Civilian Crisis Management in the European Union

- Mind the Gap

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Abstract

In the past decade the European Union has established itself as an actor in Civilian Crisis Management. This process has been accompanied by a set-up and development of various institutions and concepts that guide the work in this field. As well as in other areas of European foreign policy, in Civilian Crisis Management a gap between policy-making and outcome can be identified. Taking this as a starting point, this study looks at three concepts that are relevant to the policy-making process in Civilian Crisis Management of the European Union: the Civilian Headline Goals, the Civilian Response Teams and force generation for civilian missions, in order to assess and explain this gap.

Key words: EU foreign policy, Civilian Crisis Management, institutionalism, CSDP, CFSP

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Preface

This thesis was written as part of the degree program ‘Master in European Affairs’ at Lund University. I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who I have interviewed for the project for their valuable contributions; they have brought me to new insights and have truly enriched the content.
List of abbreviations

CCM  Civilian Crisis Management
CiC  Call for Contributions
CFSP  Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHG  Civilian Headline Goal
CIVCOM  Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CivOpsCdr  Civilian Operations Commander
CMPD  Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CONOPS  Concept of Operations
COREPER  Committee of Permanent Representatives
CPCC  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CRT  Civilian Response Team
CSDP  Common Security and Defence Policy
DGE  Directorate General E - External and Political-Military Affairs
EEAS  European External Action Service
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
EUMC  European Union Military Committee
EUMS  European Union Military Staff
EUSR  European Union Special Representative
FAC  Foreign Affairs Council
GAC  General Affairs Council
GAERC  General Affairs and External Relations Council
GSC  General Secretariat of the Council
HoM  Head of Mission
HR/VP  High Representative / Vice-President
OPLAN  Operational Plan
PMG  Politico-Military Group
PSC  Political and Security Committee
RELEX  Relations Exterieures
RoL  Rule of Law
SG  Secretary-General
SitCen  Joint Situation Centre
1 Introduction

Since the inception of the European Security and Defence Policy -now Common Security and Defence Policy after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon- the EU has set up various Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) missions around the world, from Guinea-Bissau to Georgia and from Aceh to Macedonia. These missions focused mostly on reforming the Rule-of-Law sector in the host countries, including police- and justice reform and supporting customs- and border management. Traditionally these efforts rest on four pillars that have been established as key priorities at the Feira European Council in 2000: policing, the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Currently there are 12 ongoing missions, all of which have ambitious targets to achieve. While the EU can claim success in deploying such a large number of missions until now, this has by no means been an unproblematic process.

First, it has become more and more difficult to generate the forces necessary from the member states. EUPOL Afghanistan, arguably one of the most important missions at the moment, in which European police provides training and advice to the Afghan National Police, is still suffering from a personnel deficit. Since its inception in 2007, the target set by member states of 400 personnel has not been reached. Currently the mission is operating with 284 international staff members and it can therefore not complete its mandate to full satisfaction -there are not enough people to guarantee the safety of the personnel outside Kabul and they are thus limited to operate solely in the capital.\(^1\) Force generation is not the only problem that is facing CCM today; there are more areas in which member states are struggling to fulfil their commitments. An example is the Civilian Response Team concept, which was meant to facilitate rapid deployment of civilian personnel in sudden crisis situations. What the Battle Groups are to the military CSDP is what the CRTs are for the civilian CSDP, in terms of being rapidly deployable units. The teams consist of members from various member states with different professional expertise. Although member states have agreed to the concept, it has been used only once and not in the way it was meant to be used. Implementation -the establishment of a pool of experts ready for rapid deployment- has not been followed through with in some member states.\(^2\) Finally, the Civilian Headline Goal -the document in which member states identify what to aim for in civilian CSDP for the coming years- shifted from very concrete and verifiable objectives in 2008 to rather vague wording in the 2010

\(^2\) Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
version, possibly illustrating member states’ intentions to now match their ambitions with their actual capabilities.

From the above considerations a number of questions arise, most obviously, why would member states choose to make unfulfillable commitments, resulting in disappointment and a deteriorating image to both the European public and actors abroad. Taking the example of Afghanistan again, the USA has already criticized the EU on a number of occasions for not following up on words with action.  

There have been studies on the EU’s performance in the CCM area, most recently one by think tank the European Council on Foreign Relations. Although this study succeeds in identifying the problems at hand, it misses the mark when comes to explaining them and providing solutions. The problems are multi-level and current studies of the EU’s civilian capacities have not gone beneath the surface to look for their underlying dynamics. This thesis is intended to fill that specific gap. Specifically the following research question will be addressed:

*How can we explain the discrepancy between policy-making and outcome in the EU’s Civilian Crisis Management?*

In order to answer the research question we will first provide background information on the history, institutions and actors of CCM policy-making. Then we will investigate three cases: the Civilian Headline Goals, the Civilian Response Teams and force generation (recruitment of civilian personnel). The analysis will be conducted using a theoretical framework -institutionalism- and will be based on in-depth interviews with Brussels-based officials who are highly involved in CCM policy-making and official Council documents. An overview of existing research has been included in chapter 3 which evaluates the literature and establishes the need for this study: so far civilian CSDP has received disproportional little attention compared to the military CSDP while it constitutes the majority of the EU’s missions abroad; there has been no attempt to pursue a theory-driven account of policy-making in this area; and the focus in the literature has been on evaluating missions instead of concepts. Here we argue that the missions are ultimately the instruments of a policy and not the policy itself, which is why a more concepts-based approach is needed. The methodology section will discuss how the cases and theoretical framework were selected and will elaborate on the interview and text analysis methods. The theoretical framework will, drawing on existing literature, set the stage for further analysis by formulating hypotheses.

A note on terminology, since the ratification of the Lisbon treaty the security and defence policies of the EU are referred to as the CSDP. Throughout this study this is the term that will be used unless an original source is being cited, in which case the text will be held in its original form, or when the history of the policies are being discussed.

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3 See for example ‘US disappointed with police training’
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,522904,00.html, seen on 05-04-2010.
Finally some limitations, this study will focus on the aspects of CCM relating to the intergovernmental CFSP and it will explicitly not deal with crisis management as it is practiced by the Community in the shape of the European Commission. Their policies deal with separate areas such as election supervision, food aid and disaster response, but also practices in areas that overlap with civilian CSDP such as reforming the Rule-of-Law sector and customs- and border management. Other actors who are also working on similar projects as CCM include former 3rd pillar entities such as EUROPOL, who amongst other things help fight organized crime in the Balkans. However, a lot has already been written about inter-pillar coherence and the need for the different actors to closely coordinate their work, including civil-civil coordination, civil-military coordination and inter-pillar cooperation; hence it will not be addressed here. Furthermore, we are analyzing the internal mechanisms, i.e. the institutions and the member states, cooperation with third actors such as the UN, NGOs or other international partners lies outside the scope of this work.

1.1 Methodology

1.1.1 Selection of theoretical framework

In order to frame the analysis, this work will make use of two theoretical perspectives, rational institutionalism and constructivist institutionalism. For a detailed description of the two, see chapter 1.2. ‘While intergovernmentalism may capture the formal institutional reality, it ignores the written and unwritten rules and norms that constitute a common framework for appropriate behaviour (…) states might formally be in control of decision-making, but processes of socialisation and institutional dynamics are responsible for a number of significant outcomes.’\(^4\) Institutions matter, but exactly how they do is subject to diverging views. That is one reason why we use two different institutionalist points of view. Another reason lies in the claim that ‘it is crucial that theorists take into account alternative theoretical explanations to the puzzles they are addressing, and this applies primarily to rational choice theorists, who would be forced to relax their universality claims.’\(^5\) It is not the purpose of the thesis to favour one approach over the other, nor to conclude that one is superior. On the contrary, both will


contribute to capturing the complexities of EU foreign policy-making. As always, there are several accounts to be told and the use of two perspectives provides ample opportunity to shed light on most aspects of the subject matter.

The use of either of these perspectives has methodological implications, as Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) have identified. Rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors understand the possibilities and limitations that the diverse decision making rules have created. More particularly, rational choice institutionalism suggests that actors adapt their behaviour to these institutions and use them strategically. Their methods have mainly been deductive, formal and universalist.6

Seen from a constructivist institutionalist perspective, institutions are ‘internal, subconscious and pre-rational’, meaning that actors are often unaware of the institutions’ effects and are less able to ‘use’ institutions, they are either ‘empowered’ or ‘restrained’ by them. Their methods have been empirical and case-study oriented. As a consequence, there exists a rich collection of descriptive analyses, but with little theoretical generalization. The very detail of these analyses may obscure the relative importance of causal variables.7 ‘The EU is a unique institution, but this uniqueness should not be an excuse for a lack of theoretical sophistication and methodological rigor. On the contrary, most institutionalist research questions on the EU refer to a selection of similar events and thus invite comparativist analysis either across policy areas, across MS or across time.’ 8

This study will thus make an attempt, by using the two theoretical viewpoints, to strike a balance between descriptive analyses of the three cases - force generation, CRTs and CHGs- and at the same time compare the three to search for possible generalizations. To do so, we make use of hypotheses which constitute a solid grounding for analysis, avoiding the trap of being overly descriptive and, while emphasizing the uniqueness of the cases, still attempting to see how they fit into the broader theoretical framework.

1.1.2 Selection of cases

When writing about Civilian Crisis Management in the EU and the differences between policy-making and outcome one might expect an analysis on how successful one or more of the 18 ongoing/completed missions have been.9 However, the missions are ultimately the instruments of a policy, not the policy

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7 Ibidem.


9 In May 2010 the exact numbers were 12 ongoing and 6 completed civilian missions. See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=EN.
itself. Behind the missions lie the ideas on what EU foreign policy should look like and which values it chooses to convey. That is why this research will be looking more into the concepts that were developed to guide CCM, such as the CRT and the CHGs, and a broader issue that is not mission-specific: the recruitment of civilian personnel.

The Civilian Headline Goals are evidently suitable to use as a case, as they contain targets that member states set for themselves in the area of civilian crisis management. Second, the Civilian Response Teams are an interesting subject because ever since they have been developed, they have never been used in the way they were meant to be used. Since there is such a clear difference here between the concept and the outcome it is a case worth looking into. Another case where we can see a difference between commitment and results obtained is force generation. The success of any mission is dependent on sufficient and qualified staff to man it, but sometimes member states have struggled to gather the personnel necessary. A final reason for the selection of all three cases lies in the availability of information, most documents that govern CCM are confidential and thus impossible to use for research purposes. Except for some documents, including both CHGs, the first CRT concept and the number of staff in the missions. However, a problem of methodological nature still arises. Although the final documents might be visible, the processes that lead to their creation and the alterations from the first to the final draft cannot be seen. An analysis of primary documents thus is not enough, which is why interviews have been conducted in order to provide more information.

1.1.3 Interview method

For this research three in-depth interviews have been carried out with persons who are highly involved in CCM policy-making. Deliberately, they stem from different backgrounds. One is working within the newly created Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, as part of the General Secretariat of the Council, where policies are drafted and adjusted on member states’ orders; one works with the CPCC, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability which deals with the planning and conduct of civilian missions, including the force generation process; one works for the Permanent Representation of a member state and represents their national interests in a CCM-related committee. Their varying institutional background provides different insights and information that was otherwise impossible to obtain. The interviews were conducted anonymously and in a semi-structured manner because of the expectation that the interviewees’ viewpoints are ‘more likely to be expressed in an openly designed interview situation than in a standardized interview or questionnaire’\(^\text{10}\).

An interview guide served to provide structure and ensure that the interview stays on topic, as well as demonstrating the existing knowledge on the subject by the researcher. In this type of interview, which we can classify as an expert or elite interview -the interviewees are of less interest as a person than their capacities of being an expert for a certain field of activity- it is important for the interview to be successful that the researcher shows that they are familiar with the topic.\textsuperscript{11} Associated with the expert interview are a number of methodological traps which one has to take into account. For example, experts might try to involve the interviewer in ongoing conflicts in the field and talks about internal matters instead of the about the topic of the interview. This did occur during some of the interviews, but it did not dominate the discussion, mainly because there was sufficient time available which permitted some off topic content. Another ‘trap’ is that the expert gives a lecture on his/her knowledge instead of joining the question and answer game of the interviewer. However, Flick sees this as being either positive or negative, as long as the lecture is actually on topic it can be useful for the research in the end.\textsuperscript{12} In the conducted interviews there was clearly a tendency to ‘lecture’; a certain question might have gotten a 15 minute long answer involving many aspects that were not directly pertaining to the nature of the question in the first place. In this case this extra information was, however, very helpful.

The questions asked ranged from open questions to questions explicitly driven by the theory and the hypotheses. All were somehow linked to the research question, hypotheses, or the three cases.\textsuperscript{13} During the interview they were asked in no particular order, and some were not asked at all because it did not fit in the ‘natural’ course of the discussion. In retrospect, some questions may have been too disconnected from the everyday life world. On the other hand, the subjects were themselves able to translate some of the theoretical concepts to their reality (nonetheless this should have been a task for the interviewer). Also, the questions may have been guiding the answers too much, but taking into account that it was explicitly stated that subjects were free to intervene and add their own views wherever possible this reduced some of the negative effects. Finally, while the interviews may not have followed the interview guide strictly, the obtained information was certainly helpful and a different outcome than the one expected is naturally part of the dynamic research process.

1.1.4 Argumentative text analysis

Next to the use of secondary literature the research will also make use of primary literature i.e. the documents agreed on and published by the member

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{12} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{13} For an interview guide, see Appendix I.
\end{flushleft}
states. The documents consist of both Civilian Headline Goals, the first version of the CRT concept\textsuperscript{14} and the Council conclusions on ESDP from November 2009. Argumentative text analysis can be used to describe and evaluate the argumentative element in single texts or in debates. It is concentrated in that part of the argument that appeals to logos, the intellect.\textsuperscript{15} The content of the documents and the arguments that they implicitly or explicitly contain will be scrutinized.

When we take the research question into account, -how can we explain the discrepancy between policy-making and outcome-, we must first look at how expectations are formulated by the member states. What are the goals that they set to achieve? What does the type of language used tell us about the commitments made? In the case of the Council conclusions we can look at how member states grade their own performance in retrospect. Second, we can look at how the different policy choices are motivated: why do member states take this decision and not another, what justifying grounds for action are invoked and what is the intrinsic motivation for action. Third, we can look at how they concretely identify ways to realize their ambitions, for example, are evaluating or implementing mechanisms put in place? The systematical analysis of the content of the texts into expectations, motivation and concretization is a step in the direction towards addressing the research question; it is however the combination of this step with the review of secondary literature and the in-depth interviews with persons highly involved in CCM policy-making that provides a solid methodological basis for this study.

1.2 Theoretical framework

With regards to the research question in this paper, ‘How can we explain the discrepancy between policy-making and outcome in the EU’s Civilian Crisis Management?’ the introduction has already suggested that the answers are not straightforward, contrary to what some previous studies have implied, and that it is valuable to look at the underlying dynamics which govern EU foreign policy making. We start with identifying the intervening variables between policy-making and outcome, we then try to allocate these factors within the framework of New Institutionalist theory, within which we recognize and delineate both rationalist and constructivist viewpoints and finally, derive hypotheses regarding our case-studies from there onwards. These hypotheses will form the basis for further analysis.

The intervening variables between policy-making and outcome are many and complex. The policy-making process in CCM is mostly, but not exclusively influenced by:

\textsuperscript{14} The concept was revised in 2009 but this version is unavailable to the public. Information about the changes and implications of this new version has been gathered through the interviews.

National interests - Member states representatives in the PSC, CIVCOM and other relevant bodies receive instructions from their respective capital on what position to take in negotiations and what constitutes their preferences.

Institutions - In the formal sense, institutions in the CCM context mean, amongst others, the legal rules and procedures, the working groups, the GSC, the Presidency and the CPCC. In the informal sense institutions also represent norms, values and uncodified rules.

Power - Member states with the most human and/or financial resources might have more influence on the policy-making process.

External pressure - Events or acts of other international organizations or states might trigger the policy-making process or steer it into another direction.

Cognitive processes - socialization at the Brussels level, ideas and discourse (the framework within which the various policy options are being discussed).

Furthermore, the implementation of policy is affected by:

- Communication from Brussels to the national, member state level and from Brussels to the theatre level - the area where CCM takes place.
- Control mechanisms and mechanisms of accountability and legitimacy.
- Feedback mechanisms, including evaluation and lessons learned.

Due to time and space constraints it is not possible to take each factor into consideration in this analysis, however, by discussing CCM in the context of New Institutionalism we are nonetheless able to cover many of the above aspects and ‘make sense’ of them by placing them in a single framework. Institutionalism, a relatively novel approach, starts from the basic premise that ‘Institutions matter’. ‘Rather than being simple and passive vessels within which politics occurs, institutions provide contexts where actors can conduct a relatively higher proportion of positive sum bargains. Institutions offer an information-rich venue where transparency prevails and trust is high. They act as an intervening variable between actor preferences and output’.

The various definitions of institutions lie somewhere between the rationalist ‘long lived equilibrium patterns of rational behaviour’ and the sociological view that ‘institutions constitute human identity and behaviour’, almost using it as a synonym for culture. Aspinwall and Schneider (2000) define institutions as ‘encompassing both formal and informal structures that influence human behaviour. In the EU, voting or legislative procedures are in the former category. The Council’s drive towards consensus solutions even in the event that QMV is possible is an example of an informal rule. Cultural practices and

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cognitive patterns also fall into this category’.

Institutions can be either constraining or empowering.

Within institutionalism there are various strands of thought that can be identified. A rational perspective focuses on short-term decision making, where actors are cost-benefit calculators and institutions act as limiting or framing their available options. Actors act in a strategic fashion and make use of bargaining techniques, threats and promises. Institutions are external to the actors themselves. ‘Humans are utility maximizers who are able to rank their priorities in accordance with fixed, exogenous preference scales’.

The rational approach can furthermore be characterised by methodological individualism and is influenced by non-cooperative game-theory. There exists a tension between individual and social interests. States create and maintain institutions to lower transaction costs and their cooperation is instrumental. Institutions are ‘formal legalistic entities and sets of decision rules that impose obligations upon self-interested political actors’.

Finally, rationalists employ a very narrow definition of institutions.

A more sociological account of institutionalism holds that human is rooted in particular contexts; their menu of options and preferences is limited by the repeated historical practice of interaction and by the social setting in which they find themselves. In short, institutions structure the game. Actors are conditioned by the accumulation of procedures, rules and norms over time. From this perspective, culture is one of the most important driving forces behind the institutionalization of human behaviour. Institutions are independent variables - there is no conception of institutional choice. Institutions are, contrary to the rational view, internal to the actors; however, it is possible to distinguish between institutional structures that are more explicit, intentional and recognized on the one hand and cultural features that are implicit, internalized and potentially unrecognized on the other.

They define institutions as ‘normative and cultural mechanisms by which both state behaviour and state identity are constrained or constructed and additionally how identity itself influences state interests and practices, as well as international normative structures.’ From the sociological institutionalist perspective integration depends crucially on cultural and cognitive variation, and consequently the impact of values, beliefs, and identities on actors’ responses to integrative challenges. Institutions increasingly become independent causes of outcomes.

The historical account has much in common with the sociological version, both hold that member state preferences are conditioned and shaped by what they

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20 Ibidem p.10.
23 Ibidem p.8.
24 Ibidem p.10.
26 Ibidem p.21.
have already agreed to do in Europe. ‘The ubiquity of unintended consequences, the autonomy of supranational institutions -although less so in European foreign policy-, and the instability of policy preferences in MS are further factors that have contributed to the unintended loss of control’ over policy outcomes.27

‘The EU, with its rich mixture of formal and informal institutions is often seen as an ideal testing ground for the various forms of institutional analyses.28 It is also a special case, as a highly institutionalized and norm-dense environment where negotiation takes place over extended periods and is repeated in time the dynamics are arguably different than in a ‘normal’ international organization. In addition, the area of foreign policy cooperation is even more unique: there exists a high degree of secrecy, mutual trust in handling confidential and secret information and negotiations on topics which are most close to member states’ sovereignty. The ECJ has no jurisdiction and there is no clear system of checks and balances. The high degree of secrecy and the lack of accountability mechanisms in EU foreign policy-making have an impact on policy-outcome. Importantly, all of the above institutionalist approaches recognise that institutions include both rules and norms. For this study, the overall definition of institution will be the one by Armstrong and Bulmer (1998): by institutions we mean ‘the formal institutions, informal institutions and conventions; the norms and symbols embedded in them; and policy instruments and procedures’.29 A clear advantage of an institutionalist approach is that one can start with the intergovernmentalist assumption about member states’ primacy, but then take account of the way in which institutions structure individual and collective policy choices.30

When reviewing the institutionalist literature, some of the similarities between the sociological/historical accounts of institutionalism with constructivism are striking. According to constructivism, reality is socially constructed rather than objectively given, which directs the researcher towards the subjective aspects of social life: how actors construe the world in which they operate and what the implications of those ‘constructions’ might be in terms of choices and constraints on action. The institutionalist take on this is that institutions perform ‘a symbolic guidance function’.31 Sociological institutionalist approaches are evident in various constructivist contributions. Perhaps the most distinctive sociological contribution stems ‘from the interest displayed by some writers in frameworks of ideas or discourses (= cognitive institutions that shape the boundaries of the possible for actors in the European context). For some, discourses should be seen as institutions. The ideational dimension of sociological institutionalism is linked to a general move away from rational choice theories of

31 Ibidem p.119-120.
32 Ibidem.
action. The central question is how ideas and discourses become embedded. A useful term here is Habermas’ communicative action. This ‘aims at producing consensus with the presumption that both speaker and listener enter the communication with a readiness to submit to the better argument.’ There is a strong focus on argumentation and deliberation and, contrary to strategic action; the goal is not to attain one’s fixed preferences but to seek a reasoned agreement.

A term inherent in the more normative aspects of new institutionalism is March and Olsen’s Logic of Appropriateness (LoA), which is ‘a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation’. They see institutions as ‘normative vessels’, i.e. carriers of beliefs, knowledge, understandings, values and established ways of doing things.

A critique on the New Institutionalism(s) has been the over-emphasis on structure as the determining factor, taking away agency from the actors themselves and thus exhibiting a ‘structuralist bias’. In fact, institutionalists do not each agree on the structure/agency relationship, for example, the constructivist strand holds that agency and structure are mutually constitutive while rationalists reside more on the agency side alone.

So far we have identified two main strands of institutionalism, a rational and a constructivist approach (the latter one encompassing the sociological as well as historical accounts). Both hold that institutions matter and that these include rules and norms. Carlsnaes et. al. (2004) see the two as being ontologically opposed: ‘rationalists are concerned to ask why particular decisions are made and actions taken; in short to explain choices and behaviour. Constructivists, on the other hand, are concerned to ask how such decisions are possible - what are the bases upon which such choices are made?’ One account is thus not necessarily better than the other; the approaches are not incompatible, but complementary. The authors’ main argument focuses on an incorporation of the EU’s ‘identity’ as a factor influencing decision-making. Then, ‘it can be left to empirical analyses to decide whether this causal impact can be explained within a sophisticated rationalist analysis or whether it can only be captured with the tools of

constructivism. Arguments that relate particular policy options and initiatives in European foreign policy to the EU’s collective identity thus enjoy greater legitimacy than arguments referring merely to the expected utility for particular member states, as a simple rationalist account would hold (i.e. in its non-institutionalist appearance).

If we apply the above considerations to our study we can derive the following hypotheses about the possible answers to the research question using the institutionalist framework:

The policy-outcome gap exists...

**Rationalist-institutionalist** - because member states make a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis of which the outcome is that the gain from a norm breach, or from not delivering upon commitments, is higher than the cost of reputation loss.

**Rationalist-institutionalist** - because of the rate of divergence between member states’ policy goals and the high premium placed on foreign policy autonomy.

**Constructivist-institutionalist** - because of a lack of opportunities for discursive policy deliberation (no communicative action) and a lack of public sphere.

**Constructivist-institutionalist** - because member states act from a Logic of Appropriateness where adhering to norms has primacy.

**Constructivist-institutionalist** - because the decision to promote certain norms as the EU has made member states involved in a process in which their original preferences are being reshaped and mutual commitments are difficult to roll back.39

These hypotheses will be tested in the empirical analysis that follows.

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2 The emergence of civilian power
Europe: background and current state-of-play

Civilian Crisis Management is part of the EU’s efforts to promote peace, human rights and democracy in third countries - using instruments such as police training, support for the Rule-of-Law sector and assistance with the functioning of civil administration. Missions deployed abroad are usually within the setting of a pre- or post-conflict situation in which countries or regions are trying to build themselves up again, for example in the Western Balkans, Georgia and Afghanistan. A clear definition of CCM does not exist, although it was described in one of the first official reports on the topic as “the intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution.” Part of the concept’s ambiguity is due to the ‘institutional split’: both the Council and the Commission engage in CCM activities and it is unclear where their respective competencies begin or end and where they overlap. In this chapter we will focus on the intergovernmental side of CCM, discussing its main institutions and actors, developments in the field to-date, decision-making procedures, changes after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and financing of CCM operations.

Member states are the key actors in CFSP/CSDP, they are at the head of the decision-making hierarchy in the shape of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and are represented in the various committees and working groups that are active in the policy-area. The Commission has a supporting role, it is involved by being represented in the different committees to ensure inter-institutional coherence and it administers the CFSP budget. The European Parliament is, although it has some indirect control through its budgetary powers, not very much involved and they have in the past voiced complaints about a lack of transparency, information and consultation. The institutional architecture is complicated because developments have been incremental and haphazard, institutions have been set up ‘after the facts’ and the division of tasks has not always been clear. Possibly, the changes made by the Lisbon Treaty will improve the situation, but the process of implementing these changes is still going on and it is hard to say what the effects will be. The organigram below reflects the current situation:

41 Ibidem.
An important actor is the General Secretariat of the Council, it is of course subordinate to the FAC, but Emerson & Gross see it as a de-facto actor due to its increasing executive role in CCM. In the last years they have gone from classic ‘secretarial’ tasks to actively providing policy input. Recently the former departments in the Directorate General of External affairs on military and civilian crisis management have merged into the CMPD -the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate-. The bringing together of these two strands should promote civil-military synergy but it remains to be seen how this will play out in the future. Another important actor in CCM is the CPCC -the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability-. While the CMPD is more concerned with developing (horizontal) concepts, the CPCC is occupied with the operational planning and implementation of missions. They coordinate the deployment of personnel, for example, and contribute to the drafting of operational documents such as the OPLAN and CONOPS.

On the side of the member states, the Political and Security Committee is often referred to as the ‘lynchpin’ of EU foreign policy. It consists of national representatives on an ambassadorial level and meets twice a week. ‘In times of crisis, the PSC is charged with examining the situation, assessing the various policy options and making a proposal to the Council defining the political interests and objectives of the Union and indicating a recommended course of action.’ Its main strength lies in the fact that it is a ‘transmission belt’ between

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Brussels and the national capitals. The PSC receives input from various committees and working groups, in the area of CCM the most important one is the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). This committee is responsible for the strategic planning and evaluating of civilian missions as well as working on the more horizontal concepts such as the CHG or, for example, gender equality in CSDP missions. It is an advisory body and provides expertise on CCM mainly to the PSC and also consists of (senior) diplomats from the permanent representations of the member states.

The Lisbon Treaty introduces the new post of HR/VP, establishing a personal link between the structures in the Council and the Commission. The HR/VP amongst other things chairs the FAC, is the Commissioner for External Relations and head of the newly established EEAS. Overall, the changes in the Treaty reflect the need for more effective policy-making, but the member states’ prerogatives in the field of CFSP/CSDP are maintained. The organizational structure for the EEAS remains to be determined; at this moment a proposal has been approved by the member states, but still has to face the scrutiny of the EP. The old-style rotating presidency of the European Council by the member states has not been completely abandoned, even though the Council now has a permanent president and the new-style member state presidency has to further define its new role.

While the ‘birth’ of CSDP is usually traced back to the St. Malo declaration in 1998 where French and British governments stated that the EU ‘must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises’, the civilian dimension of CM was highlighted the first time in 2000 at the Feira European Council. ‘The new emphasis on civilian crisis management was further supported under the Swedish presidency of 2001, with the European Council meeting in Göteborg emphasising the rule of law in its conclusions. A ministerial conference in November 2001 established commitments to maintain a capacity of 5,000 police officers and other civilian personnel, of which 1,400 were to be available at short notice. In addition, four priority areas for civilian action were identified: policing, the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.’ Since then developments rapidly followed each other, the first civilian mission was deployed in Bosnia (EUPM) and, using lessons learned from this experience, several other missions followed suit. Today there have been a total of 18 (partially) civilian missions of which 12 are still ongoing. See chart below:

While the St. Malo declaration highlighted military cooperation, we can clearly see that missions of civilian nature have dominated the EU’s missions abroad.

Where and when a new civilian mission is undertaken is usually decided by the PSC and then endorsed by COREPER and the FAC in the shape of a Joint Action. ‘In practice, proposals for CSDP actions are introduced by a Member State directly, on instruction of their respective Foreign Ministry, particularly when the proposal is the result of a request for assistance from a third state or another international organisation (e.g. the UN). Although the Council has internal mechanisms and structures for ‘early warning’ that are linked to CFSP regional working groups, no CSDP action has yet resulted from a proposal generated by these working groups.’

In practice, political will and member state

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capabilities seem to be the main driving force of new missions. Gourlay argues that this is the main reason why CSDP missions still have limited mandates that are achievable in the short term.\textsuperscript{48} To add to that, the larger missions such as EUPOL Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo are those that indeed seem to have broad support from most member states. Decision-making is unanimous and member states do have the final say, but ‘these decisions are achieved following a complex process of decision-making that normally entails extensive, institutions-based intergovernmental interaction. When looking at CFSP/ESDP institutions and their development, therefore, the accent is put on how political decisions are \textit{shaped} in the interplay between the European and national levels of governance.’\textsuperscript{49}

According to art. 41 TEU administrative expenditure related to the provisions on CFSP shall be charged to the Union budget as well as operating expenditure, with the exception that when this has ‘military or defence implications’ or when the Council unanimously decides otherwise it shall fall outside the Union budget (art.42 TEU). Amongst other things, salaries for personnel for civilian missions are thus borne by the member states. Although the CFSP budget has increased over the years as the scope of the policy widened, it still is a fairly small amount. Also, civilian missions take up a significant part of the budget, see table below:

Figure 3: CFSP budget and the proportion which is spent on civilian operations\textsuperscript{50}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>46,3</td>
<td>62,6</td>
<td>62,6</td>
<td>102,6</td>
<td>159,2</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian CSDP*</td>
<td>44,2</td>
<td>58,6</td>
<td>79,7</td>
<td>135,6</td>
<td>250,5</td>
<td>210**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table based on data from the GSC. Figures are in millions of Euro.

* Expenditure directly pertaining to civilian CSDP within the CFSP budget
** Estimate

Gourlay accounts the small budget to the influence of the EP, which will limit any significant expansion as long as they do not have more power in the decision-making process. This means that member states will have to keep carrying most of the costs, limiting the number and scope of the different missions.\textsuperscript{51}

To conclude, in a relatively short amount of time the EU has been able to deploy a significant amount of civilian missions while developing the institutions and decision-making process that come with it along the way. In writing, the

\textsuperscript{50} Ibidem p.93.
commitments made by member states are impressive, but it is up to the analysis that follows to investigate those further.
3 Research overview

Twelve years after the St. Malo declaration there is a considerable amount of literature on the foreign and defence policy of the EU and its crisis management capabilities. We can divide the literature into three broad categories. First, there is the general literature on European foreign and defence policy that provides a historical overview and comprehensive account of recent developments. Second, there is specific literature on the EU and crisis management and here we will highlight the works of Duke, Blockmans and Gross who have written the main contributions to this field. Third, there is the literature on the civilian aspects of crisis management, which will also be discussed below.

Duke’s account of crisis management consists of three elements, the evolution of CM mechanisms, a ‘tour d’horizon’ and progress made until now and what remains to be done. As well as so many others, he identifies that the main challenge is the matching of member states’ resolve with resources. Three main issues he names are thus the cost/affordability gap, the future of US-EU relations and the prospect of EU enlargement. Taking into account that the book was written in 2005, the information is now slightly outdated. At that time the crisis surrounding the Iraq war of 2003 was still fresh in everyone’s minds and there was a serious rift between the trans-Atlantic partners. Ten new Eastern European countries had only just about joined the EU and the new dynamics were unsure. Finally, the civilian dimension of CM had not been developed to a great extent, the first mission was only deployed in Bosnia in 2003 and the majority of other civilian missions deployed during or after 2005. It is therefore also not surprising that Duke’s main focus lies on the military side of crisis management, the EU had just deployed the ‘revolutionary’ missions in Congo (Artemis) and Macedonia (Concordia, later followed on by police-mission Proxima) and cooperation in such a new and controversial area attracted researchers’ interests.

Blockmans analyses the policy and legal aspects of crisis management, the legal grounds upon which it is build, the activity of the EU in diverse geographical areas, cooperation with other international actors, coherence and consistency. Like Duke, his focus lies mainly on the military side, but Schuyer...
provides an interesting account on the development of civilian capabilities. In his introduction Blockmans highlights the fact that CSDP missions have been scrutinized to some extent, but that there is a need for evaluating the crisis management concepts, which is what this thesis is now focussing on.

Gross’ book asks to what extent member states’ positions have been Europeanized in favour of a greater EU role. She investigates the positions of the three largest / presumably most influential member states (France, Germany, UK) and thereby takes a distinct intergovernmental approach, which she justifies by stating that ‘because of the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in the EU CFSP and ESDP, the policies and attitudes of national governments towards CFSP are relevant, as they are crucial not only for the institutional evolution of CFSP and ESDP but also for its application: if CFSP is sidelined by national policy priorities, it cannot be expected to be an effective policy instrument.’ (my emphasis). While it is viable as a starting point for analysis, later on she indicates as well that ‘the further institutionalization of European foreign policy as a result of the Lisbon Treaty is likely to lead to greater socialization and adaptation pressures.’ Although she concludes that the Europeanization approach proves itself useful in the pre-theoretical stage, providing some degree of explanation, she calls for others to explore a real theory-driven, parsimonious account for policy decisions taken in the foreign / defence areas. This challenge is taken up by this paper.

The third category of literature is the specific enquiries into civilian crisis management as a policy (i.e. not the literature on the EU as a civilian power per se). While purely academic approaches are existent, they form a minority. Most contributions here come from the corner of think tanks such as the Centre for European Policy Studies, the European Council on Foreign Relations and the CFSP’s ‘own’ research department, the EU-ISS. In the Chaillot paper on CCM from the latter institution, the authors state that ‘recent developments are evidence that a lot has been done to improve intra-pillar coherence at least at the conceptual and methodological level. However, the question that remains unanswered for the

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56 Ibidem p.173.
moment is to what extent the new flexible and integrated approach has been implemented on the ground or whether there is a gap between EU rhetoric and reality (emphasis mine). The realisation of the ambitious EU agenda set in the European Security Strategy now depends on the Member States providing appropriate means and resources.\textsuperscript{59} The question in italics, whether it is called rhetoric/reality or policy-making/outcome, is addressed here.

The report from the European Council on Foreign Relations deserves specific attention; it was released in October 2009 and caused a buzz in Brussels’ corridors because of its very critical nature. Korski and Gowan’s analysis, based on ‘extensive research in all 27 EU member states, interviews with more than 50 EU officials and reviews of completed and ongoing ESDP missions’ identifies three main problems in the area of civilian crisis management. First, they see a misfit between the concepts for missions and reality: the first missions in the Balkan were set-up according to the ‘Bosnia template’- “capacity building” through long-term police and security reform, usually in the form of small teams of European experts training and mentoring senior local law enforcement officials-. While the model functioned well in this context, subsequent missions had to deal with a different array of issues and were hence in need for a different approach. The use of the same template for different situations is what is called ‘naïve transference’. Second, they mention the ‘absence of civilian capacity in almost all member states’, which refers to the difficulties that exist with regards to the recruitment of civilian mission personnel. Some of these personnel issues are inherent to the fact that civilian staff is harder to recruit for foreign missions than their military equivalents for a variety of reasons that are the same in all member states: policemen and lawyers are needed at home, the career perspectives for mission members are bad (there is no EU career path and when they return to their old job they often miss promotion opportunities due to their absence) and civilian personnel most of the time have regular day-jobs and families at home. The differences in performance between member states can thus be explained by ‘varying methods for recruitment, planning, training and deployment of personnel’. Finally, Korski and Gowan argue that it is the institutional ‘wrangles’ in Brussels that impede effective policy-making and implementation. They mention Commission/ Council turf wars and the EU’s attempts to keep ‘security’ strictly separated from ‘development’, an unnatural divide. Also, a culture of ‘micromanagement’ from Brussels hampers effective decision-making on the ground: ‘European policymaking consists of sending an endless flow of PDFs to and from Brussels\textsuperscript{60}, and ‘Member state representatives can spend hours discussing interpreters and armoured vehicles, but will shy away from dealing with real issues and the confrontational debates they would inevitably entail’\textsuperscript{61}.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibidem.
While their study correctly highlights the main problems of the EU’s crisis management it neglects to see these issues through a political lens. And it is because of this that the second part of their analysis, the recommendations for the future, is not very helpful. In order to provide viable solutions for certain issues one must first understand why it is a problem in the first place. Korski and Gowan do not touch upon the nature of foreign policy making in the EU, the degree of intergovernmentalism and the effect it has on nation states’ sovereignty. Their analysis is written as if the EU was already a state, and indeed, if that were the case its performance record in CCM would be bad. However, for 27 states to work together and devise a common policy that is has for example been able to suspend a frozen conflict (Aceh) and prevented a crisis situation from deteriorating (Georgia) is an achievement as such. Naturally, this should not prevent critical analysis, but such an investigation should be more nuanced and take political reality into account.

Among the policy recommendations that they propose are speedy decision-making, better security for civilian missions and self sufficiency, and more independence from policy-makers in Brussels. Such changes would imply that member states lose control over foreign policy making and thus put an end to ‘micromanagement’, as they call it. Whether this is desirable or not is a different debate, but -even when taking the changes made under the Lisbon Treaty into account- this does not seem likely to happen in the near future. To conclude, Korski and Gowan’s analysis is valuable and the first of its kind to seriously investigate CCM, but it is lacking political insight and theoretical ground which leads them to somewhat flawed results.

To conclude, the literature on foreign and defence policy of the EU is extensive, but noticeably less attention has been paid to the civilian dimension of crisis management. Where this has been analysed the focus has been on the decision-making procedures; cooperation with other international actors; the Community dimension of crisis management -which we do not address here-, evaluating the civilian missions; and the EU as civilian/normative power. These studies have identified the following problems with CCM: 1) The Gap (known as the expectations-capability gap, rhetoric-resources gap, discourse and practice gap, vision vs. decision gap, rhetoric-reality gap and as we call it here: policy-making vs. outcome gap); 2) insufficient inter-pillar coherence and consistency between the various EU tools; and 3) inadequate capabilities in terms of financial and staffing resources. They have also identified areas for further investigation: the need to look into the civilian dimension of crisis management; to evaluate concepts instead of missions; the need to pursue a theory-driven

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65 Ibidem.
account of policy decisions in the area of CFSP/CSDP; and to re-assess ‘The Gap’. This is exactly where the added value of this study is located.
4 Civilian Headline Goals

This chapter will analyze the texts of both Civilian Headline Goals and discuss the output from the interviews on this topic, as well as attempting to connect this analysis to the more theoretical hypotheses that were formulated earlier. The Civilian Headline Goal was a process first initiated in 2004, partially motivated by the European Security Strategy. In the beginning of the first CHG document it is stated that the EU is willing ‘to share in the responsibility for global security’ and that ‘a more active and capable European Union would contribute to a fairer, safer and more united world. It is therefore important to enhance the capacity of the EU in the field of Civilian Crisis Management, as an essential component of the EU’s overall external policy.’\textsuperscript{67} Here we can see how the establishment of the CHG is \textit{motivated} by the member states. Another motivation can be found in ‘the EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs through preventive activities since timely intervention can avoid a situation from deteriorating.’\textsuperscript{68} and the document refers to an increased demand in the EU’s CCM capacities and the possible development of more missions in the future. Finally, ‘the EU must be able to provide an effective response across the full range of tasks in conflict prevention and Civilian Crisis Management’\textsuperscript{69}, this support needs to be continuous and the EU should be able to ‘respond more effectively to requests from international organizations, in particular the UN.’\textsuperscript{70} The document sets outs goals and targets for the member states to achieve in the area of CCM and they commit themselves to reach the objectives of the first CHG by 2008. The objectives that they set out to achieve include a strong focus on the coherence of civilian CSDP instruments with Community policies, which is of ‘key importance’ to improve the quality.\textsuperscript{71}

If we then look at the \textit{expectations} that the document gives rise to and we identify more objectives, we can plainly see that member states are committing themselves to take the steps necessary to reach the Goal by 2008. They commit to deploying integrated CCM packages; make full use of their CCM capacities; to gain the ability to conduct ‘concurrent civilian missions at different levels of engagement’; to put the sustainability and quality of personnel at the core of their efforts; to be able to launch a mission within five days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept; and to ensure maximum coherence and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{67} Council of the European Union, DOC 15863/04 - Civilian Headline Goal 2008, p.2.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{68} Ibidem p.3.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{69} Ibidem} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{70} Ibidem} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{71} Ibidem p.4.} \\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{71} Ibidem p.2.}
effectiveness.\textsuperscript{72} To supplement the CHG member states decided to draft a Capabilities Requirement List which established the categories and quantities of personnel needed for civilian missions and it was the first time that this was actually addressed within the European framework.

The third element within the 2008 document, which is how expectations are made concrete and what implementing measures are put in place, stands out quite clearly. Member states quite often use the phrase that they ‘will’ do something: they will improve their ability to deploy at short notice; they will ‘regularly review capabilities committed’; will apply a systematic approach in the development of the necessary civilian capabilities and ‘the Council will regularly review progress made in the development and implementation of the Civilian Headline Goal’. The document also identifies key steps towards completing the Headline Goals with corresponding deadlines. The document makes it quite clear how member states will go about implementation and devotes a significant part of the text just to identifying the key steps.\textsuperscript{73}

The Civilian Headline Goal 2010, which was agreed upon at the end of 2007 calls upon the same motivation as the first document, the support of the EU to international peace and security, the growing demand for an active EU role and the need to respond coherently to international crises -especially now that ESDP has ventured a field and the missions and tasks have been diversified-. Next to that it also sees scope for further and more focused action even though the CHG 2008 is classified as ‘important and groundbreaking work’.\textsuperscript{74}

However, the ambitions that they set out are very different to the CHG 2008 - the text as well as the type of language that is used. Whereas the CHG 2008 was all about ‘will’, the new document focuses more on what the EU ‘should’ be doing. For example, ‘the CHG 2010 should help to ensure that the EU can conduct crisis management’, ‘sufficient numbers of qualified personnel’ should be available -as opposed to numerical targets- and ‘member states should be invited to review regularly their potential availability to contribute to ESDP missions’.\textsuperscript{75} Overall we can see the focus shifting from personnel capabilities to other aspects, such as ‘lessons learned’, the mainstreaming of human rights and gender and synergies with the military, third pillar or Community instruments. The document does point to the capabilities listed in the CHG 2008 as still being relevant and serving as a first reference.\textsuperscript{76}

Then if one looks at the way in which the 2010 document is concretized we can see that this is done to a lot lesser degree. Tools facilitating the regular review of member states’ potential availability to contribute to missions ‘should be developed’, without specifying what kind of tools these would be for example.\textsuperscript{77} In the two-paragraph final implementation discussion the ‘living’

\textsuperscript{72} Council of the European Union, DOC 15863/04 - Civilian Headline Goal 2008 p.3-4.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibidem p.3-6.
\textsuperscript{74} Council of the European Union, DOC 14807/07 - Civilian Headline Goal 2010.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibidem p.4.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibidem p.3.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibidem p.4.
aspect of the CHG is emphasised, making way for flexible interpretation and adaptation along the way. Finally the CHG 2010 does provide a calendar for implementation of the process, even if the ambitions are arguably less high than before. Overall the amount of text dedicated to implementation is less in volume and in substance when compared to the CHG 2008.\textsuperscript{78}

The launch of the first CHG process was groundbreaking in the sense that the ‘largely virtual, generic policy areas and national commitments agreed in the previous years now needed to be converted into a more specific description of required capabilities and into more stringent criteria for member states to identify, recruit and make available civilian personnel, including at short notice and in integrated packages.’\textsuperscript{79} This had never been done before. Grevi also notes the difference between the 2008 and 2010 document and he attributes it to the growth of operational experience in the time between the two concepts, an observation that we can support, but that is not all there is to it. While the development of capabilities in the CHG 2008 was based mostly on ‘illustrative scenarios’, the new CHG relies on ‘real-life experience’.\textsuperscript{80} Between the two CHGs the number of missions has grown exponentially and this necessitated a more professional and efficient approach. Unfortunately progress in supplying personnel has been ‘permanently outpaced by increase in demand’.\textsuperscript{81} That trend has continued and there is still a disadvantage in place. One interviewee confirms that in the beginning the focus was on launching as many missions as possible to put the EU on the map as an actor in this field and that other concerns were only of secondary nature. Member states are only now slowly catching up.\textsuperscript{82}

The idea of ‘lessons learned’ and similar concepts such as ‘benchmarking’ and ‘evaluation’ fit uneasily within the realm of European foreign policy. ‘In the past, lessons have sometimes been identified but not necessarily learned, meaning transposed in policies and practice.’\textsuperscript{83} This is in fact one of the main obstacles to the CHG process, or to CCM capability development as such. When the CHG process was discussed in the expert interviews this element also came up. ‘There is indeed no independent inspectorate to look at the civilian activities, CPCC has an in-house evaluation capability but they are often the same people who make the policy. Of course it’s another club, but under the same management. (…) For member states to submit themselves to benchmarking, well, that is beneath their dignity.’\textsuperscript{84} When asked about the transition from the 2008 to the 2010 document an interviewee stated that the 2008 process had to be cancelled because the Portuguese Presidency wanted to set up the new CHG as a ‘trophy’ of their

\textsuperscript{78} Council of the European Union, DOC 14807/07 - Civilian Headline Goal 2010.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibidem p.108.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{82} Official from the Permanent Representation of a Member State, personal interview, 08-03-2010.
\textsuperscript{83} Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds.), ESDP: The first 10 years (1999-2009) EU-ISS (2009), p.112.
\textsuperscript{84} Official from the Permanent Representation of a Member State, personal interview, 08-03-2010.
Presidency. What was in it was not the most relevant to them. The Secretariat thus played a large part in determining the concept’s content, they decided to pull the process together with the Military Headline Goal so that you would have a common evaluation moment and they tried to focus on adding aspects that were not addressed in the CHG 2008. From the point of view of the expert based at the GSC the member states have not kept a firm hand in the implementation of the Headline Goal process. One of their main goals was to improve coherence, but member states did not stick to that idea very strictly. Other initiatives were developed in the same area as the CHG, but were not linked to the process, hence forcing it to the background. The setting up of a new actor which also became involved in capability development, the CPCC, lead to a ‘turf war’ in which the previous work done by the Secretariat was ‘totally ignored’. The representative from the member state agrees that the implementation process is not very well done. The first CHG was mainly quantitative and ‘because they (the member states) understood that it would become embarrassing for the EU, the switch was made to a qualitative approach. Yes, that is also important, but obviously more difficult to measure.’

The conclusions that we can draw from this analysis relating to the theoretical hypotheses about the nature of the policy-making - outcome gap will mostly be discussed in the overall conclusions of the thesis, taking the other cases into account. However, we can already argue in favour of the premise that member states make a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis of which the outcome is that the gain from a norm breach is higher than the cost of reputation loss. There is no independent actor who is evaluating member state performance on the Civilian Headline Goals, member states are their own referees and the fact that not all are equally dedicated to CCM does not promote strict implementation either. Not all member states are committed in the same way to making the CHG process a success; some just pay ‘lip-service’. This leads us in the direction of a rationalist-institutionalist explanation of member state behaviour.

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85 Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
86 Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
87 Official from the Permanent Representation of a Member State, personal interview, 08-03-2010.
88 Ibidem.
This chapter will give a short introduction to the CRT concept, analyze the text of the document and use data from expert interviews to complement the findings. The CRT concept is an excellent case to analyze the policy-making - outcome gap in CCM because of the apparent discrepancy between the two -since its inception in 2005 the concept has never been used in the way it was intended-

The CRTs were proposed by the Swedish in 2005 as a part of the CHG 2008 process, which outlined that priority should be given to the development of these rapidly deployable capabilities.89 The CRT constitutes a pool of 100 staff from the different member states with different areas of expertise in crisis management, who are able to be rapidly deployed in a crisis situation. Their main use would be for three specific situations: assessment and fact-finding missions in an (impending) crisis situation; rapid operational presence when the Council had adopted a Joint Action to deploy a civilian CSDP mission; reinforcement for existing mechanisms for EU crisis management under the auspices of an EU Special Representative when he/she needs urgent and distinct assistance.90 The CRT concept was based on a concept from the UN called UNDAC: the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination teams, which is a stand-by team of disaster management professionals. This served as a reference for the development of the CRTs and one of the persons who was drafting the document in the GSC actually came from the UN and had worked with the UNDACs there.91 The CRT team members are supposed to undergo joint training, should be able to deploy within five days, and should be sustainable for as much as three months. A joint training session under the lead of the European Group on Training actually did take place in 2006 under the auspices of the Commission. Twice an individual -not a team- has been deployed in the name of the CRTs, once in Georgia and once in Palestine, both in 2008.92

The text of the first CRT concept is publicly available and it is interesting to analyze it further to see what kind of commitments the member states make, how they formulate them and how they set up implementing measures. The development of the CRTs is explicitly motivated by the CHG 2008 process and the European Security Strategy and by the need for the EU to increase its rapid

91 Official from the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
reaction capacity, to contribute to the adequacy and effectiveness of an EU crisis management response as well as to its coherence with other actors. In the paragraphs on ‘Rationale’ one can find that ‘a timely deployment for crisis response can have a positive effect on trust and confidence among stakeholders in the affected country and thus facilitates the implementation of a civilian crisis management mission.’\textsuperscript{93} The goals that member states set to achieve or the objectives of the CRT capacity are carrying out assessment and fact-finding missions and to provide input to the development of a Crisis Management Concept before a possible Joint Action is adopted by the Council. Looking at implementation and concretization of the concept, to which a significant amount of the document is dedicated, we see that the pool of experts should be comprised of 100 persons who are accessed through national rosters containing CVs and further relevant professional details about the experts. These rosters are managed by the member states. ‘Member states take the decision to make CRT experts available for a CRT mission in accordance with predetermined procedures ensuring its timely deployment. A CRT is mobilised where other instruments will not be either timely, adequate or effective.’\textsuperscript{94}

Five years later the concept has not been used in the way it was meant to be used and this is confirmed by the interviewees as being a failure, dubbing it ‘a sad story’ and ‘if you do an implementation-analysis on those [the CRTs] the result is quite devastating.’\textsuperscript{95} The member of staff at the GSC states that the outcome of the CRT ‘totally does not justify the invested time, money and effort that have been needed to set this up’.\textsuperscript{96} This expert ascribes the failure to a mismatch between the drafters of the document and the implementing parties, the member states. ‘The CRTs have been set up without taking into account the political message that the use of the CRTs would send’\textsuperscript{97}. There is the constant fear of the EU that they are giving off a premature signal to third countries regarding the deployment readiness of the EU. ‘You hear the same argument in CIVCOM and PSC when they are discussing fact-finding missions, which is that fact-finding is seen as a signal that further efforts are being prepared.’ Thus, when member states send something or someone over they will be very careful not to label it fact-finding in order to manage expectations in the third country involved. Because fact-finding is one of the core tasks of the CRT this is a problem that seriously impedes its deployment. ‘In a sense this is hypersensitivity on behalf of the member states, because fact-finding merely means ‘to see what’s going on’ and then think about how you will react. But the fact is that they are so frightened that they will be dragged into something they do not want to get into that they are already seeing the fact-finding as a signal that should not be given (…) we [at the GSC] did not think about that.’ The nature of the CRT concept is too structured,

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\textsuperscript{93} Council of the European Union, DOC 10462/05 - Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in an Integrated Format - CIVILIAN RESPONSE TEAMS, p.4.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibidem p.6.
\textsuperscript{95} Official from the Permanent Representation of a Member State, personal interview, 08-03-2010.
\textsuperscript{96} Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibidem.
‘it is a pool of experts, it is this, it is that, while if you see it within the broader force generation context it is just a group of people within a much larger group of people who are ready to deploy within a specified period.’

These observations are supported by the text analysis. The CRT document explicitly links the deployment of a CRT to a possible Joint Action by the Council on a civilian CSDP operation. Even though, in paragraph 11 it says that ‘the decision to deploy a CRT does not prejudge action to be taken by the European Union in response to a crisis’, in paragraphs 12 and 13 the text states ‘A decision to deploy a CRT (…) before a possible Joint Action is adopted by the Council on a civilian ESDP operation…’ and ‘A decision to deploy a CRT after a Joint Action is adopted by the Council…’ (emphasis mine). Thus the CRTs are deliberately placed before a possible Joint Action or after one, and taking the signal that such a deployment would send into account, the non-use of the CRTs can be partially explained by this. Similar instances of linking the CRTs to the deployment of a civilian CSDP mission can be found throughout the document.

Another factor that possibly contributed to the unsuccessful implementation of the CRT concept is the involvement of the Swedish with the set-up. The expert from the member state representation identifies that the CRTs fit within the Nordic perspective: ‘The Swedes are organized, everything is in place, and it is easier to organize things there. People are available for deployment abroad; they have good agreements with their employer about going away and in other countries that’s just simply more difficult.’ So you see that the Swedish blueprint thinking is generalized to other countries: ‘The Swedes are good at that, their people can convince others and they also have people at strategic locations within the GSC and they are 100% dedicated, like bulldozers, push push push.’

This view fits within the picture outlined by Jakobsen in his article on the Nordic influence on the Civilian ESDP, in which he argues that these countries have had a significant and sometimes even decisive influence on civilian CSDP. They were successful agenda-setters in the area; played central roles in designing the institutions and concepts and have made disproportionate financial and personnel contributions. He explains their successful approach by referring to their status as front-runners; persistent promotion of their initiatives by persuasion and coalition-building; and a backing up of their initiatives with enough means to support them. Furthermore, he agrees with the statement that the only reason for the Nordic influence to be this big is because it did not contradict any vital interests of the great member states and that these were happy to free-ride and let the others do the hard work for them. However, he concludes that EU crisis management is not the ‘domaine réservé for the great powers that it is generally made out to be’.

98 Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
100 Official from the Permanent Representation of a Member State, personal interview, 08-03-2010.
101 Ibidem.
Turning back to the CRTs, the concept might have been successful if all EU member states had such a developed system for the recruitment of civilian personnel such as Sweden, Finland and Germany (all three have a specific government agency that deals with all aspects of the recruitment process) and if all member states prioritized the civilian dimension as much as the Nordic countries did.

The role of the GSC is not to be ignored, as said before, the Council Secretariat is more than the name suggests since they have gotten many additional tasks in the realm of CCM next to their secretarial tasks -such as drafting and preparing documents-. This has to do with the historical development of the CFSP. With the CRTs, the GSC is responsible for identifying training needs, they can contribute experts to the CRTs, they are responsible for developing and updating the CRT methodology and they maintain the list of names of all CRT experts. Also, when a CRT is deployed outside the framework of a civilian mission or EUSR, the GSC is at the top of the chain of command. Member states responsibilities include selecting their experts, assuring the availability of their staff for deployment and training and establishing a national Point of Contact to facilitate contacts with the GSC.

Already in the document one can detect a certain hesitancy about the functioning of this system, as per footnote 3: “Given the expected level of skills and experience of the CRT experts, it is borne in mind that at any given time, the availability of individual experts may vary as some of them might have been deployed for services in other missions…."

In one of the interviews it was indicated that the development of the CRTs was seen as a sort of coup by the GSC and that is why the concept has always been surrounded by distrust.

The same issues with regards to the recruitment of civilian personnel -see the chapter on force generation- are also inhibiting the use of the CRTs. The problem is that the CRT concept draws on the same, already relatively small group of civilian personnel who are able to be deployed abroad. “A few experts were designated, good and qualified people, we have trained them, but when a moment for possible deployment arrived the PSC never really decided to use a CRT. (…) These people are a very depletable resource, especially if you ask them to join and then you do not use them, because then they will not return. And every effort that you have put in the training of personnel is then lost. And in fact, that is what happened.”

To sum up, the CRT concept was written and based on a different reality, one in which all member states have similar priorities and capabilities to recruit civilian personnel and one in which ‘fact-finding’ does not necessarily lead to a new civilian CSDP mission. In fact, the link to a possible mission was all too


104 Ibidem.

105 Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.

106 Ibidem.
explicit. The staff for the teams is naturally hard to find, member states were reluctant towards the concept from the beginning, the GSC had the upper hand in combination with the role of Sweden as initiator and ‘pusher’ of the idea with other member states only passively supporting the concept. According to the expert within the CPCC: ‘It’s a question of the will of the member states. They support the concept, but when you ask them to provide the personnel then it becomes quiet.’ This has ultimately lead to its breakdown. One could say that in this case, the policy-making - outcome gap exists because of the rate of divergence between member states’ policy goals and the high premium placed on foreign policy autonomy. It is the divergence between the member states in both priorities and capabilities that contributed to the deficient implementation of the CRTs. They still committed themselves to the CRT, knowing that poor performance would have few consequences and/or that the Nordic countries would pay the bill for their pet-project. These conclusions seem to support a rationalist-institutionalist theoretical approach; however, the final conclusions of this study will go in to this more deeply.

107 Official from the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
6 Force generation

This chapter will discuss the civilian force generation process, i.e. how personnel is recruited for missions, the difficulties that the process has faced and will attempt to provide further explanations for the inconsistency of member states’ commitments versus actual deployment. First of all, force generation is inherently different from the other cases, the CRT and the CHGs because it is not a concept *stricto sensu*. It is the broader area of recruiting staff for missions, part of the problematic surrounding the two former cases and a yet a very distinct aspect of CCM. As previously emphasised in the methodology chapter, this case is worthwhile investigating since there is a clear lack of performance of the member states. The figure below is compiled from data from the Korski and Gowan report and compares the quantitative commitment from the CHG 2008 to the actual number of staff that member states have in the missions at the moment (September 2009).

Figure 4: Personnel commitments Civilian Headline Goal 2008 versus actual deployment per member state

The differences between pledges and reality are striking and this constitutes the starting point for the following analysis, which begins by describing the force generation process. Following is the text analysis which looks at the Council conclusions on ESDP from November 2009, since a focused text on force generation is not publicly available. Luckily a part of the Council conclusions is specifically devoted to civilian capabilities and enhancing the availability of civilian personnel. Finally, incorporating data from the expert interviews, conclusions will be drawn as to the nature of the policy-making - outcome gap in this area.

Staff for civilian CSDP missions is mostly seconded, which means that they are nominated through one of the official channels of a member state. A minor part of the staff is contracted, which means that they are hired directly by the HoM and that the mission bears the costs for this personnel, unlike seconded staff, which is remunerated by the member states. When a Joint Action for a mission has been adopted, the CPCC releases a Call for Contributions to the member states which contains the job descriptions for the necessary personnel. Often unofficial deliberations have already taken place discussing the possible contributions by the member states, lead by the states that have the most interest in the mission.\footnote{Annika Björkdahl and Maria Strömvik, \textit{EU Crisis Management Operations. ESDP bodies and decision-making procedures}, DIIS Copenhagen Report 8 (2008) p.29.} The CPCC together with CIVCOM and the HoM are responsible for filling the vacancies and CIVCOM representatives act as a communications channel between the CPCC and the national authorities. The national structures for the recruitment of civilian personnel differ to a large extent. Sweden, Finland and Germany have government agencies who are solely responsible for the recruitment process, others have inter-ministerial consultative bodies that provide a platform for recruitment by bringing together the ministry of foreign affairs (present in CIVCOM), ministry of the interior (provides police), ministry of defence (provides military police, for example the French gendarmerie or Italian carabinieri), ministry of justice (provides judges) and ministry of finance (provides customs experts). Finally, there are those countries who recruit staff on an \textit{ad hoc} basis without any fixed structures at the national level. Korski and Gowan in their report on the EU’s civilian capacities divide the member states into four groups: the professionals, the strivers, the agnostics and the indifferenters\footnote{Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, \textit{Can the EU rebuild failing states? A review of Europe’s civilian capacities}, European Council on Foreign Relations (2009) p.43-51.}, which gives good insight in the degree of difference between national practices, and although one can debate their categorization of certain member states, it is a helpful analytical tool.

Most recently the mission in Afghanistan has received scrutiny for its persistent shortage of staff, as of 19 April 2010 the mission consists of 284 international members, while the goal since its inception in 2007 has been 400.\footnote{http://www.eupol-afg.eu > Factsheets, seen on 24-04-2010.} However, Afghanistan is no exception. The lack of qualified personnel has
plagued civilian CSDP since its first mission, EUPM Bosnia. How is this addressed in the text of the Council Conclusions? Civilian capability development is mainly covered in paragraphs 40 to 54. The development of civilian capabilities is motivated by the same factors that we saw in the previous cases: the rise of new security threats and challenges, the growing demand for EU CCM and the increasingly challenging and complex tasks that the missions face. In paragraph 45: “We have to enable the EU to successfully deliver on mission mandates.”

The method for analyzing this document cannot be entirely the same as with the other two cases since this is a document that is mostly evaluating past performance, the determining of objectives for the future is present to a lesser extent. There is a need to take into account the tendency of member states to boast particular results and neglect or downplay poor performance. With this in mind, paragraph 40 states that: “moving forward means addressing persistent shortfalls, as they have been identified in the course of the CHG 2010 (...) and better preparing, deploying and conducting ESDP civilian missions...” including the “growing need to ensure that civilian ESDP missions (...) are able to be deployed rapidly by the EU...” And in paragraph 41: “Although it [the Council] acknowledged the need of taking into account the various national approaches, the Council deemed that a well coordinated civilian capability development framework continues to be necessary to guide future work on enhancing civilian capabilities.”

This paragraph resonates with what interviewees have said about how member states ‘do as they please’ and if the political will is present an initiative will be moved forward. Thus, some of the instruments or frameworks established at the EU level are not very relevant unless there is a situation where they are explicitly desired. In the case of Georgia, where war suddenly broke out in August 2008, France was pushing for the EU’s civilian mission to be deployed rapidly and within 3 weeks, 350 staff was ready on the ground. The rapid deployment was a result of both political will and the existing institutions to back this up. By emphasising this aspect in the Council conclusions member states recognize the need for structures at the EU level, while at the same time recognizing the dominance of national approaches. It is not a question of structures determining actions, but member states choosing when and how to use the structures available.

There are specific paragraphs dedicated to enhancing the availability of civilian personnel, starting at paragraph 44, where, reflecting on their own performance: ‘The Council welcomed the significant progress made by member states in enacting and implementing national measures facilitating the deployment of civilian personnel. It noted that several member states are in the process of adopting such national measures/strategies and establishing more appropriate

113 Council of the European Union - Council Conclusions on ESDP of 17 November 2009 p.8
114 Ibidem p.7.
115 Ibidem p.8.
structures. The Council welcomed, in this context, the fostering of a continuous exchange of experiences and best practices (…) leading to increased involvement of relevant national authorities in the civilian force generation process. (…) The Council expects this work to be pursued without delay.¹¹⁶ So the focus is on coordinating each other’s national measures and strategies and establishing national structures. However, this is all based on an exchange of experiences and best practices which, unsurprisingly, fits the intergovernmental character of the policy area.

Then in paragraph 45: ‘The Council noted the continued need for missions to be adequately staffed with high quality personnel to enable the successful delivery of mission mandates. The Council stressed the importance of continuing efforts to match ambitions with resources. It encouraged strongly that all member states take practical steps to ensure the required force generation.’¹¹⁷ The Council hereby acknowledges that missions are not adequately staffed and literally refers to the gap, but all that can be done to close it is ‘encouragement’. Nonetheless the reflectiveness displayed here is interesting. It is worth mentioning that these Council conclusions do not have the interest of the media, mostly since they have been smoothened out before publication and do not contain any news as such. There is no public debate on the civilian CSDP. This is a point that all interviewees in some way or another touched upon, with the member state representative stating that they would not act differently if there was more scrutiny from the media, from the public or from the European Parliament. If there would be more scrutiny the result would be positive, because ‘they like what we do’. ‘Civilian missions have something nice over them, something peaceful, something constructive, well, who could be against that?’¹¹⁸ On the other hand, the GSC expert says in relation to the Korski and Gowan report, that even though it was not very nuanced and the conclusions might not have been very realistic, it got relatively much attention and their report was discussed, ‘they set the stage for the debate, citizens once again got an insight about something that they normally have no understanding of. In that respect, it is actually equivalent to the art piece of the Czech presidency. The busses pulled into Brussels, filled with people. The fact is that that is what we need.’¹¹⁹ The interviewee from the CPCC focussed on the pedagogical efforts that they and the GSC should be making, mostly publicity to the ministries involved to establish a turn in national terms. Taking Italy as an example they say ‘Why do you want to go to Kosovo? We need the judges at home to fight the mafia’ and then we’ll say ‘Well, you import mafia from Kosovo so if you fight it at the root it can eventually help Italy’. And ‘Member states do not like the idea of contracted personnel because they want to keep a firm grip on the process. However, they still keep certain key functions to themselves. You need to teach them and say ‘either you give us financial experts or we have to go

¹¹⁷ Ibidem.
¹¹⁸ Official from the Permanent Representation of a Member State, personal interview, 08-03-2010.
¹¹⁹ Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
and get them on the market” (emphasis mine). Next to teaching national authorities about the importance of force generation it would be fascinating to see what effect more scrutiny from the public and the EP would have on the EU’s CCM. In any case, it would make the process more democratic and transparent.

Back to the Council conclusions, in paragraph 46 it is stated that: “With a view to facilitating an orderly and predictable force generation, the Council welcomed the significantly improved procedures that have been put in place regarding calls for contribution and selection of staff. The Council took note of standardisation of job descriptions as well as of the development of standard mission administrative tools.” “The Council welcomed progress made towards enhancing civilian rapid deployment capability, and recalled the need to enhance further this capacity as a priority action.” It refers, most likely, to the only rapid deployment mechanism that is known to civilian CSDP, i.e. the CRTs and taking the analysis in the previous chapter into account one wonders what progress is exactly being referred to. They do address the CRTs specifically in paragraph 51, where they state that: “the Council welcomed the revision of the CRT concept. This foresees that the CRT pool shall be doubled with a target up to 200 experts with additional fields of expertise, as well as more efficient procedures for decision and deployment.” Interestingly, when under the old concept it was deemed impossible to gather and continuously keep 100 experts in the pool it is hard to envisage an enlargement of the pool to 200 will improve this situation. “The Council expects that the revised CRT concept will lead to a higher degree of flexibility and availability.” Unlike the interviewees, who expect that the revised concept will not make a difference and that it will still not be used. So far, the interviewees’ insights turned out to be correct. Then, “It [the Council] looked forward to the implementation of the revised CRT concept, while at the same time taking into account the development of the European SSR pool.” SSR stands for Security Sector Reform, and the idea here was to set up a pool with persons who could be rapidly deployed for these specific SSR tasks. As an interviewee identified, this pool will still draw on the same group of scarce people that are also necessary for missions and CRTs for example, making the pool susceptible to the same faith as the CRTs.

Force generation and its sustainability is a growing problem, it is becoming harder to obtain high quality personnel for rotating missions. Member states themselves offer three reasons for these difficulties, as Jakobsen identifies in his article: ‘1) financial reasons - member states cannot find the funds to support their staff in missions. 2) There is a lack of available personnel because of

120 Official from the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
122 Ibidem p.10.
123 Ibidem.
124 Official from the Permanent Representation of a Member State, personal interview, 08-03-2010; Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010; Official from the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
126 Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.
deployments elsewhere and 3) increased policing requirements at home, following 9/11, the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London attacks in 2005. The gap between the member states’ commitments and their contributions is, however, too large to be explained by deployments elsewhere and increased policing requirements at home.\footnote{Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, ‘The ESDP and Civilian Rapid Reaction: Adding Value is Harder than Expected’, European Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2006) p.309.} He correctly identifies that the problem of force generation is caused not just by a lack of capacity, but by a lack of political will. This is a much more accurate observation than the one that is made in Korski’s and Gowan’s report who just refer to the practical difficulties of recruitment of civilian personnel. We have mentioned before that these practical difficulties include the fact that civilian personnel tend to have day-jobs, many do not want to spend a long time away from home and the career perspectives upon return are not that good. They do ascribe these issues to the varying national systems for planning, recruitment and training, which implies a lack of political will and different priorities, but they do not address it any further. In this study, it is exactly the core of the story.

When the interviewees were asked for the reason the commitment for EUPOL Afghanistan was set at 400 international staff and why this number has not been reached, they gave similar analyses. There is an imbalance on the side of the member states, where you have the ministry of foreign affairs, who are active in Brussels policy-making, and the ministry of interior, who usually provides civilian personnel. Germany, for example, does not have a military police force (such as the French gendarmerie) and national police in Germany is a very flexible concept, each Bundesland has its own independent force. ‘Those authorities are less interested in what the ministry of foreign affairs in Berlin says. It is a matter of convincing the national actors, almost like establishing a cultural change. If you do not manage to do so before a mission starts, it is already flawed from the beginning.’\footnote{Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.} Second, there are institutional problems at the EU level from the viewpoint of the GSC expert: the newly created CMPD and the CPCC relate poorly to each other, where the CMPD on the one side represents the strategic-political level, and the CPCC on the other side represents the operational level. The balance between the operational and the strategic-political level is uneven. That is why those who are supposed to deal with force generation are not focussing on the right issues. ‘They are not interested in how things work on a national level; their mindset is just like ‘we need to have those people’.\footnote{Ibidem.} Hence, force generation is not about just pushing a button with the ministry of interior and staff appears, you have to go to the courthouses and police stations. Member states should be induced to establish national systems to make the process more manageable and the EU must provide them with the instruments to do so. Nowadays, after a CfC is issued the attitude towards member states is that they have to arrange their own business from there onwards, using their national

\footnote{127} \footnote{128} \footnote{129}
systems for recruitment. Possibly, a provision of tools for recruitment from the EU institutions could be an adequate solution to the current problems, although any moves in this direction are regarded with suspicion from the member states. A project called ‘the goalkeeper’, software for standardising recruitment for civilian missions, has been under development for the last few years but has not been widely implemented.\footnote{Official from the General Secretariat of the Council, personal interview, 09-03-2010.} A similarity between force generation and the CRTs is that in both cases the EU has not listened enough to the concerns of the member states and to their actual needs. It has developed a theoretical system and left the rest to be determined on a national level. Naturally in EU foreign affairs there is the boundary determining if something is a national sensitivity or not. On the one hand, this boundary is broken with thoughtlessness by the GSC, CPCC and other EU institutional actors involved, by developing concepts on a different reality than is actually the case. On the other hand, they can be too timid and do not do what is needed to address the current problems.

A discussion with the expert from the member state representation paints another picture about the case with EUPOL Afghanistan specifically. The commitment of 400 staff is attributed to the German presidency in 2007, where the German police had to be convinced that their staff would be transferred from their bilateral mission to the EU mission, however, they were only willing to contribute if the mission would have an impact. So, the number was set on 400, which was proposed with certain ‘aplomb’ by the presidency: ‘there is often no real negotiation, states often get a bit carried away, and if possible they will want to go along with the emerging consensus. Look, if the three big ones are pro-something, then the deal is done. If other countries’ vital interests are not affected, then it happens.’\footnote{Official from the Permanent Representation of a Member State, personal interview, 08-03-2010.} With regards to Afghanistan, the interviewee states that they have now settled for the fact that the goal of 400 staff will not be achieved and that even the HoM is giving less prominence to that goal. The mission will now have to be reconfigured in order to obtain effectiveness with fewer members. As well as the expert from the CPCC the member state representative emphasises the need to convince supporters at home to contribute with scarce personnel, to detach them from domestic structures and deploy them abroad. He identifies the Unions and middle management at the national level as actors who ‘step on the brake’, while higher management is more enthusiastic.\footnote{Ibidem.} Convincing the national actors involved is thus a recurrent theme in the interviewees’ responses.

To conclude, the following aspects contribute to the policy-making - outcome gap in the case of force generation. First, member states tend to follow the emerging consensus when it comes to setting up new missions, but then lack the political will to back up theses promises with the staff necessary. In the Council conclusions they identify the need for appropriate structures at the EU level to support the force generation process, but whether or when these are used is to be determined on an ad hoc basis, depending on political will. On the side of
the institutions there has been a tendency to draft concepts and structures in a theoretical manner, on the one hand disregarding the member states’ national systems and on the other hand giving them too much leeway in their implementation. Not surprisingly, because of the intergovernmental nature of the policy-making area, which is once more affirmed by stating in the Council conclusions that future development is based on an ‘exchange of experiences and best practices’. Finally, there are the classical problems identified with the recruitment of civilian personnel, the fact that it is not just about pushing a button at the ministry of interior and that deployments abroad are not as natural for this group as it is for example to the military. There is a need for informing and educating national authorities to improve the force generation process, to improve the imbalance between the foreign ministries in Brussels and the authorities at home.
7 Conclusions

In the beginning of this study we asked how the discrepancy between policy-making and outcome could be explained in the EU’s Civilian Crisis Management. As many other studies have discussed the Gap in EU foreign policy, whether one calls it ‘expectations-capability’ gap or ‘rhetoric-resources’ gap, it is a persistent problem. In the case of CCM, how could this gap be analyzed? The study used three cases to investigate this question, namely the Civilian Headline Goals - the documents in which member states set goals for themselves to achieve in the area of CCM; the Civilian Response Teams - a rapid response concept developed for civilian missions; and force generation - the broader notion of recruiting personnel for missions. The analysis was guided by theory-based hypotheses in order to avoid being overly descriptive of the cases and attempting to see how these fit in the broader theoretical framework of new institutionalism. A somewhat obvious conclusion in assessing ‘the gap’ would be that the reason for the discrepancy lies in the fact that we are talking about EU foreign policy, i.e. an area in which the member states have primacy and the policies touch the core of what constitutes a sovereign nation-state. However, the added value of this work is not made up by stating such truisms and generalisations that apply to most of the field of cooperation in foreign and defence policies. Instead, it lies in evaluating the discrepancy for the specific cases as such. If you can then identify similarities between the three and draw some general conclusions for CCM as such which go beyond reaffirming the dominance of the member states, you have hopefully contributed to existing research with some new and useful insights.

A new institutionalist framework was chosen as a theoretical basis, because of the advantage that one can start from the assumption that member states have primacy, but then take into account the way in which institutions structure their choices and limit or widen their options available. This framework generated hypotheses which will be evaluated in these conclusions, after which limitations and suggestions for further research will be discussed. However, first some case-specific conclusions and general conclusions will be drawn.

7.1 Case-specific conclusions

In the case of the Civilian Headline Goals we have identified differences between the 2008 and 2010 document. While the first set mainly quantitative objectives, devoted a considerable part to implementation and used firm language to underline the commitments made, the second focussed more on qualitative objectives, devoted a smaller part to implementation and used weaker language in
affirming the commitments. Literature has suggested that these differences can be explained by the rapid development of CCM in the time between the two headline goals, i.e. the set up of multiple missions and increased operational experience. Our analysis has shown that these differences can also be explained by poor implementation of the headline goals. A shift from quantitative to qualitative objectives had the added benefit of making evaluation more difficult. The fact that there is no independent inspectorate to keep check on the headline goal process, but just an in-house evaluation capability -the same people who draft the policy- contributed to this situation. The very core of the CHGs, which entails the member states submitting themselves to benchmarking, is problematic.

Turning to the case of the Civilian Response Teams, as concluded in chapter five the concept was based on a different reality. For a large part developed by the Swedish in close cooperation with the GSC, the concept generalized their thinking to the other member states which constituted a misfit and contributed to it not being used. A second cause in this case is the fact that in the concept the CRTs were explicitly linked to fact-finding and fact-finding was in its turn connected to establishing a new civilian mission. Since member states were afraid of giving of any premature signals to third countries the teams were never deployed in the way they were meant to be deployed.

Concerning force generation, there exist great differences between the member states when it comes to the way they recruit their personnel, some are highly professionalised and some completely lack a national structure. The national systems are not very well coordinated. Then there are the practical difficulties associated with deployment: civilians are not used to being deployed abroad, it does not fit well into their career path and they are very much needed at home. There is more to it, but since these observations are also applicable to the other cases they will be in discussed in the general conclusions that follow.

7.2 General conclusions

First, the process between drafting a policy or a concept and the outcome needs to be controlled in one way or another to assess its functioning. The problem in CCM is that because of its intergovernmental nature this assessment is almost always done by ‘soft’ instruments such as evaluation, benchmarking, best practices and lessons learned. An immediate solution to this issue cannot be envisaged, however, it is clear that it is contributing to the gap in CCM.

Second, in all cases we can see that institutions such as the GSC, CPCC and now the CMPD have gotten increasing roles related to the incremental expansion of the civilian CSDP and have developed institutional personalities. This has already been suggested in the literature and in this study can for example be attested by the statement that the development of the CRTs was seen as a ‘coup’ by the Secretariat and that in the case of the CHGs the Secretariat had the opportunity to submit some elements to the CHG 2010 which they thought were of importance. The GSC, including the CMPD, has gone through a shift from
classic secretarial tasks to actively contributing to the development of policy, a task for which they were not made for in the first instance. However, now with the establishment of the EEAS through the Lisbon Treaty, which will absorb the CMPD, a matter-of-fact situation is finally legalized, officially adding these new tasks to the package. The increasing personality of these actors and occasional inter-institutional struggles contributed to the development of concepts that might have not fit member states’ inclinations, resulting in poor implementation.

A third conclusion of a more general nature is that the large differences between member states’ priorities contribute to the policy-making - outcome gap. Whereas some have always been strong supporters, others merely pay lip-service. The difficulty here is that member states will be tempted to go along with the emerging consensus as long as it does not run counter to any vital interests and that especially in the case of CCM or conflict prevention, it is hard to be opposed to the idea. Even though some member states favour the military dimension they are still convinced by the arguments of the Nordic countries and others who actively support action in the civilian area. ‘As a senior official at the EU Commission observed, conflict prevention is like ‘motherhood and apple pie – one cannot be against it’. Some proposals in the civilian area have even been called ‘naïve, normative and value-driven’ by French officials. That gives all the more credit to the persuasive skills of the Nordics and their partners, and their success in placing people on key positions within the institutions. These differing attitudes among member states explain some of the difficulties in CCM policy-making as well.

Finally, the creation of structures and concepts is necessary at an EU level. Member states have come to this conclusion already after the Balkan wars in the 1990s and it is one of the reasons for the development of the CSDP. Without these structures and concepts, the quick set up of a mission such as in the case of Georgia would have never been possible. This need for institutions on an EU level on the one hand has to coexist with the dominance of national approaches on the other hand. The case-studies have indicated that it is still up to the member states when and how to use the structures that are available to them. The fact that the EEAS was born indicates that member states want to develop the foreign policy aspects further, but the fact that there are such persistent problems, also in CCM, points out as well that member states are not willing to loosen their grip in this area. That is why they do not empower the institutions and it is why concepts are often formulated so weakly. In civilian CSDP, policies are created in a way in which they really do not impose any barriers - they are very flexible.

134 Ibidem.
7.3 Hypotheses

The policy-outcome gap exists...

Rationalist-institutionalist - because member states make a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis of which the outcome is that the gain from a norm breach, or from not delivering upon commitments, is higher than the cost of reputation loss.

We can argue in favour of this hypothesis. It is easy and desirable to go along with the emerging consensus, there are no direct negative consequences attached to the breach of a commitment, other member states with a direct interest in a mission or concept (for example the Nordic countries with the CRT and France with the mission in Georgia) traditionally shoulder most of the costs in terms of personnel and financing.

Rationalist-institutionalist - because of the rate of divergence between member states’ policy goals and the high premium placed on foreign policy autonomy.

This hypothesis has arguably been confirmed as well. In the end one sees that concepts and policies are agreed upon, but it is the implementation that is lacking and one of the reasons is the status that CCM enjoys within the different member states. Some are very dedicated while others have little interest in the field.

Constructivist-institutionalist - because of a lack of opportunities for discursive policy deliberation (no communicative action) and a lack of public sphere.

It is harder to support this hypothesis because one cannot speculate on what the effects of more involvement and public debate would be, but what can be confirmed is that all interviewees responded positively to any question in this direction. As the GSC expert noted, ‘we need buses of people pulling into Brussels’, also praising the Korski and Gowan report for being slightly controversial and thus generating attention. And the CPCC expert discussed how national authorities need to be taught the importance of CCM, as part of a solution to the gap, implying that a missing public sphere and debate is part of the problem.

Constructivist-institutionalist - because member states act from a Logic of Appropriateness where adhering to norms has primacy.

On the one hand it is difficult to assess this hypothesis, because at first sight it seems that the only or at least strongest norm that governs CCM is the one of decision-making by consensus. However, looking at the results from the text analysis, especially to how the concepts are motivated, one could argue in favour of an LoA being present. Referring to international peace and security, the
European Security Strategy, the need for the EU to project peace across its borders - the motivation for the expansion of the civilian CSDP and the establishment of these policies and concepts is grounded or at least justified by normative arguments. Nevertheless, while it is possible to say that member states speak from a Logic of Appropriateness, the continuous gap in CCM indicates that they do not act from one, contradicting the hypothesis.\footnote{Karen Smith in Carlsnaes et. al., \textit{Contemporary European Foreign Policy}, London: SAGE (2004) p.132.}

Constructivist-institutionalist - because the decision to promote certain norms as the EU has made member states involved in a process in which their original preferences are being reshaped and mutual commitments are difficult to roll back.

The EU is a goal-oriented process, whether this goal is a federal state or not is less relevant than the basic idea that the institutions and policies keep developing in a certain direction, this also applies to the CFSP and CSDP. Hence this hypothesis is definitively relevant, but it is perhaps not a cause of the policy-making - outcome gap as such. The problem with this premise is that it takes away the agency from the member states while we have seen from the analysis above that they are still in large control of the process, unlike this hypothesis would suggest.

7.4 Limitations and further research

Combining a study of the EU’s CCM with a theoretical perspective has proven to be challenging, as well as bridging the gap between the more pragmatic think-tank reports and the more abstract academic literature. While it was interesting to use theory-based hypotheses, a limitation of the study could be that these have guided the research to much into a certain direction. Undoubtedly this is not the case, the hypotheses have in fact made the analysis more guided and structured and it was only until the end of the writing process that the conclusions actually became clear. Another limitation could be the reliance on the limited number of interviews. However, as emphasised, the interviews were held with experts on the topic who work and have worked within the EU’s CCM for years. The pool of people to whom this applies is small, it consists of approximately 50-100 persons and taking into account the different institutional points of view from which the interviewees stem, the partial reliance on the interviews as sources of information is justified.

Further research on the topic would benefit from looking at the same issue, but instead of taking a top-down perspective like this study does, by seeing the issues through a ‘Brussels-lens’, take a bottom-up perspective and go to the
national authorities and future- or former mission personnel. The picture that would emerge might be very different. Due to time and space constraints these aspects have not been addressed here, but they would certainly provide added value.
Executive summary

Civilian Crisis Management (CCM) is part of the EU’s efforts to promote peace, human rights and democracy in third countries. Since the inception of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1998 and the establishment of the civilian aspects of CSDP at the Feira European Council in 2000, the EU has deployed 18 civilian missions abroad, of which 12 missions are still ongoing. The tasks of these missions include the training of police, judges and customs experts, reform of the Rule-of-Law sector, and support for civilian administration and civil protection. While the EU can claim success in deploying such a large number of missions until now, this has by no means been an unproblematic process.

It has become more difficult to generate the forces necessary from the member states and it is not the only area in which member states are having problems fulfilling their commitments. A clear gap between pledges on paper and result is visible in CCM, which is why this thesis is asking the question: *How can we explain the discrepancy between policy-making and outcome in the EU’s Civilian Crisis Management?* The need for the study is established by the fact that previous studies have mostly neglected the civilian CSDP, while it constitutes the majority of the EU’s missions abroad. In the existing literature on the topic focus has been on evaluating the civilian missions, coherence between Community and Council action or cooperation with other actors. This study, however, analyses concepts instead of missions, where concepts mean the policy-documents on which EU action is based. It uses three cases, the Civilian Headline Goals, the Civilian Response Teams and force generation to support the analysis. Methods include text analysis of official Council documents, interviews with Brussels-based experts and a review of secondary literature. The analysis is further supported by a theoretical framework, new institutionalism, from which the following hypotheses regarding the nature of the policy-making - outcome gap are derived:

*The policy-outcome gap exists…*

1. *Rationalist-institutionalist* - because member states make a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis of which the outcome is that the gain from a norm breach, or from not delivering upon commitments, is higher than the cost of reputation loss.
2. *Rationalist-institutionalist* - because of the rate of divergence between member states’ policy goals and the high premium placed on foreign policy autonomy.
3. *Constructivist-institutionalist* - because of a lack of opportunities for discursive policy deliberation (no communicative action) and a lack of public sphere.
4. *Constructivist-institutionalist* - because member states act from a Logic of Appropriateness where adhering to norms has primacy.
5. Constructivist-institutionalist - because the decision to promote certain norms as the EU has made member states involved in a process in which their original preferences are being reshaped and mutual commitments are difficult to roll back.¹³⁶ These hypotheses are tested in an analysis of the three cases.

The Civilian Headline Goals are documents in which the member states set out goals to achieve in CCM relating mostly to capability development. The first CHG process was initiated in 2004 and the deadline was set for 2008. This document set out clear and quantifiable objectives for the member states and it is even accompanied by a Capabilities Requirement List which lists personnel requirements for the missions. The second CHG was initiated already in 2007 with a deadline in 2010 was more focussed on qualitative objectives, such as the mainstreaming of human rights and gender. This made an implementation analysis more difficult. From the interviews it became clear that member states have not kept a firm hand in the implementation process. The fact that there is no independent inspectorate to keep check on the headline goal process, but just an in-house evaluation capability - the same people who draft the policy - contributed to this situation. The very core of the CHGs, which entails the member states submitting themselves to benchmarking, turned out to be problematic.

The Civilian Response Teams are teams meant for rapid deployment in the case of a sudden crisis. They can be used for fact-finding, situational assessment or as temporary assistance to a mission. The teams are drawn from a pool of 100-200 members and contain people with specific CCM expertise. The concept was proposed by the Swedish in 2005 and subsequently adopted by the member states. However, until today the teams have only been used twice, and in these two cases it was actually individuals who were deployed from the pool, not teams as they were meant to be. Reasons for this failure can amongst other things be ascribed to two factors: the concept generalized the thinking of the Swedish in cooperation with the General Secretariat of the Council to the other member states which constituted a misfit. Second, in the concept the CRTs were explicitly linked to fact-finding, which is in its turn connected to establishing a new civilian mission. Since member states were afraid of giving of any premature signals to third countries the teams were never deployed according to the original idea.

As a third case, force generation is the broader area of recruiting staff for civilian missions and it is different from the other cases in the sense that there is no publicly available document that discusses this theme. It is however a suitable case to use for answering the research question since there is such a clear discrepancy between personnel commitments made by the member states and the actual numbers of deployment. The text analysis has been performed on the Council conclusions on ESDP from November 2009. There exist great differences between the member states when it comes to the way they recruit their personnel, some are highly professionalised and some completely lack a national structure. The national systems are not very well coordinated. There are also practical difficulties associated with deployment: civilians are not used to being deployed

abroad, it does not fit well into their career path and they are very much needed at home. These are both factors that contribute to the problems that are specifically related to force generation.

The conclusions of this thesis are the following: next to the case-specific conclusions, the policy-making - outcome gap exists because of the intergovernmental nature of CCM policy-making - there are often no strong implementing or evaluating mechanisms put in place. Combined with the differing priorities regarding CCM among member states, where some actively promote the concept and some just pay lip-service, and institutions such as the Secretariat, CMPD and CPCC who are more actively influencing the development of policies, nowadays this can lead to a misfit between concepts developed and reality, causing the policy-making - outcome gap. However, commitments are still made, concepts and structures are still being developed, because there is a need for these structures to support the member states when the political will is present. Of the theoretical hypotheses points 1 to 3 could arguably be confirmed, whereas points 4 and 5 were partially discarded.
References


Council of the European Union, DOC 10462/05 - Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in an Integrated Format - CIVILIAN RESPONSE TEAMS.


Appendix - Interview guide

Introduction

I am currently doing research for my Master’s thesis which intends to evaluate the present state-of-play in the EU’s civilian crisis management. Mainly I am looking at a possible difference between policy-making and outcome, for which I am using 3 ‘case-studies’: force generation for civilian missions, the set-up and implementation of the CRT’s and the Civilian Headline Goals 2008 & 2010. I am trying to see whether there are any structural causes that might explain the dynamics in CCM policy-making.

First, I will ask a few general questions and then I will go more into the cases specifically. If you feel like adding something or interrupting me, please go ahead, my intention is not to have a Q&A session, but more of a structured conversation. Also, I would like to emphasize once again that this interview is fully anonymous and all information will be treated with care. Is there anything you would like to know before we start?

…

1) In CCM, do you perceive a difference between policy-making (the drafting of policy in the GSC/CPCC together with the presidency and the discussion and decision-making in PSC/CIVCOM) and policy-outcome (i.e. the actual implementation and results achieved)?

If so, what are some of the reasons that, according to you, can explain this difference?

2) Which factors do member states take into account when they decide about CCM policy implementation? Does reputation matter (versus the other member states)?

3) How divergent are the policy goals between the different member states?

4) How would you describe the type of dialogue when things like force generation, CRTs and CHGs are being discussed? What is the style of negotiating? How does the absence of public participation/public opinion/EP power affect the discussion?
5) Which formal / informal norms can you identify within the realm of CCM policy-making? Do you think that ‘appropriateness’ plays a part, i.e. member states agree to something because it is ‘the right thing to do’?

6) What role do previous commitments made / institutions set up / agreed common goals play in limiting policy choices available and determining future policy choices?

Force Generation: What is the current status of staffing missions to their full potential? Where do you think the problem lies?

CRT: Recently the concept has been revived, how do you think it will develop in the future? Why has it not been used properly until now?

CHG: How do you explain the differences between CHG ’08 and ’10? Has there been any talk recently on evaluating CHG ’10? How does the implementation process work?