the influx of Burundian refugees following the

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83 The members of the elite who gathered in Kigali remained tight links to the communes of origin, which they would often visit. Very often, they served as direct link when it came to implementing policies out on the hills. This structure overlapped with the group of people forming a network surrounding Habyarimana. Within this network, one finds an inner circle the akazu, which mainly consisted of people from Habyarimana’s home region and where Mme Habyarimana and her relatives were the major players. Within the akazu there were persons who exercised power overtly holding power positions as prefects or secretaries within the presidential realm or as corporate heads and others who did not (any longer) hold official office.

84 The Arusha Accords signed in January 1993 foresaw power sharing in form of a broad based Government of National Unity, the integration of the RPF into the Rwandan Armed Forces and a Commission on Reconciliation. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda now has its seat there.

85 Les solidaires, sometimes said to mean ‘those who work together’ (for example Des Forges et al., 1999), sometimes said to mean ‘the solidarian fighters’ (Chrétien et al., 1995).
military putsch in Burundi in 1993, where Ndaye the country’s first elected Hutu president was ousted by the Tutsi-dominated army, this produced unrest and ‘appeasement operations’ by the government forces (i.e. massacres of rural Hutus). The arming and training of militiamen amongst the refugees was well underway and far from a secret in 1993. Judging from eyewitnesses’ accounts Burundian refugees were among the most ferocious and brutal killers. Villagers under pressure from authorities to kill their neighbours would at times have ‘Burundians’ carry out the killing, and even Rwandan militias would threaten victims with bringing them to the ‘Burundians’ (African Rights, 1995a:63-64). The party politics and competition opened anticipated possibilities for a number of persons. Local party leader flew the party flag outside their homes or businesses and could arrange animated meetings that were the previous unique prerogative of the MRND officials. Also to those unemployed and landless and so far without any prospects, the parties’ youth groups/militias opened up the possibility to earn some money and to be someone by being part of something (see Chrétien et al., 1995; Des Forges et al., 1999).

With the introduction of competition for power within a field of party politics went the process of an establishment of a field of mass media. For a long time mass media in Rwanda were limited to official government voices such as Radio Rwanda and some weekly magazines plus a few monthly church magazines86. In 1987 a new weekly magazine saw the daylight; Kanguka (‘wake up’). A businessman formerly close to the Habyarimana family launched a critical stance vis à vis the regime in it. The founder and the staff less and less timidly denounced the abuses of the regime, as well as the framework analysis of Rwanda was not in terms of ethnicity, but rather in terms of an opposition rich-poor. Kanguka was above all an iconoclast paper. The style was not entirely new to Rwanda, Kinyamateka (the catholic monthly) had a similar approach in its opposition days. Taking up the challenge, in terms of sales, the Catholic Church tried to revive Kinyamateka. It enjoyed some advantages over any competition, apart for the official journals it was the only one to have a national network for distribution. In addition, the fact that the archbishop until 1990 was part of the MRND central committee ensured a relative safety for the staff. Kinyamateka began to publicly denounce the corruption within the government as well as point out to its regional bias that was contrasting with the official demagogy claiming its popular and rural anchoring. In doing so the editorial staff broke with the pro-Habyarimana stance higher up in the church hierarchy (Chrétien et al., 1995:20ff; Des Forges et al., 1999:45). As the circle around Habyarimana got under pressure and they did not find the legal means to fight back, combined with increasing international pressure, they launched their own journal which was to defend the ethnicism as the raison d’être for the Rwandan state and the present regime. When Kangura (wake it up!) saw the daylight its articles were not only direct responses to the ones in Kanguka but the first page was often the same, in addition to this the regime from time to time stopped the latter from being published or arrested its editor in chief. The persons behind the journal, some of

86 The genesis of a mass media field and its role in the genocide merits a study in itself. There have been studies undertaken on the issue, the most notorious ought to be Chrétien et al (1995), but to my knowledge there has not been any study concerned with the internal logic of the field as such, which should probably reveal interesting features of how its internal struggles may have propelled the genocide. This kind of information is available in the work mentioned but it is not its explicit study concern.
them now detained at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, claim to have acted on behalf of Mme Habyarimana. Following the Habyarimana regime’s backing down and seeking an honourable retreat strategy on the press issue after the trial of the chief editor of Kinyamateka there was veritable ‘spring of the Rwandan press’ in 1990. Most of the journals had at the outset a rather moderate tone on ‘the ethnic issue’ and expressed their favour to a multiparty system. The only journal to claim that demokarasi was a political suicide to the Hutus is Kangura who describes itself as ‘the voice that seeks to wake up and guide the majority people’.

The Kangura editor in chief, Hassan Ngeze, had a temporarily falling out with the akazu since he was too much running his own race. The salvation for Kangura and Ngeze was the RPF invasion on October 1st 1990. Following this, he and his staff again enjoyed the support from the regime. In the issue following the invasion Kangura publishes a ‘found’ plan dating from 1962 where an ‘unknown Tutsi’ declares a programme on how the Tutsis are to colonise the whole region. In 1991 a law on a ‘relative liberty of press’ was passed. En passage we could note that when the number of journals rose, without obliterating that the majority of journals were not bent on extremism, 11 out of the forty publications created in this year had more or less strong links to the akazu. People in general was also very much aware of the hate magazines semi-official standing (Chrétien et al., 1995:24ff)

Meanwhile Radio Rwanda continued a rather sleepy routine glorification of the president of the Republic and the people surrounding him. In they eyes of Kangura this was not zeal enough in a moment of crisis. As in many other cases when a ‘sick element’ in the body politic was pointed out by this journal it ipso facto gave consequences for the person targeted; the director of Radio Rwanda and ORINFOR (Office Rwandais d’Information) was sacked a few days after the critique in Kangura. He was replaced by Ferdinand Nahimana.

In Rwanda, radio is the mass media since there was about one radio on every thirteen people, and the authorities to address people (Chrétien et al., 1995:57), regularly used it. Given the more and more extremist derive of Radio Rwanda Habyarimana had to sack Nahimana who temporarily regained his post at NUR, only to return at the head of the private Radio station RTLM (Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines) that was to be a ‘rural radio’; since most people live on the hills they should have a forum where they could address the authorities as well as ‘civil society’ (i.e. NGOs etc.). The fraternity with Kangura, was obvious. It attracted big audiences by playing musique congolaise and breaking with the rather dull official messages of Radio Rwanda. The events in Burundi rendered RTLM as militant and extreme as Kangura. Also RTLM was semi-official, it used the transmitters and frequencies of Radio Rwanda as well as the power, literally, came from the neighbouring presidential palace’s generator (Chrétien et al., 1995:66ff et passim). Between the founding of RTLM and the genocide there was only nine months, but it was enough for it to siege the written media. Sometimes literally, by employing the journalists, or having them as guests radio hosts. Also by dictating what was the ‘popular voice’, in a sort of an audience rating dictatorship and by having people in the rural communities, who always expressed themselves with a surprising ease, live on air. RTLM could also allow to mix the
popular Congolese music with ‘hate songs’ by popular singers in a traditional Rwandan style that were to extreme too go on air on Radio Rwanda. They would air them ten or fifteen times a day until people knew them by heart. Even if you did not agree with their message you would listen since if the designated someone you could be sure that the Interahamwe would arrive at the home of that person within hours or the next day. So “also prudent people should absolutely listen to this radio, in case they were being mentioned” (Musangamfura in Chrétien et al., 1995:73).

So what we have is a ‘field of mass media’ with its proper logic and its proper struggles, it was far from autonomous but was not entirely submitted to the authorities in place. It was directly connected with the central power as well as the extremist fora served as media for the ideas that could not be transmitted through the official channels due to the regimes need to stay put with the donor community. It was the arena in which fights over power took place, be they inside the presidential palace, or be it the party politics going on outside it. This latter field of party politics, including the militias, had also separated out as a relatively autonomous sub-field within the field of power.

5.3.2.3 The Discourse of ‘Self-Defence’

The fact that Rwandans living outside Rwanda were misrecognised as Rwandans within that present state of the Rwandan field made it easier to produce a discourse where the ‘invaders’ were demonised (see Appendix VI for examples). As it was, they were literally outside the Rwandan political territory when they started to cut in on the conversation. The war made the discourse, propelled by extremist media and authority officials on all levels, of the invaders as monarchists whose only interest was the restoration of feudalism and Hutu servitude seem reasonable. The logic of this prophecy of a ‘final war of the races’ one finds in the constitutive political imaginary, as it is recycled in the ‘Hutu ideology’ in self-fulfilling prophecies announced in the mass media; in these ‘predictions’ a final combat on life and death appeared (Chrétien et al., 1995:131). Many of the similarities of the propaganda used before and during the genocide stems from the fact that it followed the same logic since it emanated from the same social context, i.e. the directing power was the same. At the same time one cannot exclude deliberate co-ordination on a central level (Des Forges et al., 1999:65). In a document found in Butare an unknown author explicitly draws on a book on ‘the psychology of publicity and propaganda’. The author advocates the use of “lies, exaggeration, ridicule and innuendo” to attack the opponent in both the public and private spheres. It is important to persuade that the public enemy represents “slavery, repression, injustice and sadistic cruelty” (Des Forges et al., 1999:66). The war is the basic matrix for the Truth, it is not peace that has established reason and logos it is war itself, as politics emerges in the interception of history-war (see Focuault, 1997 passim). It is justified to fight the enemy with any means necessary precisely because one has the right to do so. So, our unknown author goes on to suggest two methods that were common practice before and during the genocide. The first is to ‘create events’ in order to lend credence to propaganda. Such examples are the ‘attack on Kigali’ on October 4-5 and reported discoveries of hidden arms, of hidden radio communications equipment, strangers with
mysterious bags etc. The second is ‘accusation in mirror’. Basically, it means that if you are to deploy terror, accuse the opponent of using terror. Take whatever measures necessary to make ‘honest people’ believe that they are under attack so any anticipating reprisals are simply ‘legitimate self-defence’ (Des Forges et al., 1999:66).

The reading of the political as a ‘war of the races’ was not something confined to any particular domain of the Rwandan society in the years leading up to the genocide. It was all also ‘very open’ the students told me, the violence threatening the Tutsi and the political opposition was not something that was hidden. ‘Neighbours that before were normal persons would start wearing banana leaves and the ‘uniforms’ of different militias’ (personal information). On songs you could here on the radio the popular (in every sense of the word) singer Simon Bikindi sang out a passionate hatred: “Let us start in the region of Butare where they liked feudalism, who would blame me for that? I hate them and I don’t apologize for that [...] Lucky for us they are few in number...Those who have ears let them hear.” (in Des Forges et al., 1999:83). In March 1993 Radio Rwanda on the same day five times broadcast the ‘news’ that a Nairobi based human rights group had issued a press release carrying the warning that Tutsis were going to kill Hutus; a ‘Committee of RPF’ had issued a list of Hutus that should be murdered. Also in the academic field proper the enemy was demonised and the FPR troops allegedly wore swastikas on their uniforms (see Bangamwabo et al., 1991). In a Kangura issue after the RPF invasion the infamous ‘Ten Commandments of Hutus’ was publicised, which also appeared in other journals. The Tutsis are described as ‘blood and power thirsty wanting to install their hegemony on the Rwandan people. Ever since 1959 they have daily dreamed of re-conquering the power, exterminate all Hutu intellectuals and impose their dominion on the rural masses’. One of the means by which the Tutsis systematically work to reinstall monarchy and servitude was their women. In this discourse female Tutsis are veritable Trojan horses ‘whose whole being is about infiltration; thus any Hutu man who marries a Tutsi, has a Tutsi mistress or has a Tutsi secretary is a traitor. Given the experience of October 1990 the Force Armée Rwandaise (FAR) should be all Hutu, no military should marry a Tutsi. The Bahutu should stop having pity on the Tutsis’ (from Chrétien et al., 1995:39-40). The leitmotiv in this propaganda is captured in the rhetoric used at mass party meetings where emotions often were high, animated as they were by music, performances and beer. The most notorious is the ‘Mugesera speech’ held in November 1992 at an MRND meeting in the North-western prefecture Gisenyi, not far from Habyarimana’s home (see Des Forges et al., 1999:83ff and Chrétien et al., 1995:55-56 for the following paragraph).

Mugesera was at the time the MRND vice-president of the prefecture and held an official post at the Ministry for the family and the promotion of feminine affairs. It was held one week after a widely publicised speech by President Habyarimana himself where he disavowed the Arusha Accords as a ‘rag paper’ and promised that the future elections would be won by the “striking force” of the party militia Interahamwe. The Mugesera speech contains the major themes of the pro-Habyarimana doctrines. In the opening remarks, Mugesera says, “At whatever cost you will leave here with these words...do not let
yourselves be invaded!’ (in Des Forges et al., 1999:84). The key phrase is mentioned ten or so times in the half an hour speech. At this stage of the Rwandan field ‘the attackers’ refer to two groups; the RPF, which should be called inyenzi (cockroaches) and nothing else. The second group is those ‘inyenzi speaking with other inyenzi’, i.e. the opposition parties who were betraying the ‘Hutu cause’ in the shape of the republic and the great majority people. Referring to the Arusha Accords and the cease-fire, he asserts that “we will never accept these things”. He goes on by stating that the MRND is also at war with these ‘race traitors’, they should “clear out of these regions [the heartland of Hutu power] because we cannot accept that such people shoot us down while pretending to live among us”. Claiming that the enemy’s goal is extermination he tells his audience “to rise up…to really rise up in self-defence” and that the MRND has a new version of the biblical adage; ‘if you are struck once on one cheek, you should strike back twice’. Further he states that the law provides the capital punishment for inyenzi who are betraying the national interest, and if the judicial system does not act in the execution of this, then people have the right to do so themselves by “exterminating this scum”, because the Constitution says that justice is rendered in the name of the people. He calls upon people to note any foreign element on the cell-level. Even further, Mugesera says that it was a mistake to let some of the inyenzi get away in 1959. Their ‘home is in Ethiopia’ where they “should be sent back by the Nyaborongo [river] as express delivery”. The enemies are depicted as “vermin” dying in the agony of death. The speech is concluded by the final warning, “Know that the persons throat that you do not cut now will be the one that cuts yours”. This kind of blunt rhetoric was until then something rather unusual on an official level in Rwanda. Excerpts of the tape-recorded speech was broadcast on national radio and copies circulated in all the major towns. The speech received heavy criticism, also from inside MRND circles, and Mugesera had to go under ground since the then minister of justice (the same Mbonempaka who, as we saw above, two-three years later defended the genocide) issued a warrant for his arrest. Allegedly, he hid at a military camp before leaving the country.

As for the political violence taking place before the violence that occurred following the FPR attack launched on October 1st, no one was charged with any of the political crimes and massacres during the years 1990-1994 (Des Forges et al., 1999). Furthermore, just as in 1963 the local authorities together with the army commenced to orchestrate murder and pillage as they called upon the population to fight the inyenzi. Despite the attempts to gain popular support in the massacres this fell short, and the instigators were mainly issued from the ranks of the army or the militias. Different regions were concerned one after the other: Mutara in October 1990; the prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in January-February 1991; Bugesera in spring 1992; and the NorthWest again in January 1993 (Nsengiyaremye, 1994; Willame, 1995:100). The Rwandan State to a larger and larger extent was openly involved in the massacres perpetrated since 1990 and onwards. For example was the massacre in Kigali triggered by a fake RPF attack (Eric Gillet in Mission d’information sur le Rwanda, 1998:Tome

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87 The Nyaborongo river feeds into the rivers of the Nile watershed and supposedly it permits passage to Ethiopia, as well as in past massacres of Tutsi dumping the bodies into the river in question was practised.
I, 59ff). By bringing forward this massacre towards the east of the country, far from the frontlines and any RPF presence, Gillet highlights the fact that for the killing to take place considerable amounts of work and planning were needed. When it comes to the Bugesera massacre one finds that precluding work was set in motion 4 months before the actual massacres began; designation of victims, justifications of the murders, individual attacks and the use of Radio Rwanda where false menaces on Hutus were announced (see also Reyntjens 1995b). This violence, as well as the instruments for ‘remote controlling’ the genocide was of a central design. The *akazu* often drew on military officers. The presidential entourage seems to be responsible for much of the violence during the years leading up to the genocide which aim it was create disorder and thus block any transition unfavourable to their ends. There can be little doubt that the president himself was aware the actions and happenings. In 1993 there were threats from a group of militaries, who supposedly were led by Bagosora, using the abbreviation AMASASU (which French words do not signify much but as a word in Kinyarwanda means ‘bullets, ammunition’) on politicians in favour of the Arusha Accords (Reyntjens, 1995a:57ff). This ‘organisation’ was probably the manifestation of what has sometimes been labelled the ‘zero network’, a kind of death squadron. To speak of ‘death squadrons’ and ‘zero network’ no doubt give way to the impression of firm and hierarchical power structures. Rather it was question of a number of persons who had converging interests. For many of the members of *akazu*, and by extension the wider circle of people relying on the powers to be for their appropriation of wealth and prestige, there were business interests at stake, menaced by the democratisation. For others there were strong ideological motives such as those who had invested themselves in ‘power institutions’ as the hate media and militias. (Reyntjens, 1995a:57ff; 1995b:270ff; see also Des Forges *et al.*, 1999). One should not forget that the army was the only institution that was a pure (Hutu) republican creation, unlike the Congo who had their *Force Publique* there was no standing armed forces in Rwanda during colonialism. The *Forces Armées Rwandaises* were thus not only the ultimate defendants of the ‘Social Revolution’ but also ultimately a pure product of the Hutu Republic. Apart from this institutional collective memory and raison d’être of the army it had grown significantly during the civil war; from 5,000 troops to more than 30,000. Persons that would need to be employed and nourished in case of an end to the civil war. These two aspects were made even more acute since the Arusha Accords foresaw that the FPR be integrated to the FAR, this would of course mean a blow both the identity of the armed forces as well as military defeat implied a higher number of persons having to be demobilised. Furthermore, a program to arm and train civilian into self-defence forces was launched in 1991. The following years it was being augmented and diffused to more than the frontal areas. To a large extent it was these ‘self-defence units’ that were to make up the core of the local implementation of the genocidal policies (De Lame, 1996 et Mamdani, 2001:206ff).

In the massacres from 1990 and onwards all the elements of the 1994 genocide were in place and put into disposition: the local authorities and the self-defence units, the FAR, the *gendarmerie* as well as the militias. The territory was already tightly cross-ruled by a coercive administration that was run
top-down, to this we have the mass-media directing the actions of many of these elements as well as giving the information that was intended to be diffused. Further, in its form the mobilisation of people for implementing the genocide did not differ much from earlier campaigns of the developmental state to end illiteracy, vaccinate children etc. The implementation of this developmental agenda had required that officials on the local level go beyond their usual duties for a limited time subduing themselves to higher goals in the interest of ‘the people’. Hence, for directing the genocide top-down the power-network could rely on existing institutional structures (Des Forges et al., 1999:44-45 et 222ff).

5.4 The Politics of Genocide

5.4.1 The Spark that Lit the Fire

On April 6 the aeroplane carrying president Habyarimana and the Burundian president Ntaryamira returning from negotiations in Dar es Salaam where the former allegedly had agreed to put in place a broad-based government was hit by ground to air missiles fired from a location close to the airport. We shall not here enter details on speculating who may, and who may not, have carried out the downing of the plane. The only things sure about this event are that it is still to date not known who committed the act, and that it was in the interest of a number of camps to see Habyarimana dead (see for example Reyntjens, 1995:21ff; Des Forges et al., 1999:181ff). The plane hit the ground at 8.22 p.m. and within a couple of hours a number of top ranking Rwandan militaries held a crisis meeting. Already during the first reunion after the death of Habyarimana the retired Colonel Bagosora in shape of substitute for the absent minister of defence took charge by chairing the meeting despite the presence of active senior officers (Reyntjens, 1995a:51ff; Des Forges et al., 1999:185). Present at this meeting was the UN military representative general Dallaire. The meeting’s agenda contained two key issues: the head of the armed forces had to be replaced since the former was among the killed aboard the plane; and the constitutional vacuum had to be filled. On the latter it would under normal circumstances have been Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a ‘moderate’ politician from the MDR party (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain) who was in the 1992 government minister of primary and secondary education. At the time of the downing of the Habyarimana plane, she was trying to form a government. Bagosora however made clear that she would not be accepted by ‘neither the military nor the people’. The meeting however appeared constructive: Kigali town was calm as it was being patrolled and key installations were being guarded. As well as things seem to be in the hands of the committee that had decided to continue implement the Arusha Accords and try to pass on command to civilian authorities as quickly as possible, thus avoiding to give rise to speculations of a military coup.

But, the ‘crisis committee’ consisting of militaries was nothing but a visible structure. Behind, or above, we find a network of persons that would work behind the scene and short-circuit any decisions made by the visible structure by putting those against or those hesitating before faits accomplis (Reyntjens, 1995a:51-56). The violence took off around 5.30 a.m. with the attack on the Prime Minister
Agathe Uwilingyama's residence and the death of ten Belgian peacekeepers. About an hour later, the systematic cleansing of certain neighbourhoods began. In this initial phase the targets were individuals, either prominent Tutsis or Hutus that could be expected to be against the genocide policy. The second command structure seems to have been centred on the person of Bagosora. The first troops to be launched in the killings were the presidential guard, the para-commandos and the reconnaissance troops. The only person at this stage having authority over these shock forces that did not sort under the ordinary military command structure was Bagosora. Further, witnesses claim to have overheard Bagosora speaking on the telephone saying, “Let's begin with one side” (Reyntjens, 1995a:56-58).

5.4.2 Inside the Storm

5.4.2.1 Administration as Usual

The interim government on paper seemed like the legal prolongation of the government formation that took off in 1992 and had an air of normality. The only obvious thing was that there were no Tutsis and that the other parties were represented by hard-liners from their ‘power-branches’. This ‘normality’ is revealing for the functioning of the Rwandan State on all its levels throughout the genocide: on the national level all paperwork followed the routines; and on the local level procurement routines are followed when for example gasoline is required. This was then sometimes used for setting houses and people on fire. Burgomasters and prefects would send written requests for enforcement, ‘please send us a couple of policemen because we have a large number of Tutsis on our hands’, and the order of the day seems to have been administration as usual (Reyntjens, 1995a:89ff; Des Forges et al., 1999: 225 et passim). The order was strictly hierarchical in the sense that all instances of organised power should be subdued to the goal of exterminating the Tutsis; burgomasters, prefects and sometimes ministers visited locations where not enough zeal was manifested, also did RTLM and radio Rwanda constantly call upon people to ‘clear the bush’, ‘keep up the good work’ or to ‘start working’. “When you begin extermination, no one, nothing must be forgiven. But here, you have merely contended yourselves with killing a few old women” the minister of Justice Agnès Ntamabyariro said in a speech in Kibuye in June (African Rights, 1995b:6). For example in Butare prefecture where the local authorities, the prefect and several burgomasters, refused to carry out the genocidal policy Hutu and Tutsi would together manner the community barriers to keep the order and prevent killing. “For two weeks, Butare remained a calm oasis while a storm raged in the rest of the country.” (Mamdani, 2001:218). Then resistance was broken down by the replacement and killing of the prefect and pressure put on the burgomasters who many of them then turned out zealous administers of the killing. Not only were important persons pressured but also those who were expected to carry out the ‘work’ were pressured by authorities and

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88 One should however not treat even the military as a homogenous genocidal block. For example did ten higher officers opposed to the Bagosora group attempt to short-circuit the proposed interim government by on April 12 publishing a communiqué reaching out to FPR in order to ‘appease the situation and install broad-based transition institutions’ (Reyntjens, 1995a:85-86). At this stage, it was however to late as
political leaders as it ‘was forbidden to help the Tutsis’. When someone was caught doing it they were like those they had been protected raped, tortured and killed, thus stating an example to others who were hesitant (personal information, Chrétien et al., 1995 passim; Des Forges et al., 1999:222ff, 432ff et passim). Those instances where the authorities had to redirect forces from elsewhere to get the killing started in a locality where people either put up resistance together, over the ethnic lines, or simply did not kill, is the most obvious proof of the central design of the genocide. That it was a centrally designed genocide is also clear from my findings. ‘When they killed all the men in our commune the girls were left, then the burgomaster held a meeting with all the inhabitants, and he told them that, ‘You who keep girls or women you should bring them to a place decided by me’. Then at that moment they began to kill all the girls and all the women.’ (Félicitée).

The overwhelming number of people who were killed in Rwanda was so in large-scale massacres. They were killed in churches and their adjacent buildings (clergy houses, clinics, schools etc.) hospitals, schools, football stadiums, local government offices etc. The events surrounding the massacres vary from one case to another, there are however some recurrent features. The militia would surround the buildings in order to prevent people from escaping, and then soldiers from the regular forces (often accompanied by gendarmes and local policemen) entered the buildings and the compounds. On several occasions local government officials (prefects, burgomasters) and notables would overlook the ‘operation’ (in some cases they were the ones who had urged people to gather in promising them protection) and sometimes participating by firing into the groups of refugees. Shooting and bombarding with fragmentation grenades would then commence and the major part of persons probably died in this first attack wave. Then followed a second attack where the militias and sometimes ordinary persons (often from other areas) would move in and kill the wounded with machetes, spears, hammers and masus (a nail studded club). They would return the following morning (often for several consecutive days) in search for wounded people to kill. Looting was often efficient and extensive to the limit that many eyewitness reports state that those persons who were dumped into rivers or latrine pits were completely naked (African Rights, 1995a:258ff).

The early killing was concentrated to Kigali where more than a thousand presidential guards, some hundred troops from other elite battalions and the police in addition with around 2,000 militia members carried out most of it. Throughout the country probably no more than 6,000-7,000 thousand participated in the initial killing. By April 11 an estimated 20,000 Rwandans had been killed, whereof the majority where Tutsis, but also a large share of prominent Hutus who were expected to be opposed to the genocide. On this day the prefects were summoned to Kigali and the following day the Tutsis in general where officially named as the main target and the Ministry of Defence issued a press release broadcast by Radio Rwanda in order to deny any cracks within Hutu Power. “Soldiers, gendarmes, and all Rwandans have decided to fight their common enemy in unison and all have identified him. The
enemy is still the same. He is the one who has always been trying to return the monarch who was overthrown. The Ministry of Defence asks Rwandans, soldiers and gendarmes the following: citizens are asked to act together, carry out patrols and fight the enemy.” (in Des Forges et al., 1999:202-203).

5.4.2.2 See no Evil, Do No Good

All along the genocide, the authorities tried to show a clean face to the surrounding world and the ‘international community’; especially to those partners on whose arms supplies they were depending. Thus whilst the genocide continued the authorities would lay a smoke screen of ‘uncontrolled ethnic violence’ and ‘the angry people taking revenge for the death of their president’. The acceptance of this official story created the space of manoeuvre for the génocidaires. The international press, at least initially, would report of ‘anarchy and tribal violence ruling Rwanda’ (Des Forges et al., 1999:595ff; The New York Times on the Web [April 14, 1994]). The interim government, which by the UN and most governments was considered the legal representatives of Rwanda until July 1994, was given the momentum to carry out its genocide plan, and effectively used the two weeks to convince those hesitant that the ‘final solution’ to the Tutsi problem could succeed without any international reaction. The UNAMIR forces (U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda) were under order to use a narrow interpretation of its mandate and avoid firing if possible. The mainstay of the forces was the Belgian contingent of 440 men and some 200 Ghanaians. The most numerous contingent, some 900 Bangladeshi troops, was poorly trained as well as poorly equipped. On more than one occasion the latter ignored calls for help from Belgian peacekeepers who were starting to be targeted. Straight after the downing of the plane General Dallaire, who commanded the peacekeeping forces, asked for reinforcements and a wide interpretation of the existing mandate. His request was turned down and he subsequently identified protecting government leaders as the main task, something which was turned into a de facto primary concern of ‘a defensive survival exercise” (Dallaire in Des Forges et al., 1999:599). Within the UN structures the Belgians at first (before they learnt about the killing of the ten Belgian peacekeepers) opted for a reinforcement of the UNAMIR (mandate as well as personnel and material), but were blocked by ‘permanent western members’ (read Great Britain and the US). Instead the UN civil servants and the council’s members opted for a ‘humanitarian evacuation force’ (comprising some 900 elite Belgian and French troops) which was to save foreigners. The UNAMIR largely were to passively witness the genocide. An idea discussed but which was never realised, was to deploy these forces together with 80 Italian troops, 300 U.S. marines from Bujumbura (the Burundian capital is half an hour away with plane) and the UNAMIR forces already there to stop the violence. All together, it would have meant nearly 2,000 capable soldiers together with another 600 Ghanaians north of Kigali and 800 Belgians on standby in Nairobi. On April 6 the estimated number of government troops were at a maximum 7,000 whereof no more than 2,000 were to be considered a serious force. The likelihood of the FAR attacking foreign troops was small in particular if French soldiers were among them (Rwanda
and France undertook military co-operation\textsuperscript{89}). In an interview Dallaire assessed that the UNAMIR and the evacuation force together “could have easily stopped the massacres and showed the people at the barriers that it was dangerous to be there” (Des Forges et al., 1999:607). As the events unfolded the evacuation force was to rescue foreigners, and embassies would deny their local staff rescue. On some occasions the militia and soldiers would literally move in as the UNAMIR moved out. This was the case of the \textit{Ecole Technique Officielle} where some 2,000 persons had sought refuge with the Belgian troops. Some of the Tutsis had asked to be shot if ever they were to be abandoned, so when they did move out the UNAMIR men gave the impression of going out on a routine mission. As they left one side of the compound the militia entered on the other side (Des Forges \textit{et al.}, 1999:615ff; African Rights, 1995a). While the permanent members of the Security Council wanted to withdraw the UNAMIR altogether, some other member states, such as Nigeria, made for that at least a token force remained. Their presence did save a large number of lives mainly by acting against the will of New York who confronted with the fact that about some 20,000 persons were being protected by the 270 peace keepers left, could not make a decision of complete withdrawal. When the decision to keep forces came it was very vague and did not mention the word ‘genocide’ (this was on April 19) but speaks of “large-scale violence”, “mindless violence” etc. (Des Forges \textit{et al.}, 1999:631). It did take until April 29 for the Secretary General to acknowledge that the killing of civilians were distinct from the war. The perhaps most infamous manifestation of how the ‘international community’ declined responsible action was the Clinton administration’s directive not to use the word ‘genocide’ since its use allegedly obliged to undertake action (see Des Forges \textit{et al.}, 1999:642).

5.5 Anomie and Utopia

The exacerbating misery of Rwanda I have outlined above should not be seen as that hardship alone automatically turns people into genocidal killers. This is an important point since many authors seem to take the ‘massive participation of uneducated peasants’ at face value (see for example Prunier, 1997; Uvin, 1998). Moreover the question of popular participation is begged by the insight that had the genocide been restricted to towns only, the magnitude of it would not have been as great as it was. The quasi totality of the population, including the victims, lived in rural milieus out on the hills tilling the land until 1994. But, where authors have been rigorous in establishing the reason for, the underlying logic of the genocidal penchant of the intelligentsia they have been prone to reduce the actions of the ‘Hutu peasant’ as something instinctual; ‘I am told by the authorities to kill, thus I kill’ (see Vidal, 1998a). As Vidal (1998a et 1998b) points out the pertinent question of ‘why?’ may be answered by ‘how was the genocide perpetrated?’ She founds her criticism in the comparison of how research on the Shoah has been conducted. This research started out by the gathering of testimonies and documentation, then followed a research concerned with the extermination mechanisms, where Hilberg’s thesis

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\textsuperscript{89} Legally speaking it was a gendarmerie co-operation but the \textit{cellule africaine} at the Elysée took rather lightly on legal matters. The contacts between the French administration and the Habyarimana regime were handled by the Habyarimana and Mitterand sons (personal information,
(defended in 1955) should be considered the culmination. After the Eichmann process in Jerusalem in 1961 the scholarly production took off as well as different ‘schools’ were formed. Her case in point is that the catastrophe was not put in perspective until there was a solid base for ‘how’ the event took place. Although historians explicitly took on the question of the genesis of the genocide the task they considered as a priority, was to ‘explore the mechanism of destruction in its proper functioning’ (Hilberg quoted in Vidal, 1998b: 654). Vidal means that in the case of the Rwandan genocide scholars and others have put priority on the genesis of the genocide, before knowing the answer to the pertinent ‘how’ question. She on her hand subscribes to the choice of putting priority on research on how the killing took place (Vidal, 1998b: 658). Otherwise one runs the risk of constructing a ‘peasant Hutu habitus’ pre-disposed to pick up the machete “in any condition to kill any Tutsi” (Vidal, 1998a:340).

With some authors, this is built into their argument. Taylor (1999:100-149) at length elaborates the genocide’s ‘cosmology of terror’. His main argument is that the patterns of the often ‘ritual killings’ during the genocide can be derived from deeply structured cultural traits specific to Rwanda or the Great Lakes region. Taylor (1999:130ff) uses the example of the omnipresent barriers and roadblocks "like Nazi shower rooms in the concentration camps, these were the most frequent loci of execution for Rwanda’s Tutsi and Hutu opponents of the regime”. Throughout the country there were roadblocks or barriers erected at every path or road. These were manned by different teams of people, the army, the gendarmerie, the militias, communal police, bands of thugs, cellule protection groups etc. A point that Taylor (1999) in my finding seems to miss is that the existence of barriers was not a feature that was unique to the genocide or the areas controlled by the genocidal powers. Barriers have for a long time been part of the Rwandan topology as a part of the coercive measures to literally keep people in place, these were known as ‘vagabond barriers’ (personal information). Ever since the colonial days one had to have the approval of the authorities to change place of residence, they were part of the overarching objective of ‘development’ (see for example Mamdani, 2001). Of course, the types of work, the function of the roadblocks have changed over time. During the genocide it was virtually impossible to avoid working at a barrier, as it was more or less the ‘law’ imposed upon people primarily by the local authorities or military officials.

The existence of power implies resistance. Since the nature of power is strictly relational, the social reality is relational; there can be no power without points of resistance (Foucault, 1976:126ff; see also Bourdieu, 1991:71ff). Taylor (1999) and other authors who readily may display how they in earlier fieldwork conducted in Rwanda have encountered a multitude of resistance against the authorities, for example in the shape of strategies in order to evade communal labour (umuganda), when it comes to

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90 However, she concludes by noting that research on the genocide is underway, but that it at its present stage does not allow synthesising approaches (Vidal, 1998b: 660).
91 Taylor (1999) explicitly draws on Bourdieu and the concept of habitus. Nevertheless, in my finding he seems to have missed the point that the 'universality' of habitus is as a tool of as analysis to be constructed. Thus, Taylor tends to treat the 'Rwandan habitus' as it was homogenous both over time and here and now, hence imputing it with perennial and natural characteristics.
92 Also in FPR controlled areas one would find barriers and roadblocks, and still today, you have to pass quite a few checkpoints wherever you go.
the genocide seem to take the popular participation in the genocide for granted, although admittedly asserting its often-forced nature (see for example De Lave, 1996; Guichaoua, 1995; Uvin 1998).

To examine this *doxa* of the ‘Rwandan peasant’s blind obedience’ to authority during the genocide let us take an example. Taylor (1998:132ff) speaks of the barriers as ‘effective means of robbing and killing’ but states that they were “next to useless in halting the slow but inexorable RPF advance, the barriers defied military logic”. Furthermore, “their utility defied ordinary logic. With roadblocks so closely placed to one another – as close as one hundred meters in some instances – most were clearly redundant. Downstream barriers had little hope of catching people who had not already been stopped and fleeced of their money and belongings.” Elsewhere in his account, he interviewed refugees in Kenya in 1994, he asserts individual cases of Hutus who deployed the most creative strategies to avoid ‘working’ at the barriers. However, when it comes to Hutus *qua* the ‘mass of peasants’ we encounter a scary logic of collective guilt by suspicion. My point is that the thought that those who erected roadblocks ‘that defied military and ordinary logic’ may have been endowed with much practical logic does not seem to have crossed Taylor’s or many other authors’ minds. What would be more efficient than erecting a barrier and manning it where virtually no-one will come by if you do not wish to kill but still want to stay safe from being killed yourself? As one of the respondents told me “I too was on a neighbourhood barrier, it was the law. Fortunately I lived in a neighbourhood where there was not much killing”. It may thus be that many of the barriers and the individual *habitus* manning them defied logos, i.e. rational reason, as in military strategically terms or the things of the logic. This does not imply that it was practices bereft of sense, quite the contrary. Instead of sense-less acts one may deduce a particular logic of practice.

As to date we do not have extensive detailed knowledge on in what form much of the killing took place. Vidal (1998a) refers to an article by Longman that appeared in 1995. Some years before he had conducted field studies in two protestant parishes. In one a small urban centre regrouped the elites; burgomaster, businessmen priests, teachers, doctors and hospital staff who all lead a life in sharp contrast with the generalised misery surrounding them. This tight elite held all the important positions in the community, including those in the local church council. In 1992-93 there were rebellions envisaging the material representations of the elite; woods planted as *umuganda* (compulsory communal labour) but appropriated by the *notables* were set on fire and the *cabaret* where the elite used to gather was laid under siege. Soon after a priest, the secondary school headmaster and a businessperson founded a local CDR section. In the second parish, the church officials managed developmental programmes that favoured the local peasantry, something that put them in opposition to the businesspersons and local politicians. The Tutsi pastor worked in constant collaboration with the farmers. The parish agronomist, a Hutu, also encouraged ‘interethnic’ co-operation and launched co-

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93 For example a young couple where the wife faked pregnancy and thus ‘had to be brought to a hospital in a town’.
94 Also here a study of politics from below would help us understand the nature of the Rwandan genocide. Des Forges et al., (1999:214) do for example speak about “good barriers” where Tutsi would not be killed and might receive warnings from the guards about other, dangerous barriers further down the road.
operatives where the leaders were elected, thus excluding the notables. From a distance, Longman learned what had happened in the two parishes during the genocide. In the first one the burgomaster and the church leaders managed to organise a riot one week after the crash of the Habyarimana aeroplane consisting of young and unemployed persons and some of the villagers. In the second parish, the burgomaster had to call in the gendarmerie and an organised band coming from elsewhere: they massacred the Tutsi pastor and his family. But, they did also kill the Hutus, the agronomist and some teachers with their respective families that they judged as being opposed to their authority. So what may we derive from this example? Firstly it is not ‘ancestral, tribal hatred’ underlying the genocide. Secondly, not all Hutus making part of the elite were exercising the genocidal powers, quite the contrary; many of them perished for opposing it. Thirdly, we learn what resistance to the genocidal powers practically meant during those conditions. Finally, it makes us break with the notion of blind obedience to authorities as a univocal trait within a ‘homogenous peasant mass’.

This is not a claim that there was no popular participation, only that it is not something one may assume a priori. There is substantial evidence that much of the killing was popular, although we can not yet assert on what ground empirical individuals did participate. It seems that a recurrent pattern to gain popular support was to start by rioting and looting for one or two days, militias often did this. As people saw that there were material profits to be made some would join in. Thus, already being a part of it once the killing began. When people did not join ‘voluntarily’ they would sometimes be compelled to kill under gunpoint (African Rights, 1995a:993ff). Taylor (1999:131ff) in his account of the barriers presents a story of a Hutu refugee who made it to Kenya. Within the party he was travelling within everyone had to pay a toll at one of the barriers: everyone had to bludgeon a captured Tutsi with a hammer before being allowed passage, some were forced to repeat the act one or two times for lack of enthusiasm.95 It seems that there was an attempt to create a “community of killers”, where getting blood on your hands was part of the initiation rite (literally in the case above). A 37 year old mother of six tells her story of becoming a killer: ‘Our councillor and another official of the cellule came to our homes and told people to kill anyone who did not agree with the MRND and the CDR, Hutus who had run away from other sectors and all Tutsis. Soldiers were also telling residents to kill. When they told us to kill many people refused. I was one of those who refused. They beat me up so badly with rifle butts that the baby, a two-month-old girl, I was carrying on my back died. They took me to the office of the commune; the wounded [Tutsi and Hutu accomplices] were gathered outside the office. They gave you a person to finish off. I killed an old man, seventy-year-old Cyeribera, with a masu. He was a peasant from our sector’ (in African Rights, 1995a:999-1000). In addition, those who did not do any killing themselves were to be made part of the ‘re-born Hutu community’. The killing made the goods of the killed and fleeing people available, for some this would open up possibilities in the anticipated post-genocide future by scaling down competition over job opportunities in the administration. For others, it
would mean that they would keep the appropriated business assets, bank accounts etc. For the Rwandan in general it could mean that they nourished aspects of acquiring land made available (in the past killings of Tutsis re-distribution of land had soon followed), or were to keep land they now lay claim on. This was made present by the rite of ‘eating their cows’ that literally meant what it said, but also implied wider spoils as well as it symbolically meant that also those who had not wielded the machetes were in the present benefiting from the genocide and thus part of the ‘community of killers’ (see African Rights, 1995a:1002ff). These ‘rites of initiation’ were based on objective structural conditions, but as states Bourdieu (1980:35-36, 60 et 114ff) we can not extrapolate too much from the observation of rites. Rites are practices that are in themselves their ends and that finds their accomplishment in their own accomplishment; acts that are carried out because ‘that’s to be done’. They are carried out in order to act on the world, to constantly make and re-make the very world where they take place. Under normal conditions, the world is self-evident and practical beliefs and myths are not a state of mind but a state of body which renders existence meaningful. The bodily dispositions are the fundamental principles of the politico-cultural arbitrary (in the sense that there is no ‘natural’ foundation) as the bodily hexis is realised political mythology in an incorporated state of being (Bourdieu, 1980a:114ff). The fact that it seems that so many persons had to be forced to pass the rite of initiation to join the community of killers imply that sweepingly evoke ‘ethnic hatred’ alone does not at all explain much. Rather does a quest for a general explanation of the genocide beg a more systematic account of the practices of exercising the genocidal powers in its capillary functioning.

However it seems as the incorporated political mythology and its ethnic/racial categories did have a bearing on a local level. Many leaders on the local level and many intellectuals turned out as passionate racists, something that is a pattern familiar to earlier outbreaks of large-scale violence in Rwanda (see Vidal, 1991). In one commune for example ‘educated people like the burgomaster, the director of the tea factory and teachers after Habyarimana’s death drove around everywhere in their cars, making the Hutus aware that their president had been killed by the Tutsis and that they had to start taking revenge. They also said that the Tutsis intended to exterminate the Hutus.’ (witness in African Rights, 1998:8). Then local Hutus who had been prepared to support the Tutsis in the defence of their lives and their homes deserted them when they realised the nature and scale of what was about to happen; that it was genocide. From there former friends seem to have followed different modes of conduct. Either they did try to help as much as they could: ‘He was a great friend of mine. I was carrying a machete\textsuperscript{95} because I thought he might kill me. When I got there, I knocked on the door. He greeted me and invited me in. He gave me food and milk to drink. He told me that the militiamen had looted our house and many of my family were dead. He also said that the Tutsis who managed to escape had gone to Bisesero [a gathering point for resistance where many Hutus and Twas were fighting

\textsuperscript{95} If we contrast this with another account presented by Taylor (1999:130ff), in combination with the insight that the refugee and his party did not have to do this at every barrier, we realise the heterogeneity of the capillary barrier power technique. The other Hutu refugee, a wealthy businessman, simply paid his way pass the barriers. In toto, the journey cost him $ 5,000.
together with the Tutsis until April 20, when most of them were convinced by the authorities to leave. He said that during the night he took food to people there.’ (African Rights, 1998:9 et 24). Sometimes people would stand their former friends down97: ‘He was one of my two best friends. On the evening of 10 April I went to his house to ask him why they wanted to kill us. I also wanted to ask him to hide my six children because he was a friend of mine. He replied laughing that he could not hide any child, but that he could hide my cows and valuable objects. He could see very well that that I was hungry, but he gave me nothing to eat nor drink. Before the genocide, when I went to his house, he would welcome me with open arms, and even if he had no beer, he would go out and buy some straight away. I realised that our friends had become our enemies.’ (African Rights, 1998:8). Or did persons transform overnight into zealous killers “we could not believe that our local policeman armed with his gun would shoot on people armed only with stones” (in African Rights, 1998:18). A then seven year-old girl gives her testimony in African Rights (1998:21): ‘One day the militia came to attack us. When I saw them I ran. There was one militiaman who saw me running. He came up behind me to kill me. When the militiaman caught up with me I was astonished because I realised that he was my friend. Before the genocide he used to come to our house everyday. He farmed my father’s fields and he received a salary. When he finished work he used to come to the house and I often gave him water so that he could wash himself. My mother gave him food. We used to play with him and he was like a brother to me event though we were not from the same family. He was just about to kill me: I asked him why he wanted to do this when I had done nothing to hurt him. I begged him to take pity on me. He said nothing but just hit me on the head with a machete. He had bits of wood in his hand which he stuck into my face. When he thought I was dead he left.’

Foucault (1976:120ff et 1997:22ff) proposes to study power not at its centre in its general mechanisms, but rather in its extremities where power turns capillary, in its local functioning. We may conceptualise the network of roadblocks and barriers as disciplinary power that works via coercive cross-ruled surveillance that ensures the cohesion of the social body (see Foucault, 1997:31-34). This is the manifestation of power not at its centre in its general mechanisms, but rather in its extremities where power turns capillary, in its local functioning where power goes beyond the rules of the law and invests itself in institutions and takes refuge in material interventions that at times are physically violent. It as this the most local level of power where it has its target, its field of application and where power produces real effects (Foucault, 1976:121ff et 1997:22-29). As the law to at least a certain extent is the discourse of verity and as such produces power effects we are judged, condemned, classified and forced to live and die in certain ways that are according to the law (Foucault, 1997:22). So, wherever one went in Rwanda in 1994, the major roads or the smallest footpath, one would encounter a barrier or a roadblock where one regularly would have to produce verification of one’s official identity. This would

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96 The fact that the person in question felt urged to carry a machete when visiting a friend says quite a deal about the perverted social relations during the genocide.
97 This is not a moral statement on my part, but merely an account of facts. As above-mentioned we know what lack of co-operation in carrying out the genocide meant.
most often be in the shape of the identity card, which as we know mentioned the officially codified ethnic identity. Power when exercised in its capillary form can not be so without the formation and the organisation of knowledge that is not simply accompanying ideological edifices (Foucault, 1997:30). So, if one had ‘lost’ it, persons having a body stature defined by ‘knowledge’ as a Hutu *hexis* might get away.

The individuals making up this chain of networks, sub-fields, are always in a position of submission as well as exercise of power; they are power relays as they pass on power. The local power relays have in a way been colonised, it is not the global dominion that is multiplied and has repercussions but rather the local micro-cosmos that are invested by this hegemonising power. We could think of this barrier/roadblock system as the ‘panoptism’ of the Rwandan genocide and as such the representation of capillary power as the compact model of the disciplinary disposition (for this and the following reasoning see Focuault, 1975:228ff). We have a strictly cross-ruled territory with a curfew imposing death sentence on those who leave their houses unless authorised to do so and the militias, the cell-leaders and other ‘trustworthy’ persons ensuring the endless ongoing control of the good conduct of everyone. This disciplining surveillance was enforced by the control of each and everyone’s official identity imposing the legitimate division of death and life (personal information; see also for example Des Forges *et al.*, 1999). As in the model of the panopticon ‘*the individual is seen, but he does not see; object of information, never subject in communication*’. Since very few individuals had any global view of what was going on the genocidal practices were highly individual, isolated to the immediately close surroundings, or even one’s ‘own barrier’, this political technology allows power to be constantly exercised despite the discontinuous actions of surveillance. At the same time, it is a massifying power that is exercised. The information received top-down allowed for the imagining of belonging to a political community where ‘everyone else was doing the same thing’. Moreover, one could only imagine one winning side: with the incessant propaganda to exterminate the Tutsis went the information that the government was winning the war (African Rights, 1995a:85). ‘*We will fight them and we will win, this is more than certain, any doubt is impossible and if they don't pay attention, they'll be exterminated, because me, I've seen it. A family about to disappear. But what to do? The inkotanyi don't understand Kinyarwanda. But who is this family about to disappear here in Rwanda? It's the inkotanyi. Because they come from a group that is but a small part of Rwanda, a group one calls Tutsis. The Tutsis are very few. [...] These people will they continue to commit suicide, to engage in a suicidal battle against a big group, won't they really be exterminated!*’ (RTLM broadcast May 13 in Chrétien *et al.*, 1995:80). ‘Well, those inkotanyi who called me on the phone before, where have they gone? What? They must have been exterminated...they must have been exterminated...so let us sing. Kantano [himself] play us another known refrain, a triumphant song from the completion of the Second Republic: Join us, friends! The inkotanyi have been exterminated! Join us friends! God cannot be unjust! Have no doubt, these criminals, they will be exterminated! I have seen the corpses spread out at Nyamirambo [Muslim/middle class area in Kigali]. These people, I don't really know what they're like
When you observe them closely, you ask yourself ‘of what race are these people?’ But, too bad for them, let’s continue. Buckle up and exterminate them […] May our children, our grandchildren, and the children of our grandchildren never again here about what one calls inkotanyi!” (RTLM broadcast, July 2 [when the war as such was already lost], in Chrétien et al., 1995:81). Thus, any anticipated probable future was one of Hutu power hegemony.

Given the anomic state of the social world power was exercised in a non-hierarchical manner if we were to follow a legalistic reading of the events. Persons who had been ‘no-bodies’ could stand out as notorious killers and thus rise above their former peers within their settings and become ‘somebody’, sub-prefects could by-pass prefects, cell-leaders could appeal to people in the military if ‘their’ burgomaster was not ‘working well enough’ etc. Retired officers could command senior officers in service, former street-boys in head of militia could intervene in the administrative realm on a central level etc. One could almost see the two radio stations and the broadcasters as ‘the bards or the priests of the genocide’. By their effort, in combination with officials on every level, the common sense vision of Rwanda was re-produced as the collective consciousness containing a never-ending war between the indigenous Hutu masses and the foreign invaders Tutsi was transmitted.

If one has sacred tasks, for example that of improving, saving, redeeming mankind…one is already sanctified by such a task” (Nietzsche quoted in Bourdieu, 1999:201). These strategies are based on ‘bad faith’ (self-deceptive fraudulence); a priest is someone who calls his own will God. The broadcasters and the génocidaires politicians called their own will the ‘majority people’ (see Bourdieu, 1991:210). By establishing the official consensus of the whole group there seems to have been a shift of stance among many hesitant persons with whom the Tutsi had been merely someone different, without that they had necessarily differed in an important way. This “labour of categorization”, i.e. making explicit and classifying groups and things, is continually being performed in everyday existence. This labour of telling people the meaning of theirs and others’ social identities is performed at every moment. At crises, when the meaning of the world is no longer clear, this power of “naming and bringing into existence” is quasi magical. In such a moment, the common sense production consists of the re-interpretation “of the common stock of sacred discourse” proverbs, sayings etc. in an attempt to purify the language of the group. “By appropriating the words in which everything recognised by a group is deposited, one gains a considerable advantage in struggles for power” (Bourdieu, 1984:9, see especially n7). By putting the common sense on your side, you gain access to the merits of having the groups’ beliefs on your side and in a way all the history that has produced the group(s). As the Tutsis came to be excluded from the collective consciousness they became excluded from the universe of obligation and thus from the collective conscience as it was not crime to kill Tutsis; rather it was virtue to do it. ‘If you are really a Hutu you really have no choice but to really obey’ (see Bourdieu, 1991:212). Although Radio Rwanda was less blunt in its information it was arguably more important for the execution of the genocide. Partly because its voice was more official and thus endowed with more authority, and partly because its broadcasts could reach all areas of the country (whereas RTLM reception was poor in some areas).
message from Radio Rwanda would be in the order of “[t]he enemy is that one from far away, that one who harbours him, that one who hides his weapons. That is why you should watch those who pass and arrest them. RPF is the enemy for as long as they fight. We know where their supporters are in every commune.” (African Rights, 1995a:84-85). Meanwhile Froduald Karamira (an MDR extremist politician) would give an interview everyday on RTLM (and sometimes on Radio Rwanda). “There is no way the rebels will find alive any of the people they are claiming as their own” and then he would ask villagers to “clear up the villages of these people” (African Rights, 1995a:85). The content of the communication of the two radio stations is captured by a dissident journalist as “the enemy – we know him. We only have one enemy; it is he who has never accepted the fact of the republic and his allies. The enemy is he who operates from outside the country and who wants to put the country under foreign domination. The majority of the population, who have benefited from the 1959 revolution rise up and make sure that the enemy and his accomplices are not around you” (African Rights, 1995a:85). Thus inherent to the propaganda continuing through out the genocide is a transcript of the Rwandan History as the war of two races. The alien race of Tutsis came and conquered the indigenous Hutus who liberated themselves after centuries of servitude through the social revolution of 1959. RPF victory would mean the return of the servitude of the Hutus, if not total annihilation. By the codification of Tutsi into ‘race’, a substance, any Tutsi was against the republic and in favour of the restoration of Tutsi power in the shape of kingdom; thus, no Tutsi could be trusted.

The genocide was a symbolic ordering of reality as it was about creating a true Hutu nation cleansed of all its unclean elements. Thus it was world making, the creation of a utopia that was made present. In order to explain the genocide in its functioning, its nature, it would take the systematic gathering of life-stories from the killers, those who carried out the genocide, that produced its real effects.
6 Speaking Genocide

6.1 The Experience of Genocide

As I have argued above, we have the present political knowledge as our starting point. Also seen from below the Rwandan genocide has an objective meaning, because it is experienced from a given objective position within the social field where it took place. If we admit that collective memory is part of a larger political culture that is an ongoing reproductive process that produce, re-produce or change identities, we realise that we have to see collective memory as an active process of sense-making through time (Olick and Levy, 1997:922). Just as the Holocaust is defined largely by the stories that are told about it, the nature and identity of the Rwandan Genocide will be determined by the narratives surrounding it and constituting it (see Rubenstein & Roth, 1987:9). As an event of recognition it will be shaped by those in Rwanda who experienced it as well as by those who did not experience it directly, but it will also be defined by its insertion to a chain of homologous events.98

In the literature on Rwanda and the genocide, the identities that we come across are but an extension of the former ethnic categories. It would of course be ridiculous to claim that ethnicity in Rwanda did not exist. Massacres carried out before wear witness of that ethnicity has sure been real enough since it has produced effects real enough, and at least in educated milieus one has come across ethnicism/racism; passions that have indeed been real, engendered in the constitutive political imaginary saying that Hutus and Tutsis are essentially different (Vidal, 1991). Even though we cannot make an unqualified assertion that the 1994 genocide was purely an ethnic matter, a ‘racial war’, the 1994 genocide bears further evidence of the existence of ethnicity in Rwanda, as it as discourse and practice played a major part in it. Bizimana (1999:103-106) establishes five categories that now inhibit the Rwandan social space: ‘Winners’ (people who were in exile, responsible for and beneficiaries of the RPF military victory, now in key power positions); ‘Survivors’ (Tutsi sympathisers of RPF who survived inside Rwanda, they allegedly have rights to more compensation); ‘Those who refused to die’ (Tutsis who survived inside Rwanda but who were not allies or sympathisers of RPF, they allegedly enjoy few fundamental rights); ‘Enemies’ (Hutus who did not flee the country and were present when RPF took over in July 1994, they are allegedly considered de facto killers/accomplices of massacres); and finally ‘Killers/Genocide Perpetrators’ (Hutu officially accused of genocide acts, before the forced repatriation and destruction of refugee camps in eastern DRC the term indiscriminately referred to all Hutu refugees).99 Mamdani (2001:266-267) also refers to five categories. Even though the Rwandan

98 For example one may in the Rwandan monthly La Nouvelle Relève (1999, No 391:25) find the term Holocaust in order to give meaning to the event. As we shall see the students often link their own individual experience with the collective genocide consciousness in order to make sense of their life stories.

99 The RPF military victory produced a Diaspora of some 2 million people. They resettled in large refugee camps in then Zaire, where the existing political structures largely remained, thus the humanitarian industry (NGOs and the UN agencies) financed and nourished the genocidal authorities that continued to undertake ‘military’ actions (mainly slaughtering civilians) inside Rwanda. The ‘International community’ failed to disarm the militias and the camps were attacked and closed by RPF and Ugandan forces during 1996 (see for example Des Forges et al., 1999; Gourevitch, 1998 and Prunier, 1997).
State generally avoids the use of Hutu or Tutsi as political identities it in its ‘genocide framework’ politically categorises people along the lines of the 1994 genocide, which has produced the ‘only politically correct categories for identification and guidelines’. In the language of officials (also used by the ‘International Community’, people are identified as returnees, refugees, victims, survivors and perpetrators. According to Mamdani (2001) one finds within the group ‘victims’ both Hutu and Tutsi, however when it comes to survivors, i.e. victims that have survived, this should only connote Tutsis. In his study of the social micro cosmos constituted by secondary education Nshimiyimana (1999) refers to four social categories: rescapés, persons who were targeted but survived the genocide (survivors); rapatriés, those who were born in exile (returnees); réintégrés, persons who went into exile following the RPF take-over and who have returned (reintegrates) and others, a kind of residual category for those that can not be referred to as belonging to any of the fore-mentioned categories. The above-mentioned is contrasted by, but also overlapping with my own findings, which lean towards the categorisation of Nshimiyimana (1999).

The experience of genocide depends on the trajectory of the empirical individuality, from where it enters the event, and so does the story on the genocide. Thus, although the different stories all are Rwandan stories on genocide we may discern different groups of stories that are engendered in the social structure where there were different ethnic groups. The identities here and now are Rwandan, but they represent the reproduction of the political imaginary directing the genocidal powers in the sense that they are the recuperation of those categories of a past that will not just pass away. Society is endowed with certain inertia and habitus is endowed with certain stability and orients itself on the basis on incorporated classificatory dispositions. But, and this is important, it is not simple repetition of history; as if the ethnic/racial imaginary was not only perennial but also eternal and Rwanda and the Banyarwanda are condemned to continue inhibit a never-ending ‘war of the races’. The present in the aftermath of the genocide is also rupture with the past. Equally important is that the rupture is not clean as the identities in the aftermath of the genocide are also recuperation of the previous ethnic categories and will not disappear solely by a will to be Rwandan. Let us take the group of survivors, rescapés as example. ‘When you say, ‘This one here he is a rescapé’ (Uwacitse ku icumu) one immediately understands that it’s a Tutsi because if you’re a rescapé it’s because you were hunted during the genocide, but you managed to survive; thus you are a ‘survivor’. For the moment the rescapés are only Tutsis, because it was they who were being hunted down’ (Kayitana). So the use of the term ‘survivor’ implies in this sense reproduction of ethnicity. Also the group of ‘returnees’ mainly, if not exclusively statistically speaking, imply a former being as Tutsi. When it comes the group of ‘reintegrates’ (any representatives of the réintégrés category are however absent from the material) this ought to imply ‘Hutu’, and this only. Then we have the group of ‘others’, that also contains mainly Hutus, given that ‘all’ survivors are Tutsi and all returnees are Tutsi and any Tutsi can be referred to as belonging to

100Returnees connotes mainly Tutsi exiles who returned with RPF, within the refugee category one finds ‘old caseload refugees’ (Tutsi pre-genocide refugees) and ‘new caseload refugees’ (Huta post-genocide refugees).
either of these groups. Here my findings too not differ essentially from that one encounters in the multitude of scholarly work on Rwanda. There still ‘is’ ethnicity in Rwanda and any labelling here and now is based on the ethnic categories of then and there, which thus are valid and have a bearing for our understanding of the Rwandan social field (see for example Prunier, 1997; Mamdani, 2001). But, this is a truth that needs to be modified. What the study shows is that it is neither morally nor scientifically defendable to speak of Rwanda as a society where it is question of Hutus vs. Tutsis, winners vs. losers or majority people vs. minority people. The sample population constituting the empirical material may all be identified as winners – after all they are alive, they are not imprisoned, they are among the lucky few that are able to pursue higher education. They may all also be identified as ‘losers’; they have all lost so much and mere being is about giving up a part of oneself everyday, they have lost their adolescence and to a certain extent everything they have experienced is in a way filtered through what they lived in 1994.

I believe that the extracts from the stories largely speak for themselves. Since they are juxtaposed the different characteristics of the different types of trajectories appear clearly. However, I will below introduce the parole of the interviewees by emphasising the things I consider important to bring forward. There are two things that are revealed by the extracts from the stories. Firstly, the interviewees when making a meaningful account of the event retrospectively project their present knowledge into the event that most likely at the time seemed anything but endowed with sense. In a sense then the event is constantly reproduced as it is represented. Secondly, how the event is represented, from which point of view it is narrated, depends on the interviewees trajectory antedating the event. For this part, carrying on how the genocide is narrated, I have decided to use rather large extracts from the stories due to that it is this critical event that determined the identities of today and this is key for our understanding of their respective positions in today’s Rwanda. In many ways, the differences in their standpoints concerning the present situation and the future also follow the demarcation of the groups that are revealed in the practice of narrating the genocide.

6.1.1 The Social Production of a ‘Meaningful Event’

From the stories we may see that the meaning of the event is very much derived from what the interviewees know today, which is then projected into the past of the story on what it ‘was like’. My question as well as the fact that the artificiality of the interview situation per se invites to stories of ‘explaining it all’ in a way provoked this, especially since they might feel urged to be more basic when explaining it to a foreigner. However, I do not believe this disqualifies the findings. For example Patricie constantly kept saying things in the order of ‘it was in that moment I came to understand that it was about a genocide of the Tutsis’, even though it from her story is rather clear that she in that present did not have any such global view. Her standpoint in that present rather seems to have been that of a

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101 Furthermore, during the interview this was more accentuated than the version which is being represented here, thus Patricie constantly kept bringing forward different moments ‘where she realised that it was about a genocide of the Tutsis’.
girl/young woman, whose concerns were to stay alive and getting to know the destiny of her family. She also integrates the overall situation in a way to explain, give meaning to the event; ‘Because everybody had to go hunting in the morning. Those who didn’t show up at the barriers, were taken for Tutsis’. Probably the phrase “We didn’t know anything about the situation, we didn’t know anything about the country.” is closer to the ‘truth’ of her situation during the three months in 1994 where she hid. Perhaps she did receive information from the man hiding her about the obligation for all the Hutu to participate in the ‘communal work’ on the barriers, but the way she renders this sense is an ex post construction. Equally when Gaspard is to speak the event, he takes refuge to what he knows today. In his quest for meaning he has asked those who belonged to the ‘other camp’ to explain their actions ‘they themselves cannot explain how this phenomenon could take place, they do not know the causes. They say that it was something that unexpectedly happened, like a strange force that imposed itself”. Kayitana made a long pause before starting speaking the genocide, as if he was gathering momentum before when to begin the story. He seems to feel a need to try to explain the occurrence of the event before turning to the event as such; “In 1990 the liberation war was launched. In the beginning of the war that began in 1990 the authorities in place began teaching the population the discourse ‘We’re at war, we’re in danger, we’re under attack’”. This is revealing in a number of ways, for now it is the term ‘liberation war’ that is interesting. This is probably not the words Kayitana would have used in the early 1990’s. Not because of that he then ‘was Hutu’, my study indicates that also those in this age who were considered ‘Tutsis’ did not have any thorough knowledge of the existence of Rwandans outside Rwanda, i.e. that there should be someone having a legitimate claim to power-sharing in Rwanda or even the right to return to Rwanda. The Rwandans finding themselves outside the Rwandan borders were excluded to an extent that their existence was officially ignored. For example Gaspard, who had an official Tutsi identity, told me, “We who were inside the country we didn’t know that there were other Rwandans who were abroad, when I grew up I thought that the only Rwandans were those who lived in Rwanda”. Thus when the RPF launched the war it was officially by the Habyarimana government proclaimed as an aggression from ‘foreigners’ as well as it was recognised as such by the population at large (see Des Forges et al., 1999 and Mamdani, 2001). The label ‘liberation war’ is thus a qualifying signifier that was earned by the military victory.

In this sense the words of Ibrahim “I don’t have the means to speak about, to tell you how I felt and what I thought during the genocide”; and Benoit, “I don’t know how to speak about the genocide, even though I may speak about it” capture well my point. The genocide was perhaps events that were experienced as bereft of meaning, but in its aftermath it has to be given meaning. It may be that this is made acute by the interview situation, but it is something that is valid also in everyday life. This kind of ‘narrative strategy’, in order to produce a meaningful event is a recurrent feature in most of the life

102 Mamdani (2001:185-233) describes how a ‘liberation army’ that turned into a de facto ‘occupation army’ initiated the RPF campaign. The war also brought with it a revival of the collective memory of the ‘social revolution’ that had been more or less erased from the collective consciousness during the 1980’s. For how the intelligentsia inside Rwanda categorised the RPF as the representatives of monarchical and ‘Tutsi-power’ see (Bangamwabo et al., 1991).
stories I have collected. It does not appear in all the extracts below but in the interviews as wholes there were a constant concern by the interviewees to make their stories endowed with sense. Which leads us in to the next conclusion one may draw from the accounting of genocide; from what perspective one speaks the genocide determines what kind of event that is represented; what the interviewee considers meaningful to tell.

6.1.2 The Social Point of View

What kind of story you tell on the genocide largely depends on your trajectory. If the way social being was categorised before was along ethnic/racial lines thus tending to impute natural quality to the different types of beings, being nowadays is more obviously a social construct. As the practical identities reveal themselves in the stories it is possible to group them in accordance with from what standpoint they present their story, needless to say any identity of today has the previous ethnic identities as one of its constituents and many of the students still bring forward that ethnicity in the sense of belonging to a group that is described as ethnic is a part of their selves. However, as we shall see further ahead, they do not make any claims or anchor rights and obligations on the belonging to an ethnic group.

From my material, we may deduce four different groups of stories with regards to the genocide. One group which may be labelled ‘stories of survival’ which is told by those who today are objectively (i.e. officially and socially in general) recognised as ‘survivors’. Then we encounter another kind of stories where the focus is on surviving, but that are somewhat de-centred from the own self, as the survival of other persons is just as present as one’s own survival. This is ‘another set of survival stories’; the persons telling this are not socially recognised as ‘survivors’. We then also come across yet another group of persons whose stories contain an element of staying alive, here the time of survival strategies are somewhat deferred to after the actual genocide. These stories may be grouped as Other stories of survival. These persons are not recognised as ‘survivors’. For them, the critical moment when it comes to life and death was just after the genocide. This does by no means imply that the threat to those who had a Hutu identity on a collective level was any way near the menace to the life of those who were Tutsis, only that they in their stories reveal a concern about that at a certain point in time they could not take life for granted. Finally we come across a story which stand out from the rest in the sense that the components of death, fear and sadness that we also find in all the previous stories on the genocide is never directly directed towards the own person, one’s own self. This kind of stories may be conceptualised as a ‘distant point of view’ and they are here represented by Jeanette’s story.

6.1.2.1 Stories of Survival

We start out by looking at Patricie’s, Félicitée’s and Gaspard’s stories, the ones who before the genocide were defined as Tutsi and thus ‘are’ (officially recognised as) ‘rescapés’ since they were both inside Rwanda as well as they were targets of the genocide. One is immediately struck by the way they
account for the genocide where their experiences are that of having to had to deploy strategies with the explicit end to avoid death. Death as an anticipated future is the eminent feature of their experiences (with the exception of Gaspard’s story, where perhaps the total absence of death is revealing as he was not to keen on speaking the genocide experience): the death of family members and other people in their closeness and the absolute immanence of death in their conditions of being. Terror by the knowledge of certain death in the probable future (perhaps the only thing certain) waiting if found, in an existence which is otherwise complete chaos. As it was Félicitée was found but avoided death due to that the rituals regarding her ‘death to come’ prolonged the existence of life chances. Thus, identity of conditions of existence where death is an ‘absolute possibility’ immediately close in the anticipated probable future; the ‘to take place’.

**Patricie:**

*I do very well remember, it was at 8.30 p.m., on the radio they started to play classic music. We were at home, in the house. We started to here the sound of bombardment and all that, because one started to exterminate people straight after the death of the president. Then with the change on the radio we were astonished. Mom came home and she said “What’s on the radio, they’ve put on classic music?”. We gathered around the radio and we listened to the communiqué, the communiqué that announced the death of the president. My mother immediately had a shock, and she said, “We’re going to have problems.” We asked “Why?”. Because we were children, we weren’t aware of what was about to happen. Then our mother told us “Go straight to bed!”. We said “Why? At this hour? Why go straight to bed now?” She said “Go straight to bed! Tomorrow morning you’re getting up early.” We said “Why?” She left us and we went to bed. We weren’t aware of what was going on, what was being done.

I was with my older sister; I asked her “Why did mother say that there will be problems? “Why?” We could see that she was afraid: “Why this change on the radio? What has it got to do with us? What’s the relation between the president and us? If he is dead, he is dead like everyone else. Why then, is she afraid?” Because I was a child. Then my older sister replied: “You, you don’t know anything, there will be problems. Get your rest, tomorrow you’ll see.”

I stayed in bed and at about 3 a.m. I was awaked by the sound of bombardment I said to my elder sister: “Do you hear that?” We went out and then we could see flames. Our mother told us to get inside the house and then she started to tell us. Because there was a neighbour, it was a Hutu, who had come to inform our mother “It’s dangerous for you, if you could leave the house, if you could go far away from here, it would be better for you.”. When my mother had asked him if he could give us shelter he said, “No, it’s forbidden, it has been forbidden to do that one has said that we should exterminate you”. My mother had kept this to herself because she didn’t want to scare us. But then around three o’clock a.m., she gathered us all in the living room and she told us what the neighbour had said. Then she said: “Get yourselves prepared, something is going to happen, that’s for sure.”*
As one started to attack the homes in the immediately close surroundings, we started to prepare to get leaving, and it was at that moment there that I learnt, that I became aware of that it was a dangerous situation. But not that it was a genocide. One started killing people, the families here around us, there were cries, cries from children and all that.

Then when the morning came we had the problem. No one could go out. There had been barriers set up, neighbourhood barriers. If you tried to leave the neighbourhood, they would kill you straight away. We tried to, we tried to leave, to get away through the window, we tried that, but we didn’t have a chance because the barriers were already in place, but we still wanted to give it a try. We wanted to get away Mom said: “Try here, while waiting, prepare yourselves to die.” I asked my mother: “Why do we have to die?” My mom replied: “Come my girl, why did they take your father and not someone else’s father? You have to die because you are Tutsi. They have condemned us all because they say that we have killed the president that’s why.” I understood that there was a danger, that one was prepared to kill me. I asked my mother: “Why is it why is it always the Tutsis that have to be attacked?” She told me: “It’s like that, we are born in a way, this is the situation, it’s like this, I don’t know how to tell you. It’s like that.”.

We stayed in the house for three days, we prepared ourselves for death. Then the neighbour came, he gave us a small amount of food, and he made us get out. We left. It was night. When I started, when we started the journey, during the night, with the rain, it was in that moment I came to understand that it was about a genocide of the Tutsi. We got out everyone in a different direction, I didn’t know: ‘Where is my family? Where is my elder sister where is my younger sister?’ I left alone, they left alone. And then one started to hunt everywhere, in the forests, in the houses that weren’t inhabited, all that. With this situation, with this hunt, it was in that moment I started to understand that it was about a genocide.

We hid. We didn’t know who had already been found, we didn’t know anything. We didn’t know anything about the situation, we didn’t know anything about the country. If I was lucky enough to be hidden by someone he could go and hurt someone else. It might be that he leaves me, he spares me and has pity on me, but he wouldn’t have pity on you. Because everybody had to go hunting in the morning. Those who didn’t show up at the barriers, were taken for Tutsis. They said: “If you don’t show up, it is because you want to hide the Tutsis.” Thus, one showed up. One may even find Tutsis, in that case one told you: “Take a machete and kill them.” If you don’t manage to do it, one kills you, because you are together with them; you are a Tutsi.

The hunt continued all over the country, and I ended up by understanding that I won’t have the possibility to exist like before. I said to myself ‘my family is already dead’. I stayed in the hideout during three months; April, May, June. It’s in June I was liberated – on 6th June, with the arrival of RPF. I was all the time in my hideout, but not in my neighbourhood, I had already arrived to another neighbourhood. I was hidden by someone who took pity on me he saw me [as] really young [petite], he saw the suffering, he took pity on me, he hid me in the maize factory [maïserie]. He was Hutu.
The hunt went on until...depending on the region...there were those who were freed already in April. The neighbourhood where we lived when it broke out, it was freed already in April\footnote{On April 12 RPF forces coming from the north entered the northern parts of Kigali, thus joining the contingent of some 600 soldiers}, it is where you pass when you come from Byumba, it’s in the north [of Kigali], so when the soldiers came they crossed the neighbourhood and those who were still there were liberated. As we had already left the neighbourhood we weren’t lucky.

I was freed in June after three months of hiding. After the liberation, my liberation, I started to understand what had taken place. I ended up by understanding that it was a genocide. Because, there were those who were not concerned, and there were those who were concerned. That’s why I confirm, I accept that it was Genocide.

\begin{quote}
Félicitée

When the communiqué announcing the death of the president appeared on the radio I could see that my father was very afraid. It made me think about the situation at school where the Hutu and the Tutsi said nasty things to each other, things that would heart you a lot. One began to see people die around us, but it took some time before the war came to Butare, it was April 23. I didn’t believe that it would take place like that, I didn’t expect that people could do such things. We were afraid so we left the house to hide in the sorghum. When we hid there, we heard that people had begun to destroy houses, set houses on fire. It was the militia and neighbours as well, people who lived very close to you. They did this, even though one shared everything before. We kept hiding and I remember being very afraid. In Butare one started by killing the men and the boys. There were a lot of people searching for the men and the boys, from the army and the Interahamwe. I then learned that my father was dead, as well as all my brothers. Then one started to kill women and girls. But it took a long time after the killing of the boys and the men before one started to kill the women and the girls. It was in May. They killed all. We hid in the sorghum for a long time, we looked for whatever to eat and drink, it was rain season so there was water to drink. One day they found us and they killed my mother. I was there and I saw it. In our commune, there were many people who were killed. But since I was a student they wanted to do things to me, very dangerous things. They brought me around the commune together with the Interahamwe, and I saw it, I watched it. Then afterwards they raped me. But then I got away, I ran away and I hid at a widow’s house that didn’t live far from us. Then when the war ended I was still there [she smiles and brightens up].

Everyone in my family was killed. I was the only one left. I didn’t want to speak to anyone; I didn’t open my mouth and stayed silent. I was given clothes but I still stayed silent. I wanted to die, but I didn’t know how to do it.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Gaspard

I was in Kigali during the day, then I returned to my village. The next day someone told me that the plane carrying Habyarimana had crashed. I didn’t really care, it was just a person whomever to
me. But then one started to kill people so we began to evacuate. We crossed a lake and then we were in safety.104

There aren’t any persons I have stopped considering friends. No, it hasn’t changed anything between concrete persons and me. Because even if you have committed things like that, today when you see them they are normal persons, they themselves cannot explain how this phenomenon could take place like that, they do not know the causes. When you ask them to explain they say that it was something that unexpectedly happened, like a strange force that imposed itself.

6.1.2.2 Another Set of Survival Stories

If we then turn to Ibrahim and Athanase, we still see that also here survival is an essential strategy that appears in their stories on the genocide experience. Both of them share the fact of having been officially identified as ‘Hutu’ but having Tutsi mothers which implies a situation where they during the genocide were not targeted qua Tutsi, but rather possible targets due to their ‘bastardness’ in the eyes of the ‘Hutu cause’. Sometimes the persons of ‘mixed descent’ were even more viciously aimed at, as if their obvious hybrid status were witness of the threat to ‘Hutuness’ and their existence as such was something Rwanda had to be cleared of. Sometimes they had to prove their ‘Hutuness’. One of the systematically used genocide acts was forcing family members to kill one another (African Rights, 1995a:638ff and 1001ff). It seems as neither Athanase nor Ibrahim was confronted with this ‘choice’.

So once again we are dealing with experiences of genocide where the strategy was explicitly aiming at survival: Ibrahim took refuge away from his own neighbourhood where people knew he was a ‘half breed’, hiding behind his official identity as Hutu105. For Athanase the major concern was keeping his mother alive, as well as his father who was a potential traitor due to his marriage to a Tutsi woman. Common to both their stories is the threat to their mothers as any distinction Hutu-Tutsi cut right through their bodies. Hence, their social positioning implies strategies of not only saving life but also the need for strategies of not taking lives, as in the case of Athanase whom due to his age was exempted from ‘communal work’ at the barriers. Thus, identity of conditions where death is an ‘absolute possibility’ immediately close in the anticipated probable future; the ‘to come’ at the same time as the risk of having to take life is inherent to ones existence as such.

Ibrahim

I don’t have the means to speak about, to tell you how I felt and what I thought during the genocide. I think I could write at least one book on it. It is something I find very bizarre, very stupid, very tragic. Normally one day has 24 hours, but there were moments when you thought a day had passed since you woke up, but it was still mid-day. I was lucky enough not to be in school, it was in the middle of the school leave, because if the genocide had happened when it was not school holidays I could be dead. I

quartered at the national parliament building since December 1993, following the Arusha Accords (Des Forges, 1999:141 and 692-693).

104 Gaspard did not get into details here, but from how I understand it he managed to join the advancing RPF forces.

105 A possible strategy he had used before (see further below ‘Becoming’).
was in fourth secondary, and I am thin and tall. Since the ethnie comes with the parents and my father was Hutu, I was Hutu too. I was thus considered Hutu since my father was Hutu.

I was in Nyamirambo, the Muslim quarters of Kigali. I was strolling around in the neighbourhood, because I had been watching a game [of football]. It was about 20.30. I met someone who told me to come and listen to the radio, “Habyarimana’s plane has been shot down!” I thought something bad would come out if it, but never that it would turn to what it did; massacres and everything. Then the orders to stay inside the houses were announced on the radio around 5 o’clock a.m. There was a communiqué from the Ministry of Defence, made by Bagosora who’s now in Arusha. Everyone had to stay indoors and the barriers were mounted. The days following the 6th April the grand personalities were killed, some ministers, among them this lady, the Prime Minister. Then after two days Rwanda was plunged into chaos, the massacres began, houses were destroyed and people were killed; with knives, machetes and grenades into schools and in the stadiums. One started then to collaborate with the neighbours in order to go somewhere else. Because one started to kill people everywhere. It was better to be in another neighbourhood than your own, since in your own neighbourhood people knew very well who you were, but in another neighbourhood, they didn’t. For example if someone was looking for Stéphane and you were in another neighbourhood, then no one could know, but if you stayed in your house, they could come to your house and say that “Ah, so here’s Stéphane hiding, we have been looking for him and he’s still alive!” So we thought about bringing my mother somewhere else, and hiding her. So the four of us tried to get out of Kigali. We were lucky. Then you would meet others who would tell you that “this one and that one are dead”. “We were together and were hunted and then he was assassinated”. Like that.

There are loads of people you no longer consider as friends. I perhaps didn’t see them as personal friends, but let’s take the example of my family, my mother. In the neighbourhood where we lived there was this family that was really close with ours. Then after the genocide my mother told me that there was one day [during the genocide] that she was notified that she was soon going to be assassinated by the militia, so she thought that she should go to this family to take refuge there. They told her that “You cannot be found here, you have to go back to your own place”. Then she was chased away. I think of this as something infidel between families that were really close before, when they refused to offer their hospitality to my mother and my younger sister. My mother went somewhere else and found protection, me as well I was protected. To her it was really hard since it was someone she thought of as a friend and she could have been killed. Today she doesn’t consider the family as friends. She still sees them from time to time, they don’t live far from us. Sometimes you run into them on the

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106 The communiqué was read on Radio Rwanda beginning 6.30 a.m. on the morning of April 7.
107 Agathe Uwilingyama
108 Ibrahim and his family are Muslims and they lived in a Muslim neighbourhood, it is not clear from the story alone that the neighbourhood co-operation against the genocidal powers was stronger in this particular neighbourhood. But Prunier (1997) has pointed to that the record for Muslims in general seem to have been somewhat better since being a Muslim implies stronger community ties than that for Christians in general. Being Muslim implied having a social identity which was not as self evident as that of being Christian, in a sense then one chose to be a Muslim Rwandan which according to Prunier (1997) meant that one was foremost Muslim and not ‘ethnic’. This may not hold true when
street and you say hello. But the relation that was there before the war, before the genocide, it’s ruined. Today it’s different, there’s a kind of necessary co-existence, but nothing more.

Athanase

It was catastrophic, I was in the Northwest in a region with many of the important personalities of the time. The president was born there, as well as the majority of the ministers were of regional provenance. During the war, the great war if I may say so, after the death of the president we stayed in the house. We listened to the radio and we saw people, taxis that transported the extremists, we heard and saw enough to understand that it was genocide. In our region, in my commune, or to be precise in our sector, people from the surroundings during the genocide massacred three Tutsi families. It was mad, my brother sometimes had to work at the barrier, but he told them that I was too young, so I didn’t have to.

It indeed has changed relations [said with a sad laughter]. For example there were neighbours that wanted to kill my mother, as well my father since they were married, but they were saved by our family, me, my sisters and brothers Then after the war the friendship wasn’t like before. They were afraid, and we…well, it’s like that.

6.1.2.3 Other Survival Stories

If we now turn to the accounting for the genocide by two persons who were identified as Hutu up until 1994 there is an obvious shift in meaning of the event from one’s own standpoint. Firstly they were both aimed by the propaganda describing first the RPF and then all Tutsi as well as ‘moderate Hutus’ as enemies of the state and the survival of the Hutus. Benoit’s phrase well describes this, “On the radio one called upon all the Rwandans... no all the Hutu, to fight the Tutsi.” Whether or not they on the radio did say ‘Hutus’ or ‘Rwandans’ does not make any difference. At this stage, it was synonymous. Because within the logic of ‘Hutu Power’ following the logic of the Rwandan constitutive imaginary the Tutsi was a ‘race’ alien to Rwanda, and Rwanda as an imagined political community connoted solely Hutus (Mamdani, 2001:190). So when the announcers on Radio Rwanda spoke of ‘the people that loves Rwanda’ and the ongoing ‘final revolution’ it was obvious whom they addressed (Chrétien et al, 1995:124ff). The words Benoit heard might have been a call for rubanda nyamwinshi (the great majority) to fight the invading inyenzi (literally cockroaches, directly denoting RPF but implying Tutsi monarchists) and their ibyitsi (accomplices, during the genocide more or less every Tutsi inside Rwanda and any Hutu who would not work with the genocidal powers; ‘moderate Hutus’). Benoit thoroughly investigated, but for further studies it should be an obvious starting point in lining out the nature of the genocide; to what extent did competing social identities (for example religious ones) prevent persons from taking part in the killing?

109 Most likely mini busses, in Rwanda ‘taxi’ refers to mini busses and ‘taxi voiture’ to personal cars serving as taxis.
could to a certain extent understand the message, knowing what was expected of him as person, and did he not the meaning of it was unfolded in the tragedy.110

With both Benoit and Kayitana there is an explicit concern to explain the occurrence of the event that did not have to await my specific question on it. They both, as did others who stated their ethnicity as ‘Hutu’ employed a strategy of explaining how the ‘discourse we are under attack’ was practised; as well as that there were official calls to everyone to participate in the ‘defence’. These features of ‘the orders from above’ in order to explain the rationale, but far from condoning, you do not find to the same extent in the other stories. True enough, Patricie and Gaspard refer to it in their attempt to make the event ‘meaningful’ but it is not an essential feature of their stories.

We do also find death in their stories on the genocide as such, but it is more from a distance. It is the loss of old friends, who may be dead or may be in exile, but it seems as they themselves never were confronted with their own deaths as possible outcomes during the genocide as such. This brings as to a temporal shift of the tragedy of the event, the anticipated probability of one’s own death was made acute in the aftermath of the genocide. From the extract of Kayitana’s story, this is evident “To me, just after the genocide, ok, it was the worst, the worst period of my life.”. It is not the genocide as such which for him was experienced as the worst period, rather it was the time of arbitrary detentions and executions that followed. This is also a feature woven into Benoit’s story. Although he does not explicitly say that it is a period worse than the genocide, he treated it more at length during the interview. Thus, genocide stories on death indeed but not one’s own probable death, but death a bit distant striking neighbours and friends. However, in the aftermath of the genocide, the possibility of one’s own death is a part of the conditions of existence and one may have to deploy strategies countering a possible anticipated death or imprisonment.

Kayitana

In the beginning of the war that began in 1990 the authorities in place began teaching the population the discourse of grosso modo “We’re at war, we’re in danger, we’re under attack”. But before, in the years 1963, 1965, there had been minor attacks made by groups that tried to attack in order to resettle in their fatherland [patrie]. But in these days I wasn’t born so I will tell you about the 1990’s. Thus in 1990, the liberation war was launched. Then, the authorities in place began to say “They attack us, those who attack are people from abroad, they are foreigners, they want to destabilise us and trouble us, they are the refugees of 1959, we have to fight these people. They attack us, thus we have to fight them”. They said this to the whole population, all of the ‘ethnies’. They sew the discourse of disagreement. The war went on, it began in Ruhengeri, the Ruehengeri préfecture and the Tyumba préfecture.

110 During the first days of the genocide also many Hutu fled due to the chaotic situation. Since many of the first days victims were targeted Hutus (i.e. ‘moderate Hutus’) it was initially hard to understand from below who the real target was (see African Rights, 1995a and Des Forges et al., 1999).
I was in my home region with my family, it was the Easter holidays. In 1994 the war kept on raging. The authorities in place made sure to use the disagreement to its advantage. It is thus how the killing, the genocide began and the population, above all the Hutu, was really relentless, they were really, how should I put it... [He does not find the words and instead give an example] they said, “Your mother, she attacks us, we will fight her”. After all one understood what was taking place, because one had begun the killings. It did even take place where we lived there was the genocide like in all areas, we did see people who killed each other, so one knew about the situation.

To me, just after the genocide, ok, it was the worst, the worst period of my life. The time that followed these killings, that period was really bad. One saw that people had grief, they were really sad; they missed their friends, their relatives, their neighbours. This period was a time of grief: the rescapés were dissatisfied; and the others...well, one was put into groups to whom the rescapés said “Now, in the region there were neighbours, and these neighbours are no longer, where are these neighbours? One has killed the other.” They [rescapés] were of course sad, they imprisoned people, they imprisoned people with saying, “It is you who have killed your neighbours”. [His voice is struck by the memories that his words are calling back.] Without looking for information they would put you in prison, of course it was due to the grief. During this period, it goes without saying, the population didn’t get along very well, even though the situation resembled of peace and things got into order. At least one didn’t kill one another any longer. But the time that followed wasn’t a good time, it was a period of anger. There was imprisonment, you could even be killed because of vengeance, one did it in clandestine. Of course, the population didn’t get along. During this period everybody was menaced, but of course not everybody was menaced in the same fashion.

After the establishment of the new government the population progressively began to get along, but little by little, and for the moment I believe that things begin to get better.

Benoit

I don’t know how to speak about the genocide, even though I may speak about it. However, before the war of 1994 there was a long period where neighbours began to suspect one another; ‘Why does he go away and stay away for such a long time?’ Then in 1994 things took another turn with the death of the president; people said “They continue to lie, they continue to attack us, we’re going to show them whom they’re dealing with”, so people, encouraged by the authorities, picked up the machete.

It began during the night of April 6. I was at home, it was very early in the morning during the rainy season and it was very foggy so one couldn’t see very far. On the radio it was classic music, as it is when a sad event has taken place. Then there was the communiqué announcing the death of the president, with it there was also information from the military about a curfew, saying that one shouldn’t leave one’s commune. In my region it didn’t matter much, everyone stayed on the hills, sure talking...
about it but nothing more. Due to the interdiction of leaving the commune one couldn’t go to the prefecture centre for more information. So one stayed tuned to Radio Rwanda and RTLM for further information. On the radio one called upon all the Rwandans… no all the Hutu, to fight the Tutsi. Things began in Kigali.

In July the war came to us and we decided to leave, my father said, “Let’s go!”. The other children said, “Let’s go.” But I said, “I’m staying, because if I stay and I’m meant to die, I’ll die, and if I go and I’m meant to die, I’ll die. It’s death that decides.” So the others decided to stay. But then in the morning we heard a lot of gunfire, so we decided to leave anyway, the only ones to stay were my grandmother who was too old to leave and my elder brother who stayed with her. Then when traversed an area where there were many who had been killed we ran into problems because people began to say that we were people from the South “They have killed all the Tutsis”. Some decided to go back, but my siblings and me stayed with my parents. The day after I decided to return to see how the people back home were doing, when I came back to the house I saw some former Rwandan militaries [ex-FAR]. They asked me where I was going and I said that I was leaving. They told me that we were going to leave together before the FPR arrives\(^\text{112}\). Then I heard gunfire from the advancing Inkotanyi\(^\text{113}\). The militaries ran away but we stayed because we had no idea about what was going on and we couldn’t even tell one side from the other. So we spent the night outdoors and the day after we went back to the house. With the first militaries from FPR to arrive there was a boy who had been to school with my brother. I recognised him and convinced him that I knew him, so I had no problems. But since that day people began to be killed, one, two or three a day, very slowly until 1995 when there were many people killed as people began to come back. Then people began being identified as participants during the genocide and the FPR soldiers coming from different regions recognised people from back home and asked them to explain how it could be their relatives were dead. I have never had any problems in the order of that I have felt reproaches since I’m Hutu. I stay on good feet with other people.

You see I was in third secondary, and there are many friends that I have still not found yet, many of them died and others took off far away. Here [at KIE] there’s no one that I was in school with. Sometimes I run into some old friends, but I haven’t met many of the friends I had before. I have been in Rwanda all the time ever since my childhood until today and I have observed all the events. After the war spent only two nights outside the house. I am a privileged Rwandan because I haven’t experienced much suffering, God has protected me.

6.1.2.4 A Distant Point of View

As I have chosen to use but one life story of those persons who are identified as ‘returnees’ some words on them as group in the sample is appropriate. Since the stories above are somewhat centred around

\(^{112}\) The strategy to use the civil population as human shields as retreating to the then Zaire was commonly used by the FAR and the militias, when settled in the refugee camps the command structure of the genocide was upheld (see for example Prunier, 1997 et De Lame, 1996). Allegedly, there is still large civil populations (perhaps even between 50,000 and 100,000) wandering around with the militias inside the DRC (personal information).
‘death’ one could perhaps expect to find a representative from the group of students who lived in Burundi before the genocide as they presumably should be disposed to speak stories where death could be a *leitmotiv*. However, no such trace was found in this group’s stories. This could of course be a result of the study design concerned with the events in Rwanda. Thus, with this reservation above, Jeanette’s story well represents the stories of the larger group of students who were not in Rwanda during the genocide.

The first thing that ought to strike the reader is the length of the extract, which is representative of her whole story on the genocide as experience. It is much shorter than the others’ stories simply because she had less to say when speaking the genocide. This should not come as a surprise to us but is rather self-evident from her trajectory; she was not in Rwanda during the genocide. Thus her story is one of the outside observer, she is touched by it indeed but for obvious reason her story is a different story. When still in Uganda ‘genocide death’ was something abstract, something perhaps not geographically far away but socially distant. However, as her body moved into the Rwandan space, genocide and death is brought socially close, *“By the time we got here they were still killing people in big numbers in the West of the country”*. I am not trying to get at that the grief felt by Jeanette should be anything in the order of ‘false consciousness’. Her grief is surely real enough. But, on one point her story of the genocide resembles more of a story I would tell than that any of the stories told by her fellow Rwandans; grief and sadness indeed, but it is not a story of fearing for one’s own life, even though that it is obvious that she at the time of the genocide was more touched by it than any one not having direct ties with Rwanda. Thus, a story on genocide where ‘death’ has its due place. Nevertheless, a story where one’s own death in the probable anticipated future is absent from the story on the genocide.

**Jeanette**

*It was all over the media it was in the paper it was on television it was on the radio, you couldn’t miss it, it was that close.*

*When I was in Uganda I didn’t really feel it. When I was in Uganda I thought I felt the grief, the extent of the grief in Rwanda, ‘til I came here and I listened to survivors, visited sites. There is no way what I felt in Uganda could have prepared me for what I would feel in Rwanda.*

*It’s much more peaceful than it was than when I got here. By the time we got here they were still killing people in big numbers in the West of the country. There were a couple of students who went to Ruhengeri [the Northwest] on several occasions ‘cause their families were still there. Some of them*

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113 Label designating RPF, derived from a 19th century military formation.
114 On October 23, 1993, the first elected Hutu president of Burundi was assassinated in a (Tutsi dominated) military coup. In its aftermath followed massacres of Tutsi and then reprisals against and repression of Hutu (see Chrétien, 1997 and Lemarchand, 1998). Many authors have pointed to the role of the events in Burundi as to make the ‘defence’- and ‘survival propaganda’ in Rwanda plausible in the eyes of the Hutu population, as well as many of the most ferocious killers seem to have been Burundian Hutus who fled the massacres in Burundi (see African Rights, 1995a; Des Forges et al., 1999 and Mamdani, 2001).
115 Apart from Gaspard’s story (it was obvious that he did not want to say more), this was a significant difference when it comes to the overall difference between those who were and those who were not in Rwanda during the genocide. The latter simply had less to say.
were killed there. Now we hardly have any killings anywhere in Rwanda. I guess it’s much more peaceful now.

6.2 Explaining the Occurrence of the Genocide

6.2.1 Explanatory Stories

Also dealing with the question of guilt and responsibility there is a concern to explain the rationale of the events; to make their narrative meaningful. A part from this one also encounters the sense of the Rwandans feeling of their place in the world order when touching upon explanations of the event. This element has been abducted from the extracts below, but I often met it. Although it is not part of the explicit focus of this work, I think one should be aware of it. The statement that ‘all men are equal’ is a normative and not a realistic one. It is best synthesised by Ibrahim: "I was here in Kigali, there was the UNAMIR here. …People were killed just in front of them. It was the first failure of the International Community in the Rwandan tragedy. No one came to the rescue. Personally, I think that the reason that no one followed up Dallaire’s warnings was that it’s in Africa, in Black Africa even and below the equator. Thus UN doesn’t consider us people with the right to live. That’s my serious opinion. If you compare with Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Timor for example the situation wasn’t by far as grave as here! 1 million Rwandans died during a period of 4 months. 1 million before the eyes of the UN! And then when France launched a military operation it wasn’t to protect people who were being massacred, quite the contrary they protected those who carried out the massacres."

The students did not cast any doubt on that the RPF should not be to blame for the genocide in the sense that they by their attack provoked the exacerbation of the situation thus degrading into the genocide in this respect Patricie’s account is representative. This is something which many outside observers have pointed to (see for example Mamdani, 2001: 185ff).

In making their narratives meaningful they once again draw extracts from the overall knowledge of the genocide, thus it is that some of them mention that family members sometimes had to kill their own; ‘there could be Hutus that had married Tutsis that would kill their spouse’. Benoit, Félicitée, Kayitana all mention it in the extracts below, but also Patricie and others I came across used this as an example, without ever having any first hand experience from this. As for Ibrahim and Athanase, who might have had to experience this at close range, they do not mention this kind of examples. In their attempts to explain the genocide they again derive examples from the collective consciousness, the

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117 General Romeo Dallaire was the commander of the UNAMIR forces. In the famous January 11 cable he informed his superiors on the information obtained from an inside informer about the existence of lists over Tutsis in Kigali and the Interahamwe’s supposed ability to wipe out up to 1000 Tutsi within 20 minutes (According to the persons who were in charge of the investigation it would rather be 1 hour [Reyntjens, 1995a:60]). Only hours of the plane crash on April 6 he sent a message to his superiors in New York, “Give me the means and I can do more”. The answer was “that nobody in New York was interested in that” (Des Forges et al., 1999:150ff and 598).
118 This is not to say that this kind of example is not a ‘true’ example. Empirically this did take place (See Des Forges et al., 1999 and African Rights, 1995a).
meta-narrative of the event, as if they know that their own situated experience of it is not enough to explain the event as such an event.

If we turn to question of guilt, all the students who were in Rwanda are unanimous on the point that it is the authorities that were in place that are to blame; the genocide was planned and implemented from above. Also experienced from below the genocide policy was obviously coming from above; how could otherwise the barriers and roadblocks be in place so quickly? When it comes to the question of guilt of the participants their answers are also unison: they all treat it with ambiguity. They simultaneously consider them guilty and as victims of propaganda and pressure from the authorities. They are all well aware of that people often acted under pressure from authorities and were given the, explicit or tacit, ‘choice’ either to be killed or to kill. In Benoit’s story we find it all rather explicit; ‘One must understand what it means to take up the machete and begin to cut the head off the neighbours. Indeed, there were some areas where people were forced to kill their wives who were Tutsi’. At the same time they know that not all participated, thus there must be some who ‘chose’ to kill because they wanted to do so; who, in the words of Félicitée, “were evil”. Therefore, the executioners of the genocide policy from above are both victims and persecutors in the eyes of the students because as Gaspard says ‘life is also complicated’. The only thing that practically distinguishes within the group of students who were in Rwanda during the genocide is a concern with a forgotten question of victimisation; the people now in prison. Something which we see from the extract from Kayitana’s story below but which one also encounters in the story of other persons who identified themselves as Hutu.

Grounded in the practical identities as they reveal themselves in the narration of life-stories Jeanette again distinguishes herself from the others. Indeed, she also expresses her ambiguity on the matter of guilt, ‘when you look back on the colonialists role they had no alternative’; the Rwandans inhibited an infernal machine that was deemed for the apocalypse. However, she also expresses her regret that people did not enough share a common Rwandan identity. As we shall see further below this might be explained by her dubious feelings about her own ‘Rwandanness’.

Benoit

The genocide took place because some rulers encouraged people to participate; some perpetrators planned the genocide. The perpetrators and all the participants are responsible, because one must understand what it means to take up the machete and begin to cut the head off the neighbours. There are people who participated and there are people who didn’t participate. It was possible to refuse. Why couldn’t those who participated refuse to participate? Indeed, there were some areas where people where forced even to kill their wives who were Tutsis. But one had a choice because some participated and others didn’t so it was possible to refuse the killing.

Kayitana
The responsible for the genocide are the authorities in place. The sowed the discourse of disagreement: “That one isn’t your neighbour. That one isn’t from the same race as you. They attack us”. The authorities are completely responsible.

[Stefan: The people who killed during the genocide?] For the moment, they are culpable, for they have killed their neighbours, members of their families. Because there could be Hutus that had married Tutsis, that would kill their spouse. But that didn’t take place very often. But you could kill your one nephews for example. For the moment that kind of persons are responsible; because they have committed killings, they have massacred people. After all, they are culpable. In this case, the victim is of course the Tutsis.

However, also other victims haven’t participated in the massacres. For the moment, they may find themselves in prison. They are also victims.

Athanase

The president died and people said that he was killed by the Tutsis, and the Hutus were angry, they killed all the Tutsis.

The grand personalities are responsible. It was incomprehensible, the president died around 20.30, and in town one could see barriers about one hour later and they were already killing people. Thus, one could see that it was well organised, also until this day the causes of the downing of the plane still aren’t known.

Ibrahim

[The reason why it took place] was simply for political reasons. The Arusha Accords had just been signed, and there were people who didn’t want to share the power. That’s it. Because in the countryside farmers shared everything. For example, here in Rwanda, you don’t have ambulances, things are thus quite traditional in the countryside. So you have something like a stretcher to transport people who are ill or injured. If someone had to be carried to a hospital everyone would aid, Hutus and Tutsis alike. The population could never have prepared the genocide. Those who participated are also responsible. But one must remember that the population – even though there was resistance in some areas – was forced to participate in the massacres. But of course if all of the population had been against the genocide, the genocide could never have taken place. But you see, people were poor, uneducated and saw the possibilities of quick enrichment etc.

Gaspard

To me it’s no one particular who’s responsible for the genocide, it’s a group of people – the rulers. The people who wanted to come back they had no choice but to take up arms since they wouldn’t be allowed to come back.

To a certain extent, the people who were on the barriers or who used the machetes they are victims, but to a certain extent they are guilty. They are guilty because they have killed people that
didn’t have a chance, who hadn’t done anything. They killed people they had never met before. But life is also complicated, they were under the influence of the authorities. In a way they were forced by the authorities.

**Félicitée**

The responsibility lies with the authorities that influenced all the inhabitants. The inhabitants couldn’t do anything but what the authorities told them to. There were people who said no, who refused to participate; they were killed, they were also killed. If you refused to kill, they killed you, as well as those who hid people. If they came and searched your house and found someone hiding there, they killed you. They were afraid because if they refused they were killed. But there were also those who were evil, who killed people, even their own children. They said, “Since my wife is Tutsi we have to find the children and kill them”.

The authorities of the country were responsible, because if the authorities aren’t responsible such a thing cannot take place in our country. I’ll give you an example. When they killed all the men in our commune the girls were left, then the burgomaster held a meeting with all the inhabitants, and he told them that, “You who keep girls or women you should bring them to a place decided by me”. Then at that moment they began to kill all the girls and all the women.

**Patricie**

When I speak of persons responsible for the genocide, I mean the promoters, those who put in place the methods, because right from the beginning of the genocide you could see that it was something that had been prepared. There were machetes that were supplied in the neighbourhood for example, everybody was in disposition of arms, and everyone should have some sort of arm at their house. The parties made the distribution of arms, you saw that the whole population was concerned except for us that who should be the object to terrorise, because we had nothing. I saw that this was made in these movements: the MRND\(^{119}\) the MDR. I think that the distribution was made through these movements, in the ‘cellules’ and the ‘secteurs’ there were promoters who were in charge of this. Even during the Genocide one distributed arms in saying it’s for fighting against the enemy. The enemy for them was the Inkotanyi but the enemy of which one spoke of here was the Tutsis because one said that the Inkotanyi it’s all the Tutsis.

Some Hutus did try to save some. At least they did try. One cannot leave it like that and say that all the Hutus have done that [committed Genocide], there are some even though they are few, that tried but with the UN I don’t know. I would say that they didn’t do anything.

**Jeanette**

\(^{119}\)National Revolutionary Movement for Development (and Democracy), founded by and centred on Juvenal Habyarimana, and Democratic Republican Movement.
When you look back on the colonialists’ role, they had no alternative. But I still think that if they had looked at themselves more as Rwandans and not as Tutsi, Hutu, Twa...it wouldn’t have come to what it did.

6.2.2 It was Politics from Above

From these extracts it is rather obvious that the genocide from the inside was experienced as something that was planned and implemented from above. Indeed if no one on the ground carries out their part of a genocide it simply does not take place, but once again, the social world is not that simple and transparent. The students are explicit on the point that it is not question of ‘Hutu’ guilt as such. The authorities in place are the ones responsible, indeed they happen to have been Hutus but they are guilty and responsible not of being Hutus, but of being génocidaires. The only conclusions one may draw from it is that root assumption among foreign scholars that the peasantry was disposed to kill at will does not seem plausible from the testimonies I have gathered, but still there are some experiences from the genocide that make some of those who survived it display a general mistrust of a whole group of people, considered as a group. This further points to the need for further studies based on a life story approach. Nevertheless, there are in my material findings that point to another perception of the guilt issue. In the dissertations written by the students in Butare who were organised as ‘survivors’ one comes across elements of a view of guilt which tends towards that it is Hutus at large that are guilty. This is however only elements and far from something in the order of ‘All organised survivors hold all Hutus guilty for the genocide’.

As stated before the meaning of the ‘genocide’ is not established once and for all, there are even some persons who deny it, and others that try to diminish it. Today inside Rwanda among the students I met there is but one and indivisible ‘genocide’ no matter from what standpoint you consider the genocide, this is clear from the following part.

6.3 The Nonsense ‘Second Genocide’

One sometimes comes across statements in the order of that there should have been a second genocide committed, but this time around it is said that the RPF should have carried out a ‘counter-genocide of Hutus by Tutsis’. In this claim exiled Hutu politicians, sometimes echoed by politicians in the West, do not only argue that the majority of people killed in the ‘events of 1994’ were Hutus but they deny the very event as ‘genocide’. Indeed there were massacres, they say, but they were caused by the war, and thus by extension the RPF, and they were neither planned nor systematic. Hence, by definition it was not genocide (Lemarchand, 1998; see also Chrétien, 1997:226ff). Further, it is claimed that if genocide it was, there was also a second genocide committed by the RPF. This kind of relativism was for example manifested in articles in Le Figaro and Le Monde in 1994, and in 1995 Pierre Erny in an article that appeared in La Croix juxtaposed a ‘dirty genocide’ (génocide sale) with a ‘clean genocide (génocide propre)’ (Chrétien, 1997:250ff). What this kind of relativism does is of course to render
probable the call for ‘racial solidarity’ and defence against the invaders and their anticipated genocide. In a way then the genocide is transformed into a legitimate self-defence of one collective against another as part of an eternal ‘war of the races’ between Hutus and Tutsis. What in fact was killing of civilians way behind any frontline, and that what was by any objective standard of war tactics ‘useless’, if not outright counterproductive, is perceived as part of the war between the regime in place and the FPR. The only analogy that comes to my mind is as if the Nazi genocide would be explained by the threat posed by ‘Semitic’ to ‘Aryans’. True, there was killing on the part of the FPR outside combat situations, both before and during the genocide. Leaving aside militia members who were killed during military clashes, which is in accord with international conventions, a number of cases where advancing FPR soldiers killed what must be presumed civilians on the mere basis of that they were Hutus and there were no Tutsis left in the communities – thus, the remaining Hutus ‘had’ to be guilty of genocide – have been recorded. There are more cases where FPR troops killed wounded or defeated RAF soldiers who had laid down their arms, as well as their seems to have been systematic killing after the Rwandan Army had left. Rwandan Army officers and politicians seem to have been special targets. As well as survivors and Hutus who were considered reliable were asked to denounce génocidaires in liberated areas who were then summarily executed. The first evidence of widespread systematic killings was the so-called ‘Gersony report’ where a UNHCR team gathered information on RPF abuses. A written note produced by the UNHCR mentioned that ‘thousands of persons’ had been killed by the FPR. Gersony himself, allegedly, appreciated the killing from April to August 1994 at between 25,000 and 45,000 persons. The unpublished ‘report’ noted that FPR probably was the most disciplined armed force in the area with an impressive chain of command, thus the killing ought to have been sanctioned high up in the command structure. It also seems that civilian survivors returning were allowed to carry out vengeance killing (Personal information; Des Forges et al., 1999:703ff).

From my encounter with the students, there is no evidence that people inside Rwanda nourish the idea that a ‘second genocide’ should ever have taken place. Neither did Jeanette or any of the other students who were repatriated after the genocide agree to that such claims had any substantiality. Jeanette’s response to my question on was in the order of ‘what should you have done if you came here to save me?’. This was also the reaction by quite a few rescapés. The FPR, as we to a certain extent have seen and will see further down, enjoy an enormous credibility in the eyes in most of the students’ eyes. Furthermore the question on a ‘second genocide’ was more or less nonsense to most of the students, and I thus had to explain what kind of event a ‘second genocide’ should be.

Félicitée: I haven’t heard about that the FPR should have killed. Only that right after the war, there were many people who had killed and they had this ideology in their heads; they couldn’t understand how the people they had just killed could take over the country and they couldn’t support

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120 For a critique of the Gersony report, see Chrétien (1997:265ff).
the new regime. Some of them were killed. But it’s not like that now. If you are killed today, it’s not a question of Hutu or Tutsi.

Sometimes the interviewee base on their personal trajectory would make up their ‘own’ meaning of what a second genocide could be said to mean. This was the case with Patricie.

[Stefan: If I say ‘The Second Genocide’, what is your reaction?] Patricie: By the Second Genocide, I understand it as when you start to ignore the situation. If the rescapés of the Genocide say that the state should do something in order to prevent the impunity here in the country and they do not do enough. Or if there is ignorance of the Genocide in other countries, you know that there are those who do not accept that it was a genocide by saying, “there were also Hutus that were killed”. There are Hutus that were killed but perhaps they were killed in being suspected for being Tutsis or that they helped the Tutsis. But, you see that these non-Tutsis [killed] were very few;

If you commence to ignore what has taken place you may speak of a Second genocide, because you recommence to kill the persons that escaped death during the genocide. People have been killed and they are already dead, when I say that it’s a Second Genocide one begins to kill even those who escaped death. Then how does one begin to kill them? One begins to kill them by ignoring what has taken placed, one begins to minimise the situation, and one begins to take the situation as something normal. In that case the hearts of the survivors are shocked and depressed. That’s what I mean be the Double Genocide.

[Stefan: Sometimes you meet people, or you here about people that say that it wasn’t only one genocide but there was also a Genocide committed by the FPR] One says? But, the Second Genocide to me, I don’t understand it as if there have been another Genocide in Rwanda. Because if you go out in the country you see that there are Genocide Sites, sometimes one says that it’s not humans it’s bones from animals and all that, but when you want to minimise something you seek arguments that aren’t true.

Patricie’s account do also underline the importance of objectified history in the shape of genocide memorials and sites as a support for collective memory and thus incorporated history (see appendix VIII). This was also underlined by Kayitana’s explanation of the term rescapés, when he said ‘that for the moment rescapés implies only Tutsi’.121

Perhaps one could expect those who identified themselves as Hutu, or had Hutu as their official identity, to tell a different story? Yes, they did to the extent that the term ‘second genocide’ did ring a bell. Nevertheless, all of them argued that nothing else but the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsis was to be called genocide. However, some of them did speak about what they called the ‘cleansing’ (nettoyage) after the forced repatriation of those who in the literature go under the name of ‘new

121 In the present state of power-knowledge the only genocide in Rwanda was that on the part of the Hutu population of the Tutsis. One may imagine a remote future where it is possible that the term rescapé denotes also Hutus who were persecuted by the genocidal regime, however it is not very probable that the abusive killing on the part of RPF will be considered as counter-genocide. Even though it is evident that a considerable amount of Hutus were killed qua Hutus, due to ‘collective guilt’, and on this ground alone were judged culpable and killed on the spot without any individual trial, Ibuka (a survivor organisation) plan to continuously commemorate those ‘brave Hutus’ who sacrificed their
caseload refugees’ or reintégrés as a strategy to eliminate the insurrection against the FPR government. As we saw earlier, Benoit has ‘been in Rwanda all the time ever since his childhood until this day and he has observed all the events’. He agreed to that he had witnessed quite some killing on the part of RPF but it could by no means be compared to the genocide.

Perhaps Athanase’s testimony is the best one to describe what kind of events did take place in these ‘cleansing campaigns’. The term itself, ‘second genocide’ (in French double génocide) did not mean anything to him, supposedly because its label within Rwandan terminology is ‘cleansing’, so I had to explain what I meant by my question.

Athanase: I have heard about this, fortunately I was born in the region from where the president, the ministers etc. came, where the second genocide is supposed to have taken place. I wouldn’t say that it’s justified to talk of a ‘second genocide’. There were attacks from the outside, from those who took refuge in Zaire. After the return of 1996 there were [members of] militias that didn’t want to return since they were afraid of being brought to justice. They hid in the forests and as they were still armed they began launching attacks in the frontal regions. There were thus armed confrontations between the RPF and the militias. Since there were quite a few of the militiamen who were born in these regions they came back to their families, they brought their arms with them, and their families gave them to eat, and then they went back to the battlefield. Then afterwards they would either return to the forests or hide with their families. Thus it was hard and these people posed a lot of problems. So what took place was that there were meetings with the RPF and the population of the region, where the militaries said that one should do whatever to end these contacts with the militias. However this was not the case and then what is called the ‘cleansing’ [nettoyage] took place. [he laughs a bit at the term]. All men were asked to leave their home region; “Unless you support the militia you will agree to leave your region”, and all the men were transferred to other regions better protected by the militaries. Those who refused to move were killed, even some women who were asked to leave but refused to do so were killed.. That’s what I have to say about the ‘second genocide’. There were many killed in 1997 and 1998, but now I think the problems are over.¹²² As I am from this region and those years, I experienced quite some situations there. In 1998, I left the region to work as a teacher for some time. So I was there during that period.

As we have seen, there is among the students no reason for speaking of a ‘second genocide’ in the sense that there should have been a genocide of the Hutus on the part of Tutsis. This view is not a matter of ethnicity, whether you before the genocide was defined as Hutu or Tutsi and still consider yourself part of one group or the other the talk of a second genocide simply does not hold true. However when confronted with the notion of a ‘second genocide’ you give meaning to it in accordance with how you experienced the genocide and its aftermath. No single person who did have an official

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¹²² As I am from this region and those years, I experienced quite some situations there. In 1998, I left the region to work as a teacher for some time. So I was there during that period.
identity as ‘Tutsi’ brought up the events that go under the name of ‘cleansing’ in Rwandan discourse. The only persons to bring this up were those who as persons may have been targeted by it due to them having an official Hutu identity at the time of the genocide, but still not all who were Hutus brought this up. Something which implies two things; it is not only a question of ethnicity but also a regional variable that has to be introduced as determining whether or not you relate to and consider the ‘cleansing’; that it was not mentioned by those who had no direct experience from it is a sign of that this is not something one speaks about in public. It is something hidden and it is not socially recognised as an event, but rather it is something that ‘has never taken place’. However, empirically something that my be labelled as ‘cleansing’ has taken place, so sooner or later this has to be officially dealt with on a social level in the sense it has to be turned into an event of recognition, it has to symbolically be inscribed into Rwandan discourse as it makes part of some Rwandans’ experiences.

We will now turn to look at how the students were shaped as ethnic personalities. One may think that this part’s due place should be in accordance with its chronological place, as in a series of cause and effect; what caused their respective actions and experiences during the genocide was based on this part of their lives. However, in view of the standing of the genocide as an event that organises their knowledge and feeling about this thing called ethnicity, placing it before the event that has shaped how they relate to this would create an illusion. Without denying that ethnicity determined how they experienced the genocide, ethnicity as it exists, to the extent it exists and how it is represented, is determined by the genocide experience.

122 The year 2001 has however been devastating and about 1500 persons have been killed inside Rwanda, a number higher than any other year after the genocide (personal information). In the long run the heightened armed activities in the north-west could be a sign of that the ex-FAR and militias are loosing ground inside Congo. Many high ranking militia members have subsequently been killed or captured.
7 Stories in the Aftermath of a Dead End ‘Race’

7.1 Coming to Ethnicity

In this part, we shall look upon how the bio-power has invested itself in human bodies. As I have argued above, race/ethnicity is not, but rather it is practised, as it constantly has to be created, reproduced; in becoming. I will not argue that the school system is the sole instance where the ethnic identity was inscribed into the individual bodies, something that stands clear from the collected life-stories, but at least here, it was made a salient difference. It also enables us to study concrete practices, because as we shall see the institution of education, formation, was an instance where the Rwandan population was individually disciplined and defined as such a population consisting of different parts. But also when dealing with other representations of the ‘State’ Rwandans were constantly confronted with a social reality where the different ethnic categories were objectified, as in the identity card, or codified, as in the law.

7.1.1 The Monopoly of Symbolic Violence

Paraphrasing Weber’s ‘the State is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of violence within a determined territory’, we may think of it as ‘the State is an X (to be determined) that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence within a determined territory and the corresponding population’. If we do not think of the State as a pseudo-metaphysic given, we come to realise that rather than a given entity of force we find that what we concretely encounter are an array of bureaucratic or administrative sub-fields. One such sub-field is the education system where the state agents, such as teachers, within the political limits of the social field as such, the imagined political community, impose symbolic violence onto the population which is to be a domesticated, docile population (Bourdieu, 1992:86ff and 1994:101-134). As pointed out by Bourdieu (1984:6) it is not by chance that the Greek katégoresthai, from which we have our ‘categories’ signifies to publicly accuse. Historically it was too a large extent in and through the education system that the ‘Rwandan imaginary’ was institutionalised, put into practice. During the colonial project the theory of Tutsi as natural born leaders, the ‘Hamites’ were imagined as essentially of higher quality than the ‘Bantu masses’, was in way made a social reality. With the Social revolution, there was an inversion. By the virtue of being the majority people, the Hutus should have a share of the education system corresponding to their share of the population; thus, the entrance to secondary education was barred with ethnic quotas. From my study, it is clear that the education system has withheld its function as a disciplinary and regulatory power institution. If not before it was here the students I met were confronted with their official identities.
Right after independence in 1962 primary schooling was declared compulsory and free. I will not enter into details on the various reforms the schooling system has undergone, but it seems as the de facto primary education has been six years. Up until the genocide there was uneven progress in the enrolment rate, this reached somewhat over 70% in 1991/92. This same year, of 1,000 students entering the system approximately 590 would have reached the fourth grade and roughly 360 would have finished the sixth grade. The access to secondary education is determined by a national exam. As there are fewer places in secondary than there are pupils who finishes primary, it is and was important to do well in these exams that you do at the age of 12-14. I do not have any figures for the pre-genocide period, but in 1996/97 around 17% of the candidates were accepted into state secondary schools and another 10% made it to private secondary schools (Children and Women of Rwanda, 1998:65-82). The ethnic quotas of the pre-genocide period mean that it was even harder for those identified as Tutsi to pursue higher education.

However, it is not figures on literacy etc. that interest us here, but rather it was important to establish that a large part of the Rwandan population was affected by this instance of State contact. In addition, in all other cases of dealing with the State the Rwandans had to take account of their officially codified ethnic identity. Interestingly enough already in primary school would the pupils be taught ‘History and Civic Education’ with its officially sanctioned History telling us who We are, and that We are divided and different (personal information).

The symbolic violence is the mechanic whereby the objectified institutions, structured structures, are returned to the individuals into who it is incorporated; political mythology given body. Thereby is the controlled consensus in a given society transmitted. The notion of symbolic violence (soft violence) is analogous to other forms of social violence, and homologous to the Weberian notion of the State as the monopolist of physical violence. All pedagogic action is by definition symbolic violence as it is imposed, and the act of communication is in an objective meaning an act of violence as the relations between the groups that constitute the social formation is founded in the culturally arbitrary power (arbitraire culturel) which is the precondition for the establishment of the relation of communication. The violence is symbolic since it can not be reduced to pure force (i.e. physical/hard violence), it can not develop its full potential, i.e. as symbolic, as long as it is not exercised as an act of communication. Further, it can not produce full effect unless it is not given the social means to be excluded from the formal definition of the relationship of communication (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1971:19-22). In yet another sense the act of communication is an act of symbolic violence since it imposes objective signifiers for demarcation that function as principle for selection and exclusion that reproduces the culturally arbitrary that arbitrarily stipulates a group as such, that takes place in and through the culturally arbitrary. The array of characteristics that define, identify a certain group within a symbolic system is arbitrary since it can not be derived to any universal, physiological or biological principle. This device of characteristics that objectively says what a certain group is in a symbolic system is thus
the socio-logical precondition in the sense that the cultural system depends on the social relations of which it is produced, and that makes sense of it, and the cohesion of the structural functions and relations that constitute it (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1971:22-23). In a given social formation the different acts of communications can not be defined independently as they are elements in a system of communicative acts, where the different acts of communication tend to reproduce the system of culturally, arbitrary traits that defines this social formation. The dominant culturally arbitrary contributes to the reproduction of the relations that puts this culturally arbitrary in a dominant position (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1971: 25). Although education was not the sole instance where the ethnicity as a principle for selection and exclusion was exercised, it is an instance where it is observable.

Inherent to ‘education’ is thus the power to impose a vision of the social word through acts and principles of di-vision. Imposed on a group it establishes meaning and consensus, a collective conscience/consciousness, on what is the identity and nature of the group, as well as what are the legitimate divisions and differences within it. Within the sub-field of education this micro-physics of power is exercised; ‘the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognise, to impose the legitimate definition of the social world, and, thereby, to make and unmake groups’. Therefore, what we have is the education system as an instance of reproductive practices of ethnicity as a legitimate division.

7.1.2 Ethnic Stories

In this section, I will not deploy extracts from all the interviewees at length. We are here going to see how some of this public accusation was practised through some of the interviewees’ stories. All stories are not on a hard and overtly violent teaching process, some of the students explained it to me as, ‘one’s belonging is something one learns when growing up, your parents tell you “We are Tutsi, the neighbours they are Hutu”. It is also known in the village, it’s just something you know.’ (Gaspard). Herein it also lies that knowing the ethnic belonging of one self and people around was something normal, something natural and self-evident; ‘that’s how it is’. Perhaps it was not always something you thought about, but if it was making your everyday life problematic, you sure were reminded of it. With this situation, the pupils had to struggle, looking for strategies where they could escape the possible stigma of belonging to the Other ethnic group. This was an option for Ibrahim who despite his body whose features belong to the domain of Tutsi stereotype physical characteristics could play the ethnic card and claim an official Hutu identity.

From the stories it seems as some people could reach a certain age without knowing their ethnic group, but sooner or later their teachers or they classmates reminded them, as if an ethnic reality imposed itself with its lines of di-vision. Or as in the words of Patricie, “Why does one condemn me? What have the Tutsi done? Are they not Rwandans?” It’s not even me that started, it was nature! It was

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123 Thus, it is probably not by chance that the widening circles of passionate ethnicism seem to coincide with a more generalised education.
the country itself!” A recurrent feature is the omnipresence of ethnicity in the Rwandan society in the years before the genocide.

Félicitée

In Burundi I didn’t know that I was Rwandan, it’s only when we came here that my parents told me and my brothers, as well as they explained what had taken place and why we were born in Burundi, that we were in exile. My parents went there in 1973 because one wanted to kill them, my mother explained to me.

When I came here, before the war, we were taught that the Tutsis are like this and the Hutus are like that. One told the Hutus to stand up and then one told the Tutsis to stand up, so we grew up with this situation, but when we were in Rwanda it were the Hutus that were privileged. Then when one told the Tutsi to stand up one felt very inferior, that one had no value. I think one simply should be Rwandan.

Patricie

When I was at school, it was a habit to ask, “You belong to what ‘ethnie’?” Then the teachers forced you to stand up [said in a loud and angry voice.] The group of Bahutu made up a large share, and the Batutsi who were there made up an insignificant number in class. When ‘stand up’ was formed [on formait débout] the others started to wriggle, to say: “That one over there isn’t Rwandan” and all of that. Thus, one knew whether you’re Tutsi, or You’re Hutu or you’re Twa. Thus in those days there was this situation of knowing the names of the Tutsi and knowing the names of the Hutu. Your comrades in class were surprised of the fact that you were Tutsi. The problem is that as one taught the culture to say that one’s different from the others, when they get to know that you are a Tutsi, one starts to condemn you.

There are parents who did not have for habit to speak of these three [ethnies] to their children, because they didn’t find it important to say that. But, there are those who are born in terrible families, which told you; “You shouldn’t have anything to do with Patricie, because she doesn’t belong to your ‘ethnie’. She is different from you.” There are families who indicated to their children that the Tutsis are very sly, that they are very dangerous. Then when you grow up with them you see that there are always problems with them. You may be together in class, but I know that with the attitude they have towards me they may attack me by saying, “You are Tutsi.” Even though I may not know that I am Tutsi. Then, when I come home I’ll ask my father; “Why have I been told that I am a Tutsi?” and then the father will invent stories; “No my child there’s nothing to worry about, when they say your Tutsi there’s nothing to worry about. It’s not dangerous to be a Tutsi”. When you go back to school, they will beat you. You will go home once again; “Why did they beat me yesterday?” “Why did they tease me?” and then you get the answer, they will tell you; “It’s like that.”
That’s what pushed me to pose myself questions: ‘Why does one condemn me? What have the Tutsi done? Are they not Rwandans?’ [In an obviously sad voice]. It’s not even me that started, it was nature! It was the country itself!

Ibrahim

If I told you that I didn’t think about it before 1994, I would be lying. Because the situation, the conditions before forced people to think about it. For a person who’s tall and thin, like me [laughter], you see it wasn’t easy. Perhaps others didn’t think about it as much, but if it poses you problems then you think about it.

[Stefan: How did you address these problems? Did you tell your comrades ‘listen I’m tall, but I am Hutu’?] Yes I did that. Sometimes [he does not like admitting it]. In 1993, it was tough; it was a period full of menaces. I even had cousins who were 100% Tutsi who were looking for ways to become Hutu, to get Hutu identity cards. There were those who had two identity cards, one Tutsi and one Hutu. There were even those who had changed [ethnie] completely because they felt obliged to do so, to be able to stay in school or keep their jobs. Before 1994, it [ethnicism] was everywhere, in school etc. Wherever you went you went with your card. In 1994 I was in fourth secondary and I went to school with my school card where it amongst other things was mentioned ‘ubwoko’124. It has always had an impact on my life, what I have experienced, when I was in school the habit was to ask “what ethnie is he from?” etc. so one knew the ethnie of the others. Because before the Rwandan tragedy, the genocide, one had above all to know the ‘ethnie’ of others.

I think it was at the age of eighteen you received an identity card. But if you went to school, you’d better carry your school card with you. I don’t remember if it was noted in the pupil identity card, but it appeared in the school registration papers. Even before passing the exams, since there were quotas for the state schools, you had to fill in your ‘ethnie’.

Athanase

When I was young I knew nothing of the Rwandan ethnies. Then when one is still young one asks one’s parents “what is my ethnie’”, who then would tell you ‘you’re Tutsi’ or ‘you’re Hutu’, your parents told you what you were. If you for example were a child and you didn’t know your ethnie and the others asked, “What is your ethnie?” and if you didn’t know they would beat you up. Then you would go home and ask your parents.

For example when the parents brought their children to the school inscription, the parents stated [the child’s] ethnie, age etc. [Stefan: During the inscription was there any problems regarding your ethnicity, since your mother is Tutsi?] It was known that she was Tutsi, but since my father is Hutu, there weren’t any problems. They just asked, “Is he Hutu”, we said, “Yes”, and that was it.

124 This word was translated with the French ‘ethnie’ – ethnic group.
Kayitana

These groups, they exist much less than before, because before, you see, before, one might say, they existed to a larger extent because the thing that forced them to exist, and persist, was that it was mentioned in our identity cards. Thus when you went to the commune [administration] they would ask for your identity card; “You are Twa or Hutu or Tutsi?” So it was mentioned in the identity card. Now with the new government, one doesn’t take account of this. The identity cards no longer mentions this, you are simply Rwandan, because one has concluded that this sows division, the discord of the population. One has chosen to abolish this thing, and then one is Rwandan tout court.

Benoit

Yes I knew my ethnic belonging when I was young. [said like the most natural of things]. My parents had told me. It’s just something one knows. Because in Rwanda one filled out one’s name, date of birth, ‘ethnie’, region and commune wherever. That’s how one gets to know one’s ethnic belonging, for example in school whenever there was a document to fill out, for exams etc. one filled out the name and ethnie: Hutu. I had it on my identity card, but ethnicity has never had any influence on me.

I remember when I was in second secondary in 1993 and I had changed school since some time. In the new school I came in contact with the Rwandan ethnic problem, because I had moved to a region where the ethnic problems were acute. There was this election of class president. In this region there were many Tutsis and the Hutu who were there have often moved in from the Northwest; Ruhengeri etc. I had problems with my class mates who said that if I work with the Tutsis it’s because I have many things in common with them, despite that these Hutu comrades knew me well, and if I continued with that I should have problems. These problems lasted several days.

For many of the stories the common denominator for the reproduction of groups is the school, the disciplining device for central power in its local mode. Especially for the students who had ‘problematic’ ethnic statutes this is the obvious case; having an official Tutsi identity or being from a mixed family. For those with ‘normal’ ethnic identities it does not seem to have been that problematic, which is expressed in the words of Benoit; ‘Yes I knew my ethnic belonging. I had it on my identity card, but ethnicity has never had any influence on me’. In a sense this is not true, not that Benoit is lying. But, it may be that he did not think of ethnicity as something problematic in his everyday life, it may be that it has never been important to him in a way that he judged other persons along ethnic lines. Nevertheless, as an active principle in Rwandan society it did have an influence on his life and his existence as it was part of the social world it imposed itself on him, and he had to adapt his behaviour to this thing called ethnicity that posed him problems.

Jeanette
I knew I was Ugandan when I was growing up. It’s only later that I got to know that I was Rwandan, but even then, I mean I knew the ethnic group I belonged to, but it wasn’t something that cropped up every time that you thought about yourself as Rwandan.

In the stories I have gathered the only persons who do not tell stories that do not contain elements of ethnicity when treating childhood and schooling are the ones that were born and raised outside Rwanda in a context where the Hutu-Tutsi difference was not salient. As my focus was only on Rwanda and not on Burundi this means that we cannot say too much about the relation Hutu-Tutsi in Burundi, the only thing I can say for sure is that they also knew their ethnicity before coming to Rwanda. But, as showed by the extract from Félicitées story there was an important component introduced to her ‘Tutsiness’ by the move to Rwanda; inferiority. Being Tutsi in Rwanda before the genocide meant directly being denied a part of ones feeling of being a human being. Ethnicity was not only something that was exercised and practised in a places remote from your own person, quotas in education and the knowledge of one’s statistically lower life chances, but ethnicity as a mean for oppression was directly exercised upon your own self.

7.1.3 History, Ethnically Speaking

Then what is this thing ethnicity to the Rwandan students? Not surprisingly, it is something which is not easily explained, especially to a foreigner. As it is, I am excluded from the realm of tacit knowledge, because as we have seen knowing the ethnicity of one’s self is just something one knows. Also knowing what ethnicity ‘is’, is just something one knows. Thus it is objectified knowledge that is incorporated through practices, its logic resides in the logic of practices and not the logic of things. Therefor it is not easily subjected to science proper. However, the ethnic practices outlined above were given rationale as knowledge proper in school through the classes of ‘History and Civic Education’. Within this curricula the origin and the essence of the Rwandan ethnic groups were taught. Herein lies the codification of the ethnic practices, explaining the rationale of the opus operatum, the other side of objectified history. All the students always took refuge to History when having to explain ethnicity in Rwanda, “If one has to explain Hutu, Tutsi and Twa one has to do it within the domain of history” (Gaspard). The vision of the Past and its di-vision has in a way been the same kind of condition and conditioning, thus identity of conditions, but yet it disciplined and regulated them into different groups and positions; thus different groups of identities. As it is they had a tacit knowledge of their places; sense of the place of their selves. The reified history in the shape of ‘Hamite’ pastoral literature remained widely diffused in the post-revolutionary era despite its obvious contradiction with the objectives of the ‘social revolution’, either because of lack of other writings or of lack of knowledge about scientific works less diffused. This goes for both people inside Rwanda and foreign observers. Without necessary insights of the limits inherent to ‘knowledge’ and its interpretation a number of readers, Africans as well as Westerners, has reproduced and deployed this knowledge endowed with a symbolic capital as it has been written (and hence codified as authentic and official) for their own, or other’s, ends, consciously or unconsciously.
The reified history where tall Tutsis conquered medium sized Hutus, with its unified kingdom and where the situation of the vagabonding Twa is perennial has been at the core of the school text-books and was kept active up until the genocide (De Lame, 1996:19 et al.). If we define ‘the past’ as ‘something that no longer exists’ we realise that it per definition does no longer exist, ‘those events that once upon a time happened’ our out of our reach. However, the accounts of this network of events exist, as they are reactivated here and now, they are made to exist. As it is there is only a present; being is presence or modification of presence (Derrida, 1967:60; see also Ringmar, 1996: 24). The objectified history exists in two forms, as incorporated (the body as memory) and as reified History which logic is that of mythology. What teaching it does is to reactivate and to make present – here and now – these two states of social being (Bourdieu, 1980b: 4-8). This officially legitimate history was not something that only a handful extremist teacher taught. In addition, someone who did not agree with it due to the place in the Rwandan ideology ascribed to her at the time it was the True History had to transmit it.

Thus one of the women I interviewed in France, who declared herself Tutsi, had to teach this official History when she up until the genocide worked as a primary school teacher (personal information).

What I want to communicate is marvellously well captured in the extract from Patricie’s story below:

*The history of Rwanda, we learned that at school. We would have a class called ‘History and civic Education’. Well, within those history classes there were these ethnic people [ces gens d’ethnies]. The origin of each ‘ethnie’ was told; this one or that one did arrive at this part [of the country] and that one at that part. We learnt that. Then one knows that the Hutus are born with a desire for the game [d’envie de jeu] which differs from that of the Tutsis, thus the game wasn’t the same. We learned that in school. Then you live with that, you continue to develop [yourself (se développer)] with this spirit.*

If we to Patricie’s account add Ibrahim’s version, we get a structure around which *grosso modo* gravitate all the stories where ethnicity speaks through History.

*I learned that there are three ethnies in Rwanda. There were the Twas, who were very few. They lived here since a long time and they were hunters-gatherers. Then came the Hutus, History says that they came from Chad, the North-Centre of Africa, and they migrated southwards to arrive in Rwanda where they begun to till the land. They began to organise into their own administration. After some time the Tutsis came, they were nomad pastoralists coming from Ethiopia and Somalia. They met these people working the land here, who also wanted meat. Thus, these cultivators posed themselves the question on how to also breed cattle. Thus one had the ubuhake; the Hutu population had to go and see the Tutsis and ask to work for them and have a cow in return. This and that the Rwandan population came from different areas we were taught in school. This was before the arrival of the coloniser. As well as if someone was tall, he was Tutsi, if you were medium size you were Hutu. That was taught a lot.*

Thus, a history populated by different ethnic groups, each one with their proper physical features and moral characteristics. What does not explicitly show in the extract above is that these different origins earlier on explicitly meant different ‘racial stocks’ and that Tutsi rule meant oppression and
repression of the (Hutu) masses. I do not know whether the students did ‘believe’ in this before. Most likely they knew (and know) the official History, just as they knew (and know) the physical characteristics that are supposed to distinguish the three ethnic groups from one another that was ‘taught a lot’ together with this history. Because it is not question of myths strictu senso it is rather question of myths-truths, and the logic of myths as well of truth is that of imagination. How is it that they all take refuge to the official political mythology – objectified History with its natural divisions as they more or less simultaneously either cast a radical doubt on it or reject as outright lies, i.e. something which is not true when they have to intellectualise and explain ethnicity?

After having told me the history as he learned in school, which he does not “know if it is true or it is all lies” Benoit added, “as well as there are physical characteristics: these are tall – those are short; these have fine noses – those have flat noses etc.” [Stefan: Is that true?] I don’t think this is the truth. Since I study biology, I know there’s no Tutsi-gene nor is there a Hutu-gene [big laughter]. Therefore, I would say that it isn’t the truth.

Also the other students had this ambiguous stance vis a vis the knowledge they had incorporated, it is possible to enounce but at the same time it is ‘totally wrong’.

Kayitana: This discourse that said “this is the conduct of these and that is the conduct of those” and “That one is a bit short; he’s a Twa” [He laughs as if he’s struck by the simplicity and stupidity of what he’s saying.] “That one, he’s tall and a bit thin; he’s a Tutsi, and that one he’s able to cultivate the land, and I don’t know what; then he’s a Hutu”. But, these characteristics you find a bit everywhere, you find them with all the ‘ethnies’. This physical description is not right. Because you may find, even, a Tutsi with a flat nose, a bit short. As well as you may find a tall Hutu, even though this is the characteristic of a Tutsi. Thus, this kind of description was completely wrong.

Given their experiences this kind of political mythology is in the present something they reject, “To explain the difference between Hutu and Tutsi? Do you want me to explain what I have been taught or what I really know, what my heart says? What I learned in class is different from what I feel” (Ibrahim). The event through which their trajectories have passed has taught a lesson on the past, “This element of origin if I may say so, the origin of each and everyone has caused the separation between these two ‘ethnies’, between the Hutu and the Tutsi. That’s why there have been confrontations, because they weren’t of the same origin” (Patricie).

Thus, it is that they all cast a doubt on what they once knew:

Kayitana: One has discovered that this History is false. Now one is about to change history. But, as we have studied it, one told us that “that this ‘ethnie’ it originates from this country, that one from that country, and that one from that country”. One taught us only that, but for the moment one has found out that this history is not true thus one is about to change it.

Athanase: I don’t think it’s the truth because when you look at it a bit closer you see that there’s no big difference in characteristics between the ethnies Hutu and Tutsi.
Those who taught history, or rather who composed the facts, were extremists. Thus, I think that there in this history there are many lies. But now one is undertaking research so that one can elaborate a truer history.

Benoit: These are things that I learned in school. I don’t know if this is true or it is all lies. One says that the Tutsi came from the north, from countries like Somalia and Ethiopia. And that the Hutu also came from the north, from countries like Chad and Cameroon. They met in Rwanda, but that the Hutu came here before the Tutsi. And there was the Batwa whom also comes from elsewhere, but then one may pose oneself the question “who was here before the Batwa?” one doesn't know. So one may pose oneself the question what was Rwanda like then?

Gaspard: I can’t say if it’s a false or true history. I just think that one doesn’t really know. I don’t know on what sources one based oneself when one said that the Hutu came from Chad, the Tutsi came from Ethiopia etc. or how one could affirm that.

Their personal experiences have proven History wrong, thus they now feel, as well as they know, that it can not be true, it must not be true. In the individual selves it all comes together: the objectified history in shape of the political mythology they were taught; the incorporated history in the shape of the experience of the genocide that they know in a way was the result of the di-visions of the objectified, authentic History. It is all in their bodies, in their selves. So it is not question of either myth or truth, the distinction is a paper distinction. For their habitus it is possible to speak the old political mythology since it has generated them as such ‘selves’, but their trajectories have passed through a genocide, experiences that also are incorporated history which is made present as their habitus speaks its self during the interview. Hence, they by a detour by what they were taught arrive at a History which more or less correspond to the one Jeanette told straight away. Because in their habitus respectively resides different stories on Rwanda, thus the tension of rupture and recuperation, belief and disbelief is incorporated. They are conditioned by the ‘old Past’, as well as their incorporated experiences (where the body function as memory) is also disposed to speak a ‘new Past’ of the present power-knowledge. A new past that in itself represents the tension of rupture and recuperation of the ‘old History’ in its attempt to reconcile available truths on Rwanda.

Below I will display a synthesis from Ibrahim’s, Jeanette’s and Gaspard’s ‘reconciled Histories’:

If you have been to university then you rely more on proofs, and then it’s a bit different, even though one cannot deny the reality of the first version. When the coloniser came, they found three groups. The Twa was a very poor class, at least they experienced a generalised poverty. Before they lived in the forests, but with the pottery there was economic progress, things went a bit better. The Hutu was kind of middle class, they were neither rich nor poor. There was also a third class, a kind of bourgeois class that consisted of rich people. That was the Tutsis. If you were born Hutu but became rich, you had many cows and you didn’t have to cultivate the land, you turned bourgeois and you became immediately Tutsi. Someone who was Tutsi but became poor, that lost his cows would turn Hutu straight away. If a Hutu or a Tutsi would find themselves in extreme poverty, they would become
Twa. (Ibrahim). For very long all the years before [colonialism], the Tutsis and the Hutus lived together without any major conflict (Jeanette). The Twa lived of hunting and pottery and the Hutu lived of the land and cultivated things like maize and manioc, they exchanged goods between each other. Then the Tutsi who were cattle-breeders came with their cows from Ethiopia and I don’t know where, in search for pastureland. When they had established themselves here they started to exchange goods with the Hutu, one gave agricultural products and the other gave cows. Thus before the relations between the three ethnic groups were good (Gaspar). Then the Tutsis managed to establish themselves as the masters, as the lords. So for very long the Hutu and the Twa they were repressed, so finally there was a Hutu rebellion. When the colonialists, the Belgians, came and wanted to rule they found that the easiest divisions they found were between ethnic groups. So they looked to divide the Twas, the Hutus and the Tutsis although there weren’t any major divisions – they were all Rwandans. It’s from then and on these differences, this division is based. (Jeanette).

As the words by Ibrahim imply there is also the tension of rupture and recuperation when it comes to History proper, “it’s a bit different, even though one cannot deny the reality of the first version”. For the moment there is no history classes taught on Rwandan history, neither in Primary and Secondary school nor at university level (personal information). “One hasn’t yet begun to teach history at school, but one is about to prepare a new history textbook. At university you study the history of Europe and the Americas, but you do not yet teach the history of Rwanda” (Ibrahim).

Thus the students feel/know that the violent chapter of the Rwandan history has to be closed, to the students ethnicity is problematic and by extension the Rwandan history is also highly problematic since the ethnic groups have played, and play such an important part of it. ‘They [Hutu, Tutsi and Twa] are 'ethnicies' who have had an influence on Rwanda, on the history of Rwanda. The rulers must be ready to explain to us all what is the origin of this problem’ (Benoit). That is why one “has stopped to give history classes. One has first to remake the history of Rwanda [refaire les écrits] because there are many errors, there are many experiences that are wrongly written” (Athanase). Or as a Rwandan school official told it to me when asked him about that ‘history is being rewritten’, “it should not be rewritten, it should be told as it is” (personal information). Thus, it is now the True history that should be established, nothing more and nothing less. This History knowledge of course implies power. Hence, a knowledge and power have been established in the aftermath of the genocide, but it can not just rewrite history, history does not emerge ex nihilo. Thus, there is a theory about a Golden age antedating colonialism where the di-vision was established “which is practised at seminars, a bit everywhere given the reality of the country” (Ibrahim). One such place where this ‘theory’ is diffused are ‘solidarity camps’, known as ingando. The students I met were to assist such in between the semester I undertook my research, and the following semester. These ‘solidarity camps’ were first established to convey political lessons to refugees who had followed the genocidal government into exile and who returned en masse in late 1996 and 1997. The camps were meant to promote ideas of nationalism, to erase the lessons on ethnic division taught by the previous government, and allegedly to spur loyalty to the FPR.
Salaried employees who wished to return to public or private employment and young people who wanted to return to school had to complete a training session at such a camp. With the increasing focus on national security, the authorities have once more begun requiring groups of people to attend the camps. Although all the camps are known by the same term and all are apparently funded by the National Commission on Unity and Reconciliation, those attended by people from most regions of Rwanda differ from those attended by people from the North-western parts of Rwanda (the prefectures Ruhengeri and Gisenyi). At camps of the first kind officials, community leaders, students, and the general population wear military uniforms, learn to shoot, and are subject to a quasi-military discipline. They are taught to accept FPR lessons about the past and the future of Rwanda. These camps generally last for one month. Students attending NUR had probably already been to such a camp. Camps of the second kind are meant to provide political education for people from regions in which the insurgency was strong (where the ‘cleansing’ took place) or for people who have returned recently from the Congo. In these latter camps, participants do not learn to shoot, and the camps last longer than those for the ‘official elite’ (in general three months). During this time, those who are cultivators are unable to attend to their crops. A substantial number of participants attend because they feel obliged to do so or because they have been told by authorities that they must. However there is no law requiring attendance (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

Another answer drawing on the past to the question of the possibility of a peaceful future is a movement called ‘the Kings army’ establishing itself in Rwanda. It seems that they have the return of the king and the creation of a constitutional monarchy on the agenda (personal information). I do not know the composition of its followers, but given what I can conclude from my findings it could be linked with the view of the pre-colonial past as a Golden age without any social tensions whatsoever. In the essays written in Butare, where there was no explicit question on history in a longer term this feature was rather clear especially among those written by students who were organised as survivors. Having said this I do not mean that organised survivors should be in favour of a return to monarchy (no one wrote any such thing), only that they in their desire for peace seek support in a glorified past and that this could be correlated with a general quest for meaning of Rwandan existence – ‘what is Rwanda?’ – to which one possible answer is ‘Rwanda is a peaceful harmonious monarchy, like during the Golden age’.

So now the historic consciousness ‘is’ one where the violence brought about by the Whites is a parenthesis in the normal state of affairs in Rwanda, ‘normally Rwandan peasants live together in peace’ (Butare essay). In this historic consciousness, there was a Golden age before colonialism where the ethnic groups indeed are present, but their nature hangs in the balance awaiting a new symbolic order. "One says that the former governments have been giving the wrong historical facts. They elaborated history books that were favourable to them. [Stefan: Do you agree with that?]. I agree and I don't agree. From one point of view it’s true that those who elaborated History they did it in order to present a certain image of the country or rather their government. From another point of view I don’t
agree for the moment because one has to wait and see what will be elaborated now so that one is able to compare with what was taught before.” (Benoit).

Benoit’s account captures the tension of rupture and reinscription of the constitutive imaginary into a new social order, which in a way still is uncertain. The root assumption based on the Hamitic hypothesis is still there as there are still different origins ascribed to the Hutus, Tutsis and Twas. However, the element of violent foundation of Rwanda and the three groups coming together through violent assimilation is being under removal. Nevertheless, it is not an easy task to bring the historic parts together. Just after the genocide ethnicity was not something one spoke of at all, and Government officials seemed to deny the very existence of the different ethnic groups (personal information). However it seems as if the new power has had adapt to the pre-existing history. From my informants I learned that the question of ‘ethnicity’ was taboo the years immediately following the genocide, but that it was now beginning to be something you speak about. There thus seems to have been a swift in the strategy from above. On the official site of the Rwandan Representation in the USA one may read that one in Rwanda finds ‘three “ethnic” groups who have intermarried for centuries’ (Embassy of Rwanda, 2001) and on the Government site (2001) one may read that ‘even though the kings of pre-colonial Rwanda were Tutsi, the chiefs were predominantly, but not exclusively, Tutsi, and that the relationship between the ordinary people Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa was symbiotic where people mutually benefit through the exchanges of labour’. In view of the extent it has been objectified in Rwandan society it is not something that is dismissed that easily. Therefore, this thing ‘ethnicity’ is still there, but it is not the same thing as before.

7.2 And Beyond

7.2.1 Ethnicity Here and Now?

If we now turn to the present situation of ethnicity, does it count in their everyday lives? Yes and no I would say. As I have evoked above ethnicity is to a certain extent reproduced within the present state of the Rwandan field. At the same time the experiences of the students have as Ibrahim says taught them a lot, the lesson learned thus says that one must not take account of ethnicity.

[Stefan: Do you know the ethnic belonging of your friends?] No. I don’t take interest in that, I don’t care. Here in our society, I think that the tragedy of 1994 has taught us a lot, a lot. Before the Rwandan tragedy, the genocide one had above all to know the ‘ethnie’ of others. (Ibrahim).

“One has found out that it’s not important. For me in my everyday life it’s no importance because I’ve found out that we are fellow-beings. We are fellow-beings, we share the same lives, the same culture, the same life style, the same suffering, we are together, and even biologically, we are

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125 It still has a bearing also in the internal political analysis. In for example the news outlet The Newsline (1999, No 23:8) one of the headlines tells us that “Another Hutu minister quits Kigali Government” (Mrs. Sebatware Panda, state minister for Internal Affairs). According to the article she was sidelined by those in the Akazu, so there also seems to be a reproduction of the discourse.
fellow-beings. To me really, the division in to characteristics of the order like “that one he’s a Tutsi etc” they are totally wrong. It is of no importance! To me it has no importance, because one is Rwandan tout court you see.” (Kayitana).

“The ethnicity of others it’s not something one speaks about. I share room with one person, even if we went to secondary school together I don’t know his ethnicity.” (Gaspard).

However, lurking somewhere is the knowledge that ethnicity did matter and that there ‘are’ ethnic groups in Rwanda. Thus one may deduce two kinds of stories on this; firstly, ‘it may not matter to me, but with others one never knows’.

Athanase: To me everyone is Rwandan, one cannot say one is like this or the other is like that, that a Hutu is a bit shorter, a Twa is short and a Tutsi is tall. I don’t think that these prejudices are well founded, that a Tutsi should have certain qualities and the others should have certain other characteristics. It’s not important to me. But some might find it important to hold account of others.

Alternatively, another kind of story may be told based in the knowledge brought about by the genocide and that has violently been written onto the body. ‘It is not being ethnic in itself that is dangerous, after all I am ethnic (i.e. a special kind of Rwandan); it is possible to be ethnic since it all comes down to the same thing in the end – we are all Rwandan’. Nevertheless, the mere existence of ethnicity poses a threat since it is something that can be mobilised.

Patricie: For the moment, I fear that among the Hutus, the Tutsis and the Twas, there are those who might be ashamed of saying: “I am Hutu”; “I am Tutsi”; “I am Twa”. To me it doesn’t have any impact; I know that I am Patricie, but I have ended up by understanding that above all I am Rwandan, before saying that I am Hutu and Tutsi. When one stabs me, or even hit me with a machete, the blood that comes from me has the colour red, as the other’s blood has the same colour red. There aren’t those who have blood that is white for example, everybody is the same. We who have experienced the genocide aren’t ashamed to tell that we’re Tutsi. In that period [of genocide] when one searched almost everywhere, “Where are the Tutsis? Where do the Tutsis hide?” Even in that moment when it was dangerous, I was already Tutsi. Why then be ashamed of being Tutsi now? If I am Tutsi, I am Tutsi.

For the moment, it’s not important. But, before the genocide it was of great importance to me, but you see it depends on the future of Rwanda if the situation doesn’t get to the same situation as during the genocide, then to me it’s not important and it doesn’t influence me. The problem is that one could always re-use this element and exterminate the Twa for example or just as well recommit the genocide of the Tutsi. In that case, the element would to me have the same meaning as it had before the genocide.

No, it does not any longer matter here and now. However, just as it was ‘nature, the country itself’ that made Patricie think about her ethnicity, the ‘country itself’ may make it important again.

[Stefan: Do these categories do they have any significance to you today in your everyday life?] Jeanette: “Well like here at campus it keeps coming up. People, students are still cautious around others, you will find that one person from one ethnic group will not feel very comfortable with a person
from another group. I for one, or most of us who came from other countries, who came back to Rwanda after the genocide, to us it’s not a problem, in a way we talk very easily with the rest. But the survivors they’re still bothered. They look at someone and they will remember what maybe people from this person’s ethnic group was ready to harm their families.”

As it is then ethnicity as categories of cognition is still there and it may be problematic to those who have experienced the genocide and its violent attempt to cut in on the social world and create an order that is totally in line with the symbolic order.

One is able to know (to a certain extent) the ethnicity of others. The body is disposed to take account of it, and it fits in the knowledge of today with the existing schemes of cognition and recognition.

[Stefan: Do you know the ethnies of these persons I met you with the other day?] Athanase: “Yes I do know it for some, but not for everybody.”.

Benoit: “I’m able to know the ethnie of people here on campus. Many things reveal this. For example, if someone is a rescapé that means that it’s a person who was able to escape the events of 1994. As well as if someone has no brothers, no sisters, no parents, no grandparents and he’s a rescapé, more or less automatically one understands. For such a person, in the vast majority of cases, he’s a Tutsi. One can also observe the behaviour of people as well as you should know that many of us know each other since a long time. Another thing that reveals your ethnie is if you went somewhere etc.126 Most people don’t have a particular behaviour, but there are some who behave in certain ways because they were heavily affected by the events, who have psychological problems because they were traumatised.”

Kayitana: For the moment, even if you are Hutus, Tutsis and Twas that does not signify anything anymore. It doesn’t show in Rwanda [at large], only that it shows in limited groups [groupes restreints]. One may know it, but I think you cannot completely know it.

As we saw before also Kayitana said that rescapé implies Tutsi. Because even if there were Hutus that were being persecuted and killed they would not be labelled rescapés; who says rescapé says Tutsi. As Benoit said you automatically understand Tutsi by rescapé, from the answer I got from Kayitana it is obvious that the thought that also a Hutu could be a rescapé had never crossed his mind.

[Stefan: Could one imagine a ‘Hutu’ rescapé?] Kayitana: Not frequently, not frequently, as...because it was the Hutus who hunted down the Tutsis. This is why you cannot call a Hutu a “rescapé” because he was not hunted down. He was not hunted down unless he was a ‘moderate Hutu’. [As a ‘moderate Hutu’] you are against the state, against the state decision, the will of the state to hunt this race, the Tutsis, in this case, you are known, as supporting the enemy, the Tutsi. You are said to be supporting the race under attack, to provoke war, in that case you are a moderate Hutu, in that case

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126 That is, if you went into exile after the during/after the genocide. After being defeated by the RPF in 1994, the genocidal government led some two million Rwandans into exile, more than half of them to Zaire (now the DRC) (Cf. Human Rights Watch, April 2000).
you are hunted down. But, I think you’re not called rescapé in that case. For the moment, the rescapés are only Tutsis because it was they who were being hunted down.

An obvious example of how power comes from below, how it is present and reproduced in the realm of the ‘personal’ (what is not always understood as political) is the question of finding a partner. In everyday language, it is hard to conceive of anything less ‘political’ and interested than marriage. Needless to say, biological reproduction is not something that takes place outside society, but rather it is at the very core of society, so also the most ‘natural’ and disinterested of things is to its very nature highly social. Also when it comes to marriage strategies, passion proper, a society where ethnicity has mattered and still to a certain extent does so, imposes itself.

[Stefan: If for example your younger sister one day comes home with a boyfriend and says she’s going to marry him, would it bother you if it was a Tutsi?] Benoit: What concerns me when it comes to marriage is love. If my sister is in love with someone, she may marry whomever she wants to. For me the principle of marriage is love. However, in Rwanda this is a big problem since many people do not want to marry people from another group. Because you see this was very problematic during the genocide, many men killed their wives, either because they wanted to or were forced to do it. Some even killed their children. So since the war there aren’t many mixed marriages. I even have friends who got married to a Tutsi girl, or Tutsi friends who got married to a Hutu girl whose parents refused to assist the wedding.

If we contrast the above with the situation with before the genocide when ‘the ethnicity of other was above all something one had to know’ we have perhaps captured one of the key elements of the difference in nature of ethnicity prior to the genocide and ethnicity in the aftermath of the genocide. As it is now it is not question of that ‘the ethnicity of others is something one should not know of’, but rather something in the order of ‘the ethnicity of others is not something one necessarily has to know of’. Nevertheless, again this is something which is valid only here and now. It has been important to the extent that it was the difference between life and death, one is still able to know it and it could be important again. Thus ethnicity is there, but an ethnic identity is not something any one of them wants to forge. They are all passionate Rwandans.

7.2.2 The Will to be Rwandan

As I evoked in the chapter on problematic a sociological study on Rwanda has to deal with identities in the dimension of passions (Vidal, 1991). As it is now the passions I encountered in the student population is the passion of being Rwandan, since any ethnic passion has disqualified itself by what it led to. Thus in this present, the only valid identity is a Rwandan identity and the only morally defendable passion is a patriotic passion, the love for a country that includes all its inhabitants. “For the moment, in this moment one can only be Rwandan. For the moment even if you are Hutu, Tutsi or Twa that does not signify anything anymore.” (Kayitana).
Gaspard: The meaning of being Rwandan has changed with time. The years before I was born there were some historic events. The troubles began in 1959 with the ethnic problems, and then with the independence it continued, as well as with the Second Republic. Then in 1990 with the war where the Rwandans who were outside Rwanda wanted to return. Then again in 1994 many people died. Today I think everyone has understood that we are Rwandans, that we have again found the good direction and that everyone is willing to work for the country. Today, with the present situation, I understand that I have to do something for my nation. I speak a lot with my comrades about this that we have to struggle together for the unity, for peace. Together we can do something.

Ibrahim: I would say that during and just after the genocide I was another person. Now afterwards I have found that when I see some persons... it’s difficult living with other people. For all Rwandans it’s a problem. But life goes on and you’re kind of obliged to live with the others, in society, to make an effort. The situation is like that, it’s not only me. For the majority it’s like that, having to make the effort to live together, having had to realise that one has to change the mentalities, to consider other persons as a necessary being. During the genocide one considered persons as insignificant beings, unimportant beings without any value whatsoever. Today, it’s a very complex question. Well, I’m, perhaps I should say that I’m nationalist – I am Rwandan. I am happy to be born in Rwanda, although my childhood and my adolescence were somewhat chaotic. The problem here in Rwanda is that everyone is very disappointed about what has taken place. Personally, I like Rwanda. But sometimes I am also disappointed with what has happened.” (Ibrahim).

Thus to be Rwandan is an act of will, it is a struggle where one has to overcome what can not be overcome. It is to give up a part of ones self and make an effort to feel love for one’s neighbour.

Patricie: Today being Rwandan means above all that one has got to have a spirit of love. Because the events that we have experienced, were caused by a lack of a loving spirit. That’s why one in order to be Rwandan has to develop this spirit of love. Before reconciling one thus has to understand that these events shocked many people, without this loving spirit, I would say a patriotic spirit; there will be no reconciliation. Because one should love one’s country, but before loving one’s country one should love one’s neighbour. One has to understand that he’s a living creature just like you, and then develop a feeling of love towards him. Nowadays this comes down to the love for the fatherland [patrie] and what one calls being Rwandan.

However, in everyday life this is quite complicated. For those who have experienced these crimes, those onto whom the genocide was applied, and even for those who carried out [qui ont réalisé] the genocide it is complicated. It is somewhat, I wouldn’t say impossible, but it’s difficult; one has to give up a part of oneself. One cannot be egocentric or egoistic. It’s a bit, I wouldn’t say it’s impossible, but it’s a bit complicated. There are those who suffered a lot [there is an apparent suffering in her voice], and there are those who suffer a lot now and for example find themselves in prison, because of the murders they have carried out. You then understand that it’s still somewhat complicated.
You know that when you start to analyse the situation, one does not manage to understand, how one can be sentenced to death, to death indeed [jusqu’à la mort]? ‘Why was it on me only? [sur moi seulement] ‘Not for you?’ [pas pour toi]. In this case the spirit of love, once you start to develop it, it becomes a bit complicated. But, I for one, I have already tried. I have tried to understand that an error I would say has been committed. An error on the part of every person having not understood that one is born like just like the other. And that when you are to be born you do not demand God ‘I will be born in this or that family’. I have started by trying to analyse the situation, I have understood ‘the why’; the causes but when I get to the consequences! When I see the consequences of the genocide the project that I had begun has failed I would say. Because I may come here to class, I may have a problem, I do not know to whom I may address asking for help to resolve my problem. Thus, I stay on my own [je reste sur moi-même]. In this case, I start to condemn those who were the cause to this. But, sometimes you get to win the fight that is taking place within, in the bottom of your heart. Sometimes you even manage to overcome it, and then you recommence life. [She smiles and finishes with a somewhat hopeful voice.].

Félicitée: To me being Rwandan means to love the others. It’s not something all Rwandans should agree upon. Since I am Christian it’s like that for me, because God has created me like he has created the others thus I should love my fellow beings, but many others don’t share this idea if you are to judge from the conduct.

Thus, you may make an effort and try to love the others. Nevertheless, from what the incorporated history tells you it is very likely that this is not the case with others.

Benoit: For me to be Rwandan is to conform with the Rwandan culture, to live with the others, to work with and share things with the others, like your work, peace, nature, as the Rwandans like peace and their country.

However, this is not true when it comes to people in general. If the Rwandans really liked peace then we shouldn’t have experienced things like those we have experienced. What has taken place ever since the social revolution and then in 1973, the war in 1990 and finally the genocide in 1994. These wars have killed people. If the Rwandans do love peace, then why all these of wars? Thus, it’s that they try to hide what they [really] do. That’s camouflage or malice.

Thus, it seems like every Rwandan plausibly is born with an original sin, a collective guilt for having not prevented the chain of events where people have been killed due to their ethnic belonging. The particular case of Jeanette is the most obvious. She feels as a part of Rwanda, as well as she has this ‘distant point of view’ on Rwanda. Hence, she is pending in between a ‘natural’ part of Rwanda and a ‘not natural’ part of Rwanda.

Jeanette: When you get to the bottom line, I am Rwandan. There’s nothing you can do about it. I am Rwandan. I can’t help it but I’m Rwandan. Sometimes I do not wish to be Rwandan, I wish I hadn’t any Rwandan blood in me. Your neighbour gets up one morning, there’s no quarrel or anything, and he gets up and kills you? I think it’s embarrassing to be Rwandan. And it’s confusing as well. How
someone plans to kill his neighbour? We are not really different; we are Rwandans. In Uganda, there are about 52 tribes and 'no nothing'. Here there’s one tribe but two ethnic groups. It has never made sense to me, and every time I think about it, when I realise that people killed each other because of the ethnic differences…it’s kind of embarrassing.

[Stefan: Should you be more embarrassed than I should?] I guess so because it is us the Rwandans killing our own people. People keep coming up and saying: “The international community should have come in to help.” Why? We should have sorted out our own differences in the very beginning we could have prevented it ourselves. I think we are more responsible for our own politics. I wasn’t here, but at heart, I am Rwandan. I’m Rwandan, and it’s my own people who killed it’s own. You shouldn’t be embarrassed; it’s not the Swedish people who killed.

Regardless of your trajectory the social field and its events that constitutes it and has constituted you as such you have come to the conclusion (you have incorporated the conclusion) that only collective identity that is worth anything is a Rwandan identity. However, it is not that easy carrying this identity in you body. You may feel guilt about what has taken place, you may not understand what has taken place, you may be worried about its repercussions, and you carry with you a disillusioned and mistrusting stance towards your fellows of the imagined political community. Nevertheless, you know and feel that ‘above all’ the only descent thing to be is Rwandan. Thus, a Rwandan conscious and consciousness manifested in the explicit will to be Rwandan. Nevertheless, being Rwandan is a combat sport on an everyday basis. Being is co-existence. Living together with people that might have wanted to hurt you and persons dear to you, it is knowing that somewhere out there remain persons that wanted you harm, and suspicion that some of these persons still want to harm you. Some of them you know of since you run into them every now and then, some of them you do not know of, which introduces an element of permanent insecurity to your existence. At the same time as you know that perhaps not everyone are able and willing to make an effort, you know that the only way to move on is for you, yourself to try and forgive without forgetting. For others it is the knowledge of that people perhaps do not trust you as you happen to belong to the group that did harm, even though you have managed so far there is always a risk that you may be falsely denounced and imprisoned. Regardless of the ethnicity you have stated you manifest a certain mistrust of people, a lack of confidence of that what they display are not their real selves.

7.3 The Sense of Here and Now

7.3.1 The Present Situation

Not very surprisingly also having to speak the present and the probable future the sense of being is highly complex and ambivalent. A being where death is something which is purely ‘natural’ is not removed from existence today. So ‘peace’ as a state of being where death is inscribed as something that ‘might’ take place in a remote future is not self evident. There is also fear in the present. Being in the
present is not only hard due to the incorporated memories but is also complicated in itself. People did not only have to survive the genocide itself and its immediate aftermath, but the calm after the storm is not always that calm.

Félicitée: Rwanda is not a democracy. In countries that are democratic you may speak out about things that you don’t find good. You may write to the authorities. If you do that here, you may even die. People are afraid.

Kayitana: For the moment, you don’t have the freedom of expression here. In Rwanda, you cannot say whatever you want to say. For example if the authorities have killed someone, then you cannot say that. You will be pursued.

Benoit: For example, what I’m saying right now, I wouldn’t want anyone to know that it’s me saying these things. As well as if someone back talks the government, would he stand a great chance of surviving? I don’t think so.

In the aftermath of the genocide, killing and harassment of already victimised people continue. Either due to what they have witnessed or over disputes over property, in the shape of land and houses or cattle that was appropriated as ‘spoils’ during the genocide. In addition, people who resisted the genocidal force before by not taking part in the looting and killing now pose a risk as a potential denouncer of those who did. The situation is somewhat better in the ‘major’ towns but in the countryside, the picture is far darker. Even in the prefecture of Kigali rurale the authorities the time after the genocide did not have the power to protect people, or it may even be that the agents of the local authority were implicated in the genocide (African Rights, 1996). It seems as the situation has improved with a tighter grip of the monopoly of legitimate physical violence, but still witnesses on both the side of defendants and prosecution fear reprisals. As well as one informant put it, “one is still killing on the hills”, said like the most natural of things.127

The victims of the genocide are entitled to have their property returned as well as to compensation ‘for other losses’, be they material or more abstract. Some survivors, mainly those based in urban centres and from an intellectual milieu or/and those who are connected to rescapé organisations, have the knowledge to file the necessary papers to court in time. For people in rural milieus or the 300,000 children living in minor-headed households it is a different story. Often those in ‘most’ need of compensation such as children and elderly widow household heads are the least informed, which may lead to disability to act in time. Consequently, such persons will never receive compensation. The National Assembly has established a ‘survivors assistance fund’ that it is to be distributed according to need and not according to damages legally awarded (Des Forges et al., 1999:760ff).

As we saw before the government of National Unity does not stand above accusations of human rights abuses in the years 1990 to 1994, neither does it have a clean human rights record the years
following the genocide. During 1999, the number of cases of persons who ‘disappeared’ at the hands of authorities diminished. But the police did engage in a number of sweeps, such as one in Kigali in June 2000, where hundreds of persons were detained on the pretext of lacking necessary identity papers or residence permits (Human Rights Watch, 2000). This year the speaker of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister and the President all left their posts under pressure. The two former also left Rwanda saying that they feared for their lives. The Prime Minister was the latest of several top Hutu politicians to leave but the Speaker, ousted due to alleged favour to the return of the king, was the first top Tutsi politician to leave the country. The departure highlighted the gap between rescapés and the RPF over issues such as justice and aid to victims as well as promotions within the military and civil service. In the beginning of the year a presidential councillor linked to Ibuka (a rescapé association) was gunned down by men in military uniform, no arrests has so far been done. When his brother, vice president of Ibuka, tried to leave Rwanda the police halted him. Other Ibuka leaders have also fled Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2001). Some authors do speak of disdain for and mistrust of the people who were inside Rwanda in 1994 among the new political leadership, both Hutus who allegedly bear a collective guilt and survivors; ‘How come they survived?’ (see Bizimana, 1999; Mamdani, 2001 and Prunier, 1997).

Despite that Government of National unity considers itself/claims to be a broad based government not representing anything but ‘the general interest of the people and the nation’ this does not seem to be the de facto case when statistically observed. Reyntjens speak of a ‘tutsisation’ of power (Mamdani, 2001:340n6). Even if the government has grosso modo equal representation in terms of ‘ethnicity’, it is somewhat different when it comes to the administration. Out of 18 general secretaries 14 are ‘Tutsi’ from the RPF and apart from two ministers all non-RPF ministers are flanked by an RPF general secretary, and nine out of twelve prefects are ‘Tutsi’ as well as the number of ‘Tutsi’ burgomasters supposedly is 80% (these are however numbers from before the March 2001 local elections). Among the fourteen officers making up the high command of the military and the gendarmerie there is one ‘Hutu’. The national assembly, already with a ‘Tutsi’ majority is continuously being purged (Mamdani, 2001:340n6). In a reshuffle of the government ten out of eighteen cabinet seats were given to the RPF, which is a violation of the Arusha Accords (Human Rights Watch, 2001). Now, we can not take this at face value in the sense that it would mean an explicit ‘Tutsi strategy’. Rather, it may be yet another sign of the tension of reproduction and recuperation as it may be that there are no alternatives in the eyes of those in power, simply because many from the former elite has disqualified themselves by their implication in the genocide, and those who did not were killed. Many of the first to be killed was those who posed a threat to the implementation of the genocide; regardless of ethnicity. Where it in my eyes is problematic is in the sense of its repercussions on how people feel part of Rwanda or not, do the survivors feel that the it is their government? Can people out on the hills feel that this Government and administration understands them? Here resides the problematic from a

127 In December 1999 groups of insurgents in the Gisenyi prefecture resurfaced and 31 Tutsi were massacred (personal information; see also Des Forges et al., 1999: 756ff). As stated earlier, the year 2001 has been devastating and about 1500 persons have been killed inside Rwanda, a
sociological point of view, to simply state that there is a continued ethnification of politics does not bring us very far. We must not short circuit the political analysis, but deconstruct in order to reconstruct a pertinent problematic, because the description above is indeed alarming and poses problems.

To this comes the situation in the overcrowded prisons and communal lockups that remain precarious, in between 125,000 and 135,000 are incarcerated on genocide charges and another 15,000 on other charges. The conditions are to be described as life-threatening (and the year 2001 some four hundred did die in prison) and food supply provided for by international organisations and NGOs is irregular, so the government have called upon families to bring food to the detainees (Human Rights Watch, 2001 and personal information). The speeds of processes are slow, the first began in late 1996 and by the end of 1997, 322 persons had been judged, whereof 111 were sentenced to death and 19 were acquitted. In 1998, the number of judgements had risen to 863, much due to the introduction of the practice of prosecuting large groups of defendants together. Still, given the present rate it would take more than 100 years to have a judgement in all the cases. The numbers are alarming since officials within the judiciary system, such as prosecutors, have in certain regions appreciated the number of legally innocent persons among the incarcerated to 15-20%. Further, such persons have claimed that up to 60% of the imprisoned should either be judged innocent or receive a sentence for a ‘category four crime’ for which the punishment is not a prison sentence. It seems to be common practice that people are constantly acquitted and then rearrested or that some people are accused on grounds based in personal material interest. Also in my conversations with people from international human rights organisations who assist accused in trials, a common feature in the Rwandan reactions to their work is that people do not seem to ‘understand’ why someone ‘guilty’ should have the right to such resources (personal information, see also Des Forges et al., 1999:754ff). When it comes to the ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) the pace is even slower. Whether you appreciate it or not does not seem to have anything whatsoever with ethnicity to do. It is rather a question of realpolitik; ‘well if it is the only way of getting hold of the big fish, it is a good thing’. During my stay in Rwanda the CDR leader Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was released on grounds of procedural errors by the prosecution and for some time the Rwanda authorities halted co-operation with the ICTR. This and other cases where persons that Rwandans ‘know’ are guilty were released is very frustrating to Rwandans in general, regardless from which standpoint they have experienced the genocide. That those who planned and orchestrated the genocide might go free, addition to that their conditions of imprisonment are far from the life threatening conditions you find in Rwandan prisons, and the discrepancy of sentences handed out in Arusha and in Rwanda is upsetting to Rwandans. At the

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number higher than any other year after the genocide (personal information).

128 The official Rwandan legal division of Genocide crimes is into four categories. In the first one finds people who held a position of authority in the State or militias etc. from national down to cell-level and who are considered organisers and were encouraging people to kill, or were ‘notorious brutal killers’ and who committed acts of sexual torture. If convicted in this category the sentence is up to and including capital punishment. Category two includes authors or accomplices of homicide or attacks that resulted in the death of the victims. Category three includes persons who caused serious injury to victims and the fourth category comprises persons who committed crimes against property (Des Forges et al., 1999: 750ff).

129 Coalition Démocratique pour la République to which the Impuzamugambi militia was attached.
exception of a few students any detailed knowledge of the judicial system in Arusha as well as in Rwanda was fairly limited. However, they spoke an existing opinion on the judicial system in Rwanda. Their answers on what they thought of the procedures in Arusha were often in the order of ‘I don’t know but Rwandans in general...’ What ‘Rwandans in general’ do seem to think is that it is bizarre, to say the least, that the *grand génocidaires* do not risk to get a death sentence while people who were not well positioned enough to get out of Rwanda ‘in time’ risk death sentences inside Rwanda. It is not to say that the students I met are unanimously in favour of the capital punishment, “the capital punishment it means killing a person, killing someone doesn’t mean anything; it’s to end someone’s life (Patricie), but rather it is the discrepancy *per se* they find disturbing. The words of Benoit sum it up quite well:

“I don’t know how it works over there but it seems as their system [the ICTR] doesn’t fit well with the system we have here. What everybody say is that in Arusha they don’t have the capital punishment and here in Rwanda they have it, as one of course could see at Nyamirambo.\(^{10}\) I think that the law in Arusha is in conformity with Human Rights, because it’s an international tribunal, which is supported by the UN. Even though I’m not a jurist and I cannot get into details, I think that the criminal process in Rwanda doesn’t respect Human Rights. So the difference should be that in Arusha one respects Human Rights and has the support of the UN, whereas in Rwanda it’s not like that. There’s also one thing to add, in neither place does justice work very fast.”

In 1995, local administrators began encouraging the settlement of claims through a ‘customary court’ system, in some sort of mediation process, which often took place in a community gathering. The system is known as *gacaca*. The talk of using the process also to judge persons accused of causing injury to persons, or even death, was begun on a government level in 1998 (Des Forges *et al.*, 1999:761). The interviews I pursued during my pilot study was quite centred on the issue as it began to surface in French papers just before I set out to undertake it, and it was much talked about when I arrived in Rwanda. Rwandan judiciary officials speak of it in terms of “participatory justice” and it is supposed to exist on cell level to prefecture level, and all categories of genocide crimes except for the category one crimes should be dealt with within the *gacaca* system (Prosecutor of the Republic, Mr Ngoga in *Nuances*, 1999). Concerns for the rights of the accused have been raised in human rights circles even though its merits of a potential speed up of processes have been admitted. This far no ‘*gacaca*-law’ has been passed (Human Rights Watch, 2001).\(^{131}\)

In this far from normal situation, even if not outright anomic conditions prevail any longer, it is no wonder that words such as ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’ are something that is in need of being

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\(^{10}\)The Kigali regional stadium where public executions were held in 1998. In total 22 persons where publicly killed around Rwanda on the same day. In contrast to what is said in Des Forges *et al.*, (1999:761) the life stories I have collected speak of the executions as something taking place far from in a “noisy, celebratory mood”. Even though no one I spoke to had assisted the executions, in some cases due to lack of seats, those who knew persons who had been their stated that they rather than excited were disgusted and shocked. In some cases, witnessing killing again allegedly traumatised persons.

\(^{131}\)Since judges were elected beginning of October and are supposed to undergo a six months training course one could expect it too take off during spring 2002 (IRIN, October 5, 2001).
qualified. To the students peace and democracy is something that is set in motion, it seems to most of them probable in the anticipated future but it is far from irreversible processes to them. We may thus speak of ‘continued democratisation’ and ‘continued peace formation’.

Kayitana: Despite that the genocide did take place peace begins to settle. But one cannot say that the prisoner knows peace. He has not found peace. Can one say that he who was menaced has found peace? No. Can one say that he who is a refugee has found peace? No. There isn’t any longer any peace for them. One is reaching a kind of peace. In general, one might say that the situation has calmed down. But people are still pursued; people may still be denounced and put in prison, where they find misery. But it happens less and less, and the situation begins to settle.

Democracy is when people participate and elect there own authorities. But that is not the case here. So for the moment one cannot say that we have democracy. The burgomasters aren’t elected, the prefects aren’t elected, neither is the president. There is not any democracy for the moment, there aren’t even political parties. Thus democracy has not come yet, but not only in Rwanda, in most African countries it’s like that [big laughter]. Democracy will come with liberty, with the freedom of speech. For the moment, you don’t have freedom of speech here. There are still problems with the justice [system], peace is not yet fully installed, we are still poor and there are still many génocidaires. Before democracy, one has to improve life conditions.

Ibrahim: In general, there is peace, even if there’s still killings in some prefectures. But if it continues like this, there will be peace.

I would say that there are gestures of democracy, but it’s far from complete. For example, we will be able to elect members of the local administration, that’s something new after the genocide. Even I can’t say that here’s the kind of democracy as you might find it elsewhere. But it’s coming. But the Rwandans have to be trained, because democracy as you find it abroad in the developed countries, we can’t have that yet. Given the events we recently have experienced it’s not good to have it now. Before the genocide, in ’92-’93 there was some experimenting with democracy in Rwanda, there are people that were killed because they were involved in politics. I have family members that were killed simply because they expressed themselves. One has to explain to the Rwandans firstly that ideas differ, as well as different ideas should be considered as expressions of the country and not of different ethnies. Democracy as westerners understand it will never take place here, one cannot loose sight of the Rwandan reality.

Félicitée: It’s very complicated. Peace has not yet come, because many people, the survivors are angry and they want to have all these people, like the Interahamwe, punished. They don’t even want to see them. Some of them have ethnic problems, and ethnic ideas. It is God alone who can bring peace.

Gaspard: There is peace today. To me there is peace today.

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132 I am not arguing that the political community we imagine as ours can be said to be ‘peaceful’ or ‘democratic’, taking such words at face value, without elaborating to what extent and in which way our social field deserves such qualifiers. But, it is self evident that it is being perceived as anything but ‘peaceful’ and ‘democratic’ to the great majority of people is not something mere existence puts in question on an everyday basis.
There’s not democracy yet but it will come. One has to involve people so that they understand.

Jeanette: I think democracy will come with time. At the moment, it would be dangerous to install it. The ethnic lines, they’re still there. I’ve been told that they’re still there, because in the cabinet when it’s in session when they pass someone they’re holding their breath for the next member being called out. If it’s someone from their ethnic group they make signs of the cross and clap if it’s someone from their own ethnic group being appointed. If you let democracy take over at the moment the divisions would be monstrous.

Athanase: In general I would say that there’s peace, but our neighbours in Congo they are experiencing war right now. Here in Rwanda one is safe now, but it could come back because Rwanda and Congo are now at war. It should be peace between them, because the Congolese might attack Rwanda. As well as Congo hosts the militias that carried out the genocide, it might be that they come back and attack our country. It worries me.

There is peace in Rwanda since…In 1995 it was good, then with the return of refugees in 1996 there were militia attacks, in certain prefectures, until 1998. But as far as this year, 1999, is concerned, I think it’s good.

If you live in an environment where you lived you life not only day by day, but rather second by second, a prospect of peace based in the experience of the present year the situation is promising.

7.3.2 Two Sides?

The students we meet in this work all show an active will to be Rwandan above anything else. The genocide is something that must never ever happen again, and ethnicity was the principal reason for the genocide to take place. The common programme is a peaceful being together. Peaceful co-existence one might say. But does not the term co-existence imply that there are at least two parts that have live together? Which are the sides that have to be reconciled?

Félicitée: The person who killed my mother has killed many people. After the genocide, he took refuge in Zaïre and when he came back, he was imprisoned, not by me however. I went to see him in prison. I asked him why he was there. He said, “I don’t know why”. I asked him what he had done. He said, “I haven’t done anything”. Although I had seen him, I knew that he had killed my mother. So I had no choice but to tell him that; “I know what you have done, if you refuse to confess it you will be condemned by God, as well as Man. Doesn’t it scare you that you will be condemned by God? You will be condemned forever, you will suffer in eternity”. He ignored me, so I left.

At first sight things seem simple. Félicitée has not forgotten, but she wants to forgive so she offers her forgiveness to the man who killed her mother. The man rejects the accusation and thereby looses the chance of forgiveness he is given. Either he is lying or Félicitée is mistaken, perhaps he after all was not the man who she witnessed killing her mother? (Something which I doubt after having listened to Félicitée’s story.) This is the ‘simple’ relation between two individuals. Then what about the collective level?
To kind of bring out the ‘essence’ (the social space in between) of the problems Rwanda and its inhabitants face, we may juxtapose extracts from Benoit’s story and Patricie’s story. They both have identified themselves as part of an ‘ethnie’, a belonging in which they take pride. At the same time, they have expressed openness to and awareness of the difficulties of the ‘other side’. It is thus interesting to see how they relate to and speak the present situation based in their experience and standpoint respectively. In many respects their standpoints converge and overlap based in their common experience and point of view from within the Rwandan field. On other points they do not perceive the problems from the same angle, because they were constructed into different kinds of Rwandans before the genocide and their trajectory during and after make them face the problems of the Rwandan society differently.

Benoit:

*There are two sides; one side which consists of the génocidaires; and another side which consists of people that begin to organise themselves into organisations for the rescapés like Ibuka, which kind of means ‘Never forget what has taken place’. These organisations seek to make sure that a given person who stands accused cannot escape Justice, thus they have groups within them that are charged with giving testimonies. Hence, they will even give false testimonies to ensure that the accused cannot get away. I can give you an example that take place today. The bishop of Gikongoro who is in prison here in Kigali, today he can defend himself through his lawyer against an accusation by someone. Then what happens is that someone else accuses him, and then another etc. Today there are at last ten accusations against him. So if he’s not convicted in the first place, he still has to defend himself a second time, and meanwhile he remains imprisoned*. Another example is the prefect of Butare who in 1996 met some Casques Bleues, the MINUAR. Then come some women who start screaming: “These are the ones who killed my husband and my children!” The prefect tried to convince her that it couldn’t be the case since they were foreign militaries. However she insisted and went on to file a complaint. So it was a scandal. Another case took place just after the war in 1994. There was a Member of Parliament who was strolling along, and then a woman comes up “It’s you! I saw you! You’re even wearing my father’s close!” Then one found out that it was a Member of Parliament that was abroad during the war. What I’m trying to say is that these organised false testimonies will aggravate the situation. These are powerful organisations, fortunately though they don’t have the agreement of the government for the moment. But if they would have the ear of the government things could go from bad to worse.

The question of whether there’s peace or not in Rwanda today depends on how one defines peace. In a strict sense, there is no peace in Rwanda today, because some groups are pleased and other

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133 He is referring to Bishop Augustin Misago. The then President Bizimungu publicly accused him at a mass meeting in April 1999, Misago was arrested immediately after. He was imprisoned for more than a year and then acquitted as the prosecution presented a flimsy case (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

134 In May 1999 the RPF publicly condemned survivors for falsely accusing others of genocide, but failed to note that RPF leaders themselves also sometimes resorted to false charges for their own ends. In some cases, survivors who spoke out against false accusations or testimony were harassed by other survivors who wanted the accused persons condemned (Human Rights Watch, 2000).
groups aren’t. With this situation, peace isn’t completed. People say “I have no job, I live a clandestine life, if people knew that I come from the North they will imprison me or even kill me.” Others say “These people have come from Uganda, they have taken power and they will let no one else share it. They won’t even let others find a job, or a better job”. Yet again others say “We are being neglected, even in school we are being neglected. The people from the outside have taken over, the Burundians and especially the Ugandans.”. One says that the English speakers are being favoured and that the people who have all the time been in Rwanda are being neglected. I don’t know if I fully agree, but the truth is that many factors give people who say such things right. If someone comes from the outside, he grabs power, and he takes everything and they don’t even share with those who have suffered a lot; Is that right? When it comes to those who say that they are afraid of being imprisoned or killed I can’t say whether they’re right or wrong.

Rwanda is not a democracy; there are no elections. The transition government gave it four years and five years have already passed. After all, during these four years the tribunals haven’t been able to work well, the government hasn’t been able to deal with the major problems of the genocide. If they first gave it four years and then another four, how can one know for sure that they will not stay another four years? As well as there are ministers who leave and hide abroad. That isn’t democracy.135

It will be very difficult with the gacaca, let’s just say that it’s not good. If you for example has committed murder, they will bring you to your region, they will ask the neighbours and some will say “he has killed this one and he has killed that one etc.”. Others they will say “no he hasn’t killed anyone, he hasn’t done anything bad”, thus the two camps will again find themselves in a situation of disagreement. It will become worse with the gacaca. As well as there will be neighbours announcing people that haven’t done anything, kind of false testimonies.

Patricie:

There could be peace in Rwanda on condition that those who have done wrong are punished, and that those who were condemned, those who have suffered are recognised, that we [on] aren’t rejected. The events that have taken place in our country are still really making marks. One puts you there, leaves you with your sorrow, you should stay there [where you are put], you shouldn’t think about those for whom you cared and that have disappeared. Despite that it is only if one manages to make all the Rwandans respect one another that the situation will improve so that we may find peace. But, if one instead of sowing the spirit of understanding thinks that those who were killed, those who were the objects of the genocide have the spirit of vengeance, in that case the weight of the genocide will make

135 Beginning of March 2001, local elections were held in Rwanda. According to Human Rights Watch hundreds of thousands of Rwandans had voted, but many “had no meaningful choice at the polls”. About 45 percent of the communal contests had only a single candidate. More than 90 percent of eligible voters had registered and there was a high turnout for the elections, but some voters had said they cast their ballots because they feared fines or other punishment if they did not do so (IRIN, 9 March, 2001). Some observers see the elections as part of the RPF ambition to develop a new cadre, especially in the countryside, before the 2003 parliament and presidential elections. So even if the polls in themselves were well organised the process of screening candidates before worries them. The National Election Commission (NEC) controlled by the RPF screened all the candidates and vetoed those that were not in line with the RPF policies. Nevertheless, these were the first district level elections ever held in Rwanda, and they are the continuation of a process that sat out in 1999 when rather tightly controlled elections were held on cell and sector levels as a kind of try-out election (International Crisis Group, 2001, see also further below).
persist one part of the population over here and another one over there. Because there are those who are imprisoned due to that they have done evil, but there are some who have stayed on the hills but have family members in the prisons, and these [latter] exercise a heavy pressure on those people who were the targets of the genocide. Thus, here you have part no.1 we could say that part no. 1 are the rescapés who were the targets of the genocide. Then you have part no. 2; these are the prisoners. Then if I have my father here [in group no. 2], in prison. There in prison there are groupings that don’t want him to confess, so they won’t be friends with him if he speaks out. But if one manages to understand that the burden of the genocide is the impunity, the reason to why the rescapés are reclaiming the theirs and the valorisation of theirs then there could be peace in Rwanda.

[Stefan: Do you consider Rwanda a democracy?] Oh, it’s a very complicated question. First, one has to understand what is democracy. I understand democracy as to give the opportunity to people to work [things out] themselves. But in Rwanda with the problems of the genocide, the installation [of democracy] must wait until after the consequences that affect people are resolved, then democracy can be something for Rwandans to hope for. But for the moment, I think it’s a bit too soon. Even though one tries to give the opportunity to the population to govern everything, but there are too many problems here. For the moment you see, we in Africa when we say democracy we say that with the procedure of several parties there could be a democracy, but in the African countries where one has tried to give democracy [to the people], through a multiparty system it has failed, sometimes there are coups d’Etat. To me if one tries to solve the problems that we have now, democracy will produce itself.

The problem is that those who are locked up due to their involvement in the Genocide they have been angry and they don’t have the will to confess that they have committed bad deeds. In this case I don’t know how the situation in Rwanda will evolve. Because if one doesn’t understand the crime one has committed against mankind, if I have killed twenty or twenty-something people, and if I stay in the neighbourhood I don’t feel like confessing that I have already done evil I make others who are innocent seem guilty. If one could confess the murders one has committed to make it known which lives one has taken, then the capital punishment doesn’t mean anything. But if one does not even manage admit that one has done something bad…If you go to prison he will say, “One has tried to make me [look like] a criminal but there is nothing in our country like the Genocide of which one speaks”…I don’t think they will have the ability to admit to what they have done.

There is also the method within the process of Gacaca that one is about to develop in the prisons to go there and teach the prisoners, but then if the authorities do not manage to sensitise them they will not be able to admit to themselves that they have done wrong. [If they confess] then one will be able to read that in that neighbourhood it was like that it was he who was the leader, in order to free those who were not implicated in the Genocide, because there are innocent people in prison, but in order to save the others some do not want to confess that they did evil. The method one uses to find proofs in the prisons, in order to sensitise the prisoners to make them tell who have been killed and who have done the killing, in this case there are prisoners who manage to confess the wrong they have done, but there
are those who haven’t that kind of heart. Then one might live in the same neighbourhood without knowing, because you may not have killed in this neighbourhood but you may have gone to kill in another neighbourhood. So you may stay calm in your neighbourhood; you eat you work you make yourself at ease so that you show that there’s nothing, so that you doesn’t get locked up, but your heart knows very well that you have already killed why then can you not go to confess “I have killed people.”? The looser is he who is suspected for having killed but haven’t.

The gacaca, I don’t know if it’s the best system one could find, because the gacaca for a crime like Genocide, really, it’s a bit like nothing. Gacaca is something between people from the same neighbourhood or the same village, when you have been unreliable to someone else you are put in a group, you’re shown what damage you have done, and then you’re given a punishment. It’s not even really a punishment, but one tries to make you think twice because you have done wrong to someone else. It’s for thefts [petty] crimes like that. But the crime of Genocide to kill a million people and to say that the suspects should be interrogated in the gacaca system, I see it as impossible. I await the elaboration of the system or it being put into practice but I see many problems. Because if I cannot admit that I have killed and I stay in the neighbourhood, I live with those whose [family] members I have killed and I don’t even manage to show them the further love by telling them. Do you know that there is someone that might make an effort to hide his bad side by showing the good side? Then you won’t know that he has done you wrong. How then can the gacaca when one comes to sit down one over here and one over there and one begins; “That one he has killed your father and this one here has killed your father!”. There might even be confrontations between families, I might have problems with you that are personal then I might use I might take advantage of the gacaca possibility in order to do you harm and I might say “This one here he has done wrong to me, he has killed.” I might even not say that it’s to me he has done harm I might say “You have killed the other one’s wife, I saw you doing it you took a machete and then you killed her.”, in that case I ruin you life. I think that if one doesn’t manage to try to avoid situations like that, then this [gacaca] system will fail.

As we see peace and democracy is far from something achieved. Still, society is perceived as relatively peaceful. However, with democracy, it is a different story with so many unhappy and dissatisfied persons and so many unhappy and dissatisfied groups feeling excluded from the [polis]. As we saw above outside observers still talk of Tutsi and Hutu as salient political identities but is this still valid? Power is being ‘tutsisised’ they say, but far from all Tutsi have a share in power from above. Patricie and Benoit speak of two sides; the génocidaires and the rescapés. Génocidaire implies Hutu and rescapé implies Tutsi. All génocidaires are Hutus but not all Hutu are génocidaires; all rescapés are Tutsis but not all Tutsis are rescapés. Is there any point of speaking of Tutsi or Hutu power in an objective sense when explaining the present state of the Rwandan field? I am not so sure of that. The students we meet in this work occupy positions that are close in the social space and they do not seem to find themselves high up in a field of power, this regardless whether or not they identify themselves or are identified by an outside observer as Hutu or Tutsi. Still, different groupings of Rwandans stand
different chances of being close or remote to any nexus of power relations. However, I do not believe that one should speak of it solely on an ethnic basis. The claims that are articulated are not done so in terms of ethnicity they are done so because one feels excluded based on other principles. Those who survived the genocide and are socially recognised as ‘survivors’ feel excluded from the construction of the new Rwanda [polis] as well as those others who feel that their participation is disqualified due to a notion of collective guilt. These two groups, here represented by Patricie and Benoit, have the sense of their places as positions of exclusion, in this sense then their distances from power seem to be the same. At the same time there is a mutual distrust of the Other group as a group considered mixed with a great deal of comprehension for what the downside of belonging to that Other group might practically mean to individuals.

For the moment there seems to be no political groupings able to speak on behalf of those that feel excluded as such. Even though the ‘survivors’ have Ibuka it does not seem to be a strong force. Neither is there any group speaking in the name of Tutsis. In addition, there is no open revelation of rights explicitly based in the name of the ‘Hutus’. The MDR party contains elements of being a ‘Hutu’ party, but does not put forward any demands qua ‘Hutus’. Also the former president Pasteur Bizimungu’s (of the RPF) attempt to form a new party was by some observers seen as an attempt to attract mainly Hutus. As well as there is no overarching party or interest group that speaks in the name of ‘we who have always been in Rwanda’, i.e. that should be based in Hutus and Tutsis alike and articulated against those who have returned (personal information). The only legitimate, articulated political voice inside Rwanda seems to be the Government of National Unity.

The RPF and the Government for National Unity, which just as the Reconciliation Commission was foreseen in the Arusha Accord from 1993, has the implementation of the Arusha Accord as its explicit agenda. Part of this is the decentralisation of the administration, in measures of empowerment and subsidiarity in what the government labels “consensual democracy”, based in the aim of achieving reconciliation and national unity. However, observers state that consensual democracy, national unity and reconciliation are imposed from the one and only legitimate political point of view in Rwanda today, that of the RPF dominated government of national unity. This single point of view is that “we need unity and reconciliation. We need to feel Rwandese all equally. But it's only possible when a community has common ideas, a common authority, a common government. After the council of ministers is finished, and the decision-making process is over, every Minister knows that the decisions taken are not those of a Hutu or a Tutsi. It will be the same for the decisions taken at the level of sector committees. And in the end the ethnic issue will fade away” (Secretary General for Local Government, Protais Musoni in International Crisis Group [ICG], 2001:4). Elections are but one part of ‘democracy’; elections are not democracy per se. Inclusive to democracy are “fundamental dimensions and rights that are indispensable for the dignity of man [i.e. security, the right to life, the absence of any discrimination, the right to equal opportunities etc.]” (then vice President Paul Kagame in ICG, 2001:4). Thus, the suspension of political parties and political life outside the Government of National
Unity in 1995 was justified since “[M]ulti-partyism in African societies, what does it mean? I use any tactic to distinguish myself from my neighbour in order to get more votes than him. [...]” in the current situation you would “divide already divided people” (Kagame quoted in ICG, 2001:4). Seven years after the genocide the government of national unity does not trust the population to be able to choose the ‘right’ leaders. Therefore the National Election Committee screened all the candidates before they could stand for election, and on several occasions it abused its powers to make sure that only candidates that were in line (en règle as Bourdieu would have it) with the RPF policies were elected. Before this there were some minimum requirements for being eligible; any counsellor candidate should have at least a secondary degree or be an ‘experienced administrator’, and any candidate for a post as executive administrator (for example mayor) had to either be a university graduate or be a secondary graduate with at least ten years of working experience (ICG, 2001). Indeed, all these precautions are understandable. Less than ten years ago the country was devastated and large parts of the Rwandans had been massacred and many went into exile. To this, it comes that the country is at war, and although the frontline has been pushed into the Congo, there are frequent attacks and insurgencies on Rwandan soil. Nevertheless, remains that National unity is defined from above, and above only. Further, no alternative visions are allowed official participation. It seems that RPF has appropriated the right to the vision of Rwanda of tomorrow, and however good in spirit it may be the institutionalisation of RPF apparatchiks seems underway.

7.3.3 The Future to Come

Inherent to the sense of one’s place in the social world is not only the way one makes present, here and now, the past in the shape of reified history and how this is incorporated. Also in how the representation of an anticipated probable future is revealed in the narration of life stories habitus are made tangible. After all their life trajectories have passed through an anomic state of being and even if they “after all think about the future” (Patricie) as life goes on and existence is an everyday practice, any anticipated future is far from self-evident. Thus, the mere fact that you get out of the bed every morning and actually do live is something that gives faith in a future at all. In addition, the students are very conscious of their particular luck; they have all managed to pursue their studies and this fact alone bears promise of a personal future with chances that are higher that most Rwandans could expect. Still though, life is a combat sport on an everyday basis: ‘It’s difficult living with other people. For all Rwandans it’s a problem. But life goes on and you kind of have to live with the others in society, to make an effort” (Ibrahim). With the exception of Benoit they perceive the direction of society in the aftermath of the genocide as promising, but it is far from obvious that it will stay like that, ‘one never knows” as Athanase says. One striking feature is the rift between those who were raised in Rwanda and lived there during the genocide and Jeanette. The former all see the outcome of their lives as much more dependent on the outcome of Rwanda at large. The tension of faith and mistrust based in ones
experiences are perhaps best expressed in the extract from Félicitée’s story. She begins with “I think that my own future is splendid. Because I see that God doesn’t want me any harm, he welcomes me.” Nevertheless, later she gets to the fear the collective conscience imposing itself on her: “I would prefer to go abroad to work after my studies. Because still today, even if God has aided me, I would prefer to leave because of the society. I am afraid that I will be contaminated with hatred and [extremist] ideas”. It may not be that the others speak of God when they speak the politics from above. However, it is obvious that how politics and policies from high up in the field of power is designed is seen as something that in a very direct manner will affect their individual lives. Empirically this is not so strange as it may sound. The President, during his time as vice-president, allegedly, personally engaged himself in the institution’s businesses, as a group of English-speaking students went on strike in protest against the obligation to learn French in order to stay at the KIE. The vice president, supposedly, gave an ultimatum ‘Either you play the game by the rules or you leave’. Many of them decided to leave (personal information). This of course presupposes the possibility to leave as a necessary condition; there must be some kind of exit strategy that is deemed a possible strategy.

As it is the students at large have confidence in the FPR regime, also among those who if one was to follow a strict ‘ethnic framework’ analysis should not be expected to: “With the government we have now Rwanda can become a good country. Democracy may be installed, with the present government one might get there” (Kayitana).137

Patricie

Even though it’s a very small country that has known many problems, I see that I manage to go to class to continue my studies. After all, I think about the future [She says it with a joyful voice.]. Because during the Genocide we [on] didn’t believe in anything, we didn’t believe in survival, but when I see that the students have begun… One begins to try to recompense that which has been lost, I think of the future for Rwanda. I dream of that my country will be a rich country like yours! [She laughs.]

I study instead of condemning, that’s why I have continued my studies. But with the capacities of our country I see that my studies don’t stand the chance of reaching completion, because I might finish my higher education, and then I should throw myself into teaching to try and find work, to try and make my family complete again. What is left of it. In this case, I will complete my higher education, but if I find an occasion to go even further, I will continue, no problems. I could, even do a thesis. Why not? Me, I like the sciences that try and understand Man, that try to put Man in a good environment, that try to develop a good environment. Because I see that our world had deteriorated because there are many wars, there are many exterminations there’s all of that. Man has ended having love for his neighbour.

136 He was rather alone on this in the overall sample population.
137 This could of course be a bias in the sample population. Presumably, those who agreed to first write the essay and then do an interview could be expected to feel more at ease with participating in the research. This could in part explain Benoit’s reluctance to follow through his engagement to be interviewed. As we have seen it is he who is the one expressing the least trust, sometimes even mistrust for and hostility to the present regime, something that goes for all the students who participated.
I would like to do my higher education in sociology but here it’s somewhat difficult to find sociology or psychology departments. But I would like to continue with that.

I would like to find a work here in Rwanda, abroad it’s somewhat impossible. Even here in Rwanda it’s somewhat difficult. One might find work as teacher, but with the situation as teacher here in the country one finds also many problems, but without saying to many bad things one ought to respect the teacher’s profession. Here we do higher education in order to become teachers; then you ought to teach.

Kayitana

With the government we have now Rwanda can become a good country. Democracy may be installed, with the present government one might get there. But, one can find extremists within the authorities, even though there aren’t many of them. But with this government and good governance these extremist may be put aside. The future of Rwanda may thus be better.

When you see that you have the luck to be a student, it’s not for everyone! It’s not for everyone to be able to study on a government grant, when you see that...When I get to finish my studies my future might be better. I intend to do all the four years here, and if my intellectual capacities allow me to, I intend to do a Ph.D. in Modern Languages. But since I study to become a teacher, I then want to teach.

If I may chose to work in the countryside or here in Kigali, I would prefer working in the former. Because this is the capital, life is very expensive here, even if life might be better here.

Jeanette

If you look upon it from the past five years from ’94, I think if it goes on like this I think Rwanda is destined for peace. It’s quite promising, but I think it will take some time. This country won’t be like it was before, for the victimised families, for the survivors.

My own future is destined for big stuff I would say! [said with a big smile] Well I’m going for further studies, a Masters. I don’t think the future of Rwanda as a country is going to frustrate my own efforts. I’m off to a brighter future. I’m going to South Africa, because there I would still feel like I’m here, I will feel more at home. Lots of friends have left home, to go to Europe and elsewhere, but they still miss home. But I’m planning to find an employment in Rwanda, I want to work in Rwanda because at the moment it looks like there are more job opportunities here. Because the development situation leads to that you find more job opportunities than elsewhere. In developed countries most of the jobs are taken now.

Félicitée

I hope that everyone will believe in God. If everybody chooses the same road as me Rwanda could even become a paradise.

I think that my own future is splendid. Because I see that God doesn’t want me any harm, he welcomes me.
[Stefan: Did you have a faith as strong as this before the genocide?] No, it’s since one year. Before that, I didn’t even like God. I had so much hatred in my heart and I didn’t speak with anyone. Right after the war I couldn’t see how I should be able to get along with anyone. I had nowhere to stay, there were many families in my extended family that had both the parents all the children. But they didn’t want me to stay with them, they wouldn’t welcome me since they didn’t want to be concerned. I moved around these families, but they didn’t want to be concerned so I couldn’t see how I would be able to live with them. They didn’t want to have me living with them so they just left me like that. That perturbed me a lot [said with a very sad voice]. The Sisters at the boarding school, which I attended, told me that I could stay with them during the school holidays. Then after my studies I found a Christian family with which I could live. I still live with them. They welcomed me as if I was their own child. God has comforted me.

I wouldn’t mind to continue with my studies after the four years here because I like studying. I would prefer to go abroad to work after my studies. Because still today, even if God has aided me, I would prefer to leave because of the society. I am afraid that I will be contaminated with hatred and the ideas, with people that don’t pray there are still extremist ideas. The people who have done me good are people who are well converted, who believe in God.

Benoit

If things at the moment went better the future would be good. But for the moment things don’t go well so I think the future will be very bad.

[Stefan: Which are the factors that will direct things in one direction or another?] The prisoners are numerous here in Rwanda and they don’t live under the best of conditions. There are also economic problems, will the Rwandans keep up their pauperisation? There’s the problem of cut off habitation – the imidugudu. It’s not that I’m against the imidugudu, it’s just that it’s badly administered. It will provoke more hatred in the communities when people in the countryside will be grouped together like that. The Rwandans that live in the country side they are poor and they have a land lot for farming around the house, when they are being grouped together like this they will sort of be living on the neighbour’s land lot. So there will be disputes over which land belongs to whom, and it will provoke disorganisation. What is good with the imidugudu is that it will enable to build houses for those who are very poor and aren’t able to construct houses for themselves. What I don’t find normal however is that what takes place is that the authorities tell people to move to the imidugudu straight away. They should at least ask who wants to leave or not. Because what can happen is that a family may have been constructing a house over the last two or three years and then the authorities come and tell them “Leave!”.

138 During 1998, as part of its effort to suppress the insurgency, the government moved hundreds of thousands of people in the two north-western prefectures into supervised camps. At the end of 1998, the government ordered the displaced to relocate once more, this time to officially designated ‘villages’ – imidugudu. Since 1995, as foreseen already in the Arusha Accords (then meant for those who went into exile in 1959 and 1973), the government has been resettling Rwandans returned from outside the country and the IDPs in imidugudu, refusing to allow them to live in the dispersed homes customary in Rwanda. They insisted that ‘villagisation’ by in a way providing for rationalisation
When it comes to my personal future I’m somewhat disheartened by what I have seen and what I see. Sometimes I tell myself that I don’t stand much chance in the future. Life in Rwanda becomes harder. The country is poor and I might soon find myself in unemployment again. Before I worked a couple of months for a friend who had a small shop. But five months employment out of couple of years after I graduated from secondary school it’s nothing. I see many people around me that are unemployed, even if they have university degrees. What might save me is that I will be a teacher, but I would prefer not to work as a teacher. But as we get the grant we are under obligation to work for the public sector a certain number of years, after having fulfilled this you may leave. But I do not know how this will be arranged. I wouldn’t mind continue my studies as long as possible, perhaps even do a Ph.D. That’s is something that I would very much like to do.

Gaspard

The future of Rwanda will depend on capable men, on intelligence, on us who are lucky enough to pursue our studies so that the situation of the country can change.

First of all I will finish my studies, find a job and perhaps find a wife get married in a couple of years. I am ready to live together with my compatriots, and I am prepared to work so that my country will progress. If everyone does that it will get better and better with each generation.

Athanase

The future of Rwanda depends on the politicians. They decide process that will give the direction of the future. Today, even though there was a genocide, all the ethnies have married in between them. If the government will create inequality between the ethnies, the problems between the ethnies will recommence one of these days. For the moment, I don’t think there’s a risk for that with this government. There are risks because the are ancient militaries, the ex-FAR, are still in Congo and they aren’t allowed to get back here, and thus one never knows. If they come there will be problems. The present government does not pose any risks.

My personal future [he laughs]. I think that after the studies I will teach. I don’t think of other things because I don’t have any other possibilities. I was inscribed at NUR before, but when you realise that you have to find lodging yourself it’s not possible, because it gets to expensive. Since I haven’t been abroad, I prefer to work here in Rwanda. Before I worked in the countryside but probably I’ll work in a town, since the establishments of secondary education are not located to the countryside. For the moment I prefer to work in a town, because immediately when you find yourself in the countryside would promote economic development and improve delivery of services (water, schools, clinics) to the population. As applied in the Northwest however, the program appeared to be meant primarily to reduce the likelihood of a new insurgency. By late 1999, 94 percent of the population of Kibungo and 60 % of the population of Mutara, both prefectures in the east, had been moved into villages, as had 40 % of the population of the prefecture surrounding the capital of Kigali. In addition 94 % of the people of the north-west who had been in camps had been moved into villages and others, still in their own homes, had been ordered to destroy them and move to the new sites, where they were obliged to live in temporary shelters, under plastic sheeting, while building new houses. Persons who resisted these orders were fined or imprisoned. Despite government promises, most sites offered no services and residents often had to walk much farther to cultivate their fields. Some say that the settlement in these villages is along ‘ethnic’ lines (Human Rights Watch, 2000; Children and Women of Rwanda, 1998; Rwanda Newsline, Vol. II No. 2, 1999:8; personal information).
Ibrahim

I would say that during and just after the genocide I was another person. Now afterwards I have found that when I see some persons... it’s difficult living with other people. For all Rwandans it’s a problem. But life goes on and you kind of have to live with the others, in society, to make an effort. The situation is like that, it’s not only me. For the majority it’s like that, having to make the effort to live together, having had to realise that one has to change the mentalities, to consider other persons as a necessary being. During the genocide one considered persons as insignificant beings, unimportant beings without any value whatsoever.

The situation today is promising, to say the least. We who are young, many amongst us have begun to see the reality. The events that Rwanda has traversed have kind of buried our adolescence, there are many who say that this that has taken place they will never forget. I have hope, first the work, that everyone will work for the development of one’s own country, and love, to have love for one’s country as well. I think that today we have the signs show that the future will be better, but it will take time.

I am lucky, I have friends who couldn’t go on after secondary school, I was lucky thus I have the state that pay for my studies, which is an advantage in the third world. We have a period of joy here at university, I enjoy myself very much. Here there are persons that share the same ideas as me.

If I may say so without being too egoistic, if I finish here my future will be good I will go on to have a good life. Rwanda has given me the opportunity to use my luck. Once Rwanda end up in peace, if peace is really installed I think my future will be good. It is Rwanda which decides my personal future.

I think that 90% of the young Rwandans, or rather the quasi totality, wouldn’t mind going abroad. Because the life conditions are better elsewhere. For example, that’s why you have people moving from the countryside to the towns, it’s the same thing. Most young Rwandans would leave if they had a chance. I’ll be honest with you; we are in Rwanda, in the third world and there’s no choice, I am here so I should study here and become teacher. But I love journalism, if I find the chance to get somewhere to study journalism, I’d go straight away. Here you are given an orientation by force, there’s no choice. The numbers are limited and one will recruit those who are interested, thus if you get a place you will come ’cause you can’t go anywhere else; if you are admitted to do science-education you will do science-education.

Again Jeanette’s story stands out. As we entered their lives, it was obvious that her experience of the genocide ‘naturally’ was different. Also her ‘coming to Rwandan’ bears an imprint that differs from the rest, so it is not so surprising that as we leave their lives her incorporated dispositions tell a different story. Nevertheless she is part of Rwanda and she relates to the sorrow felt by her compatriots and she is well aware of the scar the genocide has cut on the social body and that it remains in the individuals
surrounding her, but on the point that her own future perhaps is not necessarily attached to the future of Rwanda Jeanette is explicit, “I don’t think the future of Rwanda as a country is going to frustrate my own efforts. I’m off to a brighter future”. Where she, and others who are returnees (judging from the other stories it does not seem to be a difference founded in differing prospects in terms of where one studies), differs from the others are that the social field of possibles contains more possibilities. As we see above the other students are fatalistic on their personal future; ‘to be a teacher’s candidate is my chance but it is also my lot, and what becomes of Rwanda is what becomes of me’. However far from any laissez faire stance, they know they have to struggle for their own and their country’s well fare, the future is what you and others make of it. They have a sense of being privileged, but privileged with an obligation to make an effort to provide for the well being of others, and despite a modest optimism there remains the tension of insecurity based on what they have experienced in a past they carry with them.
8 Ethnicity and Beyond – A Concluding Discussion

What Simone de Beauvoir in her simple but yet so magnificent phrase, *one is not born woman: one becomes it*, tells us is that there is no natural foundation for any of the categories that inhabit our social world. They are social through and through. We all bear the imprints of the society surrounding us in our bodies, we have all incorporated ‘souls’ that tell us who we ‘are’, and how we are supposed to act given what we are. If the means of production for producing selves change, then we change with them. If the political imaginary that we incorporate change; the senses of our places change, our selves change.

In the beginning of this work I stated the scientific aim as to study present Rwandan social identities and that this ambition was propelled by the question; how are group identities produced and reproduced in Rwanda? The simple answer to the question is that according to this study it is not in terms of ‘passionate ethnicity’, rather as passionate Rwandans. Nevertheless, ethnicity remains as a principle for reproduction of political mythology and social identities in the sense that it is a constituent in the tense present and it is a principle for different groups of ‘becoming Rwandan’. Inclusive to this ‘Rwandanness’ is a feeling of insecurity caused by experiences organised around the principle of ethnicity, the anomic state of being caused by its standing in Rwanda has left a remnant of anomie. In keeping this potential anomie at bay the students rely on the collective consciousness of today; in this very present the political mythology is being re-produced as the Rwandan narrative recuperates and breaks with the past. In this narrative there is a place for ‘ethnicity’, and thus for partially ethnic selves, as it has to deal with this essential element of the Rwandan constitutive imaginary that has produced Rwandan history. Thus, in the life stories of the empirical individuals there is the constant dialectic between the individual experience and the collective level as the individual experience would not make sense without this link when narrated. Accordingly, the stories told contains elements of ethnicity as the students who told their stories in this work have incorporated experiences based on a principle of ethnicity. Hence, in the tense present the Rwandan political mythology and the social identities simultaneously are both ‘ethnic’ and ‘non-ethnic’.

8.1 Rwandan Trajectories

When we in this work plot the different trajectories in a series over time we see that they from different angles enter the present *par excellence*, the genocide, that defines the present political knowledge and power. We also see that the trajectories until then largely are stories of becoming ethnic, something which is made particularly acute when they enter the Rwandan state in one of its sub-fields; the school system. Most of them spoke of a happy childhood, where one knew or not that people where different, in accordance with ethnicity, but not the form of the difference (thus, ethnicity as categories of cognition). Then with schooling and rationalised symbolic violence the ethnic categories are imposed and transformed into categories of recognition, it means something to belong to one group or another.
Here those that were not born and raised in Rwanda differ in a way from the others, as they were not schooled within the Rwandan territory they were not becoming ethnic in the same sense. This period of their lives largely coincide with an overarching political process where Rwandan society is getting more and more tension ridden and even entering a period of war. Your ethnic belonging becomes increasingly important and it is ‘something’ that is a greater and greater part of yourself. Then hell breaks loose and the hecatomb begins and in a way, your ethnic belonging does not mean ‘something’; it means everything. This ‘everything’ is different to the different groups of students, as it decides whether or not they in the calm after the storm are survivors, returnees, refugees or those ‘Others’ that has not found their due place in the present political landscape. Here in the calm after the storm, that after all is not that calm as Rwanda is still waging a war against the genocidal powers that be inside the Congo, the differences between the groups are not that clear-cut. In that present that we can not sociologically understand – the genocide – their trajectories were fractured, and when we meet them here and now in this work we meet a group of Rwandan students.

Then where in time and space do these different trajectories meet? In this study, which is a momentary picture of Rwanda, it is in the sub-field of higher education in the aftermath of the genocide. One thing that should immediately strike us are the shortcomings of this work in terms of ‘who speaks’. Indeed, it has been a politics from below approach, but we must not forget that the population as a group, and one group, considered ought to have very specific traits with regards to many other Rwandans. This is signified by how most of them live their lives on campus, they thus have to co-exist. In a deeper sense, this means that they all participate in common project that on a macro level is part of an explicit Government strategy of nation building; when I assisted a girls secondary school inauguration the then Vice President (now President) spoke of education as ‘the continuation of the war with other means’. This is made very acute for the students who attend KIE as they face a ‘to come’ as civil servants within the education system, but it is also valid for those who pursue their studies at NUR, albeit to a lesser extent as the group of students are not as homogenous with regards to career possibilities (futures ‘to come’). So when they spoke of patriotism and the love for one’s country this is not only confined to an abstract macro level, but to many of the students it will make part of their everyday working life. As it is they are aware of their privileged standing as they are given the means by the State (the ‘Rwandan Nation’) to pursue their education, they thus show a Rwandan State ethos and as products of the State they manifest habitus that are going build the nation by educating the following generations of Rwandans. It thus makes sense to them to display Rwandan selves (they have invested themselves in this common project) and as they owe some of their particularities, such as their privilege, to the schooling system they forge identities endowed with strategies that in the past have been rewarded by the schooling system and that in the future are likely to be so as well.
8.2 Rupture and Recuperation

Society, structuring structures and incorporated structures that are predisposed to structure, is endowed with certain inertia; changes do not take place in a fortnight and revolutions are not made in a day. What we incorporated yesterday we carry with us in our bodies today and the experiences we have made make us disposed to anticipate a certain probable future ‘to come’. In the present, ‘ethnicity’ remains in Rwanda, i.e. it has shaped those that live there today and they are all aware of that it has been used in dangerous ways in the past and it might be so again. Nevertheless, this work’s population at least initially deny the existence of ethnicity. By what right can we deny the right to denial of a principle of identity in which the social actors do not wish to believe? This is not to say that all the students I have met do not any longer imagine themselves as having another identity than Rwandan, only that all of them would subscribe to that Rwandan has to be the referential identity for imagining a political community. What emerged from the life stories told by the students was not any antagonistic identities, differing indeed, but not antagonistic.

This means that it is not only a matter of decency and respect for fellow human beings to take what they say into account, but from a strictly sociological point of view we also have to take it into consideration, simply because active definitions of the social world matters as they make part of the very social world. If social actors deny the very principal of an identity, they do so because there is (practical) reason to do so. When observing these reasons, the underlying logic of practice, we can not rely solely on how social actors identify themselves and others, but how this is practically expressed. Given the individual experiences, there are reasons to claim a Rwandan identity; thus they produce Rwandan selves that say ‘I am Rwandan’. This is with the empirical individuals part of an active strategy of distinction, strategies based on an urge to identify oneself (to re-appropriate one’s own self), both against powers that imposed themselves in the shape of the genocide, and to some extent also against a Western discourse that has not always enough listened to those ‘objects that speak’. This latter was of course made present by me being there, posing these questions on ‘ethnicity’ and thus putting their selves in question. Ethnicity was before to some of the students experienced as blocked paths in education, being beat and teased at school, being publicly accused of belonging to the once upon a time usurper ‘race’. It culminated in the fear for one’s own life – a fear based in the knowledge of one’s own anticipated, probable death made present. Ethnicity means experiences of rape, witnessing people kill and being killed – persons who sometimes were near and dear persons. To some of the students the time prior to the genocide was also a harsh time, the sort of the Rwandan in general was not easy, but it did not mean hardship for them for ‘ethnic’ reasons most of the time. The genocide does not seem to have been experienced as life menacing to the own self, at least not in any biological sense, but one may assume that it implied strategies to avoiding becoming a killer. Then after what was the genocide as such an event, threats to their lives and life chances were imposed upon them. To this it perhaps comes the feeling of guilt, for not having taken a stance against discrimination that they now in retrospective know was part of the order that culminated in the genocide, an order of things that they in part benefited
from. They are perhaps also feeling guilt and shame for what took place during the genocide, if not for their own actions then for the acts persons close to them committed, or in a defensive mode against ‘expected probable accusations’. Something which was expressed in their need to explain the logic of the genocide. Other persons that had ‘Hutu’ identities were ‘Hutu’ enough to not be discriminated against during ‘normal’ times, then when it all came to its peak; ‘ethnicity’ as the ultimate principle for the right to life or death during the genocide, they were no longer safe from harm. Since they were born in a ‘mixed marriage’, their ‘true’ identities were put in question. For the ones not having been brought up in Rwanda, it is a somewhat different story. They also identify themselves as Rwandan, perhaps the reasons for being a passionate Rwandan is that they know that their ‘Rwandanness’ has previously been questioned, even denied them. This is for some combined with the mixed feelings about being Rwandan, having partly incorporated the feeling of belonging to somewhere else, and now being admitted an official Rwandan identity but still being Rwandan in a position in between ‘two cultures’.

The students all, regardless of ‘ethnic’ belonging, whether born inside or outside Rwanda, share the experience of having been denied, or being denied parts of their selves, their identities, a right to a status that is fully human.

It is also part of a strategy for achieving something. Their experiences, incorporated memory, tell them that if they are to achieve anything of that something, then ‘ethnicity’ is a dead end race, it leads them nowhere. What is then this something they want? On a macro level, it is peace, prosperity and equal rights for everybody, regardless of birth or ‘origin’. On the micro level in the everyday struggle, it comes down to so many dreams as there are Rwandans. For the students this is expressed in the want to spend time with persons they love, family and friends, to meet a future wife to settle down with, finish the studies and get an employment. In brief, the right to a human existence, a being that is something more than mere persistence.

The only thing sure that can provide them the basis for this is a peaceful Rwanda, a Rwanda that is not anomic but where some sort of order prevail, with a peace that is permanent and where the battle is not only in suspense, where perhaps not all dreams come true, but where they at least not are disqualified based on principles of ‘ethnicity’. The common referential point for them all is thus a Rwandan imagined community. Clinging on to a Rwandan identity is in my eyes not ‘false consciousness’ (how can consciousness be false?). Being a passionate Rwandan, actively expressing a will of being Rwandan, is the only practically logic and justified stance for these students. Thus, they are all Banyarwanda and as an imagined community they are neither more nor less real than any other social group.

Nevertheless, just as there are so many Rwandans there are so many individual identities. Although the continuum of Rwandan identities per definition is continuous, there are different groups of experiences laying the foundation for the Rwandan identity, different roads leading to ‘Rwandanness’. The sociological practice of break may thus carve out discontinuities in the sets of experiences that are engendered in the identities of the past and the reified history making sense of these identities. These
groups exist as virtual groups, and to the extent they are socially recognised as such and are able to produce social effects, these groups are real. The self-identification as Rwandan is done from different positions. To some extent the genocide contained the same elements, witnessing killing, threats to one’s own life. In brief, a social world experienced as bereft of all reason, of all meaning. It was an anomic state of being. Nevertheless, the sense of one’s place, how one is practically and actively experiencing one’s own position in the social field, is also inclusive to the social world. As individuals experienced the genocide differently depending on whether the person by the genocidal powers imposing themselves was meant to be killed or to kill, to rape or be raped, witnessing killing of neighbours, witnessing killing of family members, hearing about it on the radio, fearing for the lives of relatives, could be expected to ‘choose’ side by killing or being killed etc., genocide is from an individual standpoint not one and indivisible. Here the individual self knows it belongs to a group of persons sharing the ‘same’ experiences and the individual self knows that there are other groups that did not experience the genocide in the same way. From what position they experienced the genocide depend upon what was were their official, ‘ethnic’ identity before the genocide, identities they had incorporated at least to the extent that they were to find out what the genocide meant to them, and the genocide sure taught it to them using the body as a memory as society spoke its law. As we saw before a life may be comprehended as a trajectory of different, subsequently occupied positions in a social field itself in becoming. Thus the students were in becoming before the genocide, and to some extent they were ‘becoming ethnic’ as a social world where being was categorised according to a principle of ‘ethnic’ division; a basis for inclusion and exclusion founded on the jurisprudence of ‘natural’ differences, practically imposed itself on them. Today they still know what an ‘ethnic’ identity is, it may be that they can not easily explain it to the foreigner excluded from the mastery of tacit knowledge, only a habitus constituted in and through the practices of a social field where ethnicity act as a structuring principle can fully know this, but in a sense it still functions as a principle for vision and di-vision. It is something that to the students was a self-evident and ‘natural’ part of their selves. Thus, Hutu and Tutsi remain part of their social identities, to some so with pride, to others reluctantly. These identities make part of the political mythology, a social construct produced by history, a reified and incorporated history in the form of a constitutive imaginary containing the myths-truths telling Rwandans who they are and where they come from, that hangs in the balance. The students took refuge to it when they had to force their social identities under the forms of formal reason, and they believe in it as we all believe in myths-truths. Only that Rwandan history, as a reified social product, is not easy to reconcile with a single Rwandan identity. This does not mean that in today’s social identities, the Rwandan and the ‘ethnic’, is nothing but the direct continuation of the constitutive imaginary and its identities. Reproduction is reification, following Elias we saw that we do not have a vocabulary that is fully fitted to social changes, our concepts are not enough differentiated, they are too tied to images of material substance, however there is some substantiality to social identities. The substantiality of social identities resides in social bodies and objectified history such as institutions, laws and identity cards. Bodies are not
constituted by knowledge alone but also of power, the relation between the social, reified history, and the incorporated products of history, *habitus*, is the dialectical process of social practices where the social is individualised. Then, if some elements of the reified history, constituting a certain identity as such, are removed, such as discriminatory practices and the identity card, whereby ‘ethnic strategies’ are made logic, possible and probable, in brief; if the means of production change, then identities change. Even if the name signifying a certain identity is the same (Hutu or Tutsi), the *habitus* incorporating it is not the same (the position in the aftermath of the genocide is not the same, and the social field where it situated and dated is not the same) and if we define ‘ethnicity’ as a principle for political exclusion and inclusion based on a foundation of ‘natural differences’, then I am not so sure what label we should put on those social identities. In this sense it is *a step beyond* ‘ethnicity’ (as a principle for social exclusion), and at the same time it is *a step not beyond* ‘ethnicity’ since social actors are able to identify themselves and others with it. It makes part of the visions they have of the social world, and as such a principle for producing social effects it still ‘is’ ‘ethnicity’. This is obvious if we see how they narrate the stories on ‘ethnicity’ before the genocide where the differences between the groups are obvious. It is not displayed as problematic to those who were recognised a ‘pure’ Hutu identity, and for example to Ibrahim it is turned problematic the years leading up to the genocide. Those who had an official Tutsi identity narrated it as something posing problems to them throughout their upbringings. To Jeanette (and to a lesser extent among other returnees) ‘ethnicity’ was not something salient before. Here the differences between the groups are real enough. The symbolic violence imposing different places to people and groups of people is in a social world that is more or less self evident not recognised for what it is; violence. Then in the moment of crisis, as the gale is blowing up, the symbolic violence telling people who is who is put in question, by the very attack of RPF the social world is made problematic to everybody; the symbolic violence saying that Rwanda is the nation of the ‘majority people’ only, is no longer self evident. The social field is transformed. From being a place where there was a restricted place for the Tutsis, they had the right to exist as such as long as they complied with the rules, it is changed to a social world from which the Tutsis should be excluded once and for all; the solution to the Tutsi problem is a final one. Gradually the symbolic violence goes from symbolism and turns into pure and naked force, and as such, it is recognised for what it is; violence. Here the logic of the war of the races is exposed in full daylight. Bio-power containing both the regulating power to make live and the sovereign power to kill was applied onto the population; by massacring the Tutsis the Hutus would live more, and as it was put forward in the genocidal discourse it was the final combat on life and death. It was now or never; either the Tutsis would win the war here and now and put the Hutus in servitude again and forever, or the Hutus would rise up and accomplish the True Hutu Revolution and finally erect the purified Hutu Republic. Thus a crisis where ethnicity is *in extremis*; both since symbolic violence in its extreme form passes from a state of symbolism to a state of physical violence, also *in extremis* since had the ‘Hutu utopia’ of the *génocidaires* been realised it should have meant the end of Rwandan history as a war of the races. It goes without saying that any
identity living a history where ethnicity is something in the order of a natural division between people, self evident and something that you put in question only on occasions when it makes existence problematic, is not the same thing after the storm. This storm escapes sociological intelligence, in itself in that moment it is bereft of sense and it defies rational reason. However, by inserting it to a chain of events we may analytically understand it as the war of the Rwandan races. In a way, this means demeaning the individual experiences of it. By trying to render a moment in time and space, where the meaning of the social world hangs in the balance and history is in suspense (as we have seen the students cannot themselves explain it to us, they speak in terms of bizarre, strange forces imposing themselves onto people, days that equal centuries etc.) intelligible we in a sense negate the very reality of that event. This is made acute by the sociologic practice of interview, but also in their everyday lives the students insert their experiences (‘their individual genocides’ respectively) into a meaningful whole, into history, i.e. into the symbolic universe that is called Rwanda and which by its very definition is social. This history of the war of the races has been unveiled to the students I met, if ever they were enchanted by it (like we all believe in myth-truths constituting us as such). The Rwandan constitutive imaginary as the struggle between two races has lost whatever charisma it had; the spell is broken by the fact that symbolic violence was revealed for what it was – violence. So now they are, and have always been Rwandans, but their stories on the time of before and during genocide are different, as it is the practical revelation of different trajectories to becoming Rwandan. The genocide was not the end of Rwandan history, there still exists different groups of Rwandans but among the population we have met in this work, differences along ethnic lines is by no means the same as before and during the genocide.

Being is presence. It is in the present the social reality is made, but any present is based on the presents of the past. This is true when it comes to objectified history; frontiers, the division of human beings into groups and identity cards saying to what group its carrier belongs. This is equally true when it comes to incorporated history – the respondents constantly speak in terms of ‘for the moment’; ‘for the moment a survivor means this; for the moment there is peace; for the moment this thing ethnicity doesn’t mean anything to me’. This should of course not come as a surprise to us; habitus as bodily dispositions are based on incorporated experiences. Given what the students have been through – the social field in which the positions of their trajectories are plotted – it is not strange that whichever ‘to come’ is made present by their individual habitus, any anticipated future is not likely to be imagined as a certain future. At most, it may be conceived of as a possible future. For the moment the RPF and the government of national unity enjoy credibility, also among those who if we were to believe certain literature, would be disposed to be against it (‘that should be on the other side of the front’). As well as we find on the other side of the line those who we, given a reading of Rwandan society as Tutsis vs. Hutus, would have thought to be ‘naturally’ disposed to be on the RPF (read ’Tutsi’) side. So the genocide and the civil war as critical events in their objectivity are bound to be socially constructed here and now, in the present, and in future ‘here and nows’. This implies that it is not once and for all established what kind of war was fought, who the belligerents were, and who were the enemies. It
would be naïve to believe that Rwandan society in the future would be a society without frictions, without [polemos], that it would be a society without its dominant and its dominated. The war continuous inside the social field called Rwanda, the war is part of the Rwandan social fabric, but it is not once and for all established that it is going to be, or even was, a war of the races that took place in 1994. There is nothing natural about the opposition Hutu-Tutsi and there is no natural foundation saying that any distinction has to be an ‘ethnic/racial’ one. The Rwandan [polis] may contain both groups, or neither. In as far it is a natural principle distinguishing Hutus from Tutsis it is ‘social nature’. As we have seen, this social nature had as its organising principle the [zoon politikon], social inclusion and social exclusion from political existence, albeit based on claims of ‘nature’ and ‘normality’ as stipulated in the constitutive imaginary.

It is acts of power that constitute society, indeed, power comes from below but local power is controlled by power from above and some of us exercise more power than others. We may thus expect that the political identities of tomorrow, the ‘to come’ are to be founded upon the lines of inclusion and inclusion of today, the present here and now. However, which is the symbolic universe to be realised? To this question, the study does not give an answer. In order not to simply reproduce a certain point of view, any social position should be envisaged from a practical angle as it reveals ‘its self’, its social identity in practice. This social position must also be put in relation with other social identities since it by its very definition does not exist in itself; society is relational Where my findings part from those like Prunier (1997) and Mamdani (2001) are where the advantage of grasping power in its capillary form and entering it from below steps in. Speaking to empirical individuals reveal that any discourse, scientific or not, containing the deployment of Hutu and Tutsi, as social identities that are not incorporated to an explicit problematic, is bound to be an oversimplified vulgarisation of a complex social world. Is it justified to speak of two ethnic groups in conflict, to continue a binary political analysis in the order of ‘two political groups; ‘the majority Hutu who claims democracy and the minority Tutsi who calls for justice’ (see Mamdani, 2001:274)? The answer given by this minor field study would be a ‘no’. The results of this study show that it is no longer tenable, if ever it was, to speak of Hutu and Tutsi as politically homogenous groups. Indeed there are socially structured differences in between the groups, as manifested in the staging of the selves in the stories on genocide, the sense of one’s place in the present and on what victims one puts the priority, that follows the pre-constructed lines of ‘ethnic’ division. However, these so-called ‘different groups’ differ in many ways just as much ‘within’ as ‘in between’ them. In insisting on deploying them, one runs the risk of taking the things of the logic for the logic of things social. It may be that at the epicentre of power of Rwanda today one finds mainly Tutsis but that does not by any mean say that all who previously were identified as Tutsis are enjoying power today, neither did all Tutsis in the colonial days or the pre-colonial days. Empirical Tutsis in general do not have a share of power, and empirical Hutus in general did not have a share of power during the ‘Hutu republics’. The closest one comes to a clear-cut distinction within the sample population is in between those who were in Rwanda and those who were not in Rwanda during the
genocide. The more your trajectory has passed through the Rwandan field the more your personal anticipated future as probability is perceived as depending on that of Rwanda as a whole. If you as an individual to a larger extent have been generated as such a personality within the Rwandan social field it is less likely that you will see the future as open and full of endless possibilities. Simply put, the more your body is marked by the events the more you feel affected by the ‘faith’ of Rwanda and the less reasons you have to expect a bright future. This does not imply that those who are returnees in the population consider themselves ‘less’ Rwandan, or that they should be ‘less’ Rwandan. Neither does it imply that they should be more Rwandan since they reveal less ethnic selves in the narration of life stories. It is just another set of stories of becoming Rwandan.

As stated earlier it is an adequate definition of the social positions that enables the most accurate prediction of practices and representations. One important feature of the stories is how the respondents when trying to tell a meaningful story link their own personal experiences of genocide from what they know now, from the collective consciousness of today. Today’s common sense tells them what kind of experiences they have had and who they ‘are’. When observing the objectification of objectification this means above all to observe the field of cultural and ideological production where the production of legitimate taxonomies; the debate over the nature of social groups, what these groups are in the common sense, take place. In this struggle, politicians and social scientists are far from disinterested. This relation coincides in the final chapter of Mamdani’s (2001) work where he states that the present Rwandan government might have to let go of power, a power he names ‘Tutsi power’, and face that the key strategy for survival might not be the monopoly of power. Rather giving it up would be the prerequisite of reconciliation and cohabitation “this will not happen as long as the minority monopolizes power” (Mamdani, 2001:281). Simultaneously he admits that Hutu and Tutsi as majority and minority considered are historical and political artefacts. However, the Government of National Unity is not articulated as ‘Tutsi power’, it claims to represent the general Rwandan interest. This we can not take at face value. Albeit for one thing, ethnic identity as something codified and formal is removed from practices, something which according to me disqualifies the notion ‘Tutsi power’, at least until further research validates or falsifies such a statement. Nevertheless, national interests, and universal interests are never disinterested, they are always the interest of someone; the general will is articulated as such from a particular position in society. There is no natural principle saying that power in Rwanda is either ‘Hutu power’ or ‘Tutsi power’. Herein lies the fundamental challenge for the evolution of the Rwandan political field, as well as for the social sciences; how to step beyond ethnicity? How does power in the aftermath of the genocide avoid being exercised as ‘Tutsi power’? How do social sciences study power in Rwanda, will they continue to succumb to the fetishism of ethnicity or will they be able to break out of the cycle of starting with the end products of power and get to the kernel of it?

This is the limit of this study, it ends here. It only maps out a number of Rwandan students as virtual groups, different groups of practical Rwandan identities. Judging from the results of this study, they are different but not antagonistic when politics are considered from below. We must not forget that
the sense of one’s place is inclusive to the social world. What we observe is the tension of rupture and recuperation, as political mythology and social identities are re-inscribed into a new social order. ‘Ethnicity’ remains part of the social topology, but among the students I met it does not engender passionate ‘ethnic’ selves.

8.3 Further Research

The validity of the findings of this study is yet to be established, it has only pointed to that within a limited population, a handful of Rwandan students, ‘ethnicity’ has in the present not much bearing. It is an explorative study and as such, it may serve as a heuristic guideline for further research.

However, before we look at some further research concerning Rwanda let us ponder the political communities we imagine as ours. By looking at a society as the Rwandan one may study a racism and genocidal structures at their extreme. I have in this work argued that social sciences should foremost be social sciences and that we should not let geographical boundaries turn into epistemological boundaries. Genocide is the extreme where social symbolic violence ends as such – it is clearly beyond the sphere of pure symbolism and since it is physical violence it is recognised for what it is; violence. As we have seen the social space of possibles, is also the social space of impossibles. During the genocide it was impossible not to conduct ‘ethnic strategies’. Up until then this was not something everybody thought about, it was a matter of concern to those for whom it rendered everyday life (existence) difficult and problematic. Thus Rwanda is a good example, ‘a good case’; does it become more clear than so? This is an important reminder for other societies, such as the one we imagine as ours, who are the persons and which are the groups to which their more or less official identity is problematic as it is making everyday life difficult? This gives us reason to believe that a notion of ‘ethnic strategies’ is a fruitful approach also in other societies, if one can discern ethnic strategies, ethnic practices one may speak of ethnic habitus. That is, at least in certain sub-fields the social agents may produce social effects through ‘ethnic strategies’. What would these be in a society as Sweden? On a European level? In approaching this one should not be enchanted by the products that we face here and now. If we are to understand how we have become what we are, we have to make a history of the present political mythology and social identities. In making this history of the present intelligible we can not turn ‘Swedishness’, ‘Europeanness’, or ‘Whiteness’ in to absent centres.

Let us return to Rwanda. One obvious end to start would be to try to establish what kind of event the genocide was. As Claudine Vidal has pointed out to date social sciences has not yet given a satisfying answer to the ‘how question’ of the killing. This is an answer that is needed if we are to understand ‘why’ the genocide took place; we have to deduce the strategies underlying what was observed as passionate killing. Here a life story approach has a great deal to contribute. As suggested by this work, the question of to be or not to be a genocidal killer is the sociological question of becoming a genocidal killer. Life, considered as a trajectory of subsequently occupied positions by the ‘same’,
'identical’ personality allows us to understand that being a genocidal killer or not is not any intrinsic quality with certain human beings. The bodily dispositions, habitus, are produced in and through social practices, but the social field is in constant flux. If the social field change, then strategies and the social effects produced by the unifying principle directing the strategies of the agent, which we perceive as an identical individual, also change. If the social world with its *sui generis* character imposes itself upon as a power directing us to kill, we may all become executioners. This by no means imply that we all potentially are *willing* executioners, but the result on the collective level of things social may be genocide. By collecting life stories from genocide killers one might discern different groups of ’killer stories’ from which one, on the paper, may be able to classify the killers and then establish different strategies that made a given empirical individuality become a genocidal killer. We may also through the collection of the life stories told by persons who statistically, *a priori* could have been expected to have become killers (i.e. had an official identity as ’Hutu’, were in a certain age etc.), but in fact never became one, and perhaps establish what made the salient difference between those who killed and those who did not.

Given the limits concerning the population, those who speak in this work, there is an obvious need to also sociologically observe the reproduction of political mythology and social identity elsewhere in Rwanda. In order to map out the Rwandan social topology one cannot rely on elites, or elites to be. One has also to get the standpoint from the hills, the villages (in the villagisation programme) *etc*. What about women in Rwanda? Is it even possible to speak in terms of ‘Rwandan women’? Why does this study not contain any stories that laid out an explicit female Hutu experience? There are other silenced groups that emerge from the study. Some standpoints that are in need to be explicitly taken into consideration are those of Batwa, the group is more or less absent from any literature, there are many things that suggest that they are also marginalised in the ’real’ Rwanda. They seem to be the only group that from within Rwanda speaks their rights in ’ethnic’ terms; which of course may be a sign of that they as group face problems. The margins are no place from where to tell a story. Many students brought the problem up when they were given the parole. “*When the Europeans and other foreigners come to Rwanda why do they stay in the intellectual milieus? Why don’t they go and see the peasants? Why don’t they take interest in the countryside where the majority of people live?”* (Benoit). A much clearer invitation, or perhaps one should say challenge, one does not get.
Appendices

Appendix I: Essay Instructions, Kigali Institute of Education

Could you please write an essay entitled:
"Being Rwandan – My childhood / adolescence, my studies, and my future."
(i.e. “Kuba Umunyarwanda” in the sense “Iyewe ndi Umunyarwanda”)
S’il vous plaît, pourriez-vous écrire une dissertation intitulée:
«Être rwandais(e) – Mon enfance / adolescence, mes études, et ma future»
(C’est à dire; «Kuba Umunyarwanda » au sens «Iyewe ndi Umunyarwanda »).
Could you please also state the following: / S’il vous plaît, pourriez-vous aussi déclarer l’information suivante:

(Please, do feel free to use the other side of the paper if you do not find enough space on this side.)
(S’il vous plaît, veuillez utiliser le verso si vous ne trouvez pas cette page suffisante)

1. Name / Nom
2. Age
3. Line of studies / Filière d’études
4. Since when you are attending higher education. / Dépuis quand faites-vous des études supérieures?
5. If you have you been studying elsewhere but in Rwanda. / Si vous avez fait des études ailleurs qu’au Rwanda.
6. If you have held any employment. / Si vous avez eu un emploi.
7. If you hold any employment right now. / Si vous avez un emploi en ce moment.
8. How you find the means to support your studies. / Comment vous trouvez les moyens de soutenir vos études.
9. Whether, or not, you were in Rwanda during the Genocide. / Si vous étiez, ou non, au Rwanda pendant le génocide.
10. Ethnic belonging. / L’appartenance ethnique.
11. Where you were born. / Lieu de naissance.
12. The profession of your parents. / La profession de vos parents

Murakoze! for giving me this help, / pour votre aimable coopération,

Stefan ANDERSSON
Appendix II: Essay Instructions, National University of Rwanda

Please, write a dissertation, which you may entitle as you please, consisting of two parts.

A Why the genocide took place in Rwanda

B How Rwanda is to be reconciled

Please, do also reply the following questions (please, do feel free to use the verso in case you need to develop your reply):

1. What is your name?
2. What is your age?
3. Since when do you attend higher education?
4. What studies do you pursue?
5. Have you studied elsewhere than Rwanda?
6. How do you find the means to support your studies?
7. Have you held any employment? If yes, what kind of work?
8. Are you currently working?
9. Where were you born?
10. What does this mean in terms of town-countryside?
11. If you were in Rwanda during the genocide, where were you?
12. If you were not in Rwanda, where were you?
13. What is your “ethnic belonging”? [Quelle est votre appartenance en termes « d’ethnie » ?]
14. How do you find the question above (no. 13)
15. Where were your parents born?
16. What is the profession of your parents?
17. Which is your mother tongue?
18. Which is your second language?
19. Which languages do you master?

Murakoze for giving me this help, Stefan ANDERSSON, LUND University, Sweden.
Appendix III: Interview Support

(Name, gender)
What is your line of studies?
For how long have you been studying?
Have you been studying outside Rwanda?
Have you held any employment?
(Do you hold any employment right now)
How do you find the means to finance your studies?
Were you born in Rwanda?
Where (in Rwanda) were you born?
What do your parents do for a living?

What does it mean to be Rwandan?
To you personally?
To people in general?
According to you, has the meaning of 'being Rwandan' changed with time?
(In what ways has it changed?)
Would you say that 'History' is important?
(One can learn from it)
(It can be used in a dangerous way)
If explained to a foreigner, like myself, what are Hutu, Tutsi and Twa?
(Amoko?)
What is the meaning of these terms to you, in your daily life?
(Friends?)
How does one know one’s belonging? (That is, how do one know to which group one belongs?)

Were you in Rwanda during Genocide?
(Do you mind talking about it? ⇒)
(Have these events changed the relations between you and any particular persons?)
What could, and should, have been done in order to avoid the tragedy that hit the people of Rwanda in 1994?
Who is to blame for what happened?
Does the term 'Double Genocide' mean anything to you? (That is, there are people who say that there was not just the Genocide committed by the former regime, but that RPF has also carried out genocidal acts).
What do you think about the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha?
(Concrete cases [like Barayagwiza])

What do you think about the justice process here in Rwanda?
(ex: Gacaca)

What about the two parallel justice processes?

Would you say that there is peace in Rwanda today?
Do you consider Rwanda a democracy?
Are there any dangers involved with a democratic process in Rwanda?
How do you look upon the future for this country?
How do you look upon your own future?
Would you like to find work in Rwanda or will you look for work elsewhere?
Are there any questions I should have posed?
Are there any questions I should not have posed?
Is there anything else you would like to add?
Appendix IV: Map of Rwanda

General Map of Rwanda, UN Cartographic Section (Relief Web, MapCentre, Http://www.reliefweb/w/map/nsf/home),
Appendix V: Administrative Map of Rwanda (Prefectures)

Map scale: 1 cm = 20 km
Source: NCGIA SB UNEP-GRID Sioux Falls

Administrative Map, FAO (Relief Web MapCentre, Http://www.reliefweb/w/map/nsf/home)
Appendix VI : Propaganda Drawings

These are but a few examples from the propaganda that was diffused in some written press. It contains the major themes: sex and the deviousness of Tutsi women; the references to the past (both in form of the revolution personified by the picture of Kayibanda as well as ‘Tutsi domination’). Finally, there are references to the future: either as prophecies of a Tutsi genocide of the Hutus (both as ‘the case of Burundi shows’ as well as ‘what FPR is really about’ - the restoration of Tutsi power); and finally a reference to a future utopia as a final solution to the Tutsi problem is presented. All pictures are from Chrétien et al. (1995).

"God's Race/Ethnie the Tutsis!
And what if we brought back the Hutu
Revolution to defeat the Tutsi cockroaches?"
(Kangura, cover December, 1993).
Kagame (or who could be Fred Rwigyema): "We the proud inyenzi-nkotanyi are coming back! We are coming back by force to live with those who we have destroyed" (Kangura, July 1993).

The October Putsch 1993 in Burundi as an illustration of the Tutsi meanness and what awaits inside Rwanda. (Kangura, February 1994).
Appendix VII: Villagisation

From the pictures below one can see the difference between the traditional way of living and constructing the personal homestead (urugo; the dwelling-house - inzu - and some surrounding buildings for storage etc.) and a ‘village’ – imidugugu – from the villagisation programme. In the former one has in the immediate surrounding the banana plantation (on the picture below there are bananas growing on the summit of the hill behind the urugo. There are also two other ingo in the picture; there is an urugo behind the bananas growing in the middle of the picture and there is a smaller urugo on the left hand surrounded by a smaller banana grove. In the northern parts of Rwanda it would probably be coffee or tea plantations.
Here we see how some housing is now grouped together according to the villagisation programme. Flying in over Rwanda one sees them stretching like pearls on a row where the corrugated steel roofs tinkle in the sunshine. Whereas a traditional urugo tends to be placed at some distance from the roads and only being accessible by a footpath, an imidugudu is often located along the roads. Worth noting is the total absence of banana groves (this village is situated in the south-central parts of Rwanda where one could expect to find bananas planted), the area surrounding the dwelling houses is suitable only for a minor vegetable garden. The leguminous plants are however traditionally planted below the banana trees and seem to coexist with these in a symbiosis, thereby maximising the limited cultivable area.
Appendix VIII: Collective Memory

In Rwanda of today sites commemorating the genocide of 1994 make part of the social landscape. All historic action makes two states of history (the social) present: history in an objectified form (such as the sign/site below); and incorporated history that has become *habitus*. Thus the genocide as an objective event is reactivated through the memorial sites.

From April 11 to May 1 the most devastating massacres were carried out, slaying hundreds or even thousands (as at the Ntarama Church) in one or two days. People took refuge in the Ntarama church, the prefecture of *Kigali Rurale*, expecting to find safety there. It was attacked by army and militia armed with rocket launchers and grenades. The place has to a large extent been kept as it was left after the massacre, the walls of the church buildings are perforated by holes and inside the church lie bibles, psalm books, clothes and bones in the same disorder as it was left in April 1994. The Church compound has been cleaned and the skulls are on display in an annex covered by plastic sheeting. The skulls are displayed in an age order, ranging from an infant to an old woman.

The place is a Rwandan symbolic micro-cosmos; just before the church there is today a newly constructed *imidugudu*. 
Appendix IX: Acronyms and Glossary

Acronyms

AMASASU  The acronym virtually says nothing, but in Kinyarwanda it says ‘bullets’, ‘ammunition’ (sing. isasa), name of military group.

APR/RPA  Armée Patriotique Rwandaise/Rwandan Patriotic Army

CDR  Coalition pour la Défense de la République. Extremist party, first in coalition with the MRND, later in opposition since it found Habyarimana and the MRND too soft.

DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo

ETO  Ecole Téchnique Officielle

FAR  Force Armée Rwandaise

FDC  Forces Démocratiques pour le Changement. The coalition of parties that were in opposition to Habyarimana and in favour of the implementation of the Arusha accords

RPA  Rwandan/Rwandese Patriotic Army (Fr. Armée Patriotique Rwandaise). Today the Rwandan armed forces, the armed branch of FPR.

RPF  Rwandan/Rwandese Patriotic Front (Fr. FPR, Front Patriotique Rwandaise). The political, in its narrow sense, branch of the guerrilla that launched the war against the Habyarimana regime.

ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (in Arusha, Tanzania) (Fr. TPIR, Tribunal Pénale Internationale pour le Rwanda)

IDP  Internally Displaced People/Persons

KIE  Kigali Institute of Education (Fr. ISP, Institut Supérieur Pédagogique)

MDR  Mouvement Démocratique Républicain. Both the name of the party of the First Republic (lead by Kayibanda) and revived as an opposition party to the Habyarimana regime during multypartism. A coalition partner to the FPR since the July 1994 government.

MRND  Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (With the multypartism renamed MRNDD, Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie). The Habyarimana regime single party.

MSM  Mouvement Social Muhutu, the predecessor of the MDR.

NGO  Non-governmental organisation

NRA  National Resistance Army (the Ugandan armed forces)
Glossary

First some introductory notes. In Kinyarwanda the number of the noun is determined by the prefix. For living creatures one uses ba-/aba- in plural and in singularis mu/umu. For example, umunyeshuri (student) and abanyeshuri (students). One may come across both umunyarwanda and munya randa (Rwandan, Rwandans) and umwami and mwami, king (pl. abami/bami). In older ‘traveller notes’ the Kiswahili prefix wa- is used; thus instead of the proper abatutsi/batutsi one comes across watutsi/watussi. (As we have seen the variations [badusi etc.] are too numerous to bring up here). Since my knowledge in Kinyarwanda is more or less non-existent I will not enter into details, especially when it comes to the pronunciation. However, the sounds of L and R are not very distinguished, therefor one encounters different spellings of for example Habyarimana/Habyalimana, ubuleetwa/abureetwa etc.

Abahutu (sing. [u]muhutu) Huts
Abami (sing. [u]mwami) Kings
Abanyiginya ‘Persons from the nyiginya ‘clan’’
Abasungu (sing. umusungu) Whites
Abatutsi (sing. [u]mututsi) Tutsis
Abatwa (sing. [u]mutwa) Twas
Abeega People of the Eega ‘clan’
Abiiru (sing. umwiiru) Guardians of the ‘esoteric code’
Akazu ‘The little house’, in Kera Rwanda this was the name for the inner circle of the royal house. In the late 1980’s it was used as a signifier for the inner core of the Habyarimana regime, connoting nepotism and power abuse. Today some are using it for the core of FPR.
Bahutu see abahutu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning/Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bakiga</td>
<td>‘Northerners’ (people from the big mountains [ki, signifying vast, big as in Kigali]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bami</td>
<td>see abami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyanduga</td>
<td>‘Southerners’ (People from Nduga, the land around Lake Muhazi in Southeastern Rwanda of today)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyarwanda</td>
<td>Rwandans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batuti</td>
<td>see abatutsi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biiru</td>
<td>See abiiuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gacaca</td>
<td>‘Community/village court’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gucupira</td>
<td>Declassify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hima</td>
<td>Group that is ‘traditionally’ nomad-pastoralists (greater in Uganda than in Rwanda).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibuka</td>
<td>Survivor organisation (means ‘Remember’, ‘souviens-toi’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibyitso (pl. icyitso)</td>
<td>Accomplice (of the RPF, came to denote all Tutsis during the genocide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imana</td>
<td>Deity, or God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imidugudu</td>
<td>‘Villages’ in the villagisation programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impuzamugambi</td>
<td>‘Those with a single purpose’, the militia of CDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interahamwe</td>
<td>‘Les solidaires’, or ‘those who work together’, the militia of MRND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inyenzi</td>
<td>‘Cockroaches’, spiteful term for the guerrilla of the 1960’s, later used for the RPF/RPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkotanyi</td>
<td>Name of 19th century military formation, used to denote the FPR (or rather the RPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inzu (pl. Amazu)</td>
<td>1. Dwelling-house. 2. Minor lineage or branch of a lineage (see also below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishyanga (pl. Amashyanga)</td>
<td>‘Sub-clan’ (see also below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iyewe ndi Umunyarwanda</td>
<td>‘I am Rwandan’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanguka</td>
<td>‘wake up’ (the name of a Rwandan weekly magazine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangura</td>
<td>‘wake it up’ (the name of a Rwandan weekly magazine, ‘hate media’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kera</td>
<td>‘Formerly’ or ‘in the past’, zamani in Kiswahili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiga</td>
<td>The big mountains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinyamateka</td>
<td>The catholic monthly magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuba Umunyarwanda</td>
<td>Being Rwandan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwihutura</td>
<td>‘Ennoblement’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masu</td>
<td>A nail studded club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwami</td>
<td>King</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nduga</td>
<td>The Rwandan ‘heartland’, the land around Lake Muhazi in South-eastern Rwanda of today</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ntore ‘Chosen’, someone chosen could be awarded a hill by the king, after the introduction of Christianity it was used for the catechumens.

Nyabingi A ‘spirit’ that could not be destroyed since it simply moved to another body if its carrier was killed, a denominator for Northern resistance against central rule.

Ubuhake ‘Cattle clientship’

Ubuletwa/Ubureetwa ‘Traditional’ forced labour (Fr. corvée)

Ubutaka Land, soil

UBWOKO (pl. Amoko) Historically ‘Clan’, since colonialism ‘ethnic group’ (Fr. ethnie)

Ubwoko bwawe ni ubuhe? ‘What is your ethnic group?’

Umuganda Communal labour

Umuheto ‘Bow’, as in umuheto group (approx. ‘social army’)

Umuryango ‘Major lineage’ (see below)

(pl. Imiryango)

Umusungu A White person

(pl. abasungu)

Umuyaga Storm

Urugo (pl. Ingo) 1. ‘Traditional’ homestead 2. Family living in this homestead, (see also below)

Uwacitse ku icumu ‘He is a survivor’

Zamani Ancient times in Kiswahili (see kera)

A Note on Rwandan Kinship

The elementary component in Rwandan kinship is urugo (pl. ingo) which has several meanings. Amongst other things, it connotes the ‘traditional’ homestead (yard and buildings) as well as the family living in this homestead. Today it mainly means family (personal information; Gasarabwe, 1992:127). Nahimana (1993:37-40) defines urugo as a group consisting of mother, father and not yet married children inhabiting the urugo. It should not however be simply translated into nuclear family since Rwandans ‘traditionally’ were polygamous (and according to my observations, this still seems to be the case among Muslims). The husband then did not have an urugo of his own but belonged to the urugo where he for the moment was residing. Urugo further connotes the spatial encounter of two lineages (de Lame, 1996:93).

The next step is inzu (pl. amazu) which according to Nahimana (1993:42-43) may be translated by “minor lineage” and by Newbury (1988: 266n2) it is referred to as a ‘branch of a lineage’. Historically the inzu was the mediating instance between the individual and political authorities (at least this is valid for ‘Central Rwanda’). In for example Kinyaga, this level of social organisation was held by the umuryango [see below]). The concrete signification is a dwelling house, whether or not it is
question of a house made of mud or brick or a cone-shaped hut with a thatched roof. The ‘traditional’ hut supposedly has a human shape (it looks out, has a forehead that protects the eye, one enters through a big mouth etc.) and is the womb from which the lineage descends. Inzu also connotes related families (ingo) that since x number of generations stems from the same ancestor and it may be described as a small and flexible clan where the cohesion has been guaranteed by geographical closeness.\textsuperscript{139} The following male generations stayed on the land of its ancestors and to leave the inzu meant founding a new (Gasarabwe, 1992:171 \textit{et al} 177; Nahimana, 1993:43-48).

A third, level of social organisation is umuryango (pl. imiryango); ‘major lineage’. In Kinyarwanda the term does not pose any problems, it simply denotes a gathering of amazu in which the members consider themselves to stem from the same, known eponymous ancestor (Nahimana, 1993:50).

When it comes to ubwoko (pl. amoko) it is one of the most mentioned social components of the Rwandan topology. ‘All’ authors I have come across translate ubwoko with clan. It consists of a cluster of imiryango that do not necessarily know of one another and claim to descend from “a common eponymous ancestor. This ancestor is often even fictive or mythical.” (Cf. Nahimana, 1993:50). Historically the clan seems to have been a unit loosely connected without any clear leader or any codified rules for the dealing of internal relations, although some clans had symbolic or ritual tasks assigned to them. Apart from this there seems to have no functions assigned to the amoko other than as a social identification. When someone travelled and arrived in a remote region he would be received by people from his own clan, and if he arrived somewhere where there was none of his clan he would be directed to the ones closest around to be found .

\textsuperscript{139} Gasarabwe states two-three generations and Nahimana states that variations are too large to make any exact statements.
Appendix X: In the Field

In Kigali

I began my fieldwork at the Kigali Institute of Education, KIE (Fr. Institut Supérieur Pédagogique, ISP), where I conducted the first month of field research. The students all study to become Secondary School teachers within different domains. Via my gatekeeper I was introduced to the vice-rector who in turn got me in contact with the student council via the two deans. I was hence parachuted into the student community top-down. After having introduced myself and my plans to do interviews as well as to have students writing essays to the student council, they spread the word of my request. A list to sign for those who ‘wanted give ideas to the white student’ circulated on the campus. Relatively quickly they had got me twenty-something students who on a Friday afternoon were willing to write a minor essay (see appendix I and II). At the essay session I also booked the first interviews. On this first formal meeting with the students it was obvious that many felt an obligation to assist the essay session (they wanted to get it done as quickly as possible, and could not wait to get out of the classroom). This was probably due to the fact that the information of me wanting to get in contact with the students was spread via the student body, and thus had a semi-official character in the eyes of the students (‘something they had to do’). Nevertheless, I got quite a group who was keen on doing interviews. As it turned out some did it because they were extremely curious about me and my presence, and others since they found it a golden opportunity to speak out. As the word spread, I presume, that the interview situation was ‘harmless’, curiosity and the want/need for telling their stories got overhand on scepticism. I thus managed to get more interviews as the days got by. The students also, presumably, got used to my presence at the campus as they would see me hang out with fellow students, work in the library and eat at the canteen; in short, doing the same thing as any other student at the campus.

As the KIE is located a bit outside central Kigali, at the Kimironko Hill, combined with the fact that I did not find accommodation on the campus, it is mainly the interviews and the essays that constitute my data. It is thus not to any larger extent question of any participant observation. Most of the time I stayed home during the morning preparing the interviews based on the essays done by the person(s) to be interviewed. I would then arrive at the campus around lunchtime and spend the afternoon reading in the library (for obvious reasons I did not want to treat my material in front of the respondents). Sometimes I would only arrive in the late afternoon in time to conduct the interviews. The interviewing was to take place in the afternoon after the days classes had finished or during weekends. This somewhat limited space in time only enabled me to conduct one or two interviews a day, more often the former, and the latter on weekends exclusively. At first sight my interview schedule seemed quite frustrating to me (two months is quite some time to be away from loved ones, but it is an awfully short period of time for undertaking field research). But, as the interviewing procedure took off, I realised that this was what I could handle. The interviews took in the range of 30 minutes and 2 hours.
and 30 minutes, depending on how much the respondent would tell me. A quite limited time indeed, but very fatiguing since all the interviews were conducted in a (common) foreign language, and thus they demanded even more concentration than a ‘regular’ interview. After the interviews, I tried to spend time with the interviewees, thus continuing the moment of data collecting. This is not as cynical as it may seem. Of course my interest in spending time was far from disinterested, but I truly enjoyed the company of most of the students I met, and I only found it fare to give them some opportunity to pose me questions.

In Butare

After Kigali I spent a couple of weeks in Butare, which is the ‘classic’ university town of Rwanda, at l’Université Nationale du Rwanda. Here I opted for the strategy of going via higher connections, and I was thus again introduced top-down to one of the student bodies. Since it took my gatekeeper within the student community some time (at least from my perspective) to introduce me to other students I felt somewhat stressed. After some days waiting, I only had another two weeks in Butare before the end of the semester. ‘Finally’ I was introduced to a group of students. The first get-together took place in a cabaret (a place where you gather for some beers and snacks). The relaxed introduction contributed to an easy relationship with the students. My first ‘Butare-sample’ consisted solely of English speaking Rwandans that were born in Uganda or Kenya. Through this group I got in contact with the president of Association des Etudiants et Elèves Rescapés du Génocide (A.E.R.G.), and during my last days in Butare I managed to get a few essays from ‘survivor’ students. I do not have any interviews from this sub-sample that allow comparison (however I do have interviews with survivors in Kigali, who were not [yet] organised as such). As Butare is a much smaller town (in every sense) than Kigali, it was much easier to meet the students, on and outside the campus. Although I did not live on the campus, it did not take me more than 15 minutes to walk there and some of the students could also drop by. This gave way to richer and more abundant field notes.
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