Loud thunders but little rain?

Analyzing political will to combat corruption in Mozambique

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that a majority of developing countries suffer from a lack of genuine political will to combat corruption, and that this is a decisive factor in determining the success or failure of anticorruption reforms. Assuming a lack of political will, this thesis also seeks to understand the factors contributing to this deficit. This is done by utilizing two independent theoretical frameworks that provide indicators used to assess political will and combining two methodological approaches – desk study and interviews with knowledgeable donors. The evidence base is thus from a donor perspective. Mozambique has been chosen as a case study as its anticorruption reform has shown little progress despite relatively large foreign assistance.

The results of both approaches confirm that there is a clear lack of political will in Mozambique and that hopes of curbing corruption ultimately rest on a change in attitude of the political leadership of the government. Three main reasons are highlighted by interviewed donors: disregard for personal civil servant values, lack of separation of interests between Frelimo and Government and lastly a weak civil society leading to modest accountability.

*Key words:* corruption, political will, donor perspective, Mozambique, Frelimo

*Words:* 13 105
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1 Introduction

1.1 Statement of purpose and research questions

African truisms are often simple in logic yet supreme in depth. One such example in Mozambique is, “saco vazio não fica de pé”, or in English, “an empty sack does not stand upright”. While this holds true on many areas and levels, in an African context, this holds arguably most true when debating governments’ genuine will to combat corruption. There is certainly no lack of lively rhetoric - progress however, remains harder to find.

A further dimension is the increasingly influential role of donors. While ultimately accountable to their respective citizens, African governments are also ever more pressured to address corruption as a precondition for receiving aid from donors. For example, the Swedish Development Agency (Sida), clearly state on their homepage that one of four preconditions for Swedish aid is that the recipient country has transparent and effective financial accountability systems in place and that the government shows a clear will to combat corruption. Spurring donor concern is the mounting evidence of the negative impacts of corruption on development efforts in combination with a lack of evident progress in tackling this problem.

Research on corruption in aid-dependent developing countries is plentiful - not only regarding the causes of corruption but more importantly how to best understand and remedy the problems at hand. Naturally, there is no silver bullet solution. Instead there exists a consensus amongst leading researchers that corruption is a complex issue with links to all sectors of society and consequently there is a need for a series of long-term strategic interventions in the form of new policies and institutions. It is thus agreed upon that only through the implementation of these strategies, can conditions be created that favour a successful anticorruption (AC) reform programme.

However, this is not the whole equation. Leading corruption researchers such as Kpundeh also highlight and acknowledge the importance of genuine political will within any country for these strategic interventions to succeed (2008, p. 92). With this acknowledgement in mind, it is surprising that while much research has been devoted to elaborating individual interventions and their relative effectiveness to anti-corruption strategies, the concept of political will has received relatively little study (Brinkerhoff, 2000). The overall aim of this thesis is thus to, from a theory-building perspective, further study the importance of the existence of genuine political will in relation to the success of national anti-corruption strategies in developing countries.
The current prevailing theory on political will concludes that a vast majority of developing/transitional countries with high levels of corruption suffer from a lack of genuine political will to combat corruption and that this is a decisive factor in determining the success or failure of AC reforms (Abdulai 2009). While it is impossible within the realms of this paper to verify this hypothesis as a universal truth, it is feasible to narrow down the object of focus to an individual country and test the hypothesis based on this individual case, with reference to previous similar studies. This country study would thus seek to develop existing theory and would, depending on the findings, grant more or less weight/validity to the above mentioned hypothesis.

The country chosen for this study is Mozambique, as it like many other developing countries is a young democracy severely affected on all levels of society by endemic corruption. While the Mozambican government has a very public national AC campaign and the country has a very strong donor presence, Mozambique has fallen in two years in a row in Transparency International’s AC rankings, achieving a relatively poor CPI score of 2,5 in 2009 compared to 2,6 in 2008 and 2,8 in 2007.

This paper seeks thus to answer the following three questions:

1. Is there a lack of genuine political will to combat corruption in Mozambique?
2. If so, is this, from a donor perspective, the decisive factor hindering anti-corruption efforts in Mozambique?
3. What are the primary factors contributing to the lack of political will in Mozambique?

1.2 Prior research

There exists already a significant amount of research regarding the fight against corruption in aid-dependent developing countries, with emphasis progressing from initially questioning the actual impacts of corruption to today recognizing its negative impacts and instead focusing on devising effective AC strategies. With the emergence of good governance as an important feature of the development discussion over the past two decades, corruption has become an increasingly real concern for policy makers, subsequently leading to widespread research on understanding its causes and effects. As theoretical models have resulted in numerous types of toolkits and strategies, corruption has despite these efforts persisted as a serious problem throughout developing countries. The fight against corruption was simply a vastly greater challenge than initially thought.

According to D.W. Brinkerhoff, a leading expert on corruption, this lead to further analysis by leading researchers (e.g. Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Johnston, 1998; Kaufmann and Wei, 1999) which generally agreed on the following three points: (1) corruption is a complex issue with links to all sectors of society, (2) the fight against corruption is a long-term undertaking requiring persistent dedication
and effort, (3) successful AC efforts depend upon genuine political will, both to initiate and to sustain the battle of time (2000, p. 240).

Despite this consensus, Brinkerhoff interestingly points out that, “Despite the acknowledgement of its importance to anti-corruption activities, however, political will itself has received relatively little study” (ibid.). Brinkerhoff states that the main challenge is how to measure whether political will exists or not. He attempts therefore in his paper to design a theoretical framework to assess political will. This framework is the second of its kind following a paper by Sahr J. Kpundeh’s from 1998 where he also attempts to design a theoretical framework with relevant indicators for measuring political will.

Since the publishing of Brinkerhoff’s above mentioned paper in 2000, there continues to exist surprisingly little study on the specific topic of political will. Searches in academic databases yield little information on the subject and the few recent papers that exist contain relatively few references to research on political will published during the past 5 years. For example, in his cross-country study on political will from 2009, Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai chooses to base his theoretical framework on Kpundeh’s framework originally published 11 years earlier. The conclusion seems to be that while researchers are aware of the problem and agree that political will is critical for the success of AC strategies, there exist few recent ideas on how to tackle the problem.

With this in mind, this paper seeks to contribute to research in this field by analyzing political will in Mozambique, a country that has made noteworthy democratic and economic advances yet has failed to make significant progress in its fight against corruption. Firstly by assessing the existence of political will, and secondly by questioning what contributes to a lack of political will.

1.3 Delimitations

This thesis is not about corruption and will thus not discuss in depth many important theoretical aspects of corruption as a subject (e.g. causes, impacts, etc). This has already been extensively written about. Instead, the focus is strictly on the essence of genuine political will and the implications of its absence.

Further, this thesis restricts its view to a donor perspective. One of the challenges of researching political will is its subjectivity. No government will publicly admit to its own lack of political will to push an anti-corruption programme. This choice will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.2.2.

1.4 Disposition

Having covered the purpose and research questions of this thesis in the first chapter, chapter two explains the chosen methodology for the research. Chapter
three provides a brief background to the political situation in Mozambique while chapter four aims to enable the reader to understand the theoretical aspects of corruption and more specifically political will as a subject, as well as the theoretical framework used for the analysis of Mozambique further on in the paper before proceeding to the results and analysis of the research in chapter five. Lastly, chapter six will sum up the research with conclusions and suggestions for further research.
2 Methodology – case study design

The aim of this thesis is to test an existing hypothesis, generated through a comparison of various countries, by analyzing whether the hypothesis holds true in an additional country. In his chapter “Case Study Research and Theory Building”, Dooley claims that, “Case study research is one method that excels at bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue and can add strength to what is already known through previous research” (2002, p.335). As the aim is to understand a complex issue (political will in relation to success of AC reform) and there already exists previous research, a case study approach seems a logical choice.

Yet, as with any methodological choice, the case study approach has its strengths and weaknesses. The most commonly cited advantage of case studies is that its qualitative nature allows for relatively more in-depth research as well as greater flexibility in terms of methods of data collection (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 534). This depth in study is however also the main limitation of case studies. The classic argument put forth is that depth comes at a sacrifice in width. In other words, only by comparison of larger numbers of cases can hypotheses be tested and subsequently generalizations be made. As this is not the case with the case study approach, it is logical to conclude that “findings deducted from individual case studies lack reliability and should not be generalized” (Dooley 2002, p. 336).

2.1 The multiple-case study approach

While the above section confirms that individual case studies are not ideal for generalization, this weakness can be addressed by replicating individual case studies to multiple cases. Writing on the topic of “Multiple-case designs” for the Encyclopedia of Case Study Research, Chmiliar (2009) states,

"Multiple-case design (...) is more powerful than single-case designs as it provides more extensive descriptions and explanations of the phenomenon or issue. Cross-case examination is employed to develop an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon or issue that may yield increased generalizability. Cause-and-effect relationships may be identified, and examination of the similarities and differences across cases may strengthen theory".

As Odell (2001) explains, comparative case methods “…add the analytical leverage that comes from comparison, to the strengths of the case study” (p. 7). Robert K.Yin, arguably one of the most knowledgeable on case study design, stresses that multiple-case studies should follow replication. If the investigator predicts that similar results will be found then more cases should be included
within the same study. Accordingly, if replicated and consistent results are found in several cases, the ambition of reliability and ability to generalize is significantly enhanced (1993, pp. 33-35). This method of research is thus predominantly qualitative in nature but seeks to obtain some of the advantages of quantitative research.

On a more concrete note, it is important to clarify here that this multiple case approach aims not compare the findings of the previous three countries individually per respective indicator and then finally compare Mozambique with all three as a comparative study would attempt to do. These three countries have already been comprehensively compared in Abdulai’s paper and an analysis per respective indicator already exists and does not need to be repeated in this paper. Instead, it is the methodology of Abdulai’s study that will be reapplied to Mozambique. Consequently, the general conclusions of Abdulai’s findings per respective indicator will also be compared to Mozambique, this in order to discover if Mozambique’s AC profile is more in line with Ghana or Singapore and Hong Kong.

2.2 Theory-testing or theory-building?

Having established that comparison is necessary in order to achieve the ambitions of reliability and generalization, from a methodological point of view the next question to ponder is whether this thesis’ ambition is to test or to build theory. According to Esaiasson et al, with theory-testing studies, the independent variable (political will) is known and cases are chosen in relation to it. In terms of this thesis, this would imply that countries with AC reforms are chosen on the basis of whether there exists political will in the respective countries or not. As the existence of political will is yet to be determined, this is not a feasible option. Esaiasson et al continue to explain that a theory-building study would instead choose a few successful and non-successful cases and from there seek to find independent variables that categorize successful and non-successful cases (the dependent variable). In terms of this thesis, this would mean that countries with successful and unsuccessful AC reforms are first selected in order to find what variable(s) categorize successful versus unsuccessful AC reforms (2003, p.124-125). As this thesis intends to do exactly the second option, it follows that this thesis’ ambition is to build theory.

The above discussion on the need for multiple-case studies design and theory building is well summed up by Dooley:

“The researcher who embarks on case study research is usually interested in a specific phenomenon and wishes to understand it completely, not by controlling variables but rather by observing all of the variables and their interacting relationships. From this single observation, the start of a theory may be formed, and this may provoke the researcher to study the same phenomenon within the boundaries of another case, and then another, and another (single cases studied independently), or between individual cases (cross-case analysis) as the theory begins to take shape” (2002, p. 336).
2.3 Material and data-collection methods

As mentioned, one of the advantages of case study research is the ability to use all methodologies within the data-collection process and to compare within case and across case for research reliability and validity. In this thesis, political will in Mozambique will be assessed in two parts. This implies that two different data collection methodologies will be used for assembling the evidence base, firstly through desk study research and secondly through interviews with well-informed respondents. While it is a stretch to mention triangulation, combining different methods of data collection certainly provide greater reliability for generalizations reached within a multiple-case study, granted of course that the results of both methods point in the same direction. Below follows a brief explanation of how these two methods will be utilized in relation to each respective theoretical model.

2.4 The desk study approach

In his comparative country study “Political will in combating corruption in developing and transition economies” (2009) of Singapore, Hong Kong and Ghana, Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai presents a model consisting of four major indicators for assessing the extent of government’s genuine commitment in AC reforms – ultimately arguing in favor of the hypothesis that political will is a critical condition for successful AC reform (discussed in more detail in chapter 4.3). The theory and methods used in the Abdulai’s cross-country study will be applied to the case study of Mozambique through a desk study approach, reviewing and analyzing relevant corruption-related reports, research papers, online articles, and other publications. The specific results obtained in this case study can consequently be added to the previous results, thus ultimately either strengthening or weakening the existing hypothesis. In order to guarantee the reliability of the gathered data, Marcelo Mosse of CIP\(^1\), the most respected public integrity CSO in Mozambique, will be interviewed. Further reasons for including Marcelo Mosse in this section are discussed under section 2.5.2.

In terms of material, the APRM-Report of Mozambique (2009) is a very extensive and trusted source for the analysis of corruption-related issues in the country and is thus regularly referred to in this thesis\(^2\). As many of the findings of

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\(^1\) CIP is a not-for-profit, non-partisan, independent organization promoting good governance, transparency and integrity in the public sphere of Mozambique (www.cip.org.mz). Its executive director, Marcelo Mosse, is a leading researcher on corruption in Mozambique and is commonly referred to as the most knowledgeable on the subject.

\(^2\) The rating procedures of other international corruption sources, for example Freedom House, have been criticized by several authors regarding its normative bias towards the western model of democracy and/or the lacking depth of its analysis (e.g. Bollen 1992, Chomsky and Herman 1994, Giannone 2010).
this thesis are based on this source, a brief review the APRM is consequently important. The report assesses the existence and shortcomings of 'Good Governance' along four governance areas\(^3\). The APRM-Reports are composed through two successive research rounds. In the first round, scientists from national research institutions conduct extensive desk research based on economic data, qualitative trend reports and the above mentioned governance indices as well as household surveys. In a second research round, the national Self-Assessment-Reports are handed to a team of experts at the continental level, where they are reassessed. Afterwards, the continental results are taken back to the country under review by a Country Review Mission (CRM) of continental governance experts. The CRM validates the findings of both the national and the continental analysis in large stakeholder meeting. After the CRM, the final APRM-Reports are drafted and handed to the APRM Forum, where the 29 governments of the APRM member states Peer-Review the report. As a result of successive research rounds and the incorporation of the views of many different stakeholders on the continental, national and local level, the APRM-Reports enjoy a high credibility among academics, the donor community and policy makers (Herbert and Gruzd 2008). In terms of Mozambique, the report was commended for its analytical value and accuracy (see Hanlon 2010). As an instrument of NEPAD, the findings of the APRM-Reports offer a high degree of 'African Ownership' with regard to the assessment of the quality of democratic governance in both countries.

2.5 The interview approach

The research on political will in Mozambique will also be complemented by a second section, based on Brinkerhoff’s model for assessing political will (explained further under chapter 4.4). Brinkerhoff’s five indicators will be used as a basis for interviews with the relevant donors in Mozambique, with their answers providing a more nuanced picture of the strengths and weaknesses of the political will of the Mozambican political leadership. The answers will also give an indication of if, in their opinion, political will is the decisive factor hindering the country’s AC efforts.

2.5.1 The respondent survey

Esaiasson et al (2003) consider that when conducting interviews, there are two main methodological alternatives: informant and/or respondent surveys. Informant surveys are used when the researcher’s aim is to portray a chain of events as

\(^3\) The four assessed Governance areas within the APRM are: Democratic Governance, Economic Governance, Corporate Governance and Socioeconomic Governance. A more detailed account of the full APRM process can be found at: http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit_council/aprm.htm
accurately as possible. The interviewees are used as knowledgeable witnesses who can provide vital information based on their respect perceptions and backgrounds. On the contrary, the respondent survey focuses not on the event, but instead on the subjective perceptions and opinions of the interviewees. The same questions are asked to each interviewee and answers are compared in order to map the different views regarding the specific event (p. 254ff).

As this thesis seeks opinions of knowledgeable witnesses on the state of political will in Mozambique, it has been a logical choice to use the respondent survey method when designing the questionnaire. It is however important to keep in mind that the findings of this thesis will subsequently be based on the subjective perceptions and individual opinions of the respondents. A critical step is therefore to carefully consider who may participate in such a questionnaire.

2.5.2 Selection of respondents

As indicated previously, this thesis is written from a donor perspective. The reason for this is quite simple. No government will publicly admit to its own lack of political will to push an anti-corruption programme. Interviewing members of the GoM will thus provide findings of very little value.

The civil society organizations (CSOs) and international donor community on the other hand, have no conflict of interest in providing honest opinions. Regrettably, there are two correlated reasons for excluding CSOs as respondents. Firstly, civil society is still very young in Mozambique and (with a few exceptions) lacks both experience and a participative base to exert meaningful political pressure. The Mozambican Civil Society Index from 2007 concludes that “…overall, the four dimensions of Mozambican civil society are weak: Structure, Environment, Values and Impact”, with a final qualitative score “…way below average” (2007, p. 101). Secondly, as described previously in chapter 2.2, the Frelimo government is largely unaccountable and provides minimal opportunities for scrutinizing CSOs to obtain insight into policy discussions. This severely hinders the work of CSOs attempting to operate on advocacy issues. The APRM-Report Mozambique (2009, p. 119) states: “Few CSOs are in involved in political activism or in governance .The reasons assigned for this is that many CSOs fear to be involved in this area as those which do so risks being perceived as members of the opposition.” In his previously cited study for OECD on donor responses to corruption in Mozambique, José Jamie Macuane concludes, “In a context of a weak Parliament and civil society, the government is more accountable to donors than to local actors because of donors’ leverage stemming from their contribution to the state budget” (2009, p. 2). This view is shared by the USAID commissioned corruption assessment report on Mozambique:

“Because of the relative weakness of civil society, the inability of ordinary citizens to hold their government accountable, and the corresponding high levels of foreign assistance from donors, Mozambique’s government is in many ways more accountable to donors than to its own citizens. Donors are therefore key stakeholders in the fight against corruption in Mozambique” (2005, p. v)
So, although the respondent results would ultimately be more complete if both donors and civil society were to be included, it is for the above reasons a reasonable choice to opt for members of the donor community as sole respondents of the questionnaire. To somewhat compensate for this, Marcelo Mosse, from CIP, was consulted in person in terms of ensuring that the evidence-base gathered during the desk study for the first theoretical section, ie. Abdulai’s theoretical framework remained accurate and up to date.

In Mozambique, individual donors work jointly within specific sectors in so-called “working groups” (WG). It is mainly through these WGs that donors receive critical insights into the work and progress of the corresponding sector within the GoM\textsuperscript{4}. However, not all sectors are equally relevant within the area of corruption and not all donors are equally well informed, which naturally has to be taken into consideration when selecting the respondents. Taking into account that firstly, corruption is a cross-sectoral topic, and secondly, that as a result of this, no AC WG exists in Mozambique, potential interviewees do not all belong to a single WG but instead several, e.g. Governance, Private Sector Promotion, Justice, etc. Several members of the donor community were thus consulted as to whom would be most appropriate to include in the list of respondents before making a final selection. In the end, quality of quantity was prioritized and only donors with insight into AC reform in Mozambique were asked to participate. As Esaiassson et al state, when conducting interviews, a smaller number of respondents is preferable and of most importance is that the interview is well-prepared and that the respondents are carefully chosen (2003, p. 286-7).

To sum up, the most critical factor considered was that the respondent was regarded as knowledgeable on corruption in Mozambique and thus well qualified to provide valid answers to the questionnaire.

2.5.3 Anonymity of respondents

A further aspect taken into consideration was anonymity and its impact on the validity of the study. According to Esaiassson et al, some studies are not credible without published sources while other studies are dependent on anonymity being given (p.285). In the pilot tests, it was made very clear that due to the sensitivity of the subject, very few, if any, of the respondents would consent to having their names published if they were to agree to be interviewed. Due to the respondents’ direct working relationship with their government counterparts, any information on the respondents’ personal opinions on the GoM’s will to fight corruption could severely jeopardize important working relationships and any sort of good-will. As donor offices are comprised of usually one position per sector, naming the institute and position of the respondent would be equal to publishing individual names. It follows thus that all respondents were promised complete confidentiality.

\textsuperscript{4} The website www.odamoz.org.mz provides excellent information on official development assistance to Mozambique.
and that only average scores of the questionnaire results as a total would be published in the thesis. Without this promise, this thesis would not be possible.

2.5.4 Choice of model for interview guide

As mentioned above, the focus of the interview is on the opinions of the interviewees regarding the indicators for political will. As Brinkerhoff explains, “high/strong rankings on each of the five characteristics aggregate to delineate the most powerful case for the presence of political will” (2000, p. 243). When contemplating the design of the interview guide (see annex 1), emphasis was therefore put on the ability to map, compare and find patterns in the findings in order to ultimately arrive at conclusions that either strengthen or weaken the existing hypothesis.

While initially contemplating a semi-structured interview guide, early pilot-testing lead to a quick realization that the opinions of 8-10 respondents would be difficult to compare in a totally transparent manner with as little interpretation of answers as possible. The respondents tended to either go off-topic or simply be diplomatic and not give straight answers. A different approach was devised whereby the respondents instead ranked their degree of agreement in regard to specific statements on the five respective indicators. Six degrees of agreement ranging from “Disagree” to “Agree” were made available in order to ensure nuanced answers. As the respondents are all highly knowledgeable on the subject of corruption in Mozambique, the option “Don’t know” was deemed unnecessary. Similarly, the option “50/50” was avoided to eliminate “lazy” answers. After all, the questions are related to the respondents’ daily work and it is assumed that they are able to have an informed opinion on each statement. Nonetheless, when unsure, the respondents were encouraged to answer to the best of their ability based on the knowledge they possess.

The interview guide also contains a second section regarding, 1) the personal convictions of the respondents regarding the direct relationship between political will and AC reforms in general and, 2) assuming that there is a certain lack of political will, the causes leading to lack of political will in Mozambique, as well as possible remedies. This last question is an open question allowing the respondent to freely explain and justify his/her opinions.

2.5.5 Interpretation of results

Upon conclusion of the interviews, each answer will receive a score on a scale of 1-6, with six implying a strong/high ranking of political will to support AC reform and vice versa. Strong rankings on each of the five indicators aggregate to show a strong presence of political will but by separating each indicator, it will also be possible to breakdown and analyze the donor responses per indicator. An average score will thus be calculated per indicator as well as for the total interview. This will show whether political will exists in certain areas but not others and
consequently which areas need strengthening. This section could potentially produce interesting results from which careful recommendations in the paper’s final analysis can be made regarding not only Mozambique specifically but also future research on the topic of political will.

Assuming that there is a certain lack of political will in Mozambique, the second section of the interview guide will provide an answer to the second question posed by this paper: whether a lack of political will is the decisive factor hindering anti-corruption efforts in Mozambique. This section will also provide country specific explanations and hopefully possible solutions for improving political will. There exists already consensus amongst researchers on the importance of political will but the collective opinion of the donors in Mozambique will give a “view from the field” in Mozambique. Although the opinions of the donors will only give indication of the importance of political will in Mozambique, the overall findings will add to the previously done country studies, thus strengthening or weakening the hypothesis on political will.
3 Country context - Mozambique

With more than 50% of its population currently living in absolute poverty and a Human Development Index ranking of 172 out of 182 (UNDP 2009), Mozambique remains one of the world’s poorest countries. As a result, aid dependency is high, with donor and lender funds accounting for more than 44% of the annual state budget (PAP Annual review 2010).

3.1 Political history

Following its independence from Portugal in 1975 after 490 years of colonial rule, Mozambique, inspired by the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Mozambique Liberation Front – Frelimo, at once adopted a one-party political system with a centrally planned economy. Internal dissatisfaction with the political system led to a 16 year long civil war, ending in 1992 following a General Peace Agreement for Mozambique between the Frelimo-led government and the opposing guerrilla movement – the Mozambique National Resistance (Rena mo). The civil war and the economic crisis led to political and economic reforms in the 1980s, resulting in a new pluralist constitution in 1990 with the first democratic elections held in 1994, as well as a shift to market economy through a structural adjustment programme (Macuane 2009, p. 2). While much economic progress has been made, Mozambique continues to suffer from poor education standards as well as insufficient health care.

3.2 Current political situation

After a landslide victory in the 1994 elections, Frelimo took advantage of 30 years of previous one-party rule and its heavy influence over state institutions to consolidate political power. While the constitution itself already grants the President of the Republic considerable powers, the absolute dominance of the Frelimo party in all sectors of government has additionally led to lack of genuine institutional checks and balances (Macuane 2009, p. 2). State capacity is especially weak at the decentralized level, which continues to be politically and financially controlled by the central government. As the president has the right to appoint the provincial governors, upcoming party members are regularly rewarded resulting in the democratic legitimacy of the highest political office at provincial level being limited (Plagemann 2009, p.6). So, while formally a multi party state,
Mozambique under Frelimo resembles more a one party state, with a largely unaccountable system and a weak civil society.

3.3 The rise of corruption

In their joint article on elite capitalism in Mozambique, Hanlon and Mosse, two prominent researchers on corruption in Mozambique, divide the country’s political history in five distinct periods: the liberation war (1965-74), independence and socialism (1975-81), civil war (1982-92), capitalism and the Washington consensus (1993-2001), and elite capitalism (2002- ) (Hanlon & Mosse 2010). Focusing on the later two periods, they argue that with the market economy reforms of the 1990s, the Mozambican political elite were in essence encouraged by the World Bank and IMF to take a lead in the privatization of the state, ultimately resulting in Frelimo leaders also becoming the country’s new capitalist elite. This rapid transition was however far from unblemished. In a study for the OECD on donor responses to corruption in Mozambique, José Macuane adds:

“As part of market economic reforms in the 1990s, attempts to convert the political élite of the former socialist regime to a new business class, led to utilisation of state resources and assets (sometimes including donors’ funds) in a non-transparent manner, hence fuelling grand-scale corruption. Furthermore, allegiance between economic and political élites has created a network of loyalties that blocks an effective fight against corruption. From an almost corruption-free country after independence, Mozambique became one of the countries in the world that had the greatest difficulty controlling corruption…” (2009, p. 2).

Unfortunately, grand corruption is not the only problem. On the contrary, Mozambique suffers today also from high levels of petty corruption throughout society. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), an instrument voluntarily acceded to by Member States of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism5, notes in their Mozambique Report from 2009 that “…the public service of Mozambique has a deplorable reputation for incompetence and ineffectiveness, corruption, bureaucratic red-tape, and poor service delivery” (2009, p. 125), and continues in terms of corruption to conclude that “…corruption has been a major issue in Mozambique’s system of public administration…” (ibid.). Similarly, the USAID corruption assessment (2005, p. iv) found that:

“The scale and scope of corruption in Mozambique are cause for alarm. This corruption is a symptom of democratic and governance weaknesses in the country, and these structural weaknesses amplify a threat that has the potential to undermine Mozambique’s future development progress. As a consequence, Mozambique’s nascent democratic government and the significant success of the country’s development efforts are at risk.”

5 A more extensive explanation of the APRM-Report as a valuable source can be found in chapter 3.4
There exist countless other sources accounting for the high levels of corruption in the country. However, the above three quotes from three quite different sources along with the example from the Carlos Cardoso case are representative enough to show that corruption in Mozambique is a serious problem with severe negative effects on the country’s goals of economic development and poverty reduction.

**Box 1: Example of high profile case of corruption in Mozambique: Carlos Cardoso**

The privatisation of public enterprises in the 1980s was a bonanza to Government and party officials who bought privatized companies cheaply and either kept them as investments or stripped their assets. Carlo Cardoso, an investigative journalist and publisher of Metical, investigated an apparent case of fraud in the Commercial Bank of Mozambique, the largest in the country, which was privatized in 1996. He uncovered alleged fraud of huge sums of money calculated at US$150-300 million. His investigations linked high government and party officials to the fraud, leading to the dismissal of the Prosecutor-General and some of his staff in July 2000. Whilst still insisting on the trial of those linked with the fraud Carlos Cardoso was murdered in November 2000.

Subsequently, following much public disquiet, the trial of those associated with the murder commenced in 2002. During the trials, four men were convicted of Cardoso’s murder. In addition, the nationally well-known Abul Satar brothers were accused of making payments to the hit-men and found guilty of ordering the assassination. However, throughout the trial, many witnesses connected Nympine Chissano to the murder. Nympine is the son of former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano. The Satars have accused Nympine of ordering the assassination and instructing them to make the payments to the hit-men. There exist a number of uncashed cheques from Nympine to the Abul Satars. The Abul Satars claim that Cardoso’s whistle-blowing threatened to expose Nympine and other senior official’s involvement in the BCM theft.

Despite an international outcry, Nympine has not yet been brought to court and there are claims that high-placed officials are deliberately dragging their feet in this regard. Aníbal dos Santos, the main actor and alleged hit-man in the crime, managed to escape from prison three times before finally being sentenced to a 30 year jail term by the Supreme Court. Powerful people named during the trial as having been behind the fraud in Bank of Mozambique and complicit in his various attempts to escape justice have not been tried. The Carlos Cardoso case remains a constant reminder of the impunity of high level corruption and the high cost that high-minded crusaders could pay.

The case has also been linked to two further murders. In August 2001, Antonio Siba-Siba, Interim Chairman of the collapsed Austral Bank was murdered while attempting to recover bad debts from, among others, senior people in Government and the ruling party, Frelimo. In 1997, banking administrator, Jose Lima Felix was murdered.

4 Theoretical framework

This chapter aims to first conceptualize corruption and political will and then explain the theoretical models used in this paper.

4.1 Conceptualizing corruption

“Corruption” is a term used loosely in politics, social sciences and everyday language. It refers to everything from paying bribes to civil servants and large-scale theft from the public purse to a wider range of illegal economic and political practices and includes many various types of corruption such as: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, favouritism, etc. For this reason, there is no single, universally accepted definition of corruption. However, to effectively analyze and address the problem, a common understanding of corruption is critical. While this subchapter will not attempt to create or adopt a specific definition of corruption, it will illustrate some of the most widely used definitions in order to pick up on the essential themes when operationalizing the term corruption.

Without getting into the specifics of the many different types of corruption, it is necessary to at least differentiate between political (or grand) corruption and bureaucratic (or petty) corruption in order to achieve a reasonable conceptualization of corruption. The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, which assists donor practitioners in more effectively addressing corruption challenges through their development support, describe the distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption as rather ambiguous, due to the fact that it is difficult to separate politics from administration and as well as an individual’s role as a public official and status as private person. Despite the difficulties in making this distinction, it is nevertheless important in analytical and practical terms. In short, political corruption takes place at the formulation stage of politics and usually involves very large sums of money, whereas bureaucratic corruption takes place at the implementation end of politics and usually involves smaller amounts of money (thereof the term “petty corruption”).

Moving on to actual working definitions, no discussion on the concept of corruption is of course complete without reference to the world’s leading AC watchdog, Transparency International (TI) and the world’s leading research institute, the World Bank. TI’s definition states: “Corruption is operationally defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” The World Bank’s working definition follows TI’s definition very closely: the abuse of public power for private benefit. Besides these very broad definitions, there exist also more specific definitions within different areas of research. Of interest to this paper is a
widely accepted definition within political science. Keeping in mind that different research fields will naturally differ on what factors to consider when creating a definition, Heidenheimer’s “Political Corruption – a handbook” states that: “Corruption is any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs” (Heidenheimer et al, 1993:6, quoted in Amundsen 1997:3).

What the above mentioned definitions have in common is the clear reference not only to the state (the public) but more importantly the relation between public and private. Accordingly, when conceptualizing corruption it is necessary to draw a distinction between the public and the private. The famed “fight against corruption” is in effect an effort to enforce checks and balances upon the members of the state, ultimately ensuring that the public function is not in conflict with private interests. Despite the obvious difficulties associated with establishing such distinctions, this is a central theme to keep in mind when discussing corruption and more importantly how to best counter it. For the purpose of this paper however, the basic understanding of corruption as the exploitation of public position for private gain is sufficient.

4.2 Conceptualizing political will

Directly associated to the fight against corruption is the genuine political will to do so\(^6\). As the real costs of corruption have been quantified and corruption in itself today categorized as one of the principle obstacles to development (Tanzi 1998, Wei 1999, Kaufmann 2006), there has been a widespread implementation of various AC strategies. As previously mentioned, from initially questioning the importance of AC measures, the issue at hand is no longer whether AC strategies are important but rather what hinders their success. While there is evidently no single explanation as to why AC strategies have struggled in the vast majority of developing countries, lessons learnt have led to a consensus within research that, regardless of the chosen approach, without the prevalence of genuine political will, strategies designed to counter corruption stand very little chance of succeeding (see Johnston & Kpundeh, 2004, p.4).

It is important to note here that there are two phases to political will. The first step is the decision from the political leadership to initiate the process by creating relevant laws, institutions and policies that aim to counter corruption. The second step is the active long-term support for the execution and implementation of these measures. As Brinkerhoff (2000) explains, political will implies not only the political will to initiate the fight against corruption in the first place but also the subsequently will to sustain the battle over time until results are achieved (p.240).

\(^6\) Throughout this paper, the term ”political will” should always to be assumed to be synonymous to ”genuine political will” and is used solely in reference to the fight against corruption. For a deeper analysis on the concept of political will see Post, Raile, and Raile, 2008 ”Defining Political Will”. 
It can thus be concluded that reform initiatives largely depend on the benevolence of political leaders for implementation. The importance of the implementation phase is best illustrated by the number of presidential candidates in African politics who have won national elections with firm promises of eliminating the corrupt practices of the previous government, only to end up leading an equally corrupt government after assuming power.

S.J. Kpundeh, a renowned expert on corruption, defines political will as “the demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level” (1998, p. 92). While Kpundeh chooses to increase the scope of responsibility past the government, the choice of the wording “demonstrated” and “credible” add to the notion that political will entails both the initiation and implementation phase. Brinkerhoff argues for a similar definition: “Political will refers to the intent of societal actors to attack the manifestations and causes of corruption in an effort to reduce or eliminate them. It is defined as: the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objective - in this case AC policies and programmes - and to sustain the costs of those actions over time” (p. 242).

But how then can it be measured whether the political leadership of a government has demonstrated credible intent? Both Abdulai and Brinkerhoff have developed two respective models utilizing various indicators in order to achieve an indication of the level of political will of a specific government. Although both models are similar, Abdulai’s model is more general in nature while Birkerhoff’s model allows for a deeper analysis. Ultimately, both models will be combined and applied to Mozambique to hopefully provide insight to the level of political will in the country.

### 4.3 Abdulai’s framework for assessing political will

In his comparative country study of Singapore, Hong Kong and Ghana, Abdulai (2009) presents a model consisting of four major indicators for assessing the extent of government’s genuine commitment in AC reforms. Abdulai’s theoretical model in his study “Political will in combating corruption in developing and transition economies” is heavily influenced by Sahr J.Kpundeh’s often cited paper “Political will in fighting corruption” from 1998. Although it could be argued that Kpundeh’s original model could be used instead of Abdulai’s, one of the aims of this paper is to analyze political will in Mozambique in order to build upon the hypothesis argued for in Abdulai’s comparative country study – that political will is a decisive factor for the success of AC reform. It is thus more logical to use Abdulai’s adapted model. The indicators used as a base for analysis are:

1. independence and freedom of AC institutions in executing their mandates;
2. provision of adequate budgets and staff for AC agencies;
3. prevalence of incentives and sanctions to deter corrupt behaviour; and
4. extent of encouraging citizen participation in AC crusades (p.399).
Abdulai subsequently provides an overview of each country’s respective AC policies and their respective degree of implementation and success. This analysis is done based on existing research papers and statistics as well as his own extensive research on Ghana. By comparing the three respective countries’ performances on the basis of the above indicators, the following conclusion is reached: Hong Kong and Singapore have advanced from two of the most corrupt countries in the world to both being ranked in the top 15 cleanest economies in 2007 (according to TI’s Corruption Perception Index), largely due to a sincere and enduring commitment from both governments towards the purging of corruption. Their achievement is largely but not exclusively credited to the successful establishment of autonomous and efficient AC agencies. Ghana by contrast, has despite extensive AC rhetoric from several governments, decisively failed to support its AC agencies and overall persistently failed to curb corruption over the past decades. Abdulai concludes:

“Despite the stated mission of President Kuffour’s administration to reduce corruption and make Ghana a “clean” society, the evidence suggests that the government’s commitment to implementing its “zero tolerance for corruption” policy remains tepid at best. Specialized AC agencies (…) are not only denied full independence; but they have also been starved of the necessary financial resources to effectively carry out their functions” (2009, p. 408).

While all three governments have implemented laws and institutions related to AC reform, Ghana has lacked the political drive to back up these measures in a credible manner. Abdulai argues that the reasons for Ghana’s failure are due to poor performance in relation to all the above indicators, thus ultimately indicative of a lack of political will to support AC reform.

By applying assessment of the same indicators to Mozambique, Abdulai’s comparative country study can be expanded to including four countries. As Abdulai affirms, “…while descriptions of corruption in single cases might be useful in drawing practical lessons for policy transfer, they add very little in terms of explanation to our comparative understanding of the phenomenon. More emphasis needs to be placed on comparative studies in order to find generalizable patterns of corruption and its control” (p. 388). However, one drawback of this cross-country study is that the analysis is fairly general and is based on statistics and general fact finding – it does not attempt a deeper analysis. Since this paper aims to provide a deeper understanding of status of political will in Mozambique from a donor perspective, a more detailed tool of analysis is required to fulfill this aim.

4.4 Brinkerhoff’s framework for assessing political will

Derick W. Brinkerhoff, a leading AC researcher, has developed a similar but comparatively more detailed conceptual framework for political will to Abdulai.
The framework links characteristics associated with political will to AC reform outcome, while also considering the importance of environmental factors. More specifically, the five features of political will have a direct impact on the design, implementation and support for AC reform, ultimately affecting AC reform outcome.

Brinkerhoff’s model proposes five key characteristics which can form the basis for indicators. The characteristics of political will are:

1. locus of initiative for AC efforts;
2. degree of analytical rigor applied to understanding the context and causes of corruption;
3. mobilization of constituencies of stakeholders in support of AC reforms;
4. application of credible sanctions in support of AC reform objectives; and
5. continuity of effort in pursuing reform efforts (p. 242).

Each indicator is then broken down into several questions which cumulatively will provide an overall score per indicator. These five scores can then be aggregated to give a total score, ultimately indicating a strong or weak presence of political will. It is important to note that countries can be strong in a particular indicator while weak in another, without implying an overall low score. As explained by the author, “a low rating on one or two of the characteristics does not necessarily signal a complete absence of political will” (p. 243). The model (illustrated in full below) allows thus for a relatively more nuanced analysis of the presence of political will in a specific country.
5 Application of theory – Assessment of political will in Mozambique

This chapter consists of three sections, the first being a general analysis of political will in Mozambique based on Abdulai’s cross-country methodology and the second a presentation and analysis of the interview results based on Brinkerhoff’s theoretical framework. Lastly, the findings regarding the personal views of the respondents on the importance of political will are discussed and analyzed in context with views from other sources.

5.1 Applying Abdulai’s framework

As indicated in chapter 4.3, the indicators used as a base for Abdulai’s analysis will be discussed in turn in order to assess the prevalence of political will in Mozambique.

1. Independence and freedom of AC institutions in executing their mandates

The principle AC institute in Mozambique is the GCCC (Central Office to Fight Corruption). It functions within the Public Prosecution Service Office and is subordinate to the Attorney General, with a core directive to investigate crimes of corruption. The GCCC was created in 2004 when Cabinet adopted the Anti-Corruption Strategy\(^7\), in effect replacing the ineffective AC Unit (UAC). The APRM report on Mozambique from 2009 gives a candid account of the performance of the UAC and the GCCC, affirming the UAC’s failure as indicative of the GoM’s benign attitude towards corruption at the time. In fact, at one point the UAC even found resistance from the Mozambican Supreme Court, who questioned its legal mandate.

It is undoubtedly positive that the Anti-Corruption Strategy from 2004 recognized the ineffectiveness of the UAC. However, its successor, the GCCC, despite having been operational since 2006, has not been any more effective than previous institutions dedicated to fighting corruption. The APRM report concludes, “Although, the GCCC has been operational since 2006, it has not been any more effective than previous institutions dedicated to fighting corruption. The GCCC is weak, its summonses to suspects are ignored and operatives subject to harassment by those being investigated (2009, p. 132-3).” Macuame similarly

\(^7\) Art. Lei n. º 6/2004, from June 17
agrees that, “Both these agencies have a poor record in effectively fighting corruption” (2009, p. 4). These claims are supported by the existing statistics on the performance of the GCCC: of the total of 341 complaints made, only 31 cases were charged, 31 filed and no information exists on how many are awaiting improved evidence (Fael 2008).

The independence of the GCCC of external political influence is also one of the factors that potentially contribute to the GCCC’s poor results. The office is subject to the Attorney General’s Office, who as per the Constitution is appointed by and accountable to the President of the Republic (PR). This chain of command (Attorney General’s Office accountable to the PR) constitutes a potential conflict of interest and provides no guarantees for the work of the GCCC remaining free from political meddling (ibid).

To conclude, while the overhaul of the UAC into the GCCC does in fact indicate a political will to improve the performance of the official Mozambican AC institute, in terms of changes to its mandate and freedom to operate, the situation remains the same, resulting in a largely ineffective GCCC. In other words, in practice there has been little political will to genuinely improve the external conditions directly affecting the performance of the country’s main AC watchdog.

2. Provision of adequate budgets and staff for AC agencies

As noted above, the GCCC has not fared much better than its predecessor. A key factor is its lack of adequate funding and staffing. There is not much to debate in this regard as the facts are quite clear. The APRM report candidly confirms that the GCCC “is poorly resourced as it does not have an independent budget and lacks personnel in adequate numbers and quality” (2009, p. 133). A closer look at the national budget more than confirms this statement, revealing in fact that the budget allocated to the GCCC has actually decreased in 2010. The Budget Execution Reports from 2008 to 2010 show that the budget allocated to the GCCC went from MZN 12,0 million in 2008, to MZN 14,3 million in 2009 but then decreased to 13,7 million in 2010. To the knowledge of Marcelo Mosse, no reason has yet been given for this decrease.

It can thus be credibly concluded that there is no political will to properly staff and fund the GCCC. Without this support and these necessary resources, there is absolutely no possibility of the GCCC successfully carrying out its mandate.

3. Prevalence of incentives and sanctions to deter corrupt behavior

In terms of sanctions, the Mozambican AC Strategy states, “The government shall promote rigorous investigation of cases of corruption and shall bring proven cases of corruption to the bodies responsible for criminal proceedings and trials” (p. 16). Naturally, in order to bring cases of corruption to court, a country first needs

In July 2010, MZN 14 million was equivalent to roughly SEK 3 million. The budget execution report for 2008, 2009, 2010 can be found at www.dno.gov.mz.

Interview, Maputo, 2010-07-22
appropriate legislation. Generally, Mozambique is widely considered to have made significant progress in adopting AC laws and integrity institutions\(^{10}\). As mentioned, an AC law was passed in 2004 and the corresponding strategy approved in 2006. However, while these are considerable steps, the essence of political will is whether these laws and institutions are enforced in practice and make a difference in society or if they are commonly regarded as moves by a pressured local government to appease donors and (to a lesser extent) civil society. The findings are mixed, revealing that there exists a certain will to create laws aimed at deterring corruption, but that they are seldom enforced.

The APRM report finds that, “the institutions established to combat corruption have not been effective despite the existence of many legal instruments (domestic, regional and international) adopted for that purpose” (p. 131). Law 4/90 (from 1990) provides an excellent example of this claim: It aimed to reshape institutions with a view to safeguarding the use of state assets for personal benefit by officeholders, in other words dealing with conflict of interest amongst top members of the government. Firstly, the law was only formally approved after ten years (Decree 55/2000), showing an evident reluctance by the top members of the government to adopt regulations of this nature. Secondly, as the law itself is rather limited (it does not establish effective control mechanisms, it establishes more rights than duties, more privileges than institutions of control, does not mention the President of the Republic, nor state where the declarations of assets should be made), a revision of the law was deemed necessary (Law 7/98). However, while there are some improvements, according to the Reconstruction National Integrity System Survey\(^{11}\) country report of Mozambique (RNISS), even Law 7/98 still fails to address the most pressing issues.

“The law provides an uncertain penal framework for corruption, violation of budgetary legislation and abusive use of information, but it is very vague about access to the declarations of assets. […] As the law stands, civil society and press – public opinion at large - that might be on the trail of a suspicion of corruption, does not have access to the declarations, making monitoring exercises difficult. (2007, p. 42)

\(^{10}\) Among the legal instruments available to fight corrupt are: the Anti-Corruption Law (no. 6/2004) of June 2004 together with Decree no. 22/2005; Decree no 30/2001 which prescribes norms or operational values for the public service; Law no 4/90 and no 21/92 which make it mandatory for the President and other high ranking government officials to declare their assets to the Constitutional Council not later than thirty days after assumption of office; Law no 9/98 defining a code of conduct for public officials; Law no. 9/2002 on treasury management, as amplified by Decree no. 23/2004; Decree no. 19/2005 on tax inspection; Law no. 7/2002 and no. 14/2007 on money laundering; and Decree no 54/2005 on public procurement. In addition, Mozambique in July 2004 ratified the SADC Protocol against Corruption. Government also ratified the AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Corruption in August 2006, followed by the ratification of the UN Convention against Corruption in December 2006. (APRM 2009, p. 132)

\(^{11}\) The National Integrity System (NIS) approach was developed by Jeremy Pope (2000) to understand the weaknesses of state institutions and the failings of previous reform initiatives by asking about corruption from a number of perspectives. The Reconstruction NIS (RNISS) takes the approach further by using it to assess postconflict countries as they rebuild the state and move toward democratization. The RNISS country studies worked to a common template, requiring a country overview and corruption profile, supported by evidence of patterns, levels and causes of corruption.
To this date, these declarations are made annually and delivered to the Constitutional Council, which is forbidden from making them public. In terms of political will the key issue is whether there exists an acceptance amongst the political elite concerning the democratically fundamental importance of declarations of assets been made available for public scrutiny. This example clearly illustrates the present situation: while Mozambique has adopted integrity laws, many of these laws remain ineffective. In terms of sanctions, there is therefore very little in place that effectively deters corrupt behavior, most especially regarding top government officials.

In terms of incentives, there exists an overwhelming consensus within reports on the public sector in Mozambique on the importance of just salaries (see APRM p. 131, Nuvunga & Mosse, 2007, p. 38, Governance and Anti-Corruption Diagnostic Survey, 2004 p. 132, USAID, 2005) - and that without reasonable salaries, there is very little hope that corruption can be curbed. Only after the salary itself as an incentive is proved satisfactory (in other words increase significantly in relation to cost of living), can further incentives even come into consideration. In fact, in 2005, the Technical Unit for Public Sector Reform (UTRESP – a GoM institution) conducted a national survey on corruption in government institutions, based on the perceptions of the people and institutions. It found that from the state personnel perspective, the most salient causes of corruption were: low salaries (58%) and lack of incentives (38%). A revision of the salary situation for public servants seems thus to be the number one priority for the GoM, followed by incentives that improve the quality of life of its staff (e.g. decent health care plan). This is obviously easier said than done – the GoM is already highly dependent on foreign aid to finance the national budget. Nonetheless, without an improvement to public salaries, its staff will always resort to alternative and often corrupt means of obtaining income to cover their cost of living.

While not a substitute for adequate remuneration, other incentives such as good working conditions, special pay scales for key positions within revenue departments, staff training that builds technical capacity as well as team spirit, etc can greatly contribute to deterring corrupt behavior especially in vulnerable sectors as customs authorities (Crotty 1997). In Mozambique, the Customs underwent a thorough institutional and operational reform during a 10 year period from 1997-2006 through a public private partnership with British company Crown Agents and incorporated many of these incentives, resulting in significant improvements in terms of both modernization and levels of corruption.

To this day, Customs staff enjoy higher wages than any other public sector in Mozambique. However, it should be pointed out that despite this, the UTRESP survey shows that there is still a widespread perception in Mozambique of the Customs being one of the most corrupt institutions in the country (2005, p. 73pp). A study by CIP on the impacts of the customs reform concluded that, “Customs reform decreased to some extent the levels of corruption, in particular the petty

12 UTRESP 2005 “National Research on Governance and Corruption”
corruption” (Mosse, 2007, p. 18) However, the report also concludes that despite this progress, there remain “…very serious allegations of conflict of interest involving senior officials, who have business interests as both importers and as clearance agents. The Customs Directorate is also being criticized for favoring some big importers with links to the Frelimo ruling Party” (ibid).

This shows a certain will to reform a critical sector, but without compromising the interests of the political elite involved in corrupt activities. Worryingly, the APRM picks up on this as a widespread problem not only in Customs but throughout national institutions:

“While corrupt junior public servants can be punished for their offences, corruption involving top government officials is hardly ever effectively investigated, let alone prosecuted, with the result that the public has become sceptical about Government’s determination to fight corruption and bring perpetrators to justice (p.130)”.

In terms of political will, it can thus be accepted that the GoM has made a credible effort to deter small scale corrupt behavior amongst junior staff. While still considerably low, the amount of sackings within the public sector has increased yearly – showing a will to deal with unacceptable behavior. It remains nevertheless questionable whether there exists any real intent to curb corrupt activities when the culprits stem from the political elite of the country. To conclude, the government demonstrates a will to dissuade petty corruption but effectively ignores grand corruption.

4. Extent of encouraging citizen participation in AC crusades
The importance of public participation is widely recognized as critical for the success of AC programmes (Abdulai 2009, p. 406). A logical step in this process is thus that the leading AC institute is able to widely incorporate the public into its approach. As indicated above, The GCCC’s ability to carry out its mandate in Mozambique hinges on its support from the political elite. In terms of citizen participation this goodwill is extremely important: If the GCCC is unable to operate freely and investigate whomever it wants (out of fear of interference, dismissals, etc), it is subsequently also unable to root its work in civil society and establish partnerships with key stakeholders such as investigate journalists and integrity CSOs. Without the cooperation of civil society groups and media, the GCCC has no way of building up vital positive public recognition and trust. This is an imperative precondition ensuring that the public is unafraid of reporting corruption. So, while Mozambique has for example established a hotline for reporting corruption, the public will remain reluctant to use tools as this if the GCCC does not publicly profile itself as a proficient and trustworthy partner. As a result, without information from the public the GCCC becomes a lame duck, with its ability to discover new cases of corruption severely limited.

A critical step for Mozambique is thus that CSOs, media and the general public not only recognizes the GCCC as an important partner but also enjoy legislative protection when reporting corruption. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Firstly, the CIP report on the Mozambique AC strategy states that the GCCC is clearly unsupported by the political elite, as it plainly does not receive the protection and
goodwill it would merit if in fact political will had existed (Mosse 2006, p. 45-6). It has for the reasons above thus little chance of establishing itself as a trustworthy partner. Further, the APRM report notes that,

“The fight against corruption is undermined by the fact that citizens are usually afraid to stick their necks out to accuse perpetrators and to serve as witnesses because of lack of confidence in the judicial process, especially as there is no system of protecting whistle blowers or witnesses” (2009, p.131).

As mentioned in the quote above, without legal protection, potential whistleblowers and informants will be extremely reluctant to put themselves at risk. This is a valid point raised by the APRM but it is however worth noting that this problem exists even in the so called developed world. International conventions like the UN Convention against Corruption, the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, and others commit the signatory countries to implementing appropriate legislation. Yet until very recently no coherent European legislation exists, and national legislation on whistleblower protection varies considerably in degree of effectiveness (www.transparency.org). So, although a precondition for obtaining support from civil society and ordinary citizens, it would be harsh to criticize the GoM for not having whistleblower legislation fully working when even far more developed countries have yet to solve this problem.

To conclude this topic, the GoM has all in all shown little effort to truly engage the public in the fight against corruption. While the rhetoric is certainly present, there seems to be no ambition to neither facilitate or encourage denunciations, nor establish partnerships with CSOs. Again it is evident that while certain legislation and institutions have been put in place to combat corruption, the genuine will to ensure that the system as a whole truly functions is lacking.

As a whole, most of the findings point towards Mozambique suffering from a lack of political will to tackle corruption. The general pattern seems to be that the measures taken are not sufficient. Systematic flaws within all the above mentioned indicators show that the political will to genuinely create conditions that favor the country’s AC reform remain wanting.

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13 Whistleblowing is defined as the disclosure of information about a perceived wrongdoing in an organisation, or the risk thereof, to individuals or entities believed to be able to effect action. (www.transparency.org)

14 The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly has in April 2010 adopted a resolution to protect whistleblowers: The protection of “whistle-blowers” Resolution 1729, (2010). (http://assembly.coe.int)

15 For example: In July 2010, the Standards in Public Office Commission (SiPOC) argued that the Irish government’s current approach to whistleblower protection is deeply flawed and that “the piecemeal approach to introducing protection for whistleblowers may have created confusion”. The State agency has also questioned “whether there is a real commitment” to encouraging people to come forward in reporting wrongdoing. (www.transparency.org - Report available at www.sipo.gov.ie)
5.2 Applying Brinkerhoff’s framework

The aim of this section was twofold. Firstly, on the basis of Brinkerhoff’s framework, to determine the perceptions of members of various donor agencies on the prevalence of political will in Mozambique, and secondly to verify whether these results correspond to the finding done through the desk study based on Abdulai’s framework, thus increasing the reliability of the findings of this thesis. A total of nine different respondents working in different sectors and of various nationalities (incl. Mozambican) answered the questionnaire.

5.2.1 Interview results

The figures below (Boxes 2&3) provide a summary of the interview results based on Brinkerhoff’s framework and are to be interpreted with help of appendix 1 (the questionnaire). Each indicator is broken down to show the results of the individual statements. For example, 1.3 refers to statement 3 under indicator 1, and so forth. A score ranging from 1-6 is given to each selection - the higher the score, the stronger the indication that political will exists.

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<tr>
<td>Indicator average (3)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td><strong>Total average for indicators 1-5:</strong></td>
<td>2.5</td>
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</table>
5.2.2 Analysis of results

As can be seen, the interview results provide a firm indication that according to donor agencies interviewed, overall there is a clear lack of political will to combat corruption in Mozambique. An average score of 2.5 out of 6 leaves little question of this. Furthermore, not a single indicator scored above 3, meaning that there is a clear lack of political will within all indicators – there exists no significant difference between the indicators.

Looking closer at the individual statements it can be seen that only one statement (5.1) received an average score above 3.5, implying strength instead of weakness towards political will. The statement queries whether “The fight against corruption in Mozambique is today better characterized by efforts undertaken for the long term rather than sporadic public symbolic purges of corrupt officials”. It would seem strange that donors would score this statement high when their opinion of political will is so low in general. A possible explanation could be that due to pressure from donors, the GoM has in fact initiated processes like the AC strategy as well as certain new AC legislation. While these are certainly efforts undertaken for the long term, it could be argued that they are taken only due to donor pressure. Looking at statements 1.2 and 1.3 regarding initiative and ownership of AC reform, it is clear that the scores 2.4 and 2.2 respectively indicate that AC steps taken in Mozambique are taken due to external pressure – which thus supports the above explanation regarding statement 5.1.

Bearing in mind that the role of the GCCC has been heavily discussed in the paper it is interesting to see that with an average score of 2.0 for statement 5.3, the respondents strongly agree that there exists little political will to genuinely support the work of this institution.
To conclude, the results are possibly lower than expected. While it is true that Mozambique suffers from high levels of corruption, the AC strategy has been in place for four years and some indications of improvement were expected from the respondents. However, the last three statements confirm that this is not the case.

5.3 Respondent’s personal views on political will

This section aimed to understand the personal opinions of the interviewee regarding the relationship between political will and AC reforms and the causes leading to lack of political will in Mozambique, as well as possible remedies.

5.3.1 Results of three statements regarding political will

The average scores of statements 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 are illustrated in Box 4 below. The higher the score, the more the respondents agree with the respective statement.

![Box 4](image)

5.3.2 Analysis of three statements regarding political will

Statement 6.1 states that political will is a decisive factor in determining the success or failure of AC reforms. The respondents overwhelmingly agree with this statement. This is a critical confirmation for this thesis. The respondents (who are all work with corruption issues) thus support the underlying hypothesis of this thesis, that political will is indeed vital to AC reform.
Statement 6.2 states that *lack of political will is the main reason hindering AC reform in Mozambique*. It would be a fair argument that there exist many reasons why AC reform in Mozambique has not shown better results. However, the high average respondent response of 5.1 thus indicates that while other reasons certainly can exist, political will remains the most important of these possible reasons. In regard to the second of the research questions posed in Chapter 1 of the thesis, it can thus be confirmed that according to donors, political will is the decisive factor hindering anti-corruption efforts in Mozambique.

Statement 6.3 states that *there is a lack of political will within the political leadership to combat corruption in Mozambique*. Considering the straightforwardness of this statement and the respective high average response of 5.3, there is little doubt that there is a lack of genuine political will to combat corruption in Mozambique. The phrasing of the statement also leaves no doubt as to the willingness of the political elite to genuinely support AC reform in Mozambique. This provides thus a solid yes to the first of the three research questions of this thesis.

### 5.3.3 Factors contributing to lack of political will in Mozambique

The respondents were asked to list three main factors they considered to contribute the most towards a lack of political will towards AC reform in Mozambique. Three factors repeatedly cited by almost all respondents were: (1) the democratic concepts of what constitutes a public servant are widely ignored in practice, (2) a lack of separation of interest between the ruling Frelimo party and government, and (3) poor education system and weak civil society leading to next to no accountability. Although these three factors are correlated, they will be discussed individually below.

A basic concept of democracy is the separation of interests when working as public servant. In theory, there exists an obvious and unacceptable conflict of interest when public servants make decisive decisions in sectors where they also have heavily invested private interests. In Mozambique however, the respondents argue that this is the overwhelming norm. Additionally, it starts from the top where the President of the Republic, Armando Guebuza is by far the largest entrepreneur in the country with economic interests in all sectors of the economy. Furthermore, these business ventures often depend on government generosity, including fishing licenses and soft loans. A majority of the respondents also added that far from being alone, Guebuza also has a wide range of business associates in the Frelimo elite whom together stand as role models for the rest of the public sector as to what constitutes a successful politician. This frame of mind thus trickles down throughout the government, leading to a moral and ethical attitude that political office is a means of establishing business investments and that this is perfectly acceptable. In terms of laws controlling conflict of interest, there exists
nothing preventing government officials from pursuing business interests of choice. As Mosse writes in an article for Savana\textsuperscript{16}, “The lack of political will to call high officials to account for conflicts of interest, combined with the decline in moral values and the get-rich-quick attitudes of the new capitalist society, means that a small political elite continues to expropriate public goods for their own benefit” (ibid). The concept of personal conflict of interest within the public sector does not seem to apply to Mozambique. A majority of the respondents conclude that ultimately, the political elite benefit from the current state of play and naturally don’t see the point of changing the existing system. Until there emerges a “critical mass” that benefits from change, the situation will remain unchanged.

Linked to this is the evolution of the Frelimo party into becoming the de facto Government. Respondents argue that due to Frelimo’s history as the country’s colonial liberator, the party enjoys the status of “the creator of the nation” and can thus get away with, from a democratic point of view, questionable political acts and privileges (e.g. Frelimo party cells within Government ministries, obligatory attendance by all public servants at Frelimo rallies, etc). This view is supported by Hanlon and Smart who argue that FRELIMO have blurred the borderlines between party, state and private sector, especially since the inauguration of president Guebuza in 2004 (Hanlon and Smart 2008, p. 97). Still within this factor, the respondents also raised the fact that due to Frelimo’s dominance of the political arena\textsuperscript{17}, other parties have little political room to operate, thus effectively minimizing political opposition. This claim is supported by the 2010 country report of the Bertelsmann Foundation: "After President Guebuza was elected in 2004 and Frelimo increased its dominance in the parliament, public space has narrowed. Political activities outside Frelimo are under strict and permanent supervision…” (2010, p. 8). One of the respondents even went so far as to call Mozambique “in theory a democracy, but in practice a one party state”. While this is doubtless a more extreme view probably not shared by most respondents, it does portray the gravity of the situation. In line with this line of thinking, the APRM Report strongly agrees with the two above mentioned factors and, as usual, leaves no room for misinterpretation:

Senior Government and party officials and their families have over the years, (…) held the economy in their stranglehold to such an extent that it is difficult to imagine the State can autonomously regulate the economy as it ought to. In Mozambique, senior FRELIMO politicians are the party; the party is the government; and the government is the state” (2009, p. 50).

All respondents raised the fact that the situation described above is only possible due to little domestic pressure for increased Government accountability. They argue that an important factor contributing to this is the combination of a poor educative system as well as a weak civil society. In terms of education, three of

\textsuperscript{16} Savana is an independant Mozambican newspaper characterized by investigative journalism, aimed chiefly at Government dealings. www.savana.co.mz

\textsuperscript{17} Frelimo also controls the county’s biggest TV channel “TVM” and daily newspaper “Noticias”.
the respondents mentioned a very important aspect – Mozambicans students are not taught to think critically. Mozambican culture is highly hierarchical and authority is continuously taught to not be questioned. According to the respondents, this is particularly true within the educational system. An example was given of the local university’s law department which, after voicing critical views once too many was subsequently closed down in 1984 by the Government and only reopened again several years later. Without the ability to think and absorb information critically, Mozambican society is deprived of not only citizens whom actively question the actions and decisions of the Government, but consequentially also CSOs able to demand accountability. According to these respondents, this is the de facto situation today. In practice this is evident by the Government repeatedly ignoring reports of blatant corruption and abuse of political power – a point highlighted during interviews by almost all respondents. This also supports the claims mentioned earlier in the thesis about the GoM only being accountable to the donor community due to the Government’s dependency on foreign aid. Additionally, respondents also mentioned that CSOs domestic legitimacy is harmed by their dependency on funding from donors. CSOs are thus often seen by the GoM as an extension of donor opinion instead of domestic actors with independent agendas. Again, this further contributes to a weakened civil society with little means of demanding accountability from the Government.

18 For example, incidents reported in independent and politically unaffiliated newspapers such as “O Pais” and “Savanah” are often completely ignored in the Government newspaper, ”Noticias”.
6 Conclusions and further research

6.1 Conclusions

This thesis initially posed three research questions on political will in Mozambique. The research done to answer these respective questions will be concluded below in turn.

Firstly, is there a lack of genuine political will to combat corruption in Mozambique? Both the desk study done based on Abdulai’s framework and the interviews performed on the basis of Brinkerhoff’s framework convincingly point towards a “yes”. Throughout this thesis it has been apparent that the GoM has been willing to take certain steps to curb corruption. However, these steps have consistently fallen short of the steps required to comprehensively deal with the different areas involved in the fight against corruption. A government genuinely perceiving corruption as a high priority takes firm action towards ensuring that its system to fight corruption is both wide-ranging and without fundamental flaws. The evidence base gathered during the course of this thesis shows that this is not the case in Mozambique.

Secondly, is, from a donor perspective, a lack of political will the decisive factor hindering AC efforts in Mozambique or do other factors exist that are more important? The high average score amongst the respondents indicates that in their view political will is certainly the root cause for the lack of progress of the AC reform. Other factors certainly exist, yet the crucial aspect nonetheless is that all of these problems have solutions. Laws can be changed, the GCCC can be improved, etc. However, if political will is the decisive factor, there is no driver to implement solutions. This is a critical situation for the future of AC reform in Mozambique.

Lastly, what are the primary factors contributing to the (now confirmed) lack of political will in Mozambique? The respondents largely agree that public servants lack core democratic values due to poor role models amongst the political leadership. Lamentably, the culture of utilizing political office for personal gain is deeply entrenched in Mozambican society. Further, the rapid evolution of Frelimo as the dominant political party in the country has lead to a worrying haziness between party and government, leading to little separation of interests. This blurring distinction risks leading the country towards a one party state rule with little political room for other political parties. Finally, respondents also indicate that the current situation is only made possible due to the GoM showing little accountability towards its people. Poor schooling leading to a culture that discourages critical thinking and the questioning of superiors has resulted in a
weak civil society, ultimately allowing the Government to widely ignore corruption claims from the public.

In conclusion, this thesis argues on the basis of the above findings that political will without doubt constitutes an imperative feature of fighting corruption and deserves more attention. Without confronting political will there is little hope for successful anticorruption reforms.

6.2 Further research

As a final question, the respondents were asked to suggest possible strategies that counter-act the factors contributing to a lack of political will. The aim of this question was to receive clues as to what areas future research should focus on. Answers ranged considerably but were overall fairly general and often analogous to the factors previously mentioned (e.g. “improve educational system”). Other suggestions sound fine in theory but are not viable in practice (e.g. “building up of the judiciary system” – this certainly contributes towards increased checks and balances ultimately making the government accountable. However, if the judiciary is already heavily influenced and controlled by the political elite then such suggestions mount to little.

There was however one interesting suggestion. For the foreseeable future Frelimo will most probably remain the overwhelmingly dominating political force in Mozambique. Considering this stronghold, it is important to identify “change agents” within and outside of Frelimo. Change cannot be imported by donors. The identification of such change agents is thus the first step of a transition towards more democratic values within party and government politics that ultimately allow AC reform a greater chance to succeed. Research is thus needed on how to best support these potential champions of reform in practical terms, especially considering the risks involved for individuals who deviate from party norms. Mozambique would provide an excellent pilot case study.
7 References


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UTRESP, Mozambique Anti-corruption Strategy 2006-2010, (Document approved by the Council of Ministers at its 8th Ordinary Session on 11 April 2006)


Vaux, Tony; Mavela, Amandio; Pereira, Joao; Stuttle, Jennifer, 2006. Strategic Conflict Assessment: Mozambique, Maputo: DFID (Department for International Development).


8 Appendix 1 – Interview guide

Interview guide – statements on indicators
This interview will be part of the evidence base for a MSc thesis on anticorruption reform and political will. The thesis aims to test the hypothesis that a majority of developing/transitional countries suffer from a lack of genuine political will (at the policy maker level) to combat corruption, and that this is a decisive factor in determining the success or failure of anticorruption reforms. Assuming a lack of political will, this thesis also seeks to understand the factors contributing to this deficit. Political will is to be understood as: the demonstrated credible intent of political actors to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level. Mozambique has been chosen as a case study to test this hypothesis.

This interview aims to gather the opinions of members of the donor community whose roles and responsibilities provide ‘hands-on’ knowledge of Mozambique’s anti-corruption policy environment. Five different indicators have been selected for investigation, all of which are part of a theoretical framework that collectively provides a method to assess the presence of political will to combat corruption. In this case, the level of political will being assessed is within the political leadership of the Govt. of Mozambique.

Thank you for your participation!

Statements on five indicators of political will – please indicate to the best of your ability the degree of your agreement.

1. Locus of initiative: This characteristic relates to where the drive for tackling corruption resides.

   1.1 The political leadership within the GoM genuinely perceives corruption as an issue requiring attention.

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   1.2 The initiative for reform comes from an external group that has induced or coerced the GoM to accept or endorse the anti-corruption issue.

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   1.3 The GoM has adopted and demonstrated ownership over current anti-corruption activities.

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2. **Degree of analytical rigor:** This characteristic of political will entails the extent to which the reform team undertakes an in-depth analysis of corruption and uses that analysis to design a technically adequate and politically feasible reform programme.

2.1 The GoM has analyzed the costs of corruption and weighed those against the costs of combating particular types of corruption.

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2.2 The GoM has built its anticorruption strategy on a plausible model of corruption that takes into account the structure of institutions and the rules that govern them.

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2.3 The GoM has shown a genuine interest in identifying and developing strategies to promote integrity (e.g. code of conduct) in government and/or private business.

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3. **Mobilization of support:** This characteristic of political will deals with the willingness and ability of the reform team to identify and mobilize support for anti-corruption activities.

3.1 The GoM has developed a credible vision of success and a strategy that is participative and incorporates the interests of important stakeholders.

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3.2 The GoM is gathering adequate and ongoing support to overcome resistance from those national stakeholders whose interests are most threatened by particular reforms.

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3.3 There is willingness to publicly report on progress, successes or failures.

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4. **Application of credible sanctions**: A fourth characteristic of political will is openness of the reformer to identify incentives and apply sanctions both positive and negative in the context of reform strategies.

4.1 The GoM seeks to use the instrument of prosecution or fear of prosecution as the principal tool for compliance.

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4.2 Existing anticorruption related sanctions are enforced.

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4.3 The GoM has generally made a credible effort to induce and/or compel individual behavioural change within the public sector (for example, firing top officials & public integrity pledges by staff).

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5. **Continuity of effort**: A fifth feature of political will is allocation of ongoing effort and resources in support of anti-corruption activities.

5.1 The fight against corruption in Mozambique is today better characterized by efforts undertaken for the long term rather than sporadic public symbolic purges of corrupt officials.

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<th>Disagree</th>
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5.2 The GoM has established a process for monitoring the impacts of anti-corruption reform efforts and utilizes this data for future improvements.

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<th>Disagree</th>
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5.3 Appropriate human and financial resources are made available to the Central Office to Fight Corruption (GCCC) and the necessary degree of mandate is provided over time to ensure that it can achieve results.

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6. **Personal opinions on political will:** This section does not form part of the indicators for political will. This section aims instead to understand the personal opinions of the interviewee regarding:

1. The relationship between political will and anticorruption reforms (3 statements as done above);
2. The causes leading to lack of political will in Mozambique, as well as possible remedies (open for discussion).

**Part 1:**

6.1 Political will is a decisive factor in determining the success or failure of anticorruption reforms.

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<tr>
<th>Disagree</th>
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6.2 A lack of political will is the main reason hindering anticorruption reform in Mozambique.

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<th>Disagree</th>
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6.3 There is a lack of political will within the political leadership to combat corruption in Mozambique.

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**Part 2:**

6.1 Assuming that there is a certain lack of political will in Mozambique, what are the main factors contributing to this?

6.2 How can these factors be realistically counter-acted?

6.3 Personal comments

Thank you for your time!