The Missing Link Revisited

Peace building from integration to impact in post-conflict Liberia
Abstract

In contemporary conflict environments, security and development are inextricably linked. This has spawned the development of the comprehensive approach to peace support operations. But there is a deficit of studies validating that integration and coherence will lead to positive outcomes and higher degrees of effectiveness. There is also a gap between strategic planning and operative implementation.

The aims of this thesis are to develop an analytical framework for monitoring and evaluation and test it in a case study to investigate the role of integration, coherence and cooperation in the production of positive outcomes. Based on the method of process-tracing, an interactive perspective on structure and agency and theories on the civil – military dilemma, a reflexive analytical framework is developed to analyse the UN mission in Liberia in the transition period from 2003 – 2006. Based on the analytical model the case is divided into three phases and analysed accordingly.

The conclusions are that cooperation enabled by integrated structures is a primary driver producing positive outcomes in the operational setting, while lack of strategic coherence hampers the transition to long-term positive outcomes.

The analytical framework is a useful tool for monitoring, but needs to be complemented with evaluation tools.

Key words: Comprehensive intervention, UN, Liberia, Process-tracing, Peace-building
### Acronyms Used

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police (United Nations)</td>
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<td>CIW</td>
<td>Complex Irregular Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, Reintegration</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace-Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States Mission In Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FOI</td>
<td>Swedish Defence Research Agency</td>
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<td>GEMAP</td>
<td>Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme</td>
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<td>HCS</td>
<td>Humanitarian Coordination Section</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMIP</td>
<td>Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>IMTF</td>
<td>Integrated Mission Task Force</td>
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<td>JIU</td>
<td>Joint Implementation Unit</td>
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<td>MPICE</td>
<td>Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments</td>
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<td>NCDDRR</td>
<td>National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation, Reintegration</td>
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<td>NEC</td>
<td>National Elections Commission</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transition Government of Liberia</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Environment Framework</td>
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<td>RFTF</td>
<td>Results Focused Transition Framework</td>
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<td>ROLIC</td>
<td>Rule Of Law Implementation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SG</td>
<td>Secretary-General (of the United Nations)</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SRSRG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCT</td>
<td>United Nations Country Team</td>
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<td>UNDG</td>
<td>United Nations Development Group</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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1 Introduction

New conflict patterns, new solutions

Since the end of the cold war, the dominant patterns of conflict are changing. The classic inter-state war is giving headway to civil wars and violent conflict in the shadow of state failure, humanitarian crises and deep social cleavages. In this complex conflict environment arises the need for humanitarian interventions, peace enforcement and conflict transformation. But the changing patterns of conflict also place demands on changing patterns of conflict management. Operations often take place in fragile or failed states, with a wide range of goals beyond humanitarian relief and security stabilisation. In these complex situations, security and development are inextricably linked (Nilsson et al 2008b:13). This has spawned new strategic thinking to how the ends, ways and means in contemporary conflict should be conceptualized. These new lines of thought can be clustered in the formation of the comprehensive or whole-of-government approach.

The evolvement of a comprehensive approach to peace-support operations is based on the broad understanding, present among international organisations as well as individual nations, that the new complex security environment requires a broad, multifunctional engagement (Nilsson et al 2008a:12).

This realisation opens up new venues for dealing with complex conflicts, but several questions are still to be answered concerning the planning and implementation of a multifunctional approach. The why question seems relatively clear, given the acute needs in conflict environments, but the how question is still elusive. What form should this integration take to effectively deal with the complex and multidimensional conflict situations present in the contemporary setting?

There is a gap between strategic planning and multifunctional implementation, and further studies need to be conducted to identify mechanisms enabling and leading to multifunctional cooperation and coordination, from the strategic level to the field level (Nilsson et al 2008b:6). There is also a deficit in studies supporting the accepted notion that coherence and integration will lead to higher effectiveness and positive outcomes (Nilsson et al 2008b:14). This is due to a lack of effective tools for monitoring and evaluating the progress of multifunctional operations, creating analytical gaps between policy, implementation, output and outcome. These complex crises, with numerous interconnected variables, makes it difficult to trace and isolate causal relations producing outcome, thus warranting an increased academic focus on this problematic area of inquiry (Nilsson et al 2008a:65-70). As the humanitarian problems and deteriorating security situation in conflict zones continues to mount, there is a growing need for clarifying the
impact of integrated approaches. The analytical gap between planning, implementation and outcome in complex interventions warrants an increased focus on this problematic area of inquiry.

1.1 Outline of the thesis

Based on the deficit identified in recent research discussed above concerning methods for monitoring and evaluation (Nilsson et al 2008b:10), this thesis first consists of a theory-evolving part where a model for analysing the intervention process from planning to outcome is created using different theoretical strands. The second part is theory testing, where the model is tested in a case study.

The aim of this thesis is twofold, namely to develop and test an analytical framework able to trace the process from different forms of cooperative action to the production of outcomes in the operation environment, and secondly to investigate if cooperative action leads to positive outcomes. This is important, since there is a lack of studies verifying the broadly accepted assumption that coherence and integration will lead to higher effectiveness and positive outcomes (Nilsson et al 2008a:14).

A very important stipulation based on this assertion is that the case studied is an intervention as a special case of an inter-agency implementation process.

In sum, this thesis is a theory evolving and theory testing case study utilizing process tracing as an overarching methodological tool to develop an analytical framework for monitoring and evaluation, and to test the hypothesis that cooperative action will lead to better outcomes (more on this below).

1.2 Research question

Based on the introduction and outline above, the question to address in this thesis is:

What is the role of integration, coherence and cooperation between multidimensional actors in the production of positive outcomes in peace support operations?

1.3 Working hypothesis

As stated earlier, an important reason to investigate the role of cooperation in the production of outcomes is because there is a broadly accepted assertion that coherence and integration will lead to higher effectiveness and positive outcomes,
which is not fully verified through research. Thus, a working hypothesis of this thesis to be tested is that:

*Coherence, integration and cooperation in the intervention process will lead to positive outcomes.*

1.4 Theory of science: Scientific realism

An important step in outlining this thesis and choosing area of interest is to venture from a basic theory of science.

I will work with scientific realism as the basis for my thesis. For this section I draw upon the causal realism of Thomas Brante, but also modified it a bit by introducing ideas by Colin Wight.

A first point of departure when conducting research is what constitutes science. As stated by Brante, science “…seek to identify the basic and durable mechanisms upon which surface phenomena rely.” (Brante 2001:175). This aim is also a good starting point for my inquiry, as I want to uncover the processes and mechanisms linking multidimensional cooperation to outcome in terms of operational effect. Thinking of science in terms of uncovering causal linkages and underlying mechanisms is a useful stance for investigating the role of cooperation in a process leading to outcomes in an intervention.

Realism, to enable the aims listed above, takes it starting point in a number of postulates or assumptions about ontology, epistemology and method, which are the basic vantage points for producing scientific knowledge (These postulates are taken from causal realism (Brante 2001:172):

- The first postulate is that there is a reality existing independently of our representations or awareness of it (ontological postulate)
- There is a social reality existing independently of social scientists’ representations or awareness of it (ontological postulate for social science).
- It is possible to achieve knowledge about this reality (epistemological postulate).
- All knowledge is fallible – and correctable (methodological postulate).

I believe scientific realism provides the framework for open-ended scientific inquiry, which I regard as a necessity to thoroughly investigate a process of complex interacting events such as an intervention.

1.4.1 Causality

A crucial concept originating from the aim of science in realism is causality. If we are to find explanations to surface phenomena and identify durable mechanism
upon which events in social reality rely, we need to clarify the concept of causality, how the social reality is connected in cause and effect.

What configuration of causality is it that allows us to reach the aim of science as stated above, and for me to conduct my inquiry? To start, social science is always produced as a part of an open system. This means that we need to leave both the uncovering of law-like regularities and predictive models, to focus on explanation of unfolding events and phenomena, instead of predicting it (Wight 2006:52). Causality adjusted to these open systems is better described as tendencies that may or may not manifest themselves given the interaction between counteracting tendencies (Wight 2006:51-52). This is causality without laws (Brante 2001:174). It fits the type of causality I expect to encounter in the analysis of the case. I believe the causal chains will be complex, where several conditions and causal chains converge to produce outcome, in interaction (George & Bennett 2005:212).

1.5 Research design

1.5.1 Building block case study

This case study is a “building block” study (George & Bennett 2005:75-76), since a particular class of a phenomenon is being studied, and adds a dimension to existing research by elaborating and testing research tools on undertheorised areas of inquiry. This study is intended as a building block in a structure of existing research within the field of civil – military relations in interventions.

1.5.2 General method: Process tracing

The method of process tracing is a useful tool for tracing causality in single cases, and moving beyond covariance to investigate complex causality (George & Bennett 2005:224). It is also a powerful tool for developing and testing theory in single case studies (George & Bennett 2005:213). It is best described as detective work, where evidence is investigated and put in sequence and compared to hypotheses, to generate an explanation of the sequence of events producing effect (George & Bennett 2005:217-219). Therefore, it is a useful method in this thesis. To summarize what process tracing as a method entails, it is worth quoting from George & Bennett at length:

“To identify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to
generate the observed sequence of events.” (George & Bennett 2005:206, emphasis added)

What process tracing basically is about and is useful for, is identifying causal paths in conditions of complex and interactive causality and equifinality (George & Bennett 2005:215). The expected form of causality to be encountered in my case study is complex and interacting. Type of causality embedded in the phenomenon under study guides the selection of method and type of process tracing (George & Bennett 2005:213). The kind of process tracing employed in this thesis is what George & Bennett calls the “analytic explanation” (2005:211). Here, detailed narratives are converted into an analytical causal explanation using analytical tools and theoretical hypotheses to focus on what is considered a particularly important part of the explanation, in this case, the impact of cooperation. However, since the casual process must be traced with rigour, the analysis will have to be open to alternative paths (George & Bennett 2005:217), again, much like detective work. A relevant aim given the use of process tracing as overall method is to go beyond the verification or rejection of the hypothesis outlined in section 1.3 and move to a specification of the hypothesis, i.e.:

Coherence, integration and cooperation in the intervention process will lead to positive outcomes under conditions x and y, but not z.

The challenge of using process tracing is associated with common methodological problems. Underspecified hypotheses based on theory in combination with incomplete data can make it hard to trace the process, and thus running risks of producing false positives, processes that appear to fit the evidence even though they are not causal, and false negatives, processes that are causal but does not appear to be so (George & Bennett 2005:223). To remedy this, patterns need to be specified along the way and tested.

To operationalise the method of process tracing, I will develop an analytical framework making it possible to trace the process in a structured manner.

1.5.3 Material

When employing process tracing as a general method, there is a high demand for good empirical material, given the detailed and rigorous analytical inquiry that needs to be performed. My intention is to use several sources of documentation, where existing research and field reports from the relevant case is an important source. As described in the previous section, the task of gathering and analysing the material can be quite cumbersome, and is best described as laying a puzzle with many different pieces. The material available will in large terms determine the success of the process-tracing.
1.5.4 On causality: the limitation of variable thinking in interactive process analysis

Given my focus on the iterative interaction between structure and agency, combining to produce outcome as gradual change, I find the classic conceptualization of a casual chain with an independent and dependent variable limiting. This has been called the “variable-oriented approaches”, where the causal power of a particular variable is established by comparing how it performs in different cases (George & Bennett 2005:179). It is limiting due to the narrow space given for the possibility of variable interaction and change in values during the process. Gradual change is studied, and in empirical terms, when implementing projects and operations, the operation environment is changed. Not only does this contribute to the end-state, it also means changing the very preconditions under which the intervention is set, that enables and constrains action.

In the standard conceptualization of variables, assigning a value to the independent variable causing variance in the dependent variable creates a straightforward causal chain. But what if the value is changed and the variance in the dependent variable is a contributor to this change? How is the whole process conceptualized then? I believe it is best viewed as a complex and iterative interaction process, causing gradual change that sets the stage for the next round of efforts. Thus, outcomes are cumulative in an ideal setting. This leads me to conceptualize causality as spiralled, instead of linear, where the operation environment (x) enables and constrains agency (y) which in turn changes the operation environment (see figure 1 below). For analytical clarity, this spiralled causality is studied in phases, where a significant change of the framework (x) initiates a new phase. This “feedback loop” conceptualisation is common in theoretical frameworks found in policy and implementation literature (Allison & Zelikow 1999:145, 275-278, Ostrom in Sabatier 2007:29-30, Zahariadis in Sabatier 2007:84, Sabatier & Weible in Sabatier 2007:191), which is an important theoretical base for my analytical framework in chapter 4. It has underpinnings based on the ontological conceptualization of structure and agency as mutually constitutive, and structure as enabling/constraining in relation to agency. This is the underlying view of causality for the framework described in chapter 4.
Figure 1: Spiral causality
2 Theoretical underpinnings

In this chapter, the aim is to position my thesis theoretically by conducting an inquiry of the theoretical underpinnings of civil–military relations.

Most recent research about civil–military relations is focused on operational aspects in the intervention context (see for example Hull 2008, Frerks et al 2006, Capstick 2007, de Coning 2007, van Klinger en 2007, Stapleton 2007). This stems from the broad interest in, and recognition that complex security crises seen in the post cold-war world need a multifunctional engagement (Nilsson et al 2008b:12). However, to be able to understand these cooperation dynamics and place them in a theoretical setting, the classic dilemma of civil–military relations and the different theories developed to address it must be revisited.

2.1 The civil–military dilemma

The underlying problem of civil–military relations is, simply put, how does a civilian government control its military? To refine the dilemma, the question arises from a simple paradox of organized societies: “Because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection.” (Feaver 1996:150). This problem arises when organized societies reach the point where there is a division of labour, in this case the delegation of authority and coercive power. The civil–military challenge arises:

“The civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do” (Feaver 1996:149)

The theory evolved to address and mitigate this tension sparked a debate and led to two identifiable opposing theoretical strands.

2.1.1 The divided approach to the civil–military dilemma

This theoretical strand was first outlined in Samuel Huntington’s seminal work “The soldier and the state” (1957). In trying to postulate a condition where there is a high degree of civilian control and military security (coercive power), Huntington identifies two essential shaping forces of the military institutions: The
functional imperative, stemming from the threats to a society’s security, and the societal imperative arising from the dominant social forces, institutions and ideology within a society. Different configurations of these imperatives will lead to different configurations of civilian control and military security (Huntington 1957:2-3). The relationship of interest is that between the officers’ corps and the state.

A crucial aspect of forming viable civil – military relations according to Huntington is the professionalization of the military officer corps. This professional ethic’s most important feature is the instrumentalist view of the military profession, being an apolitical servant to the state (Huntington 1957:79).

Herein lies the solution to the civil-military dilemma: The professional military. This is reached by maintaining a condition, which Huntington describes as “objective civilian control” (Huntington 1957:83-85). In this condition, control is exercised through the professionalization of the officers’ corps, making them a neutral tool of the state. Thus, the military is formed only by the functional imperative, the security structure, and not the societal imperative. This means that there is only one form of objective civilian control, since the military is only shaped by the universal functional imperative, whereas in conditions of subjective civilian control, there are many configurations depending on the societal imperative and which civilian group is controlling the military (Huntington 1957:80-83).

Huntington’s argument can be summarized as follows: “autonomy leads to professionalization, which leads to political neutrality and voluntary subordination, which leads to secure civilian control” (Feaver cited in Egnell 2007:45).

2.1.2 The integrated approach to the civil – military dilemma

Morris Janowitz, stemming from a sociological school of thought, offers one strong critique of Huntington’s view of civil – military relations. Janowitz departs from the technical and strategic innovations most notably characterized by the nuclear bomb. In this structural setting the military professional should be viewed as a constabulary force, seeking to uphold viable relations of international security (Janowitz 1960:418-420). This requires the professional military to be sensitive to politics and policy and able to interpret the political will (Janowitz 1960: 420). Ultimately, what divides the approach advocated by Huntington in relation to Janowitz is the definition of the professional military, and in analytical terms, different views of the functional imperative (see figure 1). The different approaches depart from the same mechanisms, but differently constituted (Feaver 1996:165).
According to Janowitz, the professional soldier is sensitive to political will and objectives, and this implies a close integration with the civilian institutions (Janowitz 1960:420). Ultimately, this means the primacy of the civilian institutions to define the functional imperative for the military (Egnell 2007:48-49).

2.1.3 A third take: The nature of civil – military relations

There is also a critique of both the approaches above, mainly concerning the concept of professionalism. Feaver (1996) argues that both theories are flawed since they define away the very problem they seek to address by including the solution in what constitutes the concept of professionalism. Instead, Feaver draws attention to the type of relationship the civil – military actually is, namely the relationship between a principal and an agent. The military is an instrumental institution; a means to an end, and this makes the principal – agent theory the point of departure. Thus, the interest is directed at different patterns of civilian control.

2.2 Towards contemporary operations

In this section, I will discuss the impacts of the civil – military dilemma and the theories above in the context of operations. The aim is to identify a viable perspective on civil – military relations, shaping necessary conceptualisations of concepts in contemporary operations, relevant for this thesis.
A point of departure here is to understand the function of the military in relation to the civilian and the political. To be able to rightly define the function of the military, the primary activity of the military must be conceptualized and related to the contemporary context of Complex Irregular Warfare\(^1\) in which this thesis is set. I believe that the famous Clausewitzian dictum of war as a continuation of politics by other means is very useful. This is especially true of contemporary wars and crises since violent conflict is present as a consequence of the lack of political institutional capacity providing public goods. This stipulation asserts that the role of the military is to pursue political objectives with other means than policy. If the function of the military is a continuation of politics by other means, the functional imperative must be dependent on political objectives. Thus it seems that the integrated approach combined with principal-agent theory is what best conceptualizes the civil – military relationship, based on the Clausewitzean dictum about the nature of war. The theoretical underpinnings prescribes that the integrated approach to civil – military relations should provide better results, but this direct causal link is not entirely convincing (Egnell 2007:47). Although integration may be necessary given the political nature of war, especially in CIW, its quality and impact cannot be guaranteed, as Egnell’s case studies of British and US operations in Iraq clearly demonstrates.

There is a causal link between the character and structure of civil – military relations and operational conduct (Egnell 2007:239), but it is in no way direct or universal. Rather, it is conditional and probabilistic (Egnell 2007:79). There is a need to stipulate under which conditions the integrated approach is likely to succeed.

There is some guidance to be found in existing research regarding these conditions. FOI\(^2\) has stipulated a number of mechanisms facilitating cooperation (Nilsson et al 2008b:56-65). The basic facilitating mechanism for cooperation is an integrated approach to analysis and planning, resulting in a common strategy and shared views of objectives and desired, viable outcomes. Facilitating mechanisms at a more operational level are mainly of the institutional character, such as integrated chains of command, co-location of offices, liaisons, communication systems. It is however important to emphasise that improvised and ad-hoc mechanisms are a crucial component beside the more institutionalised mechanisms, given the dynamic character of conflict environments.

Ultimately, the functional imperative and evaluation of the utility of integrated civil – military relations lies in the ability to produce outcomes according to political objectives. This is evident given the military as an instrument of political will.

This is where I position my thesis. Given that the causal chain between integration and outcomes in no way are direct and obvious, the impact and

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\(^1\) Complex Irregular Warfare is used as an umbrella concept for many types of operations similar in character, for example Peace Support Operations (which is the focus of this thesis), insurgencies, humanitarian interventions and low-intensity conflicts. See Egnell 2007:22 for further clarifications. Abbreviated CIW in this chapter.

\(^2\) FOI, the Swedish Defence Research Agency
explanatory power of civil - military cooperation dynamics in relation to outcomes must be further investigated. Egnell (2007) takes an indirect approach to this problem, positioning the dependent variable of operational conduct against “best practice” identified in complex irregular warfare (Egnell 2007:29-41). However, a practice must partly be considered “best” due to its ability to produce viable outcomes.

In my thesis, the focus is on the outcome aspect of effectiveness, examining the assumed causal link between mission command, coordinated operational conduct (implementation) and outcomes. The merit of my thesis positioned against Egnell is that I move the causal chain one step further (see figure 2).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Causal chain of Egnell (2007)} \\
X & \rightarrow Z & \rightarrow Y \\
\text{Patterns of civil - military relations} & \rightarrow \text{Command and control Trust Culture} & \rightarrow \text{Operational conduct}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Causal chain in this thesis} \\
X & \rightarrow Z & \rightarrow Y \\
\text{Command and control Trust Culture} & \rightarrow \text{Operational conduct} & \rightarrow \text{Outcome}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 3: Causal chains in comparison

2.2.1 Conceptualizing outcomes: ends defining the means

Given the discussion above, a crucial question is what can be seen as a viable, positive outcome in the general category of CIW, which my case belongs to (see chapter 3). Some theoretically based conceptualizations can be made, guiding the analysis in later stages.

Based on the assertion that the utility of the military, and thus the functional imperative of the military in contemporary CIW, is the ability to attain political objectives by other means, the outcome can no longer be conceptualised as outright “victory” in military terms. Viable outcomes for action (especially military action) in CIW are essentially about establishing a condition from which political outcomes can be decided (Smith 2005:269). To conceptualize desired outcomes, the MPICE (Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments) framework provides an insightful operationalization of when peace becomes viable in a conflict environment (see figure 3), focusing on domestic political institutional capacity in relation to drivers of conflict. This matches well with the basic
conceptualization of viable outcomes as a condition in which political solutions are possible.

Figure 4: The “X” Chart (Guttieri 2008:2 retrieved from http://www.sagecenter.net/node/20, 2009-02-16)

The analytical approach in the MPICE framework is to trace reduction in the drivers of conflict and increases in domestic institutional capacity across five sectors (Guttieri 2008:2):

1. Political moderation and stable democracy
2. Safe and secure environment
3. Rule of law
4. Economic sustainability
5. Social well-being

This is a useful conceptualisation of viable outcomes to this thesis. It is also a good idea to divide the analysis in programmes relating to these sectors, as it makes the analysis more structured.

2.2.2 Concluding remarks: the civil – military dilemma in contemporary operations

As shown above, classic theory about how to solve the civil – military dilemma impacts on the way operations are understood and conceptualized, and also how
outcomes of these operations are conceptualized. The dilemma transferred to the operational setting is manifested in the paradox that the intervention takes over the functions of the failed domestic civilian institutions at the same time as the reconstruction of these institutions are imperative to success. Thus it is two opposed activities and objectives defining the functional imperative of the intervening force. The classic problem of striking a balance between military effectiveness and civilian control is put to its forefront in contemporary interventions.
3  Selection of case: The comprehensive intervention

3.1  Delimitation: Conceptualizing the population of cases

As stated above, this thesis will be conducted as a building block case study, with a theory-building and theory-testing aim. There are some important considerations to be made regarding the design of the study. A first relevant question when designing a case study is what constitutes a case?

A point of departure is a general conceptualization of what constitutes a case in social science. George & Bennett define a case as “an instance of a class of events” (2005:17). This is the important question of “a case of what?”

In this thesis, the general class of event studied is the intervention process in a conflict zone, seen as a special case of an inter-agency implementation process. The subclass is the comprehensive type of intervention. I will establish a conceptualization of this subclass of events below, which later guides the selection of case.

3.1.1  The case outlined: Comprehensive intervention as a case of an intervention process

The aspects of contemporary conflict place distinct demands on the type of intervention necessary to tackle these complex situations. The basic assertion is that security and development are inextricably linked. This requires a comprehensive, multi-actor intervention, with far-reaching goals such as democratization, reconstruction of institutional capacity and conflict transformation. A first important assertion is that the comprehensive intervention as I frame it in this thesis is mainly focused on the period of military intervention, normally dictated by a separate mandate from other programmes (Nilsson et al 2008b:18).

In the broadest term and from the military intervention perspective, a comprehensive intervention refers to “the approach to, and the implementation of, a peace support operation in coordination with other actors…” (Nilsson et al 2008b:17).
Figure 5 below illustrates the “comprehensive intervention box”, outlining the temporal frame of the comprehensive intervention (the box), and thus the frame for the type of case studied. It also points to the level of security in the conflict environment during the intervention phase (the curve on the lower part), and the transition to existing and new self-sustaining programmes at the end of the box (the arrows running through the box along the timeline).

To summarize, we now have some basic traits guiding the selection of case:

- There is a mandated military intervention that sets the time-frame for the case
- Programmes dealing with humanitarian, political and development assistance run parallel to the intervention
- Military intervention is regarded as complementary and facilitating
- The end-state is a transition of responsibility to self-sustaining programmes with focus on long-term development (process-oriented gradual change of framework)

3.1.2 The case outlined: comprehensive intervention as a case of an inter-agency implementation process

A crucial aspect guiding the research design of this thesis is the conceptualization of the comprehensive intervention as a case of an inter-agency implementation process.
The case will be structured according to a stage heuristic, where each stage represents an important activity in the implementation process. These stages are iteratively repeated as the intervention progresses and the operation environment change. The stages of the implementation process are:

- Planning/decision
- Implementation
- Output
- Outcome

Output and outcome are kept separate for analytical reasons. Causality is traced across these stages in iterative steps, with strong emphasis on the interaction between structure and agency in shaping implementation and outcome.

3.1.3 Drawing inferences from a single case: problems and opportunities

An obvious problem with the research design described in chapter 1 and case studies in general is what kind of inferences that can be drawn. Equifinality can hamper the analysis. It is possible that other theories stressing the causal effect of different phenomena can reach the same outcome (George & Bennett 2005:161). This is remedied in this thesis in two ways. Firstly, multiple interactions take place, answering to changing conditions in the operation environment. This creates the opportunity to make multiple observations within the same case, and thus poses grounds for comparing and evaluating the causal effect of cooperation on outcomes (George & Bennett 2005:32, 220). The intervention as a case consists of several instances of interagency implementation, albeit linked in a continuous process of interaction between structure and agency.

Secondly, the method of process tracing enables the researcher to investigate hypothesised casual connections in depth, and stipulate under which conditions the causal capacity of the hypothesised phenomenon is realized (George & Bennett 2005:207). By making these assertions it is possible to test the hypothesis and explore the causal link between cooperative action and outcomes in a single case.

3.2 Selection of case: most likely case, theory development and testing

As theory are being developed and hypotheses and theory tested, at this initial stage of research into an under-theorized aspect, a most likely scenario is useful (George & Bennett 2005:121-122), where a large degree of structural integration is present. This enables me to investigate whether my analytical framework is
useful at all in producing interesting results, and by process tracing specifying and developing the initial hypothesis into a more refined and conditional statement (see section 1.5.2). Normally a most likely case is used to reject theories (George & Bennett 2005:121-122), but in this instance the goal is to specify theory and make an initial assessment of the usefulness of a new analytical approach.

A most likely scenario holding the co-variation stipulated in the hypothesis (a large degree of cooperation and a positive outcome) is the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It is a most likely scenario because:

- The UN integrated missions concept that is applied in Liberia is deemed as the most mature comprehensive intervention approach, with its integrated chain of command. Thus there is presumably a high degree of cooperation (Hull 2008:10).
- The outcome of the intervention is acknowledged as quite positive and successful (Hull 2008:11).

Using UNMIL as a case fulfils the stipulated traits in section 3.1.1. The case is set in a post-conflict transitional setting, which opens up for a broad variety of actors and coordination opportunities of interest to this thesis.

The case is set temporally between 2003 with the starting point in the wide deployment of UNMIL in October up to January 2006 when a new government was elected (SG progress report no.10 2006). Thus it covers the crucial transition period from the end of the conflict towards the first steps to self-sustaining peace.
4 Analytical framework

Based on process tracing as a general method, and the conceptualisation of spiral causality presented in section 1.5.4, the analytical framework employed in this thesis is presented here. It is based on the basic conceptualisations about structure and agency as mutually constitutive and interacting to produce effects, where structure is seen as enabling and constraining in relation to agency, which then works in a feedback loop to change the preconditions for action. It follows the spiral pattern of causality identified above when the process is traced. The analytical model is presented below in figure 6.

![Analytical Model Diagram](image)

**Figure 6: Analytical Model**

4.1 General Outline

This model is a combination of crisis decision-making theory and implementation theory, linking the two fields together in one framework. The model advances over time in analytical phases, where each phase is focused on change in the operation environment framework (OEF) via activities of planning/decision, implementation, output and outcome. Thus the model is read from top to bottom and left to right.
A new phase commences when a significant change has come about, that means a renegotiation of the preconditions for action. This means that the phases can cover varying temporal space, but are chronologically ordered, making process tracing over time possible. This adds analytical sensitivity, ensuring that crucial changes are not missed due to inappropriate temporal divisions. The framework is focused on outcomes as structural change, and tracks progress in a reflexive manner. Output and outcome are kept separate for analytical clarity although they may not be temporally separated, thus keeping the implementation process and its actor interaction in focus during the interaction process, and then analysing it in combination with operation environment factors. An important remark to be made is that causal processes can have varying temporal length, meaning that outcomes in phase 1 for example can still have effects on the OEF in phase 3, which the arrow from outcome phase 1 via OEF phase 2 to OEF phase 3 illustrates. In other words, previous actions can still have effects on the operation environment despite longer temporal separation, and constrain and enable action for following phases. Taking this into account in the analytical model enables me to study causality with short chains of events leading to long outcome chains of events, and also trace path dependence, i.e. if previous decisions and actions undertaken make certain causal developments more or less likely.

Another crucial point is that the framework allows for analysis of the role of learning. Is there an adaptation in behaviour based on previous successes and failures?

Below, each analytical category is discussed, where content such as relevant activities and properties within the categories are highlighted.

### 4.2 Operation Environment Framework

This analytical category can be seen as the alpha and omega of the model employed. It is the starting point for analysis in each phase where structural features that constrains and enables action are identified and thus sets the playing field for interaction. It is also the end of the line in the analysis, as the final goal outcome is identified as a condition from which political outcomes can be decided. The effect of action, and more specifically, cooperative action, is measured by the structural change of the operation environment it is able to facilitate (outcomes feeding back to, and changing the OEF).

Thus this category contains the circumstances external to the following interaction process that dictates the preconditions for action. This modelling is inspired by the “institutional rational choice” framework for analysing policy processes (Ostrom i Sabatier 2007:27), where external factors are treated as preconditions that sets the stage for agency. The reflexive dimension is also important, which is concerned with how agency changes the preconditions for action by producing outputs leading to certain outcomes.

In basic structure and agency terms, the OEF is concerned with the structure (preconditions) that defines the world of the possible for agency, the latent carrier
of causality (Wight 2006:298), and how the OEF is changed in a reflexive manner by agency.

Thus this category can contain different forms of entities and phenomena, such as institutionalised structures dictating how information is exchanged or hostile local environment constraining relief efforts.

The analytical task in this category is firstly to identify the preconditions constraining and enabling agency, and how these preconditions sets the stage for action. As the analysis progresses, the task are to identify change of these preconditions creating new enablers and constraints for agency.

4.3 The interaction process

This cluster of analytical categories is concerned with the unfolding events, i.e. the agency, which unfolds based on the structural conditions in the OEF. Focus through these categories are on the actions undertaken by actors in the intervention process, progressing from planning/decision activities to the production of output by implementation. Through the analysis of the different stages in the interaction process, attention will especially be directed to the activation of cooperation mechanisms and the unfolding implementation and production of output of cooperative action. In the ideal comprehensive intervention, coherence is upheld through the whole of the process and therefore attention is directed towards tracing cooperative action across the analytical categories.

Below, each analytical category of activity is described, with focus on what kind of activities will be analysed, and how.

4.3.1 Planning/decision

This category is focused on the activities of planning and subsequent decision-making based on the preconditions identified in the OEF. This is basically about how responses to the situation are formalised and conceptualised at the strategic to the operational level, the “ends, ways and means of the intervention” (Nilsson et al 2008b:54). This is an important step to include, since it will guide and define the actions undertaken in the following steps. It is also an important analytical category to analyse iteratively, hence present in every phase, since this enables me to trace how responses are formulated to a changing context (Nilsson et al 2008b:51, 55).

The analytical task in this category is in the first phases to identify how the intervention is formalised, based on the preconditions of the intervention, such as the conflict environment and the overall mandate. In the following phases, the focus will be on how responses are formulated through planning and decision-making in relation to a dynamic and changing environment.
Since my research interest is directed towards the role of cooperation in the production of outcomes, special attention will be given to the degree of coherence in the (re)planning and decision-making. It creates the setting for understanding the subsequent implementation undertaken, and the cooperation dynamics in the implementation, thus enabling me to trace cooperation across the analytical categories.

This will be the important backdrop for understanding and analysis in the category of implementation. Based on the decisions, what unfolds when they are converted to action?

4.3.2 Implementation

Implementation can in its simplest form be described as "the stage in the policy process concerned with turning policy intentions into action" (John quoted in Hill & Hupe 2002:7-8). This stage in the process is often neglected in the literature of crisis management, where decisions are directly linked to outcomes. But as Allison states, "most decisions leave considerable leeway in implementation" (Allison & Zelikov 1999:304). This means that in order to trace the process and identify and specify the role of cooperation in the production of outcome, the implementation process cannot be left out.

The analytical task in this category is to analyse the implementation process against the backdrop of the OEF, and the planning and decisions made. The OEF and the plans established in the previous category will be treated as enablers/constraints in the process of implementation. Focus will be directed to cooperative implementation, and if this is of a flexible improvised nature or based on cooperative planning and decisions. By linking the OEF, planning and decision to implementation, the process can be traced across analytical categories to outcome, and it is possible to identify if the outcome was a result of planned or improvised, modified implementation.

4.3.3 Output

This analytical category is evaluation oriented and basically concerned with the performance of the implementation process, what the output is of plans and decisions converted into action. Performance is evaluated based on the convergence between plans and decisions and the implementation process. There is also an important distinction made between output and outcome for analytical clarity. Output is the performance of the process, whereas outcome is concerned with the impact of the process in the operation environment (Hill & Hupe 2002:63). This enables me to summarize what actually was done in relation to decisions and planning before analysing impact.

The analytical task is therefore to summarize and evaluate the interaction process by analysing the interplay and compatibility between planning/decision-making and implementation.
4.4 Outcomes

This is the final analytical stage in one phase, and in this stage the impact of the interaction process on the operation environment is evaluated. The outcome is thus a combination of the output above interacting with the dynamic factors of the operation environment, producing effect. This basically means that independent factors external to the policy and implementation process influence the result of the process (Hill & Hupe 2002:122). The analytical design enables me to analyse unpredictability in the production of effect.

This stage is the important link to the next phase, conceptualising outcome as a change of the operation environment, which sets the stage for action in the next phase or even several following phases.

Thus the analytical task in this category is firstly to link the performance of the interaction process to the impact in the conflict environment by adding the dynamic factors external to the interaction process influencing the outcome. This identified impact will then alter the preconditions in the OEF for the following phases. The second task is to evaluate the outcome in terms of positive and negative effects. For this task I employ the MPICE definition of viable peace as standards for evaluating outcomes (see figure 4 in section 2.2.1). The outcome is deemed positive if it contributes to either the reduction of conflict drivers or the increase of domestic institutional capacity, or both. This is important to evaluate and track to be able to specify the role of cooperation in the production of positive outcomes. To add analytical clarity, outcomes are evaluated and categorised in 5 areas of intervention activity identified as major mission elements of conflict transformation and stabilization in the quest for viable peace (Guttieri 2008:2).

Conflict transformation and stabilization as outcomes are tracked in these sectors across three stages, stage 0 – imposed stability, stage 1 – assisted stability, stage 2 – self-sustaining peace (MPICE Metrics Framework 2008:5). In this thesis the process is traced from stage 0 to stage 1. The sectors of major mission elements are presented in figure 7 below:

| Political Moderation & Stable Democracy | Security | Rule of Law | Economic Sustainability | Social Well-being |

Figure 7: Major mission elements of conflict transformation and stabilization (MPICE 2008:5)

The MPICE framework uses goals in each sector under the headlines “diminish drivers of conflict” and “strengthen institutional performance”, and each goal contains a number of indicators to determine if the effect is a reduction of conflict drivers or an increase in domestic institutional capacity.

However, the indicators will be thematically used to evaluate if it is classified as a positive or negative outcome according to the criteria stated above. The
reason for me to not to adhere to the indicators in a strict sense is that such inquiries lies beyond the scope of this thesis, since the purpose of the MPICE framework is to track progress in detail. For me to be able to link cooperation to positive outcomes, it is enough to assert if the outcome in each phase can be deemed positive at all, according to the basic definition of viable peace above. A thematically relevant application of indicators is enough. This stage concludes one phase.

In the next chapter, phase one is analysed according to the model presented here.
5 Analysis

In this chapter, the analysis is performed according to the model presented in the previous chapter. The analysis starts off with an investigation of the start-up phase of UNMIL, up to the point where the intervention is fully mobilised and operational in Liberia. This also includes the start-up of the important disarmament and demobilisation process.

5.1 Phase 1: UNMIL deployment, August 2003 – March 2004

5.1.1 Operation Environment Framework phase 1

The framework enabling and constraining the whole UNMIL intervention and especially the deployment and start-up of the mission is presented in this section. It consists of two parts, one consisting of the general situation in the operation environment, where drivers of conflict are identified and presented along with a description of the many mounting problems in Liberia. The second part is concerned with the institutional UN framework and especially the mandate for UNMIL. The command structure set up for the operation is also described.

The operation environment: Post-conflict, Pre-peace

Liberia was at the time of the planning and deployment of UNMIL a post-conflict setting, with a peace treaty in place signed in Accra, Ghana in August 2003. This put an end to 14 years of civil war that claimed the lives of over 200 000 Liberians and displaced at least a million others within and outside of the country (Fiawosime in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:165). There is no single cause that can explain the conflict; rather, it is a combination of causes that can explain the civil war that lasted for over a decade. Political exclusion and inequality is an important factor (Aboagye & Bah 2004:16) that has been present in Liberia for a long time (Frerks et al 2006:72).

This is the setting in which the UNMIL operation enters, and the scope of the analysis. Although hostilities are largely concluded and a feasible peace treaty is signed, there are mounting problems that need to be addressed in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. A chief conflict driver identified above is the politics of exclusion and repression based on ethnic identities and affiliation with ruling
elites (Frerks et al 2006:73). This is coupled with weak justice systems, causing corruption and impunity. The security sector needs to be reformed extensively, since it were often used for human right violations and repression. The whole region is also unstable, which is acerbated by the numerous ex-combatants present in the region along with easy access to small arms. There is large human suffering, food shortage and poverty both as a cause and result of conflict. The large number of IDP’s and refugees returning worsens this, causing strains on a virtually non-existent infrastructure, where the health, transport and education systems are collapsed (McCandless 2008:5). These factors underline the tense peace present in Liberia at the time of the start-up of UNMIL. But enabling factors in dealing with these problems are also present, facilitating the establishment and actions of UNMIL. These are listed below:

1. There is a feasible peace agreement to enforce. There is a stable albeit tense situation with a war-weary, benign population awaiting the deployment of UNMIL. This means that UNMIL will not have to get involved in outright combat to enforce their presence, and security concerns for own personnel are less constraining.
2. There is already a peacekeeping presence on the ground. The presence of ECOMIL facilitates the establishment of UNMIL as forces with situational awareness and headquarters already are present (Aboagye & Bah 2005:100-102). This is an important enabling factor.

Next, the UNMIL mandate and the UN structure for UNMIL is examined and analysed as precondition factors.

The resolution and the UN framework: enabling UNMIL as an integrated mission

In September 2003, Security Council resolution 1509 was adopted, which set up the basic task and mandate for UNMIL. This is therefore the overarching framework for the mission.

Resolution 1509 sets up the mandate and frame for UNMIL. The mandate states that transfer of authority is due on 1 October 2003, and the mandate stretches for 12 months, and was subsequently prolonged. UNMIL was essentially mandated with two overarching task, to support and to protect. These tasks included the following responsibilities (UNSC resolution 1509:3-4):

- Support for the implementation of the cease-fire agreement
- Support for humanitarian and human rights assistance
- Support for security sector reform
- Protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment,
- Ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, without prejudice to the efforts of the government,
- Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities;
Resolution 1509 is a broad mandate with a robust chapter VII base. This serves as an enabling institutional factor for UNMIL, granting them the necessary legitimacy and mission objectives for carrying out their mission. This frames the mission as a comprehensive intervention, as it is tasked with supporting the transition from war to peace, rather than merely keeping the peace (Frerks et al 2006:76). This broad mandate is also reflected in the institutional structure of UNMIL, which is discussed below.

The structure of UNMIL and the UN framework: enabling the comprehensive intervention

An important enabling factor for the mission is firstly the UN framework as the institutional context for the mission. The UN system is the only international organisation that can undertake comprehensive missions all by itself (Nilsson et al 2008b:46). The UN consists of a large range of capacities, which enables them to undertake and manage complex peace building missions. Furthermore, the UN is the only international institution that has legitimacy to intervene or mandate others to intervene in states (Nilsson et al 2008b:46-47). These factors are great enablers when setting up and executing interventions.

The largest constrainer is that the UN is dependent on member states for funding, approval and troop contributions, which can render responses slow or inadequate (Nilsson et al 2008b:46-47).

With the enabling and broad UN system mobilised for UNMIL, the structure of the mission represents these strengths of the UN and is what marks UNMIL as an integrated mission. The structure of UNMIL is presented in figure 8 below.
All components of the mission is under the leadership of the special representative of the secretary general (SRSG), which means that the mission has an integrated chain of command with one commander of the entire mission.

As is evident above, the challenges in Liberia are pressing and large, where a fragile peace exists in a war-torn country. But there is also a structural enabler in the UN system, equipping UNMIL with necessary tools to meet these challenges. The following analysis over the phases to come is the story of how these structural preconditions are transformed into action and results.

5.1.2 Planning/Decision phase 1

In this section, the planning and decision-making concerning the start-up of UNMIL are analysed. This planning was under a tight constraint of time-pressure, as the take-over from ECOMIL was set to October 1, 2003.

The planning of the deployment of UNMIL
At the overall strategic level, the planning of UNMIL was designed in accordance with recommendations made by the Brahimi report, which outlines the UN integrated mission peacekeeping concept (Durch et al 2003:47). This entailed the set-up of an integrated mission task force (IMTF) that would enable broad inputs from the competencies of the UN system. The IMTF consist of several UN departments that jointly plan the aspects of the mission. However, there were too many representatives involved, which meant that the IMTF quickly became a briefing format instead of a truly integrated planning body (Durch et al 2003:48). Traditional ways of planning and decision-making where heavily relied upon, with the department of peacekeeping operation (DPKO) taking the lead in planning, as this is the standard channel of planning and decision-making under the authority of the secretary general (Hull 2008:25).

The IMTF was replaced by a Liberia working group to reduce the number of participants, and this group proved more effective at working out differences between police and military functions (Durch et al 2003:48). However, it was still mostly an aide to the DPKO, and the group failed at drafting a joint integrated strategy for Liberia (Hull 2008:26). The strategic planning lacked integration, and DPKO took their perspectives on what was needed for other UN agencies. Also, communication horizontally and vertically (to the UN country team, UNCT, in Liberia) was flawed (Eide et al 2005:22-23). This resulted in a heavy reliance on DPKO and that other departments of the UN had to conform to their “security first” agenda (Campell & Kaspersen 2008:474). UNMIL initiated the operation from the planning without an integrated strategic framework, which meant that common views of objectives and vision for the mission was lacking.

Previous experiences and SOP’s where heavily relied upon in the planning process, hampering integration and resulting in a lack of a shared strategic framework.

The assessment missions carried out before the deployment, compensated for a lack of ground awareness and enabled swift deployment, alleviated these flaws to some extent. The assessment missions were much more integrated in their design and execution. Liaison officers were used in contact with the ECOMIL presence on the ground, and several UN departments along with troop contributing countries participated in the assessment missions. Contacts were also established with the rebel factions to guarantee access (Fiawosime in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:173-174). This also resulted in the establishment of an advance UN headquarters that the UN ran in collaboration with regional staff until the larger UNMIL force was deployed (Aboagye & Bah in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:101-102). The logistics branch was also deployed.

As a result of the inputs from the liaison officers and the establishment of logistics and advance headquarters, this enabled the UNMIL to deploy rapidly.

**Needs assessment: an evolving transitional strategic framework**

As the deployment of UNMIL was underway, the lack of a strategic framework became evident. To remedy this, the UN set up a Joint Needs Assessment in collaboration with the World Bank, to set up a strategic framework for the
transition to durable peace (UNDG Liberia 2006:3). This planning was an integrated effort with technical assessment groups and a coordinating body in Liberia. Many stakeholders were involved, including the Liberian transition government (NTGL). This planning process resulted in a results focused transition framework (RFTF), which outlined priorities in clusters with attached costs (UNDG Liberia 2006:3-4). An attempt were also made to incorporate the Humanitarian appeals framework driven by the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA), but was eventually kept as needs outside of the RFTF.

Although the effort was integrated and included a commendable width in stakeholders, UNMIL, due to engagement with deployment, did not participate to a larger extent. There was no linkage to the assessment missions, which would have been useful since access outside the capital Monrovia was heavily constrained. There was also no link to other strategic plans such as the UN development assistance framework or the long-term strategy of the NTGL (UNDG Liberia 2006:5). This made some of the objectives in the clusters overly optimistic. As a strategic framework it was a good attempt, but lacked considerations of root causes of conflict and the weak ability of the state institutions as implementers. As a strategic framework must consider root causes and have a centre of gravity on which the resolution of the conflict relies to make all other efforts possible (Eide et al 2005:19), the RFTF did not manage to provide the strategic overview for the transition period.

But the assessment was an important coordinated appeal for funds based on needs identified on the ground.

Rehabilitating the ex-combatants

A Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programme was identified as a key ingredient in the transition to peace. The planning was hallmarked by a broad engagement of UN, NGO, donors and local actors, and resulted in an action plan. The structure set up by this plan was under the leadership of a national commission for DDRR (NCDDR), which gave policy to the Joint Implementation Unit (JIU). The JIU was the hub of the DDRR programme structure, supported by a technical committee (UNDP 2004:12). The plan covered the DDRR process, but was biased towards the DD part without much attention given to rehabilitation and reintegration. This was to be able to jump-start the programme in December 2003 (UNDP 2004:46-47). Although the plan lacked sufficient coverage of the RR component, the structure outlined was integrated and contained many implementing agencies, covering areas as administration, medical care, security and demobilisation, enabling the programme to handle the DDRR in a comprehensive way. The DDRR programme is thus an example a heavily integrated field.

In the next section, the implementation of the deployment and startup of the DDRR programme is analysed, along with the results of the needs assessment.
5.1.3 Implementation phase 1

In this section, the initial implementation of the planning processes above are described and analysed. The deployment of UNMIL is the most notable activity.

The deployment of UNMIL

The troops deployed in four sectors of the country, starting mainly in sector one, the capital Monrovia and its surroundings. The deployment of troops was in broad terms implemented quite rapidly. In mid-march 2004, 85% of the force had been deployed (DPKO best practices unit 2004:6). This was much owed to the assessment missions made before deployment, enabling to assess ground situations. Although this can be viewed as a success in comparison with other UN deployments, UNMIL did not deploy in the 90-day timeframe endorsed by the mandate and the Brahimi report.

This was mainly because of a slow response from the troop contributing countries to fulfil the pledges that was made. This was also in part due to logistical constraints due to a shortfall in support personnel and the re-hatting of the ECOMIL troops. Also, camps and facilities were in a poor condition (DPKO best practices unit 2004). Another problematic factor was that the established headquarters could not be co-located due to the infrastructure constraints discussed in the OEF above. The separate location of civil and military components created an idea of separate chains of command inconsistent with UNMIL structure (DPKO best practices unit 2004:8). The shortfall of civilian personnel was a key concern, constraining the overall deployment, especially regarding logistics, but also impacted on crucial activities as the DDRR programme (see below). The public information component was rapidly deployed, but was constrained by limited logistical and technical expertise discussed above. This meant that the launch of radio broadcasts was delayed (UNDPKO best practices unit 2004:14).

The disarmament and demobilisation start-up: Camp Scheiffelin, Dec 2003

The DDRR programme was quickly launched on 7 Dec 2003, with demobilisation activities outside Monrovia. However, the implementation was ill-prepared and executed due to lack of experienced personnel, both civilian and military, the weak infrastructure of the camp and insufficient logistical support that could correct it. Another aspect contributing to the failed implementation was that the number of ex-combatants estimated to register was largely underestimated, and no information campaign was held before the start-up due to logistical problems, making expectations on the demobilisation process unrealistic (Jennings 2007:208). The situation got out of hand when a massive turnout of ex-combatants started violence, looting and riots at the camp and in Monrovia, due to the inability of the programme to attend to all the ex-combatants. The situation was eventually resolved through a timely and coordinated effort by the WFP and UNMIL liaison officers enabling distribution of food packages and other items to
calm the situation (Fiawosime in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:175). The start-up of the programme was then resumed and a total of 13,490 combatants were disarmed (Aboagye & Bah in Fiawosime and Bah 2005:110).

**From assessment to funding: Donor conference**

An important activity implemented in line with needs assessment planning process was the international donor conference held at the UN HQ in New York, February 2004. The RFTF outlined was overwhelmingly endorsed, resulting in $520 million pledged for the reconstruction of Liberia (UNDG Liberia 2006:7).

5.1.4 Output phase 1

The output of the implementation can be evaluated and commented from two perspectives. The deployment can firstly be viewed as largely successful and rapid in comparison to other UN operations, the output being that UNMIL had managed to deploy 85% of the force in mid-March 2003. This successful deployment owes much to the assessment missions undertaken beforehand.

However, in relation to made planning, the deployment did not manage the 90-day time-frame. The lack of competent civilian personnel and the slow reaction of the troop contributing countries were especially problematic. This in turn affected other projects such as the DDRR process, and the consolidation of security outside of Monrovia.

We can here see how the start-up phase of the deployment is linked in a chain of events, with roots in the structural features of the UN system, its strengths and weaknesses. What enabled the deployment and made it possible was the experience present in the UN system with peacekeeping. On the other hand, the weakness of the UN framework is also acerbated. That is, the reliance on voluntary contributions from member states to amass personnel and other assets. We can see how the short time-frame set up during planning led to unrealistic expectations on the implementation, and how the structural features of the UN framework manifested themselves to affect the implementation, thus limiting the output of the deployment, and in turn, hampering several other projects, most notably the DDRR. The DDRR process was initiated with weak performance due to the implementation shortfalls in the deployment, leading to inadequate security, facility support, administration and communication with relevant stakeholders. The constraining infrastructural conditions on the ground further complicated the implementation.

Overall, the output (implementation in relation to planning) shortfalls can be ascribed to the unrealistic time-frame of 90 days in combination with the built in constraints in the UN framework discussed earlier.

The output of the needs assessment was positive however, since it managed to secure fund pledges for the mission at the donor conference.
5.1.5 Outcome phase 1

The outcome of the deployment in large is that the security situation in Monrovia was largely improved, making it possible for the UN to consolidate their position there for inland advancement. This is the major change of the OEF that calls for the analysis to commence with phase 2. However, the deployment delays discussed earlier made the inland consolidation and setting up of headquarters in other sectors delayed, in effect resulting little or no improvements of the security situation outside Monrovia (SG progress report no. 1 2003:2).

The outcome of the start-up of the DDRR process can be seen as having a short and long impact. The short outcome was that the security situation deteriorated, leading to riots and looting at the camp and around Monrovia. Here we clearly see a case of external events to the interaction process interacting with weak output to produce a volatile short-term outcome. However, as a result of the rioting and looting, the DDRR programme was suspended until the preparations were adequate. This is an aggravating outcome; since this hampered the DDRR in other parts of the country, leaving ex-combatants active around the country, thus further destabilizing the security outside Monrovia (SG progress report no 1 2003:14). However, even though the suspension lead to a preservation of a conflict driver for some time, it gave important lessons learned for the resumption of the programme and an expedited access to funding (Aboagye & Bah in Fiawosime & Bah 2005:110). The outcome on the short term meant a preservation of a crucial conflict driver and deteriorated security for a short period in Monrovia, but the long term outcome stretching in to the next phases is lessons learned and funding for the resumption of the programme.

The needs assessment gave an important outcome in form of funding due to the results of the donor conference discussed above.

To evaluate the outcome of phase one, we first need to categorise outcomes based on MPICE sectors of crucial activities, then look if conflict drivers are reduced or institutional capacity boosted. The most notable impact is made in the sector concerning security, with the deployment of UNMIL. The conflict transformation is clearly in stage 0, since active intervention is necessary to maintain order (MPICE 2008:5). Overall, the impact of the deployment and DDRR activities is a reduction of conflict drivers concerning security, since the political violence in Monrovia is diminished and the threat from ex-combatants is diminished after the demobilisation (MPICE 2008:16). However, at this stage, these impacts are only relevant for the Monrovia area, and represent a positive outcome spatially limited.

There is an identified positive outcome concerning the security sector. What instances of cooperation can be identified as contributing to this positive outcome?

The most notable cooperative action contributing to this outcome is the assessment missions undertaken, that paved the way for UNMIL deployment. Liaison officers were an important mechanism used. Also, the concerted action of the Liaison officers and WFP enabled the DDRR start-up to proceed with demobilisation. The needs assessment was a broad instance of cooperative
planning that resulted in crucial funding for the mission. From this initial phase, it can be concluded that cooperative action served a supportive role enabling action and thus facilitating the output, but was not the main vehicle driving the implementation to outcome, as the UNMIL deployment planning and execution was handled mainly by the DPKO. Although the DDRR planning was integrated, the constraints created by the weaknesses of the deployment combined with the infrastructural constraints of the ground failed to produce expected impact. It seems that coordination mainly had a facilitating impact on the operational level, in concrete mission settings on the ground with a clear, achievable outcome.

5.2 Phase 2: Commencement of programmes, March – December 2004

5.2.1 Operation Environment Framework phase 2

A key question is what changes have come about that warrants the shift to a new analytical phase, and how these operate as constrainers/enablers for action. It is clear that the deployment of UNMIL marks a dramatic change to the operation environment, since it is a large operation deploying a number of actors in Liberia. The most notable change is the increase in security, stabilising the Monrovia area and expanding beyond as the deployment continues. This increase in security means that the preconditions for action change, as new areas become accessible and a large number of humanitarian and political activities can commence (SG report no. 3 2004:11, SG report no. 4 2004:16). As phase 2 begins, the deployment of UNMIL is largely completed.

As the planning and implementation aspects of deployment have been discussed in phase 1, the deployment will from now on be treated as an enabling structural factor. The deployment continues on a smaller scale, and thus doesn’t warrant analytical planning and implementation attention. This security enabler opens up the playing field for a range of activities. I will trace the activities of DDRR, rule of law, humanitarian assistance and the organising of elections through the stages with a sectored approach. These are crucial components of the mission in line with the peace accord, and touches upon the focus sectors of the MPICE framework.

As the security situation is stabilised, but fragile, due to the UNMIL presence (SG progress report no.3 2004:4), the focus becomes the increased activity in political, humanitarian and development programmes. These programmes face formidable challenges and are constrained mainly by the lack of infrastructure, such as facilities and passable roads, food and competent civilian personnel (SG progress report no.3 2004:8). Also, the composition of the transitional government (shared by the armed factions) and the low institutional capacity to restore
government control coupled with widespread corruption is constraining the efforts to re-establish the rule of law (Bashua in Fiawosime & Bah 2005:134).

After some difficulties in the initial deployment, a working public information system is in place, which provides an enabling mechanism to deliver information to the public and facilitate smooth implementation of programmes, most notably the DDRR process (SG progress report no.3 2004:8).

In sum, the operation environment is somewhat stabilised, which enable these programmes to start on a larger scale, but the lack of infrastructure, the deplorable humanitarian situation and the lack of personnel constrains the programmes.

### 5.2.2 Planning/Decision phase 2

In this planning phase, the preparations and outlined plans and mechanisms for implementing the programmes in focus is examined.

**Strategic Planning: Implementation goals**

At the strategic level, the RFTF stands as the closest thing to a strategic framework for the operation. This continues to be the main framework for prioritizing needs and negotiating these between the national actors (UNDG Liberia 2006:12). But as mentioned, there is a significant lack in coordination, since the clusters of activity are poorly linked due to uncoordinated reports, and mechanisms for monitoring and coordination did not work properly, resulting in inadequate tracking of donor funds received and difficulties on assessing impacts (UNDG Liberia 2006:12). Although it serves the purpose of channelling funds and linking projects to donors, the RFTF as an overall plan lacks in coordination and transparency, and serves more as implementation guidance than a strategic framework that sequences and coordinates activity to a shared ultimate goal. This weak strategic coordination constrains the impacts of individual programmes under review.

In April 2004, UNMIL released an Integrated Mandate Implementation Plan (IMIP). This was however more of a plan outlining important activities than a strategic framework (Hull 2008:26).

**Disarmament, Rehabilitation: Lessons learned, plans remade**

Due to the events described in phase 1, the programme was suspended. However, this provided crucial lessons for the resumption of the programme in April 2004. In a sense, past failures were utilised in the planning of the re-launch, thus enabling a secure and efficient disarmament and demobilisation. The national commission on DDRR (NCDDRR) guided the process through policy direction, and the set up mechanisms for funding and implementation were utilized to identify and reconstruct cantonment sites for disarmament and demobilisation and contract implementing partners. The planning process this time around is marked by an integrated effort, drawing on relevant components of the UN system and
NGO implementing partners to address the needs in the DDRR process in a comprehensive manner. Planning and allocation of resources were fair and transparent (UNDP 2004:12-16). The plan set up is designed for the demobilisation of 38,000 ex-combatants.

A crucial component in the planning process is the intense information and sensitisation campaign held across the country by UNMIL department of public information and the JIU (UNDP 2004:9). This was enabled by the working public information system set up as a result of the deployment phase. This was a crucial initiative, which minimized risks of misunderstandings on benefits and purposes.

The planning and preparations for the re-launch of the programme was this time around carefully planned and executed. Camps were carefully selected and prepared, and relevant stakeholders were involved in the planning process, which made sure that acceptable security, sanitation, transport and infrastructure and administrative conditions were resolved, and standards were in place for these issues (UNDP 2004:15).

The planning of the subsequent rehabilitation and reintegration component was not given the attention as the first component did (UNDP 2004). The plans envisaged in December stands, which means that eligible ex-combatants will receive social and economic training and counselling, participating in various projects, mainly implemented by community based NGOs contracted by the JIU (UNDP 2004:36, 40-41). There were also stopgap projects planned to fill the transfer period between demobilisation and rehabilitation projects (UNDP 2004:46-47).

To summarise, the planning process was this time carefully executed, with a broad base of stakeholders involved and functioning coordination mechanisms. The lessons learned from the December demobilisation was incorporated into the planning of the activities. This shows that the analytical structure of phases and iterative processes can identify instances of learning. The eagerness to restart the programme made the planning biased towards the DD components, leaving the RR components neglected in terms of economic and implementation plans.

**Humanitarian aid: Coordination mechanisms**

With the security umbrella of UNMIL largely established, and the DDRR process on track, the various humanitarian aid programmes boosts their activities due to the enabling security situation. Since there is a multitude of actors working in this field, and many of them operates outside the UNMIL structure, there is no coherent planning for this field. However, there are several coordination mechanisms and also planning activities linked to these that are interesting to discuss. Beyond this, the focus will be on the rehabilitation of refugees and IDPs and provision of health care in this sector of work.

Within the UN structure, the office for coordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA) is responsible for the coordination and strategic guidance of humanitarian programmes. This is an agency outside of the UNMIL structure. But in the phase under review, the decision was made to incorporate OCHA into the UNMIL structure, and the Humanitarian Coordination Section was established.
(Frerks et al 2006:80). The HCS works as an interface structure between UNMIL, other UN agencies and NGOs. Planning and coordination is also channelled through the Humanitarian Action Committee, which hold regular briefings with NGOs and other UN agencies, to ensure that aid efforts are coordinated (Frerks et al 2006:80). There has been some critique of the disbandment of OCHA and integration of the HCS into the UNMIL structure from NGOs. They mean that their impartiality and neutrality is compromised due to the affiliations of HCS to the military and political UN agencies (Olson & Gregorian 2007:41). This poses a constraint to the planning of humanitarian efforts. But the picture is not uniform, given the plethora of aid agencies operating in Liberia. Most NGOs of the principled position are international, big entities, and the cooperative NGOs mostly consist of local organisations. Also, the perspectives in the rural and remote areas seem to be more pragmatic than in Monrovia (Frerks et al 2006:92). However, at a minimum, the HCS enabled actors to get up to date information and possibilities of field coordination, especially logistics.

However, there is a clear lack of shared strategic perspectives and comprehensive planning (Olson & Gregorian 2007:51-53).

**Rule of Law: restoring state capacity**

As the security umbrella of UNMIL is established in Liberia, a priority is to strengthen state capacity by establishing the rule of law. To this end, there is a dire need to restructure the police service. This task is coupled with the strong challenge of reforming the judiciary and penal systems. This task is heavily constrained by the lack of skilled personnel and infrastructure. There are few working courts and prisons in Liberia. One target that is set is that the Liberian police service should include 1800 officers for the elections scheduled for October 2005 (SG progress report no. 3 2004:7).

To coordinate the effort and gain a comprehensive and holistic approach to planning and implementation of the rule of law sector, the Rule of Law Implementation Committee (ROLIC) is established. This mechanism is chaired by the deputy special representative for rule of law, and involves several stakeholders from the transition government and UNMIL (SG progress report no.3 2004:7). As a strategic planning mechanism, the ROLIC is clearly constrained by the transition government’s inability and, sometimes, unwillingness to initiate major reform of the judiciary system and laws. ROLIC advice was ignored in 98% of the cases (Blume 2008:8-9). Planning is mostly short-term; the overall picture becomes shattered, with uneven standards across the country. Partial interests are manifested in the political system and impacts on the rule of law reform, making progress at the strategic level constrained.

At the operational level, the planning and set up of the reforms show better results. The UNMIL civilian police (CIVPOL) component together with civil society stakeholders developed a comprehensive training package for the new Liberian police, coupled with extensive screening mechanisms for identifying eligible recruits (Aboagye & Bah 2004:11). This was coupled with the restoration of the police academy funded by a UNMIL quick impact project (SG progress
report no.3 2004:7), which is an integral mechanism of the integrated mission concept. CIVPOL also concluded an agreement with the transition government enabling them to co-deploy with the Liberian police at all levels. The public information system also enabled the promotion of community policing practices (Aboagye & Bah 2004:11).

The reform of the corrections system is tasked mainly to the transition government, with UNMIL filling an advisory role. This sector encounters considerable constraints, mainly by the lack of infrastructure and judicial personnel to administer justice. This is coupled with the weak ability of the transition government to carry the reform process forward (Aboagye & Bah 2004:11).

UNMIL also coordinated plans with the chief of justice to open courts through Liberia (SG report no. 3 2004:7).

In sum, there is a virtually non-existent strategic planning, and mixed results in the operational planning of the components of rule of law.

Elections: Planning for the end of the transition phase

This activity is included in the analysis because elections are the crucial focal point for the ending of the transition phase. It is outlined in the Accra peace accord that elections should be held no later than October 2005. In this phase, as the initial security situation is stabilised, the planning commences. This activity will only have a planning stage in this phase.

In order to fulfil the Accra peace agreement, the Liberian transition government is to prepare and hold elections with the support of UNMIL. This is channelled through the establishment of the National Elections Commission (NEC). A crucial aspect is that the repatriation of refugees needs to make considerable progress if they should be able to vote. A joint assessment mission was made, clarifying the UN and its partner’s role in the election. It was evident that the NEC needed substantial support to be able to fulfil its task. Crucial was material, staff and information capacity support. The UNMIL objectives were identified as assisting the conduct of credible elections and leave behind a Liberian management body that will rely less on international assistance in the following elections (SG progress report no.3 2004:10). In August, the draft for electoral reform legislation was delivered to the legislative assembly (SG progress report no.4 2004:9).

This draft was delayed however, since the legislative assembly did not ratify the draft, and made several amendments that had to be vetoed by the chairman of the transition government. This delay of the electoral reform threatened the election process, as it delayed operative planning and voter education (SG progress report no.5 2004:9).

It is clear that the transitional government works as a constraining factor to the planning of elections, since different instances of the government work against each other. This is clearly a consequence of the transition government being made up of former warring parties sharing power.
5.2.3 Implementation phase 2

Demobilisation and rehabilitation

After the resumed planning and preparations of the DDRR programme, it was finally re-launched with disarmament and demobilisation. Enabled by the comprehensive planning effort and the intensive information campaigns, the disarmament and demobilisation process went smooth without any major disturbances. Each UN agency was responsible for one part of the activities in each camp, utilising NGOs as implementing partners. The responsibilities are listed below (UNDP 2004:20):

Cantonment Management – UNMIL/NCDDRR
Food Management – WFP
Pre-Discharge Orientation – UNDP
Transport - UNDP
Medical Screening – WHO
Reproductive Health and Sexually Based Gender Violence – UNFPA
Interim Care Centres – UNICEF
Communication – UNDP

It is clear that form followed function in the planning and implementation of the DD components. The integrated planning was followed by an integrated implementation where different expertise were responsible for different crucial services, and tasked these activities to NGOs and local organisations. The DD implementation showed some remarkable results, and 1 month after its official completion on 31 Oct, a total of 101,449 ex-combatants had been disarmed and demobilised. 27,892 weapons had been collected (SG progress report no.5 2004:5). Due to the unexpected large quantity of ex-combatants and lax screening of applicants, the implementation had to make some changes, most notably by increasing staff volume and shortening the cantonment period of the demobilisation process from 2-3 weeks to just 4-5 days (UNDP 2004:21,47).

The rehabilitation and reintegration programmes were not as carefully planned as the disarmament and demobilisation exercise. This is also evident in the implementation. Due to the overwhelming response to the DD programmes, and the subsequent shorter period of cantonment, the RR component was severely constrained. Funds from the UNDP trust fund were largely used for the DD process, and thus funds were lacking for the RR component. Of the planned stopgap projects discussed in the planning section, none were implemented (UNDP 2004:47), which resulted in that a large number of ex-combatants simply had to wait for their rehabilitation and reintegration to commence. In December 2004, only 16,190 ex-combatants were absorbed by RR activities, and an additional 40,000 were planned for. This leaves 43,000 to be provided for, and a shortage of funds amounting to $60 million (SG report no.5 2004:6).

Again, it is evident that a casual process of converging factors impact on the implementation of the programme, were the excessive focus on DD components
combined with the overwhelming response leaves the implementation of the RR components suboptimal and uncoordinated with the DD component.

**Humanitarian aid**

As the security umbrella is established, and the disarmament and demobilisation is creating safe environments in more and more counties, the humanitarian aid programmes expands through the country. In the implementation, I will focus on education, repatriation, and health and food aid. I will also make some common remarks regarding the operative field conditions and the role of cooperation.

The operative field conditions, although enabled by the improvements in security, still faces numerous challenges. Due to the improved security conditions, a large number of refugees and IDPs return but live in camps (SG progress report no.3 2004:12). A serious constraint discussed in the OEF is the bad state of the road network, which makes deliveries and repatriations hard. This manifests itself in the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, where this is only possible on a small scale during the spring and summer due to the rainy season. In-field logistical cooperation is crucial in these instances, where UNMIL supports the UNHCR with airlifts (SG progress report no.3 2004:12). Large-scale repatriation becomes possible late in this analytical phase, in October 2004. This ordered repatriation is a collaborative effort by UNHCR and the transition government, with many NGOs as implementing partners (Fiawosime in Fiawosime & Bah 2005:167). At the end of 2004, some 150,000 refugees have been repatriated, including 5,500 assisted voluntary returnees. UNHCR and its partners also worked with community based reintegration activities to sustain the repatriation (Fiawosime in Fiawosime & Bah 2005:167).

The UN structure also comes to its full potential in the rehabilitation of the schools. This was a truly collaborative effort, were UN agencies coordinated action to provide food, sanitation, facilities and education materials, and the repatriation of displaced teachers to get the schools running (SG progress report no.3 2004:13). This is also an important activity picking up the slack of the DDRR programme, as many combatants were child soldiers, and funds from the Quick impact projects are being used to attend to their needs (SG progress report no.4 2004:11). This programme reaches over 800,000 children, and 12,000 school teachers have completed and orientation programme. This is coupled with the supply of food, materials and sanitation (SG progress report no.4 and 5 2004).

There is substantial ad-hoc, on the ground cooperation in this sector. The general trends are, due to the logistics constraints, that UNMIL assets are used broadly to facilitate aid delivery and repatriation (Fiawosime in Fiawosime & Bah 2005:176). UNMIL lends these assets willingly, and indicates that the military component, in line with integrated theories, facilitates the establishment of viable conditions. However, due to the integrated structure and the integration of the humanitarian component into UNMIL, some NGOs are reluctant to use the help of UN agencies, as they think their neutrality is compromised. However, the principled stand of some NGOs hampers the prospect of an overall strategy, as the actors have various timetables and views of what humanitarian aid is and should
comprise. The integrated mission as a structure provides both positive enablers in implementation, especially when UN resources are used, and a constraining factor in relation to some NGOs, as they distance themselves from UN agencies that they normally could cooperate with.

**Rule of law**

Based on the preparations made, operations to reform the police, prison and judicial system at the operational level are most notable. Regarding the reform of the Liberian police, the most notable implementation activities are the reopening of the Liberian police training college, and the retraining of 646 police officers by CIVPOL and relevant stakeholders (Aboagye & Bah 2004:11). Also, training of 854 recruits is underway after a rigorous selection process coupled with the launching of the recruitment process in May (SG report no.3 2004:6). Thus, the implementation of the police reform is on track, and strengthened by the codeployment of CIVPOL and the Liberian police.

The implementation of the reform of the court and penal system is slow however, and severely constrained by the bad shape of the facilities and lack of experienced personnel. 5 prisons were open during this second phase in Liberia (SG progress report no.5 2004:7). Prisons lacked basic sanitation, health care and food support, and were very overcrowded, resulting in several escapes and unacceptable conditions for inmates. This was somewhat relieved as the WFP and the ICRC stepped in to provide basic health and food services (SG progress report no.5 2004:7).

The judicial reform was hampered by the lack of infrastructure and personnel, but some steps were implemented to improve the situation. Quick impact projects were used to reopen the law school, allowing for 400 students to resume their studies. The temple of justice in Monrovia is functioning and the Supreme Court is in the process of ruling in several cases (SG progress report no.4 2004:6). The judicial reform in Liberia is implemented at a slow rate, owing to lack of facilities and equipment, and skilled personnel (SG progress report no.5 2004:6). There is also a problem of wide-spread corruption and lack of competence and separation from political institutions, which hampers the judicial implementation.

5.2.4 Output phase 2

**Demobilisation and reintegration: mismatch in performance**

When evaluating the performance of the DDRR implementation, it is clear that it was not implemented according to plan. The planning targeted 38,000 ex-combatants, and over 100,000 were demobilised. This indicates that the eligibility criterion was not effectively enforced, especially when looking at the low man-to-weapon ratio (UNDP 2004:19). When looking at the DD output alone, this indicates that the implementation was not according to plan, but very effective and successful in administering the process. However, this severely impacted on
the RR component, creating constrains leading to a very weak output, due to an overwhelming caseload and an acute lack of funding.

**Humanitarian aid: first steps towards rehabilitating the country**

When looking at the performance of the delivery of humanitarian aid, it is clear that considerable success can be noted, especially in the areas of health and education, owing much to the enabling integrated UN structure. Cooperation has a large role to play in these instances, although mostly at an operational and even ad hoc level. The performance is quite remarkable given that funding has been lacking, since the pledges made only have been paid to about 38% (SG report no.4 2004:12). Thus synergies have been reached and competition over scarce resources has been kept at bay (Olson & Gregorian 2007:46).

**Rule of law: mismatch in performance**

As with the DDRR process, it is clear that there is a mismatch in performance between the components in this sector. The process of enhancing the Liberian police is performing quite well, under UNMIL leadership. But the judicial and penal reforms, led by the transition government, are lagging behind the progress with the police reforms. This was mainly attributed to mentioned constraining conditions and the weak performance of the transition government in implementing the projects. The performance is barely upheld by cooperation with WFP and NGOs in the penal sector. This mismatch in performance clearly demonstrates the lack of strategic direction of the rule of law process. Coordination and the use of quick impact projects contribute significantly to progress in the individual parts, but overall performance is hampered due to a lack of coordination, and divided responsibilities.

**5.2.5 Outcome phase 2**

**Demobilisation and disarmament: impacts**

The skewed output had some serious ramifications for the impacts in the operation environment. It is here fruitful to conceptualise the impacts on a short-term and long-term basis. In the short-term, the unexpected quantity of the DD activities contributes vastly to reducing conflict drivers related to the presence of small arms and threat from ex-combatants and thus improving the security situation (MPICE 2008:16). To this end, the large inclusion in the DD process is an advantage.

But in the long term, it is evident that the failure to rehabilitate and reintegrate the massive caseload of ex-combatants sustains the conflict driver it is intended to reduce, by failing to meet expectations and leaving demobilised ex-combatants in a frustrating limbo. This is a case in point of the inextricable link between security and development, and an interesting dilemma (Jennings 2007:212-213). The wide inclusion facilitates the stabilisation of security in the short term, but as it fails to
link to viable projects of development and a scope wide enough to address the larger community, the frustrations lead to a sustainment of the very conflict driver the programme was set out to reduce.

A nation-wide survey confirms this analysis: the least integrated and those that had the worst situation was ex-combatants that was waiting for a rehabilitation and reintegraion programme to commence (Pugel 2006:4-5). Thus, as frustration grows, so will the conflict driver.

Another related aspect of the security – development link is the strategic coordination with other activities. The question here is, reintegration into what? Reintegration outpaced national recovery and development (UNDP 2004:48).

What about the role of cooperation in producing these impacts? The integrated planning and coordinated implementation was a central causal factor in producing the short-term reduction of conflict drivers. Form followed function, and each part worked in a comprehensive manner to achieve remarkable result, that would have not been possible without all the components. However, coordination to strategic issues and long-term stabilisation continues to be difficult.

The pattern seems to be that cooperation and coordination can produce positive outcomes in clear instances of burden-sharing with achievable and measurable results, but fail to coordinate the strategic issues and connect to long-term development.

**Humanitarian aid: Success or failure?**

Impacts have been largely positive, especially in the sectors of health and education. This implementation impacts to create feasible living conditions and also picks up some of the slack from the DDRR programme. The deliveries made by the humanitarian aid programmes both diminishes the drivers of conflict associated with social disintegration, displacement and demographic pressures, and strengthens institutional performance by making basic necessities available and the provision of basic social services, most notably the school systems (MPICE 2008:43).

It is also clear that cooperation had a major role in creating these positive impacts, especially since both financial and logistical constraints were present. The pattern is especially strong in technical areas, were form follows function. On more political issues, the opinions differ. The repatriation was viewed by some NGOs as a political project to ensure viable constituencies for upcoming elections (Olson & Gregorian 2007:47). This is telling of the lack of shared vision and strategic planning in this sector.

Another pattern, albeit of moderate impact as the security situation and infrastructural conditions improve, is the constraining mechanism the integrated UN system play in relation to some NGOs, as they become reluctant to accepting UN support.

**Rule of law: mixed results**
Due to the improved security situation and the training and patrolling of the Liberian police in cooperation with CIVPOL, order is restored and arrests are made possible. But the weak performance of the prison and judicial system means that prisons become overcrowded, and insecure, and weakens the judicial system since suspects are denied the right to a speedy trial due to the judicial shortages (Aboagye & Bah 2004:11). This leads to escapes, detrimental conditions in prisons with risks of abuse, and the release of prisoners for unduly long incarceration periods.

The lack of strategic coordination and the inability to tackle the root problems in the legal systems hamper the impact. In short term, the progress in police reform means that security is strengthened mainly by the reform of the police, thus reducing conflict drivers associated with the use of national security forces for political repression (MPICE 2008:16). There is a positive impact owing both to reduction of conflict drivers and strengthening of institutional capacity related to establishing a safe and secure environment (MPICE 2008:16).

However, due to the lack of progress concerning the penal and judicial system, and the lack of strategic coordination and comprehensive judicial reform, the overall strengthening of institutional performance remains absent in the impacts of this phase. Judicial independence and government accountability is still weak (MPICE 2008:25). Corruption and impunity are still present drivers of conflict, and thus there is weak reduction of these drivers of conflict (MPICE 2008:25). Although the symptoms are mildly addressed, the root causes (bad governance and political intervention in the justice system) are not addressed, which in long-term impact can threat the establishment of the rule of law.

The role of cooperation in creating positive impacts is clearly present at the operational level. However, it is clear that the lack of strategic coordination played a big part, in conjunction with the unwillingness of the transition government to initiate comprehensive reform, to hampering positive institution building impacts.

**Overall evaluation of impacts and the role of cooperation in phase 2**

To evaluate the overall impact in this phase, some clear progress has been made in restoring the Liberian society.

A pattern of cooperative action in relation to positive outcomes begins to emerge. Form follows function, and where there are technical issues to be coordinated, cooperation delivers good results, even under a lack of funding and political constraints. However, these impacts are impeded by the lack of strategic coherence. The sum of the parts become less positive, as projects are not linked, and short-term positive outcomes are not transformed to steady long-term development. The mismatch in the DDRR programme is a case in point. This is further acerbated by the funding constraints present in all areas and the weak performance of the transitional government in dealing with corruption and restoring state capacity. There is a holistic casual process at the strategic level constraining the impacts made at the operational level.
However, the momentum gained at the operational level has enabled the planning of elections to pick up speed, and the progress made feeds into each other. Overall, this operational progress lays the ground for the accelerated elections preparations.

5.3 Phase 3: Ending the transition period, December 2005 – January 2006

5.3.1 Operation Environment Framework phase 3

The most notable change of the operation environment is the completion of the disarmament and demobilisation programme and the disbandment of the armed factions in Liberia, allowing for operations in programmes discussed in phase two to move into an accelerated pace. Also, the former armed factions turn a new leaf and form political parties or aligning themselves with existing political candidates or parties (SG progress report no.6 2005:1). This means that the conflict dynamics change and take a non-violent political shape. This is the most important reason for the changed dynamics in the operation environment that motivates an analytical phase-shift.

There is a largely enabling security environment. But the long-term impact of the failure to connect the DD and RR activities is starting to manifest a new dynamic, were disgruntled ex-combatants awaiting reintegration is a constrainer and a source of tension (SG progress report no.6 2005:4). Although the security situation is generally stable, this dynamic is a real threat to progress. This is a constrainer for upcoming elections, as eruptions of violence can threaten the election process. Other constraining dynamics, which was already noted in phase 2, is the composition of the transition government, which entails a government marred with factional disputes and corruption, frustrating UNMILs facilitating and supporting role. Inability to deal with this is a major concern, since a primary conflict driver in Liberia has been bad governance (see OEF phase 1). Limited resources are a major constraint, especially to the RR process. The state of the roads in Liberia continues to be a logistical constraint, even more so during the rainy season, which affects the elections.

However, the progress made in the previous phase of training police, delivering community services and repatriating refugees instil a state of normalcy and laying the enabling ground for the upcoming election. Two other enabling factors in relation to the elections is, firstly, that the political transformation of the former armed factions impact much on security and stability, but relatively little on the political landscape. The factions are mostly aligned with existing candidates or form parties of little influence, or simply dissolve (Harris 2006:376-377). The second and most important enabling factor is that there is no incumbent
government with power and resources participating in the political election, due to the stipulations in the Accra peace accord (Harris 2006:377). This creates a political structural condition in which the playing field is relatively level and dominated by civilian actors, not associated with rebel groups and the transition government. No actor can control the security situation either, which was the case with Taylor in the previous elections in 1997 (Harris 2006:377).

5.3.2 Planning/Decision phase 3

As the elections start to draw near, focus is on making the necessary preparations to conclude the transition period with an election in October. The weak performance of the transition government and the constraints it has exhibited also draws much attention in the planning and decision-making activities in this phase. The activities traced in phase 2 continue to be implemented, and thus have no planning activities relevant for this final phase.

**Dealing with a primary constrainer: Steps to manage corruption and economic malpractice**

As a result of pressure from donors, attention is given to the weak performance of the transition government, the lack of transparency and corruption being two major problems. The most crucial activity in this phase coupled with alleviating the discussed constraint is the development of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP) for Liberia. This plan was a robust intervention into the government affairs in Liberia, and was developed in collaboration between Liberia’s international partners such as the World Bank, UN, EU, IMF, ECOWAS, and the transition government (Dwan & Bailey 2006:6). In the planning and discussions leading up to the establishment of the GEMAP in September 2005, political tensions came to the fore, and the draft made so far was rejected (Dwan & Bailey 2006:12). This shows the problem of combining technical planning of the GEMAP with the sensitive political nature of the process, which caused tension. This was further acerbated by the lack of strategic plans regarding the UN role in governance reform (Dwan & Bailey 2006:12-13). The transition government’s opposition was finally broken down with international pressure in form of threats of aid withdrawals (Dwan & Bailey 2006:13-14). Due to the late signing in September, GEMAP setup was slow and a hampered by the ongoing elections. The elections had to be settled before any progress could be made (Dwan & Bailey 2006:14).

This means that crucial steps were taken to dissolve one crucial constrainer to Liberia’s development, but as the planning convened with the elections, no implementation or impact could be made in the transition period. The constraint was still present in this phase, and the attitude of the new government determines the fate of GEMAP. However, it is a promising tool for economic development, since it is linked to existing frameworks and peace processes, and also an action plan for the lifting of UN sanctions (Dwan & Bailey 2006:16).
This was in many aspects an integrated planning process, with the incorporation of donors, stakeholders both national and international, and civil society. It also connects to the general peace process and has an inclusive oversight mechanism with genuine authority (Dwan & Bailey 2006:21-22).

**Elections: Establishing a condition from which political outcomes can be decided**

As the groundwork was laid in the previous phase with the submission of the electoral reform, the planning picks up pace with the ratification of the electoral reform in mid-December. The planning continues with the National Elections Commission taking lead and is supported by UNMIL. Legal and policy frameworks are developed through the adoption of guidelines for registration of political parties, alliances and independent candidates (SG progress report no.6 2005:10). The timetable for the elections was announced in February; Voter registration was to be conducted from 25 April to 21 May, and exhibited from 27 June to 1 July. The elections will be held on 11 October and results announced on 26 October (SG progress report no.6 2005:11).

As the timetable is set and the legal framework developed, operational planning ensues, with relevant stakeholders participating to ensure the smooth running of elections. UNMIL and NEC, in collaboration with other international agencies, both IGOs and NGOs, is preparing the voter registration exercise, which mainly focus on logistical and administrative issues (SG progress report no.6 2005:11). UNMIL also hold information campaigns and community outreach, this was crucial to deliver relevant information on registration and voting in a country of low accessibility and a high illiteracy rate (IRI report 2005:8-9). Planning and coordination of security is also launched. UNMIL has a substantial role here, both as security umbrella and logistical support. UNMIL also supports the national police with mentoring and monitoring (SG progress report no.6 2005:11). UNDP collaborates with the National Democratic Institute for the involvement of civil society groups in carrying out a civic and voter education programme (SG progress report no.6 2005:11).

With the electoral reform as an enabling planning framework for the operational planning, the preparations for the elections are rigorous and on track. It is also clear that a high level of coordination is achieved through the involvement of international partners, local authorities, civil society and the UNMIL.

5.3.3 Implementation phase 3

It is noteworthy that the implementation of most programmes are now geared towards making the elections work smoothly and credible.
Rehabilitation and reintegration: shortage of funds

The primary constrainer for the implementation in this phase is the acute lack of funds, due to the disparities in the output in the previous phase. Only about 25,500 ex-combatants participated in reintegration projects at the beginning of the year. There were several projects planned for and in the pipeline since the previous phase that provides opportunities for 44,500 additional ex-combatants. This situation was somewhat alleviated as referral and counselling offices were opened, disseminating information and assisting ex-combatants in enlisting to reintegration opportunities, and as funds were made available, the amount of ex-combatants not enlisted in reintegration projects declined to 26,000 (SG progress report no.8 2005:5). However, these combatants need to be provided opportunities to ensure that security is strengthened and development is kept on track.

Humanitarian aid: Repatriating refugees

As the elections draws near, efforts were concentrated on repatriating IDPs and creating feasible conditions for their reintegration, this will be the primary focus of this phase, as other programmes generally continue as they did in phase 2. The accelerated repatriation enabled by improved security conditions, was a coordinated effort involving many implementing agencies and connected to other activities of development and reintegration to ensure viable and orderly conditions for the return. UNHCR provided the transportation and non-food items while WFP has provided food rations, and UNMIL increased patrols to guarantee security. UNMIL also supported the return with transport and occasional airlifts when needed, as the rainy season and bad roads constrained the effort. These returns are supported by broader reintegration programmes under the RFTF, with rebuilding of roads, schools and clinics in the area of return (SG progress report no.7 2005:12-13). Community based reintegration projects are also implemented. This coordinated implementation links the short-term repatriation goals with broader society integration. At the end of the year and phase 3, about 232,500 IDPs had received repatriation support (SG progress report no.9 2005:14).

Rule of law

The work with restoring the judicial, penal and police services continue, albeit largely in the same pattern noted in phase 2. However, due to the coming elections, more attention is given to the training and deployment of police, as the goal set out of 1800 police in time for the elections draws near. The overall implementation continues to be slow, and the pattern is partial and piecemeal in its approach. The important constrainers manifesting themselves in the implementation is the lack of funding and the continued bad governance of the transition government.

The most substantial implementation activity is found in the training and deployment of the new Liberian police force. The target was reached in time of the elections, and thus facilitated the election process (SG progress report no.9
The police are also deployed to all counties in Liberia (SG progress report no.8 2005:6).

The implementation of rebuilding the judicial and penal systems are running slow, and the transition government are still not able to provide for acceptable standards in the six prisons running in the country (SG progress report no.6 2005:8). There have been some achievements in the judicial system, as 20 new circuit-court judges and magistrates were assigned to 145 courts. UNMIL quick impact projects were used to rebuild many of the deteriorated courts and provide material, but there is still an acute lack of trained personnel, equipment and facilities (SG progress report no.8 2005:10).

The patterns in phase 2 are very much present in this phase too. The supporting role of UNMIL and its partners is frustrated by the lack of funds needed to make headway in the programmes and the weak capacity and dedication of the transition government also hampers progress.

**Elections: Completing the transition**

The implementation of the elections operates in a both constraining and enabling environment. The major constraints are the bad road conditions present in the country and the potential security threat from ex-combatants seeking to derail the election process. Both these constraints create a heavy reliance on UNMIL assets. The enablers are clearly the level playing field and the rigorous preparations made involving a multitude of actors. A special mention should be made of the incorporation and training of civil-society actors who serve as monitors, educators and administrative staff, thus securing local participation and legitimacy (IRI report 2005:15).

The implementation started as scheduled with voter registration in April to May. The general impression was that voter registration functioned well and smoothly, due to good preparations and the coordinated effort of the involved actors (IRI report 2005:8). UNMIL logistical support was crucial to the implementation (IRI report 2005:15). The national police with support from UNMIL provided perimeter security, resulting in a calm implementation with no major incidents reported. During the registration process, some 1.3 million voters were registered (SG progress report no.7 2005:7). There was some political commotion in this stage of implementation, as the legislative assembly of the transition government adopted a resolution calling for an extension of the voter registration period, but the NEC rejected this and the Supreme Court supported the NEC's position (SG progress report no.7 2005:7-8).

As this process was completed, the nomination of candidates was concluded when the NEC approved of 22 presidential candidates and 22 vice-presidential candidates, 205 senate candidates and 513 house of representative candidates. The campaigning started on 15 August and was generally peaceful. The process continues to be hallmarked by cooperation and coordination at all levels, from senior technical assistance to the NEC down to information campaigns and education run by NGOs and UN agencies (SG progress report no.8 2005:8-9).
Two political events in the implementation threatened the process and timetable to a lesser extent. The Supreme Court ordered the NEC to allow each voter to cast two votes for the two senatorial seats in each county, and also ordered the NEC to allow two candidates to remedy their nomination papers during a period of seven days. This decision would mean that the elections would have to be postponed, and violate the peace accord. This was solved through ECOWAS mediation, were the candidates agreed to step down. The first decision was implemented by re-educating voters and did not affect the timetable, thanks to the support of civil society and the information mechanisms in place (SG progress report no.9 2005:2).

The voting commenced on 11 October and was generally orderly and peaceful, which mainly can be ascribed to the disappearance of combat forces and the robust UNMIL and police presence (Harris 2006:377). The structural threat present from disgruntled ex-combatants did not manifest, reasonably due to the tight security and some progress in the reintegration and rehabilitation process. The elections were deemed as free and fair, and the impartiality of the NEC was commendable (Harris 2006:378), removing the constraint posed by a fractioned transition government. UNMIL capacities were also well coordinated and used.

The voter turnout was 74.9%, and interestingly, almost exactly half of the voters were women (Harris 2006:380-381). Polling officials were well-trained and acted competently to support the voting process based on NEC guidelines (IRI report 2005:11). This was crucial given the difficulty of reaching all with information in the rural areas. Nine parties won seats in the senate, and eleven parties and seven independent candidates in the House of Representatives (SG progress report no.9 2005:2). No presidential candidate received over 50% of the votes, meaning that a run-off election was held between the two candidates with the most votes, which was George Weah and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (SG progress report no.9 2005:2). Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was declared winner and obtained 59.4% of the votes. Allegations were made by the runner-up of massive fraud. This was resolved when the NEC ruled that the result was valid and only minor technical errors were present in the elections (SG progress report no.10 2006:1). Weah stepped down, and on 16 January 2006, Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf was sworn in as president of Liberia (SG progress report no.6 2006:2), putting an end to the transition period and the election process. She is the first female head of state in Africa.

5.3.4 Output phase 3

Rehabilitation and reintegration: Constrainers in operation

Implementation was clearly constrained due to the lack of funds for projects. This clearly shows the ramifications of not applying a strict screening standard in the DD programme in phase 2, resulting in a big caseload of ex-combatants and the depletion of funds, which constrains the implementation in this phase. The actions in the previous phase constrained the output in this phase, in exemplifying how
the analytical model works in regard to path dependence. Performance was thus hampered by the funding deficit, and only after contributions outside of the original budget was made, could the ex-combatants receive new opportunities. This output contributed greatly to the elections being secured.

**Humanitarian aid: enabling refugees to vote**

Given the funding constraints present, the performance of the repatriation and rehabilitation process is commendable, and the utilisation of RFTF programmes in conjunction with repatriation activities coordinated between relevant support functions contributed to making the accelerated repatriation a success. However, there were diverging opinions on this issue, as some NGOs though that security and support structures were lacking for the IDPs, and that repatriation mainly was motivated by ensuring electoral participation. This diverging view clearly illustrates the lack of shared strategy and vision (Olson & Gregorian 2007:47).

**Rule of law: ensuring safe elections**

The training of the Liberian police reached its goal and can be seen as a success, contributing to the output of the elections and enabling a safe and secure voting process. However, the pattern of ill-coordinated cross programme implementation endures. In individual programmes, some headway is made, but it is mostly piecemeal. The use of UNMIL quick impact projects are a good alleviating mechanisms in lack of funding, and the NGO contributions to the prison system is also crucial, but overall, the constraints of the lack of commitment, both in form of funds and will from the transition government, make the overall output weak, and frustrates the improvements on the operational level.

**Elections: A veritable success**

When evaluating the performance of the elections implementation, it is clear that it was a great success; the elections were described as free, fair and transparent (SG progress report no.9 2005:3, IRI report 2005:15). It was also held within the established time-frame. The commendable work and impartial role of the NEC was a big enabler, functioning as an alleviator of the constraint present in the fractional and weak transition government. The logistical constraints was effectively handled by UNMIL planning and resources, and security was successfully enforced. The successful performance was also enabled by the converging implementation in the other programmes, with the repatriation of IDPs, the deployment of the Liberian police and the increased rehabilitation efforts in the DDRR programme. With the initial conditions observed, the absence of former armed factions and government meddling in the process coupled with the good performance of the NEC, the strong coherence and cooperation in planning to operational implementation led to Liberia’s post-conflict election becoming free, fair and peaceful, and an encouraging end to the transition phase.
5.3.5 Outcomes phase 3

Rehabilitation and reintegration: alleviating security constraints

The funds made available in this phase meant that more ex-combatants could start their reintegration programmes. This clearly contributed to diminishing the security threat posed by this volatile group. This impact converged to produce the positive output of the election process.

To evaluate this impact, it is clear those reintegration programmes of ex-combatants picks up the slack left by the DD components and sustains the reduction of conflict drivers, by reducing social disintegration for this volatile group (MPICE 2008:43) and thus diminishing the threat from ex-combatants to the operation environment (MPICE 2008:16). However, it is vital that the remaining ex-combatants will be offered viable opportunities to sustain these impacts.

The role of cooperation in facilitating the positive outcome in this phase is somewhat limited. Success was based on projects already being in the pipeline, thus building on cooperative measures taken in phase 2 planning, and, most importantly, the donations made to facilitate these projects.

*This indicates that cooperation, while being an important feature for effective delivery, is no replacement for sustained commitment and funding by donors.*

Humanitarian aid: enabling voter participation

The impact made in the short term by the repatriation of the IDPs is that they were enabled to vote and therefore enabled the election process and made it more representative and fair. However, a side-effect impact was that land disputes became more common, and since the judicial system was still underdeveloped, this introduced a new conflict dynamic.

Thus, the evaluation of the impact is mixed, since it on one hand contributes by further diminishing the drivers of conflict associated with social disintegration, displacement and demographic pressures, and strengthens institutional performance by making basic necessities available and the provision of basic social services (MPICE 2008:43). But on the other hand, these disputes could lead to violence if mechanisms for dealing with these conflicts are not in place.

The cooperative and synced efforts clearly made this large repatriation possible, where agencies pooled resources and contributed with factored competence adding up to the impact.

Rule of law: enabling secure elections

It is clear that the impacts made by the deployment of the police clearly contributed to the elections being safe and non-violent. But overall, the judicial system is far from operational. This is problematic in relation to the repatriation of IDPs through the country, increasing land disputes and posing threats to the security environment (SG report no.6 2005:4). As the court systems are not fully operative, these problems have to be dealt with by alternate means.
When evaluating the impact made, it is clear that the successful deployment of police contributes to the establishment of a safe and secure environment, both by reducing conflict drivers associated with police being used as a tool of repression, and also strengthening the institutional capacity by increasing the performance of the national security forces, and public order and safety is also strengthened relating to rule of law institutional capacity (MPICE 2008:16, 25). However, the piecemeal implementation and lack of strategic direction makes the impact on the overall establishment of rule of law marginal. The justice system still does not operate at acceptable levels, and the patterns in phase 2 repeat itself (see 5.2.5).

The role of cooperation is, as in phase two, limited to the operational setting, where UNMIL and CIVPOL provides support to ongoing processes, and NGOs help the running of the prisons. The lack of strategic integration, in conjunction with the initial conditions of lack of funding and bad national governance leads to a hampered holistic impact.

**Elections**

As pointed out, the success of the elections is a positive end to the transition period. The impact is most importantly the removal of the fractional and ineffective transition government. The result of the elections impacts as a positive enabler, since executive authority in Liberia is strong, and the elections removed the factional interest from this power position. This produced a good framework for the implementation of development in the continued efforts. At the same time, the results of the elections led to a diverse and mixed composition of the legislative instances, balancing the executive power and thus providing ground for reconciliation and compromise (Harris 2006:393).

Moving on to impact evaluation, it is clear that the smooth implementation and result of the elections both reduce conflict drivers and strengthen institutional capacity. In the sector of political moderation and stable democracy, conflict drivers are reduced by diminishing the competition for exclusive power, and adherence to the peace settlement is strong as the elections was an important benchmark and the results were accepted (MPICE 2008:8). The institutional capacity is strengthened as the elections made a considerable contribution to government legitimacy and accountability. The involvement of civil society also strengthened citizen participation (MPICE 2008:8). The vibrant plethora of political parties also indicates a strengthening of institutional performance, as the elections were for civilians by civilians, and political issues are resolved peacefully (MPICE 2008:8, 13-14).

Cooperation had a major role in the production of these positive outcomes and the success of the election process. The coherence and cooperation, from planning and framework level to operational level managed to capitalize on the initial enabling conditions of the absence of an incumbent government and former fighting factions in the elections process. Logistical and security constraints were effectively dealt with through cooperation, and disputes were mitigated. Synergies between programmes, such as the successful repatriation of IDPs, contributed to the positive outcome. Again, the pattern is clear that coordination of concrete and
operational issues produce positive outcomes, but even more interesting was the coordination in the planning stages that managed to ensure synergies rather than hampered effects.

**Overall evaluation of impacts and the role of cooperation in phase 3**

It is clear that the holding of free and fair elections, resulting in the removal of the transition government is a milestone in the path towards viable peace. This impact clearly enables the continued work for UNMIL and the new government, as the transition government was a main constrainer, and a primary conflict driver in Liberia’s war was bad governance. Regarding the elections, the overall holistic development impacts were supportive. However, they were still operating in a constraining manner regarding the rule of law, as the police reform successes were not matched by the judicial or penal reform. This problem was further acerbated in the face of land disputes when IDPs returned, as a legal conflict resolution mechanism was absent in many places.

The role of cooperation was quite outstanding in the contribution to positive outcomes, as stakeholders cooperating to a large extent, made the election process and repatriation of refugees possible through effective coordination. *The pattern still stands that form follows function and coordination is brought to its full potential in the handling of technical issues*. The convergence of impacts towards elections was also consistent with this pattern, as effort where coordinated to a clear and achievable aim set in time.

However, in the DDRR programme, it is clear that the boost of funds was the driving force behind successful implementation and positive outcomes. This shows that cooperation can only take it so far, and doesn’t replace sustained commitment in funding and good governance. Again, the rule of law activities and its impacts were overall hampered primarily due to the weak performance of the transition government.

### 5.4 Assessing overall impacts of the transition period

As the final phase of the process-tracing of the transition period is concluded, an overall evaluation of the impact achieved will be made in relation to the MPICE model. The overall role of cooperation and discernable patterns in the transition phase will be evaluated in the conclusions in chapter 6.

UNMIL has completed many aspects of its initial mandate, and made progress towards completing remaining key tasks. The presence of 15,000 military and 1,115 police personnel had made a substantial impact in establishing the enabling security environment necessary for sustained development. Programmes have made several steps towards sustainable peace, including repatriation of IDPs and refugees, and the completion of the disarmament and demobilisation programme.

In making an overall assessment, it is fruitful to recapitulate the MPICE stages concept, were the transition period can be conceptualised as moving from stage 0,
imposed stability, to stage 1, assisted stability (see figure 7 below), where consolidation and subsequently drawdown of the intervening force becomes possible (MPICE 2008:5). UNMIL is currently in the drawdown phase (SG progress report no.18 2009), indicating that stage 1 is becoming more consolidated.

![Figure 7: Major mission elements of conflict transformation and stabilization (MPICE Metrics Framework 2008:5)](image)

However, key areas remain to be consolidated, not least the establishment of rule of law, economic sustainability and state authority through Liberia, to ensure viable and subsequent self-sustaining peace. UNMIL, its partners and the Liberian government has an enabling ground to stand on, in the achievements made, not least since the transition government was one of the key constrainers to progress in many instances.

This also highlights the dilemma present in the transition period of reducing conflict drivers and strengthening institutional capacity at the same time, as was discussed in chapter 2. UNMIL’s role was primarily supportive and enabling, and the efforts were often frustrated by the transition government’s poor performance and will. The establishment of GEMAP put this dilemma in the light. Deemed necessary for sustained development and ridding Liberia of rampant corruption, it is also an intrusive and powerful intervention. This illustrates the sensitive balance between reducing conflict drivers and strengthening institutional capacity. The pattern seems to be that UNMIL fared much better in reducing conflict drivers than in strengthening institutional capacity, with the DDRR programme being a case in point. This is partly explainable by the period studied being a transition phase, and naturally focus is firstly on establishing favourable conditions, but the link between security and development manifests as failure to strengthen institutional capacity will nullify the reduction of conflict drivers in the long-term impacts. This also highlights the crucial role of the national government, as it is the main vehicle for institutional capacity, and thus sustained peace and development.
6 Conclusions

In this final chapter, I will reconnect to my research questions and aims stipulated in the beginning of the thesis, and draw upon the discernable patterns in the analysis to answer the questions and reflect on the research aim. Focus will firstly be on patterns of cooperation leading to positive outcomes. Secondly, as this was a theory developing and testing case study, the analytical model will be evaluated as a tool for process-tracing.

6.1 The link between cooperation and positive outcomes: emerging patterns

In light of the process-tracing performed using the analytical framework outlined in chapter 4, it is clear that some interesting patterns of cooperation in relation to outcomes can be discerned.

Cooperation between multidimensional actors, such as military, UN agencies and NGOs lead to positive outcomes mainly in the operative setting, where there is a clear and achievable short-term outcome.

The dominant pattern is that form follows function, meaning that in programmes and activities that require a mixed set of competencies and technical expertise (such as disarmament and demobilisation), cooperation is brought about and crucial to reach the positive outcome, as this outcome is dependent on many aspects and converging variables to be realised. The integrated structure of UNMIL and the enabling UN system with its full set of capabilities are manifested in the set-up of joint coordinating mechanisms, which enables in field cooperation and production of positive outcomes through the convergence of outputs in distinct areas of expertise. The elections are a case in point, were cooperative causal processes at many levels converged to produce the positive impact. Legal frameworks were negotiated, along with security planning, repatriation of IDPs, administrative education, information campaigns and observer missions. This pattern is consistent over the programmes and activities traced in the analysis. Largely, cooperation depends on the initial condition of an enabling security environment. The first failure in the disarmament and demobilisation in phase 1 speaks its clear language.

The major constrainers to cooperative action, impeding positive impacts are clearly a lack of funding and bad domestic governance. This is confirmed by the pattern that cooperation had a major role in the reduction of conflict drivers, but generally had little impact on overall strengthening of institutional capacity. As that process is long-term and more political in its nature, it is also harder to
coordinate and require domestic government commitment. Cases to this point that can be compared are the rule of law programme, were activities under the responsibility of the government failed to induce progress, and the elections, were the commended role of the National Elections Commission and its hard work greatly enabled progress by establishing legal frameworks in cooperation with international partners, and driving on implementation.

This leads me to a very important remark. Cooperation and comprehensive approaches are not the holy grail of peacekeeping, as the attention it receives in research and policy today would suggest. It cannot replace sustained commitment by adequate funding, enabling mandates and good and responsible governance. This was also evident in the analysis, as the best results were achieved in instances were activities were well-funded, and drew support of the domestic government, and conversely, the least positive impacts were made when bad governance and lack of funding hampered the process, as with the rule of law sector and the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants. Lack of funding and bad domestic governance tends to be somewhat endemic of peace support operations. Bad governance often is the problem in the first place and peace agreements tend to reflect the interests of the belligerent parties, and that peace support operations in at least the UN system relies on the flickering political will of the international community. But it is just because these initial constraining conditions that integration and coherence are needed on a strategic level, since strategy basically is about prioritising efforts and allocating funds based on a defined overarching goal (Eide et al 2005:19), and coordination can compensate for lack of funds, as in the humanitarian sector in phase 2. There has to be a shared understanding of the ends, ways and means through the operation from day one to deal with these deficiencies. As noted in the analysis, cooperation on short-term and highly technical issues contributed immensely to positive direct impacts, but the lack of coherence at the strategic level hampered these efforts, most notably in the DDRR programme, but also in the rule of law sector, as the different part were not delivering and performing as one, leading to hampered positive impacts or even an increase in conflict drivers, as with the ex-combatants. Given that the UN had a supportive role, coherent strategies become even more important, especially in relation to the domestic government.

This is also true as the reduction of conflict drivers and strengthening of institutional capacity requires a delicate balance.

To summarize and revert to the research question in chapter 1:

What is the role of integration, coherence and cooperation between multidimensional actors in the production of positive outcomes in peace support operations?

Cooperation, enabled by integrated command structures, is a primary driver in the production of positive outcomes in the operational setting, where there is a clear and achievable short-term outcome and form follows function. The lack of coherence at the strategic level, in conjunction with lack of funding and weak political support, hampers the transition from short-term partial gains to
sustainable and holistic positive impact. Lack of funding and bad governance is primary drivers while the lack of strategic coherence intervenes and acerbates these structural constraints.

6.1.1 Specification of hypothesis

I also stated in chapter 1 that one important aim was a specification of the hypothesis:

*Coherence, integration and cooperation in the intervention process will lead to positive outcomes.*

Based on the emerging patterns and the answer to the research question, it is formulated in the following way:

*Cooperation, enabled by integrated command structures, will lead to positive outcomes on the operative level where there is a clear and achievable short-term aim. Lack of coherence at the strategic level will hamper the transition to long-term, sustainable positive outcomes, enforcing the primary drivers; lack of funding and bad governance.*

This hypothesis can now be lifted to new cases to be further validated, complemented, or rejected.

6.1.2 Building block case study: contributions and implications

As stated in the research design, this was a building block case study of the most likely type. In this section, the contributions of this thesis in relation to existing research and the implications of the most likely case selection are discussed.

The main contribution, complementing the findings of Egnell (2007) is showing that cooperation in the operational setting, facilitated by integrated structures along the integrated theoretical strand will lead to positive outcomes in short-term. Together with the findings of Egnell that stipulates that integration and cooperation will lead to improved operational conduct, this implies that cooperation and integration in interventions will lead to higher effectiveness (as it both enhances operational conduct and the ability to produce positive outcomes), and also under what conditions as stipulated in my hypothesis.

Another important contribution is the affirmation of the strategic deficit and the weak link between the strategic and operative level discussed in the introduction to chapter 1.

As this was a most likely case-study, there are some implications for the contributions above. The conclusions drawn and the specified hypothesis about the link between cooperation, coherence and integration to positive outcomes need to be further tested. This was an initial probing study to identify initial
patterns. Moving on, more tough test can be made, preferably outside the UN structure were institutional integration is weaker, or in more straining conflict settings.

Quite alarming is the lack of strategic coherence even in this most likely case. This suggests that the strategic deficit and the weak link between the strategic and operational setting is strongly validated. A key policy focus should therefore be to develop shared understandings and enabling institutional setups that fosters coherence over the ends, ways and means early or even prior to future operations.

6.2 Evaluation of the analytical framework

As this was a theory-evolving and theory testing case study in the sense that an analytical framework was developed and applied in the analysis, an evaluation of this framework is appropriate. The overall ground for evaluation is based on the framework’s ability to operationalise the overall methodology of process-tracing. To get a base to stand on for evaluation, I will recapitulate a quote used earlier:

“To identify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to generate the observed sequence of events.” (George & Bennett 2005:206, emphasis added)

With this and the performed analysis as the background, the framework, by utilising spiral causality and emphasising the interplay between structure and agency progressing in phases over assorted activities of the policy and implementation process, was able to trace the sequence of events and identify initial structural conditions, and which manifested agency processes that in conjunction led to the unfolding sequence of events and impacts. It was able to identify instances of short-term successful impacts transforming to long-term negative impacts, path dependence and converging implementation leading to gradual change (see for example the DDRR programme, where initial lax screening had path dependent effects on the RR parts, and rule of law, where multiple processes mixed impact hampered overall holistic impact in conjunction with structural constrainers). Thus it functions well as a tool for process-tracing.

The weakness identified is that it mainly is an analytical framework for monitoring and process-tracing, and need to be complemented if evaluation and theoretical assertions are to be made. The MPICE model proved to be a valuable complementing tool for assessing impacts. But this lack of evaluation mechanisms in the framework could also be a strength, as it can be applied in many settings and function to study diverse cases of implementation and decision-making, provided that evaluative tools are added.
6.3 A final remark

As this concluded the thesis, a final reflection on linking and evaluating outcomes is in place. It has been pointed out in existing research (for example Egnell 2007) that evaluating outcomes are indeed a difficult effort. The process in Liberia does not end where this thesis does, and the final word is not said. Long-term sustainable development and peace is still not secured. Thus, the final outcome is not yet revealed. However, as crises and protracted conflicts continue to mount, I sincerely question the “wait and see” approach. Tools for monitoring and evaluation are desperately needed, enabling linkages to be made and best practices to be established. It is imperative for securing a viable future for peace support operations.
7 Executive summary

Outline of the thesis

In the contemporary complex conflict environment, operations often take place in fragile or failed states, with a wide range of goals beyond humanitarian relief and security stabilisation. In these complex situations, security and development are inextricably linked. This calls for a broad, multifunctional and coherent engagement. The best form of these engagements is yet to be formalised. There is a gap between strategic planning and multifunctional implementation, and there is also a deficit in studies supporting the notion that coherence and integration will lead to higher effectiveness and positive outcomes. This is based on the lack of tools for monitoring and evaluation.

In light of the identified deficits above, the aims of this thesis are too develop a framework for monitoring and evaluation and apply this in a case study, to test the following hypothesis:

Coherence, integration and cooperation in the intervention process will lead to positive outcomes.

The research question guiding the analysis is the following:

What is the role of integration, coherence and cooperation between multidimensional actors in the production of positive outcomes in peace support operations?

The case study uses the method of process tracing, which is a useful tool for investigating the relationship between cause and effect in complex processes where diverse phenomena interact. Process-tracing is best described as detective work, where evidence is investigated and put in sequence and compared to hypotheses, to generate an explanation of the sequence of events producing effect. The use of this method makes it possible to go beyond the verification or rejection of the hypothesis above and move to specification, i.e. under what conditions integration, coherence and cooperation produce positive outcomes.

Theoretical underpinnings

In order to create an analytical framework, conceptualisations have to be made about how operations involving multiple actors are understood and, most importantly what constitutes viable and positive outcome in complex peace support operations. Theories about the civil-military dilemma, how to reconcile a
military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do, are investigated to get an understanding of cooperation dynamics and how to conceptualise the role of peace support operations in contemporary conflicts. Two main theoretical strands are identified advocating two different approaches. The divided approach argues for the separation of the civilian and the military, giving the military space to develop a professional ethic and define their function according to objective security threats. The integrated approach argues for integration of the civilian and military institutions, since the military has to be sensitive to political will since the political will guides the military’s function and defines what a security threat is.

In applying this to the contemporary setting, were conflict often is a result of the lack of political institutional capacity, it is clear that the function of the military is to attain political objectives by other means, since peace support operations have far-reaching development objectives. Thus the function is defined by the political, and the integrated approach fits these situations. This prescribes that an integrated approach should lead to higher effectiveness, but how is not evident, and thus motivates the research question. Ultimately, the functional imperative and evaluation of the utility of integrated civil – military relations lies in the ability to produce outcomes according to political objectives. This is evident given the military as an instrument of political will. Based on this, viable outcomes is best conceptualised as establishing a condition from which political outcomes can be decided. This means that focus is on gradual positive change of the operation environment instead of outright and decisive victory. To conceptualise positive outcomes, the Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments framework is applied, which determines progress by using various indicators to measure domestic political institutional capacity and drivers of conflict. Outcomes are thus deemed positive if they reduce drivers of conflict or increase domestic institutional capacity, or both. The dilemma in the contemporary setting is to balance the reduction of conflict drivers with the building of domestic institutional capacity, so that sustainable peace becomes possible when the institutional capacity to resolve conflict prevails over conflict drivers.

Selection of case

Based on these assertions, the UN Mission In Liberia (UNMIL) is selected as a case, given that it fulfils the traits of an intervention with an integrated approach, and is therefore a case most likely to exhibit the link between cooperation and positive outcomes, enabling a specification of the hypothesis. The period studied is the transition period from the start of the intervention in October 2003 to the inauguration of a democratically elected government, replacing the transition government in January 2006.
Analytical framework

The analytical framework is the concrete operative tool for the analysis, based on the method of process-tracing and the assertions made from the theoretical background. It treats the intervention as a multi-actor implementation process, and focus on interaction between the dynamic operation environment, functioning as an enabling or constraining framework, and the planning and implementation of the intervening actors in the production of outcomes, where outcomes are conceptualised as gradual change. The model advances over time in analytical phases, where each phase is focused on change in the operation environment framework (OEF) via activities of planning/decision-making, implementation, output and outcome. A new phase commences when a significant change has come about, that means a renegotiation of the preconditions for action. This means that the phases can cover varying temporal space, but are chronologically ordered, making process tracing over time possible. The Measuring Progress In Conflict Environment framework is used to evaluate outcomes in each phase based on the criteria stipulated above, making it possible to trace progress across phases. This makes it possible to trace gradual change of the operation environment, judge if the outcome was positive, and single out the role of cooperation and integration in the convergence of many aspects to produce outcome, providing with the necessary tools to answer the research question. The framework is illustrated in a figure below. The model is read from top to bottom and left to right.

Analysis of the transition period, October 2003 – January 2006

The analysis is divided into three phases, where the first phase focus on the deployment of the mission and the start-up of the disarmament, demobilisation,
rehabilitation and reintegration programme that targets ex-combatants. The second phase commences when the operation environment is changed positively due to the enabling security umbrella the deployment causes, and focus on activities within four crucial programmes that can commence on a large scale due to the enabling security structure. These programmes are: Disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration, humanitarian aid, establishing the rule of law, and election planning. The third phase commences when the disarmament and demobilisation activities are concluded, which means that armed factions are disbanded and the conflict dynamics change to a non-violent political shape, which motivates a shift of phase. The third and final phase of the transition period is focused on the final planning and implementation of elections, which means that the transition government is removed and replaced by a democratically elected one. The end of the disarmament and demobilisation process and the advancements made in the other programmes enables this. Programmes continue during this phase, converging in impact to enable elections.

In the first phase it was noted that coordination mainly had a facilitating impact on the operational level, in concrete mission settings on the ground with a clear, achievable outcome. Deployment was mainly planned and implemented through a single UN department. Delays in the deployment implementation hampered the disarmament and demobilisation start-up, with the consequence that the programme was postponed until conditions and planning was more stable.

In the second phase, a pattern of cooperative action in relation to positive outcomes begins to emerge. Form follows function, and where there are technical issues to be coordinated, cooperation delivers good results, even under a lack of funding and political constraints. However, the lack of overall strategic coherence, the weak performance of the Liberian transition government, and lack of funds impede these impacts. There is a holistic casual process at the strategic level constraining the impacts made at the operational level. However, the momentum gained at the operational level has enabled the planning of elections to pick up speed, and the progress made feeds into each other. Overall, this operational progress lays the ground for the accelerated elections preparations.

In the third phase, it is clear that the holding of free and fair elections, resulting in the removal of the transition government is a milestone in the path towards viable peace. This impact clearly enables the continued work for UNMIL and the new government, as the transition government was a main constrainer, and a primary conflict driver in Liberia’s war was bad governance. The role of cooperation was quite outstanding in the contribution to positive outcomes, as stakeholders cooperating to a large extent, made the election process and repatriation of refugees possible through effective coordination. The pattern still stands that form follows function and coordination is brought to its full potential in the handling of technical issues. The convergence of impacts towards elections was also consistent with this pattern, as effort where coordinated to a clear and achievable aim set in time.
The overall progress in the transition period is positive, with the culmination being free and fair elections, enabling continued development towards sustainable peace. However, key areas remain to be consolidated, not least the establishment of rule of law, economic sustainability and state authority through Liberia, to ensure viable and subsequent self-sustaining peace. The pattern seems to be that UNMIL fared much better in reducing conflict drivers than in strengthening institutional capacity. This is partly explainable by the period studied being a transition phase, and naturally focus is firstly on establishing favourable conditions, but the link between security and development manifests as failure to strengthen institutional capacity will nullify the reduction of conflict drivers in the long-term impacts. This highlights the dilemma of reducing conflict drivers and strengthening institutional capacity at the same time.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the role of cooperation, enabled by integrated command structures, is a primary variable in the production of positive impacts in the operational setting, where there is a clear and achievable short-term outcome and form follows function. The lack of coherence at the strategic level, in conjunction with lack of funding and weak political support, hampers the transition from short-term partial gains to sustainable and holistic positive impact. Lack of funding and bad governance is primary drivers while the lack of strategic coherence intervenes and acerbates these structural constraints.

Based on the conclusions identified above, the specification of the hypothesis is formulated in the following way:

*Cooperation, enabled by integrated command structures, will lead to positive outcomes on the operative level where there is a clear and achievable short-term aim. Lack of coherence at the strategic level will hamper the transition to long-term, sustainable positive outcomes, enforcing the primary drivers, lack of funding and bad governance.*

This hypothesis can now be lifted to new cases to be further validated, complemented, or rejected.

The analytical model used proved to be a useful for process-tracing and disentangling individual aspect’s impact. However, it needs to be supported with evaluation tools such as the Measuring Progress In Conflict Environment framework, as it is primary designed for monitoring and tracing a process. It could be useful as a tool for process tracing in many areas, given that appropriate evaluation tools are added. Tools for monitoring and evaluation should continue to be the focus for research, as it is imperative for developing future peace support operations.
Quite alarming is the lack of strategic coherence, because this was a most likely case. This suggests that the strategic deficit and the weak link between the strategic and operational setting is strongly validated.

*A key policy focus should therefore be to develop shared understandings and enabling institutional mechanisms that fosters coherence over the ends, ways and means early or even prior to future operations.*
8 References


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