MINOR FIELD STUDY:

As You Saw, So Shall You Reap

An attempt to explain Senegal’s decision to brake off negotiations on a renewed Fisheries Agreement with the EU in 2006

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I extend my gratitude to the kind respondents. For practical as well as intellectual matters, thank you Jesper Bjarnesen, Pierre Guiol, Baptiste Genet, Sara Lindegren, Tina Kolhammar, and M. Ebrima Sall.

Special thanks to M. Abdoulaye Sadio and M. Magueye Sy with families.

*Science sans conscience n’est que ruine de l’âme.*
ABSTRACT

The Senegalese decision to brake off negotiations over a renewed fisheries agreement with the European Union in 2006 represents a puzzle since substantial economical gains are associated with an accord and because such agreements have been renewed with a certain degree of continuity in the past. In this thesis, it is argued that the Senegalese withdrawal can be understood as a response to solid domestic opposition to an eventual agreement. The resistance was rooted in government manipulation of accord-opposing factions during the fisheries agreement negotiations of 2002 as well as in a historic process that has brought, notably, labor unions and civil organizations to occupy political space formerly held by the Senegalese state. The EU, on its part, reduced the probability of success as the negotiating delegation of 2006 brought with it a new mandate, stemming from the reform of the CFP, which demanded unwanted financial transparency from the part of the Senegalese. Ideas held by actors involved in the process have played a small, yet distinguishable, part. The results have been obtained primarily through interviews with informed actors and stakeholders in the Senegalese capital of Dakar.

Key words: Senegal, International Negotiation, Common Fisheries Policy, Two-Level games, Fisheries Partnership Agreements.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CFP</td>
<td>Common Fisheries Policy</td>
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<td>DUE</td>
<td>FR: <em>Delegation de’Union Européenne</em></td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Fisheries Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>Asian, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION

Fishing is at the very heart of Senegal’s existence. The name “Senegal” comes from the dominant native language Wolof and means “our pirogue” – and pirogues are fishing canoes. Since the country suspended negotiations over a Fisheries Partnership Agreement with the European Union in 2006, Senegal finds itself on a policy-path that is clearly distinguishable from other West African countries. There are most likely identifiable reasons for this. This thesis is an attempt to encircle some of them.

1.1 Background

The European Union (EU) conducts a Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Since 1979, the union, as part of the CFP, negotiates bilateral fisheries agreements with developing countries. Negotiation mandates are fixed by the European governments in The European Council. The agreements are, since the CFP was reformed in 2004, known as Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) (MRAG 2007: 1). The stated aim of these agreements is to:

Provide the European fleet with access to surplus fish resources in the territorial waters of non-EU countries and to promote responsible and sustainable fisheries in the waters of those countries, in particular by supporting fisheries policies in partner countries (European Commission 2008a).

In 2006, negotiations on a renewed, bilateral fisheries accord between the European Union and Senegal broke down. No interim agreement was agreed upon and as a consequence European fishing vessels lost their right to make use of the fishing waters outside the Senegalese coast (Bojs 2008). The situation is yet to be resolved although rumors of initiated talks circle Dakar in the winter of 2009. The situation constitute an interesting exception from “business as usual” as the European Union has running fishing agreements with a large majority of West African countries (European Commission 2008a). The state of affairs is also noteworthy considering that the European Union\(^1\), has acquired the right to make

\(^1\) Formerly as the European Community (EC)
use of the fishing waters of outside the West African coast for 30 years – the first agreement in fact being signed with Senegal (UNDP 2005:3).

A reason for the continuity could be the substantial financial compensations that the EU can offer states entering an FPA accord. Example wise, no less than 30 % of GDP in Mauretania and Guinea-Bissau (both neighboring countries) is said to originate from the FPAs (SSNC 2009). Substantial economic incitements for entering a deal thus exist and, also notable, a refusal brings significant costs (in addition to the alternative cost of not enclosing a deal). The costs are related to the fact that a non-deal situation prompts the refusing government in question to closely guard its fishing waters and assure that rogue fishing does not occur (Bojs 2008). The Senegalese government hence holds numerous motivations for entering in a fisheries arrangement with the EU. Yet, in 2006, the country walked out of negotiations on that same subject.

1.2 Aim of the study

This study sets out to give a plausible explanation as to why Senegal, in 2006, chose to suspend the negotiations with the EU with no new FPA-accord, or interim arrangement, in view. My overarching research question will hence be: What can explain the fact that Senegal never concluded the negotiations on a renewed FPA-protocol with the European Union in 2006? In order to systematically analyze what brought about the decision, core elements have been drawn from an analytical model conceived by Harvard professor Robert D. Putnam.

1.3 Purpose

In general, West Africa is a region that receives modest attention from the non-francophone academic world. When to fisheries related issues, exceptions of studies exist but they emanate mainly from the natural sciences. Reports on Senegal that have been published with focus on social, economic or political issues appear rather seldom and, as a consequence, plentiful of knowledge on the area is outdated. Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that are present, or take interest in the region, publish reports more frequently but their publications tend to mirror organizational ideals and causes. Theoretically, Senegal is often made a dependant variable and policy-recipient. It is rare to see studies bring out the richness of Senegalese domestic political life and explain how they relate to policy outcomes.
With luck, this study can somewhat redeem the situation using a broad spectrum of unique interview data and secondary sources gathered among actors on the domestic scene.

1.4 Delimitations

A number studies and manifests seek to “name and blame” actors for the current state of the sea resources in West Africa and some are outspokenly compiled with the specific task to influence European governments (e.g. SSNC 2009; Action Aid 2008; UNDP 2005). It is not my endeavor to participate in such a debate even though I am conscious that some of my findings may have implications for various suggestions that have been made in the public discussion. The essay is voluntarily short off normative positions despite that anyone, I included, recognize the severity of the ecological situation in the waters of West Africa.

Field research has been carried out in the Senegalese capital of Dakar, which is West Africa’s most important city, serving as the region’s economic and infrastructural hub. In a perfect world however, complementary field work in for example Brussels would have been recommendable. The theoretical model suggests that also the interchange between the EU Commission and its domestic constituencies (the peoples of Europe) ought to be studied. For practical reasons, this has not been possible. Instead, I have concentrated my research to other aspects of the theory, a move that is admittedly somewhat unsatisfactory. I would however not say that it is compromising for the study as such, as the issue has a very low political profile and does not undergo severe scrutiny in Europe. A focus on fewer theoretical elements, I hope, only adds depth to the study.

1.5 Anatomy of the study

A pedagogic aim is to transport the reader from a point where something appears presumably illogic to the point where it emerges as understandable. After having presented the theory, and the choices that preceded it, I raise a few methodological considerations. Subsequently, the reader is presented with a short introduction to the political entity of Senegal. The ambition with the introductory text is to contextualize the larger, main body of the empirical text. The latter section presents the central data that has been gathered in an account that is organized in a chronological order. Last, I sum up the picture with empirical and theoretical conclusions. The conclusion section has, with inspiration from

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2 See section 2.4
Strömvik (2005), been enriched with a segment that accounts for some data that the theoretical model could not explain, and also suggests how it perhaps can be understood with ideas from other research\(^3\). This provides the thesis with a miniature theory evaluating/developing touch, although the essay is predominantly theory consuming.

\(^3\) This might, albeit, be less elegant than keeping the conclusion "clean" from new input. Such ideal however, should be weighed against scientific frankness. I have deemed it a minor duty to account for the most important segment of data that did not fit the theoretic model. See also discussion in Lundquist 1993:116-18
International negotiations constitute a distinct subfield in international affairs. Theories within the subfield can however be placed within larger research traditions. For example, Lake, Ikenberry and Mastanduno’s *Realist Theory of State Action* (1989) places itself in a tradition of state-centred research models. In the following section, I outline the foundations of systemic, state and individual-centered approaches and point to some of their flaws. The aim of the overview is to provide a modest theoretical background but also to outline the path that led to the choice of a Two-level approach. Intellectually, the discussion is particularly indebted to Kenneth Waltz (1979) and Andrew Moravcsik (1993).

### 2.1 Systemic analysis?

A classic way to approach an analysis of interstate relations is by imagining three different levels of action: the systemic (international) level, the state level and the individual, (cognitive) level. Attempts at understanding international political decision making that entirely ignores one level, or more, risk being incomplete, as argued by for example Kenneth Waltz (see account in Baylis & Smith 2005:207). Usually, one level of analysis is given preeminence and more weight than another however.

In Kenneth Waltz thought, it is the systemic level that make up the main determinant of international political action. Placed in a negotiation context, Waltz would argue that the position of the individual state in the international system is the key to understand its behavior. A negotiation outcome can be viewed as a product of the bargaining power’s relative clout, which is linked to their position in the system (ibid.). An alteration in outcome from one negotiation round to anther can thus be explained by a shift in the international environment to which the individual state responds (Moravcsik 1993:5). A drawback with the pure systemic approach is that it fails to explain variations of responses by states to the same international developments (Gustavsson 1998:16). Following scholarly developments, few pure\(^4\) systemic theories remain that are of broad use. Instead, the theories have been refined to include also, primarily, state behavior (Moravcsik 1993:6-7).

\(^4\) In the sense that they are untainted by state-centered or cognitive elements
When applying a systemic model to the EU-Senegal case, a paradox emerges: a systemic analysis, in most cases, implies that Senegal, arguably, has considerably more to win than to lose by finally accepting an EU bid. A small, developing country that is positioned in the periphery of the global economy would normally be expected to, in the end, strike a deal. The country has also done so for nearly 30 years (UNDP 2005:3). In 2006, however, its officials chose not to. Environmental organizations, and other observers of the talks, have been quick to stress the inherent inequity between the two parties as the trouble source, thus arguably adhering to a quasi systemic approach (see for ex. Action A 2007:2-6, SSNC 2009). As a rule, they do not confront the difficult issue being that Senegal, despite the disparity in power relations, did go its own way to suspend the talks. Also, an analysis made from a systemic perspective is required to illustrate the changes in the international system, from one negotiation round to another. Such a systemic alteration, I argue, is difficult to substantiate in this case. The systemic disposition is naturally not identical from 2002 to 2006, but neither are there any alterations sufficient to explain the policy shift.

Any inquiry should therefore attempt to “open up” the Senegalese state for analysis. Could an explanation for example be sought in the mindset of individual decision makers?

2.2 Individual policy agents?

Prominent research has been conducted centering on analysis of individual decision makers and their mind-sets. A basic thought behind research focusing on cognitive aspects is that people do not respond in the same way to the same events, simply because they are made up differently. It is thus not an event in itself that triggers a response but how it is perceived by those capable to produce a response that really counts (Gustavsson 1998:16). In order to understand a decision, it could thus be fruitful to attempt to sketch the mind-sets that were involved when it was taken. Such research, also, as a consequence, gives room for ideas and ideologies as independent variables in political decision making. A basic critique is that such science, within the Political Science realm, is speculative or, worse, resemble amateur psychology.

It can also be argued, that an individual centred approach is best applied on states where the individual has sufficient space to carry through the response to “objective” occurrences that he “subjectively” deems best suited. In autocratic or dictatorial environments for example, such research can provide plausible explanations to policy choices when glancing at the mindsets of those, or the one, in power. As a prominent example could be mentioned John G. Stoessinger’s steadfast account of Hitler’s attack on Russia (Stoessinger 2005:27ff). Senegal is

5 In political science, predominantly public decision makers
6 Known as “Operation Barbarossa”
a passably functioning and complex political arena to not go well with such a research approach. In addition, it would bring insurmountable methodological problems as it is difficult to access credible material on the heaviest decision maker in 2006 – President Abdoulaye Wade. Luckily, explanations can be sought elsewhere within Senegal.

2.3 Domestic explanations?

The rejection of pure systemic inquiry as well as a persona-centered analysis respectively, does not necessarily entail an analysis that focuses exclusively on the domestic policy arena. Despite its utility, domestic analysis can never substitute international explanations (Moravcsik 1993:9). On the contrary, one can argue, as does Robert Keohane, that a look at the international environment should make up the “first cut” of any analysis:

> It is a precondition for effective comparative analysis. Without a conception of the common external, problems, pressures and challenges, (...) we lack the analytic basis for identifying the role played by domestic interests (Keohane, quoted in Moravcsik 1993:9)

Attempts at reconciling the two approaches have been made, but many of them are imbalanced to the gain of the systemic approach. One such theory, well rooted in classical Realism, is Lake, Ikenberry and Mastanduno’s *Realist Theory of State Action* (1988) which contains a thoughtful effort to bridge the systemic environment with the domestic policy arena with sophisticated suppositions about state conduct. Even so, it bears compromising imperfections. The model somewhat rigidly, postulates that the state to its character is exceptionally rational, that it has an almost constant capability to mobilize resources and that it has stable preferences (Moravcsik 1993:9-11). Another inherent problem with many bridging theories, that Andrew Moravcsik, point to, is that they often “ignore the influence” of domestic factors on international bargaining (Moravcsik 1993: 14). In his understanding, domestic arena influence is underestimated in international negotiation theory. He writes: “the effects of domestic factors are not limited to the process of interest formation, but affect strategy and bargaining outcomes as well.” (Moravcsik 1993:15) What is thus required is a theory, or analytical concept, that not only balances the two realms of political action in its approach but also can fully capture the influence of the domestic scene on international negotiations.

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7 See also section 4
2.4 Two-level games

In my attempt to explain the failed negotiations on a renewed FPA between the EU and Senegal, terminology and concepts have been drawn from Robert D. Putnam’s *Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: the Logic of Two Level Games* (1988).

Robert D. Putnam’s “two-level game” is somewhat of a classic theory in the field of international relations, to a large extent because Putnam not only states that international and domestic politics are entangled, which is undisputed, but suggests ideas of how the two are entwined. The analytical framework places the negotiator – or the decision making statesman – in the centre and shows how obstacles and opportunities on the one gaming table can influence the disposition of blockages and openings on the other. The central idea is that the decision maker is obliged to adapt to developments on both tables. Putnam underlines that many experienced negotiators spend as much time conferring with their “domestic constituencies” as they do negotiating internationally (Putnam 1988:433).

The domestic level (called Level II) is where state preferences are formed. Different societal stakeholders strive to make government adopt to them favorable policies and decision makers broker between the same factions or/and form coalitions among the groups. On the international arena (called Level I), a statesman work towards optimizing the bargaining outcome for his domestic constituencies while at the same time trying to fend off, for the same constituencies, unwanted schemes originating from other international actors (Putnam 1988:434).

As he makes assumptions about linkages between the first and second levels, Putnam also creates a terminology intended for the analysis. Of particular importance are two expressions, which are interconnected: ratification and win-set. Ratification is, in Putnam’s model, not merely a parliamentary procedure but could also be any action (or non-action) that is taken by domestic groups to embrace implementation of an accord negotiated on Level I. Groups could be government agencies, trade unions, social classes etc. The groups define the domestic constraints that narrow the statesman’s choice of action, and his range of policy options is called win-set. It is defined by Putnam as “the set of all possible Level I agreements that would ‘win’ – that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents – when simply voted up or down” (Putnam 1988:437).

In short, what the statesman achieves on a global arena has to be saleable on the arena that determines the win-set and win-sets in a bilateral negotiation need to overlap in order for a deal to be possible. As a consequence, the larger the win-set, the more probable is the agreement and mirror wise, the narrower the win-set the less probability of agreement (Putnam 1988:435-38, Eichengreen & Uzan 1993:197).

However, there is ambiguity. In effect, it can be of advantage to have a narrow win-set since it has bearing on the eventual distribution of gains among the negotiating parties. A slim win-set can be exploited to take on inflexible positions that forces concessions on the counterpart. An example is how negotiators of the United States executive branch, in an arguably systematic way, underscore how
any international accord will be useless unless it appears appetizing to the legislative branch (the American congress) which ratifies the accords. Undeniably, such tactic has affected the outcome of the negotiations to the country’s advantage at several occasions (Putnam 1988:440). However, the tactic brings risks: if the card is played too aggressively, demanding for example hefty concessions with reference to the narrow room for maneuver, the negotiator may seem unserious or inflexible. The distribution of gains is in that case irrelevant since there is no agreement to supply any gains. Win-sets are hence double-edged.

2.4.1 Win-set determinants

There are three essential determinants of win-sets according to Putnam: Level II preferences and coalitions, Level II institutions and Level I negotiation strategies (1988:442). Drawing from these determinants, the focal point in this study will be on preferences and actors of Level II as well as on actions and bids Level I. Putnam suggests ideas on how the win-sets are essentially formed on these arenas and how the researcher can understand them,

**Level II:** Any analysis of Level II preferences and actors has to be rooted in a theory or deeper reflection on society mechanics in order to get a grasp of power relations. From this point an onwards, a researcher can sketch “certain principles that govern the size of the win-sets” (Putnam 1988: 442). One key assumption is that the lower cost of a non-agreement for domestic constituencies, the narrower the win-set and thus the less likely an agreement on Level I (ibid.).

**Level I:** Moves and bids on this arena require attention and with luck one can draw an image of the tactics employed. The strategies may involve direct manipulation of the political conditions on Level II. For example, the negotiator can choose to rally support from Level II by seeking a manifestation of vast support, thus narrowing the win-set. The following short text, involving Rhodesia’s\(^8\) former Prime Minister Ian Smith and his bargaining with Britain on independence, may serve as an example:

> In a general election that Smith called in May 1965, asking for a decisive vote of confidence to strengthen his hand in negotiations with Britain, he achieved a resounding victory: all fifty white seats went to the Rhodesian Front (Meredith 2005: 133).

The support does not have to be parliamentary, as in the example, but could also consist of street protests, petitions or other manifestations of support discretely encouraged by the government. Yet, such tactics are not employed without considerable risk. Putnam notes that “such tactics may have irreversible affects on constituents’ attitudes, hampering subsequent ratification of a compromise

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\(^8\) The name of Zimbabwe prior to independence
agreement” (Putnam 1988:450). An action to rally domestic support, in order to narrow the win-set, thus bears a double-edged feature.
3 Methodological Foundation

This section deals with the methodological underpinnings of this study and the choices that have led to them.

3.1 Qualitative case-studies

Case studies in different forms usually share the same advantages and limitations. Of course, studying one case solely, allows for in-depth analysis. On the other hand, the results can rarely be generalized from (Devine 2002:207; Lundquist 1993:105). The latter fact undermines the scientific value to the opinion of some scholars. Qualitative research in the form of case studies is sometimes criticized for being as “unrepresentative and atypical” and a research focus on an anomaly can be argued to reinforce such tendencies (Devine 2002:204). Yet, as argued by Gustavsson, a case-study can be a perfectly justifiable scientific method, even superior to other techniques depending on the research aims (1998:7). First, the method can be argued to make up in depth what it lacks as basis for generalization. This is especially worth considering when dealing with areas where theory is relatively undeveloped. A case-study simply requires an empirical insight through which “the analyst can (…) reach a better understanding of the context in which the phenomenon under study took place” thus avoiding “oversimplified generalizations” (Gustavsson 1998:7). Second, a case-study is a flexible method. The focus on one case allows the researcher to leave issues such as exactly what material to include or who to interview, or how to structure the presentation, relatively open long into the study (Hartman 2004:271; Gustavsson 1998:7). A third advantage is that a case-study easily can be infused with a narrative quality. The scientist interested not only in explaining why something happened but also telling a story that reveals how it happened, is well served of a case-study (Gustavsson 1998:7).

3.2 Interviews: practical point of departure
During a two-month stay in Dakar\(^9\) I have, all in all, conducted longer interviews with 12 individuals that have either been directly involved in the negotiation process, have been able to provide orientation on the issue at hand or a political insight in general. Nine out of the twelve interviews have been recorded, the three remaining were documented through note taking. Recording has enabled me to carry out attentive interviews (with no notes to take) as well as to double-check expressions in French\(^{10}\) afterwards. None of my respondents were, to my impression, in any significant extent inhibited by the fact that they were recorded (see discussion in Burnham et al. 2008:239). Interviewees include a European Commission (EC) official in charge of fisheries accords, the former head of Senegal’s Office of Maritime Fishing\(^{11}\), the deputy director at Senegal’s Office of Maritime Fishing and high ranking professionals in Senegalese trade unions and civil organizations. A guiding principal through the field work has been to talk to the right people rather than talking to a statistically important number of people\(^{12}\).

Interview quotes (and some written material) in French has passed through my amateur translating skills before being integrated into the text.

3.3 Interviewing as method and interviews as sources

An underpinning for the choice of interviews is its usefulness when it comes to obtaining first-hand information which would otherwise be inaccessible. The dialogue based interview – in contrast to questionnaires – leaves the field open to unexpected answers. Moreover, the answers can be followed up instantly (Esaiasson et al. 2003:279). As this has been the main method of research, several considerations have been made in order to avoid large errors related to selection, reliability and interpretation (Devine 2002:202-07). It has been essential to talk to respondents from dissimilar parts and opposing factions of society since both aim and theory of the study entail such representation. Also, I deem, such depiction enhances the study’s overall credibility.

Nine in-depth, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with persons that have either been involved in negotiations or have insightful knowledge of the issues at stake. The selection of the interviewees has been made with regards to diversification, the informant’s involvement or knowledge of the issue at hand and their accessibility.

The process to depict respondents has gone from encircling a societal stakeholder or grouping, suitable for the study, to identifying an appropriate

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\(^9\) Financed with kind support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) through a “Minor Field Study” grant. The grant is administered through academic institutions such as my own – The Department of Political Science at Lund University

\(^{10}\) 10 out of 12 interviews were carried out in French, the remaining two in Swedish.

\(^{11}\) FR: Directeurat des Pêches Maritimes

\(^{12}\) See also section 3.3
candidate for interview. In the third step, I have on occasion ruled out potential candidates because of their high profile and limited accessibility. For reasons of diversification, I have avoided talking to people in the same network, consciously ruling out a “snowballing” technique\(^\text{13}\) (Devine 2002:205; Esaiasson 2003:286).

The concrete interviewing approach has been informed by what is generally called “elite interviewing” (Burnham et al. 2008:231; Esaiasson et al. 2003:257). Elite interviewing refers to both the target group (the “elite”) as well as a research technique. Useful ideas have been drawn from this tradition, most notably the concept of semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews imply the employment of a mix of pre-conceived questions and improvised discussion that allows the informant to extend his/her points of particular interest. This tells the researcher something about the interviewee’s priorities and strong knowledge points, or for that matter, eventual knowledge gaps (Burnham, et al. 2008:242). I have taken to account that in this sort of interview, the respondents can be inclined to remember occurrences incorrectly, especially when it comes to their own importance to events (Gustavsson 1998:10).

Naturally, an interview response can never be taken for a reflection of real events and as Burnham puts it is: “the key guideline [in elite interviewing] must be not to base any piece of work entirely on elite interviewing.” (Burnham et al. 2008:231). For that reason, interview sources have been balanced with plentiful of secondary material.

The interviewing material as such has undergone scrutiny in order sustain its reliability. Well aware of how any form of objectivity is almost unobtainable in an interview situation, potential biases have been, to the best of ability, mapped and the respondents have been placed in a societal context as part of the research (Devine 2002: 205-6). Their answers have been verified through a simple process of triangulation where statements and sources have been actively compared (see discussion in Burnham et al. 2008:232). Three interviews, beside the nine mentioned above, have been made with persons that are not directly involved in the Senegalese domestic discussion. They are chosen with aim to, in the most possible extent, validate or not, what the other informants say. Finally, I have tried to observe the perhaps singular most valuable advice in interview methodology: “listening is the most essential quality with an interviewer” (Svensson & Starrin 1996:66). The questionnaire that served as point of departure for the interviews can be viewed in Appendix II.

3.4 Secondary sources

\(^{13}\) “Snowballing” implies an exponential increase of interviews where one interviewee suggests the next informant who recommends the next etc. See Devine 2002:205 and Esaiasson 2003:286
All through the study, a variety of published sources have been used. Academic empirical material has been scarce when to events that has taken place in the 21st century. A few rapports emanating from the natural sciences, with focus on environmental aspects, have however been of use. The works of Senegal specialists such as Christian Coulon and Sheldon Gellar have helped to get an idea of the domestic political evolvement of Senegal. A drawback is that their studies have not been nor revised nor updated for more than a decade. This creates a research challenge in bridging past with present – without much contemporary guidance or points of reference.

Furthermore, I have made broad use of popular accounts by journalists and reports by civil organizations in Europe and Senegal. Much of the media and many of the organizations are stakeholders in the issue under study and others have very specific positions that they defend with continuity and intensity. Their accuracy is therefore questionable. Nevertheless, these sources are not less ‘valid’ to use since they indicate organizational positions and because their views make up part of the story that I tell. Not only when using this sort of account but when consulting secondary material in general, it is vital to look out for potential biases and keep critical of the material (Lundquist 1993:110-13).
4 SENEGAL: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

This section serves as brief introduction to a country that few know much about. In addition, it provides a contextualization of the empirical account in section 5.

4.1 Uniqueness and conformity

Senegal is in all probability the strongest democracy in West Africa. The country’s competition for such a position however, must be said to be weak in view of to the democratically fragile, unstable or outright autocratic surroundings. Of its neighboring states, two recently experienced a coup d’état (Mauretania and Guinea), one is a de-facto dictatorship (Gambia) and only the Guinea separates Senegal from a region of reoccurring civil war (Sierra Leone and Liberia). In relation to European democracies however, Senegal is better referred to as a “quasi-democracy”, using terminology lend from Vengroff & Creevey (1997:204). The constitution, the presidential role, and means of governance have, in not so many words, been modeled after the French Jacobin state, which first existed through the short reign of Robespierre, but also made up an integral part of Napoleonic rule and still holds influence on modern French governance. The term, in its contemporary sense, refers to a high degree of centralization of power and state functions and is associated with an almost intrusive state.

Free press is a pillar in Senegalese public life. Not only is Senegalese press unfettered but also energetic and “quite willing to criticize and attack government policy and individual leaders” (Vengroff & Creevey 1997:204). In stark contrast to adjacent countries, the Senegalese armed forces play a marginal role in politics (Coulon 1990:437).

Civil and organizational life is rich and visible throughout the country and is studied up closer in this thesis. The country, moreover, has a tradition of high-profiled participation in regional and international discussions, which was illustrated during the EU-ACP talks on a multilateral EPA-accord (Vengroff & Creevey 1997:207; www.jeuneafrique.com)

On a more negative note, the country could be said to be ruled by an elite, remote from its citizens and with a somewhat patrimonial approach to the latter’s troubles and concerns. In this respect, today’s Senegalese state is a heritage from the colonial rule (Vengroff & Creevey 1997: 205). Senegal celebrates 50 years of

14 It also, depending on context, implies that only one language is official language (in the mentioned countries French) and that there is separation between state and church (état laïque)
independence from colonial French rule in 2010. Other signs of a vital democracy are feeble or absent: a stable economy, high education and literacy levels as well as an influential and held together government opposition (ibid.). These democratic flaws are generally shared with several other countries in the West African sub region.

4.2 Centralized state governance

More than anything, the centralized state characterizes governance in Senegal to the detriment of local, regional, civil and private spheres of influence. Development and “national unity”, has provided pretexts to validate advanced centralization. Scholar Christian Coulon notes for example that “regions are void of power and autonomy” (Coulon 1990: 435) A strong state that dominates public and economic affairs is since long perceived as pre-requisite for ethnic impartiality and efficient development strategies (Coulon 1990: 436). To a very large extent, political parties, with the exception of left-wing and Muslim radicals, rally behind this concept of governance.

The elite is, almost without exception, Dakar-based. In the capital, high-level bureaucrats and politicians co-exist in an environment quite distant from both grass-roots and electorates (Coulon 1990: 437-39). The view from the outside is that the same elite is well educated and skilled. Senegalese officials working in international negotiation are overall well seen and highly respected (Lindegren 2009; EC Official 2009).

Most powerful in Dakar, and thus in Senegal, is the president. In 2000, the first non-socialist, Abdoulaye Wade rose to power beating long-time president Abdou Diouf. Wade is the founder of Senegal’s liberal party PDS\textsuperscript{15} and was re-elected in 2007 (www.britannica.com).

4.3 Organizational life and interest groups

Regarding associational liberties, Senegal has stood out as an exception among the West African states. Rights of assembly, organization and freedom of expression have relatively seldom been suppressed. Organizational life has historically been vital and attracts countless community members (Harvey & Robinson 1995:40-1) Interest groups have nonetheless often found themselves in competition with the Senegalese state over strong leaders and initiative (for example on development topics). Not seldom, this has resulted in the state co-

\textsuperscript{15} FR: Parti Démocratique Sénégalais
opting an interest group, recruiting its leaders and sometimes even turning the whole association into a “parastatal” organization (Meredith 2005:196). Arguably this has been a way to silence opposition and marking territory. The country’s tradition of “associational activity in which industrial workers, students and, to some extent, farmers, has been organized into well defined interest groups and associations, capable of exercising considerable political leverage” has nevertheless lived on (Harvey & Robinson 1995:40) Such a vital force, it has occupied the political space that has been available to it.

4.4 Senegal and fisheries

The fisheries sector is the most important economic sector in Senegal, ahead of both tourism and peanut export (UNDP 2005:1). The estimated production is around 400,000 tons annually (Fenagie/Pêche 2009). A low estimate is that the sector directly employs 100,000 people. However, this figure does not incorporate the job opportunities that arise with refinement, sales and distribution. Another 600,000 people are believed to be involved in related production in a country with 11 million people (UNDP 2005:1). An important distinction is made in Senegal between craftsman fishing\(^\text{16}\) (or small-scale fishing) and industrial fishing and the overwhelming majority of fishery workers (70-90 percent) are found under the former category (Fenagie/Pêche 2009; UNDP 2005:1). The sector is, since the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, widely held to be in a state of crisis. The asserted reasons for the decline in maritime resources are believed to be numerous: the demographic growth, the failure and low profitability of agriculture, massive exportation of resources, poor education followed by abusive and exploitative fishing methods and a global collapse of ecosystems (Fenagie/Pêche 2009). The crisis in the fishery sector is, because of its extreme importance in the economy, subject to constant public debate and polemics.

A tangible tension between state representatives and the sector exist. Officials and civil servants consider small-scale fishing to be an impediment to free government action (for example to sell licences to foreign countries) as it is estimated to land between 90-95 percent of the total catch of sea resources. Recognized statistics do support such figures. The sector remains difficult to control or regulate and normally evade taxation (European Commission 2008\textit{d}; Thiam 2009; Office of Maritime Fishing Statistiques Generales 2009). From the point of view of those employed in the sector, and in particular the trade unions of the small scale fishermen, the decline in available resources is due to authorized foreign fishing as well as foreign rogue fishing, insufficient coast guard and inattentive authorities (Fall 2009; Samba 2009). Some hold that statistics has been manipulated to support government purposes (Haïdar 2009).

\textsuperscript{16} FR: la pêche artisanale
5 THE JOURNEY TOWARD “NON”

This section tells the events that proceeded and arguably triggered the Senegalese withdrawal from negotiations.

5.1 Level II: Economic liberalization and Jacobin withdrawal 1981-

The theoretical model of use suggests that a “theory” of Level II conditions should be sketched in order to get an image of what governs the win-set of the same level. In this context, I present a development that has had impact as “invisible variable” and that sets the scene for the negotiations in 2002 and 2006.

A slow but tangible process of economic liberalization and state withdrawal has transformed Senegal to become the most westernized in West Africa. Only one force – Islam – is able to compete with the politico-cultural influence of the west (Gellar 1982:1). In the early 1980s, under the leadership of new president Abdou Diouf, the country began a distinct reorientation toward a more liberalized economy. Important structural reforms were undertaken; a peanut-marketing monopoly was abandoned, a range of markets were deregulated and deprived of subsidies, tariffs were reduced and industrial protection came to an end (Harvey and Robinson 1995:32). A first structural adjust program (SAP) was entered with the IMF and required efforts in the form of a downsized bureaucracy, a reduced budget deficit and, overall, more efficient economic management (ibid.).

The original protocols signed with the EU have to be understood in this economic context. The first one entered in vigor 1980 with aim to boost a poorly performing fishing industry (Mutume 2002:3; Diop 2009). At this point, early in the liberalization process, Senegal had a very limited amount of trading partners and a fishing industry that was unequipped and unable to land the full potentials of the rich fisheries resources. Selling the excess stocks through agreements became a logic step toward more efficient economic handling and increased state revenues.

During the nineties, fisheries overtook the role as the most important Senegalese export commodity, reflecting a trend to trade more goods with more numerous partners (Mutume 2002:2). The demand, and thus world prices on fishery products, was at a stable high causing increased interest to earn a living within sector. The sector grew and was enlarged further by a migration movement from the countryside to the west coast of the country. Push factors included drought and severe living conditions in the east, the pull factors consisted of circulating rumors of prosperity that surrounded the fisheries sector (Fall 2009).
By the beginning of the 21st century, the pressure on fish stocks had increased to an ecologically critical level as a consequence. The industrial fishing fleet had albeit grown, but in particular small-scale fishing had developed into a giant fleet. At the same time, several countries sought fisheries deals with Senegal as response to investment- and export friendly policies. With the gradual fading of fishery excess stocks and improved fishery capacity, an important underpinning of the early fishery agreements vanished.

The economical changes also had an important side-product engendering administrative reforms necessary to slim the omnipresent Senegalese state. As a result from internal pressure, as well as external traits (e.g. the SAPs overseen by the World Bank and the IMF) the Jacobin state retreated from several societal areas and the process of state trimming, after having been a purely economic matter, evolved to become a political objective with the slogan “moins d’état, mieux d’état” (Young & Kante 1992:72). As it turned out, such policies appealed to electorates. Mandates and overall societal involvement by directorates and parastatal organizations came under scrutiny. The terms of existence and the rules of political engagement for organizational life as a consequence changed to progressively more resemble those in Europe. Trade unions, civil associations and other interest groups in Senegalese society enjoy liberties and exert weight otherwise distant. Young and Kante states that “a shrinkage of the state has occurred, opening more space – economic, social and political – to civil society, whose autonomy has increased in consequence” (1992:72). All through the nineties, in particular trade unions and NGOs continued to prosper “yet seeking their full potential” (Sall 2009).

5.2 Level I: The 2002 FPA Negotiations and tactic maneuvering

Evidence points to 2002 as an important turning point in the bilateral relations pertaining to fisheries. A habitual round of negotiations was commenced that eventually got unprecedented attention from media, trade unions and other actors. This was in part the result of the developments described above, but also, as we shall see, an effect of the Wade-governments employment of rallying tactics.

Numerous grand meetings and workshops among stakeholders in the fish production – labor unions, industrial representatives, ship owners, civil society organizations and government representatives – met intensively starting more than six months before the actual negotiations. The largest reunion was held in Saly-Portudal, on the Senegalese west coast, and the reunion was covered by Le Soleil, one of two large national newspapers. According to its head organizer the main goal of the event, which included guests from across the West African sub region,

17 “Less state, more performing state” (authors translation)
was to “promote a roadmap for negotiation”. He was quoted in an article headline declaring that “in terms of enrichment, our states need to think of alternatives to the fishery accords” (Sene 2001).

When the first round of negotiations was commenced in Brussels in 2001, the demands of the Senegalese delegation were strikingly similar to the demands put forward in the forum at Saly-Portudal. “Senegal is not in a position in which we are in need of these accords and nothing currently impels Senegal to sign an agreement with the European Union” said the head of delegation to Le Soleil (Seck 2001). Instead, Senegal advocated a “development-accord” expressing a will to fundamentally alter the nature of the accords:

The EU (…) needs to take into account the new policies of Senegal that are derived from a national dialogue on fisheries and aquaculture in order for the two parties to achieve better cooperation (Seck 2001).

Following the meeting in Brussels, authorities and government representatives widely used media contacts and links with trade unions to encourage continuous reporting on the issue (Haïdar 2009; Fall 2009). The topic subsequently remained in the spotlight.

The negotiations progressed but were difficult. *Africa Recovery* 18 published a critical article that talked of “breakdown” in the talks with the European Union. Its author argued in favor of discontinuing the negotiations and proclaimed that “the loss of income for local fishermen, environmental damage and depletion of native fish (…) far outweigh the short term financial gains”. (Mutume 2002:2) Also international organizations such as the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) joined in the chant expressing satisfaction over the hard negotiations, adding that the disagreements were a “positive sign” (Bridges Weekly Trade News 2002:6). A handful of Senegalese organizations, in parallel, publicly made a non-deal their *casus belli*. Senegal banned European fishing completely as negotiations became deadlocked causing the European commissioner for agriculture and fisheries, Franz Fischler, to remark that the action was “not in accordance with the excellent long-standing relations existing between the EU and Senegal.” (European Commission 2008c)

In 2002 thus, a rare societal consensus on the issue of a renewed fisheries agreement seemingly developed. It was however, I argue, a superficial consensus. Evidence suggests that the Senegalese government’s actions and rhetoric had tactical motives. A key matter is that the government, throughout the process, arguably wore two faces. The one stressed that a new accord should be drastically different and that media, along with the fishing communities, should stay active on the matter as it had ethic and environmental implications. The other one, thinking of itself as a responsible negotiator, wanted a profitable deal. Much evidence point in this direction: the government did desire an agreement, and was

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18 UN-sponsored bulletin dedicated to development related news
ready to accept one without radical re-dispositions, but sought, through the new approach, to improve its gains.

After nine rounds of negotiations and a total of one year of delay, an agreement was finally sealed. In the end it was not fundamentally different from the version of 1997 in the sense that it was still a ‘cash for access’ agreement (www.lesafriques.com).

It was the first ever non-socialist government in Senegal that negotiated the deal for the first time, and, arguably, they wanted to try a new strategy. With Putnam’s terminology, it narrowed the win-set by mobilizing domestic constituencies in an attempt to influence the distribution of gains. The interviewed EC Official, with good knowledge of the negotiations, point out that, to his view, financial compensation was the single most important, and guiding, element to the Senegalese delegation. In 2002 as well as 2006 (EC Official 2009).

Rallying domestic groups in order to achieve a slim win-set is however a tactic that bears risks.

### 5.3 Level II: Tactics boomerang – the 2006 FPA negotiations

It is here argued that the effects of the tactics used in 2002, turned into a burden in 2006 and that essentially, the government came to harvest in 2006 what it saw in 2002.

Yet, this requires an understanding of how the discontent with the government could be put on hold for four years. This can be understood in the light of two things: First, the general enthusiasm and optimism that surrounded Abdoulaye Wade’s win of presidency had almost faded away entirely and been replaced by widespread disenchantment. Second, and more important to the specific interest groups, the government bought itself out of eventual legitimacy crisis in 2002. In order to avoid widespread displeasure, a pledge was made to the stakeholders (industry and trade unions) that they would economically benefit from the agreement with a specified amount destined to develop the sector. The experience is however that very little – or no money at all – reached its destination (Samba 2009; Wade 2009).

Less than a year from the presidential elections of 2007, the temperature on several domestic debates was high: corruption, constitutional changes, migration to Europe and weakened social conditions were all on the wall. But with 600.000 people living of fisheries, out of 4.9 million voters, questions related to fisheries

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19 Arguably neither very different from the FA of 1980
20 16 million Euros per year was agreed, totalizing 64 million in financial compensation Euros on four years
21 It is difficult to assess, and also beyond the scope of this thesis, if they succeeded
22 Primarily as a result of widespread accusations of financial mismanagement and corruption
were bound to become issues of discussion. As they appreciated the moment to be one of opportunity, interest groups made ever increasing efforts to organize themselves. By consequence, a concerted mobilization against an eventual renewal of the accords took place. Ali Haïdar, leading organizer and lobbyist, NGO boss and also president of Senegal’s green party says:

We summoned the small-scale fishermen and we asked them ‘do you want Senegal to sign these agreements?’ They said no. I told them that this was the objective to achieve (…). At every occasion an EU-delegation would be around to negotiate, all the small scale local fishermen would gather on the location to denounce the accords; a grand meeting in St-Louis, a grand meeting in Mbor, in Dakar, in Ziguinchor. On every occasion! (Haïdar 2009).

Ali Haïdar underscores that the media was used in a more strategic and consistent way than in 2002:

We worked the media, we brought in a lot, a lot of media attention, all the radios (…) we gave interviews, we brought them along wherever we held demonstrations. (Haïdar 2009)

At the negotiation table, there were frustrated negotiators under pressure. From the Senegalese negotiators point of view, it was not the European fishing activities that inhibited the Senegalese from getting their catch. They perceived the small scale fishermen to be misinformed (Thiam 2009; www.zamnet.zm). The deputy director at Senegal's Office of Maritime Fishing states flatly that:

We truly wanted to conclude an agreement (…). As to the sector mobilizing, pressure or not pressure… they played a role. (Thiam 2009).

After two fruitless rounds, the Senegalese called an end to the negotiations. The two Senegalese respondents that were part of the delegation of 2006 underline that the end was not dramatic, which was, and is, otherwise widely stated23. They walked out, but rather unwillingly. None of those involved in the bargaining that have been interviewed agree to notions of “breakdown”24 or “split”25 but rather prefers to use the words as “blockage”26 (EC Official 2009; Diop 2009; Thiam 2009).

When negotiations failed, it was ultimately the result of amounting domestic pressure. The applied domestic clout was however not converted into a direct dismissal of the negotiations but instead turned into a bid on Level I that was merely considered realistic. The bid was, says the EU Commissions responsible

23 See /www.rfi.fr for a prominent example. The article begins: “It’s a split”.
24 FR: effondrement
25 FR: rupture
26 FR: blocage
for fisheries accords in Dakar, 60 % less access to resources with sustained financial compensation (interview 2009). Hence, the same amount\textsuperscript{27} as in 2002-2006 would be paid for only 40 % of the goods\textsuperscript{28}. The bid was rejected. There were attempts to break the deadlock but, in the words of the interviewed EC Official; “I think that the prime minister (of Senegal) had given the delegation a very specific mandate” (2009). Financial compensation was, in the eyes of the EU-delegation, the issue that triggered the failure of the negotiations. But it is reasonable to think that such bid originated from a calculation that it would be rejected. It represented a win-set too narrow.

When it came to presenting the end result to the press and addressing the stakeholders, an angle that reminded of the consensus climate of 2002, was chosen by the Senegalese. The former director of the Office of Maritime Fishing herself states that her top priority during negotiations was “preserving the resources” and allow for “regeneration of species” and that this was also what she said in the press conference\textsuperscript{29} that followed the failure (Diop 2009). The image of a government that “breaks bonds” with Europe in order to protect its natural resources can thus partly be explained by how the Senegalese Officials used the failure in order to appease its domestic constituencies.

They suffered\textsuperscript{30} the decision but they exploited the subsequent communication politically. They were not happy with the end result (Haidar 2009).

When the attention had somewhat faded, Senegal sold licenses with extensive quotas for tuna to French and Spanish companies (www.seneweb.com).

5.4 Level I: The CFP reform narrows the EU win-set

In 2004, with the adoption of council conclusions of July 2004, the EU adopted a new Common Fisheries Policy. According to the \textit{Council conclusions on Partnership Agreements}:

\begin{quote}
financial contribution will be determined on the basis of three parameters: accessible fishing possibilities, action to promote the sustainable development of fisheries and the impact of the FPA, and participation of European interests as a whole. (D-G Fish 2004)
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{27} 16 million Euros per year
\item\textsuperscript{28} The numbers have been confirmed by the former director of Senegal's Office of Maritime Fishing as by her deputy at the time (EC Official 2009; Diop 2009)
\item\textsuperscript{29} Press communiqués or transcripts of the press conference have not been found
\item\textsuperscript{30} FR: subt
The two latter phrasings have been interpreted as a mandate to insist that a part of the financial compensation is reserved for purposes in which the EU has a saying. In short, negotiators in EU-delegation perceived the changes as a demand to put forward: *we want to know how the Senegalese government intends to use this money and we want to monitor their use* (EC Official 2009). The demand was however deemed unacceptable by the negotiating counterpart:

It was a question of sovereignty; it was a question of dignity! Would the EU itself accept such an arrangement? (Diop 2009).

No country would have accepted it. (Thiam 2009).

It must be underlined that the “compensation with monitoring” was new to the 2006 negotiations – it had not been demanded before. To the context relatively unbiased observers like MRAG has concluded that the new approach “has caused concern with some partner countries, mainly related to the perception that this may infringe on their national sovereignty and right to establish their own national policies and priorities” (MRAG 2007:19). From the EU, it is said that Senegal “categorically refused our proposal to assign part of (the) finance to developing their own national fisheries sector.” (European Commission 2008d) With certitude, the demand influenced the negotiations. With the terminology lent from Putnam, the requirement almost certainly rendered the EU less flexible and consequently narrowed its win-set.
6 SUMMING UP THE PICTURE

6.1 The odd made logic

The Senegalese governments’ decision to abstain from renewal of the FPAs, and suspend further talks with the EU in 2006, was with likelihood, a direct result of short-sighted negotiation tactics in 2002. Their high-stake game in this round resulted in strong domestic mobilization against an agreement in 2006. Groups that cooperated in order to apply political pressure could, as a result of a long gone process of state withdrawal from a number of sectors, operate on political ground formerly held by the “Jacobin” Senegalese state.

Another source of Senegalese reluctance to enter into agreement was the CFP-reform, which in the eyes of the Senegalese negotiators, brought unsavory content to the negotiations. Some perceived the demands as provocative. In all probability, it further diminished the outlook for a deal.

The fact that Senegal, not long after the failure of negotiations, negotiated separate bilateral fisheries deals with two countries could suggest that economic liberalization have played a small part, bringing more trade choices to the Senegalese. My material is too scarce to provide an answer on this and I can only encourage further studies. The separate deals do, however- confirm that the FPAs were not rejected on principle, and that the government did seek the revenue.

6.2 Theoretic assessment

Theoretically, important aspects of Putnam’s theory can be both illustrated and validated by this case. First, his conviction that any two-level game analysis needs to contain a profound analysis of Level II conditions seem justified. Without a wider perspective on societal developments relevant to the issue under study, certain events appear less comprehensible. In this case, the role of labour unions and civil organizations’ can easily be misread without a background. In my case, the perspective is somewhat historical, but such analysis can also be done differently.

Second, the assumption that the lower cost of a non-agreement for domestic constituencies, the less likely the accord, seem to have relevance. Undeniably, the broken pledges to the domestic constituency gave the sector the very sense to have nothing to lose – or, mirror wise, very little to win with an accord.

Third, the case demonstrates the double-edged quality of actions designed to narrow the win-set, in this case with “rallying tactics”. With Putnam’s
terminology, the voluntarily signalled narrow win-set of 2002 was costly to the Senegalese government. However, what Putnam think could be the problem with a rallying tactic – ratification – was initially not the problem in Senegal. Ratification can, as demonstrated be bought. In a quasi-democracy, credibility however cannot, and the problems of domestic ratification appeared only with delay. He is thus both right and wrong. In every case, a win-set with prospects of overlapping with the EU win-set, shrank dramatically as a consequence.

If there ever was a chance for overlapping win-set, it became miniscule with the EU plight for Senegalese transparency. If the CFP reform and the ideas it brought to the table actually originated from pressures on Level II within the EU could be an interesting subject for further studies.

6.3 Explanatory limitations of Putnam’s model and the role of ideas

Another potential area of further studies is the role of ideas in these negotiations. Even though the theoretical model arguably has directed light to the essential parts for understanding the failed negotiations, it nevertheless fails to capture certain variables. The largest segment of observations that fell outside the model’s explanatory capability is related to ideas. An interest-based approach simply does not fully explain certain positions taken by respondents toward the EU and the FPA’s.

In Senegal, governmental behaviour is to a noticeable extent guided by strokes of paternalism and inclinations toward Jacobin state-building. Important affairs, in this way of thinking, should be run by a mighty state, controlled by a strong government with an almost solitaire integrity (Diop 2009; Thiam 2009). They co-exist however with a strong liberal, trade-protagonist tradition in addition to what Coulon calls as “a constant concern to convey an acceptable image to the outside” (1990:430). The Senegalese trade unions and NGOs, on their part, hold ideas that correspond with other researchers’ observations of perceptions in negotiating developing countries. In the EPA-negotiations between the EU and one group of ACP-countries, Elgström notes that the EU was easily “demonized” by actors who perceive “the world system as basically unjust and symmetrical” (2008:6). Ideas of this kind, with inclinations to regard the EU as neo-colonial agent, can have experienced a surge in Senegal as a consequence of the parallel EPA-negotiations. Here is thus a complementary element that could advance the understanding of the failed negotiations further.

Another theoretical assessment could be that two-level games in a fruitful way integrate systemic variables in a state-based model. To the extent that it does not blur the sight, it could probably be rewarding to insert also a cognitive element, capable of capturing beliefs that are altered or activated by external events. Such conclusion is however not revelatory (see e.g. Gustavsson 1998; Uzan & Eichengreen 1993).
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Appendix I: Senegal’s Geographic location

Map: Senegal’s position
Source: www.unimaps.org
The questionnaire below was merely used as point of departure as a semi-structured interview approach was utilized. They were asked in French and the account below is an English translation.

Sir/Madame:

What is your formal position and what responsibilities are associated with it?
Did you take part in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement negotiations of 2002 or 2006?
Do you have detailed knowledge of the negotiation proceedings?
What is your view on the ecological situation in the fisheries waters outside the Senegalese coast?
Is your opinion founded on any sort of statistical material and what material in that case?
How would you describe the negotiations? Where they confrontational or more oriented toward cooperation to their character?
What arguments where advanced by the negotiating parties?
Could you detect any traces of strategy on the part of the other negotiating team?
Did the public discussion on the issues have any echo in the negotiations?
In your view, what was it that changed between 2002 and 2006 for there to be disagreement and negotiation failure in 2006?
Who wins and who loses from the arisen situation of disagreement?
Of what significance is an agreement to the negotiating parties?
What type of issue do you associate the FPAs with? Is it a question of environment, social conditions, economics, development, alimentation, sovereignty or otherwise?
Have your perception of the other negotiating party changed during the last decade and how in that case?