Does Candidate Status Matter?

“Unpacking the Relationship Between Europeanization and Conditionality in Turkey and Serbia”

Digdem Soyaltun
Abstract

Europeanization as a crucial instrument for democratization process in target countries requires gradual compliance with EU membership conditions where conditional positive incentives (ultimately EU membership) in return are offered as rewards to acceding countries. Provoked by conflicts at domestic level, the current setbacks in Europeanization processes of several countries (here is Turkey and Serbia), however, put a query on the effectiveness of conditionality strategy. This thesis seeks to answer a highly related question to this debate: Does candidate status matters? And to what extent it matters?

Unpacking the relationship between Europeanization and conditionality, I argue that it is less the candidate/membership status *per se* that matters but rather the unfavourable domestic factors, high costs of compliance, existence of domestic veto players and, the failure of the countries to include the civil society actors in the transformation process, that account for the limited impact of transformative power of EU and for low level of compliance in Turkey and Serbia. The empirical analysis of two cases reveals that credible accession conditionality is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of EU success in promoting reform process. In order to be effective it has to be accompanied by favourable domestic conditions. As a conclusion, this thesis points out that European actors must take into account of the cultural filters of target countries and loopholes in the Europeanization process and recognize that “*one size does not fit all*” but rather domestic factors matter.

*Key words*: Europeanization, transformation, conditionality, Turkey, Serbia.

Words: 20,097
....to make political writing into an art.

G.Orwell
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<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party</td>
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<td>APD</td>
<td>Accession Partnership Document</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
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<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<td>DEP</td>
<td>Democracy Party</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Democratic Opposition of Serbia</td>
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<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party</td>
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<td>Democratic Party of Serbia</td>
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<td>DTP</td>
<td>Democratic Society Party</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Money Fund</td>
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<td>MDSD</td>
<td>Most Different Systems Design</td>
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<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Action Party</td>
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<td>MSSD</td>
<td>Most Similar Systems Design</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non -govermental Organization</td>
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<td>NPAA</td>
<td>National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Parti Karkerani Kurdistan (Kurdish Worker Party)</td>
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<td>RTUK</td>
<td>High Audio Visual Board</td>
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<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Process</td>
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<td>SJR</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia</td>
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<td>SRS</td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAF</td>
<td>Turkish Armed Forces</td>
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<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<td>TUSIAD</td>
<td>Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmens’ Associations</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>YOK</td>
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Map of EU

Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries*

*Taken from www.ec.europa.eu
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1 Introduction

At the Helsinki European Council Summit in December 1999, Turkey was given formal status of candidate country. This put country’s general project of Westernization into a different and more concrete context and resulted in an intensification of reform process in the country. (Eralp, 2006:52). Following the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, Serbia was granted potential candidate country status (proto-candidate) for EU accession which triggered a comprehensive reform process in the country. I will label these EU-guided reform processes as Europeanization. As a relatively new and exiting way of looking at domestic change, Europeanization is generally used with regard to ‘the domestic impact of the EU’ (Sedelmeier 2006: 4) and thus constitutes a crucial concept for analyzing the Union's transformative power where conditionality is very much at the centre.

However, as it has become obvious with the current backsets in Europeanization process in both countries, the EU leverage has been ineffective alone to ensure sustainable compliance when European values, norms and rules meet with political contestation and resistance in the national arena. Within this perspective favourable domestic factors, pro-reformist change agents and indirect diffusion mechanisms such as socialization have gained immense importance to achieve sustainable compliancy process and internalization of norms. Addressing the apparent role of cultural filters of the countries which mitigate the transformative impact of European norm diffusion and political learning in the country, this thesis argues that case of Turkey and Serbia can be considered as a litmus test for the success of transformative power of conditionality and role of external incentives in achieving eventual Europeanization.

1.1 Research Question and Purpose

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the ‘limits of conditionality’ with a particular emphasis on Europeanization process in Turkey and Serbia where the accession negotiations with the former were suspended in 8 chapters of acquis in 2006 and the association negotiations with the latter has fallen into abeyance between May 2006 and June 2007 due to conflicts at national level. While EU conditionality can have important catalytic role in prompting reforms, a sustainable reform process also requires certain domestic conditions to prevail.
By comparing Turkey as a negotiating candidate country and Serbia as a part of Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) which is a special version of the EU’s enlargement policy, the thesis thereby asks if candidate status matters – and to what extent it matters. It argues that the comparison between the two group of countries within different institutional framework of EU (countries with/without a candidate status), is not only relevant for the research question and critical for the hypotheses being tested; but also is a considerably underdeveloped research area in the current literature which made this question a ripe for analysis.

1.1.1 Hypothesis and Main Argument

Starting from a Europeanization perspective and taking a middle-ground between rationalist and sociological (constructivist) institutionalism, the thesis focuses on the hypothesis that it is less the candidate status per se that matters but rather the unfavourable domestic factors, high costs of compliance, existence of robust veto players and the failure of the countries to include the civil society actors in their transformation process that account for the limited impact of transformative power of EU through conditionality and for low level of compliance. In particular when the political costs of compliance are high for target governments, that is when fulfilling EU conditions becomes a challenge for traditional notions of the regime, for the security and integrity of the state, and/or the interests of government, it becomes difficult for government and political elites too attach to ultimate goal of EU membership and to resist against veto players who have a vested interest in protecting the status quo.

Even credible membership/candidacy incentives therefore prove to be ineffective where favourable domestic factors and pro-reformist change agents can promote further reforms. Considering the current situation, Brussels should face the weak facades of its enlargement strategy based conditionality. This puts eventual success of Europeanization in question and reveals the limits of it as a top-down and elite-driven project (Öniş, 2009a:22).

1.1.2 Sub-questions and Contribution

The question if candidate status matters is at the same time closely related to the second part of the question – namely to what extent it matters. It is impossible to evaluate the impact of EU candidate status if we cannot explain the facilitating and constraining domestic factors which have impact on both. Therefore, some sub-questions have to be considered:
The second part of the question mainly is related to impact of domestic factors on the EU candidate status. Internal characteristics have brought about different dynamics in the Europeanization process which still have to be fully researched. So far they have usually been cited in the Europeanization literature as important variables, but they are still mostly treated as ‘a black box’ or have only been partially revealed (Fink-Hafner, 2008:167). By focusing on endogenous factors in this thesis I seek to contribute to closing the mentioned gap in research.

Another contribution of this thesis to the literature is to analyze the impact and implementation of the EU’s transformative power in relation to domestic factors in a comparative case study of Turkey and Serbia where the former is a negotiating candidate country and the latter is a part of SAP. While there is a general necessity to widen research on SAP-Europeanization, it can be also observed that the ‘Europeanization and enlargement’ literature has so far mainly focused on CEE accession (cf. Sedelmeier 2006: 6). It follows from this that there is an urgent need to analyze in more detail democratization and Europeanization processes in SAP countries and more recent candidate countries such as Turkey that have different institutional ties with of EU.

1.2 Research Design, Case Selection and Methods

1.2.1 Research Design and Approach

The research design is a ‘comparative case study’ which is equipped with a strong theoretical background and an extensive empirical analysis. This type of comparison has also been referred to as ‘case-oriented’ since country is unit of analysis and the aim is to test hypotheses for differences or similarities between countries in order to generate a deeper understanding of a topic (Landman, 2008:28). By comparing two cases that are not share similar features but have a common political outcome (Most Different Systems Design –MDSD) allows researcher to distill out the common elements from diverse countries that have...
greater explanatory power for outcome. This system is based on Mill’s method of agreement which seeks to identify those features that are same among different countries in an effort to account for a particular outcome (ibid:70)

Method of agreement and difference

Based on J.S Mill’ (1843) method of agreement and difference, the method of comparing few countries can be divided into two types of system design: Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). MSSD seeks to identify the features that are different among similar countries and which account for the different political outcome, while MDSD compares countries that are not share similar features but have a common political outcome (Landman 2008:28).

Case study method, as an empirical inquiry, provides a much more rich and accurate description and explanation of the phenomenon in question, and thus also contributes to theory-testing in the social sciences. In general the thesis is designed as a theory-testing case study to assess the conditions of effective incentives and learning, and to determine which of them are necessary and/or sufficient for compliance and political change or in other words Europeanization in target countries-Turkey and Serbia. The main difficulty in theory testing method is that tests are partly dependent on the causal assumptions of theories themselves. That is, the cases are chosen biased that they support and fit the theory. However since the set of variables strong enough to predict the outcome of cases (high probability) and they are more important in accounting the outcome; thus the theory will not be forced into predictions beyond its scope (Landman, 2008:37; Evera, 1997:34).

This research employs a traditional linear approach which follows a hypothetico-deductive strategy. This forms a linear process where specific hypotheses are derived from existing theory, with data then collected and tested in relation to those hypotheses (Babbie et al 2007: 9, Flick 2006: 98-102) Focusing on domestic factors as the intervening variables in explaining the (non-) compliance with demands of EU I will derive hypotheses from external incentives and social learning models.

Dependent-Independent Variables

The thesis tests hypotheses -structured as independent variables- of the social learning model and the external incentives model (size and credibility of rewards and legitimacy, domestic adoption costs, veto players, identification, domestic resonance) to examine the conditions under which political elites in Turkey and Serbia have complied, or partially complied or rejected to comply with the political demands of EU- dependent variable-. 
The independent variables are subdivided into external and domestic conditions and organized as a simple model which exemplifies the impact of interaction between external incentives and domestic conditionson Europeanization patterns of countries (Putnam’s two level game). For each case a similar basic template is used which begins with initial conflict and different issues of norm violation in target country, and then turns to European demands and conditions. The analysis finalizes with the outcome part where the compliancy patterns of countries are analysed in different temporal stages.

1.2.2 Case Selection

Testing of hypotheses relates directly to the question of generalizability and this in turn relates to the question of case selection. Here generalizability of case study results can be increased by the strategic selection of cases. Case selection therefore is an integral part of a good research strategy to achieve well-defined objectives of the study. Hence the primary criteria for case selection is whether it has relevance to the research objective of the study—here to theory testing purposes and provides rich opportunities for improving understanding of the primary phenomena or processes under research (Yin, 2003:34).

Since the purpose of this thesis to examine the ‘scope and limitations of conditionality’ with a particular emphasis on Europeanization process, 'hard cases' (Turkey and Serbia) are selected in which democratic conditionality and its effects are more easily observable than in 'easy cases’. ‘We will be able to learn more about the conditions of its effectiveness and ineffectiveness since the challenge to conditionality is higher in cases of significant conflict (Schimmelfening et al.2003:501). Thus these two countries can be regarded a critical cases which can be defined as having strategic importance in relation to the general problem (Flyvbjerg, 2006:229). Moreover they are also selected in accordance with MDSD which compares countries that are not share similar features but have a common political outcome. Turkey and Serbia are different in many terms (see p.11) however both face with challenges on the road to EU membership.

Selected cases: Turkey and Serbia

Turkey and Serbia are selected as case studies which are difficult cases concerning the conflict between European political norms and state behavior due to varying set of factors. Recent events corroborate the strains and fictions: The accession negotiations with Turkey were partially suspended in December 2006; and the association negotiations with Serbia were frozen between May 2006 and June 2007 due to conflicting domestic factors. Consequently these two countries are critical cases to understand why Europeanization mechanism does not work properly when it meets with conflict and resistance at national arena.
1.2.3 Methodological Considerations and Data Collection

In order to measure the level of adaptation to democratic conditions of EU as the dependent variable, the Freedoms House's guidelines are commonly used by a wide range of scholars for analyzing the progress of democratic change. However considering current problems in the Europeanization process in Turkey and Serbia, I found out that the problems are not related to democratic institutions, political rights, or civil liberties, therefore the Freedoms House ratings of both countries did not change within the selected time frames and even during the critical junctures. In particular, when Europeanization process became a challenge and negotiation process was partially stalled in Turkey in 2006 and, in Serbia between 2006 and 2007, the ratings remained the same.¹ The recent problems can not be totally explained then by the general analysis of Freedoms House's guidelines, therefore I primarily focused on analysis of official EU documents.

The core of the empirical research consists the analysis of official documents (Regular reports, Accession Partnership Documents and National Programmes for Adoption of Acquis for Turkey and SAP feasibility reports for Serbia, Reports from the Commission and DG Enlargement) and daily news services which allows to keep close track the demands of EU and reactions of target goverments. In addition to primary (official documents, speeches, press releases etc.) sources, the analysis relies on the rich collection of secondary sources (academic literature).

In order to gain a better understanding on the issue, semi-standardized expert interviews with scholars working on Europeanization in South Eastern Europe (specifically on Turkey and in Serbia) are chosen to be conducted.² Semi-standardized interview developed by Scheele and Groeben (2001) as a specific elaboration of semi-structured interviews, combines a highly structured agenda with the flexibility to ask subsequent questions (Flick, 2006:155-56). In the interviews, interview guides are used, as Flick argues ‘are partially structured by a written interview guide which mentions several topics’ (Flick, 2006:156). A guide for semi-standardized interview ensures that interview does not get lost in topics that are of no relevance and permits the expert to extemporize his or her issue and view on matters (Meuser and Nagel, 2002:77). The questions (open-ended and hypotheses-directed) are ideally constructed some time before the interview and are sent to the experts so they can start to prepare responses³.

1 See Appendix A- Freedom House Guidelines and Ratings
2 See Appendix B -List of Interviewees and Interview Guide
3 See Appendix B -List of Interviewees and Interview Guide
I complement the analysis of conditions and compliance with a process-tracing analysis through examining the histories, official documents, interview transcripts, and others sources to “trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes” (George and Bennett, 2005:6). Process tracing is an indispensable tool of theory-testing. The process tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal chain between an independent variable (or variables) and outcome of dependent variable (George and Bennett, 2005:206). It allows analyzing the effect of different independent variables and the effect of variance in the independent variables across cases (ibid: 75-81). Taken together these methods ensure to better assess what really matter for compliance and non-compliance patterns of target countries.

What really matters...

The thesis, proposes that it is less the size of reward (membership/candidate status) *per se* that matters but rather the low level of domestic resonance, high costs of compliance, absence of European identity, existence of powerful veto players and failure of the domestic actors to include the civil society level to promote societal Europeanization process and to promote internalization of this externally driven transformation process that account for the limited impact of transformative power of EU and for low level of sustainable compliance in selected cases.

1.2.4 Limits of Comparative Analysis

There are some limitations of this comparative analysis. Firstly Europeanization is still an ongoing process and a moving target in both cases so it is early to analyse the process. Secondly the case studies and comparative analysis covers short-term elite responses to European demands where the decisions of political leaders in power that matter most for the compliance patterns with EU requirements of the countries. However domestic actors outside government such as interest groups, big business community, NGOs and other civil society organizations have also crucial role in Europeanization process Therefore no complete picture of the Europeanization process in each country can be made.

Thirdly, Turkey and Serbia have different historical backgrounds whereas the former has a long tradition of parliamentarian democracy and the latter has been an illiberal regime which was dominated by a nationalist and/or authoritarian leadership under Milošević, until 2000. It is very recent that Serbia has become a nation state of modern European type with international legal personality.
Some History...

From 2003 to 2006, Serbia has been part of the "State Union of Serbia and Montenegro." This union was the successor to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ). Following the referendum in Montenegro in 2006, the National Assembly of Serbia declared the "Republic of Serbia." However Turkey, in spite of its inherent limitations and frequent, though short-lived interruptions, is a democratic, secular, unitary, constitutional republic whose political system was established in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I.

Yet another issue that makes a comparison between Serbia and Turkey somewhat problematic concerns the differences in the Europeanization experiences of the two countries. Turkey’s relations with Europe dates back to the 1950s. Turkey has been treated as a credible candidate since the 1980s. At the Helsinki Summit of the European Council in 1999 offered Turkey concrete prospect of full membership, more than four decades after its application for association with the European Economic Community in 1959. This put general project of Westernization into a different and more concrete context of Europeanization Thus, a strong identification with Europe has been and is a core feature of modern Turkey.

Europeanization process, however, is still at the very beginning in Serbia whereby new leaders announced that Serbia would seek to join the EU with the fall of Milošević in 2000. Serbia was granted potential candidate country status (proto-candidate) for EU accession following the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 after which EU has become undoubtedly a significant factor shaping the transition to democracy in general and an important factor driving change in the country (Ladrech, 2008:149).

It should be noted that the differences between these two cases are also advantageous for an enriched comparative analysis. Since the main question of this thesis is whether candidate status matters, it is relevant to compare Turkey and Serbia where the former is holding a candidacy status since 1999 while latter is not since it is a proto-candidate since 2003. Moreover the variation among two countries in the independent variables provides rich opportunities for understanding of the processes under research.
1.3 Literature Review

There is a growing literature dealing with the EU's transformative power or, in other words, Europeanization in South-Eastern European countries such as Croatia, Serbia and Turkey and Bulgaria and Romania. However, the literature dealing with the political (democratic) facets of Europeanization and the compliance problems in countries is recently emerging (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003, Emerson et al., 2005, Grabbe, 2003, Noutcheva, 2006 Schimmelfenning 2008, Schimmelfenning et al., 2006, Subotic, 2009).

More on Literature...

This area of study recently emerged as a developing research field with the compliance problems especially in South-Eastern European countries due to incompatible domestic factors and high level of adoption cost for government. Recent events confirm the strains and frictions: the start of accession negotiations with Croatia was postponed for half a year in 2005, the accession negotiations with Turkey were partially suspended in December 2006; and the association negotiations with Serbia were frozen between May 2006 and June 2007. EU conditions such as cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ICTY at The Hague and between the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the future status of Kosovo, and Turkey’s recognition of the Republic of Cyprus are related to issues of national identity that put potentially high political costs of compliance on the target governments and have been responsible for the recent problems where Europeanisation is paralysed. In case of Romania and Bulgaria, both countries have problems to comply with EU requirements due to domestic factors such as powerful veto players, difficulty of political mentality or elite culture which is still significantly influenced by the past regime, low level of civil mobilization (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Pridham 2007; Demetropoulou, 2002).

While the transformative impact of Europe on domestic politics in Turkey and in Western Balkan countries including Serbia, attracted widespread interest within academic literature, the present lack of comparative analysis on the EU’s influence Turkey and Serbia can be considered as a research deficit and a blind spot in current Europeanization research; and a topic ripe for analysis.

The transformative impact of the EU on Turkish politics has generated a large body of literature with most attention having been directed at assessing the impact of the EU on democratization in post–2002 era (e.g.Öniş 2003, Aydır and Keyman 2004, Tocci 2005, Baç 2005, Kubicek 2005). There is a growing body of literature concerning the contradictory nature of Europeanization process where its transformative power startd to challenge the established notions of regime (Kemalism, civil-military relations and identity politics), interests of government (Verney and Ifantis, 2009, Hughes, 2004, Grigoriadis, 2008, Joseph 2007, Heper, 2005, Glyptis, 2005, Kirişçi 2007, Öniş and Keyman, 2007, Öniş 2006 ) and on

For the case of Serbia, there are several studies analysing the impact of the EU framework; through the prospect of future membership, EU active mediation through conditionality and socialization, and challenges of the process (Noutcheva and Huysseune, 2004, Noutcheva 2006, Cierco, 2009 Subotic 2009, Jelincic et al. 2006, Anastakis, 2005). However as Subotic (2009) argues that Serbia (with Albania, Moldova) as the the most reluctant Europeanizer and the most challenging case for Europeanization still remains persistently understudied and undertheorized in the Europeanization literature. Subotic presents three alternative arguments for EU’s low impact in hard cases: weak endogenous demand for Europeanization (absence of European idea), veto players institutionalized in democratic structures (power of old regime spoilers) and competing elite preferences about Europe. She tests her theoretical framework to explain the stalled process of Europeanization in Serbia.

There are also some studies cover comparative studies of South Eastern European countries (see e.g. Engert 2004; Kubicek 2003; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006, 2003 Baracani 2006, Noutcheva 2006, 2007) Noutcheva (2007:2) argues that the EU’s policy of conditionality vis-à-vis three Western Balkan cases-Serbia and Montenegro during 2002–06, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Kosovo -has been based on strategic interests rather than normative considerations or moral concerns. Moreover the domestic actors in the three cases have tried to challenge the normative grounds of the EU’s policy and have responded with fake compliance, partial compliance and non-compliance. She demonstrates that the legitimacy of the EU’s demands as perceived by domestic political actors is key for explaining the divergent compliance responses of the Western Balkan countries.

Starting from the two most prominent models in the literature on international norm promotion–the social learning model and the external incentives model Schimmelfennig et al. (2006) use Qualitative Comparative Analysis to examine the domestic and external conditions under which governments in eastern Europe have complied with the political demands of EU and to assess the conditions of effective incentives and learning, and to determine which of them were necessary and/or sufficient for political change. However it does not explain how and why those changes come about or not. I aim to fill this gap by explaining the reasons behind different Europeanization outcomes in Turkey and Serbia.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The structure of this thesis is as follows. After the introductory chapter which broadly covers the research question(s), main argument and hypotheses, research design, methodology and an overview of the existing literature, next chapter (Chapter 2) presents conceptualisation and theoretical framework for Europeanization. Chapter 3 describes the main hypotheses and the variables as a model to be tested for the selected cases in the following chapter. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 introduce the empirical findings of the study where the conditions and compliance patterns are evaluated for each case, respectively for Turkey and Serbia. Chapter 6 makes comparative analysis of the cases in relation to the prescribed model and the research question whereas chapter 7 summarizes the findings with a special focus on importance of neglected factors and points out avenues for future research.
2. Europeanization

Europeanization has become one of the most widely used theoretical approaches for studying the EU and its influence on the current and future EU member states which has emerged as an ‘academically developing industry’ (Olsen, 2002:921). There is a burgeoning literature on conceptualizing the term and identifying how this process might shape a country’s internal politics.

As is the case with so many concepts in political science, Europeanization refers to a number of related phenomena and thus is much like ‘the proverbial elephant’ as named by Ishiyama (2006:5); it means many different things to many different scholars. Although there is a lively debate over the concrete definition of Europeanization (see Cowles et al., 2001, Radaelli and Featherstone 2003, Olsen, 2002, Risse and Börzel, 2003 Grabbe 2001), the term is generally used with regard to “the domestic impact of the EU” (Sedelmeier 2006: 4) and thus constitutes a crucial concept for analyzing the Union's transformative power through diffusion of ideas namely rules, values and norms (Börzel and Risse, 2008)

2.1 Conceptual Framework

The literature in Europeanization studies has historically focused on bottom-up perspective analyzing the impact of its transformative power on the countries that have already joined the EU (Cowles et al. 2000; Radaelli 2000, Goetz and Hix, 2001). Caporaso et al. have used Europeanization to describe the ‘emergence and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving which formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules” (Cowles et al, 2001:3)

Within this context, Europeanization affects nation state, political culture and domestic policies but also informal structures such as business-government relations, public discourses, and nation state identities and collective

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See Appendix C, Box 1-Europeanization
understanding of citizenship norms. Thus, it is clear that Europeanization changes structure of nation states and the collective understandings attached to them (Cowles et al, 2001:236).

However a perception of the “Europeanization process as being self-contained and limited only to the EU’s member states may be misleading since Europeanization can also be exported, especially towards the candidate countries” (Papadimitriou, 2002:5). EU exerts similar pressure on the applicant countries whereby its transformative power has catalyzed fundamental democratic and economic reforms and change through conditionality in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) (Grabbe 2004, Goetz 2005, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Vachudova, 2005, Pridham 2005). This thesis therefore has a post-ontological approach which focused on the post-ontological state of Europeanization theory.

Post-Ontological Approach towards Europeanization

In post-ontological approach it is assumed that there is a process of European integration under way, but that the focus in research should not be on the nature of the beast-why Europeanization is taking place. Instead Europeanization, as a research agenda is all about bringing domestic politics back into our understanding of European integration, is all about how the EU matters, focusing on the impact of Europeanization on domestic political and societal processes (Radaelli 2004:2-3). Within this sense the thesis has a top-down perspective of Europeanization where the lines between European and national are more clearly drawn for the transformative impact of the EU on target countries. It gives a more comprehensive picture for analysing the processes between the European and national levels (Börzel and Risse 2003:57).

2.1.1 Europeanization: An Instrument for Democratisation

More recently the literature concerning the transition and democratisation especially in CEECs, makes extensive use of the concept of “Europeanization” which becomes an important instrument and mechanism for top-down democratisation process of countries in the enlargement track. Conditionality is a concept that is placed very much at the centre of the Europeanization. EU democratic conditionality is based on rule transfer and generally works through ‘reinforcement by reward where membership is the greatest reward to be offered’ (see Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005; Grabbe 2004). The Copenhagen criteria of 1993 draw the main framework of candidate countries’ Europeanization along the EU accession process. It puts emphasis on ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities’.
Recently, the EU, as a gravity model of democratisation (Emerson and Noutcheva 2004), is furthering development of democracy, namely Europeanization via the mechanism of political conditionality in Turkey and in Western Balkans creating new opportunity structures but also leading to challenges and paradoxes for these countries.

The Turkish, Croatian and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonian (FYROM) candidacy and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in the Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo) provide researchers with intriguing opportunities for scrutinizing the effects of transformative power of EU on promoting democracy and facilitate legislative, institutional and normative changes in a diverse group of countries. These studies thus started to broaden the focus of Europeanization and establish the Europeanization of applicant states as a separate sub-field of this broader research agenda.

2.1.2 Europeanization: Just ‘Formal’ Rule Transfer or More?

Within the framework of this thesis, I will be attached to Radaelli's definition to Europeanization which is broad enough to cover political structure, public policy, identities and the cognitive dimension of politics. Radaelli argues that this can be applied both to the EU member states and other countries. Thus, “the concept of Europeanization, as it stands now, is supposed to explain processes of cultural change, new identities’ formation, policy change, administrative innovation and even modernization” (Radaelli 2000:4-5):

Radaelli’s definition or Europeanization;

“Europeanization consists of processes of:

a) construction,
b) diffusion and
c) institutionalisation

of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.” (Radaelli, 2000:4)

There are two reasons why I have preferred to be adhered to Radaelli’s definition within the framework of this thesis. Firstly, Radaelli's definition attributes the different types of change what Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) define as formal change (the legal transposition of rules) and behavioural
change (implementation, application and enforcement). Thus this definition presents an opportunity to analyze Europeanization not only as hard transfer of rules, procedures and policy paradigms but also as soft transfer of styles, ways of doing things, shared beliefs, norms and discourses. As a second reasoning, since the focus of this definition is on the adaptive response by actors to a changed and/or changing environment, it presents an opportunity to systematically analyze the compliance patterns of political elites and other actors as the agents of change, once the Europeanization has been gradually incorporated in the rationale of behaviour, policies, discourses and agendas of these actors.

### Change agents

Change agents are sometimes called “norm entrepreneurs” in the domestic system. These change agents can be NGOs, universities, the media, political parties, professional associations (lawyers, doctors, and business people) but also state bureaucracies and politicians. They engage with similar organizations and people in the EU and form “transnational networks” and “epistemic communities” through which social-learning occurs. They try to influence the government. (Aydı and Çarkoğlu, 2006:73)

I understand Europeanization, therefore, as a process much broader than political change through “EU rule transfer”. The European impact actually goes beyond policy dimension and spill-over patterns of democratic legitimation. Europeanization encompasses the penetration of EU rules, norms and values into different domestic spheres where it has normative transformative impact on ideological structures and preferences of the target states. This expansive concept of Europeanization is the starting assumption of this thesis. I argue that investigating the deeper normative impact of the EU on states and societies would provide for a more complex picture of how and to what extent the EU matters, and/or if it matters at all. After outlining the Europeanization conceptual delimitations, the thesis turns to theorizing Europeanization process through elaborating its main areas of influence, scope and mechanisms.
2.2 Theorizing Europeanization

Taking the Radaelli’s definition of Europeanization as the main point of departure, now I aim to have a deeper understanding of this heuristic concept by raising the several questions- “what is Europeanized to what extent and how (or not)?

2.2.1 Domains of Europeanization

The question ‘what is Europeanized?’ refers to domains of Europeanization - that is, the area where the effects of Europeanization are supposed to materialize. Radaelli (2000:7-14) argues that there are two main areas where Europeanization has fundamental impact; i) domestic structures (political structures of representation and cleavages, cognitive and normative structures) and, ii) public policy. Börzel and Risse (2003: 60-1) use distinction between policies, politics and polity to identify three dimensions along which the domestic impact of Europeanization can be analysed and processes of domestic change can be traced. Policies refers to standards, instruments, problem-solving mechanisms, policy narratives and discourse; politics includes processes of interest formation, interest aggregation, interest representation and public discourse; whereas polity attributes political institutions, intergovernmental relations, judicial structures, public administration, state traditions, economic institutions, state-society relations and collective identities.

**Figure 1 Dimensions of Domestic Change: Polity, Policy, and Politics**

![Diagram of Polity, Policy, and Politics]

*Source: Börzel, Tanja (2003) How the EU interacts with its member states, Riehe Politikwissenschaft, Political Science Series, 93, p.4*

It is important to demonstrate the domains of Europeanization which are all partly nested with each other, to manifest the wide range of EU influence on target countries. It is actually not only about legal engineering through adoption of
EU laws, regulations and rules but also about change of ways of doing things, norms and collective understandings.

2.2.2 Scope of Europeanization: “…to what extent?”

The scope of domestic change in response to EU’s transformative power through diffusion of its values, norms and rules differs is related to how much change’ has been brought about by Europeanization. Domestic change in response to Europeanization (that is, extension and direction of Europeanization or outcome of Europeanization) pressures can be weak or strong.

The literature broadly distinguishes between five different outcomes regarding the scope or degree of change; inertia, absorption, accomodation, transformation and retrenchment. (Radaelli 2000; Cowles et al 2001, Risse and Börzel, 2003, Börzel 2003). Taken together, they cover both the magnitude of change and its direction. On each of these levels the effect of diffusion processes can range from more or less domestic change to large scale transformation. (See Figure 2 below).

**Figure 2 Scope of domestic change in response to Europeanization**

Source: Börzel, Tanja (2003) How the EU interacts with its member states, Riehe Politikwissenschaft, Political Science Series, 93, p.16

To begin with, *inertia* refers to ‘a situation of lack of change’ which can take forms of lags, delays in the transposition of EU rules and in implementation, and abrupt resistance to compliance with EU requirements (Radaelli, 2000: 14). From a constructivist perspective high adaptational pressure is likely to meet inertia, inhibiting any domestic change. In contrast, a rationalist approach would see high adaptational pressure as likely to result in transformation within the target country (Börzel, 2003:17). The reason behind the inertia can be the inconsistency between EU political architectures, choices, models or policy and domestic practices. In the long-term, however, inertia can not be sustained economically and politically since it would produce crisis.

*Absorption* is accommodation of policy requirements without real modification of the essential structures and changes in the ‘logic’ of political behavior (Héritier 1998 : 21). Thus the degree of change is low. It can be said that
it is just legal adaptation or in other words formal change through ‘hard transfer’ of EU rules without changing the core.

Accommodation should not be confused with transformation where the former refers to modest level of change and the latter to high level of change. Receiving countries accommodate European pressure by adapting existing processes, policies and institutions without changing core features and the underlying collective understandings attached to them (Knill 2001).

Transformation occurs when existing policies, processes, and institutions are changed by new, considerably different ones, or altered existing ones to the extent that their core features and/or the underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed (Börzel, 2003:16). The degree of domestic change is high, affecting the core of system-wide political, economic and social structures and the political culture of a country (Cowles, et al, 2001: 15).

However, as stated by Radaelli (2000:11) Europeanization can also induce retrenchment which can be an example of ‘negative’ Europeanization. This is a very paradoxical effect, as it implies that national policy becomes less ‘European’ than it was.

The expected consequence of EU’s transformative power through diffusion of its values, norms and rules is to promote transformation and compliance. However this is not a process free of conflict, resistance, and politics (Börzel and Risse, 2008:2). Consequently, as the Europeanization literature suggests, the influence of transformative power of EU on receiving countries depends on domestic configurations. Thus the process is conceptualized as “domestic adaptation with national colors” in which national features continue to play a role in shaping affect the direction and extension of diffusion of European ideas (Cowles et al.2001:1-3).

2.2.3 How countries Europeanized?

Europeanization literature has offered interesting insights into the mechanisms of EU influence on the domestic structures of target countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Grabbe 2004; Kelley, 2004; Vachudova, 2005). The literature has identified several mechanisms through which Europe can make the target states to comply with its requirements.

Knill and Lehmkühl distinguish between institutional compliance, where the EU prescribes a particular model which is ‘imposed’ on the receiving states, changing domestic opportunity structures, which leads to a redistribution of resources between domestic actors, and policy framing, which alters the beliefs of domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkühl 1999) Börzel (2003) and the contributors to
Green Cowles et al. (2000) have drawn attention to the so-called ‘goodness of fit’ (in plain English, the degree of institutional compatibility) between domestic institutions and European policy. By focusing on the ‘goodness of fit’, these authors draw our attention to explanatory-mediating factors (facilitating formal institutions, veto players, change agents and political culture) related to any mechanism of change (See Figure 3). They argue that the domestic structural change under the process of Europeanization can be perceived as a “three-step” approach. The three steps; Europeanization, goodness of fit and mediating factors altogether affect the outcome of domestic structural change.

**Figure 3 Europeanization, Mediating Factors and Domestic Change**

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The different causal mechanisms of domestic change can be grouped around two theoretical approaches that draw on different strands of neo-institutionalist reasoning: Rationalist institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The former refers to interest-based whereas the latter refers to norm-based motives driving governments’ compliance (Börzel and Risse 2003, Börzel 2003). Rationalist institutionalists suggest that ‘logic of consequentiality’ (instrumental rationality or rational choice) is the main factor influencing the EU’s impact on domestic change.
As Sedelmeier (2006:10) points out, the pressure of the EU for adaptation changes the opportunity structure of domestic actors. Whereas the EU offers material rewards in case of compliance with its interests, national elites follow such conditionality according to a cost-benefit calculation. This logic primarily relies on an interest-driven argument, according to which domestic reforms are implemented in order to pursue interests that are created or supported by this new opportunity structure (Sedelmeier 2006: 10). Socialization approaches in contrast to the rationalist ‘logic of consequentialism’ with a constructivist ‘logic of appropriateness’ (or normative rationality) (March and Olsen 1998). From this perspective, EU is more than a political opportunity structure. It entails new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning, which the target states have to incorporate. Domestic actors are socialized into European norms and rules of appropriateness through processes of persuasion and social learning and redefine their interests and identities accordingly. (Checkel 1999).

To sum up, the different causal mechanisms of domestic change give rise to distinct expectations when and how actors seek to promote ideas and decide to adopt them, respectively.

2.3 Explanatory Models of Europeanization

Within the framework of this thesis I follow Schimmelfenning et al. (2006) approach and employ two basic models for European governance and rule promotion—external incentives and social learning—to understand the motives behind the compliance decisions of target states.

2.3.1 External Incentives Model

The external incentives model which is a rationalist bargaining model focuses on the size and speed of rewards, credibility of conditionality as well as domestic veto players and domestic costs of adaptation. Accordingly the external incentives model mainly follows governance by conditionality in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the target states have to fulfill in order to receive EU rewards (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir, 2004: 661-679). The starting point of external incentives model is the misfit between between European and domestic processes, policies and institution (goodness of fit) which puts adaptational pressure on states (Cowles et al. 2001, Börzel and Risse, 2000). The model assumes that the EU conditionality challenges domestic status quo by providing incentives for rule adoption and changes the domestic opportunity structure (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005:11).
Given the asymmetrical interdependence (Vachudova, 2006:9), the model allows EU to use the threat of exclusion from the next stage of process on candidate countries that are not fulfilling the required reforms and reward states in response to progress in complying with the conditions, implementing reforms and adapting EU laws. The most general proposition of the external incentives model of conditionality and Europeanization is therefore that “a state comply with the norms of the EU if the benefits of the rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs and level of credibility of incentive is high” (Schimmelfennig, 2005:4). This cost-benefit balance depends on the size and credibility of international rewards, on the one hand, and the size of domestic adoption costs, on the other.

2.3.2 Social Learning Model

In contrast, the social learning model emphasizes the legitimacy and domestic resonance of the norms, and the identity and cognitive priors of the target actors. The main hypothesis based on the social learning model is that “the likelihood of compliance increase with the legitimacy and resonance of the norms and the identification of the target state with the EU” (Schimmelfennig, 2005:7). This is known as the “domestic salience” (Linden ed. 2002) or the “resonance” hypothesis of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (ed. 2005: 20).

This is also argued by Checkel (1999:83-114) who maintains that the success of norm diffusion in a certain domestic context depends on the “degree of cultural match” between international norms and domestic practices. Thus it should be also noted that actors are more open to social learning and persuasion when the norms and values of EU have some resonance with pre-existing norms, values and practices in the target country. So the domestic politics -in particular, institutional and historical contexts- delimit the causal role of persuasion/social learning and national compliance with European ideas, thus helping both rationalists and constructivists to redefine their borders within they can influence compliance process.

“Both/and” perspective

In order to move from an "either/or," "gladiator" style of analysis to a "both/and perspective (Checkel, 2001:581) and to prevent the possibility to fall into the “norms versus interest' trap of theorizing” (Börzel and Risse 2007: 3), Checkel puts emphasis on interaction between these two approaches through of logic of arguing which is based on the role of argumentative persuasion and social learning.
3. Modelling Europeanization: Set of Conditions for (non-)Compliance

Research into member states’ compliance with EU has become a large and thriving subfield in EU studies, which has resulted in a fairly long list of factors that plausibly affect compliance in the EU but it still remains somewhat inconclusive with regard to the factors that explain the causes of failure in compliance. However, even in absence of generally accepted explanation of causes of non-compliance, it is possible to use hypotheses of Schimmelfennig et al. (2006) for compliance in opposite way for non-compliance. For the empirical analysis, I would concretise Europeanization into a model of analysis, albeit in inherently different ways, based Schimmelfennig et al.’s hypotheses.

3.1 Main Hypotheses and Variables

The main hypothesis based on the external incentive model is that; ‘a state resist to comply with the norms of the EU if the domestic adoption costs exceed the benefits of the rewards and level of credibility of incentive is low’. The external incentive model proposes two factors which have impact on resistance to comply with EU requirements in target countries: credible incentives and costs.

The main hypothesis based on the social learning model is that; ‘a state resist to comply with the norms of the EU if the level of perceived legitimacy and resonance of the norms and the identification of the target state with the EU is low’. The social learning model, then puts forward three factors which may explain different Europeanization outcomes in target countries: legitimacy, identity and resonance.

The dependent variable of the study is (target state) compliance with the demands of EU. To discriminate between compliance and non-compliance, the main indicator is legal rule adoption. “A state is considered to be in compliance if it has signed a treaty and/or passed a law on the basis of the norm promoted by EU”(Schimmelfennig et al 2006: 58). Focusing on external and domestic factors as the intervening/independent variables in explaining the (non-) compliance at

\[ \text{See Appendix C, Box 2-Failure in Compliance} \]
EU level I will benefit from the hypotheses of external incentives and social learning models to examine the limit the effectiveness of political conditionality. For general analytical purposes I argue that states find it challenging to comply with EU requirements and resist change due to set of factors (independent variables)

The domestic independent variables are important to illustrate that the compliance decision is not only about legal rule adoption but also soft transfer of styles, ways of doing things, shared beliefs, norms and discourses.

3.2 Two Level Game: External-Domestic Factors

The independent variables will be subdivided into external and domestic conditions. In this respect, Robert Putnam (1998)’s two-level game framework is illustrative where the interplay between external and domestic level complicate the compliance patterns and limit the effectiveness of political conditionality in target countries.

The external conditions refer to attribute of EU’s strategies (size and credibility of rewards and legitimay); whereas domestic conditions attributes of target government (costs, veto players identification, resonance):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External factors</th>
<th>Domestic Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i) The size and credibility of EU rewards</td>
<td>i) The domestic compliance costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Legitimacy of EU arguments</td>
<td>ii) The existence of veto players in domestic structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iii) The identification with EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>iv) The domestic resonance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 The conceptualisation of variables

3.3.1 Size and Credibility of EU rewards

The first source of variation under a strategy of reinforcement by reward is the size and credibility of the conditional rewards. The target countries are offered
material or other tangible political rewards in return for compliance—such as financial assistance, market access, and technical expertise—nevertheless institutional tie is the most powerful political instrument for enforcing compliance which starts with trade and cooperation agreements, is followed by association agreements whereas full membership is the strongest institutional tie and the greatest reward to be offered (Schimmelfennig, et al 2003:496-7).

Given a strategy of reinforcement by reward, effective external governance as argued by Schimmelfennig (2008:921) has to be credible in two ways. Firstly, it requires certainty where target states are rewarded with significant steps toward accession in response to progress in complying with the EU’s political conditions and adapting EU laws. Secondly they should be aware of that they would be excluded from EU membership if they do not fulfill the required reforms. Grabbe (2001:1020) calls this part of process ‘gate keeping’ as EU determines when each candidate can progress to the next stage towards accession. Within this context the distance of the membership perspective or in other words likelihood that rewards will be delivered in the foreseeable future also affect the effectiveness of conditionality and have impact on compliance (Schimmelfennig et al, 2002:11)

3.3.2 Perceived Legitimacy of EU conditions

The main hypothesis postulates that the level of perceived legitimacy of EU condition matter for effectiveness of the conditionality. When conditions are based on rules, which are consensually shared among the Member States, clearly defined, and coherently applied in the EU, their level of legitimacy and thus the pull effect for compliance is high and they are difficult to manipulate by the target governments. By contrast, ‘double standards’ would result in low level of trust in EU and fail to exert the same compliance pull (Schimmelfennig, 2006:50).

3.3.3. Domestic Adoption Costs

The likelihood of adoption decreases with net domestic adoption costs (political or power costs of governments) from compliance to EU requirements. Political actors in the target countries calculate whether the rewards offered by EU are worth the costs of adaptation. The size of domestic adoption costs, in this sense, determines whether they will accept or reject the conditions. When the political costs of compliance are high for the target government, that is, when fulfilling EU conditions threatens the security or integrity of the state, or the survival of the regime or the government’s domestic power base, and its core political practices for power preservation, even credible membership incentives turns out to be ineffective (Schimmelfennig, 2008:921) Moreover when short term
costs of reform are so great it may create a majority of voters opposing it and this lead to failure in complaince.⁶

Vachudova shows that, although EU began to implement the conditionality of the pre-accession process, it had little success in changing domestic policies in illiberal democracies in Western Balkans where ‘governments turned their backs on the benefits of EU membership to protect their power, autonomy and rent-seeking opportunities’ (Vachudova, 2006:2).

3.3.4 Veto players /Elite competition

According to veto players theory, ‘the difficulty for a significant change of the status quo . . . increases in general with the number of veto players and with their distances’ (Tsebelis 2002: 37). Compliance to EU requirements, therefore becomes a challenge if there is a high number of veto players (political elites, military and judiciary actors, bureaucrats etc.) who are institutionalized in domestic structures with vested interest in protecting the old normative order and control the apparatus of force (the military, police, or intelligence agencies) that sustain it. Thus, when Europeanization threatens the interest of these forces, limit their autonomy or alter their place, the costs of compliance will be too high, and Europeanization would stall.

The painful and costly transformation in pre-accession period provides greatest opportunities for veto players and creates a vacuum in which they benefit by adopting anti-EU position through populist politics (Schrijvers 2007:41, Lewis 2008:156). The existence of powerful veto players and competing elite preferences/strategies about Europe therefore directly shape Europeanization outcomes (Subotic, forthcoming).

3.3.5 Identification with EU

Identification with EU refers to that the target government regards as its relevant “in-group” and that it aspires to belong to. Non-member states are more likely to be persuaded by EU if they identify themselves with the state and society of EU community (Checkel 2001: 563) The main hypothesis is that the stronger the identification of a government with “Europe”, the more likely conditionality will be effective.

⁶ J-curve hypothesis developed by Adam Przeworski, see Appendix C Box-2
3.3.6 Domestic Resonance

States are more likely to be persuaded by EU if European norms and values have resonance with pre-existing domestic norms, values and practices in the target country and if ‘the European idea’ is a constitutive part of a candidate state’s political identity (whether state describes itself and its state as “Western” and/or “European”). This is known as the “domestic salience” (Linden et al. 2002) or the “resonance” hypothesis Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005: 20). Thus it should be noted that actors are more open to social learning and persuasion when the norms and values of EU have some resonance with pre-existing norms, values and practices in the target country—what Checkel (1999:83-114) terms as "cultural match”. Similarly, Risse accounts for the differential Europeanization of nation-state identities in the EU with the varying degree of resonance of Europeanization with domestic political visions and understandings of Europe (Risse, 2001).

3.4 A model for Interactive Analysis

Figure 1 (see below) presents a simple model which illustrates the impact of interaction between external incentives and domestic conditions on Europeanization patterns of countries. The external conditions refer to attribute of EU’s strategies (size and credibility of rewards and legitimation); whereas domestic conditions attributes of target governments (costs, veto players identification, resonance). Before explaining the model it should be noted that the model is based on the pre-assumption that compliance is a process driven by elites where the decisions of political leaders in power that matter most for the compliance patterns with EU requirements of the countries. However domestic actors outside government such as interest groups, big business communities, NGOs and other civil society organizations have also crucial role in shaping Europeanization process. They can act as change agents can put pressure on governments and force political elites for further European reforms.

(1) *Positive Europeanization*: If endogenous factors are favourable and external incentive is strong, this powerful push-pull impact will lead to positive Europeanization where the level of compliance to EU requirements is on its highest level. Referring to scope of domestic change in response to Europeanization, the outcome can be evaluated as transformation where the degree of domestic change is high, affecting informal and formal structures of countries (see p.17)

(2) *Slowed but ongoing Europeanization*: Europeanization loses its impetus but still continues on a lower rank through pushing power of favourable domestic
factors and/or demand of change agents who put pressure on government for further reforms although external incentive is weak

**Figure 4  Modelling Europeanization Patterns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External incentives</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favourable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Conditions</td>
<td>(1) Positive/genuine Europeanization</td>
<td>(2) Slowed/ongoing Europeanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
<td>(3) Partial/fake Europeanization</td>
<td>(4) Stalled Europeanization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) *Partial/fake Europeanization*: Europeanization process moves further by efforts of political actors who simulate compliance to avoid the even higher costs of confrontation, total refusal to comply and denial of a membership prospect if domestic factors are unfavourable. In this sense even credible external incentives prove ineffective. Noutcheva argues that “fake/shallow compliance is cheaper than non-compliance because the costs of non-compliance are higher than the costs of simulating EU compliant change in the short run while seeking ways of reversing that change and maximizing profits in the long run”. In this case domestic actors pass legislations to meet with EU requirements but implication does not follow up due to lack of political will to do the reforms demanded. Hence, the actors do not believe in the appropriateness of these domestic changes (Noutcheva, 2006:17-21). Thus the degree of change is low (level of absorption) where policy requirements are accommodated without changes in the ‘logic’ of political behavior (see p.12).

(4) *Stalled Europeanization*: When unfavourable domestic conditions are combined with weak external incentives, the outcome can be characterized as stalled Europeanization where the reform process paralysed and faced with a rupture. This can take forms of lags, delays in the transposition of EU rules and in implementation, and abrupt resistance to compliance with EU requirements what is called inertia (see p.12).
If the domestic political elites question the legitimacy of EU norms and painful and costly transformation process connected to Europeanization, they tend to oppose further integration with EU which paved the way for negative Europeanization. In context of rising nationalism and populism the political elites concentrate on identity politics and issues of nationality in order to justify their EU-reluctance and mobilize frustrated voters (see p.12).

The constellation of domestic factors can vary from one country to another. To gain explanatory adequacy about interaction between domestic and external level the descriptive studies have to be complemented with carefully conducted in-depth case studies which offer both theoretical rigor and empirical process tracing. By focusing on the two level game where internal characteristics have brought about different dynamics in the Europeanization process in two countries- Turkey and Serbia- this thesis aims to unpack the relationship between conditionality and Europeanization and to understand the reasons behind different Europeanization patterns in these countries.

3.5 Litmus Test for the Model of Europeanization: Turkey and Serbia

Turkey and Serbia with plethora of challenges to Europeanization process are selected as case studies to test the above mentioned hypotheses. Both countries difficult cases concerning the conflict between European political norms and national legacies and state behavior. EU decided to freeze accession negotiations in 8 chapters of *acquis* with Turkey in December 2006; and the association negotiations with Serbia between May 2006 and June 2007 due to issues related with countries’ identity politics and national legacies.

The cases illustrate the cultural filters which mitigate or constrain the transformative impact of European norm diffusion and political learning in the country leading to unexpected consequences such as resistance and rejection of norms.

**Cultural Filter**

The cultural filter is “based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion “

Ian Manners (2002:245)
The interplay turned out to be negative in these countries once adaptation to the EU requirements have become a challenge to historical legacies, political culture and national identity and thus the political costs of compliance turned out to be too high and veto players embedded in the domestic sociopolitical context gained more power through nationalist and populist strategies.

The problem with Europeanization of Turkey and Serbia therefore do not rest only on formal compliance to EU requirements. The greatest challenges will be to abandon practices of past so become behaviorally Europeanized (Jano, 2008:67) Therefore recent developments in these countries put the limits of conditionality in achieving national compliance and the success of eventual Europeanization in a litmus test. The analysis begins with Turkey then turns to Serbia and finalizes with a comparative review.
4. Turkey: The Train Crashed or Continues to Move?

‘Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out the ashes of Ottoman Empire. It was ‘made’ in the image of Kemalist elite’.

Feroz Ahmad

Turkey (in contrast to Serbia) has never been a dictatorial regime but has a long tradition of liberal parliamentarian democracy. Addressing its Kemalist ideology and ‘reform-averse’ political culture, Turkey exemplifies a unique and challenging test with regard to resonance of European norms (Uğur and Yankaya, 2008:581)

The Europeanization process in all areas of policy in Turkey as Ulusoy (2005a: 22) puts it very well ‘is much more profound than the framework of democratic conditionality thereby it is actually not only about changing laws, regulations but rather goes to the core of the political structure’. This paved the pay to mental transformation and transvaluation whereby the normative core of political activity, its defining values and all features of mainstream Turkish political culture face the need to radically change.

4.1 Conflict and NormViolation: Kemalist Paradox

Kemalism is the state doctrine that defines the basic characteristics of the Republic of Turkey and, has two core principles: secularism (the strict separation of religion and state) and nationalism reflecting a single Turkish identity (ethno-cultural homogenity and territorial unity) (Posch, 2007:10; Patton, 2007:341). It was formulated by the Turkish national movement and its leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with the eventual aim of reaching contemporary level of civilization since Turkish state elites consider themselves as Western. Therefore achieving EU membership is regarded as the zenith of the Kemalist model of modernization and realization of Atatürk’s long lasting dream for the country (Öniş, 2006:4).

Turkey’s identification with Europe has been a product of this Kemalist project. However as the EU has increasingly moved into normative nucleus of Turkish state through imposing Copenhagen criteria, the EU membership started to shake Turkey’s self-definition as a European state and all features of Kemalist political culture what makes Turkish case a ‘trial for Europeanization (Kubicek, 1999:157; Grigoriadis, 2009). Kemalist elites in bureaucracy, military and
judiciary therefore have become the main veto players against the EU reform process (Patton, 2007:349). Anti-EU Kemalist elites are anxious about the process would undermine the Kemalist ideology and also their power and privileges. The Kemalist paradox and robust veto players put potentially high political costs of compliance on government and caused slowdown in the reform process in the country. Stated by Grigoriadis, “the veto players in the bureaucracy are still powerful in the country, This has become obvious with the decision of Constitutional Court annuling the amendments that would have opened the way for women to wear a headscarf in universities which can be interpreted a step back of the reform process, towards negative Europeanization”.

The question in the case of Kemalism is: is that possible? Can Kemalism be streamlined in a way that makes it fully compatible with EU membership requirements which are virtually of a revolutionary character,? As Glyptis correctly puts it, ‘the biggest challenge facing Turkey is not measured in terms of its ability to meet EU criteria but in terms of its willingness to change the normative content of Turkish politics’ (2005:401). Within the framework of this thesis, Kurdish question, insufficient democratic-civilian control of military and Cyprus problem are taken as examples illustrating contradictory nature of Turkish policy practises and its Kemalist ideology for EU’s notions of liberal democracy.

4.2 Kemalist Nomenclature: Kurdish Question, Role of Military and Cyprus Deadlock

As Feroz Ahmad noted ‘Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out the ashes of Ottoman Empire. It was ‘made’ in the image of Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and old regime’ (1993:2). The top-down Kemalist model of modernization could not, however, transform itself into democratic consolidation and failed to stimulate cultural modernization which has manifested itself more explicitly with the European integration process in forma of identity-based demands for cultural recognition (cf. Kurdish question), increased democratic control of military and more liberal approach towards Cyprus conflict challenging the strictly secularist and state controlled nature of Kemalist ideology (Keyman and Öniş, 2007:11-17).

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7 Author’s interview with Ioannis N. Grigoriadis , 27 March 2009 , EUI-Florence, Italy
8 Democratic consolidation offered by Juan J. Linz, who calls it a state of affairs “in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power, and . . . no political institution or group has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision makers. . . . To put it simply, democracy must be seen as the ‘only game in town.’ (adopted from O'Donnell 1996)
4.2.1 Kurdish Question

Turkey’s Kemalist conceptualization of national identity which emphasizes the homogeneity, unity and indivisibility of state, its people and its territory leaves no room for recognition of ethnic minorities. The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 which was signed as the consequence of the Turkish War of Independence between the Allies of World War I and Turkey, acknowledges religious, non-Muslim groups as minorities (Greek and Armenian Orthodoxs and Jews) enjoying the same civil and political rights as Moslems (Lundgren and Oktav, 2009:4-5). Thus recognizing minorities other than these groups (cf. Kurdish) is not only about changing laws through legal engineering but changing definition and the very nature of Turkish state.

The Kurds represent Turkey’s largest ethnic, cultural and linguistic minority of about 12-13 million people, around four to five million of whom live in provinces of south-east Anatolia (Ergil, 2000:125, Karimova and Deverell, 2001:13). However, Kurdish question is not only about ethno-Kurdish nationalism in form of identity politics claiming for recognition of difference but also and more devastatingly about low intensity war between government and the terrorist-guerrilla organisation that PKK - *Parti Karkerani Kurdistan* (the Kurdish Worker Party) (Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997:227).

**PKK and Kurdish Question**

The PKK is a militant organization which was established in 1970s. The original aim of the organization, though changed during time, is to establish a Kurdish state in the borders of Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq. The organization used terrorism against both civilians and military targets since that time. Therefore, it is listed as a terrorist organization by a number of states. Recently, the PKK has softened its original aim which is to acquire cultural and political rights for the Kurds in Turkey (Tocci, 2008:877).

The demands for the recognition of Kurdish identity due to its links to PKK were perceived as threats to the territorial integrity of the state and met with harsh reactions by the traditional establishment. In sum Turkish policy towards Kurdish problem came into sharp conflict with European human rights and standards requiring respect for and, protection of minorities.

4.2.2 Old Soldiers Never Die

Another principle of Turkish political culture is traditionally defined role of military, more precisely the Turkish Armed Forces-TAF (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri-TSK*) in politics. The military actors with secularist elites were traditional architectures of westernization project in Turkey where they were entitled as
The military actors are uncomfortable with EU-induced reforms since the process became challenging for indivisible integrity and the secular character of the state which are two fundamental values of military. In the eyes of military elites, EU membership process would weaken state through curbing military power and opening state to the threats of Islamist resurgence and Kurdish separatism (Aydın and Çarkoğlu, 2006:53; Patton, 2008:346). The traditionally tailored role of TAF in politics is, therefore, contradictory to the structure of civil-military relations defined in European countries. However, should be noted that the military still remains by far the most trusted institution in society (Karaveli, 2008:5).

4.2.3 Cyprus Deadlock

The last example is Cyprus conflict whose roots date back to the early twentieth century.\(^9\) In the Kemalist establishment, the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) has traditionally been regarded as an indispensable part of the Turkish motherland since 1974 when the Turkish military intervened and took control of the northern part of the island. On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the establishment of the TRNC as a sovereign independent State.

\(^9\) See Appendix C, Box 6; for a historical overview of Cyprus conflict.
This unilateral declaration of independence has failed to achieve international recognition but with the sole exception of Turkey and as a result the TRNC has been economically dependent on Turkey (which has also kept a military force there). In the south, the Greek Cypriots retained the title of “Republic of Cyprus” (RoC) viewed by the international community, with the exception of Turkey, as the only legitimate authority on the island despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots in state institutions (Baracani, 2007:14-6).

The Cyprus dispute reached a deadlock when Turkey issued a Declaration on Cyprus stating that its signature in the EU Summit in December 2004—where the decision to open the accession negotiations with Turkey was also taken—to extend its Customs Union with the EU to all new member states (including Cyprus) does not constitute recognition of the divided island’ (Ulusoy, 2008: 318) which is unacceptable by EU. Besides its practical concerns Cyprus issue also carries “a symbolic value for Turkey. In the Kemalist establishment, the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ has traditionally been regarded as an key security issue for the Turkish ‘motherland’. Thus, recognition of the Republic of Cyprus is related to issues of national identity (Schimmelfennig, 2008:919-20). This is also underlined by Grigoriadis “The Cyprus issue has become an issue of national pride and the symbolic domestic cost of a compromise seems to something prohibitive”

4.3 European Demands and Conditions

The size and credibility of rewards and rule legitimacy can be regarded as high for the issues of Kurdish question and insufficient democratic-civilian control of military; but the legitimacy is comparatively low for Cyprus problem (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006:98-9)

With regard to Kurdish rights, EU has codified respect for and protection of minority rights as norm in community’s treaties and put it as a condition to become an EU member in Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Thus it is clearly defined, consensually shared among all the Member States, and coherently applied in the EU. In addition EU put respect for minority rights, cultural rights and protection of minorities as one of the priorities in its Accession Partnership Documents (APD) with Turkey in 2001 and repeated it in 2003, 2006, 2008.

10 Author’s interview with Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, 27 March 2009, EUI-Florence, Italy
Ankara should “ensure cultural diversity, guarantee cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin and promote respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), improve effective access to radio and TV broadcasting in languages other than Turkish [...] to enhance economic, social and cultural opportunities for all Turkish citizens, including those of Kurdish origin”


Civilian and democratic control of military is not included in official accession criteria of Copenhagen or in acquis. Nonetheless the rule legitimacy can still be considered as high since it is the norm unanimously shared in all member states (ibid:99) and could be argued to be a norm with unobjectionable status. ‘Such predominant norms are considered impossible to oppose openly” (Elgström 2005:29).

It is demanded that Turkish goverment “should align civilian control of the military with practice in EU Member States to assure that civilian authorities fully exercise their supervisory functions and establish full parliamentary oversight of military and defence policy and all related expenditure, including by external audit and to abrogate any remaining competence of military courts to try civilians.”

The major institution that attracts EU attention and criticism in this context was NSC which should not be more than an advisory body to the Government as it is stated in APD for Turkey in 2001 (Öniş, 2003:15).

Resolution of Cyprus issue is one of the most pressing stumbling blocks that remain in the way of Turkey’s accession to the EU. As a rule it has stated neither in official accession criteria of Copenhagen or in acquis. Nonetheless, when the European Council decided at its meeting in Brussels on 17 December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005, it linked Turkey’s accession process with the Cyprus problem. Turkey reacted to decision arguing that EU applied double standards to Turkey to which EU counter attacked by a declaration stating that ‘recognition of all Member States and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, are necessary components of the accession process… Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations’ meaning that Ankara should recognize the...

Peaceful settlement of Cyprus problem is also pronounced in Negotiation Framework of EU for Turkey as a condition for membership. It says “The advancement of the negotiations will be guided by [...] Turkey's supports for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework”\(^{13}\). This clause is also repeated in APD of 2006 and again in 2008 after failure of Annan plan and entrance of divided Cyprus to EU.

### 4.4 Outcome: Conditions and Compliance

The case study covers Turkey’s Europeanization process divided in different time frames due to critical breakthroughs. Europeanization is not a linear process but rather cyclical and moves in circles. It can be argued that democratic transformation in Turkey has developed in a stop-and-go or up-and down pattern. These time frames portray these ups and downs. The process includes the period begins with when Turkey was given candidate status in 1999 and is subdivided in three phases.

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<td>From 1999 when Turkey was given candidate status in Helsinki to 2002 when Justice and Development Party-JDP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) gained landslide victory in general elections.</td>
<td>From 2002 to 2005 when EU has decided to partially suspend negotiations in 8 chapters with Turkey in December due to Turkey’s refusal to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the agreement on the EU-Turkey Customs Union</td>
<td>Most recent period from 2005 onwards which is marked by strong political tensions and conflicts at national arena and weak external incentives which paralysed the reform process and in stalled Europeanization</td>
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Admitting weak external incentives, there is a slowed but ongoing Europeanization process triggered by government efforts and demands of change agents since 2008. The combinations of external incentives and domestic

\(^{13}\text{Negotiating Framework for Turkey, October 2005, p.2}\)
conditions in different nature shape the outcome of the Europeanization process leading positive (genuine), slowed, fake/partial and stalled Europeanization during these three phases, would be elaborated below.

4.4.1 Phase I (1999-2002): Partial/Fake Europeanization

The Helsinki Decision of December 1999 granting Turkey EU candidacy status marked a turning point in terms of Turkey-EU relations. By clarifying a concrete and a credible membership perspective, the Helsinki decision put Turkey within EU’s irreversible pre-accession framework which is determined by ‘conditionality-compliance’ principles (Ulusoy, 2005:1). This implies that Annual Progress Reports would be prepared by EU to monitor progress on meeting EU criteria. After the Summit the European Commission published first Accession Partnership Document in 2000 which was replied by preparation of Turkish National Programme for Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) by Turkey in 2001.\(^\text{14}\)

Turkey’s EU candidacy since 1999 has helped to instigate a series of radical reforms and deep-seated change on the democraization front which in turn intensified the Europeanization process in the country (Öniş and Keyman, 2007: 39). Between 1999 and 2002, Turkey experienced a series of ‘rather path breaking’ legislative and constitutional changes in order to meet the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria under coalition government of Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi-DSP), the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) and Nationalist Action Party, (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, MHP).

\begin{quote}
Coalition Government

The parties formed the coalition government had different/competing ideologies and views over EU membership thus domestic resonance was low. Claimed to be a social democratic party, the ideology of the DSP was influenced by nationalistic and state centric understanding of democracy whereas MHP was an ultra-nationalist party. ANAP with its liberal orientation could not be able to change the nationalist and Euro-sceptic configuration of government (Baç, 2005:22; Keyman and Öniş, 2007:219-20
\end{quote}

Regarding Kurdish question, the capture of PKK commander Öcalan in 1999 by the Turkish military which ended armed struggle, comparatively reduced cost

\(\text{14}\) In 2003, 2006 and 2008 revised version of Accession Partnership were adopted by EC. Accordingly National Programme was revised in 2003 and then in 2008.
of compliance with minority rights (Gunter, 2000:864, Schimmelfennig et al, 2006:105). What is more important is that emergence of EU conditionality triggered a change in the official Kurdish strategy leading to significant reforms which directly aimed to improve the rights of Kurds in the country.15

The constitutional amendments of October 2001 removed the restriction on the use of any language prohibited by law in the expression and dissemination of thought from the constitution. Similarly, restrictive language on broadcasting was also removed. In August 2002, the constitutional reform package abolished the death penalty in peacetime, revised the Anti-Terror Law, allowed for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish. The law that deals with the teaching of foreign languages was also amended with the third package in August 2002, opening the way for private courses in Kurdish. (Baç, 2005:22, Aydınn and Keyman, 2004:36) However, European Commission (2002, p.41-2) concluded that contrary to certain hopes expressed notably by some Member States in the context of the Öcalan trial, progress on the Kurdish question has not been made.

Concerning military reforms,16 the compliance was also limited where MHP holds and extremely nationalist and conservative position and DSP has cordial relations with military (Heper and Güney 2000: 647). Both parties have also anxieties about process whereas the former is uncomfortable with EU’s agenda on multiculturalism and minority rights which they find threatening for integrity and national unity of state and the latter is anxious about the process would undermine Kemalist ideology of the regime.

With the 2001 constitutional amendments, a number of fundamental changes have been made to the duties, functioning and composition of the NSC whereby the ‘advisory’ nature of the NSC was enshrined in the constitution stressing that its role is limited to recommendations. The government is no longer obliged to ‘give priority’ to the Council’s advice but only to ‘assess’ the views so conveyed. Moreover, the number of civilian members of the NSC has been increased from five to nine while the number of the military representatives remains same (Faltas and Jansen, 2006: 39). However as it has pronounced in 2002 Regular report for Turkey NSC-related changes did not seem to have altered ‘the way in which the National Security Council operates in practice’.17 Commission also underlines in its report that the NSC has continued to be an important factor in domestic politics where opinions of its military members continue to carry great weight although decisions are taken by majority. Its conclusions, statements or recommendations on sensitive political issues continue to strongly influence the political process.

15 See Appendix C Box 4 Reforms undertaken on the Kurdish issue
16 See Appendix C, Box 5 Reforms undertaken to decrease the influence of the military in politics
17 European Commission, 2002 Regular Progress Report for Turkey, p.25
Cyprus issue was not on the agenda during this phase. In 1999 Helsinki European Council, where EU decided not to condition the RoC accession to the settlement of the conflict, decided to grant Turkey the candidate status and to condition Turkey’s EU accession to the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Thus the rule legitimacy was low during the period. The 2002 progress report on Turkey welcomed Turkish government’s support for the current process of direct talks between the leaders of the two communities. However government did not take any substantial step towards comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and delayed it to an undetermined future.

In sum, government’s efforts to comply with EU demands through several reforms ‘could not move beyond tactical concessions since credible external incentives were thwarted by unfavourable domestic conditions; i.e high domestic adoption costs, competing elite strategies, strong veto players and low level of domestic resonance’ (Schimmelfennig et al, 2006:106).

What about civic actors?

It should be also noted that civil society was not qualitatively strong enough in Turkey to resist against veto players and put pressure on government for continuation of the reforms. As argued elsewhere (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005), the strong-state tradition, the organic vision of society, and the republican model of citizenship together has established the foundational basis for the state-centric mode of operation of Turkish modernity. It is within this context that civil society in Turkey is still far from enjoying the kind of presence and influence that is generally associated with civil society in the EU states (Piccoli, 2005: 17) However the post- Helsinki era witnessed the empowerment of certain civic actors outside government such as interest groups, big business community—especially -TUSIAD-NGOs and other civil society organizations (İçduygu, 2005). (TUSIAD-Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmens’ Association)

When the timing of reform steps in 2001 and 2002 is taken it into account, it is argued that the compliance was fake/shallow where reforms have been oriented towards the EU timetable for the updating of the Progress Report on Turkey and EU decision-making on the opening of accession negotiations (Schimmelfennig et al, 2003:509). The European Commission (2002, p. 139) concluded that ‘Turkey has made noticeable progress … [but] does not fully meet the political criteria’. Moreover, the Commission (2002, p. 47) demanded to see the implementation in practice to decide on the opening of membership negotiations (European Council, 2002, pp. 5–6). The outcome of first phase, accordingly, may be regarded as partial/fake Europeanization.
4.4.2 Phase II (2002-2005): Positive Europeanization

In November 2002, AKP, describing itself as a conservative democratic party reflected in its program and practices, won a landslide victory in general elections (Özbudun, 2006). The party alone won almost two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament with just 34 percent of the valid votes while Republican People’s Party (CHP-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) received 19 percent of the votes and became the only opposition party (Çarkoğlu, 2002, Tosun, 2003) This new government was more liberal and pro-European although CHP has developed anti-European and neo nationalistic rhetoric, paradoxically emerged as a veto player and became increasingly alienated from the EU during the process. However since AKP gained enough seats to change the constitution on its own, thus the domestic resonance increased (Schimmelfennig et al, 2006:107)

Regarding Kurdish question, the AKP government had a highly cosmopolitan strategy but nationalistic elements somewhat subdued which would albeit revive in the next phase. However government withdrew many discriminative measures that limited individual freedoms of Kurdish citizens such as opening of Kurdish courses in three cities in the south-eastern Anatolia lifting of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law 18 which expanded freedom of speech, granting the right to name children in Kurdish which in practice was used to ban non-Turkish names (through using letter Q-X-W), retrial of the Democracy Party (DEP) parliamentarians who had been in jail since 1994 for supporting terrorism and Kurdish separatism in Turkey (cf. Leyla Zana) and abolishing the death penalty in all circumstances, including wartime (Baç, 2005:26; Aydın and Keyman, 2004, 36). These reforms 19 which broke many taboos led to a radical extension of cultural rights especially for Kurdish segments of population.

The military elite and Kemalist bureaucracy were not comfortable with the EU reforms carrying risks for unity and security of Turkish state and Kemalist ideology. However, in an environment where the country was adjusting major political reforms process and there was strong support for EU membership coming from public and pressure from civil society actors, the power and resilience of the Euro-skeptic elements diminished, anti-reformist actors were politically marginalized (Öniş, 2005:6).

18 Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law criminalised ‘propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state’ and had been used in the past to imprison a large amount of journalists and publishers.
19 See Appendix B, Box 4, for the reforms undertaken on Kurdish issue
**Civil Society Activism in post-Helsinki era**

One of the most crucial and exciting developments of the post-Helsinki era was emergence of domestic actors outside the government such as interest groups, big business community-especially TUSIAD- NGOs and other civil society organizations as supporters of EU reform process. With the increased crebility of EU membership perpective visibility and activities of these actors in political arena have increased through putting pressure on government for launching and/or continuing democratic reforms. In this sense it can be said that Europeanisation process has provided a positive anchor and external pressure role for the emergence of these societal actors for further democratization (İçduyu, 2005:3) It was the pincer in which external and internal actors put pressure on government that trigger reform process in post-Helsinki era.

Although the reforms were far from producing deep-rooted changes which would multiculturalism and lead to a gradual transformation of the notion of citizenship in the country (Keyman, 2009:20) they broke ossified understanding on Kurdish issue thus 2004 regular Report, in general, has a more positive tone than the previous ones with a special emphasis on the progress achieved in the field of Kurdish rights.

With regard to democratic control of military AKP goverment modified structure, competences and duties of NSC and its Secretariat General with ‘seventh reform package’ in 2003 which constitutes nothing less than a “quiet revolution.” 

Through these reforms NSC was transformed into a purely consultative body with limited impact. Its budget and numbers of meeting were reduced. The budget would be monitored by a parliamentary Court of Auditors.

The position of the Secretary General of the NSC, traditionally reserved for a military official, was revised and it was decided to have a civilian as its secretary general. The AKP government adopted the another reform package after it won in local elections in 2004 to meet the Copenhagen criteria. This package made crucial amendments to the Constitution, abolishing state security courts, eliminating the NSC’s Secretary General representative from High Audio Visual Board (RTÜK)–the Kemalist dominated national broadcasting agency, thereby decreasing its control over Turkish broadcasting. and removing the Chief of Staff’s representative from the Higher Education Board (YÖK) as another domain of Kemalists.

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20 A quiet revolution: Less power for Turkey's army is a triumph for the EU", Financial Times (editorial), July 31, 2003.
21 YÖK was established after the 1980 military coup with a mission of controlling universities. It is another domain of Kemalists targeted for institutional reform by AKP goverment (Patton, 2007:351).
Why military actors remained silent?

Although AKP government’s reform packages were threatening for privileged position of military, the military actors did not show harsh reactions since AKP has taken the secular order as its basic reference point and had strong western orientation with full commitment to EU membership (Öniş, 2006:9). However it should be also noted that military actors have been undergoing a self-learning process with Europeanization process which leads to behavioral change (Öniş and Keyman, 2007:67). This learning process is promising for healthier relations with civil-military actors in long term.

The 2004 Regular Report also noted that although the ‘military continues to enjoy a degree of autonomy [as it is] not accountable to the civilian structure, the civilian control of the military has been strengthened through a number of changes which have shifted the balance of civil-military relations towards the civilians’ […] (p.15) Consequently, in the second phase the compliance with regard to military reform was at a higher level.

In the second phase of the process UN led the negotiations on the Cyprus conflict under the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ proposing to reunify the island, before joining the EU. For a long time the Turkish public had become accustomed to the view that ‘no solution is the solution in Cyprus and advocating ideas challenging the status quo in Cyprus amounted to virtual treason’ (Baracani, 2007:18) However AKP government altered status quo oriented state policy on Cyprus with consensus seeking approach which was a proceeding of a Europeanization framework.

AKP government supported Annan Plan for reunification of island distancing itself from Denktash policies. Goverment also tried to delink Europeanization process of country from Cyprus dispute. Even military chose to remain silent concerns the developments in Cyprus. The support that the Turkish government has given to Annan Plan which has been approved in the referendum on the Turkish-Cypriot side, means that “Turkey can no longer easily be blamed for the island’s continued division” (Diez, 2005:174)

AKP’s liberal and pluralist approach in identity politics (namely Kurdish, minorities) secularist discourse (helped to legitimize their political standing in front of veto players-Kemalist centers of judiciary, military and state bureaucracy) and problem-solving and consensus-seeking perspective towards problems (Cyprus conflict) within framework of “Europeanization” resulted in low domestic adoption costs and higher domestic resonance (Schimmelfennig et al.

22 See Appendix C, Box 6 Annan Plan for Settlement of Cyprus Dispute
2006:107). The impressive legal and constitutional change and AKP government’s efforts to implement these changes, have upgraded Turkish democracy which were also supported by civic actors.

All of these positive developments were welcomed by the European Council. Due to this decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process” Council decided that ‘Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations […]’23. Consequently, the accession negotiations were decided to open on 3rd October 2005. The second phase, therefore may be regarded as **positive Europeanization** where strong external incentives are meet with far more favourable domestic conditions.

### 4.4.3 Phase III (Post 2005): Stalled Europeanization

The relations with EU reached its apex during AKP government with opening of membership negotiations on 3rd of October in 2005. The incentive based model assumes that the credibility of conditional rewards increases via the opening accession negotiations with the candidate states (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005:14). The case of Turkey demonstrates exactly the opposite outcome in contrast to this assumption since Turkey’s domestic situation was not amenable at that time to push forward significant requirements.

The post-2005 period in the country, was marked by high political tensions and conflicts which resulted in worsening of EU-Turkey relations and paralysing of reform process. Moreover Turkish government seemed to have lost much of its initial European zeal and increasingly displayed signs of ‘reform fatigue’, hesitating to push hard for implementation and enforcement of the EU reforms (Patton, 2007:340) and the public support for EU membership appears to have declined by a considerable margin (Öniş, 2009:41).24

Regarding Kurdish issue, AKP’s policy towards Kurdish problem lost its pre-election multicultural and pluralistic vision. Given the resurgence of Kurdish terrorism and PKK violence in south-eastern Anatolia and in big cities during the course of 2006, the nationalist segments were fulled and it became hard and costly for government to stick to its pluralist discourse of national identity (Onar, 2007:285). AKP’s discourse towards identity issues has turned into more hard core nationalist in 2008. AKP’s approach appeared to converge to the traditional repressive approach of the Turkish state, thus pendulum once again swung

23 The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meeting in Brussels on 16-17 December 2004, p.6
24 In 2004 almost 70% of the population was in favour EU membership, whereas in 2006 the level of support decreased under 50% (See Appendix D Figure 1)
towards the old style strong state tradition and ethnically exclusive nationalism (Öniş, 2009 :43).

“Either leave or love the country”

Erdogan bluntly declared that “all Kurds who were not happy in Turkey should leave the country” during a visit to the predominantly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir in southeast Anatolia. Erdogan’s controversial statement was greeted with shock, not least because “his words appeared to echo the Love it or leave it” slogan of the ultranationalist MHP (Jenkins, 2009)

Due to these events which threatened to deteriorate relations between Turks and Kurds at societal level and questioned the continuation of reforms on Kurdish issue, Kurdish-related reforms in has entered a period of inertia the where several reforms (such as launching of a channel broadcasting in languages other than Turkish) has been delayed.  

With the regard the role of military in politics, it can be said that military’s voice has been heard more loudly during this period. AKP’s recent Islamic statements and controversial activities such as; enthusiastic attempts for promotion of religious freedoms allowing female students to enter schools and universities with their headscarves and announcement of its candidate for the presidential election as Abdullah Gül whose wife has a headscarfed led to harsh Islamists-Kemalist (militarist) confrontation over secularism and strengthen Kemalists’ hands in their arguments about the AKP’s hidden project. (Islamization of the state) (Öniş, 2009:44, Cornell, 2008:3).

The military replied to these Islamic attempts by an unusually harsh anti-government statement, which came to be known as the “e-memorandum,” and issued on the general staff’s website. Following the military’s move Kemalist circles organized huge demonstrations to show Kemalist principles are still in a sense the main principles of political activity and remain enthusiastically guarded by large numbers of Kemalists- military elite, intellectuals, judges, politicians and officers which became obvious by chief prosecutor’s submission of a case for AKP’s closure on account of constituting a focal point for undermining secularism (Cornell and Karaveli, 2008:33) The polarised elite resistance to membership found ample opportunities for manipulating the public agenda and shrinking the mass support for EU by providing misinformation to the public and strategically shaping the rhetoric around the “sensitive issues” (Aydın and Çarkoğlu, 2006:69).

25 European Commission, 2008 Regular Progress Report for Turkey, p.26
26 see Appendix C, Box 3-Islamization of the state
After years of silence, military again used its influence over politics and showed it is still in the game. Moreover the situation was worsened by revival of terrorist activities which resulted in adoption of amendments to the Anti-terror law in 2006. The amendments granted security forces more extensive authority to deal with terrorism, including the removal of safeguards against torture. As Öniş clearly stated “the new Anti-Terror Law clearly marked a major step backwards in Turkey’s recent democratization” (2009:44).

Europeanization process in Turkey came face to face with a serious critical juncture just 13 months later after the negotiations started. The negotiations appear to be on the brink of the “train crash” which Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn warned against in early autumn, 27 when Turkey refused to open its ports and airports to trade with Republic of Cyprus. In light of this situation, the European Council meeting in Brussels on 14–15 December 2006 decided to suspend eight chapters from the accession negotiations with Turkey. At the EU Summit, the ‘train crash’ was avoided. However, it was clear at this conjuncture that the ‘Cyprus problem would hamper Turkey–EU relations as long as the paralysis over this issue continued’ (Ulusoy, 2008: 320).

It could be said that the legitimacy of rule has decreased by accession of a divided Cyprus to EU with the acquis communitaire applying only for its southern part although it was the Greek side who said no in referendum to the Annan Plan which was for settlement of the dispute via re-unification of the island. 28 Thus the ongoing political tension in the country was reinforced by partially suspending of the negotiations and decreasing level of credibility and legitimacy of external incentives which engendered stalled Europeanization.

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27 Oli Rehn, “Turkey’s best response is a rock-solid commitment to reforms” Ankara, 3 October 2006, SPEECH/06/559.
28 Eurobarometer, shows that the image of the EU as a whole has dropped significantly in the eyes of Turkish citizens in 2006 (43% of Turks view the EU positively and 41% of the population trust in EU) (See Appendix D, Figure 3)
The concessions demanded by the EU in Cyprus and the question of Kurdish rights further fuel Turkish neo-nationalism and populism (Cornell and Karaveli, 2008: 45, Grigoriadis, 2006:9-12). Politically, veto players use the Kurdish issue and Cyprus conflict to present themselves to the voters as a truly ‘patriotic’ force, which preserves Turkish national legacy and does not ‘put it up for sale’. This environment is extremely dangerous for Turkey’s further democratization process since it provides great opportunities for veto players who tend to nationalize and polarize political issues and thus mobilize EU-reluctant voters. As a result the process may drift away from positive Europeanization or in other words turn to a ‘negative Europeanization’.

4.4.4 An Unexpected Move: Ongoing Europeanization?

Turkish reform process stalled by the decline in the credibility of EU conditionality and the veto players incurred high adoption costs. However, the Turkish government has still been launching several democratic reforms since 2008. As Olli Rehn has said that ‘there is a slowing down because of works further down the tracks, however the Train continues to move’. Thus the period since 2008 can be regarded as slowed but ongoing Europeanization.

In January 2008 Turkey’s first official 24-hour Kurdish-language television channel (TRT-6) started broadcasting. Then, government welcomed the recent opening of departments of Kurdish literature at Dicle and Istanbul University, a bill introduced in November by DTP deputy. These positive developments can be interpreted as ‘possible sings of a renewed impetus on the part of AKP government to revitalize its drive to Europeanization’ (Öniş, 2009a:32)

The rising trend of the reforms in spite of the considerable lower level of EU credibility and of public support can partly be explained by pro-reformist government which is dissatisfied by the status quo and by the internal demand for change coming from change agents especially business communities, NGOs and intelligentsia (Yılmaz, 2009). Consequently, EU anchor is perceived and used by policy makers and change agents to gain sufficient strength and credibility to relaunch and advance domestic reform process (Tocci, 2005:75, Aydin and Carkoglu, 2006:81). In the AKP’s rhetoric, the EU anchor is also portrayed as a means of attaining the objectives of reform, which are as important as membership itself (Tocci, 2005: 80). Indeed PM Erdoğan reconfirmed this stating that ‘Turkey will adopt the Copenhagen political criteria and considers them as

29 The level of public support for EU membership decreased to 42% in second half of 2008 (See Appendix D Figure 2)
Ankara criteria’. He underlined that ‘we continue progressing on our own path even if the EU fails to open accession talks with Turkey’.  

30 Erdogan: Copenhagen criteria would become Ankara criteria’, Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW), July 2005
5. Serbia: ‘Caught in trap of past’ or Turning the EU Corner?

“The world asks – how much does it cost being Serb? How much for your memory? How much for your history?... It is better that we pay you to be someone else, not who you are”

Boris Tadić

Serbia has been an illiberal regime which had been dominated by a nationalist and/or authoritarian leadership under Milošević, until 2000. This strong influence of the authoritarian heritage impacts on the present day leading to a large extent of Euroscepticism in country. However with the fall of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, Serbia's new leaders announced that Serbia would seek to join the EU (Subotic, forthcoming). Addressing its unreformed nationalist ideology, entrenched veto players, and mutually hostile elites, the lessons learned from Serbian case point to a more general conclusion about the relationship between EU conditionality and Europeanization.

5.1 Conflict and NormViolation: The Miloševic Heritage and Absence of European Idea

Due to its legacies of war, communist heritage; the political culture of statism and authoritarianism remained deeply embedded in Serbia. Since non-democratic political culture remained dominant in which narrow nationalistic and populist interests have a very strong influence, the identification with norms of international community (here is EU). Serbia’s attitude toward Europe is a deeply conflicted one since “European idea” is not broadly shared as in some other East European countries and Serbian elites displayed strong ideological obstinacy to

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Europeanize.\textsuperscript{31} Thus level of identification with Europe has been significantly lower in Serbia when it is compared with Turkey.

In the post-Miloševic era the newly democratic Serbia is also shaped by values, beliefs and institutions (military, police and the secret service) from the old regime which continue to influence present developments and has been supported by majorities of the Serbian elite and public. Within a path-dependant approach, it can be said that historical legacies have left their traits in political elite behavior where elites continued to show resistance to EU requirements. (Pop-Eleches, 2007). This continuation of Miloševic era policies also manifested itself in Serbia’s very ambivalent attitudes towards Europe.

\textit{Serbian political culture and path dependency}

Nicole Gallina (2007) presents a path-dependent approach arguing that a change of political elite culture has taken place only partly after the establishment of a liberal democratic framework in Eastern Central Europe. Within a path-dependent approach, values, beliefs and institutions from the old regime may be regarded as assets that continue to influence present developments. I argue that this approach can also be used to analyse impact of Miloševic regime on Serbia’s present political developments.

As Subotic (2009:30) very well puts it; ‘Europe was imagined as taking something away – territory (Kosovo), national pride (humiliation of losing the Balkan wars), and collective memory of the past (by writing a new historical transcript at the Hague).’ When the EU put government’s co-operation with the ICTY to capture and extradite suspected war criminals, as a condition for the opening and continuation of negotiations, it became a challenge to the national heritage and historical legacies. However what makes the situation more challenging is EU’s pressure on government to recognize Kosovo which is an unacceptable for most of Serbian elites (army, old communist political elites, the Serbian Orthodox Church, establishment intelligentsia and the largely unreformed and unprofessionalized media) and the Serbian people. Consequently, complying with EU demands potentially cause high domestic political costs for government.

5.1.1 Cooperation with the Hague (ICTY)

Serbia was obligated to cooperate with the ICTY by arresting and transferring war crimes suspect, in particular Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić in order to

\textsuperscript{31} Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009.
keep its relations close with EU and to receive financial aid. Besides its practical implications the issue has high symbolic value for national identity where these generals are regarded as national heroes. For European actors, cooperation with ICTY has been regarded as a means of signalling a clean break with past. However cooperation with ICTY is contradictory for collective understanding of public reflecting that Serbian nation fought a just war and was victim rather than perpetrator.32

Who are they: Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić?

Karadžić was Former Bosnian Serb political leader and Mladić was the Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army during the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. There has been an outstanding international arrest warrant against both men following the Rule 61 of ICTY which concluded that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they have committed the crimes in question, including genocide of 8,000 Bosniak Muslims in Srebrenica. Karadžić has been was been indicted for war crimes by the ICTY in July 2008. Mladić is still fugitive.

The Serbian elites and majority of the public therefore mostly opposed and rejected the Hague Tribunal which had traditionally been perceived as an anti-Serb institution trying to indicate Serbs.33 However there are different views and approaches towards ICTY cooperation and EU conditionality within Serbian elites: conservatives and reformists.

The conservatives -Euro resisters- gathered around (former) President Koštunica included traditional nationalists, but also significant numbers of former Milošević loyalists - mostly from Milošević’s SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia) and the extremist SRS (Serbian Radical Party) - who flocked to Kostunica’s DSS-Democratic Party of Serbia). The conservatives displayed general hostility towards normative Europeanization; and strongly opposed cooperation with ICTY due to ideological but also political and populist reasons. They concentrate on identity politics and issues of nationality in order to justify their EU-reluctance and mobilize frustrated voters (Gallina, 2007:75-91). They had significant support among the army, old communist political elites, the Serbian Orthodox Church, establishment intelligentsia and media.

33 Public opinion in Serbia - Attitudes towards the ICTY -survey undertaken by Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing Research in, 2004 shows that attitude to ICTY is extremely negative and even every fourth citizen thinks that there should be no cooperation under no circumstances despite being uninformed about ICTY activities and trials. Three quarter of citizens interpret ICTY mission as world conspiracy against Serbs and Serbia and more than two thirds of the population think ICTY tries to indicated Serbs in a biased manner (See Appendix D, Figure 4 and Figure 5)
The reformists-instrumental promoters of Europeanization gathered around the Democratic Party (DS) led first by Prime Minister Djindjic, and after his 2003 assassination around his heirs Zivkovic and Tadic. Democratic Party linked cooperation with the ICTY to European integration and positioned themselves as supporter of European integration, reform, and internationalism. “Europe is our house and no price is too high to pay… I am for Europe,” Djindjic famously said, implying that his opponents were not. The party got support from most cabinet members, major business and technocratic elites, from most of Serbia’s civil society sector which have been too weak to really matter and from public. The public opinion polls also illustrate Serbian membership to the EU continues to receive support, varying depending on the circumstances, but never lower than 60 percent.34

Although the two camps frequently differed on matters of policy, their biggest point of disagreement was on issues of cooperation with ICTY and the path towards European integration.35 As Subotic (forthcoming) argues the domestic political conflict over competing elite strategies therefore directly shaped Europeanization outcomes which is also endorsed by Pridham “Opposition to EU inspired change might exist because of a strong nationalist constituency as in Serbia which is an interesting case because of divided opinions there and the close balance between them.” 36

5.1.2 Kosovo: Serbs ‘Jerusalem’

_A field like no other, Heaven above it, Heaven below._

Vasko Papa

In addition to cooperation with the Hague, recognition of independent Kosovo is another issue where EU put pressure on government. The status of Kosovo, formally a province of Serbia but under international administrations since 1999 allows nationalist mobilization and distracts from democratic reforms.37

Kosovo represents a constitutive part of the Serbian national mythology.38 The question of Kosovo goes to heart of the question of Serbian statehood which Serbs frame it in nationalist terms (Batt, 2005:33) In words of Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic ‘It is their Jerusalem’ This is also underlined by Subotic “Kosovo is a cornerstone of Serbian constructed national identity. There is complete agreement

34 See Appendix D Figure 8 and Figure 9
35 See Appendix D Figure 6
36 Author’s interview with Geoffrey Pridham, 14 April 2009.
in Serbia – across different elites – that without Kosovo, Serbs will no longer be Serbs. This sentiment is shared across all segments of society. It is partly nationalist mythology, partly a continuation of Serbian sense of victimization and loss, and party a foundational bloc of Serbian identity. This will be very difficult for Serbia to overcome.” 39

The major constitutional preamble of Serbia states that Kosovo is a constitutive, ‘inalienable’ part of Serbia. Thus, the prospect of losing Kosovo was widely perceived as a profound blow to Serbian identity and the Serbian state by not only conservative nationalists but also moderates and reformers (Subotic, 2009:38). The Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 even worsened the situation where even the government dissolved on grounds of lack of consensus to deal with Kosovo.40

Serbian’s refusal to accept Kosovo’s declaration of interdependence has further complicated its relationship with the EU, while European support of Kosovo’s independence angered Serbia and dramatically soured its desire to Europeanize. Subotic argues that “EU requirement that Serbia recognizes Kosovo’s independence has so delegitimized EU in the eyes of the Serbian elites and population, that the EU is no longer considered a desirable group to join (EU is seen as taking something away from Serbia, not giving Serbia anything in return). The issue of Kosovo and EU conditionality around Kosovo has then greatly benefited right-wing nationalist parties, which have pushed for Serbia’s increasing ties with Russia.” 41

The issue of cooperation with ICTY has degraded to a lower level and become more obsolete as the new crisis namely instability following Kosovo’s declaration of independence was looming large. The earlier trade off – Europe for The Hague – was now replaced by a new one – Europe for Kosovo (Subotic, 2009: 38). In a speech a few days after Kosovo declared independence, Tadic pleaded that Serbia has been part of Europe for two centuries and should join the EU as a whole, not without a part of its territory: “The world asks – how much does it cost being Serb? How much for your memory? How much for your history?... It is better that we pay you to be someone else, not who you are.... For us to sit at the table of the European family as the only state that got its seat through an indecent trade, denying its own memory and identity... I do not know how to make such a bargain.” 42 In sum these two political problems – the Hague and Kosovo – and the European requirements regarding them profoundly shaped the process and outcome of Europeanization process in Serbia.
5.2 European Demands and Conditions

The EU ‘democratization’ platform for Serbia has been very inclusive, and it captured proposed reforms many areas. Thus it is larger than Copenhagen political criteria, which include regional cooperation (Kosovo-related issues) good neighborly relations with enlargement countries and member states, and respect for international obligations (such as cooperation with the UN ICTY) that quickly proved to be Serbia’s stumbling block on the road to Brussels. There is general tendency in public that the EU constantly imposes new conditions for accession of Serbia to the EU thereby placing Serbia in unfavourable situation in relation to any other country. This implies low level of legitimacy of EU conditions.43

The cooperation with the ICTY has been European Union’s primary, if not only, measurement of how far along Serbia was in adopting the idea of addressing crimes from its recent past since it was a measurable indicator -number of suspects arrested and transferred to The Hague, number of documents and testimonies sent, could all be classified, systematized and easily counted. This, in turn, then became shorthand for Serbia’s readiness to accept international justice standards and its desire to Europeanize (Subotic, forthcoming; Orthenlicher, 2008, pp.52-8). Most specifically, “[......] full cooperation with the ICTY is an international obligation and one of the key priorities of the European Partnership” as it is stated clearly in Commission’s progress report on Serbia (2008:21)

However, the strength of the EU’s commitment to that linkage has been diluted over time. The EU has officially resumed SAA negotiations with Serbia in June 2007. In April 2008 EU signed SAA along with the Interim Agreement with Serbia, despite of Serbia’s continuing failure to deliver the two major suspects-Mladić and Karadžić.

**Conditional Implementation of SAA**

The implementation of the SAA was made conditional on proof of cooperation with international justice. The Dutch government in particular was adamant that the arrest of Mladic must remain the condition for further rapprochement with the EU.

In this sense the Council stated that “full cooperation with the ICTY, including all possible efforts to arrest and transfer indictees, is an essential element of these Agreements. EU ministers agreed to submit the SAA to their parliaments for ratification and the Community agreed to implement the Interim Agreement as soon as the Council decides that Serbia is fully cooperating with the ICTY.”


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43 See Appendix D, Figure 10
The main reason behind EU’s willingness to put Serbia on a fast track toward membership was to gain more credibility and room or manoeuvre to pressure on Serbia to accept the inevitable independence of Kosovo at a time when long-protracted negotiations over the territory’s status were exhausted without an agreed solution. In a move vehemently opposed by Serbia, Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008 which led to collapse of government and deterioration of relations with EU. Although European integration process is not officially conditional to recognition of Kosovo, EU asks for developing regional cooperation which indirectly points Kosovo issue. The the majority public (70%) indeed perceive recognizing Kosovo as a condition for Serbia’s EU integration.

5.3 Outcome: Conditions and Compliance

The case study covers Serbia’s Europeanization process since Serbia went through a mostly peaceful democratic transition, overthrowing the autocratic regime of Milošević at the ballot box in October 2000 and is subdivided in three phases.

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<td>From 2000 to 2003 when the prime minister Zoran Djindjic, a center-left moderate, assassinated in March 2003 by a paramilitary group due to his actions for arresting Miloševic and transferring him to The Hague and, when Serbia was given potential candidate country status for EU accession following the Thessaloniki European Council of June.</td>
<td>From 2003 when Serbia gained a EU membership perspective in Thessaloniki to 2005 where negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia launched</td>
<td>From 2005 to 2008 when the EU and Serbia signed the SAA includes the period of frozen of association negotiations between May 2006 and June 2007 due to non-compliance of Serbia with EU conditions cooperation with ICTY</td>
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44 See Susanne Simon, “EU agreement even without surrendering Mladić; Stability more important than arrest of war criminals,” Die Welt, Dec. 18, 2007
45 See Appendix D, Figure 7, B92 Public Pull results

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5.3.1 Phase I (2000-2003): Stalled Europeanization

After ousting of Milošević in October 2000 which was regarded as triumph of pro-European politicians, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia-DOS 46 government where Koštunica was President and Djindjic was Prime minister, sought rapprochment with international community and started to reintegrate into Europe’s regional organization. Only days after the new government took over, the EU has radically revised its policy toward Serbia first lifted its long-lasting economic sanctions against Serbia, pledged billions in reconstruction aid and officially endorsed the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for Serbia. However the increased credibility of external incentives was thwarted by low level of legitimacy of European conditions (especially cooperation with ICTY) and unfavourable domestic factors.

To deal with the issue of the past, specifically the Milošević wars and war crimes became a challenge for the new transitional government. Illiberal nationalists have continued to play a prominent and toxic role in Serbian politics (Orentlicher, 2008:19) which became obvious with Prime Minister Djindjic’s assassination. Then on June 28, 2001 Milošević was arrested for corruption and abuse of power and transferred to The Hague, in an operation coordinated by Djindjic. “Our country’s place is in the international community,” Djindjic said following Milošević’s transfer to The Hague in order to justify his action however could not rescue himself from the tragic end.

Djindjic’s assassination was a crucial moment in Serbia’s democratic transition. His death significantly weakened the reformist government and therefore provided a huge power vacuum, which was immediately filled by anti-EU forces -Kostunica’s DSS and by the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in the 2003 elections. After re-election Kostunica went back to his entrenched position of non-compliance and anti-EU, hard line nationalist policies (Subotic, forthcoming).

The assassination proved that current limited progress of reform and integration with EU was vulnerable, impeded by extreme nationalism and war legacy and had been enough to stop Serbian reforms which were ongoing due to pragmatic cost-benefit calculations rather than deep commitment with European values and norms. Therefore the first phase of Europeanization was marked by absence of European idea, high political cost of adoption, competing elite

46 The DOS itself was a coalition of two main parties and personalities: the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) led by new president Vojislav Kostunica and the Democratic Party (DS) led by prime minister Zoran Djindjic
strategies over Europe, low level of resonance and still robust existence of old regime spoilers which resulted in stalled Europeanization.

Self-learning process

However there is one point that should not be missed in Djindjic’s assassination. It was the first step toward acknowledging Serbian responsibility for atrocious crimes and unequivocally condemning them and started a learning process where ICTY began to educate the Serbian public about atrocities—especially about crimes committed by their political leaders (Orhendlicher, 2008:22) The long term effects of this learning process would help to change nature of Europeanization from stalled or fake to positive during coming years.

5.3.2 Phase II (2003-2005) : Fake Europeanization

The second phase begins with EU’s attempts to make its policy towards WB more credible through Thessaloniki European Council in June where SAP, leading to conclusion of SAA and thereafter the perspective of eventual EU membership is confirmed for all Western Balkan countries including Serbia. In response to this strong external incentive and intense international pressure for failing to work closely with the Court, the Kostunica government instituted a new strategy of “voluntary surrenders” where state would guarantee the suspects if they surrender voluntarily. As a result of this new initiative, a total of 13 Serbian or Bosnian Serb ICTY suspects were arrested and transferred to The Hague in just a few months which were presented to public as the key for opening up doors for Serbia to join the EU (Subotic, forthcoming).

This new strategy however was not motivated by moral values (to achieve justice) but rather by pragmatic/tactical calculations such as propitiating European actors, avoiding from sanctions, gaining a stonger bargaining position for Kosovo and getting a better record from EU’s Feasibility Study.  As Subotic underlines; “The sudden change of heart and the streamlined process of “voluntary surrenders” was the result of larger political calculations of the Serbian government, which was concerned that, unless Serbia steps up its cooperation with the ICTY, it will not be allowed a seat at the table regarding much more important issues on the agenda – the status of Kosovo.”

47 The Feasibility Study is an evaluation report that establishes whether a country is able to negotiate an SAA
48 Author’s Interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009
The Serbian government’s new strategy worked and EU approved a positive Feasibility Study in April assessing that although this has been slow and sometimes partial especially owing to the legacy of the past regime Serbia has made sufficient progress in meeting the prerequisites and developing the capacity to negotiate which in turn resulted opening up SAA negotiations in October 2005.

Although political elites seemed to support Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, they have framed cooperation in terms that resonate with Serbian nationalists in order to sell Europeanization and its cost to public at home (Orentlicher, 2008:21) They used the jargon of cooperation with ICTY and international justice in true nationalist style sending signals to the domestic audience that nothing significant would change, that the grand-narrative of Serbia’s victim-centered nationalist tradition would continue. Consequently this strategy allowed Serbia to go through the motions of formally complying with European institutional demands, while in fact repudiating behavioural change and profound social transformation Europeanization requires. A survey conducted in December 2004, reverberates the impact of government’s strategy on public showing that only 15 percent of those polled support cooperation with the ICTY in order to achieve justice while a majority support cooperation on the pragmatic grounds often cited by political leaders.

Since the cost of full compliance was still high, government of Kostunica simulated compliance to avoid the even higher costs of total refusal to and to update the Feasibility Study of EU and EU decision-making on the opening of association negotiations. Several war criminals were arrested but the actors still did not believe in the appropriateness of these domestic changes. Thus the second phase of Europeanization process in the country may be considered as partial/fake Europeanization and did not moved beyond political cost-benefit calculations as also stated by Subotic “the entire process of Europeanization in Serbia has been shallow or fake compliance. Serbian elites, even the reformers, pick and choose how they want to Europeanize. So they accept some requirements, but then reject the most important ones such as cooperation with the ICTY and recognition of Kosovo”

50 Belgrade Centre for Human Rights and Strategic Marketing Research, “Public Opinion in Serbia: Views on Domestic War Crimes Judicial Authorities and the Hague Tribunal,” December 2004 (See Appendix D, Figure 4)
51 Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009.
5.3.3 Phase III (2005-2009): Positive Europeanization....But!

Serbia’s strategic ‘quasi-compliance’ with EU’s principal requirement collapsed in 2006 when Serbia failed to transfer two remaining most wanted indictees – Radovan Karadžić and especially Ratko Mladić to the Hague. The EU squeezed on Serbia to arrest and to transfer those two men who was widely believed to be hiding in Serbia, protected by the Serbian military. On May 3, 2006, EU negotiations on Serbia’s accession were officially suspended. This unfavorable turn of events put great strain on Serbian government and resulted in stalled Europeanization. The public opinion surveys shows that Serbian public tended to accuse EU of slowing down the reform process and blackmailing towards their country.\(^52\)

In the next few months, however, European policies towards Serbia began to change. On February 12, 2007 EU announced, that SAA negotiations with Serbia would resume provided the government shows a clear commitment to achieve full cooperation with the ICTY, and takes concrete and effective action for full cooperation without clarifying ‘clear commitment’. In November 2007, the EU initialized the SAA and finally signed the agreement with Serbia on April 29, 2008 putting Serbia on a fast track toward membership, although Serbia did not show any progress in cooperation with ICTY. Moreover, in January 2008, a visa facilitation and a readmission agreement between Serbia and the EU came into force which is important to “revive Euro enthusiasm in Serbia”, Subotic says. “Serbs don’t care much about war crimes, about their responsibility for the war. They want to join Europe because they understand that this will bring them material benefits, but not at any cost. But overall, when you look at opinion polls, most citizens want to join Europe for very practical reasons (to get on a Schengen visa list, to get access to European markets)\(^53\) and not because they feel European.”\(^54\)

The calculations behind EU’s unexpected turn reflects the intricacy of the EU’s strategies but a key factor was strengthening pro-European forces within Serbia namely reformist Democratic Party against hard line Democratic Party of Serbia and Serbian Radical Party for the coming parliamentary elections in May 2008 (Orentlicher, 2008:49) The EU’s strategy may have contributed to election results that favored the pro-reformist and Euro-enthusiastic Democratic Party led by President Tadić.

\(^{52}\) See Appendix D Figure 11
\(^{53}\) A November 2008 public opinion survey carried out by the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy found that living conditions and the economy remain the most important issues for Serbian citizens, with EU integration (Cvijic,2009:2) (See Appendix D, Figure 12)
\(^{54}\) Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009.
The change of government lowered the costs of adoption, increased the level of domestic resonance and more importantly triggered the improvement in cooperation with the ICTY where the new reformist political leaders surprised international observers and the Hague tribunal itself by arresting Radovan Karadžić in Belgrade, in July 2008. This development is of major symbolic and political significance as an essential step in Europe’s direction (Rupnik, 2008).

**2008 Elections: Pro-reformist Coalition Government**

Divisions between political parties on major policy issues adversely affected the activities of parliament and government, leading to early legislative elections in 2008. For a European Serbia is an electoral coalition that won the Serbian parliamentary election, 2008. The coalition was formed by the Democratic Party led by Boris Tadić, G17+, Serbian Renewal Movement, League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina and Sanjak Democratic Party. All parties (with the arguable exception of some radical nationalist formations) have been committed to democratizing Serbian politics. The coalition formed the Government with Mirko Cvetković as a Prime Minister on July 7 after securing the needed majority in the National Assembly with the coalition around the Socialist Party.

The arrest of Karadžić also testifies to the effectiveness of European leverage since there has been an ongoing debate among Europeans about the wisdom and effectiveness of European conditionality with regard to cooperation with the International Tribunal (Rupnik, 2008). ‘We have to appreciate Serbia for the efforts she has made until now’ says Oli Rehn; ‘Serbia has cooperated in locating and handing over 20 of the 24 ICTY indictees. shows that our policy of conditionality works’. The increased level of cooperation with ICTY had also an educative function teaching the Serbian public about war crimes committed by their political leaders. This is a first step toward acknowledging Serbian responsibility for atrocious crimes and unequivocally condemning them (Orentlicher, 2008: 20) which increased the level of legitimacy of EU requirements.

The strong external incentives were supported by favourable domestic conditions when the new governing coalition has placed pro-European actors in the divers’ seat of European politics (Spendzharova, 2003) The government has seemed to be willing and able to move on a number of important issues including the arrest of war-crimes indictee Karadžić, ratification of SAA with EU and planning to complete its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal by the end of 2009 by handing over the remaining indictees – Ratko Mladić (and Goran Hadžic). For the first time since the assassination of reformist PM Djindic in 2003, Serbia

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appers to make progress towards full democratic consolidation (Edmuns, 2009:128), and **positive Europeanization** due to low level of adoption costs, high domestic resonance and more credible EU perspective.

However the process itself carries its negative seeds inside since illiberal resilience is rooted in Serbian political culture. Reformist elements and newly emerging civil society activism which is very weak therefore have had to work within—and often struggle against—a political space shaped by the illiberal practices of the past (Edmuns, 2009:139). The positive nature of Europeanization may turn easily into a negative one and the direction of the country can change since Kosovo still stands as a problem as it become clear in words of Vuk Jeremić -Foreign Minister of Serbia; “*The Serbian government will not recognize Kosovo at any cost. Not now. Not in a year. Not in a decade. Never. For Kosovo and Metohija shall remain a part of Serbia forever*” 56 As Batt (2009:3) highlighted leaving Kosovo unresolved would sooner or later put obstacles in the way of Serbia in implementation of SAA and *acquis*. Cooperation with the Hague and Kosovo issue are keeping Serbia in the ‘trap of its unfinished past’ (Orlovic, 2008:216). This reveals that uprooting the embedded illiberal legacies of the Milošević regime and consolidating democracy where political culture is committed to liberal-democratic principles and rooted in active civil society, are likely to be a slow and far from straightforward task in Serbia.

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56 Jeremić: Serbia won't recognize Kosovo, 22 April 2009, B92 Insight
6. Does Candidate Status Matter? A Comparative Analysis

Does candidate status matter? Yes it does matter! A state complies with the norms of the EU if the level credibility and size of external incentive is high. The Helsinki Summit in 1999 where Turkey gained a formal status of candidate country, provided a strong incentive to launch taboo-breaking democratic reforms for the membership. Similarly when Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 confirmed association process, leading to the perspective of eventual EU membership for Serbia, the Kostunica government has taken crucial steps towards cooperation with the ICTY. It can be said that policies of conditionality lead to fast and radical changes in the short to medium run as in the case in Turkey and Serbia. However the more deep-rooted changes may only be expected in the longer run where civic actors and socialization process gain more importance for internalization of EU norms and values and, societal Europeanization.

Societal Europeanization

It operates on a fundamental level and can be defined as a process of change in the ‘construction of systems of meanings and collective understandings’ within the context of European integration (Cowles et al., p. 219). This implies that the EU and Europe become reference points in the construction of social identities and alter the way in which such identities are constructed and represented (Diez et al, 2005, p.5-6)

The credible accession conditionality, therefore, is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of EU success in promoting reform process. When the compliance to EU requirements costs too much, that is when fulfilling EU conditions contradict the established notions of the regime and historical legacies, threaten the securitry and integrity of the state, and/or the political interests of government, it becomes a challenge for political elites to continue EU-demanded reform process and to resist against veto players who tend to mobilize anti-EU tendencies. Thus even credible membership/ candidacy incentives prove ineffective to produce compliancy without being accompanied by favourable domestic conditions which illustrates the interplay between two levels. The problem has crucial connotation of the EU’s failure to recognize the specific political circumstances of the countries which may mitigate the transformative power of EU (Edmuns, 2009:140)
In Turkey and Serbia the Europeanization has not been a smooth and linear process but rather moves in a up and down/stop-and-go pattern since it meets with resistance in national arena. Thus the limited progress of reform and integration with EU has been vulnerable.

In Turkey the European integration process is paralysed when EU requirements began to shake main corner stones of Kemalist ideology and the very nucleus of the state whereas in Serbia the reform process just stalled since European demands disturbed ghosts of Milošević era policies. In both countries there are strong veto players within the state structure who have privileged positions and interest in the keeping their seats.

These cases therefore do not only demonstrate that domestic factors matter more than external incentives for the future trajectory of the reform process but also depicts the limits of conditionality in sustaining momentum for reform along the long and difficult road to accession. As Schimmelfennig highlights “external rewards can compensate for domestic costs and other inhibiting factors – but only to a point. In the end, domestic factors are trump.”

The long term effectiveness of the EU’s influence and its ability to promote democracy also depend on regime type and party policy constellations in candidates (Schimmelfennig, 2007:132; Sedelmeier, 2006:15). As it has exhibited in the cases the parties in government affect the Europeanization pattern of countries. In the mixed party policy constellation such as in Turkey and Serbia, liberal and antiliberal parties or coalitions compete for political power. In these cases, democratic transformation has developed in a up-and-down pattern (ibid:134). For example in Turkish case, the first phase of the process was marked by fake copmlaince where MHP-DSP-ANAP coalition had illiberal tendencies towards reforms concerning Kurdish rights and role of military. However in the second phase AKP govermment adopt its policy/programme content and agenda that are consistent with EU requirements which in turn led to positive Europeanization. The Serbian case also proves the argument where the pro-reformist and Euro-enthusiastic Democratic Party after 2008 elections triggered the reform process through improving the cooperation with the ICTY.

57 Author’s interview with Frank Schimmelfennig, 7 May 2009.
58 See Digdem Soyaltın “Europeanization as a path dependent process in Turkey: Changing positions of political parties within an unchanging European trajectory”. Paper presented at the EUI Tenth Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence 25-28 March 2009. The author has discussed the impact of transformative power of Europeanization on Turkey where EU’s leverage challenges traditional notions of republic and reshapes established positions of political parties.
I argue -and time will tell- EU’s clear membership perspective creates the conditions for ‘locking in’ liberal democratic changes, signals to the parties that compliance is “the only game in town” and triggers a process of domestic debate whereby parties and constituencies realise what kind of benefits that could be achieved by playing the “Europeanisation card”. Simultaneously, authoritarian-nationalist parties would adapt to an EU-compatible agenda, change their rhetoric and outlook in favor of compliance in the long run (Vachudova, 2006:33, Saatçioğlu, 2007:13). Schimmelfennig also underlines that “the lock-in effects of integration creates path dependency across changes in government and may, eventually, change the party constellations from mixed to liberal in the end.”

To sell Europeanization to Public...

In Turkey and Serbia, prospect of EU membership perspective has played a crucial role in terms of transforming all political parties by making them to adopt their policy/programme contents and agendas to some extent consistent with EU requirements. However the transformative mechanisms work weakly in these two countries since the current reformers (DS, G17 in Serbia and AKP in Turkey) are not liberal enough. They are certainly much better than nationalist and illiberal parties, but they still work within ideologically nationalist framework, especially when it comes to sensitive issues since it is challenging to sell Europeanization to the public.

It is clear that the EU’s transformative mechanisms in Turkey and Serbia will not be effective in promoting sustainable compliance without efforts of domestic actors to work in synergy with EU and, the consensus among the political, economic and social elites and the citizens as to the necessity of EU-guided democratisation (Schimmelfennig, 2008: 918; Vachudova, 2006: 34 Anastakis and Bechev, 2003: 11). In this sense the active participation of civil society actors is important as it sets in motion – beyond legal Europeanization– a process of socialization and societal Europeanization.

In Turkey post-Helsinki era witnessed the rise of the intense internal pressure from business interest NGOs, liberal civil society organizations, universities, the media on the government for launching reforms. The launch of reforms in 2002 and ongoing reform process since 2008 therefore, have been partly a consequence of active pressure via these change agents to the government. In this sense lack of civil society activism due to its communist culture, is perhaps the biggest problem in Serbia. There are no powerful civic actors to put pressure on government for triggering democratic reforms. Moreover government, media, and

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59 Author’s interview with Frank Schimmelfennig, 7 May 2009
60 Serbia’s Freedom of House rating for civil society remains at 2.75 whereas it is 4.33 in Turkey due recent liberal reforms which have eased restrictions on the civic associations in 2007-2008 (see more : www.freedomhouse.org) However very recently the strong liberalizing tendencies are observable in civil society.
society remain hostile to civil society. As Subotic underlines “these change agents are still largely nationalistic, especially the media, universities, and politicians. NGOs and some pro-European politicians do exist, but they are very weak. They have no real access to political change. They are often ridiculed in the media, they are abused (some of these NGO and liberal politicians are often physically attacked). This is because it is still much safer to be a nationalist than a reformist in Serbia.”

Studying compliance as such requires a thorough analysis of changing public stance, rival political party orientations towards EU membership and civil society activism in target countries as the main causal mechanism between conditionality and Europeanization which could not be fully elaborated upon here due to space limitations. Such a comprehensive analysis would clearly allow us to unpack the puzzle of cross-national variation in Europeanization patterns. This thesis therefore points out new research areas for further analysis.

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62 Author’s interview with Jelena Subotic, 13 March 2009.
63 Author aims to study during her PhD on party adaptation to EU accession as the transformation of political parties and the party system in Croatia, Turkey and Serbia has wider affects than the sphere of party politics and has a significant impact on Europeanization of politics, domestic political debate and public opinion about European matters in general.
7. Concluding Remarks

Europeanization is a long process. It does not come at once and does not come alone but rather bring challenges along with. Given the EU norm violation in Turkey and Serbia and the conflicts at national arena, the effectiveness of the incorporation of ready-made model is doubtful. In this sense this thesis attempts to open the black box of the domestic factors which have brought different dynamics to Europeanization process. Turkey and Serbia are chosen as case studies to point out the cultural filters which mitigate or constrain the transformative impact of EU and political learning in the countries leading to unexpected consequences such as resistance and rejection of EU norms.

This thesis tested external incentives and domestic factors to examine the conditions under which political elites in Turkey and Serbia have complied, or partially complied or rejected to comply with the political demands of EU referring different Europeanization patterns of countries. For each country a similar basic template is used which begins with initial conflict and different issues of norm violation in target country, and continues with European demands and conditions. The analysis finalizes with the outcome part where the compliance patterns of countries are analysed in different time frames. The empirical analysis exemplify that the reward on the edge of the tunnel –that is the candidacy/membership status-does not lead to assertable compliance and a long lasting reform process unless the national features provide a fertile ground and domestic/civic actors hold a light in their hands in order to move on this long road.

Addressing the backlashes of Europeanization strategy in both countries in recent years, the conditionality strategy has been ineffective to achieve compliance under the constraints of cultural filters. This does not only reveal the loopholes of Europeanization which European actors must take into account of, but also pinpoints the importance socialization as an indirect influence mechanism in order to assure sustainable compliance, to promote norm diffusion and to avoid from ‘shallow, fake, partial or negative Europeanization.’ Moreover, the role of change agents converged on a pro-EU agenda resisting against the power of veto players should also be taken into account since they apparently push governments towards a reformist trajectory. The active participation of these actors is important as it paves the way for a process of socialization, a societal and a ‘genuine Europeanization.’ A collaboration between political elites, civic actors and public both at national and European level is the key for the success of eventual Europeanization.
8. Executive Summary

Europeanization has been recently emerging as crucial instrument and mechanism for top-down democratisation process of countries in the enlargement track. Conditionality is a concept that is placed very much at the centre of the Europeanization which is based on rule transfer and generally works through reinforcement by reward where membership is the greatest reward to be offered. However current disappointments of Europeanization in several countries put the effectiveness of reinforcement by reward strategy in question.

This thesis seeks to answer a highly related question to this debate question of *if candidate status matters – and to what extent it matters* for two countries- Turkey and Serbia. The first part of the question addresses the impact of external incentives- namely size and credibility of EU rewards- on compliance patterns of countries with EU demands and attempts to demonstrate how important the credible prospect of EU membership is, in this sense. The second part of the question is related to impact of domestic characteristics which carry different dynamics to Europeanization process. In this sense it is argued that the transformative power of EU is filtered by domestic factors that are incompatible with European values, norms and rules.

The thesis focuses on the hypothesis that it is less the candidate status *per se* that matters but rather the unfavourable domestic factors, high costs of compliance, existence of robust veto players and the failure of the countries to include the civil society actors in their transformation process that account for the limited impact of transformative power of EU through conditionality and for low level of compliance.

The case selection demonstrate the loopholes in Europeanization process in which conditionality turns out to be weak to promote compliance when EU’s demands meet with resistance at national arena. The Europeanization process in Turkey and Serbia where the accession negotiations with the former were partially suspended in 2006 and the association negotiations with the latter has fallen into abeyance between May 2006 and June 2007 is paralysed due to high costs of compliance to EU requirements. In particular in both countries fulfilling EU conditions has become a challenge for traditional notions of the regime, for the security and integrity of the state, and/or the interests of government. Thus it has been difficult for government and political elites too attach to ultimate goal of EU membership and to resist against veto players who benefit from mobilizing anti-EU tendencies through linking national problem and EU membership process.
The conflicts at national arena point out that EU conditionality can have important catalytic role in prompting reforms, a sustainable reform process however requires certain domestic conditions to prevail which in turn exhibits the the impact of interaction between external incentives and domestic conditions on Europeanization patterns of countries (Putnam’s two level game).

The thesis is mainly divided in seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introductory part which begins with clarifying research question(s), main argument and hypotheses, and continues with research design, case selection, methodological considerations and finalizes with an overview of the existing literature and the structure of the thesis. Next chapter (Chapter 2) draws a framework for Europeanization where a comprehensive conceptualisation and a theoretical background are presented. This thesis has a post-ontological approach towards Europeanization which brings domestic politics back into our understanding of European integration through focusing on the impact of EU on domestic political and societal processes. I understand Europeanization as a process includes both hard transfer of rules, procedures and policy paradigms but also soft transfer of styles, ways of doing things, shared beliefs, norms and discourses since formal rule transfer also has a normative transformative impact on ideological structures and preferences of the target states.

After outlining the Europeanization conceptual delimitations, the thesis turns to theorizing Europeanization process through elaborating its main areas of influence, scope and mechanisms. It is important to demonstrate the domains of Europeanization to clarify the wide range of EU influence on target countries. It is actually not only about legal engineering through adoption of EU rules but also about change of ways of doing things, norms and collective understandings. The scope of domestic change in response to EU’s transformative power is related to how much change’ has been brought about by Europeanization which can range from more or less domestic change to large scale transformation.

Within the framework of this thesis I follow Schimmelfenning et al’s approach and employ two basic models for European governance and rule promotion–external incentives and social learning to understand the motives behind the compliance decisions of target states. External incentives model is based on cost-benefit balance which depends on the size and credibility of international rewards, on the one hand, and the size of domestic adoption costs, on the other. Social learning model whereas emphasizes on degree of cultural match between EU norms and domestic practices.

Chapter 3 illuminates the main hypotheses of the external incentives and social learning model and describes the independent and dependent variables. The independent variables which have impact on compliance to EU requirements (as dependent variable) are subdivided into external and domestic conditions and put in a table to model Europeanization patterns of the countries. The external conditions refer to attribute of EU’s strategies (size and credibility of rewards and
legitimacy); whereas domestic conditions attributes of target governments (costs, veto players identification, resonance).

Four different Europeanization outcomes are formulated by using different combinations of external and domestic conditions: positive, slowed, fake and stalled Europeanization. Europeanization is likely to be positive if endogenous factors are favourable and external incentive is strong where the level of compliance to EU requirements is on its highest level. The reform process led by Europeanization loses its momentum but still continues on a lower rank due to power of favourable domestic factors and/or demand of change agents who put pressure on government for further reforms although external incentive is weak.

Fake/partial Europeanization refers simulating compliance to avoid the even higher costs of confrontation, total refusal to comply and denial of a membership prospect if domestic factors are unfavourable. However the outcome can be worse when unfavourable domestic conditions are worsened by weak external incentive resulting in stalled Europeanization where the reform process paralysed and faced with a rupture.

Chapter 4 and 5 follow the same template which begins with initial conflict and different issues of norm violation in target country, and continues with European demands and conditions and finalizes with the outcome part where the compliance patterns of countries are analysed in different time frames. These time frames are formulated following critical junctures and ups and downs in countries’ Europeanization processes. This template is used for both Turkey and Serbia for the empirical analysis.

The core of the empirical research consists the analysis of official documents of EU which follows the progress made by target countries in order to fulfill the EU demands and daily news which allows me to track the conditions of EU and compliance/non-compliance patterns of target governments. In addition to primary (official documents, speeches, press releases etc.) sources, the analysis counts on the rich collection of secondary sources (academic literature). Furthermore several semi-standardized expert interviews with scholars working on Europeanization in South Eastern Europe (specifically on Turkey and in Serbia) are also conducted to acquire a more structured insight on the issue.64

Within the framework of the Turkish case (Chapter 4) Kurdish question, insufficient democratic-civilian control of military and Cyprus problem are taken as examples illustrating contradictory nature of Turkish policy practises and its Kemalist ideology for EU’s notions of liberal democracy. The case study covers Turkey’s Europeanization process which begins with when Turkey was given candidate status in 1999 and is subdivided in three phases (1999-2002/2002-

64 See Appendix B - List of Interviewees
2005/post-2005). In case of Serbia (Chapter 5), co-operation with the ICTY to capture and extradite suspected war criminals and recognition of Kosovo are chosen since they became challenging for national identity and historical legacies. The case of Serbia covers country’s Europeanization process since Serbia went through a democratic transition, overthrowing regime of Milošević in October 2000 and is subdivided in three phases (2000-2003/2003-2005/2005-2008).

Chapter 6 attempts to reply the pre-asked research question of this thesis (Does candidate status matter?) in the light of the empirical findings. The comparative analysis of the cases demonstrates that the credible accession conditionality is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition of EU success in promoting reform process. It should be supplemented with a fertile domestic environment which illustrates the interplay between two levels. Furthermore long term effectiveness of the process also depends on party policy constellations and active participation of civil society actors to the process which are neglected factors. The conclusionary findings of this thesis therefore mark new avenues for future research.

The EU membership perspective has played a key role in terms of transforming political parties even the authoritarian-nationalist ones by making them to adopt their policy/programme contents and agendas to some extent consistent with EU requirements. It also creates the conditions for ‘locking in’ liberal democratic changes in which governments are locked in to a predictable policy making. DS, G17 in Serbia and AKP in Turkey reveal evidence of impact of Europeanization. However without the consensus among the political, economic and social elites and the citizens as to the necessity of EU-guided democratisation, the eventual success of Europeanization is doubtful. Within this regard, the civil society activism is important as it puts an additional pressure on government besides EU leverage for further democratic reforms.

The ‘pincer’ in which external and internal actors have formed an alliance to put top-down and bottom-up pressure on the target government to make liberal and democratic reforms is the key factor for a societal and a genuine Europeanization. The last chapter (Chapter 7) introduces a more general epilogue about the relationship between EU conditionality and Europeanization where Brussels must take into account of the cultural filters of the countries and loopholes in the Europeanization process and acknowledge that Europeanization is not a common panacea for all countries but domestic factors matter!
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10. Appendices

10.1 Appendix A - Freedoms House's Guidelines and Ratings

Freedom House provided guidelines for ratings and a checklist of questions covering seven categories: electoral process; civil society; independent media; national democratic governance; local democratic governance; judicial framework and independence (formerly constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework); and corruption. Which can be summarised under two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties The political rights and civil liberties categories contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country or territory. For reading its democracy scorecard, it offers the guide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy score</th>
<th>Regime type</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Consolidated democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Semi-consolidated democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Transitional government or hybrid type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Semi-consolidated authoritarian regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>Consolidated authoritarian regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House. The democracy score is an average of ratings for political rights and civil liberties scores where ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year.
Democracy Score - Average of Freedom House Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy score</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.50</td>
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<td>2004</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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*created by the Author

In the Graph above the Y-axis shows the average democracy score ranking between 1 and 7.

CJ: Critical Junctures where negotiations were opened with EU and then were partly frozen (for Turkey 2005/2006, for Serbia 2005/2007)
10.2 Appendix B-List of Interviewees and Interview Guide

MSc. Thesis

Does candidate status matter?

“Unpacking the relationship between of Europeanization and the Conditionality in Turkey and Serbia”

Digdem Soyaltin, MSc.
Lund University

List Of Interviewees

1. Professor Frank Schimmelfennig, ETH Zürich, European Politics, Switzerland (skype interview, 7 May 2009)

2 Professor Geoffrey Pridham, European Politics at Bristol University, UK; and currently ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council, UK) (e-mail interview, 2 April 2009)

3. Dr. Jelena Subotic- Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University in Atlanta. (Skype interview, 13 March 2009)

4. Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Lecturer at the Department of Turkish and Modern Asian Studies, University of Athens and Research Fellow, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) (face to face interview, 27March 2009 –Florence)

Didem: Q1. The external incentive model of Schimmelfennig (2006) is proved to be highly effective in locking in democratic reforms in unstable democratic countries. So although the powerful veto players and institutional structures embedded in the domestic sociopolitical context may obstruct reforms, the EU’s leverage helps explain why this failed countries can succeed in breaking the vicious circle and in ultimately qualifying for EU membership. The EU conditionality tilts the political balance in favour of a consensus on pro-EU reforms. Can this model work to change Serbia/Turkey’s stalled Europeanization process? If not why?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q2. Jelena Subotic present three alternative arguments for EU’s low impact in difficult states: weak domestic demand for Europeanization, veto players institutionalized in democratic structures, and competing elite strategies. Do you think that this model can be tested for Turkey where adoption of the political aspects of Copenhagen criteria became a challenge for its state ideology -Kemalism-, its unitary understanding of national identity and minorities and traditionally defined role of military in politics?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q3- Gergana Noutcheva (2006) argues when the cost of full compliance is very high in short term and the degree of legitimacy of EU conditions is low, political actors can simulate compliance (fake compliance) to avoid the even higher costs of blatant confrontation, total refusal to comply and denial of a membership prospect. Socialization activities under these circumstances are not sufficient to convince actors in the “appropriateness” of EU-demanded institutional and policy change. In practical terms, the difference between genuine and fake compliance can be registered by looking at implementation. If domestic actors pass legislation compliant with EU-demands but legal enforcement does not follow up, the ensuing conclusion is that there is no political will to do the reforms requested. Hence, the actors do not believe in the appropriateness of these domestic changes. Is it true to say that the limited compliance to EU requirements in Serbia/Turkey can be an example of fake compliance?

Interviewee:
Didem: Q4- Referring to Noutcheva’s model even if benefits are higher than costs for the EU-demanded reforms, domestic actors resist to compliance since they do not find the normative power of EU arguments persuasive (legitimacy is low). The only way in Noutcheva’s model to promote compliance is then to use conditionality. But high pressure can also lead resistance as we have seen in Serbia. From this perspective can we say that low level of perceived legitimacy of EU makes more sense for Serbian/Turkish elites’ motives for their (non)compliance decisions than cost/benefits balance of EU membership?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q5- What is your impression about the Serbia’s future position towards independent Kosovo? What is the price of recognizing Kosovo? Is it more expensive then being excluded from EU membership when other Balkan countries are on the EU track? Can you make a comparison of Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo with Turkey’s policy towards Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus? Are both indispensable national interests and part of old regimes’ legacies that both countries can not give up?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q6- EU announced in February 2007 that SAA negotiations with Serbia would start despite of Serbia’s continuing failure to deliver the two major suspects- Mladic and Karadzic. Do you think it will help EU and pro-reformist actors in Serbia to pressure the Serbian government to recognize Kosovo? Or if EU would go one step further and offer to Serbia the candidate status, does it matter for Serbia and Serbia’s policy for Kosovo? In my thesis I argue that it is less the candidate status (size and credibility of rewards) per se that matters but rather the incompatible domestic factors and high costs of compliance that account for the limited impact of transformative power of EU through conditionality and for low level of compliance. Do you think this is the case for Serbia?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q7- The level of support for EU membership especially within young people is not too low in Serbia. But the Serbian elites—media, Church, intellectuals—are reluctant to Europeanize. In Turkey there is strong elite support. How do you define role of elite support/lack of elite support for Europeanization process of countries?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q8- Looking at the results of public opinion polls in Serbia leads to the conclusion that while Milosevic’s Serbia during the 1990s kept distancing itself from Europe, the post-Milosevic’ Serbia after 2000 sees the return to Europe as the only alternative (3/4 of citizens) So are closer partnership with Russia and third way of neutrality real alternatives for Serbia? Can lack of any alternative other than EU promote EU forms in Serbia?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q9- Is there a way to change negative narrative or arrogant image of EU in eyes of Serbs? Can pro-EU media, change agents, business communities, interest groups play a role in changing Serbia’s policy towards EU? Are civil society organizations, business communities, and interest groups etc powerful enough to put pressure on government to trigger EU reforms? Isn’t it more beneficial (benefits exceed costs) for these actors to be on EU track rather than to be caught in the ‘trap of an unfinished past’?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q10- Political parties in Serbia/Turkey reveal evidence of Europeanization in adapting their programmes and organization, as well as in imposing European themes in electoral campaigns. Do you believe that increased participation in European structures would have some socializing effects on Serbian/Turkish parties resulting in incorporation of EU rules, norms, values and practises and in a more pro-EU policy in the country?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q11- The unavoidable political hallmark of Serbia is its central position in the Balkans, the crossing point of civilizations and their influences, as well as the hyper production of history and therefore an obsession with the past instead of the future. The strong influence of the authoritarian heritage impacts on the present day, leading to a large extent towards Euroscepticism. How do you define Euroscepticism in Serbia? Is it totally against EU membership and entire project of European integration or only against the implementation of EU requirements on the grounds that such reforms would undermine traditional legacies, historical heritage and national interests which it the case in Turkey? (Refering to discussion about hard/soft Eurosceptism, Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2001)

Interviewee:
Didem: Q12- If compliance to European values, norms and rules is not the case, under which conditions this issue moves from the political fringe to become a central cleavage of national party politics? National cultural legacies and domestic factors delimiting the norm diffusion, can give a reason for the non-compliance? What are the factors and mechanisms then, to achieve sustainable compliance and to promote norm diffusion?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q13- Since the membership perspective became more clear the (pro)-European mood of Serbian/Turkish public opinion has advanced. But an anomaly is present. Although a majority of citizens support entry to the EU, a significantly smaller number supports the extradition of those indicted for war crimes in Serbia and recognition of RoC even though they are conditions for negotiations on the Association/membership Agreement. How do you explain this anomaly? What does being a EU member mean for Serbian/Turkish people?

Interviewee:

Didem :Q14- The painful and costly transformation in pre-accession period, therefore provides greatest opportunities for anti-EU forces and creates a vacuum which extreme rightist or leftist parties benefit by adopting anti-EU position. Thus opposition to EU membership is not always ideological but political which is based on popular moves and electoral calculations of the country’s political parties and their leaders. Can we say that this is the case for Serbia/Turkey? If so, the anti-EU groups can change their positions when benefits exceeds costs of compliance with EU requirements and being against EU membership becomes costly in terms of vote seeking and coalition building, so the whole picture can change in Serbia/Turkey in future. Is it true? What do you think about Serbia/Turkey’s EU policy in long term?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q15- Vachudova (2006) in her article (Democratization in Postcommunist Europe: illiberal Regimes and the Leverage of International Actors) focuses on the sources of political change in previously illiberal regimes and after ‘watershed elections,’ especially in the Western Balkans. She argues that over time the EU’s leverage strengthened the hand of liberal forces against illiberal ones by way of four mechanisms: creating a focal point for cooperation, providing incentives for adapting, using conditionality, and serving as a credible commitment for reform. Consequently, most political parties have eventually changed their agenda to make it compatible with the state’s bid for EU membership.

She investigates the domestic conditions that have caused these mechanisms to function only weakly in Serbia. Serbia did have decisive ‘watershed elections’ in 2000, but political parties have adapted to the Western liberal democratic and economic agenda only slowly and erratically. However Schimmelfennig argues that after 2000 elections the effectiveness of political conditionality has increased in Serbia. He mentions credible conditional membership promise as the recommended strategy in order to promote compliance with EU requirements. How do you evaluate the impact of 2000 elections on Serbia’s EU policy? Do you think that Vachudova’s mechanisms to function more properly in Serbia after 2000? Can we analyse 207 elections in Turkey as watershed elections?

Interviewee:

Didem: Q16 Schimmelfennig (2007) argues in his article (European Regional Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe) the longer-term effectiveness of political conditionality depends on the party constellations in the target countries. After domestic revolution in Serbia in 2000 the national party constellations changed from anti-liberal to mixed where liberal and anti-liberal parties or coalitions compete for political power. Thus democratic transformation has developed in a stop-and-go or up-and down pattern. Over time, however, in Serbia when liberal parties control the government, their democratic reforms clear the hurdles for further Western integration, and progress in integration raises the stakes in democratic consolidation and increases the costs of any future reversal. Populist parties therefore will adapt their political goals to preserve the achieved benefits of integration. During the same time, major nationalist-authoritarian parties will modify their programs and present themselves as unequivocally pro-integration. Thus, the lock-in effects of integration create path dependency across changes in government and may, eventually, change the party constellation from mixed to liberal. Do you predict such a change in Serbia/Turkey in long term? Is EU membership incentive (or disincentive) powerful enough to change party politics in Serbia/Turkey?

Didem: Q17- What is the impact of 2008 elections in Serbia and 2007 elections in Turkey on its relations with EU? Does Schimmelfennig’s lock-in effect of integration lead to changes in government and in party constellations from mixed to liberal? How do you evaluate Do you have any insights for the future steps of government policy towards EU?

Interviewee: 

THANK YOU!
10.3 Appendix C-Boxes

**Box-1 Europeanization**

Europeanization is defined in different ways with several scholars. Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso define Europeanization as the emergence and development of distinct structures of governance at the European level [Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso (eds), *Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 1]. Robert Ladrech understands Europeanisation as an “incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” [Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Democratic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1994, p. 70]. Johan P. Olsen differentiates between five possible meanings of Europeanisation. According to him, Europeanisation may refer to changes in the external territorial boundaries of the EU, to the development of institutions of governance at EU level, to central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance, to the export of forms of distinctively European political organisation and governance beyond the territory of the EU, and to a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger EU [Johan P. Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization”, *ARENA Working Papers*, 2002, WP 01/2. Claudio M. Radaelli defines Europeanisation as a process of “(a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” [Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy”, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 30]. Most studies of Europeanisation have an explicit emphasis on the EU policy process and limit Europeanisation effects to the EU member states. Olsen suggests a possible transfer of EU rules, procedures and paradigms to third countries, but it is Heather Grabbe who offers a systematic analysis of the EU’s impact on the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the EU accession process [Heather Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process”, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 309-310].

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Box 3 Islamization of the state

There are discussions about AKP’s real agenda behind the European curtain-Islamization of state. AKP’s recent statements and activities led to harsh Islamists-Kemalists confrontation over secularism. More precisely alcohol ban, criminalizing adultery, introducing Helal labeling on food products, separation of men and women in public spaces increasing number of proportion of those women wearing the Islamic headscarf have given rise to discussions about rising conservatism in Turkey, AKP’s limits as an Islamist conservative party to carry out the Europeanisation agenda and strengthen Kemalists’ hands in their arguments about the AKP’s hidden project (Öniş, 2009:46, Cornell, 2008:3). The discussions heated by AKP’s enthusiastic attempts for promotion of religious freedoms allowing female students to enter schools and universities with their headscarves escalating polarization of the existing cleavage in Turkey between the moderate Islamist government and the secularist establishment. However the main break occured by AKP’s announcement of its candidate for the presidential election as Abdullah Gül whose wife has a headscarf.

This move was criticized by the Kemalist elites as endangering Turkey’s secularist state. In the eyes of Kemalists, AKP’s pro-European standing point is just a smokescreen to hide its hidden Islamist agenda and its domestic legitimacy deficit. Accordingly AKP is using the European card in order to secure its political position against the secularist ideology of the republican state elites, to extend scope of freedom of religious, to circumscribe the military and undercut secularism (Gyliptis, 2005:413)

Box 2 Failure in Compliance

Three main strands of thought from political economy literature dominate the debate on policy reform failure and the factors that explain the causes of failure in compliance The interest group strand-based of classic ideas of Mancur Olson- predicts failure when the benefits or reform are spread across citizens whereas the costs are expected to be incurred by a much smaller group which can effectively organize to influence or capture the state apparatus. The J-curve hypothesis developed by Adam Przeworski predicts failure when short term costs of reform are so great as to create a majority of voters opposing it. Finally most recent trends in institutional models of politics have focused on the role of veto players in the political process as a critical factor in policy reform as mentioned by Tsebelis. Although these theories are not directly pertinent to (non-) compliance with EU political criteria their basic insights democratic politics are transferable to the situations where costs and benefits are more symbolic and not all entirely monetary in nature.
Box 4 Reforms undertaken on the Kurdish issue

• The constitutional amendments of October 2001 removed the restriction on the use of any language prohibited by law in the expression and dissemination of thought from Art. 26 of the constitution. Similarly, restrictive language on broadcasting was also removed from Art. 28.
• Broadcasting in Kurdish was permitted with the third democratisation package in August 2002. The seventh package adopted in July 2003 further amended the broadcasting law to provide for such broadcasting by public and private radio and television stations.
• The law that deals with the teaching of foreign languages was also amended with the third package in August 2002, opening the way for private courses in Kurdish. The seventh package adopted in July 2003 allowed the teaching of such languages in existing private courses without requiring that new courses be created altogether. It also prescribed that the Council of Ministers alone would regulate and decide which languages are to be taught (without having to obtain the approval of the National Security Council).
• The Civil Registry Law was amended in July 2003 to permit parents to name their children in Kurdish.
• In an attempt to foster social peace in the region, parliament adopted a law on ‘social reinsertion’ in August 2003. The law provides for a partial amnesty and reduction in sentences for persons involved in the activities of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK. The law excludes the leaders of the organisation as well as those who have committed crimes. By December 2003, 524 prisoners out of 2067 applications had been released and about 586 PKK militants have surrendered.
• Implementation of the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project” (where the aim is to support the return of those displaced during the conflict to their villages) has continued. According to official sources, 124,218 people were authorised to return to their villages from June 2000 to May 2004. More than 400 villages and hamlets have reportedly been reopened with government assistance. (Aydin and Keyman, 2004: 35)
Box 5 Reforms undertaken to decrease the influence of the military in politics

*National Security Council*
- With the October 2001 constitutional amendments, the ‘advisory’ nature of the NSC was enshrined in the constitution and the number of civilians in the NSC was increased.
- With the July 2003 (sixth) harmonisation package, the representative of the NSC on the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music was removed.
- With the August 2003 (seventh) harmonisation package, the extended executive and supervisory powers of the secretary-general of the NSC were abolished and other provisions authorising unlimited access of the NSC to any civilian agency were abrogated. The post of secretary-general was no longer confined to a military person and a civilian could be appointed upon the proposal of the prime minister. The frequency of NSC meetings was modified to convene every two months instead of once a month. With this package, the provision to obtain the views of the NSC when determining the languages to be taught in Turkey was also abrogated.
- With the May 2004 constitutional amendments, the military representative in the Higher Education Council (YÖK) was removed.
- The eighth harmonisation package repealed the provision allowing for the nomination of a member of the High Audio-Visual Board (RTÜK) by the Secretariat General of the NSC.

*Defence expenditures*
- With the August 2003 (seventh) package and the May 2004 constitutional amendments, new provisions have been adopted with a view to enhancing the transparency of defence expenditures. The seventh package allows the Court of Auditors, upon request of parliament, to audit accounts and transactions of all types of organisations including those concerning the state properties owned by the armed forces. The May 2004 constitutional amendments removed the items exempt from auditing under the secrecy clause.
- The Public Finance Ruling and Controlling Law adopted on 10 December 2003, which will enter into force in 1 January 2005, brings extra-budgetary funds into the overall state budget. The law requires more detailed information and documents to be provided in the budget proposals to be submitted to the parliamentary committees and parliament. It also requires longer periods of debate on the defence budget proposals.
- The Public Finance Ruling and Controlling Law establishes a method of budgeting based on performance, by requiring performance reports to be submitted to the parliament and related institutions, enhancing parliamentary control on military spending. The law also enables the Court of Auditors to undertake ‘value for money’ inquiries and improves the mechanisms of internal control.

(Aydın and Keyman, 2004:20)
Box 6 Cyprus Conflict and Annan Plan for Settlement of the Dispute

Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960 in a power-sharing deal between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority. In 1963, three years after the establishment of the Republic, large-scale violence broke out and de facto collapsed. A buffer zone marked by “the green line” was drawn between the opposing groups, and in 1964. A U.N. peacekeeping force was sent in after collapse of the country. The crisis intensified following the 1967 military coup in Greece, and in particular in July 1974, when the Greek Cypriot National Guard staged a coup to extend its dictatorship to Cyprus. Invoking its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey intervened militarily and extended its control to 37 per cent of the island’s territory in the north.

The 1975 Vienna accords on exchange of populations led to the displacement of Greek Cypriots from the north and Turkish Cypriots from the south. The island was de facto partitioned into two zones – the Turkish Cypriot in the north and Greek Cypriot in the south – and the 1960 constitutional order was not restored. In 1975 the Turkish Cypriots in the north constituted the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”, and then in 1983 declared independence as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), not recognised by the international community,10 with the sole exception of Turkey. In the south, the Greek Cypriots retained the title of “Republic of Cyprus”, viewed by the international community, with the exception of Turkey, as the only legitimate authority on the island despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots in state institutions. The decades that followed witnessed a consolidation of the conflict, notwithstanding the efforts of the United Nations, supported in the last years also by the European Union. The Helsinki Summit of 1999 constituted a break for the Cyprus conflict since it provided a clear linkage between the progress of the quality/nature of Turkey–EU relations and the resolution of the conflict together with the rest of Turkey’s problems with her neighbours.

In the period 2002-04 the UN led the negotiations on the conflict under the so-called ‘Annan Plan’ The Plan provided for the establishment of a single United Cyprus Republic, constituted by a federal level and two constituent states (a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot state). The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan presented five successive revisions of the Plan since November 2002, the last of which was submitted to separate referendums on 24 April 2004. The Plan provided for the establishment of a single United Cyprus Republic, constituted by a federal level and two constituent states (a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot state). In February 2004, Papadopoulos and Denktas accepted Kofi Annan's invitation to resume negotiations on a settlement on the basis of the Annan plan. After meeting with Annan in New York, talks began on-island on 19 February 2004. The two major communities of the island held a referendum on settling the Cyprus dispute on 24 April 2004. The result was surprising. The Turkish Cypriots voted in favour of the Plan with a 64.9 per cent majority and the Greek Cypriots rejected it with an emphatic 75.8 per cent majority. Then on 1 May 2004 the Greek Cypriots chose to become an EU member, representing the whole island. (Baracani, 2007; Ulusoy, 2008)
10.4 Appendix D - Figures

**Figure 1**

EU Membership for Turkey?

*Translated in English by the Author
Eurobarometer, National Report Turkey Spring 2007, p. 14

**Figure 2**

EU Membership for Turkey?

*Translated in English by the Author
Eurobarometer, National Report Turkey Fall 2008, p. 20
Figure 3

Trust in EU in Turkey *

*created by the Author
Eurobarometer Public Survey, National reports for Turkey
Figure 5

Attitudes towards ICTY: confidence that it is unbiased

Confidence that ICTY will give a fair and fact-based trial to indicted Serb nationalities

Confidence in ICTY shows the greatest bias towards indicted Serbs in comparison to indicted of other nationalities

Answers by part of population who doubt that ICTY is unbiased

Do not know
Confidence
Both yes and no
Lack of confidence

More than two thirds of population think that ICTY biases the indicted Serbs in a biased manner, and the reason most often given for this opinion is that there are more indicted Serbs.

Belgrade Center for Human Right

Figure 6

Attitudes towards ICTY: attitude to cooperation

Attitude to cooperation of Serbia with ICTY depending on political orientation

Belgrade Center for Human Right
Figure 7

Will recognizing Kosovo be a condition for Serbia’s EU integration?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2937 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1049 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>162 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B92 Public Polls


Figure 8

Polling Data: How would you vote in referendum on Serbia’s accession to EU?

| In favour | 61% |
| Against   | 13% |
| Would not vote | 16% |
| Not sure  | 10% |

Source: Strategic Marketing & Media Research Institute
Methodology: Interviews with 1,024 Serb adults, conducted From Dec. 11 to Dec. 17, 2008. Margin of error is 3 per cent.
### Figure 9

If the referendum were held tomorrow with the following question: “Do you support the accession of our country to the EU?” - how would you vote?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Would vote in favour</th>
<th>Would vote against</th>
<th>Does not know / Ref</th>
<th>Sustained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec 03</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 04</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 04</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 04</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 05</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 06</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 07</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 07</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 08</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 08</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 10

Which of these statements describe in the best way what the European Union represents for you personally?

- 28% The EU constantly imposes new conditions for Serbia, thereby placing Serbia in unfavourable situation in relation to any other country
- 62% The EU does not impose conditions, but merely requires that Serbia fulfills what was agreed
- 10% Does not know - does not have an opinion
- 7% The EU does not impose conditions, but merely requires that Serbia fulfills what was agreed

Strategic Marketing Agency December 2008 (www.seio.gov.rs)
In your opinion, what is the main reason for slowing down / causing difficulties for the accession of our country to the EU?

- The continuing policy of conditionality and blackmailing of the EU towards our country: 49%
- Incompetence of leaders: 20%
- Failure to fulfill the obligations taken: 17%
- Objective obstacles (substantial reforms to be undertaken in all areas): 6%
- Mentality of people and reluctance towards change: 6%
- The opposition of some politicians and parties to proceed towards the EU: 1%
- Does not know - refuses to answer: 2%

Which of these statements describes in the best way what the European Union represents for you personally?

- Path to a better future for young people: 51%
- More employment opportunities: 43%
- Opportunity to travel wherever I want within the European Union: 41%
- Opportunity to regulate current situation in our country: 28%
- Risk to lose our own cultural identity: 19%
- Instrument to protect citizens' rights: 18%
- Guarantee of the long-term peace in the European Union: 18%
- Just a dream, an utopian idea: 15%
- Red tape, loss of time and money: 13%
- Improvement instrument of the general economic situation in the European Union: 11%
- Does not know - refuses to answer: 0.2%

Strategic Maketing Agency December 2008 (www.seio.gov.rs)