Turkey and the West: Change in Continuity?

A Two-way Approach to Turkey’s Relations with the West

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Abstract

Westernization is a centuries long project started in the Ottoman Empire, in order to fix the dysfunctionalities of the empire inside and to boost the empire’s image outside. It has transformed into a quest of transformation of Turkey into a modern state and it found its reflection in the foreign policy as a pro-Western approach in the Turkish Republic.

Historical institutionalism suggests that the policies are path dependent and rational choice institutionalism insists on interest-driven actors and policies. Today, given the ambiguities surrounding Turkey’s membership to the EU and complexity of Turkish-American relations, Turkey had been pushed to question its foreign policy priorities. This study will aim to seek answers using these two institutionalist approaches by putting their hypotheses into a test, in order to find out whether Westernism is a case of persistence or Turkey’s main foreign policy axis being the West would change.

Key words: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, westernism, westernization, Turkish foreign policy
Words: 19.524
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Party of Justice and Development)</td>
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<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)</td>
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<td>CHP</td>
<td>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)</td>
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<td>CUP</td>
<td>Committee of Union and Progress</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)</td>
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<td>DYP</td>
<td>Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>HI</td>
<td>Historical institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MGK</td>
<td>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (Commission of National Security)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>RCI</td>
<td>Rational choice institutionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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1 Introduction

When Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey he had one great ideal in his mind, and that was to raise the Turkish nation to highest standard of civilization and prosperity. To this end, Turkey had to leave the bitterness of its occupation by the Western states after the World War I. Following his victory during the Turkish Independence War between 1919 and 1923, he managed to arrange negotiations on equal terms with Great Britain, France, Italy and Greece and soon he managed to restore the relations with the West. He transformed Turkey via various reforms, which is known as the Kemalist Revolution. His legacy led his successors to follow his steps, to transform Turkey into a modern Western state. Since then Turkey had enjoyed an almost uninterrupted pro-Western foreign policy. Turkey became a part of important European and Transatlantic co-operations, and today its quest of becoming a modern Western state has been transformed into a quest of becoming a member of the EU.

The major conjunctural change following the end of Cold War has been a major challenge for Turkey as to the need of redefinition of its foreign policy approaches. Its relations with the West have gone under a rough patch since Turkey no more enjoyed its tactical position under the Soviet threat. On the one hand, relations with the USA are never the same after Turkish Parliament’s disapproval of Iraq War in 2003 and the accession process with the EU has taken an ambiguous path. Many have started questioning the possibility of de-westernization of Turkish foreign policy. On the other hand, Turkey has not put an end to Europeanizing reforms and still insists to become a member to the EU. Therefore, this study will aim to shed a light on Turkey’s persistent quest to become a Western/European state.

1.1 Research Question and Related Sub-questions

Historical institutionalism (HI) suggests that the conditions surrounding the formation stage of a policy or an institution has a determinant effect on the policy far into the future. Therefore, the policies tend to be path dependent (Peters, 1999, p. 63). Nevertheless, from a rational choice institutionalist (RCI) perspective, even an institutional setting, actors continue to be rational and continue to seek for their best interests. Institutions offer some constraints to actor preference; however in the end it is totally up to the actors to choose to obey these constraints or not (Shepsle, 2006, p. 24).

The main research question of this study is “How does westernism effect Turkish foreign policy?”. Given the hypotheses of the two approaches, it is needed
to examine under what circumstances westernism had emerged, what the link between westernism and foreign policy and how westernism was institutionalized. Finally we need to ask whether westernism generates a path-dependency regarding Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy and whether Turkey’s relations with the West were interest-driven.

1.2 Scope of the Research

In order to refine the research, a definition of the institution in the scope of this case would be needed. This will also help to clarify what is not included in the scope of this research. While there are several definitions of institutions, the definition by Thelen and Steinmo will be followed, not only they actually are historical institutionalists, also it is the best fitting definition to the phenomena at hand. According to them, the definition includes both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure the conduct (Thelen et al., 1992, p. 2), they encourage development of intermediate-level categories; which is, according to them, the difference between the old and the new institutionalisms. ‘Intermediate’ here means, according to Guy Peters, is the level between the generality of states as entities and individual behavior (Peters, 1999, p. 66). The significance of intermediate-level institution is that they ‘mediate between the behavior of individual political actors and national political outcomes (Thelen et al., p. 11). The definition of Uphoff, referring to public administration, is also relevant to the case at hand; according to him institutions are ‘complexes of norms and behaviors that persist over time by serving collectively valued purposes’, no matter they are organizations or not; because some institutions may have organizational forms with established roles and structures, although others may appear in form of ‘pervasive influences on behavior’ (Raadschelders, 1998, p. 568)

In this case, the institution should be between Turkey as a state and individual diplomats. The Turkish law distributes the authority of the making of foreign policy between Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the government and partially to the president and to the military. Turkish law provides authority to National Security Council (MGK) in matters related to security (Özcan, 2004, p. 829), which is composed of the president, the prime minister and some ministers; along with Turkish General Staff; high rank generals from Turkish Army. Thus, the military also has influence on foreign policy. The effect of public opinion and civil society will not be examined in the scope of this research; main reason is the institutional nature of the theories employed.

First, this study will start by a statement of methodology to be applied with justifications. It will be followed by the explanation of the approaches employed; historical institutionalism (HI) and rational choice institutionalism (RCI). Then, as HI points to the importance of initial stage of a policy, the Ottoman background for the reforms and westernism and Mustafa Kemal’s ideology will be explained. The final chapter will be dedicated to examine the question of path dependency in
Turkish foreign policy, the three institutional determinants; the MFA, leaders and the Turkish Military will be examined, we will see how Turkish foreign policy experts perceive the continuity of the Turkish foreign policy and we will have a brief look at Turkey’s relations with the West and to its alternative policy approaches. Finally, an empirical analysis using HI and RCI will be conducted to answer the research question at hand.

2 Methodology

The research will be conducted using a theory-testing methodology. If a theory is fairly well developed, the case study can be used to test theories. By theory testing, the aim is not to refute a certain theory completely; but rather to understand its scope and possibly to have a look at applicability of competing theories. According to George and Bennett, it is quite challenging to imply whether the theory fails when it cannot explain any evidence in the case; it may not be clear if the theory fails to explain that specific case or to explain any case at all. Thus, we should not jump to conclusion if the theory fails to explain an abnormality; it may still explain other cases (George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 115-116). Therefore some claims on Turkish foreign policy will be examined, as indicated in the introduction.

What makes HI relevant to this case is that it provides the necessary framework in order to understand policy continuity over time within a country (Thelen et al., p. 10). HI claims that the ‘policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or a policy is initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future’ (Peters, 1999, p. 63). However, Alexander George suggests that single case studies face a certain risk, as single case studies may lead to selective facts and may exclude other explanations. A researcher focusing on a single theory may show little or no interest to alternative scenarios and this may create a strong confirmation bias (George and Bennett, p.217). Moreover, HI is a flexible theory, meaning that there is a variety of definitions from different theoreticians within HI. In order to avoid this, he suggests an alternative explanation, possibly by using the next best-fitting theory. According to Martin Carrier, explanation by a certain theory will be stronger and more convincing if it reaches to facts that could not been expected from best rival theory and if it has thing to say about reality when the adversary theory has nothing to say about (Carrier, 1988, pp. 213-214).

Since the subject is about politics and RCI is very controversial to HI (more controversial than constructivist or sociological institutionalisms), it constitutes
the best rival theory. The main theoretical basis remaining HI, the RCI will provide an alternative explanation to what appears to be the continuity. Application of RCI is another reason to use deduction (theory-testing) but not theory-building; which is actually more accommodating to HI. RCI offers global assumptions, a ‘universal tool kit’, whereas historical institutionalists work with empirical data and develop their own results (Thelen et al., p. 11). However, for the sake of argument, it would be much more convenient to carry a deductive approach; as RCI offers a strong position to begin with.

Since the process at hand is quite long, the type of analysis will be process tracing rather than historical explanation. Process tracing helps the researchers to be selective and pinpoint the events in history that are relevant to the research. Alexander George points out that theories used in process tracing should be sufficiently specified, so that the researcher may confidently identify causal processes (George and Bennett, p. 218). HI is sufficiently detailed and refined, it is not just about continuity and gives a certain room for change; at one hand it offers a path dependent causal link and on the other hand offers several definitions of change. The process at hand may change and still can be in line with the path. Moreover, process tracing has a big potential to convert that it seems to be atheoretical into analytical finding, if there is a potential causal path during the process uncovered via research (George and Bennett, p. 221). Thelen and Steinmo also agree that process tracing is central to HI (Thelen et al., p. 9). Since there aren’t many research dedicated to theorizing Turkish foreign policy (except the ones using realism) and most studies settle for history telling rather than analysis, process tracing may help this research to come up with a new causal link that might explain continuity in Turkish foreign policy.

3 Theoretical Framework

Study of institutions is a long time tradition, according to Guy Peters; it can even be traced back to antiquity and the first systematic thinking about political life. However, if we were to talk about the emergence of institutionalism, it coincides with the emergence of political science from late 19th century through the first half of 20th (Peters, 1999, p. 3-6). Since then, questions regarding the institutions remained principal
3.1 New Institutionalism

The term ‘institutionalism’ refers to a general approach to the study of political institutions; it is a collection of theoretical ideas and hypotheses surrounding the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance and change. March and Olsen define an institution as an enduring collection of rules and organized practices, a structure resilient to individual practices and external circumstances. Institutions empower and constrain individuals, making them capable of acting according to rules, in a sense of acting ‘appropriately’ (March and Olsen, 2006, p. 3-4).

The ‘old’ institutionalism mostly included detailed configurative studies of different administrative, legal and political structures, often normative and only a small portion was comparative. Comparative analysis were mostly juxtapositions of descriptions of different institutional organizations, though was not really permissive towards development of true comparative research and explanatory theories (Thelen et al., p. 3), while most of the research was atheoretical and descriptive (Peters, p. 3-10).

The studies on institutions were highly influenced by the behavioral revolution in 1950s and 1960s. Under the influence of rational choice and behavioralism, it was assumed that individuals act unconstraint by institutional rules but autonomously, dependant on their socio-psychological characteristics or on rational calculations of utility (Peters, p. 15). The behavioral revolution was considered as an attack to the tradition where government and politics were considered as the issue of formal-legal institutions; this tradition was criticized as being too formalistic, old fashioned and insensitive to non-political elements of political behavior (March and Olsen, p. 5) According to behavioralists, in order to understand politics and political outcomes, instead of formal institutions, analysts should focus on informal distributions of power (Thelen et al., p. 4). While behavioralism was in complete denial on the role of formal institutions for determining political outputs, rational choice was somewhat hospitable to institutionalism.

According to Rhodes, behavioralism was a reaction against old institutionalism and new institutionalism was a reaction against behavioralism (Rhodes, 2006, p. 92-93). Behavioralists wanted to go beyond formal institutions by looking at observable beliefs and behaviors of individuals and groups. Nevertheless, this was answered by critiques of institutionalist and consequently generated three approaches of new institutionalism: rational choice, historical and normative institutionalisms. According to Kenneth Shepsle (one of the theoreticians of RCI), behavioralism came with its price: restriction of scope of analysis (Thelen et al., p. 5). For instance, according to Thelen and Steinmo (of main developers of HI), behavioralists could not answer why the political behaviors, attitudes and distribution of power among groups differed from one country to another. March and Olsen (normative institutionalists) also largely criticized behavioralism as the state and forms of political organization lost their centrality in political science: they find it rather unwilling to separate polity from
the rest of society, to attribute political outcomes to organizational structures and rules of appropriate behavior, to question political actors’ obligations and duties and to recognize the meaning of political life through symbols, rituals and ceremonies (March and Olsen, 1984, 735).

New institutionalism was initially named by March and Olsen in 1984, it was a name for new theoretical works in political science that blended the old concern with institutions into theoretical styles. According to March and Olsen: ‘…new institutionalism emphasizes the relative autonomy of political institutions, possibilities for inefficiency in history, and the importance of symbolic action to an understanding of politics’ (March and Olsen, p. 734). Since the beginning of the 80’s, there has been a growing concern on formal and informal institutions and the role they play. This new wave of institutionalists not only carried the features of ‘old’ institutionalism, but enriched it with new theoretical and empirical frameworks. The new institutionalism advanced institutionalism with new research tools and a deep interest with theorization (Peters, p. 1). March and Olsen see new institutionalism as a ‘cumulative consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and persistent commentary from observers of them’; the kind of transformation caused by institutions’ becoming larger, more complex and increasingly important to collective life (March and Olsen, p. 374).

An important point we need to recognize about new institutionalism is that it doesn’t constitute a unified body of thought. According to Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, there are at least three approaches that call themselves as new institutionalists: HI, RCI and sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 936). Today the list goes longer; with the addition of normative institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, international institutionalism, network institutionalism, discursive institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism; and potentially the list goes on.

Even with this diversification, Guy Peters point out that there are some common characteristics that unify these approaches. With differences in definition, structures matter in all of them. Structures persist while individuals come and go. New institutionalists also argue that structures create regularity on human behavior, thus enhance explanatory and predictive capacity of social sciences (Peters, 2008, pp. 5-6). Finally, Steinmo describes an institutionalist as a scholar who gives ‘special emphasis to the role that institutions play in structuring behavior’ (Steinmo, 2008, p. 123).

### 3.2 Historical Institutionalism

HI claims that the ‘policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or a policy is initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future’ (Peters, 1999, p. 63). The idea of the persistence of initial patterns in HI is referred to as ‘path dependency’. Thus, before an elaborated explanation of HI, it is important to understand what path dependency is.
3.2.1 Path Dependency

Handling path dependency, Raadschelders refers to two questions: whether we can understand the impact of time on the present and whether the analysis of development in space and time may help us understand the decision makers when they face a critical choice between a range of alternatives (Raadschelders, p. 565). William Sewell gives a vague definition of path dependence; ‘what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time. Margret Levi uses a tree metaphor rather than a path: when a country starts a track it will be costly to reverse; “there will be choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice”; as on a tree there are several branches from the same trunk; even if it may seem possible to change the branch we would tend to follow the branch that we begun with (Pierson, 2004, p. 20). Pierson suggests that ‘policies provide incentives that encourage individuals to act in ways that lock in a particular path of policy development’ (Pierson, 1993, p. 606).

According to Scott Page, there are four related reasons of path dependence: increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedbacks and lock-in:

“Though related, these causes differ. Increasing returns means that the more a choice is made or an action is taken, the greater its benefits. Self-reinforcement means that making a choice or taking an action puts in place a set of forces or complementary institutions that encourage that choice to be sustained. With positive feedbacks, an action or choice creates positive externalities when that same choice is made by other people… Increasing returns can be thought of as benefits that rise smoothly as more people make a particular choice and positive feedbacks as little bonuses given to people who already made that choice or who will make that choice in the future. Finally, lock-in means that one choice or action becomes better than any other one because a sufficient number of people have already made that choice.” (Page, 2006, p. 88)

An important feature that an historical process generates is positive feedback, which refers to the irreversibility of history. Characteristics of a positive feedback process: they are unpredictable; as the early events have large and random effects, they are inflexible, further down the path it becomes harder to shift into an alternative; early accidents in the process do not cancel out, they have feedback into the future (Pierson, p. 18). Once structures are institutionalized, they create their own “boundary-maintaining mechanisms, its own directions of change and its own potential for further development” (Raadschelders, p. 570). Many scientists talk about path dependency while talking about the processes where history matters; eventually early events matter more than later ones; and different sequences may bring different outcomes. Path dependence is invoked to support some claims; such as to indicate that relatively small events may cause large
outcomes or to demonstrate that specific patterns of timing and sequence matter (Pierson, p. 18). According to Raadschelders, once we grasp the root of the path, we may actually map the path; path dependency not only links past to present but also can demonstrate how past limits the range of choices in present (Raadschelders, p. 570).

Positive feedback draws attention to a few important points on a path-dependent process; it emphasizes that switching paths get costlier as we go down the path; it differs formative periods and conjunctures from the periods that reinforce the path. Thus the question concerning positive feedback becomes rather a question of when it happens than what happens (Pierson, p. 19). Possibly the most mentioned example of path dependence, even by the political scientists is the QWERTY keyboards. Since its development, QWERTY model established persistence and is resistant to fundamental change (Boas, 2007, pp. 34-35 and Barnes et al., 2004, p. 371), to the point that it became very costly to develop and market computers with rearranged the letters.

Talking about path dependency, we should not assume that there is no room for change. According to David Wilsford, a path-dependent sequence of policy change would be tied down by previous decisions; however a combination of path-dependency and strong conjunctural forces or occasional windows of exceptional opportunity may determine how a political system responds to policy imperatives (Wilsford, 1994, p. 252).

3.2.2 Framework

According to Sven Steinmo, HI is not a theory or a method, but best can be described as an approach (Steinmo, 2008, p. 118). Institution in this context is generally described as rules: some emphasize formal rules and organizations, while others describe as informal rules and norms (p. 124). Scholars of HI study history simply because they believe that history matters. Steinmo demonstrates three reasons why history matters. First, politics occur in a historical context that directly affects decisions and outcomes. Second, actors can learn from experience. And finally expectations are shaped by the past. History is not treated as a mere chain of independent events; causal variable are interdependent rather than independent (pp. 127-128).

According to Pierson, ‘important influences on courses of development may operate only over time and are unlikely to be captured by snapshot accounts focused on the choices of particular actors.’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 134). HI treats all political phenomena in the same manner irrespective of time, it can offer a deeper and richer understanding of a specific event as it would treat the variable outside the temporal context (Steinmo, p. 127). HI focuses on organizational configurations where others look at particular settings in isolation; it pays attention to critical junctures and long-term processes where others look only at slices of time or short-term maneuvers. (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002, p. 693).

Institutional development is a lengthy process, and early decisions in the process may essentially limit the available options in the future; it is really
important to identify such constraints in order to capture reasons of institutional change. One of the main features of HI is the acceptance that historical development over time is path dependent. In order to understand policy outcomes, we must recognize historical development of the institution and understand original, distinct culture and problems in which the institution emerged (Sanders, 2006, p. 39). According to Ellen Immergut, institutions not only give obstacles but they also constrain the “menu of choices available in different regimes” (Steinmo, p. 124).

Historical institutionalists are interested in explanation rather than prediction; mostly because for them predictions can only be proximate. We may have tool or models for predictions, however due to ‘complex interactions of interdependent variable’ there would be many possible outcomes (p. 134).

Another important characteristic of HI is the importance of ideas. In an institutional context, ideas are the glue that holds the members of the institution together and serve as a standard for evaluation of the institution’s policy outcomes (Sanders, p. 42). Ideas and principles, as well, can create persistence and path dependency once they are institutionalized. A very common assumption in HI is that the individuals would accept the constraints of the institution when they choose to participate. This refers to a notion, as what Peters calls, an ‘autopilot’ mechanism; meaning that the principles put forward by the members some decades ago would still endure (Peters, p. 71). HI is not very clear on how individual ideas are translated into institutional setting. However, we may assume that individuals are ready to accept the ideas would join the institution, or at least would have the goals that are compatible with the goals of the institution. Or at least, the organization should have the capacity to ‘sell’ its ideas and norms to current and future members of the institution, which is crucial to establish the structure-actor link (p. 72).

3.2.3 Institutional Change

In the context of HI, change is quite problematic but still possible. Steinmo gives a couple of reasons why institutions would resist changing; institutions are normally are embedded within a larger set of institutions, therefore other institutions which will be likely to be affected by the change of a certain institution would create pressure not to change. Moreover, individuals in the institutional sphere have expectations from the continuity of the set of norms and rules; otherwise the institution would become unstable and unpredictable. Norms and rules may cause a lock-in, as the institutions invest in teaching the rules and new rules may raise new costs. Finally, institutions affect the preferences of its members: individual may come to prefer to continue to live with current rules simply because they are used to (Steinmo, p. 129). Institutions may be resistant to change; however, this doesn’t necessarily mean the outcomes from the very institution may remain constant. A drastic change in socio-economic or political environment may cause a subtle shift in outcomes (Thelen at al., p. 18). Sanders points out that, in the context of HI, it is
possible to understand historical change both as a bottom-up or a top-down process. As a top-down process, the focus is on the leaders, elites and the higher rank officials; who may enforce new rules and ideas (Sanders, pp. 44-47). According to Steinmo, institutions may change when powerful actors demonstrate the will and ability to do so in the presence of new ideas. Collective approval of change may be needed, if the idea is the solution for a specific problem (Steinmo, pp. 130-131). A more pluralist approach is bottom-up; meaning that the crowd at the bottom of the organization may force to change; just like workers defending their rights may cause change within the organization.

Another model of change is the one of Stephen Krasner; which is called punctuated equilibrium. According to this model, institutions enjoy long periods of stability, which are periodically ‘punctuated’ by crises that would cause institutional change. The types of crises are external, like a change in the conjuncture. However, institutions are still bound to their historical arrangements, meaning that this would still remain a study of institutions not the external changes (Thelen et al, p. 15). Peters points out that there are limits to this model, most importantly the model is incapable of prediction. Only after the institutional change we may assume that there had been a force enough to cause change (Peters, 1999, pp. 68-69). Another, yet similar model is ‘critical junctures’. In this model change happens by some sort of coalition of a variety of forces, who would be incapable of change if acted individually (p. 69). Finally, Paul Pierson suggests that institutions can change by evolution. He believes that gradual change is also possible; institutions may incrementally adjust in order to answer changing demands or incapability of the initial design (p. 70).

3.3 Historical Institutionalism vs. Rational Choice Institutionalism

Realist school approaches may be seen as over-rated, as they are genuinely criticized by many scholars. However, many scholars continue to think about politics in realist terms; a constant power struggle, balance of power or rational actors maximizing their interests. RCI, like other realist approaches, focus on actor behavior, however in an institutional context. According to Shepsle, an institution is ‘...a script that names the actors, their respective behavioral repertoires (or strategies), the sequence in which the actors choose from them, the information they possess when they make their selections, and the outcome resulting from the combination of actor choices’ (Shepsle, 2006, p. 24). Besides the assumption of individualistic behavior, rational choice institutionalists have come to understand that political life mostly occurs in institutional settings (Peters, 1999, p. 43).

Different scholars have different views about how HI differs from RCI. In every possible occasion, they would not abstain from criticizing one another.
Historical institutionalist claim is that the RCI falls short on explaining real observed events. On the other hand, rational choice institutionalists claims that historical institutionalists are only bringing details together and ‘merely telling stories’ (Thelen, 1999, p. 372). Nevertheless, both institutionalisms agree that institutions are ‘humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (Sanders, p. 42). Sanders suggests that two schools differ in object and the timespan of their studies; for rational choice, it is the ‘microcosmic game, the particular interaction of preference-holding, utility-seeking individuals within a set of (stable) institutional constraints’. Whereas for HI, the main interest is ‘construction, maintenance and adaptation of institutions’, rather than individual, logic-driven preferences of actors (Sanders, p. 42).

On the one hand in RCI, individuals act rationally by using cost and benefit calculations, even in an institutional context individual would strategically follow the rules and norms, simply to maximize gain: because individual get more when they co-operate (Steinmo, p. 126). Institutions may only constraint behavior in a strategic context; members of an institution adapt to change and new rules in pursuit of their interest (Thelen et al., p. 7). Shepsle calls it as ‘equilibrium ways of doing things’; a player may decide to play with different rules, making the institution out of equilibrium and fragile (Shepsle, p. 26). On the other hand; in HI individuals can be both norm-abiding and self-interested; if we were to observe a certain constant organizational quality, then we would need a wider view of persistent, self-sustaining practices rather than a focus on individual behavior (Thelen et al, p. 8). Moreover, HI is rather skeptic to such definitions, but rather would be interested to understand why a certain policy choice was made or a certain outcome happened. The rest would be explained by looking at the history and it would be then discovered whether it was self interest or the logic of appropriateness that was determinant in the process (Steinmo, p. 126). Shepsle criticizes historical institutional view of seeing institutions as “magical”, institutions form and reform by complex and unknowable forces and never by human intervention (Shepsle, pp. 26-27).

In HI, goals and collective action are much more important than personal benefit, goals have a public dimension. Rational choice puts institutions under a microscope; however historical institutionalism is more interested in institutional evolution. Moreover, while rational choice is concerned with preferences, historical institutionalism is attentive to ideas (Sanders, p. 42). In RCI, actor preferences form the situation; whereas in historical institutionalism, the institutions not only shape strategies but also the goals of the actors (Thelen et al., p. 8). As Thelen and Steinmo put “…unless something is known about the context, broad assumptions about "self-interested behavior" are empty”, historical institutionalists may believe that interest-maximization had played a role, however they would not simply explain the situation only with individual behavior (p. 9). Preference formation is handled quite differently in two approaches. In RCI, instutions are exogenous constraints; differently put, they limit human behavior as external factors. Instution offers a sequence of strategies in which actors may choose (Shepsle, p. 24). However in historical institutionalist context, institutions serve as endogenous factors; they shape not only actors’ goals and strategies, they
also mediate actors’ cooperation and conflicts. When institutions structure politics, they leave their imprints (Thelen et al, p. 9).

Finally, according to Thelen, the differences between the two approaches might be over exaggerated. For instance; according to Rueschemeyer HI ‘go beyond conventional history’s preoccupation with historical particularity and aim for theoretical generalization’ (Thelen, 1999, p. 373). If we were to talk about generalizations, it means the two theories have more in common after all. It means that HI can be stretched into a more theoretical approach. Besides, there is evidence that rational choice institutionalists becoming more empirical; such as Bates’ conclusion that their study has become more problem driven then theory driven; they have explored the cases and not elaborated the theory (Thelen, p. 373).

4 Ideology, Concepts and Background for Turkish Foreign Policy

According to Ilhan Tekeli, modernization is a project aimed to change the world. It is the fruit of the illumination, and has different aspect; economy, technology, knowledge, morality, art… Another feature of the project is education, so that the people can free themselves from bounds of traditional ways of life. Finally, it requires institutional reorganization in order to support change (Tekeli, 2009, pp. 19-20). Habermas points out the difference between the modernity and modernization. According to him, modernity is the project and the ideas and modernization is the structural and institutional evolution that makes the project and the ideas possible. In this case, Ahmet Çağdem suggests that non-western civilization may only modernize but not be completely modern. Westernization is a compensatory ideology and the tool for overcoming the historical delay ( Çağdem, 2009, p. 68), and is used for in exchange of modernization (however bearing slight differences), following the example of the West and is a project involving social engineering (Ortaylı, 2008, p. 24). According to Ilber Ortaylı, West constitutes an example to modernizing countries, because western civilization demonstrated a consciousness that realized the necessity of change and figured how to intervene and control change before any other civilization (Ortaylı, 1985, p. 134). ‘West’ in this context refers to Western Europe (Ortaylı,
2008, p. 36) however together with Northern America starting from late 19th Century.

4.1 Ottoman Legacy: Emergence of Westernism and Westernization

Before the waves of modernization in Europe, the Ottoman Empire was one of the most powerful and developed states; yet enjoyed ‘Pax Ottomana’ for centuries (Tekeli, p. 21). The meaning and application of westernization was totally different then we perceive today. Westernization emerged because of practical concerns (Toker and Tekin, 2009, p. 82). The first movements of westernization started on early 19th Century in Ottoman Empire. At first, the ideas emerged after the French Revolution did not find any echo in Ottoman Empire. The western ideas were systematically rejected, mainly because of Islam – Christianity rivalry (Lewis, 1961, p. 40) However, the empire had lots of points of contact with the West; sooner or later, it was inevitable that the European ideas would find its voice within the empire. First attempts of westernization were accomplished in early 18th Century, however were mostly imitation or adaptation of selected elements from Western civilization (Ortaylı, p. 137, Lewis, p. 45). Some reforms were carried out mainly because of the realization that the gap between the European states and the empire was growing, mainly in terms of military power. For instance military engineering school and army of Nizam-ı Cedid (New Order) founded by Sultan Selim III (p.57). The westernization movements bore a new political thought: the westernism. However, the essence of this thought was still technical and practical. This kind of mentality led to a denial of insolvability of the empire’s problems with partial reforms (Toker and Tekin, p. 82).

Sultan and his advisers tried to implement a series of reforms, in order to reinforce the empire and gain sympathy from western states. Most continuous period of reforms was between 1839 and 1872; which is the period first Abdülmecit (1839-1861) then Abdülaziz (1861-1876) reigned. However, this was received as a mere opportunistic diplomacy movement by the European states (Zürcher, 2005, p. 4). Nevertheless, the reforms were not really consistent; they were mostly implemented, as some sort of patch to repair the failures of the Empire. Considering the complex state system of the Empire, it is fair to say that the empire was in no place to response quickly to foreign ideas. The administration was aware that the empire was not functioning as it should be; however, at first, the solution found was to repair existing institutions (Tekeli, p. 22). Moreover, the reforms transformed the empire to its most authoritarian state ever (Zürcher, p.8).
In 1839, Sultan Abdülmecit announced the famous Tanzimat Fermanı (Rescript of Reorganization), which brought serous changes and marked the era. It proclaimed principles such as security of life, honor and property, abolished the tax-farming, introduced the right to fair and public trial (Lewis, p. 107). Tanzimat reduced the power of the providence, especially the one of the dominant feudal families. As the state mechanism become much more centralized in the hands of the sultan and Babıali (the imperial government) (increasingly the Babıali rather than the sultan himself); the need of new institutions emerged. Modern schools were established, modern laws were passed, and the authority of the ulema (Muslim legal scholars) was diminished (Zürcher, p. 7).

Higher rank bureaucrats increasingly started to be educated abroad, especially within the new diplomatic missions established in Europe and the translation room within Babıali. This new generation of bureaucrats was not really popular; they were conceived as degenerated. As they were much more open to ways of modern life of Europe, they lost their conception of ottoman values and traditions. They grew apart from the public mass. However, their understanding of European culture was superficial and they were trying to bring modernity to the empire with this superficial knowledge (Zürcher, p. 8).

As more and more bureaucrats were educated, it was unavoidable that they came to understand the true essence of western ideas, such as nationalism and liberalism. These new bureaucrats created the movement known as the Young Ottomans. They criticized the superficial nature of Tanzimat and centralization of authority, and they started to make demands such as establishment of a parliament and a constitution. The focus of their criticism was not the sultan but Babıali, which dominated the administration (Mardin, 2008, p. 33). On the other hand, Young Ottomans were still devoted to Islam; they believe that in its true essence, Islam was compatible with modernity. They were looking for ways to synthesize the Islam of 7th Century with the liberalism of 19th Century. To promote their ideas, they used means that were new to the empire; the press (Zürcher, pp. 9-11). As a requirement of its development, Turkish westernization demanded certain features. They may have wanted to be westernized; however they wanted to stay as Ottoman, Turkish and Muslim (Çiğdem, p. 69). This is why ideologies like ottomanism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism were popular among the Young Ottomans.

The Young Ottomans formed secret organizations, and eventually casted suspicion of the government; which resulted with their expulsion away from Istanbul. However, they always had the desire to return to Istanbul and to participate in the bureaucracy again, so that they could influence the politics (Zürcher, pp. 12-13). However, the movement could not revive at this point.

Between 1871 and 1876, conservatives regained power. Nevertheless, Ottoman Empire continued to fall; the empire announced bankruptcy on 1876. This had negative effects on empire’s international image and European forces took control of Ottoman economy (p. 13). A new set of reforms were established, partially from necessity and partially because of the fear of external intervention. On 1876, government established the constitution and a parliament, with European attributes embedded; however this did not boost Ottoman’s image in the
West. It did not take long before sultan Abdülhamit took control, dissolved the parliament, restored monarchy and transformed the regime into despotism and reigned until 1909 (pp. 13-18). While he repressed the opposition, he did not put a stop to the reforms (on education, administration, law, transport, communication…); he adapted Western methods. Meanwhile, he followed a strict censorship policy and tried to keep western ideas away.

Within the new schools (Galatasaray (Imperial High School), Mulkiye (Administrative School), Harbiye (Military Academy) and Bahriye (Imperial Navy School)), there were many teachers who shared Young Ottomans’ ideals. It is also important to mention that, since the banishment of the Janissaries (they were the bodyguards of the Sultan) in 1839, it kind of became a tradition to accept students from lower classes of the population. The underlying reason was to limit the dependence on the traditional elites, nonetheless resulted as an outspread of western ideas to the people from various backgrounds (Mardin, p. 72). This new social class with a broader base in Ottoman society was “determined to alter not only political, but also the social and economic structure of the empire in their own favor” (Ahmad, 2008a, p. 5).

The growing opposition started to form secret organizations, and the movement was now called the Young Turks, many from the Young Ottomans participated this movement, as well (Mardin, p. 34). The most famous of all was the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which grew fast between 1894 and 1896 (Zürcher, p 23). As a result of Abdülhamit’s despotism, many Young Turks had to escape to Europe; they even managed to publish newspapers abroad, such as ‘La Turquie Contemporaine’ (Contemporary Turkey) in Paris (Mardin, p. 38). For the very same reason, many of them chose to organize away from the capital, in the providences of the Empire, such as in Bulgaria and Macedonia (p. 47).

They believed that the Babıali was making far too many concessions when comes to relations with European states. Moreover, they were convinced of the necessity of giving a number of rights to the peoples1 of the empire, in order to put a stop to dissolution of the empire (Ottomanism); because then they would not have a reason to support separatist movements (Akşin, 2001, p. 25). They aimed to restore the parliamentary monarchy; which they believed to be the protector of rights and continuity of modernization. They were organized as cells; every member could only know the identity of three members; the one who recruited him and his superior and the one that he himself recruited (p. 38). According to Akşin, they had a tendency towards creating some sort of bourgeoisie; they were all well educated, dressed like Europeans. They also let the women to join their organization on equal terms with men; which would have been nothing but a fantasy if we think of any other Ottoman organization (p. 118).

Even if Abdulhamit tried to suppress the Western impact, he failed to do so. He could not foresee the emergence of the new generation of manifesting intellectuals (Berkes, 1998, pp.289-289). According to Berkes, these new intellectuals found comfort in Western ideas; Europe was a land of freedom, art, dignity and reason for them (p. 291). As it was mentioned before, the early

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1 They referred to the non-muslim groups, especially in the Balkans; who were deeply affected by the nationalist and separatist movements after the French revolution
conceptions of modernization was not opposed to Islam. However, more and more westernists started to see the oriental culture as backward and western culture as superior (pp. 296-297). Even so, they were not complete democrats, they only aimed to restore the parliament and end the despotism. The will to remove Abdülhamit from the throne was growing; however, two serious attempts before 1908 failed. In 1907, CUP organized a big congress in Paris, in order to unite the opposition. With the help of CUP members within the post services, the organization in Macedonia grew. The most crucial development was without doubt was the involvement of the officers from the Third Army in Macedonia and Second Army in Edirne. They started a rebellion against the sultan, even if the sultan tried to send troops he could not stop their march towards Istanbul; many of the sultan’s soldiers were killed and many were already sympathizers of CUP and refused to fight against them. Sultan finally gave up on 23 July 1908 and restored the constitution and the parliament (Zürcher, 1993, pp. 89-90). The end of the despotism of 30 years was embraced by the masses; there were celebrations all over Istanbul (Akşin, p.124). Higher rank members of the committee went to Istanbul and formed a party. They won the elections by a large majority and formed a government.

CUP remained in power until the World War I, and their regime was no doubt questionable. They made many enemies along the road; especially of non-Muslim ethnicities and Islamist-conservative groups, along with the liberals who separated from the unionists. However, they had important effects relevant to the case at hand. The first modern diplomats came amongst this new generation of intellectuals. The first westernist ideas in Turkey had emerged with their presence. Possibly the most important of all is the fact that Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the other founders of the Republic of Turkey was once a member of CUP and were genuinely inspired by the new wave of ideas.

4.2 Kemalism and Kemalist Westernism

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is the founder of the Republic of Turkey (29 October 1923) and the first president of the republic. In the literature, he usually is referred to as Mustafa Kemal for the era before the republic was found and as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk or simply as Ataturk for the era of the republic; as the launched the surname law in 1934 and his surname was given by the National Assembly of Turkey. His surname literally means ‘forefather of the Turks’. His ideology is usually referred to as Atatürkçülük (Ataturkism) in Turkish, however usually translated as Kemalism in the literature in English.

The reforms of Mustafa Kemal, which eventually coincides with the first one and a half decades of the Republic of Turkey is usually referred to as the Kemalist Revolution. However this usage of the term ‘revolution’ is unique to Kemalist Revolution, in the sense that revolutions normally occur around a group or a class of people. For instance, in case of Soviet Revolution, Lenin’s presence is strong but he is not the only one to initiate it. However, in this case it involves ideas and
implementation of a man, which led to the referral to Mustafa Kemal as ‘Tek Adam’ (The Only Man) (Aksin, 2009, p. 21).

Mustafa Kemal started to manifest his agenda during the War of Independence (1919-1923); while many were still loyal to the Sultan. Istanbul was under occupation since World War I, which led to the gathering of a national assembly on exile on 23 April 1920 in Ankara, which later became the capital of the republic. However, the assembly was not recognized by Sultan Vahdeddin, who was in throne in occupied Istanbul (Okyar, 1984, p. 49). As early as July 1920, he declared in the National Assembly that the government should pass to the hands of the people (Lewis, p. 256). The clash between the two national powers; Sultan and his government in Istanbul and the National Assembly in Ankara reached its climax in the negotiations after the Independence war, when both sides were invited to the peace negotiations in Lausanne on 28 October 1922. This resulted as the realization of Mustafa Kemal that the Sultanate should be abolished once and for all, in order to put an end to this division (p. 257). Mustafa Kemal decided to divide the titles ‘sultan’ and ‘caliphate’ which the sultans hold since the 16th Century. Therefore he tried to avoid the reaction of religious-conservative groups while the National Assembly successfully abolished the sultanate on 1 November 1922 on unanimous vote (p. 259). The People’s Party (later became Republican People’s Party) (CHP) was found on April 1923; Mustafa Kemal became the head of the party. The first manifesto of the party covered many of his ideas, however he was cautious about revealing his ideas; in his own words he did not want to “give the ignorant and the reactionary the opportunity to poison the whole nation” (p. 260). Soon, the assembly proclaimed the republic (29 October 1923), Mustafa Kemal became the president and Ismet Pasha (Inönü) became the prime minister. This eventually caused unrest in Istanbul where many were loyal to the Caliph and to idea that Istanbul as the capital (Zürcher, 1993, p. 197).

Soon, the Caliphate became the symbol for the opposition. As long as the Caliphate and the Islamic institutions continued to exist; ‘the supporters of the old regime would always be able to manipulate the symbols of Islam as powerful weapons against the reformers and their programme’ (Ahmad, 1993, p. 54). It eventually led to the abolishment of the Caliphate and the banishment of the Ottoman dynasty from Turkey by the assembly on 3 March 1924.

The conservatives were not the only opposition; there was a certain group in Istanbul who started to support the idea of an American mandate, some of whom saw a great deal of loss of interest in case of nationalization and state control over economy. They believed that USA could bring the kind of development and prosperity that a nation needs in order to reach a modern state within twenty years. This type of opposition was far more dangerous than the supporters of the old regime, as they were liberals and modernists. They protested as they did not abolish the monarchy in order to establish a republic under the personal rule of Mustafa Kemal (Ahmad, p. 56). However, according to Kemalists, these demands could only represent short term interests; they only wanted to profit from the “commercial intermediary in a country run by a mandatory power” (Ahmad, 2008a, p. 181).
Another opposing group was Mustafa Kemal’s military rivals; who are from upper class families, who had strong bounds with the Ottoman dynasty over generation; thus were loyal to them. However, according to Feroz Ahmad, what makes Mustafa Kemal so different was his background. He was from a family of provincial lower-middle class that sees the army as a mean of employment and upward mobility in a slow economy. They did not feel the kind of loyalty that the upper class has to the sultan; thus making them much more radical and open to idea of change (Ahmad, p. 56).

As it was mentioned before, westernism led to a disconnection from the traditions and old structures. Mustafa Kemal tried to reject the Ottoman legacy as he one by one abolished the Ottoman institutions and structures; sultanate, caliphate, the Ottoman alphabet and the Islamic institutions. He changed the way people dress, he promoted modern laws and he gave the women the right to vote and to be elected. He believed that the Turkish people should be liberated from restrictive Ottoman value system. In his view of modernization, he believed in political change in order to create a system without barriers between the ruler and the people. He aimed to introduce a western type social, cultural, economic value system where individuals could be encouraged to develop their capacities (Okyar, p. 51).

Nonetheless, there is undeniable Ottoman intellectual heritage to Mustafa Kemal’s way of thinking, some aspects of his ideology was already present in Young Turks’ views. He was graduated from Harbiye (Imperial Military School) which was one of the most modern of its time (Oran, 2002a, p 53). Because of the secret nature of the Committee of Union and Progress, there is limited material on how the organization functioned in practice. However, there is still proof of Mustafa Kemal’s presence within the organization, especially for the years following the CUP revolution of 1908. In 1909, there was a counter-revolution attempt, against the parliamentary monarchy and CUP government. In order to stop it, CUP asked help of the army. Mustafa Kemal also took part in this army sent to Istanbul. Moreover, he participated in the 2nd Congress of CUP, and he defended the idea of non-intervention of the military to the politics (Zürcher, 2005, p. 75). He also befriended many who are known to have participated CUP (pp. 73-73).

The republic found in 1923 was not a democratic one, considering that it was at first a single-party system and involved suppression of opposition that is seen as a threat to the new regime. Considering that the country was under foreign occupation only a year ago and the fact that there are many groups of opposition, it would be hard to expect it to be so. He obviously put broader aspects of modernization ahead of political freedom (Okyar, p. 52). However, according to Feroz Ahmad, we can at least see it as an initiation to build a democratic secular state. After all, Kemalism’s main goal was ‘to raise Turkey to the level of contemporary Western civilization’ (Ahmad, 2008a, p. 176). Moreover, Mustafa Kemal was a high rank soldier, the Commander in Chief of the national forces during the independence war, the army had a great prestige and legitimacy; if he wanted to establish a military dictatorship, it would be much easier to establish than a republic (p. 177). However he chose to distance the army from politics
instead. The principle of popular participation, which is an important element to democracy, was present in his ideology, as his famous expression goes “unconditional, unrestricted sovereignty belongs to the nation”. Mustafa Kemal’s one-party authoritarian regime was unique; as it tried to remove the possibility of a dictatorship (Giritli, 1984, p. 253).

The program of the CHP adopted on 1931 is known as the ‘Six Arrows’, the six principles are considered as the main principals of Kemalism: republicanism, laicity, nationalism, revolutionism, populism and etatism. Republicanism comprises the notions of popular sovereignty, freedom and equality before law. Laicism created a state-controlled Islam (Ahmad, 2003, p. 84). Nationalism refers to a nation bound by a community of language, culture and ideal, it is not defined by race or religion but by cohesion. Revolutionism (in some literature translated as reformism) comes from the word ‘inkilab’ which is not mot-a-mot revolution but refers to a radical change applied with order and method. Populism means a government by the people and for the people. Finally, etatism is the intervention of the state where ever the general interest of the nation is involved (Dumont, 1984, pp. 26-41). According to Feroz Ahmad, the difference of modernization projects of late Ottoman and the modernization project of Kemalism is the Kemalism’s commitment to modernity and equality, whereas the empire tried to modernize the old order (Ahmad, p. 85). Atatürk’s westernism was not just about imitation or a superficial adaptation of western institutions but also about embracing infrastructure of the western model (Oran, p. 53).

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had a strong will and determination to create a modern Turkish nation, via westernizing reforms; where there was no room for those who supported Islamic traditions, communism and eastern ideals. The republic was born under the shadow of the phobia caused by the Treaty of Sevres; which anticipated the division of Turkish territory among the winning states of World War I, yet was not implemented as a result of the Turkish Independence War (Ahmad, 2008b, 261). There was always the pride of hard won independence from western imperialism; however, soon he started to repair relations with the western powers. Also, he maintained good relations with the Soviet Union and he always kept an open door for relations with other countries (Kushner, 1984, p. 233). He did not formally tied Turkey to the West; however, his legacy to his successors led them to take further steps to become an ally of the West (p. 234).

Kemalist ideology’s legacy provided stability and pacifism for Turkish foreign policy. He points out that all Turkish governments mention that they would follow a foreign policy in accordance with Atatürk’s principles in their programmes. Lausanne Treaty, signed after the Independence War with the Western powers was the initiation factor of the foreign policy oriented towards the West. Atatürk’s principle “Peace at home, peace in the World” served as a pacifying factor; Atatürk openly opposed to the idea of war by calling it murder (Aksın, 1999, p. 275). Contrary to the Empire’s foreign policy, he was not expansionist and wanted keep the borders of the new Turkish State as it is after the independence war (p. 276). Apparently, he aimed to create a positive international environment for Turkish Republic for the future (Sander, 2006, pp. 144-147).
5 Turkish – West Relations: Path Dependent?

Turkish foreign policy is a long tradition, taking its roots back to Ottoman diplomacy. Westernism has become a part of this tradition, it has been claimed that, western orientation in Turkish foreign policy has certain continuity and priority, for example by Oral Sander (Sander, p.71) and Faruk Sönmezoğlu (Sönmezoğlu, 2004, p. 1047). If we were to prove that this ‘continuity’ constitutes a path-dependency, we will be able to understand why Turkey insists this much to integrate with the Western world; for instance why Turkey insists to keep relations with USA or to become a member of the EU.

5.1 Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy

According to Guy Peters the environment of an institution is composed of other institutions if we were to talk about executive political functions; we need to understand how they relate to each other. He also points out that the relation between political executives and permanent bureaucrats in high civil service is crucial (Peters, 2008, pp. 200-201). Therefore, it is also necessary to examine how the government interacts with MFA and the military.

5.1.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

HI indicates that initial stage of an institution’s formation; first decision and conditions surrounding the formation have a determinate effect on that institution’s future. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the foundation of MFA. As a part of modernizing reforms in Ottoman Empire, ambassadors were sent out to Europe (first to Great Britain, in the following years to Prussia, France and Austria) by Sultan Selim III in 1972 for the first time. The ambassadors had a double mission; to restore the declining empire’s relations with European powers and to observe the political changes, to provide intelligence about their intentions towards the Empire (Girgin, 1994, pp. 40-42). However, as the ambassadors failed to accomplish what Selim II expected; for instance they failed to report France’s intervention to Egypt, they were called back to Istanbul (p. 43). An important
reason of this failure was the ambassadors’ lack of information, experience regarding foreign policy and knowledge of foreign languages (p. 45).

In the Ottoman system, Reisülküttap, one of the assistants of the Grand Vizier was responsible for foreign relations. Sultan Mahmut II reinstated the embassy system in 1836; however this time paired with ‘Hariciye Nezareti’ (Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs). However, this ministry was a continuity of classical organization and did not constitute much change. Until Tanzimat era, it is not possible to talk about application of modern diplomacy and international law. According to Versan, the main reason was Islamic foundation of the empire that restricted to establish relations on equal terms with non-Muslim states (Versan, 1999, p. 105). However, as the empire started to lose power and pushed to solitude, the need to establish closer relations with the West had emerged. The empire then started to accept the international law and principles of western diplomacy; being the first non-Christian/Western state to apply these rules (p. 107).

During Independence War, foreign relations were a matter of urgency. Within first ten days of the National Assembly; the ‘Hariciye Vekaleti’ (Ministry (or Representation) of Foreign Affairs 2(MFA) was established, on 2 May 1920; however with limited resources (Girgin, pp. 117-118). The ministry was composed of personnel of three, started to work in a room in Governor of Ankara’s building, a paper indicating the name of ministry attached to its door. Nevertheless, the Ministry moved to its own building soon, and started to establish relations with other states and nations; starting with Soviet Union and Armenians (pp. 118-119), meaning that other states started to recognize the Government in Ankara as legitimate. First missions abroad were also found before the Republic; in Baku, Rome and Moscow. During the first years of the Republic, the government had to donate land and buildings in Ankara to foreign missions which were long established in Istanbul; in order to lure them to move Ankara and to establish relations with the new ministry (p. 122).

As Girgin points out, the two ministries; one in Istanbul the other in Ankara, coexisted for 3.5 years. The ministry in Istanbul was legally nullified during fall 1922 and one third of the new MFA was composed of Ottoman diplomats (Uzgel, 2002, p. 75). Despite the fact that MFA tried to carry the foreign diplomatic missions to Ankara, today they are in peace with the Ottoman diplomacy’s legacy; as it is mentioned in the very first sentence of MFA’s history on their official website: ‘The Foreign Service of the Republic of Turkey is founded on the well established traditions and legacy of Ottoman diplomacy with a long history’. Deputy Undersecretary of MFA Aydan Karahan points out that MFA is highly committed to its traditions and to historical organization of its bureaucracy (Karahan, 1999, p. 729).

In historical institutionalist perspective, protection of ideas and values is crucial to the continuity of an institution, possibly by selecting individuals who are ready to do accept the constraints of an institution (Peters, p. 71). MFA is very conservative when it comes to recruitment. According to the regulation for MFA’s

2 Today the ministry is called Dışişleri Bakanlığı.
3 For more, please see: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-cumhuriyeti-disisleri-bakanligi-tarihcesi.en.mfa
recruitment; only graduates under the age of 31 may enter the exam, there is a short-list of faculties that the candidates must hold the diploma of; the candidates must obtain a certain point in the central Examination for the Recruitment of Public Personnel (KPSS). Then the qualifying candidates should apply to a separate examination of MFA, which is done in two stages. First is a series of written exams, composed of a series of essay questions in both Turkish and foreign languages (English, French and German) and translation questions. The questions are asked in order to reveal the views of the candidates about Turkish foreign policy; for instance the essay question asked in 2009’s examination was: “Enlist the top three priorities of Turkish foreign policy according to you and explain your own ideas about each one of them”. The question of 2008 was: “According to you, what should be the qualities of a Turkish diplomat?”.

Apparently, questions are very direct and do not make it very hard to differentiate the candidates with MFA material. The second stage is an oral exam, for the ones who could pass the first stage. This exam is the only form of recruitment according to the regulation (Oran, 2002b, pp. 57-58). This can also mean that the staff of MFA stays intact even if the governments change, even if the government differ in view of foreign policy from MFA. Moreover, according to Christopher Hill, diplomats have a strong sense of elite status; an esprit de corps. The examination is open to candidates from all social classes, however still in Turkey the diplomats are called as ‘mon cher’, because of their lifestyle, language and behaviors (Günver, 1999, p. 739). According to Günver; who is a retired diplomat; diplomats should be respectful, polite, should be attentive to their clothing and to their private life (p. 741). Turkish diplomats should be Kemalist, laic, democrat and modern (p. 742). If not elites, at least MFA may be trying to preserve its image through the individuals recruited; as in the example of oral examination, not only the candidates are examined for their knowledge, but also for their attitudes (Oran, p. 58).

Foreign policy emerges as the product of a complex institutional setting; and the outcomes are usually attributed to the leader. The public tend to ignore about how the foreign policy came to existence and focus on the leader (Demir, 2007, p. 15). However, the continuity and stability of a ministry of foreign affairs, that prepares the policies, is crucial, not just for Turkey but for any country. It should be composed of reliable agents (Hill, 2003, pp. 72-75). It is mostly because the governments heavily depend on their expertise. Günver provides some insider information on elements of continuity in MFA:

“Diplomat does not interfere with domestic policy. He has no ties to political parties... During elections he votes for whoever he wants, but, in his professional life he works for the state, not the government. He serves every government with loyalty, he does not discriminate between governments, governments come and go but diplomats stay on duty... According to the statistics, MFA has a new minister every 1.5 years…” (Gunver, p. 742).

The principles of Turkish Foreign are incontestable. These principles were determined by Kemal Ataturk and according to Günver cannot change; the style

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For the list of questions, see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/BAKANLIK/insankaynaklari/MeslekMemurluguSinavSoruOrnekleri.pdf
and tactics of each government may change but the interests of Turkey and the
principles stay intact (pp. 742-744). Moreover, Turkish law confides the authority
to apply the foreign policy to MFA and the task to prepare the proposals in order
to establish foreign policy. According to Baskın Oran, Turkish prime ministers’
knowledge is generally limited to domestic policy or at least insufficient to keep
up with changing conjuncture. Nevertheless, diplomats have the knowledge and
expertise; they sometimes have to cover the mistakes of some politicians, in order
to avoid awkward situations for Turkey’s image. MFA, according to their
traditions, has to execute the relations with international organizations according
to the prime minister’s wish; even if that specific relation is not likely to have
much profit for Turkey and is against westernism. However, MFA tends not to
continue the relations with that certain organization after the prime minister’s
term. For instance, instead of minister of foreign affairs, MFA sends out a
minister of state to the summits of the organization (Oran, p. 57).

According to Özcan, MFA is the symbol of continuity of the state and is an
institution all the key agencies need and trust (Özcan, p. 839). Governments come
and go, however the staff of MFA stays intact; MFA accomplishes this by keeping
their distances to political parties. For instance, the most important post in MFA is
the Undersecretary and undersecretaries reach their positions via promotion over
the years within MFA and not via appointment by the government, and their
employment period surpasses the ministers’, which supports continuity (Oran, p.
61). For instance Onur Oymen became the undersecretary between 1995 and
1997, and served for five ministers of foreign affairs (Özcan, p.841).

5.1.2 Role of the Leaders

Ali Faik Demir believes that an analysis of leader behavior is needed to
understand continuity; this comprises a comparison of their personal ideologies,
their foreign policy actions and their relations with MFA bureaucrats (Demir,p.
21). Following this view, it may be useful to have a quick look at some notable
leaders and their ideology and actions.

After the passage to the multi-party system, Adnan Menderes was the first
prime minister to be elected who is not a member of CHP. Before Menderes was
elected to the assembly, he was the leader of the main opposition party, the
Democrat Party (DP) which can be considered as a liberal party as to their views
on politics and economy (Yetener, 2007, p. 40). He openly challenged CHP
leaders including Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, who was the second life-long leader of
CHP and was the prime minister for 7 terms before he was elected as president in
1938. Because of his ‘Inonu phobia’, he was observed to be distant to
bureaucracy. However, he still confided MFA staff for their expertise, and
established close relations while keeping the authority of initiative to himself
(Uzgel, p. 76). Menderes’ foreign policy still can be considered in continuity with
Ataturk’s principles, as he prioritized stability. He expanded Turkey’s relations
with the West. During Menderes era, Turkey had problems with Great Britain;
while Menderes considered France and Germany as traditional allies (p. 67). As an extension of US containment policy, Turkey became an ally of USA and a member to NATO (p. 73). Menderes had also initiated the candidacy process to EEC in 1959 (p. 71).

Süleyman Demirel was the second democratically elected prime minister of Turkey and was the leader of True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) which succeeded DP after the military coup of 1960. He served as a prime minister for several governments (some of which were coalitions) between 1965 and 1993 and was elected as the president in 1993. His political carrier was interrupted by a ban from politics after the military coup of 1980 until 1987. While being an active leader in foreign policy, he chose to express his view as in accordance with Kemalist principles (Tuncer, 2007, p. 147). He chose not to act alone on foreign policy, and he expressed his confidence to MFA (p. 153), which is in his words meant conducting the state’s policy not his own (p.147). He had a westernist approach; as he expressed that ‘Turkey should be with Europe, not apart’ (p. 180).

Turgut Özal was the prime minister for the two terms between 1983 and 1989 and was the leader of Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) known as a centre-right party. He believed that the chronic problems of Turkish foreign policy could be solved by economic means (Uzgel, p. 82). He was a leader who actively challenged the ministry and tried to change Turkey’s foreign policy priorities. He always thought that the ministry was far too clumsy to give quick responses and make new policy moves; in various occasions he ignored the expertise of the diplomats and contacted foreign leaders using his own staff or via telephone diplomacy, he gave critical speeches without asking anything to the ministry (Laçinok, 2007, pp. 556-559). As a response to Özal, while continuing its duties, MFA chose not to cover up Özal’s personal and political mistakes (Oran, p. 63). Demirel criticized his actions by stating that ‘Özal is acting out of limits of his constitutional authorization’ (Tuncer, p. 154) He did not cease relations with the West; his priority was to repair relations with USA, as he mentioned on various occasions that he saw USA as a rich client (Laçinok, p. 574). However, his relations with EEC were cautious. His government served right after a military coup (1980), in an era when Europe was questioning the nature of democracy in Turkey. In his party’s official agenda; it’s mentioned that “Our aim with EEC is full membership; however we need to balance our interests in our relations with EEC”. On the other hand, he also mentioned that he would not have any problems if Turkey was kicked out of Council of Europe (p. 574). He launched his Central Asia policy, right after the end of the Cold War; for Özal it was a big opportunity for Turkey, he mentioned that classical Turkish foreign policy would not do any good in relations with Central Asia. He wanted Turkey to serve as model for emerging Turkic states and become the leader of the region (p. 628). He also launched special relations with Iran, Iraq, Palestine and Syria. He believed that Turkey should play a special role in the Middle East and in Muslim World; regardless of various criticisms of secularists. Some of his policies were unsustainable by MFA after his term, as MFA was ignored during the process; for instance Özal lifted the tourist visa for the Greeks unilaterally and leadership argument for Central Asia was not followed.
Necmettin Erbakan was the leader of National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) which was banned after the military coup of 1980 and Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) which was closed down by the Constitutional Court on grounds of their Islamist views. He was actively against westernism, which he defined as ‘imitator’ (Bakır, 2007, p. 377), and he defined Kemalist foreign policy as utopist (p. 379). According to his foreign policy view, Turkey should become the leader of the Muslim World which would then become a force against the West. Consequently, he was against Turkey’s candidacy to the EU. Erbakan was the prime minister for two years, between 1996 and 1997, for the coalition government with DYP. He deliberately excluded MFA in his foreign policy actions during his prime ministry, for instance he ignored the views of diplomats during his visits to Muslim states (p. 383) He tried to divide MFA’s mandate by attributing the authority to establish relations with Cyprus and Turkic states to a minister of state, Abdullah Gül (p. 382). On the other hand he chose not to interfere with relations with USA, NATO and the EU, by confiding them to Tansu Ciller, Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of DYP (p. 383). Under the circumstances, despite his opposition towards westernism, the relations with the West were not interrupted. He also wanted to establish mescits (chapels) in each embassy and he wanted the acceptance of Arabic-speaking diplomats to MFA (Heper and Güney, 2000, p. 641). Finally, he was forced to step down after a post-modern military coup, as the military officers and westernist elite started to be concerned about the well-being of secularism in 1997 (p. 637).

5.1.3 Role of the Military

The end of the Cold War was marked by the redefinition of the military role in many Western and non-Western countries. For many former communist states in Eastern Europe, it resulted with the democratization of the military-civil relations, with the help of the pressure by the EU (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, 2005, p. 440) However, the perceptions of the military in Turkey remained unique and quite paradoxical. On the one hand, the military’s power upon Turkish foreign policy and its impact on democracy is not welcomed by the EU. On the other hand, a high percentage of the public trusts the Turkish military; most of the time more than the government, public tends to see the military as a safeguard of the regime, status quo, secularism and democracy. İlhan Uzgel explains the political influence via political and social culture of Turkey, which led to the military’s influence over the politics not only during military coups but also during the eras of stabilization. Moreover, the distrust towards political parties, especially marked by many scandals and corruption during the ‘90’s boosted the image of the military against the parties. Finally, military’s fight against separatist terrorism increased the confidence of the public for the military (Uzgel, p. 85).

The concept of military presence should be understood together with historical legacy. First of all, since the Ottoman era, the military officers were among the westernized elites; for instance they participated to Young Turks movement. (p.
They played important roles during the Revolution of 1908, when the constitutional monarchy was found for the second time; and they were involved in the demise of the empire. They developed persistence against religion and internalized secularism as a crucial factor of the regime. Their perception of westernization was democracy; however a ‘rational democracy’; where democracy is perceived as ‘an intelligent debate among the educated for the purpose of deciding upon the best policy option’ (Heper and Güney, p. 636). Moreover, the founders of the republic, such as Ataturk and Inonu had military backgrounds. Kemalism is also highly accepted by the military officers; the legacy of Kemalist principles are invoked against the civilian regimes, who are “drifting apart” from these values, by the military, therefore the military legitimizes its interventions to put things back into order (Güney and Karatekelioğlu, p. 443).

According to a poll conducted in 2007, the question of confidence to state institutions was asked to 1001 Turkish citizens; the results turned out to be a 81% confidence to the military, while confidence to the government stayed at 56% (Rheault, 2007, p. 10). As Jenkins points out; even the intelligentsia who criticizes military at the times of stability, turn to the military in the times of crisis (Jenkins, 2007, p. 339). This confidence is surprisingly a result of military coups in Turkey. Menderes’ populist agenda with short-term interests caused a political instability during the 1950’s. The instability generated an increasing authoritarianism of Menderes, which then resulted by the military coup in 1960 (p. 341). The coup resulted with execution of high rank members of DP as well as Menderes, while military governed the country for about a year, until the civilian regime was restored with the Constitution of 1961. Military intervened again in 1971 in order to stop the fight between political parties; which resulted with a government change. During the ‘70’s street fights peaked between the leftist and rightist extremists, putting Turkey almost into a civil war; military staged another coup in 1980. This time the consequences were heavy; existing political parties, a lot of politicians, newspapers, books, and films were banned, professional associations and unions were suspended. Around 650,000 people were arrested, while 171 prisoners died as a result of torture during interrogations (p. 342). Despite the terrifying consequences of the coup of 1980, the public trusted the military to put a stop to Erbakan’s prime ministry; as many perceived Erbakan’s Welfare Party as a menace to the secular regime in 1997. Military was also alarmed by the reports of increase of activity of many Islamic organizations and Hezbollah and by the accumulation of funds in the hands of Islamic companies which were suspected to be used for supporting political Islam (Heper and Güney, p. 640) After the incidents of Sincan, where some radicals called for Shari’a, military tanks roamed the streets of Sincan; while the message was received by the government and Erbakan stepped down from his post (p.641).

The Turkish Army influences Turkey’s foreign policy through National Security Council (MGK). MGK is formed by the president, the prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs and some other ministers, as well as the Chief of General Staff and military force commanders. Through MGK, the military is authorized to give recommendations about Turkey’s national security policy,
Based on the constitutional clauses, MGK’s presence is highly criticized by the EU. EU perceives MGK as a tool for the military to influence the politics, therefore as a constraint for Turkish democracy (Bilgiç, 2009, p. 804). Accordingly with the EU demands, civil-military relations were tried to be democratized through a series of institutional reforms; however according to Bilgiç, it is unrealistic to expect any radical transformation of civil-military relations with institutional changes alone (p. 807). As long as the public support for the Turkish army pursues, the military will remain as the legitimate safeguard of secularism and order.

Despite the EU’s perceptions, the view of the Turkish military is neither anti-EU nor anti-Copenhagen criteria. Before Turkey’s candidacy in 1999, the army expressed its support for the membership. For the army, membership is a geopolitical imperative. However, the military is against some imperatives of the EU, especially the ones about the Kurdish and Cyprus issues. The military members of MGK did not want the Northern Cyprus question a subject of bargaining. They were also against granting some minority rights which would overlap with the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK’s demands (p. 809).

5.2 Question of Continuity and Priority of the West in Turkish Foreign Policy

Many experts on Turkish foreign policy talk about continuity without making any reference to path dependency, but rather to ideologies, geopolitics and interests. It might be useful to look at some explanations of continuity before having a brief look at Turkey’s relations with the West and emerging alternatives to Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy

5.2.1 Arguments About Continuity

Oral Sander does not question the continuity in Turkish foreign policy and starts right away to enlist the reasons of the continuity. According to Sander; West oriented foreign policy is an incontestable feature of Turkey. This orientation does not constitute a limited or a temporary concept such as in a case of threat to security, but has continuity. He points out that even in the first decades of the Republic, considering that Turkey had just got out of a war with Great Britain, France, Italy and Greece, surprisingly Turkey tried to approach to Europe leaving the sentiments of threat and resentment behind. After the World War II, this tendency did not stop and Turkey not only became a sympathizer but an ally of the West (Sander, 2006, pp. 71-72).

Sander asks the following question why Turkey is the only country in Middle East and Asia which has uninterrupted relations with the West. He then opposes to answers such as it was ‘administrative elites’ interests’, he finds this type of
explanations too easy and misleading (Sander, p. 72). The first reason he cites for Turkey’s uniqueness is the legacy of Ataturk’s foreign policy principles. The second is related to Turkey’s geopolitics and its place in the international system; and to the sentiment of insecurity caused by these factors. The third is the preferences caused by the necessities of an economy developed under the circumstances mentioned in the first two reasons (p. 72). Sander points out that even the reasons for continuity take root from history and are powerful, it does not mean there has been change in Turkey’s foreign policy. For him, Turkey has been trying to fit into regional and global changes in the conjuncture, however it still responds accordingly to its Western oriented foreign policy (p. 73).

Bülent Tanör indicates that Ataturk’s principle of 'peace at home, peace in the World' had been constitutionalized, first by the Constitution of 1961, the by the Constitution of 1982 (in the preamble), together with other principles such as laicity, indivisibility of Turkey, the republic as the only regime. All acts of foreign policy against these principles were considered as unlawful by the article 11 of the Turkish constitution (Tanör, 2004, pp. 810-811).

As stated by Faruk Sönmezoglu, Turkey’s Western orientation is a permanent feature of Turkish foreign policy. Together with Ottoman’s legacy, chronologically Turkey gave priority to establish cooperation with Great Britain/France, USA and European Union. As long as Turkey’s relations with the West were satisfying, Turkey did not look for other allies. Only in times of crisis, such as the case of Cyprus, Turkey temporarily carried on alternative foreign policy behavior. However, Turkey reoriented to the West as soon as the crises ended. Sönmezoglu does not see this only as a matter of conjunctural necessity but also as an assurance of Turkey’s regime (Sönmezoglu, 2004, p. 1047).

Baskın Oran states the two continuous foundations of Turkish foreign policy as status quoism and westernism (Oran, 2002a, p. 46). Status quoism means to preserve current borders and to find the balance in the current international system and conjuncture. In other words, even if Turkey has a West oriented foreign policy, as a necessity of its geopolitics has to establish relations with states that may be hostile to the West and Turkey should always find a way to make the two policies work in parallel (p. 49). According to Oran, there are a few factors that explain westernism and western oriented foreign policy. Israel and Turkey are the only democratic states in the Middle East, and Turkey is the only Muslim state with laicist system. As a newborn state, Turkey inherited westernist administrative elite which started a westernization process about a century before other underdeveloped states. Oran admits the gap between the East and the West and as a consequence an identity crisis in Turkey. He also points out that westernization and authoritarian application of it widened the gap between the public and the elite. However, westernist elites still constitute an important factor of Turkey’s embrace of Western values. From this point of view, an orientation towards the West and Western institutions is a natural outcome for Turkish foreign policy (Oran, p. 21). Moreover, the need for stability is inherited from other states once established on Turkey’s soil, not just Ottoman Empire but Byzantine Empire, as well. Status quo and stability was and still is a necessity of Turkey’s geopolitics. Oran also points out that the founders of the republic were once members of CUP,
and they continued their Westernist vision during the republic, as well (p. 50). Finally, Ottoman diplomacy’s legacy is important according to Oran; thanks to this legacy Turkey did not suffer from the kind of inexperience and difficulty a newborn state would normally suffer (p. 23). After all, Turkey accepted the continuity of Ottoman Empire’s legal personality, paid of its debts and answer to all problems caused by the empire; Turkey only ignored the regime of the empire but not the state itself.

Oran also compares Turkey to other developing countries and points out Turkey’s uniqueness. Compared to other developing countries, the embrace of Western example had been easier and smoother. As Ottoman was never a part of colonial invasions, the elites were never alienated from the West. It also had been to Turkey’s advantage that Soviet regime was quite new when the republic was found, which made it easier to adopt a western development model (p. 52).

5.2.2 Relations with the West: an Overview

As the founders established the principles of westernism, since the foundation of the republic, Turkey wanted to become a Western state. Westernism was institutionalized in every aspect of political life, it also defined the direction of Turkish foreign policy; not only during the initial stage of the new regime but for the years to come, as well. Westernism’s meaning expanded from an ideology into foreign and military policies; Turkey tried to participate to political, economical and military system of Atlantic and European integration (Bozdağhoğlu, 2003, p. 58). The vision of Atatürk to ‘to raise Turkey to the level of contemporary Western civilization’ was later transformed into Turkey’s will to be identified as a European state.

Cold War appeared as an opportunity for Turkey to establish organic relations with the West; as Turkey stayed neutral during World War II, it had to give up this position and apply for European and Atlantic organizations. Towards the end of the war, Turkey declared war against Nazi Germany and eventually became one of the founders of United Nations in 1945 (Camyar and Tagma, 2006, p. 16). Westernization became a project impossible to accomplish unless Turkey established cooperation with Europe and USA. Consequently, Turkey aimed to join almost all of the international institutions in the wake of the World War II. The full association of Turkey with the West was realized through the Truman Doctrine in 1947, membership in the OECD and the Council of Europe in 1948 and 1949 respectively, and its admission to NATO in 1952 (Bozdağhoğlu, p. 58). All these memberships constitute positive feedbacks that made Turkey’s westernization process continuous. Turkey’s membership to NATO was welcomed with much enthusiasm by both Menderes government and by opposition, CHP; it was conceived as a sign of Turkey’s recognition as a true Western state (Zürcher, 1993, p. 235). The effect of this fascination was the total denial of Middle Eastern politics and an effort to keep Turkey away from the region as long as it could (Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu, 2009, p. 578).
Within the framework of the Cold War, Turkey’s participation to the Western bloc also meant that it has to establish relations, not only with Western Europe but also with USA. Until the republic, USA was not a part of ideologies of the Westernist elites; the image of the ‘West’ was still limited to Europe. Until the end of World War II, it was conceived as a symbol of power, however out-of-reach. Nevertheless, at the post-war era, USA gained the image of ‘New West’ in the eyes of Turkish political elite (Bora, 2009, pp. 149-150). The actions of the Soviet Union were also an important factor that pushed Turkey towards the West. On March 1945, Soviet Union (USSR) sent Turkey a diplomatic note where it declared that the Soviet Union would not be renewing the non-aggression pact which was originally signed in 1925. USSR demanded the amendment of Montreux Convention regarding the regime of the Turkish Straits which was signed in 1936; so that USSR could become a part of straits’ defense. USSR also affirmed the land claims of Georgia and Armenia from Turkey. (Turan and Barlas, 2004, pp. 153-154). Under the circumstances Turkey had nothing but to turn to the West for help, while Great Britain declared that they would no longer provide military and economic assistance to Turkey. Turkey soon became a part of USA’s policy of containment and started to receive economic and military assistance, and found its position in the Western bloc. During the 50’s USA and Turkey signed many agreements about military cooperation; while Turkey sent over 25,000 soldiers to Korean War (Türkmęn, 2009, p. 111). A military base was opened in Incirlik in 1954, for the American army for use within the framework of NATO.

Despite all the agreements, Turkish-American relations were not flawless and were marked by a series of crisis. Possibly the biggest was the Cyprus crisis; while Turkish public pressured the government for military intervention, İnönü was hopeful about American mediation; until he received the ‘Johnson Letter’ in 1964. Turkey was warned not to intervene without consulting Washington, and it was forbidden from using American weapons if Turkey was to intervene. This letter was a ‘fatal blow’, as Füsun Türkmen calls it, to Turkish-American relations; and had seeded anti-Americanism in Turkey. Even if İnönü was later invited to Washington to overcome the crisis, the relations were damaged; which then resulted as Turkey’s refusal to support Vietnam War within the UN General Assembly. Relations were later marked by the missile crisis in 1962 and the arms embargo between 1975 and 1978, right after Turkey’s intervention to Cyprus in 1974 (p. 112).

Despite the crisis, the relations were normalized after the military coup of 1980. USA resumed economic and military support, in exchange Özal fully supported USA during Gulf War, establishing embargo against Iraq; which was a major shift away from status-quoism ideology of Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, the developments in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Central Asia since the beginning of 1990’s caused USA and Turkey to renew their relations under so-called “enhanced partnership” as the American and Turkish interests in these regions converged. USA also supports Turkey’s accession to the EU (Türkmęn, p. 115).

As the European integration went deeper, the nature Turkey’s relations with European countries gradually changed from relations with individual countries to
the relationship with European organizations. The start of the relationship between the EU and Turkey dates back to 1959, when Turkey applied to EEC to become an associate member for the first time (Hakkı, 2006, p. 451). Following the restoration of civil authority after the military coup of 1960, the relations with EEC were resumed and Ankara agreement; the association agreement between EEC and Turkey was signed in 1963. Turkey became an associate member, which suggested that Turkey’s full membership to EEC would be realized through a three phased customs union (Aybey, 2004, p. 22). Turkey applied for a full membership to EC in 1987, while European Commission made a recommendation against the application in 1989. EU-Turkey Customs Union was formed in 1996, during RP-DYP coalition government. While Turkey was left out from being a candidate in 1997’s Luxembourg Summit, it could only achieve to candidacy status in 1999, during Helsinki Summit when Greece lifted its veto against this candidacy (Hakkı, pp. 451-452). After a lot of ups and downs, full membership negotiations were opened between Turkey and the EU, in 2005; after European Council was convinced about Turkey’s will for transformation. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of the final outcome of the negotiations still remains (Keyman and Düzgit, 2007, p. 71).

The candidacy requires a great commitment of Turkey to apply fundamental changes in various aspects (democracy, human rights, minority rights, legal and institutional changes including changes concerning judiciary, police and army) accordingly to the principles determined by the Copenhagen criteria, without the promise of membership in the end. According to Kenneth Dyson, the implications of acquis communautaire, which Turkey did not take part in its agreement, would create an asymmetry of power regarding domestic political acceptance. However, this asymmetry is legitimized by the experts and political elites, by indicating that the short-term costs of compliance will be overridden by the long term benefits of the full EU membership; such as entry to the European market, economic stability and freedom of movement (Dyson, 2007, p. 54). The prolonged process inevitably creates threats from, what Dyson calls, a ‘reform fatigue’, and from domestic veto players, national populists and Euro-sceptics (p. 55). After all, Turkey’s accession process is so far the longest.

As we can see, the nature of Turkish-American and Turkish-European relations is different. The elements of continuity of Turkish-American relations are, from the Turkish perspective are security concerns of Turkey, the need of economic and military aid; and from the American perspective Turkey’s geopolitical location and proximity to Middle East (Sander, pp. 116-124). As far as the EU is concerned; while the reform process is far from being complete and the results may be questionable, however it is undeniable that Turkey had gone under its most comprehensive democratic change of its history. Since the application for full membership in 1987, Turkey had seen governments (single party or coalitions) from a large spectrum of parties; from nationalists to Islamists, from liberals to social democrats. However the will and the commitment to integrate to the EU were successive. This is another factor that makes the nature of Turkey’s relations with the EU different than its relations with USA, as Turkey is willing to transform for the EU. In 2001, the National Assembly passed thirty-
four constitutional amendments; in 2002 a new Civil Code was adopted. The reforms were accomplished especially regarding human rights, minority rights, freedom of expression and freedom of association. The reforms pursue despite the growing critiques; which indicates, according to Kırval, that the modernizing elite is still in control of most of the institutional structures and that civil society involvement is still limited (Kırval, 2007, p. 185)

5.2.3 Change and Alternatives in Turkish Foreign Policy

As Faruk Sönmezəoğlu points out, the presence of the elements of continuity in Turkish foreign policy should not be understood as there is no room for change. The trends of foreign policy is set by external factors rather than internal. Sönmezəoğlu links the necessity for change to Turkey’s ‘minimum conflict, maximum stability’ policy (Sönmezəoğlu, p. 1047). If we were to remember Kranser’s notion of punctuated equilibrium, according to which institutions enjoy long periods of stability and stability is periodically ‘punctuated’ by external crises; a change in the conjuncture is likely to generate institutional change, while institutions are still bound to their historical arrangements (Thelen et al., p. 15). The end of Cold War is likely to have created a punctuation of this sort. However, there are two kinds of views; on the one hand there are some scholars who claim that there has been a shift away from the West in Turkish foreign policy; on the other hand, others claim that pro-western politics is still the core.

As the Soviet threat was out of the picture, the end of cold War opened up new opportunities and challenges for Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. These perspectives were long-forgotten or ignored; however brought new security threats along (Turkmen, p. 119). Turkey’s traditional policy of caution and non-interference had changed as Turkey took part in co-operations regarding Gulf War or multilateral forces in the Balkans.

The new perspectives brought some disappointments for Turkey, as well. Following Özal’s declaration of ‘21st Century will be the Century of Turkey and the Turks’ on May 1991, he aimed to become the leader of the Turkic world. However, Turkey soon failed to fulfill its aim to become the regional leader and to unite the Turkic republics because of economic and social problems and limitations of the international system. Towards the end of the ‘90’s, arguments with ethnic emphasis faded and Turkey came to understand the Turkic states as (Özcan, 2004, pp. 832-833).

In 2002, Justice and Development Party (AKP), the moderate successor of RP came to power. In 2003, the National Assembly voted for the disapproval of Iraq War. While government’s position was not clear throughout the crisis, the National Assembly’s disapproval cost Turkey a lot in relations with USA.
(Keyman and Düzgit, p. 70). This was the sign of the new directions in Turkish foreign policy: some experts called it Neo-Ottomanism, others as re-Islamization or Middle Easternization of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey soon started mediation efforts between Syria and Israel. Turkey started talks with Hamas as authority in Palestine, even though Hamas is politically isolated by the West; started to enhance cooperation in Black Sea region with Bulgaria and Russia which is not necessarily in line with NATO priorities; and to establish relations with Armenia as the President Abdullah Gül visited the country in September 2008 (Turkmen, pp. 119-120).

Oğuzlu defines Middle Easternization of Turkish foreign policy as “adoption of a more pragmatic/rational rather than an emotional/romantic approach towards the EU and the United States” (Oğuzlu, 2008, p. 4). Oğuzlu suggests that Turkey finally realized that establishing institutional relations with NATO and the EU does not make Turkey a Western state and pro-Western policies are not always to Turkey’s interest (p. 5). Finally, he believes that Turkey is putting so much effort to contributing to stabilization of Middle East because the EU would not want to become neighbor to a region with such chaos and instability, therefore Turkey’s chances of accession would decrease (p. 4). Moreover, developments in the Middle East are likely to determine the nature of USA-Turkey relations in the future. Turkey was late to grasp the change of the nature of its relations with USA after the Cold War and under rapid globalization. Westernism blinded Turkish elites for long, they did not realize the opportunity they missed when the Gulf War in 1990 underlined Turkey’s role in the Middle East (p. 6).

The opposite view comes from Öniş and Yılmaz; they believe the war in Iraq in 2003 pushed Turkey towards West, thus accelerated Turkey’s efforts to join the EU. The war had helped shift the balance of Turkey’s politics to a more pro-EU manner (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005, p. 266).

At this phase, most of the comments are limited to what Turkish foreign policy should be, rather than what it is. For instance, Keyman supports that Turkish foreign policy’s main axis should be the EU, rather than USA or rather than having no axis and opt out for autonomy and pragmatism (Keyman, 2009, p. 39). It is a sign that we are at HI’s limits for analysis. As Peters points out, HI does not have a capability for prediction (Peters, 1999, pp. 68-69). Historical institutionalists are interested in explanation rather than prediction; mostly because predictions can only be proximate, even if there are tools and models at hand (Steinmo, 2008, p. 134). At this point, it is not possible say whether there has been a solid shift away from westernism. Since AKP is still in the office, we cannot know if this new multidimensional and pragmatist foreign policy will be followed by future governments. We need to look from a distance to see whether the AKP government has caused a permanent change and a new path for Turkish foreign policy.

5.3 Empirical Analysis
Westernization is a project which be traced back to the Ottoman reforms starting from late 18th Century; which eventually became a major goal for the political elite in the republican era, who has Young Turks’ characteristics from Ottoman era (Bozdağlıoğlu, p. 46). Westernism eventually became the official state ideology and most of the major parties expressed their vague commitment to it, even the Islamist oriented ones seemed to have shifted to a pro-western approach, such as in the example of AKP (Öniş, 2003, p. 17). Following Atatürk’s ideology to elevate Turkey to the rank of “highly civilized nations”; meaning the West, thus westernism eventually found its reflection in foreign policy.

From an HI perspective, this clearly illustrates a case of path dependency; following the claim “policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or a policy is initiated, will have a continuuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future” (Peters, p. 63). It is possible to accept conditions leading to the creation of westernization project and the foundation of the republic as the critical junctures, the starting point of the path. Since then, westernizing reforms and pro-western policy created persistent patterns for Turkish political elite. Despite the fact that pro-western foreign policy was interrupted by the military coup of 1980 which led EEC’s suspension of its relations with Turkey, the relations were normalized once the civilian rule was reestablished (Yılmaz, 2009, p. 55). During the process, Turkey’s membership to European and Transatlantic organizations created positive feedbacks, as more elites were convinced that Turkey is indeed in the verge of becoming a true Western state (Zürcher, 1993, p. 253). In spite of the ambiguity of outcomes surrounding Turkey’s candidacy to the EU, Turkey did not stop implementing Westernizing reforms. In fact, Turkey did not question the EU accession process, it was not a not a new phenomena but continuation of the westernization process which is one of the founding elements of the republic (Jørgensen and LaGro, 2007, p. 227).

Following RCI, it is possible to say that pro-western foreign policy is a mere accumulation of foreign policy choices made by rational actors. In rational choice institutionalist terms; individual members of an institution seek to maximize their interests, however in an institutional context; as institutions offer a sequence of choices for the actors (Shepsle, p. 24). RCI necessitates micro-historical approach. Because of the limited time span of the approach (Sanders, p. 42), we have to look at each era separately, that is another reason why pro-western policy is to be perceived as a mere coincidental accumulation. According to Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu, westernization had started as a security-driven process until Atatürk ‘injected a strong ideational soul to the initially fear-driven westernization process’ (Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu, p. 578). Both the sultans and Babiali had the empire’s interest in their minds while carrying out reforms might; restoring the state’s image and to gain sympathy in Europe. In existing trends and conjuncture,
they might have simply seen their interest in approaching to Europe; the sultans out of fear of falling apart and foreign occupation. Even Ataturk can be considered in terms of interest, as he was aiming to create a stable environment for the newborn republic (Sander, 2008, p.71). He might have been constraint by the fragility of the structure and institutions that are so new, he had to make peace with Europe so that he can continue building the new state. The actions of both the sultans and the founders of the republic were driven by ‘fear of exclusion, dismemberment and encirclement’, and their solution was the ‘pursuit of closer security cooperation with Western European states’ (Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu, p. 579). The conjuncture emerged with the Cold War pushed Turkey towards the West and Turkey eventually gave up its neutral position it had during the World War II. It was to Turkey’s best interest to seek help from the West in existence of Soviet threat (Turan and Barlas, p. 154). Furthermore, as new foreign policy opportunities emerged, even if it meant embracing a non-westernist approach, Turkey seized them. For instance, shortly after the fall of communism, Özal aimed to become the leader of newly emerged Turkic states in Central Asia. Since 2002, AKP government managed to establish close ties with Middle Eastern countries and adopted a more rational foreign policy, leaving emotional ties with Europe behind (Oğuzlu, p. 4).

At this point, it is important to mention a few critiques on the lock-in to westernism institutionalized by the political elites. Since Ottoman era, reforms have pattern of being top-down processes, meaning that the reforms are not demanded by the public but was implemented despite the public. Şerif Mardin points out the lack of philosophical foundation in Turkish modernization project, unlike its western examples. It is possible to link this to the pragmatic adaptation of western type institutions since the emergence of westernization (Mardin, 2008, pp. 16-20). This type of westernizing logic caused a positivist-authoritarian administration ideology. This ideology aiming a “production” of a certain social order has characterized the early republican era; however it also manifests in modernization efforts of Turkey today (Toker and Tekin, p. 84). Lack of philosophical justification, together with the rejection of traditions caused a legitimacy problem; thus westernization was never completely internalized by the whole population, which today manifests itself as euro-scepticism in Turkey. Even with 150 years long modernization project, Turkey still lags behind western standards. Despite this deficiency; the modernizing elite, who still control key institutional structures, never questioned the ambition of transforming Turkey into a true Western power. Elizabeth Özdalga points out that, even authoritarianism and westernization are conflicting concepts; in political practice they have gone hand-in-hand (Özdalga, 2005, p.3).

5.3.2 Westernism, Actors and Continuity

Ottoman diplomats are one of the first to bring westernist ideas to the empire, part of a new elite soon to become so powerful; with the collaboration of janissaries
they managed change the grand viziers as they wish (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 23-24). Even before the ministry was found, it is clear that diplomats and westernism was interconnected. MFA inherited the tradition and ideas of Ottoman diplomacy; when MFA was established, Ottoman diplomats were recruited which consisted one third of its initial personnel (Uzgel, p. 75). MFA has the highest level of institutionalization of westernism among other actors involved in foreign policy. MFA is devoted to its traditions and values. MFA’s persistent continuity is secured by its complex recruitment system and by its distance to governments and daily politics. Thus, its personnel are immune to governmental changes. This type of continuity is a general necessity, not just for Turkey but for all ministries of foreign affairs; governments heavily rely on the ministries and their knowledge and expertise on subjects of international relations. It would be wrong to assume that a party that forms a government to know every little detail about relations with other countries, all the steps taken in the past and all the agreements signed (Hill, 2003, pp. 72-77). However, continuity in time creates a lock-in; makes it hard to make new policy moves. In Turkey’s case, it has demonstrated itself as a lock-in on westernism; no matter which party takes over the government, the ministry serves constraints in order to stop Turkey’s alignment to go anywhere else but towards the West. First example could be Özal’s government, where Özal left out MFA’s bureaucracy out of his policy actions. After Özal passed away, MFA showed no will to follow his leadership ideology regarding Central Asia. The second is Erbakan, who declared that the EU is a Christian Club and Turkey has no place in the EU, which could be considered as a negative feedback. However, as Tagma and Camyar point out, path dependent western-oriented foreign policy generated a persistence stopping Turkish foreign policy to move away from the West. Erbakan’s RP was succeeded by moderate Islamist AKP, which chose to follow a pro-EU approach which led the EU to open negotiations with Turkey in 2005 (Camyar and Tagma, p. 20).

In RCI, individuals may choose to follow institutional rules and norms if they see their interest in doing so, as they may get more if they cooperate (Steinmo, 2008, p. 126). If this is a matter of individual choice, we can say that Özal chose not to be limited by institutional constraints; he thought that heavy bureaucracy might slow him down, he did not follow various protocols and ignored the expertise of diplomats. He was apparently a man of opportunism: he did his best to use post-Cold War environment in Central Asia to make Turkey the leader of Turkic countries. AKP government’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is also perceived as a pragmatic actor; as an actor who Middle Easternized Turkish foreign policy. Oğuzlu suggests that during AKP’s term, Turkey adopted a rational approach rather than an emotional approach (Oğuzlu, p. 4).

Turkey’s history is marked by two major military coups; of 1960 and of 1980. However the outcomes were completely different. The coup of 1960 was carried out by young officers, who shared and applied the views and critiques of political elite of the republican (CHP) opposition and general public on erosion of moral values (Ahmad, 1993, p. 125). They put a stop to DP’s autocratic regime, gathered academicians and adopted the Constitution of 1961, under which Turkey enjoyed a greater degree of freedom ever. People had more civil rights, students and
workers had freedom to organize associations (p. 136), however it created political camps which almost put Turkey into a civil war. Nevertheless, the coup of 1980 brought a very restrictive constitution, putting a lot of limitations on rights. “Each time, the armed forces went back to their barracks, but not before they had widened their prerogatives, thus increasing the military’s political power more than ever before” (Bilgiç, p. 803).

Today, military’s interference with politics creates a democratic deficit for Turkey, causing problems on Turkey’s accession to the EU. As far as the military’s loyalties are concerned, it may not be possible to suggest that military has a full-pledged support for westernism but the military was always loyal to two essential aspects of Kemalist westernism; protection of secularism and the status-quo. In an HI perspective, the civil unrest caused by the excessive rights created a critical juncture in the military’s path. Today, the military has serious reserves on rights. For the military, the separatists may try to gain some concessions hiding behind demand of freedom and rights, if Turkey becomes blinded by the process of accession to the EU (p. 808). Furthermore, if secularism seems to be under threat, military urges to intervene with the support of a high percentage of the public, as in the example of post-modern coup of 1997 (Heper and Güney, p. 637).

RCI brings a clear answer to Turkish Army’s acts; army solely acts in answer to Turkey’s internal and external security threats and follow a policy according to Turkey’s interest. Therefore, the army makes no solid commitment to any camp, East or West. Tuncer Kılıç’s statement, General Secretary of MGK in 2002, speaks for itself:

“Turkey definitely needs to be looking for new opportunities… obviously in Russia and the USA, but also if possible with Iran. Turkey has not received the slightest help from the EU. The EU takes antagonistic view on issues of importance to Turkey.” (Sugden, 2004, p. 254).

Therefore, the army has no attachment to pro-western policies. They supported the rapprochement with the West under Soviet threat however since the conjuncture has changed, there is no more such an obligation.

Finally it may be worth mentioning the EU’s view on Kemalist/Westernist actors in Turkey. It was mentioned in European Parliament’s Committee of Foreign Affairs that Kemalism generates an exaggerated fear, too much importance for the army and a strict attitude towards religion and that “this underlying philosophy is itself is a barrier to the EU membership” (Fokas, 2004, p. 164). Uğur and Canefe point out that the Turkish model had become dysfunctional for Turkey’s bid for the EU. Especially the model’s components such as Kemalist elite, centre-right(such as ANAP and DYP) and centre-left(CHP) parties and the military had turned into major forces of resistance to Turkey’s integration to the EU. Eventually “new owners” for the European project has emerged, such as minority groups and moderate Islamists (Uğur and Canefe, 2004, p. 266).
6 Conclusion

The aim of this study was not to create a choice between the two institutionalisms, but was rather to highlight different aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy and the project of westernization of Turkey. It was done in this manner in order to avoid a confirmation bias that could be caused by the explanation using a single theory potentially successful to explain the phenomena at hand, however too flexible in the sense that HI could provide answers too easily; mainly because of the variety of definitions and opinions within the approach.

6.1 A Comparison of the Findings of the Two Institutionalist Approaches

So far, RCI can successfully explain every step, for every decision regarding foreign policy can be explained by a certain interest. However, it would only explain Turkish foreign policy as a sum of actions made for interest due to the change of conjuncture, but not as a whole. There is no place for values, norms or continuity in RCI. In that case, it is not possible to go too hard on RCI, as these concepts do not exist in the approach. Thus, RCI is successful to explain the case, in its separate way from HI. For instance, in an interest-driven logic, it is possible to say that as long as Turkey is convinced about the long term benefits of Westernizing reforms, it will be willing to bear the costs of becoming a Western state (Oğuzlu and Kibaroğlu, p. 580). Thus, the policy makers will continue the reforms. Moreover, westernization is seen as an emotional attachment to the idea of becoming a Western state and would sooner or later be replaced by rational foreign policy perspective (Oğuzlu, p.4).

As far as HI is concerned, Turkey faced various crises which could have served as critical junctures and would turned Turkey away from the West; the two military coups (1960 and 1980), the Cyprus crisis or the end of Cold War. Even the prolonged membership story of Turkey to European Union could serve as a reason to step back from westernism and Turkey could start looking for alternatives. However, after each crisis, Turkey managed to restore its relations to the West, it should be enough to demonstrate that Turkey’s foreign policy is path-dependent. Turkey’s foreign policy takes its legacy from the Ottoman diplomats who tried to carry Western values to the Empire, it was initiated by Ataturk whose vision was to create a Western Turkey, and Turkey never ceased relations with the West since then.

As far as the EU is concerned, there sure are interests involved, both in terms of economy, politics and security. However, the steps taken are not likely to
produce any profit for Turkey in the short term. The process itself now reached a half a century long and created much frustration both among the public, elites, military and policy-makers. This is another crucial point that RCI would fail to explain; because there are no immediate interests involved, there may be even no interests in case Turkey fails to become a member of the EU. In this sense, it would be hard to attribute the membership efforts of policy makers an explanation through interest-maximization. It is best explained by path dependency and lock-in, put down by centuries of Westernizing practice and institutionalism of that ideology. Considering even the Turkish military is not against the membership in principle, it is fair to say that westernization created a path that policy makers cannot turn away from.

However, coming to the 2000’s, we are approaching HI’s limit of explanation. After all, HI only offers analysis of what had happened and has no will to provide predictions. In that case, it would be wrong to make assumptions such as Middle Easternization of Turkish foreign policy is only temporary and Westernist bureaucrats such as of MFA will put Turkey back to its pro-Western path.

6.2 Concluding Remarks

The aim of this research is to analyze Turkey’s foreign policy towards the West. If we were to remember the research question “How does westernism effect Turkish foreign policy?”, we can clearly say that there are two separate answers as a result of this research, one from historical institutionalist and one from rational choice institutionalist perspectives.

In viewpoint of HI, westernism emerged in late Ottoman era and institutionalized by the founders of the Turkish Republic has generated a path dependency and a lock-in to pro-Western foreign policy. It has produced a persistence which makes it hard for the policy makers to shift away from a mainly Western oriented foreign policy. Kemalist ideal for Turkey to reach the level of contemporary civilizations was later transformed into Turkey’s quest to become a true European state, thus this path-dependency explains Turkey’s insistence towards its membership to the EU, despite all the difficulties and ambiguities surrounding the accession process.

In RCI’s point of view, westernism is nothing but an emotional attachment to the dream of Turkey’s becoming a Western state and the foreign policy is oriented by rational actors who would act according to their interest calculations. Turkey may have followed a pro-western foreign policy for a long time; however it was due to the fact that as long as foreign policy makers were satisfied with the relations with the West, they did not look for other allies. Europeanizing reforms would continue as long as the policy makers are convinced of their outcomes. Thus, westernism does not have a continuous or persistent effect on Turkish foreign policy, rational policy makers can always look for alternatives to pro-Western approaches as it fits Turkey’s interest. Finally, Turkey does not have a certain persistence to become a member of the EU, as military is already
Eurosceptic, and there is a growing reform fatigue and anti-EU sentiments among the general public which may lead policy makers to quit this so-called “path”, especially would concern the governments who would see their best interest in caring for the public opinion as they would seek for re-election.

Finally, the aim for this study was not to make a preference concerning these two answers, as both of them are important in their separate ways. The purpose was rather to provide a better understanding of Turkish foreign policy using more than one approach. The making of Turkish foreign policy is a very complex process, given the unique collection of internal and external determinants. The determinants are in no manner limited to institutional factors. However, for the sake of argument, limiting the scope of the research to a sub-set of determinants provides an opportunity for a richer and deeper analysis.

**Executive Summary**

Westernization and westernism are Ottoman Empire’s legacy for Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had transformed them into Turkey’s quest to elevate the Turkish nation to the level of contemporary civilizations and to be recognized as a Western state. Westernism reflects on Turkish foreign policy as a pro-Western approach. Atatürk’s successors followed his ideals, which today can be felt by Turkey’s insistence to maintain relations with the West and to become a member of the EU.

The main research question of this study is “how westernism effects Turkish foreign policy?”. In order to answer this question, two institutionalist approaches is used, historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Two approaches were chosen instead of one, in order to avoid the confirmation bias which might be caused due to selective analysis. Historical institutionalism suggests that initial decisions when an institution or a policy was created will have a determinant and enduring effect on the institutions future. This enduring effect is conceptualized as path dependency, which suggest that making shifting away from the established path is costly, making it hard for the policy makers to take alternative paths. However, rational choice institutionalism suggests that institutions only offer a set of choices and actors in the institutional setting would make their choices as a result of their cost-benefit calculations. These claims will be tested using a deductive approach.

Westernization project started in early 19th Century, when Ottoman Empire realized the growing gap between the empire’s power and the Western states’. However, it was only the adaptation of selective elements of the Western civilization, and the Empire had not captured the true essence of Europe’s modernity. However, the modern schools established in the era created a new intelligentsia which is fascinated by the Western ideas. This new class, called the Young Turks, started to organize secret organizations such as the Committee of Union and Progress. They soon started to look for ways to bring more reforms and
managed to pull off a regime change in 1908, where the parliamentary monarchy was found. Atatürk once belonged to this class; only he saw the deficiency of imitation of Western forms and started a full scale westernization, starting with the foundation of a republic, followed by various reforms; including on education, alphabet, measurements, laws and dress codes. His ideology is known as Kemalism. He embraced secularism; he abolished the sultanate and the caliphate, religious schools and institutions and established a system where religion is controlled by the states. One of his ideals was “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” which marked the foreign policy of his successors as status quoism. His regime was in no sense a democratic one, however he opened the path towards a democracy, as his famous quote goes: “unconditional, unrestricted sovereignty belongs to the nation”. Nevertheless, the top-down application of the reforms since the Ottoman era, including the republic, had caused a legitimacy problem concerning the public opinion, which today manifests itself as the growing euroscepticism as reaction to the EU compliance.

The main institutional actors of Turkish foreign policy are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the leaders and the Turkish military. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an institution highly attached to its traditions and ideals, which are set by the founder of the republic, Atatürk. The ministry is known with its distance to political parties and governments, which causes leaders to challenge their authority. Some leaders choose to entrust the ministry’s expertise, while some choose to conduct the foreign policy with their own experts. The ministry usually chooses not to follow the foreign policy moves made without their consult and therefore is a crucial element for westernism’s continuity. It is hard to suggest that the military has embraced westernization as a whole; however it finds in itself the authority to protect secularism and the status quo, and military enjoys a large public support by doing so. When it comes to Europeanizing reforms, it has serious reserves, especially on the minority rights as to the fear of reinforcement of separatism and of deterioration of the status quo. The military’s interference with the politics is one of the main concerns of the EU about Turkey.

Many experts on Turkish foreign policy have a consensus on Turkish foreign policy’s continuity. This continuity is not necessarily tied to path dependency; however one of the reasons is Kemalist westernism’s legacy. Another reason of continuity is status quoism, which refers to maintaining current borders and to non-interference with the problems in the neighboring countries, in order to create a peaceful environment for Turkey. Pro-western foreign policy is also perceived as continuous, which suggests that maintaining the relations with the West is not only a conjunctural necessity but an assurance for Turkey’s regime. It is true that Turkey had enjoyed almost uninterrupted relations with the West, however marked by some crises, such as the military coups of 1960 and 1980 and the Cyprus issue. When the crises were over, Turkey managed to restore the relations with the West.

The last two decades are marked by major conjunctural changes which forced Turkey to reconsider its foreign policy priorities. As the Cold War ended, Turkey no longer enjoyed its tactical position under the Soviet threat, which generated major changes to Turkish-American relations. In the ‘90’s, the co-operation lasted
because of the Gulf War; however as Turkey refused to support the Iraq War, the future of the relations with the USA became ambiguous. Turkey’s efforts to become a member of the EU was also unfruitful, as Turkey’s candidature became the most enduring one ever. Turkey established closer relations with Syria and Iran, tried to become the mediator for Israel-Palestine conflict, engaged in co-operations with Turkic states of Central Asia and Russia.

From an historical institutionalist point of view; Turkey’s pro-Western foreign policy path dependent. This is why Turkey normalized relations with the West after each crisis, and why pro-Western foreign policy remains as the main axis even if Turkey had developed relations with other regions in parallel. The persistence of pro-Western foreign policy and westernism also explains Turkey’s insistence to become a member of the EU even if the accession process had become a rough patch. The EU also recognizes the persistence of the patterns, however is critical towards them. According to the EU, Kemalism generates an exaggerated fear, too much importance to the military and a tough approach to religion and therefore is a barrier to the membership.

In rational choice institutionalist perspective, westernism is nothing but an emotional attachment to the dream of becoming a Western state. Turkey would continue its relations with the West as long as it fits its interests and as long as the policy makers are convinced that long term interests would override the short term costs of the reforms. Rationally acting policy makers can move away from pro-Western foreign policy, therefore pro-western policy is neither path dependent nor continuous.

The aim of this research was not to make any preferences over the answers provided by the two approaches but to offer analysis from various aspects. Both approaches have its limits. Historical institutionalism is incapable of making any predictions for the future, even in the presence of models for explanation. Rational choice institutionalism can explain each step taken in terms of foreign policy, however falls short on offering a more general perspective and understanding of foreign policy. Furthermore, as there are no short terms interests involved in Turkey’s accession process and there is always a possibility of not ending up with a membership, rational choice institutionalism does not explain Turkey’s insistence to become a member to the EU.
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