The United Nations, Intelligence and Peacekeeping

International relations at play

Pavel Larsson
Abstract

The end of the Cold War marked the ending of an era of a bipolar rivalry, but it also brought about a new set of challenges for policymakers and national intelligence agencies. One of these new challenges is sharing sensitive information with states and actors outside comfortable alliances, whilst countering a myriad of asymmetric, often low-level type of security threats. Implementation of intelligence components in multinational peacekeeping operations has been, to say the least, troublesome. A tactical, as well as strategic component for successful conflict resolution has therefore often been jeopardized. As the international community demanded a better and more effective use of peacekeepers, grounded international relations held a firm grip on cooperation in the intelligence realm in these multinational interventions. This has led to ad hoc type of solutions, leading to poor situational awareness and support for key policymakers. This paper describes international intelligence liaison in UN-led peacekeeping operations, and the often present challenges within that multilateral context. Several missions are analyzed, as well as two cases of bilateral intelligence cooperation outside the UN realm. The conclusion is that intelligence liaison is a sensitive matter for states and that the UN organization is an unfavorable partner to deal with.

Key words: peacekeeping, UN, intelligence, liaison, Mearsheimer, UKUSA
Words: 9909
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### Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (US)</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CPNI</td>
<td>Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (UK)</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)</td>
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<td>FSB</td>
<td>Federal Security Service (Russia)</td>
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<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>Geospatial Intelligence</td>
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<td>GRU</td>
<td>Main Intelligence Directorate (Russia)</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>MASINT</td>
<td>Measurement and Signature Intelligence</td>
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<td>MI5</td>
<td>Security Service (UK)</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission DR Congo</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OSINT</td>
<td>Open source Intelligence</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
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<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace support Operation</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
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<td>SVR</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMO</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer/-s</td>
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<td>UNOSOM I, II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia I and II</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNTMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
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1 Introduction

Peacekeeping efforts during the 1990s were intense. A new role for United Nations meant tens of thousands peacekeepers deployed in complex internal conflicts around the world. According to the plan, extensive diplomatic efforts and negotiations would make sure that the warring parties would reach cease-fire agreements and peace would flourish. The news reports in the television sets of the western world were, however, of a different kind. UN personnel were described as inept and powerless, unable to achieve any kind of progress in these new internal conflicts. “Few memories of my UN days disturb me more than the recollection of how little I knew when we plunged into new conflicts”, is how former UN Under-Secretary General Mark Goulding described the situation (Martyn 2006, p. 28). The reasons for this development are many. One of these is the subject of this paper.

States invest a large amount of resources to properly perceive and interpret the international environment in order to support their decision making process. New threats, conflicts, crises and disasters demand fast interpretation and accurate decisions, if the policymakers aim to come out of the situation successful. Studying intelligence gives us an opportunity to better our understanding of such complex policy processes of the different actors involved.

“Intelligence is about reducing uncertainty in conflict” (Clark 2009, p. 8), and unlike diplomacy and negotiations, intelligence offers decision makers situational awareness necessary for implementation of correct decisions and/or preventive measures. Yet the dilemmas and controversy surrounding the methods and practices of intelligence in UN’s peace efforts has often left the organization to rely heavily on the contribution of member states. This contribution was not always wholehearted, nor unified among the different troop contributors.

1.1 Why ‘intelligence’ in peace efforts

Strategic intelligence is obviously required to understand the political situation between the parties to a conflict prior to UN involvement and, once peacekeepers are deployed, to anticipate the political moves of governments or factions, especially if there is a risk of violence (Smith 1994, p. 231).

The unique role of UN has put it in a tough situation when it comes to the use of “intelligence”. When this function was insufficient or absent during PKOs,
It is important to study international intelligence liaison in UN context because it allows us to view a much broader picture of how decision making and policy support materialized during the different peace efforts. The subject of intelligence remains largely understudied, and it is of interest to question how this rarely highlighted paradigm of policy support actually functioned in these interventions.

1.2 Purpose and disposition

The purpose of this paper is to describe intelligence liaison during UN-led peacekeeping operations. The attention is aimed at Western states as primary actors across the entire spectrum of intelligence initiatives; strategic, operational and tactical. To accomplish this I choose to utilize the theoretical basis of structural realism in my description (see Chapter 2). The UN cases are outlined in (Chapter 3). The following Chapter 4 analyses two cases of bilateral intelligence liaison. It is important to describe the form of such bilateral agreements in order to provide a clear perspective for the common challenges present in multilateral intelligence cooperation, such as the UN organization. The results are presented in Chapter 5.

1.2.1 Research questions

The two questions I seek to answer in this paper are:

- *What characterizes intelligence liaison between states in multinational peacekeeping operations led by UN?*

- *What distinguishes intelligence sharing and cooperation among states?*

In this division, I aim to highlight the differences between cooperation during UN-led operations and established intelligence agreements. The second question is therefore linked to the first one, but a division of two is necessary.

1.2.2 Choice of case studies

I intend to answer the first research question with analysis of the following operations: a closer description of UNPROFOR 1992-1995 in Bosnia and the planned intervention in Zaire 1996. Later follows a more general description of
the four missions UNAMSIL, INTERFET, UNMITAH and MONUC/Operation Artemis. The level of analysis and writing is distinguished in this way due to the amount of material. I argue however that I have relatively more available data to describe how intelligence liaison occurred in these particular operations compared to others (such as UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II and UNMIL). In section 3.4, I briefly address developments in recent PKO’s: MONUC and MINUSTAH. The population of cases consists of the new, so called multidimensional peacekeeping operations: covering the time period beginning in 1992 and ending with MINUSTAH, 2007 (see Dorn 2009).

In order to answer the second question, I address two bilateral intelligence relationships: the “UKUSA” agreement and intelligence cooperation in the former Soviet Union, with main player being Russia. The purpose here is to describe how intelligence cooperation occurs outside the realm of UN. Although smaller states can also be of interest to study, these two cases were chosen on the fact that the United States and Russia are two important geopolitical players.

In the ‘Results’ chapter I also present perspectives that relate to the theoretical scope outside of structural realism. This is relevant to contemporary development inside the UN, and it is also important to show the limitations of my chosen theoretical and methodical approaches.

1.3 Method

In order to answer the stated research questions I intend to conduct a qualitative analysis of several cases (Brady & Collier 2004, pp. 105-121, 123-138). Because of the limited amount of material, I choose this method to answer my research questions, and that I simply must work with what I have (Warner; in Johnson 2009, p. 24). The level of qualitative analysis is general in nature, in that I search to describe and interpret the cooperation context and not, for example, intelligence collection methods of each state involved (Gill & Phythian 2006, pp. 35-38; see Chapter 2). From my standpoint of “outsider scholar” it is necessary to process as much available data about intelligence cooperation in the given cases as possible: which at times, as in the case of Zaire, does not amount to more than two research articles; in order to have a broad overview of the cases, the patterns, and possible theoretical limitations (Gill et al. 2009, pp. 61-62; Warner; in Johnson 2009, p. 24). Another important point to state is that the research conducted here does not represent up to date development. Although recent material is used, the reality of the studied subject is that “There can be no doubt that rigorous investigation of intelligence liaison is officially discouraged, and especially so in a contemporary context” (Svendsen 2009, p. 707).

I divided the writing between the referral to the authors, and my own analysis and theoretical interpretation, keeping validity in mind. To overcome the challenges of such analysis, I delimit myself to research international liaison and
measure two general level types of factors: *unity of effort* and *sharing of intelligence with the UN*.

The obvious limitation in studies of intelligence is the amount of available material, and this is a question of reliability. This is the direct reason for the descriptive research and research questions. However, with the given amount of such contribution where authors have had access to primary material or interviewed the involved officers, I consider that the description of this delimited part of intelligence liaison in the given contexts is possible to achieve. Particularly helpful in the work process of mapping the different states and cases were methodological approaches provided by Clark: the principles of targets, operations and linkages (here liaison) (Clark 2009, pp. 42-43).

1.4 Material

I choose to describe international intelligence cooperation from a structural realist perspective, mainly the offensive realist view formulated by John Mearsheimer in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001). Points made by Seth G. Jones (2007) are also considered, as Jones focuses more in-depth on interstate security cooperation (especially Europe) from a realist perspective (see Chapter 2).

The material to the UN cases is the studies made by Cees Wiebes and Walter Dorn, as well as articles written by former practitioners, intelligence officers and UN officials. The material for the three UN cases and bilateral cooperation is primarily gathered from the journals *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, *Intelligence and National Security* and *International Peacekeeping*, in the form of research articles. These journals constitute a practical and accessible medium to follow contemporary developments in the intelligence studies (IS) field and intelligence world in general. Research articles and practitioner views are also gathered from topic collections edited by Jong et al. (2003), Carment & Rudner (2006), and Johnson (2009)(see Chapter 6). Practitioner oriented works on intelligence analysis written by Clark (2009) and Bruce & George (2008) are also cited in this paper.

The material used in the two bilateral cases consists mainly of the articles written by Svendsen (2008), Lefebvre (2003; 2008) and Anderson (2007). Because of the nature of such agreements and the richness of the material, corresponding more easily with the theory, the analysis here is shorter and more concise. These two cases are contemporary, and are enhanced with recent media articles highlighting the latest developments.

Research articles from journals on foreign policy and contemporary international development are also cited for the purpose of describing the wider political context/s existing in the specific cases. Inserted footnotes provide additional commentary and description of policy developments.

Media sources cited in this paper are used for following purposes:
• Interviews with practitioners/policymakers or intelligence officials (see Die Welt 2009; Izvestia 2007).
• Background information on conflicts; summarizing articles, and articles regarding recent policy developments (see CNN 1996; EJ 2010; NYT 2010; PBS 1996)

The material used in this paper is openly accessible, and gathering it has not been an issue. The last remark is that amount of open material depends heavily on the country/-ies of study in question.

1.5 Earlier research

Earlier research on the subject of intelligence, and intelligence cooperation in particular can be categorized into two groups: theoretically and empirically oriented.

Researchers in IS with a theoretical intention discuss the research of intelligence itself, the use of terms, definitions, methodological and theoretical perspectives etc. My choice of theory is based on the conclusions in the articles written by Mark Phythian (Gill et al. 2009, pp. 54-72) and Adam D. M. Svendsen (Svendsen 2009), about where and how intelligence liaison fits with the theories of international relations (IR). Phythian points out different views on how the theoretical groundwork within IS relates to IR theories, specifically structural realism, and points out limits of such approach. Svendsen takes a more comparative approach, and outlines the pros and cons of possible applicable theories, including less conventional ones, such as cybernetics. Also, considerations in IS research and methodology by Peter Gill and Michael Warner (both published in Johnson 2009) have brought me valuable insights into what type of research questions I can pose and answer, considering the obvious challenge with the amount of available material.

Empirical research of intelligence liaison I found most relevant are articles written by Clough (2004), Lefebvre (2003) and Svendsen (2008, 2009). These articles summarize the nature of interstate intelligence liaison and agreements, challenges present in bilateral and multilateral types of cooperation, and the value of these assets and exchange for states. I found these articles essential, and refer to these frequently in Chapters 4 and 5.
2 Theoretical approach

2.1 International Relations: Structural Realism

Before I can focus on the role of intelligence and intelligence liaison, I will provide the underlying theoretical concept from which I view this function. Realism, as a theory, has an advantage over other international relations theories in respect to intelligence. Realism perceives states as key actors in international politics, and most intelligence activities are (in terms of security/military related intelligence capabilities) state-based.

Mearsheimer’s offensive realism can be summarized in following five core assumptions:

- The structure of the international system is anarchic, and this causes states to compete for power. There is no central authority in the system, and great powers have the largest impact on the international politics. Here, Mearsheimer doesn’t support the classic realist view of Morgenthau that the lust for power is inherent in human nature (Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 18-22, 30)
- States, and particularly great powers, possess some form of offensive military capability
- States can never be certain about other states intentions. Mearsheimer also points out that these intentions can change quickly
- The prime motive of states in the international system is survival
- States are rational actors and consider both immediate and long term consequences of their actions (Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 30-32)

Mearsheimer concludes that “[...] when the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other” (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 32). The main goal of states is to achieve regional hegemony.

I choose Mearsheimer’s theory over Waltz for a primary reason: in the intra-realist discussion of rational vs. irrational state behavior I support the offensive realism side.

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With a general look at Mearsheimer's assumptions, it makes sense for states to invest in intelligence capabilities, as it gives them a relative security advantage. Mearsheimer writes further that states do assess their external environment, and their available options (Mearsheimer 2009, p. 244). Here, Mearsheimer also acknowledges the difficulties in these assessments, “[…] rational states miscalculate from time to time because they invariably make important decisions on the basis of imperfect information. They hardly ever have complete information about any situation they confront, which forces them to make educated guesses.” (Mearsheimer 2009, p. 244). Beside the offensive advantage, I agree that states, especially smaller ones, do utilize intelligence functions for defensive means as well.

Mark Phythian (2009) thoroughly describes where the use of intelligence is to be placed within structural (offensive) realism theory and points out that the validity of these assumptions, particularly the third, strengthens state investment in intelligence. There is an evident need for secrecy in this field as well in order for the state to secure its relative advantage (Gill et al. 2009, pp. 58-59). This bit is central, and sets the theory of realism apart from others, with an advantage of describing the intelligence world more accurately from the point of necessity, that states treat intelligence as a sensitive, in essence important function for their survival in the international environment.

A definition of the term *intelligence* provides a bridge of how this function relates to the international system and international co-operation, and the implications of such functions therein. Therefore, the definition I choose here is presented by Gill & Phythian (Gill & Phythian 2006, p. 7):

> The umbrella term referring to the range of activities – from planning and information collection to analysis and dissemination – conducted in secret, and aimed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for the timely implementation of a preventive policy or strategy, including, where deemed desirable, covert activities.

International co-operation, according to Mearsheimer, can occur if the participant states will benefit from it, preferably in the form of absolute gains. But, due to the fundamentally competitive environment, cooperation can be difficult both to achieve and sustain (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 52). Cooperation may be, however, the only way for weaker states to achieve influence in the international system. Jones describes it as: “States cooperate to realize gains that are unachievable through individual action: policymaking is achieved multilaterally rather than unilaterally”, with empirical evidence in the form of European Union (Jones 2007, p. 8). Another important point made by Jones is that unit-level factors may determine whether and with whom a state will co-operate, and that it is easier for similar states to do so simply because of the lower costs involved (Jones 2007, p. 21). Mentioning unit-level factors (yet not researched closely in this paper), I acknowledge a slight inclination towards neoclassical realism (Baylis et al. 2008, p. 99). The fundamental basis for intelligence liaison between two states is mutual trust, which can be developed in different ways (see Chapter 4).
Of course, the structural realist approach has its limits, and Mearsheimer is well aware of this fact (Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 10-11). Phythian states that structural realism “[…] has little to say about intelligence co-operation or the role of intelligence in support of UN operations” (Gill et al. 2009, p. 60). However, this depends largely upon the approach and the questions stated. In my ambition to describe the nature of intelligence liaison in UN-led operations, I found that, through an overview of the perceived challenges, structural realism does in fact stand on good ground.

Realism has obvious limits towards non-state actors, such as warring parties\(^2\), and has a more firm ground in bilateral intelligence arrangements than multilateral, simply because of fewer factors between states involved in the interaction. Therefore, two sections in Chapter 5 are dedicated to address such factors, mainly the institutional factors of the United Nations organization itself.

### 2.2 Intelligence process

The intelligence process itself is commonly divided up and analyzed through an *intelligence cycle* (Figure 1):

\(^2\) Although, as Sean Kay states “Other forms of alliance behavior remain consistent with realist explanations” (Kay 2006, p. 344).
Planning and Direction: the first step of the cycle is to plan and direct the process towards given tasks. Customers’ information needs are evaluated, assessed and action plans are formed.

Collection: collection phase refers to acquirement of raw data. This can be achieved through a range of overt or covert activities, sources (assets) such as HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT, and other, less usual forms of “INTs”, such as GEOINT, MASINT etc.

Processing: the processing step in the cycle often addresses the need to prepare data for analysis. Raw data may require decryption, translation, sorting or reduction. The data becomes information.

Analysis and Production: here, the analysis of the information takes place. The information’s reliability, validity, and relevance is evaluated and weighed. The information is logically integrated, put in context, and used to produce intelligence (FBI DI 2009). Thus, the information becomes intelligence.

Dissemination: the final product is then presented to the specific customers or decision/policy-makers. If the requirements are not met, or are updated, the cycle begins anew.

The sole principle of peacekeeping is monitoring, in essence gathering of information. The process begins when a peacekeeper reports observations of various meaning and importance up the command chain and staff elements, and ends (or should end) in the form of written assessments, evaluations, estimations or reports to policymakers.

In practice, the cycle is not always practical (Clark 2009, pp. 10-13; Wiebes 2003, p. 19). In theory, this cycle provides a framework to examine “[…] the processes that underlie analytic production” (Gill et al. 2009, p. 131), and if present, the inherent challenges or failures. With the given research questions however I need to measure the specific liaison context, and the intelligence cycle is an insufficient tool for this task (Svendsen 2009, p. 707).

2.2.1 International intelligence liaison: measurement

For obvious reasons, a theory or a definition of intelligence liaison is hard to create, much like with the definition of term ‘intelligence’ itself, due to the constantly changing utilization of the term itself (also, Svendsen 2009, p. 707). Delimiting the research to the analysis of the ‘multinational’ (i.e. liaison) element, I choose to look at two factors of interest:

Unity of effort – was there any intelligence goals that were shared, and if not, where and how did they differ? Did the states pursue their own interests in the

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3 The closest substitute I have found is the five constructive “Multinational Intelligence Principles” presented in a publication made for US JSOTF, JP 3-05.1 (2007). The five principles are: Maintain unity of effort; Adjust for national differences; Share all necessary information; Conduct complementary operations; Plan early and plan concurrently (US JP 3-05.1, 2007:VI-15).
area and/or tried to influence the combined intelligence process, or were the states
co-operating successfully? How did the UN relate to the co-operation?

Sharing of intelligence with the UN – was all information shared, both with
the other states involved, and in particular the UN? Did the states “trust” UN and
each other?

The above factors I will base my description upon are obviously general in
nature. This is primarily due to the amount of and the level of details in the
available material, but also limits in terms of space.

I present these factors in order to operationalize, i.e. measure the actual
cooperation itself. Authors of the case studies clarify the challenges and failure of
the combined intelligence process thoroughly, thus such operationalization is not
of significant importance in a study where the focus is directly aimed at the
combined intelligence effort. However, the analysis of national efforts (and
interests) made by authors is often based on the framework of the “cycle”, such as
frequent referrals to the problem of dissemination. Hence, I treat the steps of the
intelligence cycle and the two multinational factors listed above, such as state
behavior, intensions and specific intelligence efforts separately, in order to answer
my research questions as accurately as possible.
3 Intelligence Liaison in Peacekeeping Operations

3.1 UNPROFOR

The conflict in Bosnia commenced after the Bosnian Serbs, led by Radovan Karadzic, opposed the declaration of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992 with armed resistance. The ambition of the Bosnian Serb (Republika Srpska) side was to divide the republic along ethnic lines in order to form a “Greater Serbia”. There were three fighting parties in the war: the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs. In March 1994, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed after an agreement has been reached between the Muslim and Croat sides. The conflict ended with Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995 (DoS, 2009).

The UN involvement in Bosnia began in April 1992, with full deployment of UNPROFOR. The main objectives of the force were to ensure the safety of the established “Safe Areas” (and “Protected Areas” in Croatia), deliver humanitarian aid, and monitor “no-fly zones”. At its peak, the force consisted of nearly 39000 troops, police officers and military observers from more than 35 countries. The UN-led operation lasted until March 1995, when it began it’s restructuring (UNPF) into the latter, and even bigger 55000 troop NATO-led IFOR (December 1995 – December 1996) and SFOR (December 1996 – June 1998). UNPROFOR is the largest peacekeeping operation in the history of the United Nations organization (UN UNPROFOR, 2009). The intelligence activity around UNPROFOR was interesting in several aspects, and the extensive case study made by Cees Wiebes (2003) provides detailed answers on the nature of intelligence liaison in this peacekeeping operation.

A multinational Military Information (read: intelligence) Office was established in Zagreb in order to support the Force Commander with intelligence. In essence, it played the role of a G-2 element⁴. The MIO was composed of staff from various countries during its period of operation. This was not an effective intelligence element, due to the fact that it lacked its own collection capabilities, and was mostly reliant on UNMOs and other forms of personal connections to gather information (with own state, alliances or personal contacts). As such, different nationals could contribute different amount and quality of information to

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⁴ In NATO terminology - intelligence staff element.
the MIO (Wiebes 2003, pp. 36-38). Restrictions on intelligence sharing were imposed on national level, such as by US, and especially between NATO and non-NATO member states and UN personnel (Dorn 1999, p. 428; Wiebes 2003, pp. 37, 43, 45-46, 236). Svensson, a former head of MIO confirms this view, and that one had to sidestep these restrictions on an informal level (Jong et al. 2003, p. 42-45).

Despite existent intelligence agreements, such as the “UKUSA” (Chapter 4), political ambitions tampered with exchange of intelligence. Aldrich writes and refers to a specific event where British special forces discovered US-supported arms shipments to the ABiH side (Aldrich 2003, p. 82). The story is also described in Wiebes’ case study (Wiebes 2003, pp. 157, 173-177, 182-188). Aldrich concludes that differences in policies between the two countries had a significant impact upon their intelligence liaison (Aldrich 2003, p. 82). With Greece and Turkey taking opposite sites in the war (Athens with Serbia and Srpska; Ankara with the side of Bosnia), provides another example of a confrontation that Wiebes describes “[…] reduced the willingness of other NATO member states to share intelligence on Yugoslavia within the alliance…” (Wiebes 2003, p. 62).

Even though intelligence functions and co-operation were not completely absent, it was coordinated poorly from the UNPROFOR side, and depended on the ability and interests of the troop contributing states (Wiebes 2003, pp. 46, 48). In the absence of intelligence from the UN, some states took matters into their own hands; some even deployed various special forces and/or intelligence support units (Wiebes 2003, pp. 49-50, 71, 208-213). This may represent a reasonable course of action for a troop contributor, in order to provide (force-) protection for its own personnel (also, Wiebes 2003, p. 235). But also, from another point of view, as the former Military Adviser to the Secretary General, Frank Van Kappen expresses “It is done for a wide variety of reasons but in general, let’s say, ‘because it suits their own purpose’” (Jong et al. 2003, p. 8).

Unity of effort – intelligence co-operation was conducted mainly on bilateral agreements, and encountered significant friction if the political opinions were of different sort, even between long-term allies. Wiebes pointed out several situations of this sort; also the liaison between French intelligence and other NATO members, including the US (Wiebes 2003, pp. 57-60, 61, 80, 87-88, 276-279). Wiebes made a following remark about the NATO alliance (Wiebes 2003, p. 62):

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5 What follows is an extensive description of a dispute between the CIA and US State Department, involvement of other states in this program and the private military contractor MPRI. According to the interviews and the information gathered by Wiebes, this was a political initiative taken by the US administration without embracing the CIA, which is why MPRI was involved (Wiebes 2003, pp. 66, 166-172, 174-176). Arms assistance was also provided to VRS, mainly by Serbia (Wiebes 2003, pp. 198-205).
It seems in general that member states are prepared to share only the intelligence that they wish to share, and which does not endanger national security in the widest sense.

Biases on information inside the UN leadership were also present (Wiebes 2003, pp. 40, 49, 195). The intelligence liaison was mostly based on a quid pro quo (this for that) principle (Wiebes 2003, pp. 44, 51). In conclusion, intelligence efforts were not unified: some states used intelligence to promote its own agendas, others tried to keep its troops safe, and the warring parties used UNPROFOR for their own intelligence needs.

**Sharing of intelligence with the UN** – the absence of sharing with the UN or UNPROFOR is presented throughout Wiebes case study and applies especially to the case of collected SIGINT (besides mentioned above, also Wiebes 2003, pp. 26-27, 135, 171, 261, 276-279, 314, 327). The UN leadership, and UNPROFOR structure itself was left to rely on the amount and quality of intelligence spared by the troop-contributing countries, other UN agencies, NGOs and the warring parties. A factor contributing to this situation is the abysmal information security in the UN system (Smith 1994, p. 238).

Other non-significant troop-contributors were sidestepped right from the get-go, as a Canadian functionary at the time expressed the following: “We are back to a world of big power politics and that is not kind to nations like Canada. We are just another troop contributor now, and no one is asking our opinion” (Wiebes 2003, p. 162). A description of the situation in Bosnia and UNPROFOR made by Aldrich is quoted, that “Bosnia was an intelligence theme park” (Aldrich 2002; in Wiebes 2003, p. 51). This description seems to be accurate.

### 3.2 Zaire

The state of refugees in East Zaire captured the international attention in November 1996. It also represents a case of intelligence co-operation at UN headquarters. Walter Dorn interviewed former officers of- and gained access to the reports produced by the Information and Research Unit (I&R) in UNs Situational Centre (SitCen) at DPKO, regarding Zaire between 1994 and 1998 (Dorn 2006).

As for the sole principle of strategic intelligence in UN, the initiative was firstly pushed forward by Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar in 1987, with the

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6 Hennessy writes that during the latter NATO-led SFOR mission, the main intelligence sharing continued to be done through and between national intelligence cells (NICs, just as under the UNPROFOR period). The author further concludes that national interests in the SFOR mission had a negative impact on the combined intelligence efforts (Hennessy 2006, pp. 36-37).
creation of Office for Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI). ORCI proved to be an ineffective solution, which terminated in 1992 with the creation of DPKO and the subsequent SitCen therein (Dorn 2006, p. 68-69). The I&R unit was created in 1993 with one US intelligence officer, the unit later grew to four (with France, UK and Russia), as representing four out of five permanent members of the Security Council. Dorn describes in detail that the intelligence contribution from the US side was considerable. During this particular crisis, however, interests collided and the situation became problematic (Dorn 2006, p. 72).

As the situation around the refugee camps quickly deteriorated, an option of a humanitarian intervention was discussed in the Security Council. After the rebel attacks in mid-November 1996, a significant number of refugees left to trek back to Rwanda, and the question remained whether a multinational force should be set in the area in order to provide additional assistance for the remaining refugees (CNN 1996).

At this point, state interests set in, and a speculation began about the remaining refugee numbers. “The estimates vary from as little as 20,000 to over 400,000, and “The ‘numbers game’ had important political ramifications” (Dorn 2006, p. 78). The US took a stand behind the lower number, and France stated the higher one. Obviously, the US estimates were far too low and the subsequent intelligence provided by US to the UN was disinformation, according to a I&R officer interviewed by Dorn (considers collected IMINT) (Dorn 2006, pp. 78, 84). A first-hand reconnaissance made by the MNF Commander Baril brought uncertain results; many refugees fearful of aircraft dispersed under jungle canopy.

The US, suffering from the known “Somalia Syndrome”, and France, with interests tied in the area, stood against each other (Brunk 2008, pp. 302-303; CNN, 1996; Dorn 2006, p. 81; PBS, 1996; Solomon, 1997). In the end, the MNF initiative for the remaining refugees was aborted, with US insisting on ceasefire before sending in troops. Hennessy also points out that the Canadian initiative to lead the MNF (Operation Assurance), although ambitious, lacked its own strategic intelligence capabilities vital for objective planning (Hennessy 2006, pp. 33-34).

**Unity of effort** – because of state interests, the planning of the mission was affected right from the start. The two players involved were France and the United States. Dorn states that several I&R unit reports took the same stand as the French government (Dorn 2006, p. 81). It is an interesting fact that these interests actualized simultaneously inside the I&R unit and the UNs Security Council. The effort was clearly disunited.

**Sharing of intelligence with the UN** – sharing was done, as a function of the I&R Unit itself. Though, it is evident that United States tried to misinform the UN leadership. The Canadian initiative to lead the MNF was thus left with biased intelligence, and so was the UN. Still, it remains unknown if some of the states

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7 “China declined to send an officer: apparently, it was unwilling to share information, a prerequisite for membership” (Dorn 2006, p. 71).
actually possessed any certain intelligence on the crisis and refugees (Dorn does not provide this evidence in his case-study).

Overall, the I&R unit did fulfill its function of providing the UN leadership with intelligence reports and these were valued by the UN officials, though at times (like above) it was subject to biases. Information & Research unit ceased to exist in February 1999, after a General Assembly vote pushed forward by the developing world which meant that all gratis personnel working in the UN had to leave (Dorn 2006, pp. 80, 82).

3.3 Other missions

The cases of UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone in 1999-2000 and EU’s (France) Operation Artemis, a support mission for MONUC in DRC 2003, address the fact that the UN did have to rely on Western intelligence and special operations expertise and capabilities in order to succeed with its tasks, because frankly, when the situation deteriorated as rapidly as it did on these two occasions, the UN was left no other option.

It is highly doubtful that UNAMSIL would turn out to be a successful endeavour without the intelligence support (Aid 2006, p. 44; I&S C UK 1999), robust organization and special operations capabilities provided by United Kingdom in 1999-2000 period, considering the a priori chaotic state of the UN intervention, UNAMSIL leadership and the ECOMOG troops operating in Sierra Leone (Barlow 2007, pp. 316-317, 401-407; Connaughton 2001, p. 118; Ero 2001, p. 57). Stability of Sierra Leone was also arguably an interest of the British government at the time (Ero 2001, pp. 56-58). British intervention in Sierra Leone was a clear example of the quantity vs. quality dilemma that faces the UNs ad hoc type of multinational peacekeeping troops in Africa, and what a well trained small force could achieve in terms of peace enforcement (Connaughton 2001, p. 118-119).

Operation Artemis was the first EU-led (France) military operation with the mandate to reinforce MONUC and stabilize the Ituri province in DRC, 2003. The International Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) included special operations and intelligence units of several EU member states (documented France and Sweden; see UN PBPU 2004, pp. 13). Homan makes the following remark (Homan 2007, p. 154; also in UN PBPU 2004, p. 14):

Another factor to note is that none of the participants in the IEMF were willing to re-hat with MONUC. This placed the mission’s credibility at risk since MONUC lacked the special forces, intelligence and overflight capabilities that were crucial to the IEMF’s success.

UNs Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit mentions challenges in (information) liaison in pre-deployment phase of the mission, but as the IEMF’s mission
progressed it reports that cooperation was established and functioned well (UN
PBPU 2004, pp. 11-17).

INTERFET (1999-2000) and UNTMIH (1997) missions represent cases where
Australia and Canada respectively were the sole leading nations providing the
bulk of the peacekeeping forces and in command of intelligence functions therein.
As such the multinational factor here was absent or severely restricted (Blaxland
cannot be classed as successful: Haiti plunged back into chaos after the bulk of
peacekeepers left the country, and MINUSTAH was established in 2004.

Unity of effort - these four mentioned missions are raised upon two important
facts; the first is that these Western countries have a well developed military
intelligence culture, and secondly the absence of challenges commonly present in
a multinational ad hoc intelligence structure involving non-compatible states. A
simplified interpretation regarding this particular factor can be made that these
four cases are positive, whereas Bosnia and Zaire represent two negative cases
(Brady & Collier 2004, pp. 130-133).

Sharing of intelligence with the UN – I do not possess such extensive material
specifically covering this factor. Cooperation with the UN in other than
intelligence field is, though, well documented (see above). The effects of these
specific initiatives brought substantial positive results for the state of UN
interventions, in the form of stabilization and regaining the peace enforcing
initiative in the highlighted conflict zones.

3.4 Summary

Michael A. Hennessy wrote a concluding statement about intelligence cooperation
in the SFOR mission, but which can also be applied to the above cases as well
(Hennessy 2006, p. 37):

Tactical military intelligence can accomplish so much if geopolitical interests do
not share a vision of “success.” Obviously where there is no unity of purpose there
cannot be unity of effort.

The cases of Bosnia and Zaire show that even NATO-participants had difficulties
of achieving or sustaining existent cooperation in a UN environment once
interests collided. These interests became obvious when the future of a significant
UN initiative, such as of a peace intervention was being decided in the Security
Council. It comes as no surprise that the reports of the I&R Unit may have taken
the same position as the participant countries (Dorn 2006, pp. 80-81).

Hugh Smith observed in 1994 that (Smith 1994, p. 248):

It is already a common complaint among Third-World nations that they provide the
majority of peacekeeping personnel, but play relatively little part in the direction
and management of peacekeeping operations. These complaints will only grow louder if the UN increases its reliance on Western powers for intelligence. The reality is, however, that it may have little other option.

With the then operational I&R Unit, and the involvement of Western states in the above mentioned PKO’s in mind, particularly the last four (Section 3.3), this scenario has certainly materialized. Robust military command structure, operational and tactical intelligence abilities may function very well at national level (especially those of Western states), but tend to conflict with the UN’s “everyone gets a turn” type of approach to peacekeeping operations (Martyn 2006, p. 21).

The multilateral intelligence cooperation in this context as the cases show is fragile, in particular the unity of effort factor. In the four latter cases specifically, unity of effort was achieved through proper interoperability, either unilaterally or with similar (favorable) states. Authors do point out the fact that sharing of intelligence with the UN has been done on a “need-to-know basis” (Dorn 2009, p. 828; Dorn 1999, p. 436; Smith 1994, p. 238). Bringing realism theory in place, sharing sensitive information with non-favorable countries or actors can bring about security risks for states. Not only in the traditional sense of protection of intelligence sources and methods, but also imposed risks on the lives of the deployed personnel. These worries are reasonable, because after all the United Nations is an organization consisting of member states, and no one can guarantee information security in the transparency culture of the UN. Although, as authors pointed out, intelligence has been provided to the UN, these situations were far from ideal.

Recent institutional developments are being made within UN, however, irrespectively of contributors involved, and these initiatives should be viewed as positive. Walter Dorn describes in detail the role and work of the newly established JMAC in the MINUSTAH mission (Dorn 2009). This initiative originated at DPKO in the form of an adopted policy in 2006, directing all UN PKOs to establish JMACs and gather and assess all-source information from the military, police and civilian sectors (Dorn 2009, p. 806). A JMAC has also been established in the MONUC mission in DRC, where even SIGINT measures were employed (Dorn 2009, pp. 806, 824; Dorn 2006, p. 82; Shetler-Jones 2008, pp. 518-519).

Shelter-Jones concludes that “Ultimately, the comparative advantage of the JMAC lies in its ability to provide information that supports the senior management’s strategic perspective and decision-making process.” (Shetler-Jones 2008, p. 523). Considering the “theme park in Bosnia”, thought patterns regarding intelligence and the need for situational awareness do change inside the UN (UN PBPU 2004, pp. 13). This need was driven home, according to Shetler-Jones at a high price, namely the bombing of the UN mission HQ in August 2003 in Baghdad, Iraq (Shetler-Jones 2008, p.519).

In general, the JMAC can provide an institutional counterweight to established international relations in order to achieve both measured factors studied in this
paper positively, particularly securing the *sharing* bit within the UN system. Still, according to the contributors’ analysis, some challenges do persist. Shetler-Jones points out challenges in integration of JMACs with the overall UN structure (Shetler-Jones 2008, pp. 523, 526), and Dorn names a consisting UN problem with counterintelligence (Dorn 2009, p. 827). It is doubtful, however, that the latter issue can be resolved within the UN system due to the sole nature of this organization (Smith 1994, pp. 238-240).
4 Bilateral Intelligence Cooperation

4.1 UKUSA

The special intelligence relationship between the United States and United Kingdom is well documented in history literature. The “UKUSA” Agreement was formed in 1946 (Lander 2004, p. 481). It is also described as being the most extensive one, besides the close cooperation on SIGINT (Lander 2004, p. 487), the US focuses more heavily on the technical aspects, and UK is traditionally more inclined towards HUMINT elements (Clough 2004, p. 605; Wiebes 2003, p. 59). Besides US and UK, the agreement has developed and also involves Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Svendsen 2008, p. 662). Recent history also shows considerable intelligence cooperation on Iraq, counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism in general (Svendsen 2008, pp. 662-663, 666, 668-672). The United States, also covered in Bosnia and Zaire cases, is in a unique position - with its broad expertise and vast technical resources it is indisputably “the center of the web” in the intelligence world (Svendsen 2008, p. 673).

The simplest explanation for the emergence of this agreement is due to the common Anglo-Saxon background, common foreign policy and developed trust through cooperation during WWII and throughout the following Cold War period. The close relationship between the countries also receives extensive media coverage. Most notably, the intense focus on Afghanistan after 9/11, and the intelligence cooperation regarding the status of WMD in Iraq in 2002-2003, although considered as an intelligence failure (Gill & Phythian 2006, pp. 125-147). Because of the changed threat environment since 9/11, Washington had to find new allies in the war against terrorism, and intelligence liaison is crucial for success in this struggle, especially with countries in the Middle East region (NYT 2010).

In retrospect to the UN-led PKOs with an objective to end an internal struggle, the contemporary counter-insurgency mission in Afghanistan presents a different dimension of challenges. The direct threat of Al Qaida and the Taliban movement, and the set objectives to stabilize Afghanistan require accurate intelligence and thorough coordination of such assets among the multinational troops and contingents of ISAF\textsuperscript{8}.

\textsuperscript{8} Recent developments are documented. NATO reports of a newly established Joint Intelligence Operations Center at ISAF HQ in Kabul, which also incorporates Afghan and Pakistani liaison officers (NATO-ISAF 2007).
Besides extensive multilateral cooperation against terrorism, resources are still invested in domestic security and counterintelligence, both in the UK and US. New types of threats are perceived: primarily economic, industrial and technological espionage and intelligence operations in an increasingly globalized community (CPNI 2010). British security service MI5 perceives the situation as following (MI5 2010):

We estimate that at least 20 foreign intelligence services are operating to some degree against UK interests. Of greatest concern are the Russians and Chinese. The number of Russian intelligence officers in London has not fallen since Soviet times.

The material used in the next section supports these concerns.

4.2 Russia and Central Asia

The characteristically HUMINT intensive modus operandi of Russian intelligence services, according to several authors and officials remain alive and well in the modern post-9/11 period.

Russia has been trying to find its new geopolitical role after substantial economic growth during the mid 2000s. With “gas-wars” and similar rhetoric, much attention of Russia’s leadership in the last decade was aimed towards energy politics (Truscott 2009, pp. 22-24). It maintained therefore a close eye on foreign developments, showing particular interest in the US, NATO, and important economic partners in the EU region. Consequently, activities of Russian foreign intelligence service, the SVR, and its military counterpart GRU followed suit (Anderson 2007, pp. 270, 275-284; for a recent example, see Die Welt, 2009). FSB remains highly active in North Caucasus region, where the situation has remained unstable (EJ 2010).

Russia, like many other countries, participates in multilateral intelligence efforts against international terrorism (Izvestia 2007; Lefebvre & McDermott 2008, p. 255). Although, according to Anderson, the effectiveness of the Russian activities is at times questionable, especially if these interfere with Moscow’s interests (Anderson 2007, p. 296).

Focus also remains on the CIS region, where Russia leads regional counterterrorism agenda and overall intelligence coordination (Anderson 2007, p. 271; Izvestia 2007; Lefebvre & McDermott 2008, pp. 254-255). Lefebvre & McDermott point out the unique position of Russian intelligence services in comparison to their counterparts in CIS countries, with superior tradecraft and experience, and subsequently more resources at hand (Lefebvre & McDermott 2008, pp. 254, 263). The two authors also question the overall efficiency of this liaison. Although the director of FSB Patrushev stated that intelligence cooperation with the CIS countries brought substantial results in counterterrorism efforts (Izvestia 2007), the overall agenda seems to be that of political nature
where states benefit from close bilateral ties with Moscow (Lefebvre & McDermott 2008, pp. 262-263). Because of the broad US counterterrorism campaigns in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the political games in the CIS region now include three big players; China, Russia and the United States. Central Asia, in effect, constitutes an important part of Russia’s modern foreign policy (Anderson 2007, pp. 298-299; Lefebvre & McDermott 2008, p. 255).

### 4.3 Summary

Lefebvre summarizes following about the reasons for intelligence cooperation (Lefebvre 2003, p. 534):

> Ultimately, intelligence cooperation occurs when the potential benefits are evident, and the costs or risks of that cooperation well understood. Filling identified gaps, reducing operational costs, and replacing nonexistent diplomatic relations are among the major benefits of intelligence cooperation.

Lefebvre also points out the difference between bilateral and multilateral type of cooperation, and the value it brings for the involved states (Lefebvre 2003, p. 537):

> Multilateral arrangements, though they exist, are mostly neglected by intelligence agencies, which place more importance on bilateral relationships, primarily for security reasons. Fulfilling other objectives, such as influencing policies and outcomes, is usually easier bilaterally, rather than through a forum comprised of dozen of intelligence agencies, each having a different mandate and objective. What is shared and done multilaterally is usually not of a sensitive nature.

Chris Clough writes similar that “Alliances and coalitions have traditionally been weak in terms of intelligence: as the number of partners increases, so the level of guaranteed security decreases” (Clough 2004, p. 612).

Returning to the measured *unity of effort* (while the second factor is not applicable), an evident theme present throughout the covered material is that intelligence liaison is a matter of mutual gains, trust and confidence (Clark 2009, pp. 95-98). The primary objective of states engaged in the exchange of their sensitive assets is first and foremost for the benefit of their national security, as in the light of structural realism theory - security advantage and survival (compare, Sims 2006, pp. 196-200, 215). Multilateral intelligence arrangements of various sorts do exist, particularly in the EU area, such as Europol and the Intelligence Directorate of the EU Military Staff (Duke 2006, pp. 620-621). Bilateral liaison is however judged to be significantly more thorough than multilateral, due to fewer security risks involved. This clearly relates to the challenges perceived in dealing with the UN organization, and the possibility of accidently sharing information with all the member states, possibly even the conflicting parties.
5 Results

Looking at the first research question – it is clear that the UN is in a tough position regarding decision support assets. Intelligence exchange may depend entirely upon the interests of the involved member states, leaving the policies of the organization to follow the strongest contributor. Ad hoc organizational solutions by the UN cannot suppress existing national preferences of established intelligence exchange and liaison. In retrospect to the “theme park in Bosnia” (see p.14), recent institutional changes are implemented, such as the incorporation of JMACs - grounding intelligence functions and coordination in the organizational structure of peacekeeping operations.

Answering the second research question, the unified theme throughout covered material is that intelligence liaison is a sensitive matter for states, governed by contemporary interests and perceived threats. The terms ‘trust’ and ‘quid pro quo’ are constantly named throughout the used material. Multilateral cooperation occurs when it is convenient for participant states to do so, but bilateral cooperation is judged as more profound. International terrorism, although a perceived threat on the agendas of many security services since 9/11, does not remove the old practices of state-on-state probing.

My focus in the following two sections is aimed towards institutional factors. Limitations of my research are also addressed.

5.1 Challenges with intelligence within the UN

Mark Phythian points out four common subjects studied in intelligence studies – failure, ethics, oversight and accountability (Gill et al. 2009, p. 67). Considering the issue being that of UN and intelligence, inevitably, all the four mentioned subjects become quickly intertwined.

The sheer application of intelligence functions implies specific dilemmas for the UN organization: The ultimate purpose of United Nations is to maintain international peace and security, and the UN should, therefore, monitor the world closely for emerging threats and conflicts, yet, not too much so, and without the “cloaks and daggers” of spy stories (Dorn 1999, p. 420). The organization is also subject to be held accountable, as Smith writes “In the case of the UN, knowledge also implies responsibility” (Smith 1994, p. 238). And the culture of transparency hinders security of information in the UN system, because transparency is the direct opposite of secrecy. The UNPROFOR case showed particular reluctance of national agencies to share intelligence with the UN structure.
Many authors cited throughout this paper offer constructive views on how these problems can be overcome (Ekpe 2009, pp. 209-214, 257-260). Without the need to summarize, one opinion that stands out is the proper collection and analysis of open source data - OSINT (Steele 2006, pp. 530-536). The information that national agencies possess (or its equivalent) can potentially be gathered through open sources and vast contact networks, such as other UN agencies or UN-affiliated NGOs. This particular issue concerns the activities and the role of DPKO and the SitCen at the UN HQ in New York (UN DPKO, 2010).

5.2 Beyond realism

Politicization of intelligence is a fact that cannot be ignored, and can constitute an important unit-level factor. The relationship between the policymaker and the intelligence analyst/s thoroughly discussed in US IS-literature (Bruce & George 2008, pp. 71-104; Clark 2009, p. 5) may also influence the direction of intelligence products, procedures and international liaison. This issue is not restricted to United States only, and applies to the UN organization just as well.

A more precise way of studying intelligence liaison can be accomplished through integration of system analysis, such as network-centric warfare (NCW) or similar methods and theories (Carment & Rudner 2006, pp. 87-104; Clark 2009, pp. 19-22, 242-248). Structural factors, Western states, and primarily military intelligence were studied in this paper, but more variables are present within the given environment. Realism by itself is not a predictive theory (Barkin 2009, pp. 237-240), and other non-highlighted changes do occur contemporarily within the international environment.

It remains to be seen how “information analysis” and the JMACs will develop inside the UN structure. Keeping the big picture in mind it has to be said - intelligence is merely a tool. Many more factors affect the foundation of UNs decisions in peace efforts.
6 References


Figure 1 (p. 8): Intelligence Cycle. Source: author.