Payer Not a Player –

The European Union as a marginal player in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) has been engaged in Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the early 1970’s. The Union has since then tried to gain a role in the diplomatic process by different means, but without any particularly success to be able to influence the bilateral talks.

One has in recent years tried to develop the union towards a more coherent collective foreign policy in order to adopt a stronger political role in worldwide politics in general, and in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in particular. In spite of these improvements of the EU institutions, it seems as if the union only holds the capacity to steer the image of itself to a certain extent. There is a problem of how the EU is perceived by the involved parties in the negotiations, which restrain the Union to gain a bigger role in the diplomatic process. Images of the EU as a marginal player in the negotiations, prevails.

This thesis sets out to examine the underlying power dynamics that may underpin the image of the EU as a weak player in the peace process. The theory of Path Dependence has been employed which provides the tools of a three-stage model, whereas each stage corresponds to different periods of the EU’s involvement in the peace process since the 1970’s. The United States (US) and Israel have not been in favour of a strong EU participation, thus kept the Union at the margin of the bilateral talks throughout the years. Consequently, one can distinguish how the image of the EU as a marginal player has come to develop, and is continuously replicated in the negotiating context.

Keywords: Middle East Peace Process, European Union, Marginal Player, Path Dependence, Power Dynamics

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1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) has been engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular since the early 1970’s when the former European Community (EC) had reached an integrational point where it could begin to act internationally (Dosenrode – Stubkjaer 2002: 84). Ever since, the EU has been a vital actor in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), as it has aided both Israel and Palestine in terms of their long-term interests in relation to each other and to Europe (Ginsberg 2001: 146). The Union has in a sense had a political impact on the two conflicting parties due to its contribution as the largest provider of aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA), and as being Israel’s main trading partner (Ginsberg 2001: 127, 143, Dror – Pardo 2006:19).

The EU’s economic strength has generated expectations of how the Union should play a political role in the MEPP, particularly within the PA. They have persistently called on the EU to transfer its economic skilfulness to the political level of the peace process (Smith 2008: 14). However, the Union has not succeeded to be an active player in the conflict resolution efforts, which have been dominated by the United States (US) (Bretherton – Vogler 2006: 184).

One has in recent years tried to respond to these aspirations by developing the Union towards a more coherent collective foreign policy in order to adopt a stronger political role in the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. In spite of improvements of the EU institutions it seems as if the union only holds the capacity to steer the image of itself to a certain extent. There is a problem of how the EU is perceived by the involved parties in the negotiations, which restrain the union to gain a bigger role in the diplomatic process. The image of the union as a marginal player in the negotiations prevails.

To explain the decision-maker’s stagnate views of the EU is of great importance since it works as an obstacle in the unions strive to reach a stronger role in the peace process. The diplomatic puissance of the Union needs to be recognized by all interested parties, namely the Israelis, the Palestinians and the Americans in order for the EU to have a say in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Gianniou 2006:15).
1.1 Question and purpose

In this thesis, I aim to highlight one of the biggest problems that the EU is facing in its strive to gain a bigger role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The EU has in recent years tried to develop into a more consistent and coherent actor on the international scene in general, and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. Still, the involved parties hold a view of the EU as a marginal player in the negotiating context.

The purpose of this thesis is accordingly to explain why the involved parties in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process cling on to an image of the EU as a marginal player in the negotiations. I do not intend to generalize my results concerning the image of the EU on the international arena, since that would require a much richer material than what I have based my study upon.

Accordingly, the question that the thesis sets out to answer is;

*How is it that the image of the European Union as a marginal player in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict persists?*

1.2 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework used in this thesis has been elaborated by Jochen Koch and Jörg Sydow in the article “Organizational Path Dependence: Opening the Black Box” (2009). They suggest a three-stage model of organizational path dependence that explicitly distinguishes three different phases of how an organization/institution evolves path dependent (Koch – Sydow 2009: 691). The main focus of this three-stage model is the self-reinforcing dynamics, and they suggest several social mechanisms that may be at work in an organizational context (Koch – Sydow 2009: 691, 698).

As for the purpose of this study, to explain the persistent image of the EU as a marginal player in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiation context, it is suitable to apply the power mechanism presented by James Mahoney in his article ””Path Dependence in Historical Sociology” (2000). There are several actors at work in this context, who all want to have a stronger say in the peace process, thus I believe that it may a power struggle that underpins the particular image assigned to the EU as a marginal player.
1.3 Method

The choice of method is a qualitative case study, which is suitable for the historical analysis I have carried out (Teorell – Svensson, 2007: 13, 82).

The aim has been to unveil the power dynamics that underpins the image of the EU as a marginal player in the Israeli/Palestinian peace negotiations. In order to substantiate my explanation of why this particular image persists, I have come to examine the perceptions of the EU held by involved parties over time.

The research has been carried out through a within-case analysis, and by using the method of process-tracing, presented in the book “Case studies and Theory Development” (Bennett – George, 2005). In order to find potential causes to the stagnate image of the EU it has been suitable to closely scrutinize the processes which might have lead to this outcome (Bennett – Geroge 2005: 207).

The time frame of the research covers a period from the early 1970’s until the year of 2004. As I apply a process perspective, it has been fruitful to look to such an extended period due to that it provides a broader perspective on the perceptions of the involved parties of the EU in critical periods. By tracing sequences of events in form of a time chronology, I have been able to examine the process in detail and furthermore been able to identify the underlying power dynamics that may have kept the Israeli-Palestinian peace process on a certain path (Koch – Sydow 2009:704).

1.4 Material

My thesis is based upon polls and reports on the view of the EU of Israeli, Palestinian and US elites at certain events. This material has mainly been found in journal’s archives online, such as Hareetz, whereas it has provided me with relevant historical information. Autobiographies has also been a resource of use, and I have contemplated the book ”Arafat, Terrorist or Peacemaker” written by Alan Hart in order to get a deeper knowledge of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) perceptions of the Europeans. Moreover I have also
contemplated academic literature and editorials, in order to find material on perceptions of the EU in a historical perspective. It is worth noting that there is a risk that a large part of the material is tendentious, as it is contemplates such an infected conflict. Persons in a biased position towards the peace process have written many of the articles, reports and polls, thus it has been important to compare different information in order to distinguish truthful material to base this study upon (Teorell – Svensson 2007: 106).

1.5 Limitations

When studying the power dynamics that may underpin the image of the EU in the MEPP, a few limitations have been made.

First, my research is guided by the tools of process-tracing that distinguishes certain vital events of the union’s involvement in the peace process. This implies that my research has no intention to be exhaustive, and that it may be additional important events that are not included in the scope of this study, thus a generalization is unattainable.

Second, when in this thesis referring to the different actors in the negotiation setting and their interests and policies, it is referred to them as being single, coherent and consistent actors. This is clearly not the case in reality, as the US, Israel, the PA and the EU are pluralistic entities with many different opinions. However, I refer to the dominant core positions which are shared by main policy elites and that shapes most decisions, and thus follows the widespread practice in international relations theory, in which states and multi-states entities are discussed as consistent single actors.
2 The Marginal Player

In this chapter a description of the prevailing image of the EU as a marginal player will be presented. Due to that historical empirical fact of the EU’s involvement in the peace process is explicitly included in the analytic part of this thesis, it is needless to present it at this point. Instead I find it fruitful to give a description of how the EU is perceived as a marginal player by the involved parties, and to further examine how this image has been clung on to over time in the analytical part of the thesis.

2.1 The Obstacle of Perceptions

In spite of the EU’s high aspirations and the adoption of new institutional instruments that equips the union to play a stronger role in the peace negotiations, it seems as if the Union only can steer the image of oneself to a certain extent. The diplomatic puissance of the Union needs to be recognized by all interested parties, namely the Israelis, the Palestinians and the Americans in order for the EU to have a say in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Gianniou 2006:15). As for present it seems they view the EU as a marginal player.

Concerning the Palestinian’s perceptions, they acknowledge the EU’s role in the sphere of economic and financial assistance (Nasrallah – Santoro 2005:25). As the EU being the largest donor of aid to the Palestinians, they have unyieldingly called on the Union to adopt a political role in the peace process. There has been an expectation that the EU should be able to transfer its economic strength to the political level of the peace process (Smith 2008: 14).

However, these hopes are withering as one has come to adopt a belief that the EU is subordinate to the US and as merely supporting the American diplomatic efforts, even within the framework of the Quartet (Nasrallah – Santoro, 2005: 25-26).

As for the Israeli views of the EU as a mediator in the peace process, they are seen as weak, deceitful and pro-Arab, and consequently there are not many that are in favour of a close political relationship. Furthermore the EU is seen as to trying to gain influence in the Middle East, in order to impair the American support of Israel (Dachs – Peters 2004: 6). As the Israelis are untrusting of the EU’s intentions towards the Middle East conflict, they have persistently opposed a larger role for the Europeans in the peace process (Dachs – Peters 2004: 6).

Among Israeli policy-maker it is also conceived as unnecessary to maintain good political relationships with the EU, since they are not really critical for Israel.
They rely on the US to fully compensate for political disagreements with the EU, due to their special relationship (Dror-Pardo 2006:32).

One thing is for certain, the image of the EU as a marginal player in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating context has had a strong hold among the decision-makers. Now, let's turn to the theory of Path Dependence that provides the tools to understand the power dynamics that may underpin these persistent perceptions.
3 Theoretical Framework

In this chapter the process-oriented theory of Path Dependence will be presented. First, I will give a brief presentation of the notion of Path Dependence, which is a widely discussed concept. Thereafter, I will define the concept of Path Dependence as self-reinforcing processes from a power perspective that will be employed in my study. Finally, I will describe the process of how a phenomenon evolves path dependence, in order to apply it to the subsequent analytical part of the thesis.

3.1 Path Dependence

The basic assumption of the theory of Path Dependence is that "history matters", and that “what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time”(Sewell 1996: 262-263). This implies, in a more specific way, that foregoing decisions are vital for current and future decision-making (Koch – Sydow 2009:690). An even narrower and more useful definition of Path Dependence is “that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice”(Levi 1997, 28). The notion of social processes of increasing returns, also known as self-reinforcing processes, captures this logic of how preceding steps in a particular direction induce further movement down the same path (Pierson 2000: 252). The concept of Path Dependence of self-reinforcing processes from a power perspective collected will be applied to the analytical part of this thesis, thus it is in its order to give a more thorough description of this particular logic.

3.1.1 Path Dependence as self-reinforcing processes

Self-reinforcing processes can be identified as drivers that are likely to accumulate in a specific path of action. They are inherent self-reinforcing dynamics, that eventually lead to an irreversible state of total inflexibility or lock-in. These processes become increasingly systemic forces, beyond the control of the individual actor. In this way, the individual actor becomes entrapped in the dynamics of the system (Koch – Sydow 2009:691).
A power explanation of self-reinforcing processes implies that actors make decisions by weighing costs and benefits. An institution distributes these costs and benefits unevenly, and consequently will actors have different endowments of resources and also different interests vis-à-vis institutional reproduction. Even when most individuals or groups prefer a change of an institution, it can persist due to that an elite that benefits from the existing arrangement is strong enough to promote its reproduction. The empowered group can then use its power to expand the institution, which in turn increases the power of the advantaged group further (Mahoney 2000:521).

From a power perspective, the institutional reproduction is a conflictual process, in which institutional persistence disadvantage significant groups. This presence of conflict implies that the disadvantaged groups may eventually be successful in challenging the prevailing arrangements (Mahoney 2000: 523).

3.1.2 The Process of Evolving Path Dependence

In Phase 1, the Preformation Phase, is characterized as an open situation with a broad scope of action, but it should not be considered as a completely separate process without any trails/traces from past events. In order to understand the activities in the first phase, one has to consider institutional imprints, because institutions are “carriers of history” and initial choices and actions are embedded in routines and practices. This phase should build upon a historically framed or imprinted contingency, neither on completely unrestricted choice or assumption of determinacy (Koch–Sydow 2009: 691-692). Once a choice is made, it may amount to small or big events/strategies that unintentionally sets of and trigger a self-reinforcing process. This moment of entering into the dynamics of a self-reinforcing process can be understood as a critical juncture (Koch–Sydow 2009: 691, 693).

Phase 2, the Formation Phase, holds the characteristic of the gradual emergence of an organizational path. It is led by the dynamics of self-reinforcing social processes, which favours a particular type of decision or action pattern. At this point it is likely for a dominant pattern to emerge, and also for the process to become increasingly irreversible, narrowing the scope of action. Consequently, as the range of options narrows, it becomes progressively difficult to reverse initial choice or pattern of action. In this phase, however, choices are still possible in spite of them being essentially constrained (Koch–Sydow 2009: 691, 693).

The transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3, the Lock-in Phase, signifies a further restriction of scope of action, thus the dominant decision pattern becomes fixed and gains a deterministic character and eventually bound all action to a path. Flexibility has been lost, due to the fact that one particular choice or action pattern has become the predominant mode. The whole setting is lead into a lock-in, which may be of mainly cognitive, normative or resource-based nature. There may be more efficient alternatives available, but individuals, organizations, decision
processes and established practices proceed to reproduce this one particular outcome (Koch – Sydow 2009: 692, 694).
4  Analysis

In this chapter the three-stage model of the formation of a path will be applied. I will distinguish how the vital events of EU’s diplomatic efforts and corresponding reactions, may have set off the reproduction, and finally lead the negotiation setting to a lock-in of cognitive nature, in which the EU is perceived as a marginal player.

4.1  The Pre-Formation of the Negotiation Setting

4.1.1  The institutional imprints of the Middle East Peace Process

The European Union (EU) has been engaged in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict since May 1971, when the then European Community (EC), adopted a report on a common position on the Arab-Israeli conflict within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (Artner 2001: 430). The report emphasized the same elements already presented in the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Resolution 242 in 1967, including demands of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and a regulation of the Palestinian refugee problem (Artner 2001: 430-431, Hart 1984:251). It was in the Brussels Declaration of November 1973 that the EC made a first attempt to play an independent mediatory role in the MEPP. In this statement, the EC called upon Israel to “end the territorial occupation which has maintained since the conflict in 1967” and recognized that account must be taken of “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians” (Declaration of the Nine 1973).

This was seen as an indication of a collective pro-Arab stance and as a response, a delegation of Arab League Foreign Ministers attended an EC summit with the hope to establish cooperation on economic issues, but also with an aim to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict and address the Palestinian problem (Smith 2008: 86). Consequently, a Euro-Arab Dialogue was initiated in 1974 which was an economic cooperation badly needed for the EC after the Yom Kippur war and the Arab use of the oil weapon in 1973 (Dannebrougher 2009: 3).

When the EC first got involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, it can seem as they had a broad scope of action due to that this marked their first involvement as a community in the
conflict. As a new actor in the region, they also held the possibility to make an impression of what type of mediator role they aimed to play. However, their and the other involved parties actions have to be understood by looking to the institutional imprints that characterized the negotiating setting, thus their choice of action was not completely unrestricted to earlier historical events. There was already a certain structure of the MEPP put in place by the only third party involved at the time, namely the US, represented by the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Kissinger perceived EC’s attempt to an independent peace policy as contradictory to the step-by-step diplomacy that he tried to accomplish in the region (Strömvik 2005: 152). The American approach was to avoid grand designs for a comprehensive solution to the Middle East conflict, and instead focus on relatively simple issues, in order to build up confidence and approach peace in stages (Artner 2001: 424). Accordingly, one can comprehend that the EC’s declaratory diplomacy threatened these American strategic routines and practices, already in place.

Moreover, the US felt increasingly threatened when the EC initiated the Euro-Arab dialogue, leaving the Europeans infringing on partly its political domination in the region, partly on its control over oil supplies in the Gulf (Othman 2009: 4). From a US perspective, the EC’s diplomatic efforts in the region was due to their interest to secure their oil supply, rather than to engage in impartial peacemaking (Dannreuther 2009:4). Kissinger was more than upset concerning the Europeans willingness to submit to Arab demands and to initiate the Euro-Arab Dialogue, after the Arabs use of the oil weapon in 1973. He described the EC response as “nothing could have better illustrated the demoralization-verging on abdication-of the democracies” (Kissinger 1982:897).

4.1.2 The EC’s choice to abandon its independent role

The US, who felt that their political domination in the region was at stake, responded by putting pressure on the EC from two main directions. First, one suggested the formation of the International Energy Commission, which was a mean to pressure the Arab states, as well as an act of reprisal to the bilateral agreements signed between some of the EC member states and the oil producing states (Othman 2002: 4). This was a successful move by the Americans since it resulted in a split of the EC, and by the end of 1974 all members had joined the US led organization (Othman 2002: 4). However it was not an evident choice of the EC members to bend to the US demands, thus their action was not a result of a completely determined context. The then French Foreign Minister Michel Joubert initially questioned this subordinate position of the EC members;

“Why must France bend to the US? France must consider its own special interests. When Europe started to make its independence clear, Henry Kissinger opposed this. What does Kissinger want from Europe – a partner or a servant?” (Quoted in Othman 2002:4).
Furthermore the Americans persuaded the Europeans to accept a prior consultation with the US (Allen 1977: 329), before taking any decision that might affect the American interests, which was a concession reached through the channels of NATO (Othman 2002:4). Thus, the early actions of the EC as a mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian was not completely unrestricted as their diplomatic aspirations came to be compromised. In order to retain a good relationship with their most important trade partner, they had to be careful in their political discussion with the Arabs (Allen 1977: 328). Accordingly, it resulted in a deadlock of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, since the EC prevented itself from taking an independent position towards the conflict or on the oil question (Othman 2009: 4).

This proves that the US actions and the corresponding EC concessions made at this stage were most certainly embedded in already established routines and practices of the MEPP. After the declaration of 1973 and initiation of the Euro Arab Dialogue, the EC made the choice to abandon its independent role in the peace process by giving in to the pressure of the US Foreign Policy makers. Consequently these events can be understood as having triggered certain Israeli and Palestinian perceptions of the EC, and a power relationship between the US and Israel against the EC involvement in the negotiations started to take shape. In other words, these events set the path-building process in motion.

4.1.3 Path-building process set in motion

The Israelis perceived the EC diplomatic efforts in the 1970’s as a threat to the peace process, and the then Foreign Minister Eban emphasized how “the original theme for the Europeans was oil rather than peace for the Middle East”. He further stressed how Israel did not believe in those “international guarantees” mentioned in the EC statement, due to that the European governments and UN refused to help when Israel needed security and support the most, namely in the wars of 1967 and 1973 (Statement Israeli Foreign Ministry 1973).

Once again it appears as “history matters”, thus the institutional imprints of the MEPP affected the initial Israeli reaction towards the Europeans as a Community. The members of the EC were passive at past critical moments, and accordingly their declarations were not perceived as trustworthy.

However, at this point, there were still an aim to include the Europeans in the peace process as the Israelis concludes by saying that they were convinced that "the 6 of November declaration cannot be Europe’s last or only word” and hoped that the EC would "reconsider the content and spirit of their declaration” (Statement Israeli Foreign Ministry 1973). It was rather the declarations of 1979 that resulted in a hostile Israeli attitude towards the Europeans. The EC was increasingly legitimizing Palestinian claims, and in this statement one deplored Israel’s claim to sovereignty over the occupied territories and the construction of settlements in these territories, which was considered illegal under international law (Statement by the EC 1979). This was the moment when the Israeli-European relation started to develop cold. The Israelis claimed that their settlements were in
accord with the law, and that the EC position did nothing but damage the newly embarked US-led negotiations (Dayan 1979).

The leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) welcomed the Europeans as a more balanced actor in the peace process. However, the EC supported the UN declarations, which included the need for the Palestinians to recognize the Israel’s right to exist in order to become a party to negotiation process. Khalad Hassan, the adviser of PLO leader Yasser Arafat, saw this demand from the International community as “totally unreasonable”, since such a concession would mean legitimizing Israel’s acquisition of territory, and result in a Palestinian waiving of their rights and land (Quoted in Hart 1984:386). Furthermore he emphasized that the US, afraid of Israel and its incredible military strength, “decided, for themselves and the Europeans, that they were, on balance, more frightened of Israel and the influence of the Zionists or than they were of the Arabs… Allowing Israel to dictate what their foreign policies should be” (Quoted in Hart 1984:392). This shows that the Palestinian leaders were fully aware of the American influence on the actions of the EC, and did not expect the Europeans to make major contributions as an independent actor in the peace process, already at this early stage of their involvement.

In this Pre-formation phase of the negotiation setting, the EC hesitant role towards the US and resulting reactions and strategies held by the involved parties described above, can be understood as have triggered the path-building process in motion.

4.1.4 The critical juncture

A critical juncture can be understood as the moment when an institution enters into the dynamics of a self-reinforcing process (Koch – Sydow 2009: 691). Applying this to the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, it seems, as the initiation of the Venice Declaration in the year 1980 was the critical juncture, and that this was the moment when the negotiating setting entered into the power dynamics of a self-reinforcing process, and the image of the EU as a marginal player was established.

The Venice Declaration was issued by the EC in the wake of the US-brokered Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel on June 13 1980. The EC was not too enthusiastic about these accords, and did not endorse the resulting peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979 (Ginsberg 2001:114). The nine held an opinion that these negotiations, even though they had resulted in a bilateral peace treaty, would further exacerbate regional tensions (Houk 2009: 90).

The Venice Declaration thus implied a more unified EC stance towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and gave notice of Europe's aspiration for greater involvement in the peace process (Hollis 1997: 18). The declaration amended a distinctive European approach on Palestinian rights as it stated that the Palestinian problem “was not simply one of refugees” in which terms it was presented by

Furthermore it emphasized that the Palestinians had to be placed in a position to “exercise fully their rights to self-determination”, and that the PLO should be included in the negotiations (The Venice Declaration 1980). The document also condemned the construction of Israeli settlements, and emphasized that they “will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem”, as they knew that the question of the city where a special concern for all parties (The Venice Declaration 1980).

These points form the basis of the official European policy towards the peace process up till today (Hollis 1997: 18), and as the EC argued for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel, it was the first articulation of the today accepted two state solution (Bretherton – Vogler 2006: 166). However, this objective to contribute towards the imposition of a just and lasting peace for the Middle East region was not a successful attempt to promote an assertive European stance in the peace process at the time. Instead it came to be a low-point in the EC relations with Israel, who rejected to grant any political role to the Europeans (Dannreuther 2002:5, Gianniou 2006: 5).

The Israeli critics to this declaration addressed that the Europeans made concessions to the PLO, in advance of the PLO’s renunciation of violence against Israel (Ginsberg 2001: 114). The EC’s use of such “megaphone diplomacy” was perceived as an infringement on Israel’s vital national and security interests, resulting in an outbreak of harsh statements from the Israeli side. One is the response to the EC’s proposal by former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban (Ginsberg 2001: 115);

"The EC is ready to sacrifice Israel’s security to ensure oil supplies and military/commercial contracts in the Arab world. Europe has a sovereign right to fix its own priorities and to put its oil supplies ahead of the list, but having placed a parochial approach above Israel’s security, Europeans could not expect to be taken seriously as a conciliator” (Quoted in Greilsammer and Weiler 1987:46).

Consequently, when the Israeli decision-makers weight the costs against the benefits of letting the EC in as an actor in the peace process, they concluded that they would benefit more by shutting the Europeans out.

The European dissatisfaction with the peace process was not shared by the US, and consequently the Americans felt no obligation to pressure Israel to accept a more prominent European role (Dannreuther 2001: 5). The US chilly reaction to the Venice declaration can further be explained by looking to the interests and strategies held by the then American administration of President Jimmy Carter. The President had made a heavy diplomatic and political investment in the Camp David strategy, and held therefore a singular focus on maintaining the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations (Houk 2009:92). The US had consequently a less critical approach towards Israel’s actions concerning Jerusalem. It went so far that the US, on the orders of Carter, refrained from the adoption of more than half a dozen UNSC resolutions that condemned Israel’s “Basic Law” of proclaiming Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital. This silence from the US administration concerning
Jerusalem was a strategic move as it gave Carter a political advantage in the negotiations (Houk 2009:92).

Regarding the Palestinian perceptions, the declaration was at first favoured by the Arab side as it amended a shift in EC policy. But the Arab’s optimism started to fade as soon as it became clear that the EC only made a half-hearted attempt to follow up the words with action and was incapable of outweighing the US with an alternative policy. Actually, the Venice Declaration fulfilled neither European nor Arab hopes, leaving the EU with a “virtually non-existent” (Dosenrode – Stubkjaer 2003: 106) role during the 1980’s.

Israel was at the time in power to steer the negotiations according to their interests, and they had the support of the US as their interests converged with those of Israel; to stick with Camp David at all costs. For different reasons, explained above, was neither of them in favour of the EC to adopt a stronger role in the peace process, thus the power dynamics of a social pattern set in and left Europe as a marginal player in the peace negotiations throughout the 1980’s.

4.2 The Formation Phase of the Negotiation Setting

4.2.1 The gradual emergence of an organizational path

Due to the critical juncture of the Venice Declaration, looking to the negotiation setting in the 1980’s and onward one can distinguish a gradual emergence of an organizational path. The course of action of the peace process were at this stage steered by the underlying power dynamics, i.e. by the interests of Israel and the US who benefited from the existing arrangement. Together, they were strong enough to promote its reproduction, which further empowered them at the expense of the EC and the Palestinians.

The Israeli reluctance towards the EC involvement and also the US efforts to keep the Europeans out of the high politics is well illustrated by the exercise of power that took place at the setting of the Madrid Peace conference in 1991.

With the re-launching of the peace process in 1991, after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, the hopes were high within the EC to ameliorate its presence in the conflict. However, these expectations were not to be realised (Dannreuther 2002: 6). The Madrid Peace Conference was convened by the US with Russia that adopted a token role (Hollis 1997:21). The EC tried to get the US and Israel to accept the EC as a full participant at this conference, but the Community was only granted an observer status at the discussions (Ginsberg 2001: 189). This was cause to Israel who essentially blocked full participation of the EC. They were the ones in power to decide whom to invite due to the fact that without the Israeli participation there would have been no conference (Ginsberg 2001: 121).
The US was not keen on involving the EC directly in the Madrid initiative either, and as always, one tried to undermine any European attempt to engage in the MEPP (Ginsberg 2001:121). There were three reasons for the US reluctance towards the EC as a third party; they wanted to keep this role for themselves, due to that Israel opposed the EC involvement and, because both Israel and the US believed that a second key mediator only would complicate the relationship between the US and the two negotiating parties (Ginsberg 2001: 121).

Instead, the EC was put in charge of the multilateral talks of the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG) (Barbé – Izquierdo 1997:129), as the US and Israel recognized the value of, and the financial resources behind an EC presence in the Middle East (Ginsberg 2001: 47). This was positive in a sense, since the union’s undertakings within this format established a concrete presence in the peace process for the Europeans (Gianniou 2006: 8). Moreover, as the Europeans were well aware of the limited influence that their diplomatic interventions had on the peace process, they chose to take on the role as responsible for economic assistance, and consolidated a plan for the financial aid towards the Palestinians (Gianniou 2006: 8).

Europe’s economic role in the peace process was remarkably strengthened with the signing of the Declaration of Principles, also known as the Oslo Accords, between Israel and the PLO on September 13 of 1993 (Dannreuther 2002: 6). The Oslo accords, entered into force at about the same time as the Maastricht Treaty, thus the EC was officially transformed into the European Union (EU) (D’Alancon 1994:41). During this time, the EU came to be the main financier of the Palestinian Authority (PA), as they provided them with Ecus 500 million from 1994 to 1998 (EC support to the MEPP). This financial support was of great importance to the survival of the peace process as it is questionable whether the PA would have managed all administrative costs otherwise (Dannreuther 2002:7).

Consequently, this gave the EU a more substantive role in the peace process, as it in a way marks the European “Return to the Middle East”, after having been totally put aside following the Madrid conference (D’Alancon 1994:41). However, one has to remember that this economic role was not accidentally delegated to the EU. All parties were rather eager to attribute this particular role to the Europeans, for different reasons (Gianniou 2006:9). The Palestinians needed all the assistance they could get from the Europeans, and their contribution following the Oslo accords came to be the most important one to foster the functional viability of the PA (Ginsberg 2001: 143). Concerning the US and Israel, the enhancement of the EU in the financial area was more than welcome also to the two parties, as it would not only ease their own financial burden to the peace process, but also alienate the Europeans from any further diplomatic aspirations (Gianniou 2006:9).

It was in the US and Israel interests, as always, to keep the EU out of the political part of the peace process, thus they captured the opportunity to turn the Europeans attention towards financial aid, functional cooperation and political dialogue in a Multilateral framework. In this manner, the two parties succeeded to empower themselves in the negotiations at the expense of the EU who was, once
again, left outside the bilateral talks. Accordingly, this period corresponds to when the dominant pattern of the EU as a marginal player in the peace process emerged. The Oslo Process came to be a successful peace negotiation context, resulting in a PLO and Israeli recognition of one another, the establishment of a framework for the peace negotiations, an agreement to the creation of the PA and the first Israeli relocation from the Occupied Territories (Ginsberg 2001: 106). However, the negotiations ended up in a deadlock with the assassination of the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the following election of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1995.

4.2.2 The negotiation setting still flexible

The EU took advantage of this stalemate and in 1996, one established the position of Special Representative for the MEPP, in an aim to acquire more visibility and enhance its involvement in the peace process by appointing a constant in situ presence (Nasrallah – Santoro 2005: 16). The efforts of the Special Envoy were to create an environment contributing to the success of peace negotiations operated by others (Bretherton – Vogler 2006: 184). The EU came to be quite successful within this format, as it gave the union the tools to influence both Israel and the US in political matters, such as encouraging the US to press Israel to implement agreements and make concessions (Ginsberg 2001: 107). The First Special envoy, Miguel Angel Moratinos, is considered to have played a behind-the-scenes role in the peace process, as he contributed to the first agreement signed between the PLO and the Likud government of Netanyahu, namely the Hebron Protocol in 1997 (Peters 2000: 160-161).

The positive outcome of these mediation efforts, even though not involved directly in the bilateral talks, was that the Special Envoy managed to project a constructive EU role and was consequently in a position to “complement” the US diplomatic efforts (Danreuther 2002: 10). As the US recognized how the EU could play a critical subordinate role for them in relation to the Palestinians, the EU presence in the MEPP reached a high point during the period from 1998-2000 (Danreuther 2002: 10). When the EU issued the Berlin Declaration in 1999, which proclaimed the support of a Palestinian state, it was a strategic diplomatic move coordinated with the US in order to dissuade Arafat from unilaterally declaring a Palestinian state (Ginsberg 2001: 123).

This proves, as the process of evolving Path Dependent being in the formation phase, that choices are still possible in spite of them being essentially constrained (Koch – Sydow 2009: 691). The negotiation setting was at this point flexible enough to grant the union a complementary role, which enabled it to influence the policies of the US, and consequently the perceptions held by the Americans in a positive way.

Another example of the flexibility of the negotiating arrangement at the time is the fact that the EU, after the outbreak of the Intifada in 2000, was included in the Quartet. Ever since the inclusion of the EU in the Quartet in 2002, the Union
has been denoted a stronger proactive political role, as it is enabled to coordinate policies towards the region together with Russia, the UN and the US. Within this format, one has come to influence the US, particularly with regard to the drafting of the “Roadmap for peace”. Due to the EU pressure in the face of US reluctance, this document was published and now forms the basis for the Quartets work towards a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bretherton – Vogler 2006: 185).

4.2.3 A narrowing scope of action

After the initiation of the Roadmap, the US emphasized the need for the Palestinians to elect new leaders, not comprised on terror, in order to obtain peace (President Bush 2002). When the EU reaffirmed Arafat’s position in 2003, regardless of Bush’s call for a new leadership for the Palestinians, the exclusion of the EU from the peace process was a fact. The EU believed that it was important to maintain a dialogue with Arafat, the elected leader of the Palestinian people, as it would help his Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas to deliver results in the peace process. These views were controversial as the US and Israel recently had sidelined Arafat, accusing him for encouraging violence in the Palestinian uprising (EU reaffirms Arafat 2003). Not surprisingly, this lead to deterioration in the EU’s relationship with Israel and the US, as for them, Arafat’s involvement was the very obstacle to progress.

The US responded by excluding the EU from the Aqaba Summit, in which the parties met to discuss on how obtain the goals set by the Quartet, thus leaving the union with a non-existing role in regional diplomacy (Steinberg 2004b: 391). Israel also put pressure on the EU to revert its receptiveness towards Arafat, as it refused to meet with EU officials that continued to visit the Palestinian President (Steinberg 2004a: 6). This lead to a more gentle EU approach towards Israel, as the Union feared its isolation from the peace process (Benn, 2003). At this time, one also made concessions to the US, by including Hamas on the EU list of terror groups, with an aspire to regain its influence within the Quartet (Benn 2003, EU Blacklist Hamas 2003).

This situation, in which the EU had to adopt along the interests of the US and Israel is an illustrative example of how the two, as belonging to the empowered group, use its power to expand the institutional arrangement in a way that increases their authority of the negotiations even further. From a power perspective, the institutional reproduction of a certain action pattern is conflictual, and this corresponds well to the EU’s struggle to maintain an independent role when they believe that their controversial position in the peace process is justified. As one could comprehend from the example above, the institutional persistence of the prevailing arrangement of the peace process with the US and Israel as the elite, disadvantages the EU whereas the Union has to compromise continuously in order to maintain a seat at the front row of the negotiations.
Furthermore, as even the Palestinians admit at this point that the US are the ones needed in the peace process, as being the only ones able to influence the Israelis, it is clear that the EU scope of action within the negotiation setting is inevitably narrowed. The then chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat emphasizes the Palestinian point of view:

“I don’t think politics is about honesty or dishonesty, politics is about shared interests and currently the US is the only superpower on earth. Its efforts are needed in this peace process, they can influence the Israelis” (Quoted in Palestine-Israel Journal 2003). He further stresses that the Palestinians are not always satisfied with the US position, which often undermine the fact that they are the people under occupation and instead sympathize with the Israelis (The Roadmap will stand, 2003). Thus, even if the Palestinians are disadvantaged by the arrangement, and wish for an enhanced role for the EU, they realize the power dynamics that underpins the peace process. As the EU was starting to lose credibility even among those in favour of their participation in the peace talks, the process had reached a point where it became extremely difficult to reverse the initial US/Israeli dominated pattern of action.

4.3 The Lock-in of Cognitive Nature

The transition from the Formation Phase to the Lock-in phase of the negotiation setting can be traced back to 2004 when the Israel-European relations reached an all-time low. This was due to that all member states of the EU chose to support an UN General Assembly resolution, which condemned Israel for its construction of the separation fence in the West Bank (Dachs–Joels 2004: 3). At this point, it seems as if the scope of action for the EU within the diplomatic context was even further restricted and that the dominant action pattern of the negotiations became fixed.

The EU was keeping a rather low profile towards Israel’s settlement policy during the beginning of the 21st century, in order to avoid controversy and to obtain a seat at the negotiating table (Youngs 2006: 150-151). In 2003, the Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom spoke with a warm tone of how he “respects the wish of Europe to play a role” and “acknowledge the contribution of the EU both to the Palestinian economy and to the US-led effort of shaping the performance-based road map” (FM Shalom 2003). However, the kind relationship between EU and Israel would not last far too long. The EU showed their unified support of the UN resolution, and thereby condemned Israel for its construction of the separation fence, as they believed was contrary to international law (UN Assembly Votes 2004). Israel, who saw the separation fence as a security device against Palestinian terrorism, was quick to respond to the European vote;

"Israel is particularly disappointed by the European stand. The willingness of the EU to fall in with the Palestinian position, together with its desire to reach a
European consensus at the price of descending to the lowest common denominator, raises doubts as to the ability of the EU to contribute anything constructive to the diplomatic process” (Statement Israeli Foreign Ministry 2004). The US Administration, who had voted against the resolution, gave its consent to the Israeli outrage, as they also believed that the resolution was one-sided and could undermine the goal of a Middle East peace based upon a two-state solution (Shamir 2004).

The scope of action the EU had gained as a mediator by its inclusion in the Quartet in 2002 was after these disagreements remarkably restricted. The relationship between Israel and the EU is at the political level characterized by disappointment and bitterness, and has reached an all-time low (Dachs — Peters 2004: 9). As the Israelis have grown deeply suspicious of European politics and intentions towards the conflict, they have become determined to minimize Europe’s role in the peace process (Dachs — Peters 2004:9).

Thus, the predominant pattern of the negotiations became fixed as the EU-Israeli relation was experiencing a colder atmosphere than ever. At this point, even though the EU had a genuine interest in securing stability in the region, and tried to prove it, the Israeli government refused to engage with them in a dialogue on the peace process (Dachs – Peters 2004: 10).

As one can pronounce from the events above, henceforward all action within the negotiations has been bound to a particular path, namely one that corresponds to the interests of the US and Israel. They are the two actors in power to decide to what extent the EU should participate in the bilateral negotiations, and who constantly reproduce the image of the EU as a marginal player. In other words, the whole negotiation setting has been lead into a lock-in of cognitive character, in which certain images are assigned to each participant in the diplomatic process. The image of the EU as a marginal player is a part of a larger social pattern, which has become deeply embedded in practice and is continuously replicated.
5 Conclusion

In analyzing the image of the EU in the Middle East peace process by applying the three-stage model of organizational path dependence, the thesis has demonstrated how there is a power dynamics that underpins a certain social structure of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation setting.

When the EC first got engaged in the Middle East Peace Process, through its declaratory diplomacy in the 1970’s, the community was meet with great resistant by the US, as the European stance was viewed as undermining the American step-by-step diplomacy. The negotiation setting was most certainly characterized by already embedded practices and routines, which constrained the union from adopting a strong independent role from start. Still, there was a possibility for the EC to discuss the conflict within the framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, a chance not taken, due to the strong pressure from their most important trade partner.

The Venice declaration can be understood as the critical juncture due to that this was the moment when the negotiating setting entered into the power dynamics of a self-reinforcing process. The US and Israel, the two parties in power, was both disturbed by the European attempt to compete with the newly signed Camp David Accords, thus the EC was shut out from the negotiations. Henceforth the negotiation setting was steered by the interests of the US and Israel, resulting in an absence of the EC in high politics during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Aiming for a more substantive role in the peace process, and well aware of its limited chances to gain a role in the bilateral talks, the EU adopted the role as a payer not a player to the great delight of the US and Israel as it would keep the Union away from the diplomatic process.

The appointment of a Special Envoy and the inclusion of the EU in the Quartet did give the Union a stronger political role, but only to a certain extent. The exercise of power seems to have continued even within this format, as the EU is excluded every time it tries to adopt an independent role. The cold relationship with Israel has led the whole negotiation setting into a lock-in of cognitive nature, in which the image of the EU as a marginal player has come to be deeply embedded and constantly reproduced.
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