A Common Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the European Union?

How Member States’ Ideas, Norms and Identities Matter

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the prospects of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union. It analyzes how Member States’ security cultures influence the establishment of a common European counter-terrorism strategy. The study examines the differences between Member States’ security cultures under the framework of social constructivism that emphasizes the impact of the socially constructed interaction between ideas, norms and identities on strategy formation. The study analyzes this impact on threat perception, espousal of multilateralism or unilateralism, use of civilian or military means and expression of self and other through the comparative discourse analysis of two Member States – United Kingdom and France. It also looks at the EU and the US security cultures and counter-terrorism strategies to come up with conclusions about the Member States’ Europeanist and Atlanticist security approaches that affect the construction of common ideas, norms and identity in the EU. The study concludes that the presence of national security cultures is the key obstacle to common security culture and counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union.

Key words: European Union, international terrorism, counter-terrorism strategy, security culture, social constructivism
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1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) is undoubtedly a significant territory as well as a crucial actor of international relations. It could definitely be said that it plays an important economic role in the world that situates the Union at the centre of economic relationships. The EU consists of the largest single market in the global economy; it possesses the largest gross national product and is the biggest commercial power and aid donor across the world (Andreatta 2005 p. 35, Bretherton and Vogler 2000 p. 38). Although the EU has become an important part of the international system through its economic power capabilities, it hasn’t yet completed its integration process within the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP is one of the most concrete and essential requirements for the European integration that would make the EU a single voice in world affairs.

Foreign policy is the political area in which actors aim to strive for their interests by strengthening their capacities to have an effect on the behavior of other actors in the external environment (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 19). It is also necessary to pinpoint that security policy of a state is the integral part of its foreign policy. Since, the primary foreign policy goal of a state is the protection of its security (ibid p. 22). It means that threats to the survival of nations lead to the most important and difficult foreign policy decisions of national leaders (ibid p. 16). In this respect, it is clear that the maintenance of security arises as the key interest of a state’s foreign policy.

The vital obstacle to establishing a common European foreign and security policy is the incompatibility of the Member States’ security policies. They follow different policies as a consequence of contradictions in their security interests. At this point, Member States’ security strategies gain a particular importance, since strategies are the plans of action in pursuing security interests. Since late 2002, intense divisions over Iraq influenced “transatlantic and European security debates” (Cornish and Edwards 2005 p. 811). Especially, the US-led Iraq War in 2003 was as a clear example, which justified the interrelation between foreign policy and security interests and displayed the contrast between the security strategies of the EU and the Member States. The distinction between the EU and Member States’ strategies emerges as a barrier to create a common European counter-terrorism strategy and maintaining further integration in the CFSP. It is widely argued that the reason behind the implementation of different counter-terrorism strategies is the presence of different security cultures consists of opposing ideas, norms and identities.
1.1 Definition of the Research Problem

The terrorist attacks perpetrated in the United States on 11 September 2001 (henceforth, 9/11) created security turmoil in the world, since the attacks brought about a new type of terrorism that is global in its structure and its purpose. The nature and the scope of contemporary international terrorism require struggling against it in a multilateral context. On 12 December 2003, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) at the European Council. The ESS introduces international terrorism as one of the key threats to European security and aims to coordinate policy issues, to establish a common security understanding and a compromise between different cultures and strategies of the Member States. The EU’s attempt at creating a common security strategy and its statement of international terrorism as a key threat to European security led the study to question the presence of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU. In this sense, the research question of the study is “Is there a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union?”

Although material factors are important in establishing counter-terrorism strategies, the study aims to explore the function of immaterial factors in the construction of strategies against international terrorism. In this respect, the study focuses on the social structural factors behind the impacts that national counter-terrorism strategies have on the creation of a common counter-terrorism strategy in Europe. It is argued that culture as an incorporeal and impalpable issue determines the actors’ behaviors and opinions and affects their description of interests and role in the international system (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 25). Hence, it is essential to analyze the influence of cultural factors on the strategy formation. In this respect, the other important question of the study is “How Member States security cultures matter to the establishment of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union?”

Culture, as a sum of shared ideas, norms and identity of an individual or a group of actors, is the key determinant of how states plan international affairs and establish their interests, and so is the prime concern in the study of foreign policy (Wendt 1999 pp. 140-1). In this sense, the study conducts the comparison between the Member States security cultures and their collation with the security culture of the Union through the analyses of differences in ideas, norms and identities. It can be deduced that while considering the presence of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU, it is indispensible to analyze the concept of strategy within the interrelation between foreign policy, culture and interest.

1.2 Scope of the Study

The study carries out the analyses of national security cultures of Member States through the United Kingdom (UK) and France, since they are the two key powers
of the EU that have the potential to influence the counter-terrorism strategies of other Member States by means of their security cultures and related counter-terrorism strategies. That is to say, the UK and France have the capacity to play a key role and to have important impacts on the establishment of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union. As Wæver states it, if the analyses appertain to the discourses of major European powers, the prospects of European integration and security can be examined (2002 p. 20).

The study conducts the investigation of counter-terrorism strategies under four categorizations originate in security cultures: the understanding of threat, the adoption of multilateralism or unilateralism, the use of military or civilian means, and the expression of self and other. The inquiry of these particular qualities is carried out by dint of the structured analyses of key official documents on security strategy comprising the years after 11 September 2001. Since, counter-terrorism became a strategic primary concern for the EU after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 237) and changed the counter-terrorism approaches of both the EU and Member States. Although the analyses of security cultures and counter-terrorism strategies are mostly based on the official documents of the EU, the UK and France, the US security culture and counter-terrorism strategy are also examined to see the influence of Atlanticist approach on the EU and Member States’ cultures and strategies.

The investigation of the US security culture is helpful to apprehend the impact of Atlanticism on the ideas, norms and identities of the Member States and on their responses to terrorism. The US impact on the constitutive elements of security culture means that it has an important role on the strategy formation of the Member States. For instance, the US has an influence on the UK’s counter-terrorism strategies, and the US’ bilateral relationship with the UK has played an inhibitive role in the formation of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union. Since, if the US approaches affects the ideas, norms and identities of the Member States, it means that the US affects their security cultures and related counter-terrorism strategies. In this respect, the analysis of the US counter-terrorism approach is useful to understand the impact of the US security culture on the establishment of a common European security strategy against international terrorism.
2 Methodology

The research strategy chosen for the inquiry is case study. Yin (2009 p. 4) holds that the distinguishing requirement for case studies occurs as a result of the aspiration to understand complex phenomena. The research phenomenon or the subject of this case study is “common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union” and the EU, the UK, France and the US are the cases of this phenomenon. It is also important to keep in mind that once the cases of the phenomenon are identified, the next important step is the collection of data and the selection of methods to analyze the collected data. In this study, discourse analysis is the method to examine the data obtained from official government documents regarding the counter-terrorism strategy.

2.1 Case Study

George and Bennett (2005 p. 17) identify a case as “an instance of a class of events”. The concept of “class of events” signifies a phenomenon of scientific interest, which is selected to analyze the divisions and congruities between instances (cases) of that phenomenon (ibid pp. 17-8). In this research, case study is made up of more instances, which provide the greatest information to query the existence of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union (Bleijenbergh 2009). In this respect, in order to analyze the phenomenon, the EU, the UK, France and the US are examined as cases in a comparative manner. It means that the type of the case study method in this research is “comparative case study”. The comparative case study method investigates completely the context and characteristics of the counter-terrorism strategies so as to analyze the differences and resemblances between the EU, the UK, France and the US (Campbell 2009).

2.1.1 Critiques of Case Study

Case study method, like other research methods, has some advantages and disadvantages. One of the benefits of the method is that it examines a contemporary phenomenon thoroughly to understand it in its real-life context (case) when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not apparent (Yin 2009 p. 18). In this sense, the case study method is helpful to understand the phenomenon of common European counter-terrorism strategy in depth within the context of the UK and France, which form the setting for the ideas, norms and identities. Second, the comparative method enables the appraisal of the heterogeneity between the UK and France in their national security cultures and
counter-terrorism strategies and thus, of the absence of a common European counter-terrorism strategy by juxtaposing empirical facts clearly. That is to say, the analyses of cases in a comparative manner provide the study with a useful empirical basis by which the study deduces significant outcomes regarding the prospects of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU. Since, the comparison provides a more inclusive and detailed analyses of the phenomenon (Aggestam 2004 p. 15). In other words, a comparative approach in the study facilitates to infer a more comprehensive and complete picture of a common European counter-terrorism strategy by comparing national security strategies of the Member States.

Third, the research’s conduct of case study by means of two Member States besides the EU and the US is another advantage of the method. As Devine states it, studying with a limited number of cases is frequently a preferred strategy to attain more comprehensive knowledge of a phenomenon (cited in Aggestam 2004 p. 22). Fourth, case studies provide to attain a high level of “conceptual validity” and to point out and evaluate the indicators that the investigator aims to measure (George and Bennett 2005 p. 19). It is relatively difficult to measure many of factors, such as security culture, that appeal to social scientists, since culture changes from country to country. For instance, an incident considered as a security threat in one cultural context might be intensely not a threat in another culture. Thus, as Locke and Thelen hold, the study carries on a “contextualized comparison,” which aims to examine an analytically comparable phenomenon across different contexts (cited in George and Bennett p. 19). In this respect, it is important to remind that common European counter-terrorism strategy is an analytically comparable phenomenon across the UK and France under the particular qualities of security cultures.

On the other hand, although the case study is the best suitable strategy for the research, it has some limitations along with its advantages. One of the criticisms is that “case selection bias” becomes an acute challenge in case study research (George and Bennett 2005 p. 22). However, this study is open to antithetical findings and does not conduct the case study to justify a predetermined position (Yin 2009 p. 72). In addition, in order to overcome this challenge in the research, the selection of cases benefits from the facts acquired from existing studies (George and Bennett 2005 p. 24). That is to say, the study does not have a preconceived position and the cases were chosen through the help of findings of previous studies. Second, James Rosenau censured that researches on foreign policy through case studies were not proper for scientific analysis that most of them were deficient in scientific consciousness and structured comparison (cited in George and Bennett 2005 p. 68). However, the study prevailed over this challenge by fulfilling some requisites.

First, a well-defined study aim leads the investigation of cases within the specific phenomenon (George and Bennett 2005 p. 69). In this case, the study objective is very clear that it aims to question the existence of a common European counter-terrorism strategy and this aim leads the analyses of the EU, the UK, France and the US. Second, it is important for the study to ascertain the cases clearly as instances of a particular phenomenon (ibid). Case selection is the basic feature of the strategy in this research to achieve the study aim (ibid p. 83). In this sense, the
selection of cases and of samples- the sources of the data- within the cases are “purposeful” (Patton 2002 p. 46) that particular Member States were chosen to ascertain, understand, and gain insight into those Member States’ strategies (Merriam 2009 p. 77). The UK and France were chosen for the research since they have affected the establishment of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union.

2.2 Discourse Analysis

After the designation of the phenomenon and the research aim and the selection of the cases, the next important course of action is the collection of data. Once the research question (study aim) and the research strategy have been determined, the next step is to choose the samples within the cases (Merriam 2009 p. 76, Bryman 2008 p. 375). Research data can be gathered from multiple sources and analyzed by using multiple methods (Gondo et al. 2009). At this point, it is crucial to select the methods and sources that have the capacity to give an accurate and deep intuitive understanding of the phenomenon at issue (ibid). In order to come up with the answers that necessitate an empirical study of counter-terrorism strategy and, particularly, a comparison between the counter-terrorism strategies of different units, it is needed to determine the appropriate research methods and data sources.

In this respect, discourse analysis and official documents on counter-terrorism strategies, which also reveal the security cultures, are the best suitable method and data sources for this study. Although official documents are the primary sources in this research, academic studies are deployed complementarily as secondary sources. Moreover, there are different types of discourse analysis. One of the main disparities between different types is that while some approaches covers comprehensive text analysis, others don’t (Fairclough 2003 p. 2). The method of discourse analysis in this study is conducted through the approach, which is defined as “textually oriented discourse analysis” (ibid). That is to say, the emphasis of the discourse analysis method of the study is on linguistic interpretations of texts (ibid p. 3). In addition, it is also significant to indicate that the texts were selected from a limited period- after the 11 September 2001 attacks-, since the counter-terrorism security discourses has changed after this incident.

2.2.1 Critiques of Discourse Analysis

The discourse analysis method has some advantages and disadvantages like the case study method. The foremost advantage of discourse analysis is that the investigation of discourses on state and Europe clarifies foreign policies (Wæver 2002 p. 20). It also means that discourse analysis clarifies security policies since safeguarding of security is the key foreign policy aim of a state. In this sense, the
method of discourse analysis is helpful for this study to understand the interrelation between foreign policy and security strategies by providing an insight into the similarities and differences in Member States’ actions.

Second, the discourse analysis method is a useful tool for analyzing particular texts and establishing a framework to analyze the discourses of cases and understand the link between discourse and the political phenomena. Discourse analysis is the most apposite method as it provides the study with the understanding of how something is determined as a security issue (Buzan et al. 1998 p. 176). In this respect, in this study, the method of discourse analysis focuses on the impacts of ideas, norms and identities on the differences between Member States’ security cultures and related the security strategies on the one hand, and its effect on the formation of a common European counter-terrorism strategy on the other. Third, as Larsen says, “Differences between ideas, meanings, is only accessible through differences between words” (1997 p. 11). It means that the comparison of British and French ideas on national and European counter-terrorism security issues contributes to the understanding of the dynamics of the European security culture. Jæger sees official security documents as “narrative representations of the way security, threat, defense, war, danger and countermeasures are conceived of” and national security documents as “privileged textual representations of the state’s security policy” (cited in Möller 2006 p. 23). In this respect, shortly, the analysis of discourses on security cultures and counter-terrorism strategies through the key EU and national official documents is the best fitting selection for the study which aims to questions the existence of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union.

On the other hand, discourse analysis method has some limitations. First, official texts often contrast with the actual policy of a state, because the most significant decisions in world politics are frequently taken behind the closed doors. In this sense, one of the criticisms of discourse analysis is that it is not found very useful for finding the real motives of the states (Buzan et al. 1998 p. 177, Wæver 2002 p. 27). Although it is possible to find reliable sources that disclose the real purpose, the method of discourse analysis does not intend to obtain the ulterior motives of actors (Buzan et al. 1998 p. 177). As a matter of fact, by this method, this study does not aim to find underlying motives and hidden intentions or secret plans (Wæver 2002 p. 26). In short, the focus of the research is to see the words as main sources rather than looking for concealed truths (Larsen 1997 p. 12).

In this respect, instead of considering this critique as a disadvantage it is possible to regard it as an advantage. Since, the research of foreign policy without dealing with the investigation of real motives and hidden agendas made the study stay at and concentrate on the level of discourse and keep the reasoning of the argument much more uncomplicated and understandable (Wæver 2002 p. 26). Second, the major methodological problem in this study might have been how to analyze concretely counter-terrorism strategy discourses of the UK and France (Larsen 1997 p. 28). In order to surmount this difficulty, the solution is to study “the terms and arguments used in texts” (ibid). Therefore, the study examined the written statements and focused on the terms and arguments concerning security culture and counter-terrorism strategies in key official security strategy documents.
3 Theoretical Framework

Rosamond says that in order to provide a systematic and structured empirical statement it is necessary to establish a theoretical framework (cited in Aggestam 2004 p. 28), since empirical studies have meaning when they are put forward as a part of theory (Wendt 1999 p. 5). The theoretical part of the study aims to facilitate empirical analyses of the phenomenon in question under the theoretical framework of social constructivism. The social constructivist logic is fruitful for this research, as it gives rise to a novel question that how the international system exists. In the theoretical part, the research comes to grips with the questions of whether the world is socially constructed, and how cultural factors influence counter-terrorism strategies.

3.1 Social Constructivism

Social constructivism (henceforth, constructivism) is characterized by a prominence on the significance of normative structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures (Burchill 2001 p. 17, Jackson and Nexon 2004 p. 334, Reus-Smit 2001 p. 209). Structure is described under twofold division: physical structure (material factors) and social structure (institutional and normative factors) (Aggestam 2004 p. 37). Social constructivists believe that international system does exist not only by the virtue of material structure, but also mostly by means of social structure. Finnemore adds that actors do not only participate in the construction of social structures, but are also impacted by them (1996b p. 24). These arguments indicate that there is a mutual interplay between the actors and structures and that intersubjective factors functions in the formation of political consequences such as foreign and security policies. In short, constructivism deals to a greater extent with the process of social interaction instead of material world. Here, it is essential to ask how interaction between actors and structures can be studied in the empirical analyses of security issues. In this sense, constructivism is helpful to explain how cultural factors shapes interests and counter-terrorism strategies.

3.1.1 Socially Constructed World

Barkin identifies the illustrative hallmark of constructivism as its emphasis on “the social construction of international politics” (2003 p. 326). The starting point of constructivist logic is the difference between the natural and the social world. Although the natural world is composed of material factors, the social world is
made up of institutional factors (Aalberts 2004 p. 35). Constructivists assert that the world and reality is socially constructed (Checkel 2008 p. 72). While socially refers to the significance of the social in contrast to the material aspects in world politics, constructed denotes the existence of the world through a process of social interplay between actors (ibid). In other words, constructivists believe that international relations are “socially constructed in more value-based or normative terms” (Howorth 2005 p. 181).

Adler describes constructivism as “the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative […] interpretations of the material world” (1997 p. 322). It means that although constructivists do not ignore the material instruments, they concern the immaterial aspects as giving the meaning to material world. In the European Union context, the common comprehension of what inaugurates the EU’s role and interests in the international system are creating the gist of EU’s material position (Hill and Smith 2005a p. 392). It also means that the analysis immaterial characteristics of the UK and France give the essence of their identities, interests and strategies.

In addition, constructivism focuses on the question whether state action is impacted to a greater extent by the process of social interactions that create states’ identities and interests. Constructivists pinpoint that states’ interests and identities develop from the “intersubjective interaction between states” (Riim 2006 pp. 37-8). They believe that social structure both establishes actors in world politics and is established by the interaction of those actors (Farrell 2002 p. 50). It means that actors, the function of social structure, the role of identities and interests are in a mutual relationship (ibid p. 51). In this sense, constructivism explains the impact of normative factors on the interaction within the European Union concerning the security issues. It also explains how the normative contexts of Member States affect the construction of a common European identity, common security interests and thus, common counter-terrorism strategies. Since, constructivists contend that both security and threat are social constructions (Schmidt 2008 p. 157) and social structure of the international system establishes “normative understandings” between actors that sequentially coordinate the action (Finnemore 1996a p. 157). Hence, this constructivist logic makes it possible to argue that a common counter-terrorism action and related the strategy of action in Europe is contingent not only on concrete aspects such as material structures, but also conditional on the construction of a common understanding of social structures among the EU Member States.

3.1.2 Strategy Formation and Culture

Constructivists investigate the process of interest formation by examining how actors’ interests are constructed within the social interaction (Checkel p. 74). Strategies are the means to achieve interests, thus it is also possible to say that constructivists investigate the process of strategy formation. Constructivists analyze not only how actors fathom themselves and others, but also how actors determine their behavior and interests (ibid p. 93). In other words, constructivism
aims to provide a satisfactory explanation for the reasons behind the predilections, actions, and decisions of actors (Merlingen 2001 p. 470). In this sense, it examines how actors’ ways in pursuing their objectives are determined in the international system.

Constructivists hold that preferences are formulated by means of culture normative ideologies, ideas and identity (Howorth 2007 p. 28, Wendt 1999 p. 104). In other words, it can be maintained that the role of culture explains why actors acquit themselves in a particular way. As constructivists assert “the constitutive effect of culture is always at play,” since culture, as the rationale of actors’ identities and attitudes, determines the actions itself and the way of dealing with and taking action on issues (Merlingen 2001 p. 478). It means that culture shapes the EU and Member States actions and plan of actions in countering international terrorism. That is to say, constructivism considers the social context as the decisive factor (Ibryamova and Dominguez 2006 p. 41), since it shapes states’ strategies in the international system (Checkel 2008 p. 80).

Constructivists argue, “states do what they think most appropriate” (Farrell 2002 p. 52). Tannenwald defines ideas as, “sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes” (2005 p. 15). It is widely discussed whether the proclivities of the actors can be inferred from material structures without considering it along with the major role of ideas (Merlingen 2001 p. 470). Wendt argues that ideas determine the interests themselves and the strategies by which states pursue their interests (1999 p. 309). Constructivists think that interests are not at all self-evident, since socially constructed ideas inaugurate the actors’ identities that shape interests (Merlingen 2001 pp. 464-5, Hinnebusch 2003 p. 360, Jepperson et al. 1996 p. 60). It demonstrates the interrelation between ideas, interests and identities and tells us that the ideas of the EU and Member States on the threat from international terrorism shape their identities and security interests, which determines their counter-terrorism strategies. According to constructivism, ideas are the intersubjective human understanding that inaugurate the international system (Jackson and Sørensen 1999 p. 162). Since ideas determine both the behavior of actors and their action in world politics (Farrell 2002 p. 50).

Another argument in the constructivist approach is the influence of norms on actors. Norms are “intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action” (Farrell 2002 p. 49). It is important to keep in mind that norms shape not only civilian and military priorities but also the methods for attaining the objectives (Kowert and Legro 1996 p. 464). In means that norms determine material and normative preferences as well as the security strategies to achieve these preferences. In addition, constructivists examine the impact of domestic and international norms on identity of states and on their internal and external actions (Riim 2006 p. 38). In other words, norms do not only shape the domestic decision-making processes, but also determine the interplay within international institutions (Risse-Kappen 1996 p. 368). The constitutive norms of institutions influence the actors’ identities and regulate their actions and strategy (Jepperson et al. 1996 pp. 52-4, Mor 2007 p. 234). It means that the EU can achieve to create a common EU identity, when it achieves to construct common EU norms. One of the main obstacles to the establishment of a common counter-terrorism strategy is thus the lack of common
norms and related a common EU identity. In this respect, it can be argued that norms are significant elements that define the European identity, its actions and strategies and affect the interaction within the EU in regard to counter-terrorism security issues.

Constructivists also argue that states are role players (March and Olsen 1999 p. 312). They intend to understand how roles of identities are constructed (Trondal 2001 p. 3). Constructivists believe that social interaction gives rise to shared understandings, which establish structures that initiate identities (Aalberts 2004 p. 35). Identity denotes mutually constructed and developing images of self and other, since it defines “the images of distinctiveness” possessed by an actor and shaped by dint of the relations with others (Jepperson et al. 1996 p. 59). Constructivist approach in security studies analyzes the concept of identity such as the meaning of national security, the basis of meanings, the nature of the state and threats (Varadarajan 2004 p. 320). It demonstrates that ideas on the nature of international terrorism are one of the integral parts of the EU and Member States identities. In brief, “what actors do in international relations, the interests they hold, and the structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material conditions” (Barkin 2003 p. 326). All these arguments on social structure tell us that the prospects of a common European counter-terrorism strategy is based on the construction of a common EU identity consists of common ideas and common norms.

To sum up, culture is a significant factor in determining national security strategy (Katzenstein 1996 p. 499). Norms and ideas not only gain greater importance as the guideline of states in designating their identities, but also play key roles as the bases of their steps in executing a certain strategy. Identity, as the integral part of culture, is a significant link between social structures and interests that influence action (Herman 1996 p. 283). It can be inferred that ideas, norms and identities affect the meaning and interpretation of security interests, which determines actions. It is also important to remind that strategies are the plans of actions in carrying out interests. In this respect, it can be deduced that there is a considerable interrelation between culture and strategy formation that cannot be ignored in the analyses of the role of social structure in security studies. If we consider culture and counter-terrorism strategy as interconnected wheels, we can describe ideas, norms and identities as the driving cogs that establish the socially constructed world and reality.
4 Security in the EU

4.1 Security Culture

In order to understand the role of culture in the EU and national counter-terrorism strategies, it is essential to examine what is meant by security culture and how security culture can be analyzed in counter-terrorism strategies. While strategy is “the mechanism through which power is created to carry security into effect” (Fakiolas 2007 p. 56), security strategies refer to “the security interests of a state and the means through which it aims to uphold these interests” (Schroeder 2009 p. 488). These definitions indicate that a security strategy gives the substance of what a state comprehends from security and establishes the power of a country by bringing its security interests into existence. The investigation of the sense and constituents of security culture within the counter-terrorism context are useful to see how counter-terrorism security strategy gains meaning through security culture. In other words, the analysis of security culture answers the question of how counter-terrorism strategies can be studied and interpreted under the social structure of security.

4.1.1 Meaning of Security Culture

The questioning of the existence of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union requires an expatiation on the concept of security culture. In order to develop a security research, at first it is necessary to give the meaning of the security concept. Buzan defines security as “the freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity” (2001 p. 432). In this respect, it can be argued that the protection of the EU security is based on its capability to create and preserve an independent European identity. At this point, it is essential to ask why national and supranational collective identities, which refer to identities at the Member State and the EU level in this study, are constructed. Bloom argues that the reason behind the individuals aspire to establish collective identity is insecurity (cited in Aggestam 2004 p. 41). It is clear that terrorism is a threat to the European Union. In other words, it creates a common situation of insecurity to all Member States. Here, It has to be asked that why this common threat has not created a common and single EU identity. The answer of the question is definitely the existence of different security cultures of the Member States.

Crawford identifies culture as the ideas, norms and identities of social groups in particular places and times (2002 p. 59). Security culture consists of ideas about the nature of world security, norms about the issues of international law and the convenience of use of force and identities about the depiction of self and other
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan argue that what determines a Member State’s opinion; contribution and stance in the EU’s foreign policy structure are its “world view” and “role conception” (2008 p. 137). Keukeleire and MacNaughtan examine ideas and norms under the concept of world view and identities under the concept of role conception. A world view includes the suppositions about the nature of the international system or, in particular, how the external world is conceived of and about the use of force and international law affecting the legitimacy of an action (ibid).

In addition, the role being played in the international system is a significant constituent of a state’s identity (Aggestam 2005 p. 3). A role conception of a state identifies whether it establishes a link between particular values and aims and whether it sees itself playing an individual role (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 138). In other words, the concept of role conception refers to an actor’s rationale that gives the meaning of action aims to carry out its interests. It also denotes the role of identity ascribed to self and other in world affairs. For instance, when a Member State identifies its position as a security actor in the international security system, it describes not only itself, but also the role ascribed to the Union. The role attributed to the EU identity is important, since it reveals the Member States’ ideas about the targeted future position for the Union and the prospects of a common European identity.

4.1.2 Security Culture in Counter-Terrorism Strategy

In order to foresee the system of interaction in the international sphere, it is necessary to investigate national security in the context of cultural standing (Dhanrajgir and Fortman 2005 pp. 128-9). Since, ideas, norms and identities constitute the interaction within the EU (Nabers 2006 pp. 305-6). In this respect, it can be added that in order to understand the structure of interaction in the EU counter-terrorism system, it is necessary to study the impact of national security cultures of the Member States. The concept of culture in politics, in particular in foreign policy and security issues, leads us to ask some questions like “What ends should the nation pursues?” “What means should it use?” (Dhanrajgir and Fortman 2005 p. 128). The Member States approaches to these questions display the nature of their security cultures and, to be specific, reveal the differences in their ideas and norms towards security matters, which cause contrasts between their security interests, identities and related their security strategies.

According to Gnesotto, the EU has been confronted by two major quandaries as a foreign policy actor: “nation and integration” and “America or Europe” (cited in Aggestam 2004 p. 2). Howorth introduces the divisions over military or civilian instruments and Atlanticists or Europeanists approaches to underline the disparities between national security cultures (2007 p. 179). In addition, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan classify Member States’ differences that influence the national positions apropos the major challenges in the development of European foreign policy as, Atlantic solidarity or European integration, civilian or military domination, intergovernmental or Community approach (2008 p. 138). The study examines the contradictions on counter-terrorism strategic dilemmas
under the framework of their security culture, which shapes these dilemmas: threat perception, multilateralism or unilateralism, civilian or military means, the expression of self and others. The analysis of these incompatibilities between Member States lay bare the disagreements over nation or Community and Atlanticism or Europeanism, since it is helpful to compare and contrast the security strategies of the Member States, the EU and the US.

While the dilemma of nation or Community gives rise to discussions on national identity and integration, the dilemma of America or Europe leads EU Member States to make a choice between the US and the EU in pursuit of interests (Aggestam 2004 p. 2). Atlanticism is one of the significant parts of a national security culture represented by NATO and eminently impacted by the United States (Edwards 2006 p. 9). As a great power the US has had influence on national cultures (ibid). Member States’ supports or oppositions towards the US and in the NATO reveal this influence and their Atlanticist or Europeanist role of identities. Especially, the Iraq War draws our consideration to strategic quandaries, since it provide the study with the implications of the presence of different security cultures in the EU. In this sense, it is important to state that the impact of US security ideas and norms on Member States affect the development of a common European identity and counter-terrorism strategy.

4.2 Contemporary International Terrorism

The terrorist attacks committed in the United States in 2001 created upheaval in the world, since the attacks gave rise to a new type of terrorism that is international in its scope. New terrorism delineates “jihadi violence” which has a number of new and unconventional characteristics that cause distinctive problems (Rees 2007 p. 216). This new terrorism is used to define “violent non-state organizations that operate across borders with transnational identities and ideology, as commonly understood in the case of Al-Qaeda” (Change Institute 2008 p. 19). Although Europe has experienced different types of terrorism in its history, the main threat currently comes from terrorism that is emphasized by an abusive interpretation of Islam. In this respect, as a consequence of the international Islamic terrorism, the beginning of the new millennium has placed religion at the center of global affairs.

4.2.1 Deterritorialization of Islam

The preliminary impression of the 9/11 and London attacks are that the militants are people coming from the Middle East, from another civilization and from another culture. However, when we look at the background of these people, it is striking that most of them have a Western background (Roy 2007). For instance, Mohammed Atta, the key leader of the 9/11 attacks, was radicalized in Germany, and the attackers of the London bombings were all British citizens. These Muslim
people are rootless migrants who have no aspiration to participate in Islamism, which gives priority to politics instead of religion and aims to build an Islamic state (Roy 2002 p. 2). They do not associate themselves with any nation-state, and they strive for saddling Muslim societies and minorities with Islamic norms and recreating ummah (a universal Muslim community) (ibid). This difference refers to the distinction between Islamists and fundamentalists. Islamists are people who consider Islam as a political ideology and real salvation as the establishment of an Islamic state through political action; however, fundamentalists are people who see Islamization as an issue of individuals and insist on individual salvation (Roy 2002 p. 250, Ismail 2004 p. 615).

The desire for the reestablishment of ummah through an absolute return to Quran, the basis of sharia (Islamic law), is an abiding characteristic of Islamic fundamentalism, though its new attribute is deterritorialization (Roy 2002 p. 233). Deterritorialization is considered as one of the important elements of globalization, which causes the rise of Islamic neofundamentalism by lessening the link between Islam, a particular society and a territory (Roy 2002 p. 24). Roy defines neofundamentalism as “the scripturalist and conservative view of Islam which rejects the national and statist dimension in favour of the ummah […] based on sharia […]” (2002 p. 272).

In this respect, it is not possible to comprehend the contemporary international Islamic terrorism by centering solely on Middle East crisis. Although Israeli-Palestinian confrontation and Iraqi occupation arouse protests against the Western world, the new Muslim generations do not struggle in Palestine or in Iraq (Roy 2002 p. 13). Instead they go to Afghanistan, Chechnya, Pakistan for training and then go to London, Madrid, New York, Washington for fighting. It demonstrates that Islamic militants establish themselves in several countries and operate globally to protect Islam without having national or territorial ambition. It means that international terrorism is an upshot of Muslim world’s globalization and that it is not the byproduct of Middle East conflicts. Failed and rogue states are argued as the major provenance of terrorism, however the state aspect is trivial in this new type of international terrorism (ibid p. 338). In brief, as Waugh states it the real problem is the deterritorialization of Muslims and Islam as a consequence of globalization (cited in Fukuyama 2006 p. 5).

In this respect, Al-Qaeda is considered as a deterritorialized movement, since it is geographically dispersed and politically diverse in contrast to other Islamist terrorist groups such as Fatah, Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, which are geographically concentrated and politically homogeneous (Rowley 2006 p. 2). Al-Qaeda does not fight to recreate an Islamic caliphate, but they struggle against the Western world at the global level without any national and territorial motives. The prominence of new terrorism is the protection of Islam rather than pursuing national and territorial interests. However, the US-led ‘war on terror’ shows that the counterterrorism strategies of the US and the UK have failed to see the deterritorialization factor and thus, have been generated within the context of territorial understanding. Hence, Roy considers the US-led ‘war on terror’ as a metaphor, but not a real policy (2002 p. 57).
4.2.2 Iraq War: Why it is Relevant to EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy?

Although terrorism is not only a post-9/11 phenomenon in Europe (Monar 2007b p. 268), it has become international in recent years and fight against international terrorism has become one of the considerable challenges to the European Union. Several European countries yielded precedence to tackle terrorism subsequent to the 9/11 attacks that led to war in Iraq, since it created a new facet for the notion of security (France Defence & Security Report Q4 2009 p. 17). The US waged a war in Iraq because it established a link between terrorism and Iraq. In this sense, the invasion of Iraq is related to the post-9/11 environment (Erickson 2007 p. 207); therefore it is not possible to consider the 9/11 attacks, war on terror and the war in Iraq separately.

The most noticeable outcome of the 9/11 attacks for the European Union has been the debacle of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Altınbaş 2002 p. 1). The threat of terrorism has become a principal security issue for the EU (Jackson 2007 p. 233), however the question of common European counter-terrorism strategy has been still prominent on the political agenda of the EU. The CFSP has always been the most troublesome subject matter regarding “the common European policies” (Altınbaş 2002 p. 13). As Foley states, the security of many western states is threatened by terrorism, however they reveal different counter-terrorism policies and methods against terrorist threats (2009 p. 436). This is also the issue in the EU that international terrorism has impended a security threat to Europe, however Member States have strong dissimilarities in their counter-terrorism strategies. Especially, the 2003 Iraq War displayed far-reaching disagreements between the Member States.

The US approach to occupy Iraq caused disintegration in the EU’s foreign policy (Rees 2007 p. 226), since the dissension among the Member States as to the decision to range themselves on the side of the US in the War casted a suspicion about the creation of common EU foreign policy (Longhurst and Miskimmon 2007 p. 88). The disagreement among Member States over the invasion of Iraq has fortified the tension between Atlantic solidarity and European integration (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 58). Here, it is crucial to remember that protection of security is the major priority of foreign policy objectives. That is to say, the divisions within the EU’s foreign policy have raised the question about the prospects of a common European counterterrorism security strategy. In this respect, Iraq War is an adequate and helpful example in the analyses of the EU and Member States’ ideas, norms and identities to see the differences in their security cultures and related counter-terrorism strategies.
4.3 Institutional Framework of Security Policy in the EU

4.3.1 Historical Background

The European Union is indubitably the most successful security community across the world since it has established a peace zone in Europe (Mayall 2005 p. 312). The EU has created a regional sort of international society, which is held in high regard all through the world as a leading political accomplishment. Although Europeans, since the early 1970s, had been seeking to coordinate a common foreign policy by dint of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), they didn’t show a consequential tendency to coordinate a common security policy until the early 1990s (Howorth 2005 p. 180). The idea of a Common Foreign and Security Policy was, for the first time, put forward as a policy area in early 1990s. In December 1991, the EU itself determined to create CFSP at the meeting of Maastricht European Council and after the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) CFSP came into operation in 1993 (Altınbaş 2002 p. 14, Howorth 2007 p. 3). Article 11(1) TEU identifies CFSP aims as: the protection of common values, foundational interests and the unity of the EU in compliance with the UN Charter; to fortify the security of the EU; to reinforce international security; to encourage international cooperation; and to enhance rule of law (European Union 2006).

Since the Franco-British summit in Saint Malo in December 1998 it has been decided that the EU needs a serious development of military and civilian crises management capability to carry on a coherent, effective and feasible European foreign and security policy as supplementary to the CFSP (Hill and Smith 2005a p. 402, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 174, Tonra 2003 p. 1). This European decision originates from the notion that the European integration process cannot be completed without a comprehensive power based on a common standing within the security and defense policy. This notion gave rise to the establishment of a new political plan and, in June 1999, the European Council in Cologne declared EU’s groundbreaking strategic venture: the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (Howorth 2007 p. 1).

It means that the genesis of the EU as a security actor originates in the Saint Malo summit (ibid p. 4). ESDP is very important, since, within the second pillar, it aims not only a common defense strategy, but also a common security strategy among the Member States to make the EU a single voice in the international system. One of the reasons behind the idea of ESDP was the reunification of Germany in the aftermath of the fall of Berlin Wall and following the replacement of Wesphalian system’s old rules by the principles of the revived United Nations (UN) within the new world order (ibid p. 54). This situation brought about an aspiration for the EU to place new normative rules, such as multilateral, international legal and interventionist rules, into the system (ibid pp. 54-5) and to complete the insufficiencies of the US military policies (Smith and Steffenson 2005 p. 350).
The first key endeavor at policy level to conceive a coherent and normative thinking to ESDP at strategic cultural level was the European Security Strategy published in December 2003 (Howorth 2007 pp. 198-9). The intended objective targeted by the ESS is very much clarified in Nicole Gnesotto’s definition of common security culture as the aim and the means to urge common thinking, like-minded responses, coherent evaluations which can create a European strategic culture over different national security cultures and interests (Howorth 2007 p. 187). In short, the EU has had an intention to establish a common security culture and a common security strategy within the Union to accomplish its interests.

4.3.2 Second Pillar: Intergovernmental Regime

The three pillars of the Treaty on European Union, to some extent, represent a multi-level system. The status, decisions and measures of the EU across the international arena are originated from frequently complex interactions in a multi-level system, including the Member States individually and jointly, and the common institutions (Hill and Smith 2005b p. 6). Common Foreign and Security Policy (Pillar II) is one of the most concrete and necessary requirements for the European integration that would make the Member States speak with one voice in world affairs. Article 12 TEU clarifies the means in pursuit of CFSP as: the designation of common strategies, the adoption of joint actions, the agreement on common positions, and the reinforcement of cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy (European Union 2006).

Common strategies, joint actions and common positions are binding legal instruments, however, the use of these legal instruments have been replaced by other means, such as “declarations, diplomatic demarches, high-level visits and talks, participation in international conferences, informal talks and telephone calls, mediation, sending observers” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 pp. 153-4). It means that an intergovernmental approach is followed in the issues regarding the field of CFSP and that cooperation between Member States continues to exist under the constraint of national security interests. The integration in the field of CFSP, which deals with the policy realm primarily affiliated with foreign policy, such as politics and security dealings with other countries and international organizations, is not as considerable as in the areas of the European Community (EC) (Pillar I), such as trade and agriculture (Andreatta 2005 p. 19).

The Community policy-making regime operated under the EC deals with mostly external economic relations, such as trade, humanitarian aid and development cooperation, within a system that establishes a balance between the Commission which plays a major position in designating the common interests; the Council of Ministers which consists of national representatives; the European Parliament; and European Court of Justice (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 67). However, within the intergovernmental policy-making regime, the governments of the Member States keep supremacy over the policy-making process by unanimity rule (ibid). The Council is the one and only decision-making body of
CFSP/ESDP and the major player in fortifying the collaboration between the security policies of the Members (ibid p. 70).

Although, as the supranational institution of the EU, the Commission plays a key role in the external relations and represents the EU in areas under the scope of the Community regime, it is mostly placed in a less influential position in CFSP and ESDP. In Articles 22 and 27 of the TEU, the Commission is defined as an institution that can get involved with the work conducted in the CFSP, is precluded from a comprehensive participation, and is given the right to ask questions and make proposals to the Council with respect to the CFSP (European Union 2006). In brief, it means that as long as the second pillar exists under the dominance and supervision of Member States, intergovernmental policy-making, which prevents the development of a common security strategy in the EU, will be paramount in CFSP/ESDP. Since, CFSP/ESDP hasn’t replaced the national foreign and security policies of the Member States yet (Howorth 2007 p. 1).

For instance, although the UK and France were two major countries that pioneered the creation of a common security policy and that started up a motivation in the direction of not only a defense but also a security plan at Saint Malo summit, the differences between their national security cultures and interests have given birth to different counter-terrorism strategies. France has been the major supporter in prompting the EU to establish ESDP as the European Pillar and a defender of a more “norms-driven, rules-based, institutionally structured, multi-lateral, international forum of solidarity” to tackle the new types of challenges (Howorth 2007 p. 159). However, since 2001, the UK had started to reconsider its strategic prime concerns, it zeroed in on a global context and played down its attention to European security (ibid p. 172). As a result of that change in the UK’s approach on security issues following the 9/11 attacks, the support for the US in its war on terror became the most important consideration for the UK.

The September attacks and the Iraq War provided a novel fillip to ESDP and extended the foreign policy agenda of the EU to incorporate strategies on counter-terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 pp. 58-9). It means that the international repercussions of the 9/11 attacks brought the western world together for a common purpose in 2001. However, different approaches to the US-led invasion of Iraq created a division among the major Member States, which led to disunity within the EU. The impacts of the Iraq War exclusively felt between the UK and France (ibid p. 58). The intense divisions between the UK backing the US-led occupation of Iraq and France leading the rivals of the War emerged as an obstacle to the creation of a common European foreign policy (Mayall 2005 p. 313). The war in Iraq, which separated the EU Member States into different camps, gave rise to a failure on the creation of a common counter-terrorism strategy in Europe and has caused a gridlock in the CFSP/ESDP pillar.
5 Counter-Terrorism Discourse

The investigation of the reasons behind the selection of the UK, France and the US and the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the security discourses of the EU, the US, the UK are important subjects matters for the research. Mythen and Walklate say, “security discourses are socially constructed by dominant institutions such as government, the police and the media” (2008 p. 227). Möller argues that studying security implies analyzing “the language of security and security documents as privileged textual representations of an institution’s approach to security” (2006 p. 21). In this respect, the evaluation on counter-terrorism discourses is conducted through key official documents on security strategies of the European Union, the UK, France and the United States: European Security Strategy (European Council 2003), Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (HM Government 2009), French White Paper on Defence and National Security (White Paper Commission 2008), the US National Security Strategy (White House 2002). These official documents are the best appropriate and useful sources to gather data for the comparison of counterterrorism security strategies and related cultures, since they include the dilemmas of security cultures and show how counter-terrorism strategies are articulated. Analyses of counter-terrorism strategies via official documents led the research to answer the question whether there is a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union.

5.1 Why the UK and France as Cases?

The study prefers to carry out “a bottom-up analysis” from state nature to the behavior of collectivity in the EU within a comparative manner instead of analyzing the European Union as an international actor from “a top-down perspective” (Aggestam 2004 p. 9, Buzan et al. 1998 p. 5). That is to say, the study gives the prominence to understand how Member States consider the EU’s foreign policy integration and influence the construction of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU. In order to carry out a fruitful comparison of counter-terrorism discourses and give a proper response to the prospects of a common European counter-terrorism strategy, it is necessary to select the most appropriate unit of analyses and clarify explicitly the reasons behind the selection of cases.

The EU Member States profoundly diverged from each other over the Iraq War, since they had different approaches about the external position (role of identity) of the EU and the United States (Van Oudenaren 2005 p. 17). There has been a crucial disparity between the Member States regarding their reliance on the US (Altınbaş 2002 p. 7). In other words, while some states contend the US
safekeeping unnecessary and support the establishment of a robust European identity, the others persist in dependency on the US in security matters and consider this reliance as unavoidable (ibid p. 8). The UK and France are the Member States chosen for the comparison of counter-terrorism discourses. The study examines the differences between British and French security cultures in order to understand why these two countries implement different counter-terrorism strategies and how these differences influence the creation of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU.

Whilst some of the Member States- such as the UK, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark- determined to support the US-led invasion of Iraq and backed by Central and Eastern European applicant countries, other Member States- such as France, Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland- objected to the American strategy in Iraq (Rees 2007 p. 226, Schweiger 2004 p. 35). In 2003, the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld identified this intense difference as a division between old Europe- France, Germany and their advocates- and new Europe- Britain, Spain and their supporters- (cited in Smith and Steffenson 2005 p. 360, Howorth 2007 p.135, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 312). France and the UK have become the leading actors of these two conflicting factions (Bailes 2005 p. 9). In this respect, the first reason behind the selection of the UK and France is their leading positions among the Member States and their capacity to affect them in important foreign and security issues.

The second reason is that the UK and France are the two major and significant EU Member States; they play therefore a key role and certainly have important influences on the building of a common European foreign policy (Aggestam 2004 p. 2, Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 126). The key role of identity has been played by the UK and France in the area of foreign policy and diplomacy, develop the EU foreign and security policy agenda (Longhurst and Miskimmon 2007 p. 87). Although these two Member States has worked for the development of a common European security and defense policy, they appeared as the centers of the opposing wings in the EU regarding the counter-terrorism policies. In this respect, examining the divergences between the UK and France that have crucial effect on the prospects of the common European security policy is worthwhile in answering the question about the existence of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU.

Third, although both the UK and France have faced similar threat from international Islamic terrorism (Foley 2009 p. 438), they imposed different policies to counter terrorism. For instance, their attempts to tackle international terrorism were carried out through different approaches and reactions towards the war in Iraq. In other words, although France and the UK, as key players of the EU, have supported the notion of establishing a common European security policy, their counter-terrorism strategies are contrasting with each other therewithal. In this sense, the comparison of them is helpful to understand that unless the countries face similar threats in Europe, they don’t put the same strategies into practice.

Fourth, although power capabilities of the UK and France are alike, they followed dissimilar strategies in the Iraq War with regard to their transatlantic relations.
Hyde-Price pinpoints that “the heterogeneity and diversity of strategic cultures in Europe” aggravates “transatlantic and intra-European divisions” and prevents the establishment of a coherent or common European response to the new international security environment occurred after 9/11 (2004 p. 327). For instance, while the UK, opted to form an alliance with the United States and gave a strong support to the US war in Iraq (Murphy 2006 p. 288), France opted out of supporting the US strategy and chose to uphold an independent European identity at the cost of transatlantic alliance (Rees 2007 p. 226). In this respect, this division between France and the UK is convenient to understand the influence of Atlanticist and Europeanists roles of identities on the establishment of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU.

5.2 Why the US as a case?

In order to provide a clear understanding of the EU’s counter-terrorism discourse, it is also essential to study the US security discourse in addressing terrorism. The study examines the main features and the transformation of the EU counter-terrorism debate occurred after the 9/11 attacks by comparing it with the US counter-terrorism discourse (Jackson 2007 p. 233). The US strategy of war on terror created an immense strain on Europe to make a response to the US’ new security plan (Rees 2005 p. 212). Although the EU security strategy is sometimes considered as a feedback to the “new America” (appeared after 9/11), the comparison demonstrates the presence of definite European policy resolutions (Everts and Keohane 2003 p. 177). In this respect, the comparison between the EU and US counter-terrorism discourses is helpful to understand the EU’s desire for the establishment of a common and independent counter-terrorism strategy in Europe.

The second rationale behind the investigation of the US discourse is that the European disapprobation with the American war on terror affected the EU strategy towards terrorism and stimulated its precedence for civilian means (Keohane 2008 p. 137). In this respect, the analysis of the US counter-terrorism discourse is beneficial to see its influence on the construction of the normative traits of the EU counter-terrorism discourse. Third, although the ESS came about at the time when the major states of the EU were mainly intend on creating compromise among each other, they also aimed at establishing compromise across the Atlantic (Bailes 2005 p. 23). They intended to make an impression on the US that the EU had established a concrete approach on threats through the ESS (ibid). It means that, in the area of security, the transatlantic relationships shape the EU politics (Hill and Smith 2005a p. 344). It demonstrates that the comparison of the US security discourse with the ESS is constructive to grasp the impact of the US power in designating the counter-terrorism strategies of the EU.

The fourth and foremost reason why it is essential to examine the US security discourse is the US influence on the Atlanticist and Europeanist approaches of the EU Member States. Even though the US is a key strategic ally of the EU in world...
politics, there is a competitive cooperation between them (Hill and Smith 2005a p. 344). The EU has been involved in difficulties by the US since the inception of European integration. For instance, the US causes many problems for the EU in tackling international terrorism (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 310-2). The EU and the Member States differ widely over security issues as a consequence of the capability of the US to step in and to exert influence (Smith and Steffenson 2005 p. 349). In order to strengthen Atlanticism in the foreign policy-making of the EU, the US likes better to shape its relations bilaterally in Europe in order to put pressure on countries or rely on the countries of the same mind (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 312). The bilateral alliance between the US and the UK best reveals the US desire to intervene in the EU’s security issues and influence other Member States’ counter-terrorism strategies. It is also mostly discussed that there is an unbalanced tussle between the EU and the US especially in the issues of hard security (Hill and Smith 2005b p. 11). The US uses its superiority in military security to affect the EU Member States. Since its power cause a strong desire for the Member States to pursue their national interests by means of the US alliance.

In this respect, the study makes use of the analysis of the US counter-terrorism discourse in the investigation of its different effects on the UK and France counter-terrorism discourses. For instance, the breakdown of European solidarity by the Iraq War- which gives rise to a stalemate between the old and new Europe and severe discords, especially, between the UK and France- is the indication of the US’ power and capacity to intervene into the EU foreign and security policy system and to influence the European integration (Smith and Steffenson p. 350). In brief, the US uses its power and capability to stimulate withdrawal of Member States from common European approaches, to expand alliance with them and, as a result, to subvert the unity of action in the EU (ibid p. 349). This US influence on the Member States causes a more intergovernmental nature for the EU’s institutional structure in the CFSP/ESDP.

5.3 Counter-Terrorism Discourse after 9/11

Post-9/11 world has demonstrated that new types of threats and sources of uncertainty dominate the security agenda in the international system. The September attacks created a period, which made some changes in the US strategic culture (Hyde-Price 2004 p. 328). The Bush administration announced the US National Security Strategy (USNSS) on 20 September 2002 to identify the threats and the measures to tackle them. The attacks to the US have also reshaped the international environment. As Nabers (2006 p. 306) considers, the 9/11 attacks has affected the security discourses between states in the international system. These devastating incidents not only altered the US discourse concerning its threat perception, strategies and role of its identity in tackling international terrorism, but also created some changes in the counter-terrorism discourses of other countries.
5.3.1 EU Counter-Terrorism Discourse

The 9/11 attacks changed the perception of threat from international terrorism through uncovering the terrorists’ ambition in seeking to foist the greatest harm on western countries (Rees 2005 p. 212). In the aftermath of the September attacks, the EU treated terrorism more as an international challenge (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 236) and thus, integrated international terrorism into its strategic thinking (Thieux 2004 p. 59). The EU has also imposed a profusion of counter-terrorism measures in order to provide coordination and coherence among Member States (Zimmerman 2006 p. 126). As it is stated in the EU joint declaration of 14 September 2001, the EU leaders considers the EU’s ability to speak with one voice as a precondition for the development of the CFSP.

Duke says that “a holistic approach to internal and external security” can make a security and, particularly, a counter-terrorism policy prosperous and effective (2002 p. 169). In this sense, an integrated internal and external security is essential for the EU to establish a common European counter-terrorism strategy. The European Security Strategy has stemmed from a ‘holistic’ perspective to security (Quille 2004 p. 422). Following the serious disagreements over Iraq, the European Security and Defense Policy plan has been reestablished through the espousal of the ESS (Cornish and Edwards 2005 p. 802). The ESS aims to bring the different elements of foreign and security policy issues into a relationship that will ensure a common standing between the different security cultures and strategies of the Member States. Even though the Member States have contrasting discourses as a result of their different national cultures, the ESS tried to develop a European discourse, which establishes the major threats to Europe, recapitulates the European behavior, and sets in place the basis of the European security culture (Edwards 2006 p. 8).

Although there are other related documents toward European counter-terrorism discourse, “the ESS itself has been followed up only in periodic Presidency reports on the ESDP rather than anything which […] gain some formal recognition for the EU’s role in security” (ibid p. 11). In this sense, the ESS can be regarded as the central document on EU’s security discourse that will provide the research with the necessary data for the analysis of counter-terrorism strategy of the EU. The ESS, as the key security strategy document of the EU, for the first time, clearly determines the key challenges to EU security (Bendiek 2006 p. 4). In addition, for the first time, the thorough mainstream denotation of terrorism as a security threat was officially realized by the ESS (Monar 2007a p. 295). It means that the ESS is the best suitable document that can give the EU’s ideas on the nature of terrorism.

The Strategy also, for the first time, established the security aims of the EU in order to promote the security priorities originated in its core values. For instance, it has created a rapid change in European foreign and security approaches concerning the multilateral and bilateral relations along security issues (Bendiek 2006 p. 4). It means that the ESS is also the vital document that introduces the normative ideologies of the EU within its security preferences. In short, the ESS is the EU’s first official and inclusive security strategy document, which is regarded as the landmark for the development of a common European foreign and security
policy (Bailes 2005 p. 1). In this respect, analyzing the ESS is helpful in understanding the divisions between the security cultures and counter-terrorism strategies of the EU and the Member States and thus, in conducting analysis about the existence of a common European counter-terrorism strategy.

5.3.2 British and French Counter-Terrorism Discourses

The US strategies following the September 11 incidents gave rise to discords between the EU Member States which started a rivalry between them in adjusting their foreign policies in order to become one of the allies of the US in its “war on terror” (Altınbaş 2002 p. 1 and 15). According to Duke, after 9/11, giving security a national character creates “a problem of symmetry in the EU’s overall response” to the security threats (2002 p. 169). Since, national discourses constitute a significant part of the European response to the threat from international terrorism (Bicchi and Martin 2006 p. 191). In this sense, it can be argued that the differences between the interests of the Member States diminish the prospects of a common counter-terrorism security policy in the EU.

Under the new circumstances of the international system, the UK was the most successful state to ameliorate “its place globally and vis-à-vis the US” (Altınbaş 2002 p. 10). Although the UK was not close to the leadership position in the EU as a result of the British skepticism about the European integration, the UK carried out a leadership role in Europe by means of its bilateral relations with the US (ibid). That is to say, the UK took the advantage of the new circumstances created by the September attacks and made use of its collaboration with the US in order to improve its place and status in the EU and international system. Since 2003, Britain has adopted different official documents on its security strategy with respect to counteracting the threat to the UK from international terrorism. However, the UK lastly reappraised its strategy and, for the first time, published such a comprehensive strategy through the document of Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (HM Government 2009: 6). In this sense, the study conducts the scrutiny of national security discourse of the United Kingdom through this official document.

The September attacks to the US have also changed the counter-terrorism security discourse of France. The 9/11 attacks and Iraq War showed beyond doubt how globalization arose new security issues; created an unstable international system and shaped international security. The 1972 and 1994 White Papers of France only undertook the issue of defense, however the White Paper on Defence and National Security (White Paper Commission, 2008) roughs out the inclusive strategy of France tackling new threats, such as international terrorism, and reviews French security interests in the era of globalization. The Paper sets out not only the French strategy for defense, but also for security of France, its people and world as a response to the new requisites and uncertain environment created by globalization (The White Paper Commission 2008: 14-6). In this respect, the analysis on French security culture and counter-terrorism strategy is conducted through the 2008 White Paper.
6 Analyses of Counter-Terrorism Discourses

Nabers points out that ideas, norms and identities cannot be investigated apart (2006 p. 312). In this respect, in this research, the analyses of security discourses are conducted under four categorizations based on security culture: threat perception (ideas), multilateralism/unilateralism (norms), civilian/military means (norms), and expression of self and others (role of identity). The study addresses the contradiction between the threat perceptions of cases via the ideas on the nature of international terrorism and on the link between international terrorism and proliferation of WMD. The divisions over the counter-terrorism norms of cases are held through their decisions between multilateralism and unilateralism in the context of international law and international cooperation and between the use of civilian or military means. Lastly, the analyses of expression of identities are carried out through the role of identity ascribed to self and other. While examining the differences between counter-terrorism discourses, the study comes up with conclusions about the Member States’ divisions over nation or Community and over Atlanticism or Europeanism.

6.1 Threat Perception

Hieselberg points out that although European states possess values in common, they contradict each other on the key issues of threat perception (cited in Rynning 2003 p. 480). Javier Solana says that in order to establish a common security culture, it is necessary to have a shared common comprehension of security issues (cited in Edwards 2006 p. 14). EU governments are of the same mind that terrorism is a consequential threat to both the security of Europe and the world (Keohane 2008 p. 125). However, Member States’ responses against the invasion of Iraq were not similar; while some Member States supported the US policy others opposed to the War (Mohsen 2007 p. 250, Murphy 2006 p. 285). Since, although there is a common idea that the new type of global terrorism is a threat to peace and security, not all countries establish a link between Iraq, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

6.1.1 Key Threats to Security

The perception of threat established in the ESS resembles the US National Security Strategy (Matlary 2006 p. 115) that they have similar approaches on the definition of key threats to their security. The USNSS asserts terrorism, state
failure and the proliferation of WMD as the key obstacles to world security (White House 2002 p. 1). It declares struggle against international terrorism as its major priority by waging a global war against terrorism (ibid p. 6). In addition, it states Al-Qaeda as an enemy which is global in its scope and thus, which is different from any other enemies in the past (ibid. 5).

The ESS indicates terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and state failure among the major threats to Europe (European Council 2003 p. 3-5). In addition, the ESS links international terrorism to religious violence and emphasizes the danger from the logistical bases for Al-Qaeda cells in European countries (ibid p. 3). The EU has displayed a similar stance with the US regarding the security challenges by conceding international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and state failure as key security threats. In this sense, it can be said that the ESS absorbed the US security agenda in defining the “new forms” of threats (Bailes 2005 p. 18).

The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism states international terrorism as a key threat to the security of the UK, its interests overseas and its citizens and clarifies the counter-terrorism strategy as tackling the threat from international terrorism (HM Government 2009 pp. 8 and 17). Although terrorism is not a new threat to the UK, the Strategy considers the contemporary international terrorism as a “new form” of terrorism, which differs from the past terrorist threat in its international nature that transcends the borders in the world (ibid pp. 8-11). The UK believes that while the threat of terrorism was identified with the territorial concerns such as the Palestine issue in the past (ibid p. 35), contemporary terrorist threat justifies terrorist actions by fighting in the name of Islam (ibid p. 81). The UK Strategy particularly evaluates the Al-Qaeda leadership, terrorist groups associated with Al-Qaeda, individuals and terrorist groups inspired by Al-Qaeda as the main sources of threat (ibid p. 30). In addition, the Strategy also considers the proliferation of WMD and state failure as a key threat that the UK must respond (ibid pp. 48 and 126). The UK counter-terrorism strategy agrees with the EU and the US by introducing the international terrorism from Al-Qaeda, the WMD proliferation and the state failure as key threats.

The French White Paper on Defence and National Security says that the 9/11 attacks has changed the scope of terrorism, which even caused war in Iraq (White Paper Commission 2008: 27). The White Paper Commission (henceforth, Commission) says that the world and international relations had undergone profound transformations as a consequence of globalization (2008: 13). The Commission believes that globalization has created a much more complex and unpredictable international system, which requires a redefinition of security. In this respect, France sees “a common European analysis of threats and of the international system” as a necessity to establish the ESS in real terms (ibid p. 91). France shares the same ideas with the EU, the UK and the US in regard to the danger of Al-Qaeda based international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. The Commission states that globalization makes terrorism a key threat to security, since it broadens religious violent radicalization to global scale (ibid p. 27). It also adds that in order to stabilize the system, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups inspired by it must be taken into consideration, since they act globally never before attained by other terrorists (ibid p. 55). France is also considers the
proliferation of WMD as a potential risk and the fight against it as a primary issue (ibid p. 109). However, the White Paper does not consider the failed states as a key threat to security.

6.1.2 Link between Terrorism, State Sponsorship and WMD Proliferation

The analyses of threat perception on key threats to security indicate that the ideas of the EU, the UK and France are the same and stems from the US security discourse developed in the post-9/11 environment. However, the shared ideas about the nature of key threats is not enough to provide a complete integrity in threat perception, as Member States have different ideas about the relation between terrorism, state sponsorship and the proliferation of WMD. Although the ESS aims to construct a common threat perception, national ideas about the terrorist threat changes from one state to another as a result of divisions in cultures (Monar 2007b p. 269). In this sense, it is important to remind that the lack of “a shared threat assessment” has been a significant basis of divisions between Member States (Everts and Keohane 2003 p. 176).

The USNSS indicates the US security priorities as the disruption and destruction of terrorist organizations of global reach, their leadership, and state sponsor of terrorism that seeks to use WMD (White House 2002 pp. 5-6). State sponsored terrorism refers to “non-state individuals or groups given variable degrees of support by states or individual components of a state in order to advance a particular view of strategic state interests” (Change Institute 2008 p. 20). The US has based its overseas counter-terrorism strategy on a connection regarding international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and states of concern (state sponsors) (Rees and Aldrich 2005 p. 905, Rees 2007 p. 217). In the aftermath of 9/11, the US not only asserted a connection between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, but also related the proliferation of WMD to state sponsor of terrorism. This US logic explicitly demonstrates the ideas behind the war in Iraq. On the other hand, the EU is cautious in establishing a link between international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and states of concern. Although the ESS considers international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as key threats to security, it does not use any statement refer to a link between the WMD proliferation and state sponsored terrorism. The opposition of the EU against the US-led invasion of Iraq can be regarded as the consequence of this EU idea.

The UK’s counter-terrorism strategy pinpoints that the threat from international terrorism becomes more dangerous with the aim of utilizing unconventional methods such as weapons of mass destruction by means of state sponsorship (HM Government 2009: 9 and 48). The Strategy also emphasizes that Al-Qaeda established bases in Afghanistan in the course of Taliban regime to investigate chemical, biological and radiological weapons and installed several explosive devices in Iraq (ibid p. 127). In this sense, the UK believes that the 2001 military action in Afghanistan gave an end to the Taliban regime and to the Al-Qaeda’s desire to initiate WMD (ibid p. 23). It demonstrates that the UK establishes a link between international terrorism, the proliferation of WMD and states of concern.
In this sense, it can be argued that whereas the UK’s counter-terrorism threat perception is not wholly compatible with the ideas of the EU, it is completely in the same line with the US as the manifestation of its Atlanticist counter-terrorism strategy. As Howorth states, the UK is regarded as the most Atlanticist major Member States of the EU (2007 p. 147). On the other hand, contrary to the US and British counter-terrorism ideas, France, like the EU, does not base its discourse on an idea that associates international terrorism with the WMD proliferation and state sponsorship. This idea elucidates the reason why France was against the US-led war in Iraq, since it had suspicion on the nexus between Iraq and Al-Qaeda (Ramsay p. 331).

6.2 Multilateralism or Unilateralism

In this study, the contradiction between actors in adopting multilateralism or unilateralism is conducted through the analyses of major dissimilarities over their norms asserted in their security discourses concerning international cooperation and international law. The difference between the EU and the US security norms is that while the ESS pledges the EU to “conflict and threat prevention” based on international law and emphasizes the necessity for a multilateral approach to security problems incorporated in the UN Charter; the USNSS underlines a preemptive and a unilateral way of approaching to international security (Quille 2004 p. 422). The ESS introduces the EU’s strategic objectives as: to come to grips with the threats, to build security far beyond the European borders, and to fortify an international order based on multilateralism (European Council 2003 pp. 6-10). It means that both key security threats from global terrorism and from the proliferation of WMD require to be overcome by means of multilateralism. The ESS says:

Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. [...] We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. (European Council 2003 p. 9)

In addition, the ESS says that no single country is capable of addressing today’s intricate challenges by itself; hence it is essential to pursue interests by dint of multilateral cooperation and strategic partnerships (European Council 2003 pp. 1 and 12-3). It also mentions the NATO as a strategic partner, which strengthen the operational capacity of the EU in crisis management (ibid p. 12). These statements of the ESS clearly show the refusal of unilateralism and the support for an effective European multilateralism strives for policies stems from establishing concurrence and acting in accordance with the rule of law (Bailes 2005 p. 17, Rees and Aldrich 2005 p. 914). Although the USNSS agree with the ESS that no nation is able to establish a safer and better world on its own, on the other hand, it also holds that the US national security strategy would be based on “a distinctly
American internationalism that strives for US values and national interests” (White House 2002 p. 1). The USNSS considers the 9/11 incidents as attacks on the security interests of NATO; accordingly it expects the creation of coalitions under NATO’s own mandate (ibid pp. 25-6). In this respect, it regards the 9/11 as the matter that threatens the NATO’s security and thus, requires acting collectively under NATO’s own mandate. This US logic shows that it desired to legitimize its war on terror under the framework of NATO’s official order by ignoring the UN mandate.

In addition, the ESS indicates that the EU should be prepared to act before crises arise, however it also emphasizes that conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start early (European Council 2003 p. 7). However, the USNSS says that it does not falter to act on its own and apply its right of self-defense by acting preemptively (White House 2002 p. 6). In this sense, although the EU is in favor of taking action before the existence of the crises, this statement is only related to conflict and threat prevention. However, the US principle of preemptive action aims to struggle against nascent threats (Bailes 2005 p. 16). In this respect, it can be argued that the US sees legal and institutional ties as an obstacle to its potential to take action independently against the threats to its national security interests (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 314). These differences in security discourses shows that whereas the Council underlines the support for international legal norms, the UA emphasizes a Westphalian view of security strategy in the context of threats to national interests and values (Matlary 2006 p. 114).

For instance, in the case of Iraq War, the EU was in favor of a multilateral process subjected to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) legitimization. The EU, as “a law-based community”, believes that the US-led war against terrorism disregards the rule of law (Rees 2007 p. 227). It demonstrates the EU’s determination to conduct intervention operations within a multilateral political process under the framework of the UNSC (Matlary 2006 p. 115). In other words, it indicates the EU’s willingness to predating the legitimacy of its policies on international cooperation (Rees and Aldrich 2005 p. 914). The EU and the Member States, which were opposed to the US unilateral and preemptive approach, argue that war in Iraq displayed the renouncement of the US from this major principle of international law. Although the Bush administration claimed that it formulated its war on terror in compliance with the right of self-defense mentioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the EU considers the US’s interpretation of the 9/11 attacks as an act of war opposed to international law (Nabers 2006 p. 313). It means that the US was not able to persuade all great powers about the invasion of Iraq, since it was not successful to legitimize its counter-terrorism policies in the eyes of many Europeans. These are unquestionably puts that the EU, from the beginning of the process started with 9/11, has been in favor of struggling international terrorism under the UN control. In short, in contrast with the American approach that puts the unilateral preemptive strategy at the center of US strategic culture (Hyde-Price 2004 p. 328, Matlary 2006 p. 114, Bendiek 2006 p. 4), the EU is an advocate of preventive engagement and of the UN endorsement for interventions (Rees and Aldrich 2005 p. 921).

The British counter-terrorism strategy says that the UK’s response to tackle
terrorism stems from the rule of law and international cooperation (HM Government 2009 p. 52). The UK believes that international cooperation is necessary on account of the international nature of the contemporary terrorist threat, which transcends the national borders (ibid). In this sense, the Strategy points out that in order to tackle international terrorism the UK is in need of close collaboration with multilateral organizations, including the EU and the UN (ibid pp. 13-6). The Strategy clarifies that the UK’s response to security challenges tends toward early engagement and a multilateral approach, preferably by international institutions (ibid p. 98). It indicates that the UK shares the same norms in its counter-terrorism strategy with the EU by adopting international law and international cooperation. However, the Strategy considers the EU and the UN as the multilateral institutions efficient only in some fields, such as “capacity building, identification of best practice and common standards and asset freezing” (ibid p. 142). In this respect, the UK aims to collaborate with the US and with other allies in the area of weapons of mass destruction (ibid. 126). The British counter-terrorism strategy shows that although the UK supports multilateralism, it does not abandon its bilateral relations in tackling terrorism. Although the Strategy does not specifically mention the partnership with NATO, it declares the UK’s most crucial partner in the field of explosives research as the US among its international partners (ibid. 130). It reveals that the UK gives a great importance to its alliance with the US regarding counter-terrorism, since it does not consider the partnership with the UN and the EU as sufficient in every field while countering international terrorism. The UK believes that multilateral approach to security problems under the legal framework of the UN is not able to overcome the two interrelated security challenges, namely the international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

The French White Paper Commission says that national or regional efforts are not enough to cope with new threats; therefore, “global collective action” is essential (2008 p. 105). The Commission believes that France should have a hand in creating a more legitimate international system through, firstly, the United Nations, the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance (ibid p. 63). France considers the ESS as a strategy which emphasizes the exigency of international security springs from an effective multilateralism and the EU as a key player which contributes to an international system stems from collective action (ibid p. 115). In means that France supports the multilateral strategy of the Union. The Commission also gives importance to NATO, since it has incorporated the strategic partnership between North America and Europe under the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and it became the most important international instrument for military joint actions between European partners themselves and for control of multilateral military actions (ibid pp. 93-6).

The French counter-terrorism strategy supports multilateralism and considers unilateralism as a strategy that causes defects in legitimacy (ibid p. 106). France believes that the collective security system has been weakened as a result of the legitimacy problem related to the UN, which has the foremost duty for providing international security and stands at the top of international relations. The Commission asserts that intervention policy of France is conducted under the multilateral framework provided by the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO (ibid p. 67). It also adds that France’s security strategy disregards any kind
of preventive warfare, even if it does not prevent *ad hoc preemptive action*—such as humanitarian operations—in situations of clear and impending threat (ibid p. 157). The French strategy considers intervention operations as legitimate when they are conducted under international law, e.g. article 51 of the UN Charter, and a decision of UNSC (ibid p. 69). The French intervention policy very clearly explains that France’s normative ideology in utilizing its intervention capabilities under the framework of international cooperation introduces the multilateral attitude of France and its commitment to legitimacy provided by international law.

The Commission also asserts that the legitimacy of military intervention brought up by the UN Security Council comprises terrorist threats to international security (ibid p. 107). Multilateral legitimacy is seen as the major necessity to be triumphant in tackling security threats under a collective action, thus the Commission believes that the role of “permanent members of the Security Council” is more important to achieve collective security (ibid p. 108). It means that the United Kingdom, as a permanent member, is in charge of providing collective security against security threats, such as international terrorism. The Commission says that when “*ad hoc* coalitions of States” is bereft of international mandate, they evade the international security institutions instead of contributing to the improvement of them (ibid p. 106). In brief, like the EU, France considers the United Nations as the linchpin of international law with respect to the use of military force not only in individual action, but also in collective action. It means that the US-led Iraq war, which has been supported by the UK, has not been approved and backed by France and seen as an action undermining collective security system.

### 6.3 Civilian or Military Means

The third important division between the actors’ counter-terrorism security discourses is based on the conflict in using military or civilian means. The USNSS says that the US must benefit from every instrument in its sources, such as military power, in the war against state sponsored terrorists of global reach seeking to use WMD (White House 2002 p. foreword). The US holds itself liable for its own security in the international system and, thus it believes that using armed forces to guarantee its security is legitimate (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 314). The US yields precedence to military means against the so-called state sponsored terrorism and WMD. This US strategy demonstrates that the US-led global war on terror has been actualized as a traditional external policy action to a security challenge (Bendiek 2006 p. 2). However, the European Union deals with the issue in a different way. The ESS says: “In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (European Council 2003 p. 7). According to the EU, using military means is not the proper way to struggle new terrorism, which is highly transnational and consists of ambiguous targets. In this respect, the ESS
does not fortify the US-led war on terror, since it considers the US approach as “over-reactive and militarily driven” (Keohane 2008 p. 134).

Bush’s proclamation of “war on terror” was not welcomed in Brussels, yet terrorism has not been considered as a threat on which a war could be declared (Rees 2007 p. 226). Europeans are inclined to identify wars as conflicts waged against states, and terrorists as criminals (Keohane 2008 p. 135). Many Europeans think that the US approach is based on preventing terrorism in the short term and is insufficient in carrying out long-term strategies (ibid). The EU tends toward long-term strategies in threat prevention, as it believes that the feature of new form of terrorism requires an inclusive approach to the issue. Hence, the European Union has devoted itself to “a policy of engagement and dialogue with countries of accused of sponsoring terrorism and developing WMD” (Rees 2007 p. 226). It indicates that long-term endeavors have been espoused by the European Union tackling the problem constituted by global terrorism and the proliferation of WMD instead of waging a war that can only be a short-term solution (Duke 2002 p. 153). In brief, whereas the value of military power and the usage of military means are accentuated by the US security strategy, the European strategy stresses the importance of civilian measures to provide long-term solutions.

In this respect, the EU has been in favor of ameliorating the conduct of states, which are indicted for backing terrorism. The ESS says that support for third countries- by means of diplomacy, European assistance programmes, European Development Fund, trade- is invaluable in countering terrorism, enhancing their securities and maintaining European and international security (European Council 2003 pp. 12-3). The EU emphasizes an assortment of “diplomatic, development, economic, and humanitarian” means towards third countries, since it believes that the European security interests are influenced by “poor governance, insecurity, poverty and conflict” experienced out of its borders (Bendiek 2006 p. 4, Oueill 2004 p. 424). It reveals that the ESS draws more attention to the root causes behind international terrorism, such as poor governance and poverty, compare to the USNSS (Howorth 2007 p. 202). In this sense, the EU has espoused a strategy based on civilian means since it considers that tackling new terrorism requires overcoming the challenges play a part in enhancing terrorism. However, the underlying causes of terrorism mentioned in the ESS are to a large extent absent in the US security discourse (Jackson 2007 p. 238).

In this respect, a comprehensive security approach is one of the principal priorities disclosed by the ESS and is based on the idea that a more secure world leads to a more secure Europe (Howorth 2007 p. 200). It is obviously understood that this comprehensive security approach differs from the nature of a traditional military response. According to the EU use of civilian means- such as assistance programmes, diplomacy and dialogues- are the most appropriate methods than coercive means to make states and the world safer and better. The EU has displayed a stable propensity to establish a dialogue with third countries as oppose to the US priority to hard security measures, such as using force or threat of force (Smith and Steffenson 2005 p. 355). In brief, the difference between the US’ militarily oriented counter-terrorism strategy and the European strategy based on civilian measures manifests the essence of EU’s comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.
However, it doesn’t mean that the EU has at all times against the use of force (Rees and Aldrich 2005 p. 914). If an action occurs in conformity with the right of self-defense mentioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter, the EU approves the use of coercive means. For instance, the EU demonstrated its support to the US by its responses immediately after the 9/11 attacks. Resolution 1368 adopted by the Security Council on 12 September 2001 reflects the EU’s support by stating that the EU is ready to help the US’ response to the attacks in compliance with the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations Security Council 2001). On the other hand, although Europeans supported the 2001 US intervention of Afghanistan, which intended for the disposal of Taliban regime, the USA had little backing of Europeans for the invasion of Iraq (Meyer 2005 p. 541, Rees and Aldrich 2005 p. 914-5, Altınbaş 2002 p. 5). Since, Europeans ask the question of whether the use of military means is an appropriate instrument for making a country democratic and stable. Many EU Member States answered this question by supporting long-term strategies instead of adopting the US counter-terrorism strategy and of taking part in the War.

For instance, France supported the US-led military operation in Afghanistan by sending the largest group of armed forces to NATO missions compare to other members, including the USA (Howorth 2007 p. 155). In addition, it was the only country, except the USA, to operate bombing missions over Afghanistan (ibid p. 158). However, France didn’t support the Iraq War and also it became a leading opponent in the international arena. The French strategy shares the same normative ideologies with the EU and pinpoints that although military force is convenient, it is not per se an adequate solution in overcoming new security issues (White Paper Commission 2008 p. 106). The White Paper says: “the complexity of international crises calls for strategies embracing all of the different instruments-diplomatic, financial, social, cultural and military […]” (ibid p. 56). In order to prevent the crises, France is in favor of enhancing the international system by creating a better connection between development assistance and international and national security systems, since it believes that development assistance is conducive to prevention (ibid p. 62). In brief, French prevention strategy is based on “diplomatic, economic, military, legal and cultural tools”, integrated at the “international, European and national levels” (ibid p. 143). The French counter-terrorism strategy concerning the use of force clearly shows that France agrees with the EU on the importance of civilian means in tackling the root causes of threats to national and international security systems and on the insufficiency of relying on using military means internalized by the US counter-terrorism strategy.

The British security discourse indicates that the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy is based on implementing long-term strategies, which aims to address both the causes and the symptoms of terrorism (HM Government 2009 pp. 9-11). The Strategy believes that military operations are not enough to confront with a security threat from terrorism. Hence, the UK’s security strategy intends to assist third countries to counter terrorism (ibid pp. 61-2). In this respect, it can be argued that the UK, France and the EU are in the same line with a focus on the importance of long-term strategies in tackling the root challenges bring about terrorism. However, the UK differs deeply from the EU and France in use of force. Although the UK accept the significance of civilian means in countering
terrorism, it does not give up using military means in its struggle against international terrorism and related the proliferation of WMD. The UK’s security strategy regarding the use of military power in tackling international terrorism has been showing itself through its support to the US in Iraq War. The British Strategy says that the leadership of Al-Qaeda will be eliminated by dint of military operations (ibid p. 10). It also adds that military action has notably diminished the power of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (ibid p. 31). In this respect, it is clear that the British counter-terrorism strategy concerning the use of force and invasion of Iraq reveals its Atlanticist normative ideologies and contradicts with the Europeanist counter-terrorism security strategy of France.

6.4 Expression of Self and Other

Nabers says, “Norms constitute the actors’ identities and interests, delineate collective goals and prescribe or proscribe behavior” (2006 p. 312). In this respect, it is important to state once again that it is not feasible to study norms and identities separately, since norms determine actors’ behaviors and compose their identities (ibid). The preferences over multilateralism or unilateralism and civilian or military means, as the integral parts of actors’ security cultures, determine their identities and related their counter-terrorism strategies to achieve desired role of identities. Horrocks and Jackson argue that a role taken is definitely a behavioral display of an actor’s identity (cited in Aggestam 2004 p. 60). The debate on identity can be conducted through a twofold approach: firstly, an analysis of how actors define their role conception and secondly, an analysis of what kind of role of identity ascribed to others. The first analysis is very important since a Member State’s definition of itself is also a respond to the presence or absence of a common European identity. As Aggestam (2004: 240) pinpoints, national identity is the key source to understand how other identities are conceived. It means that the investigation of the national identities give birth to the second part of analysis that explores the Member States’ ideas, definition and conception of European identity. In this respect, the latter is significant to understand the role of European identity attributed by the Member States and to examine how Member States’ dilemmas of nation or Community and Atlanticism or Europeanism influence the construction of an independent European identity.

The expression of role identity established in the European Security Strategy bears a resemblance to the US National Security Strategy (Matlary 2006 p. 115). The EU has displayed a similar stance with the US regarding its role identity by accepting itself as one of the key players in combating security threats outside its borders (Rees and Aldrich 2005 p. 921). Although they have a similar approach on the desirable role for their identities, they have deep differences in the definition of the roles they ascribed to themselves. The most important constituent of a state’s foreign policy is described as grand strategy. The establishment of national security objectives by foreign policy officials, the identification of security threats and the determination of the means by which to accomplish national security aims formulate grand strategy (Schmidt 2008 p. 164).
Multilateralism and primacy are two of the grand strategies introduced by Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross (cited in Mayerchak 2006 p. 33).

The ESS asserts its preferable role by saying, “[…] the European Union is a global player. […] Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (European Council 2003 p. 1). The EU’s desire to be a global actor, to participate in global security system in order to build a secure world demonstrates the multilateral role of its identity. In this respect the roles of identity ascribed to the EU itself are: “global key actor” and “contributor to world security”. However, the preemptive and unilateral language of the USNSS no doubt reflects the primacy-oriented role of the US foreign policy orientation. The USNSS draws the picture of US primacy with statements like “We seek […] human freedom”, “We will preserve the peace”, “We will actively work to bring […] democracy”, and other nations and other governments should or must do this or that (White House 2002 pp. foreword and 21). It is discussed that the US interest in providing peace stems from the US’ grand strategy of primacy which sees the creation of a peaceful international system under the US power for the perpetuation of the US superiority and ascendancy (Schmidt 2008 p. 167). According to Rees and Aldrich, the US security policy originates from “American exceptionalism” which sees American political and moral values as higher in status compare to others and which gives a keen intuitive awareness of task for the protection of humanity (2005 p. 908). For instance, the US has had a great confidence to undertake the control and leadership for precipitating constancy and democracy to Iraq, since it sees itself as the promoter of human rights and democracy in the world. In this respect, what roles of identity the US attributes to itself are: “world leader”, “promoter of humanity in the world”.

The British counter-terrorism strategy both reveals the UK’s role identity and the role identities ascribed to others by the UK. The Strategy says that partnerships overseas are necessarily important for the success of the UK, since it depends on its allies in tackling international terrorism (HM Government 2009 p. 11). At this point, it is important to remind the aim of the British counter-terrorism strategy. It intends to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism (ibid p. 6). It this respect, the UK believes that it cannot carry out its counter-terrorism strategy alone and, in essence, desires to establish partnerships with other countries in order to maintain its own interests. In addition, the Strategy considers the EU as a multilateral institution with limited capabilities, such as capacity building and asset freezing (ibid p. 142). It shows that the UK sees the EU as an international actor with limited power capacity rather than as a global actor. However, it introduces the US as the key partner in the field of explosives research, such as weapons of mass destruction (ibid p. 126). It is important to remember that the proliferation of WMD is regarded as one of the crucial threats to UK security interests. In this sense, the UK’s support to the US-led war in Iraq is the most obvious example, which display that when the UK’s national security interests are at stake, it does not avoid ranging itself on the side of the US. In this respect, while the UK defines the EU’s roles of identity as “civilian power” and “international actor”, sees the US as a “military power” and “strategic partner”.

The Strategy demonstrates that instead of contributing to the creation of a single-
voice among the EU Member States which will make the EU a key player and a
global actor in the international system, the UK aims to establish a partnership
against international terrorism both with the EU Member States and the US to
preserve its own security and increase its independence power in world politics. In
particular, it can also be argued that the UK supports the counter-terrorism
partnership within the EU for its own national interests rather than establishing a
common European security culture and counter-terrorism strategy. It other words,
the idea of national independence dominates the British counter-terrorism security
strategy which aims to protect its freedom of action when British interests differ
markedly from other EU Member States. It means that the second pillar of
CFSP/ESDP will remain under the intergovernmental regime, since having close
partnership in security matters is not the same thing with integration in the EU’s
foreign and security policy, which is essential to construct a common European
identity and create a common European counter-terrorism strategy.

Charles de Gaulle was always against the full Community membership of the UK,
as he believed that it would be a bridge between the US and Europe that would
move US interests into Europe (Altınbaş 2002 p. 6-7). It appears to be that de
Gaulle’s fears are true to a certain extent today, since the UK’s bilateral alliance
with the US and its relations with the EU Member States at the partnership level
in counter-terrorism security issues cause obstacles to create a common counter-
terrorism security identity and strategy in the EU. All these arguments indicate
that the roles can be attributed to the UK’s counter-terrorism security identity are:
“independent Britain”, “contributor to European partnership”, “stalwart US ally”.
In means that British security identity is a product of a mixture of Atlanticist and
Europeanist security approaches. At this point, the British identity can be defined
as an Atlanticist European (Aggestam 2004 p. 144). In brief, the British counter-
terrorism security identity, which goes around Atlanticist and European identities,
clashes with the European security strategy, which intends to create a common
security culture by dint of CFSP/ESDP.

The French White Paper Commission pinpoints that France has committed the
task of maintaining peace and security since the establishment of the United
Nations Security Council (2008 p. 57). The Commission presents the first
objective of the strategy as the defense of French territory and its people, and the
second aim as the maintenance of European and international security under the
framework of the United Nations (ibid p. 58). It means that France is not only in
favor of pursuing its national interests, but also aware of its duties to preserve
international security. In this sense, it can be deduced that France attributes an
international role to its identity. Furthermore, the Commission says “our
commitment to the security of our European partners is the expression of an ever
closer union” (ibid p. 65). Hence, France aims to work for “a more unified,
stronger European Union” in the field of security, and supports a more
independent and more effective EU position in strengthening international
security as well as European security (ibid pp. 75 and 82). In this respect, the
Commission introduces France’s prime concern of security policy as making the
EU a key player in international security system (ibid p. 303).

France believes that it is essential to form an independent European security
identity in order to make the EU a key actor in security issues across the world.
Thus, the Commission grounds the French security strategy on a coherent intention and international policy, which advocates the European Union as a “global security actor”. For instance, it desires a collective action, such as in a situation whereby an intervention is required, which increases the EU’s power and secures its role in the international system. The White Paper emphasizes that different approaches within the Union, such as concerning the invasion of Iraq, have been an obstacle for the EU to be influential in the international system (ibid p. 78). Hence, France supports the establishment of a common foreign and security policy in Europe. In this sense, it considers the ESDP as an instrument, which aims to overcome the chasm between the Member States’ national security cultures and sees the ESS as the reestablishment of the ESDP plan and as a landmark in the assertion of the EU’s international role (ibid pp. 78 and 90). In the light of these arguments, the roles of French counter-terrorism security identity can be defined as “contributor to international security” and “integrationist European or Europeanist European”.
7 Conclusion

Threat from international terrorism, which transcends the national borders, has been reinforcing the idea of establishing a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union. However, some EU Member States consider the integration process in the EU’s foreign and security policy as the impairment of national interests. This situation causes instability within the second pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy and thus, a failure in the creation of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU. One of the challenges in constructing common European security measures is the EU’s response to terrorism stems from cooperation and coordination instead of integration (Monar 2007a pp. 308-9). The EU Member States have hitherto prioritized the use of instruments, which promotes cooperation and coordination between national counter-terrorism systems and capabilities (ibid p. 309). It means that the Member States have not handed over any authority to the Union in the area of counter-terrorism that can lead to integration in the area of foreign and security policy.

The failure in the establishment of a common European counter-terrorism strategy put forward social constructivist debates concerning the investigation of security culture as the factor behind the debacle in the CFSP. Socially constructed ideas, norms and identities, as the building blocks of security culture, play the key role in the prospects of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU. The analysis of the 2003 European Security Strategy demonstrates that European leaders are united that there should be a common European modus operandi to tackle terrorism and that the EU of 27 Member States needs integration in counter-terrorism strategy over the Member States’ different security cultures and counter-terrorism strategies. This integration process encumbers particular responsibilities to key Member States, since they have the capability to influence other members to establish a common counter-terrorism understanding within the Union and to carry the EU’s foreign and security policy agenda forward. However, the comparative discourse analyses of the UK and France concerning their security cultures demonstrate that they own different ideas, norms and identities that lead to segregation in the EU. Since, the differences between the security cultures of the UK and France prevent them to construct a common strategy against international terrorism.

For instance, Iraq War occurred as an incident that brought about a deadlock in the integration process of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The tremendous division between the UK and France over the issue of Iraq intervention and of helping the US has made them to form their cliques, which caused a partition of the EU as old and new Europe. This rift created an intense dissension within the members as “Atlanticist Member States led by the UK” and “Europeanist Member States led by France” (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008 p. 312). In this respect, in this research, studying the differences between the UK and France in a comparative manner through their security cultures and counter-terrorism strategies revealed the absence of a coherent and compatible European
security discourse on security culture and counter-terrorism strategy. The invasion of Iraq shows how the UK’s bilateral alliance with the United States influence the CSFP and become an obstacle to the formation of a common security culture in the EU. In other words, the Iraq War is a very clear example that uncovers how a major Member State sacrifices the prospects of a common European counter-terrorism strategy to its strategic partnership with the US and to its national security interests.

In conclusion, the study indicates that the difference in the Member States’ national security cultures has a vital importance, since the lack of success to meet on a common ground in the field of foreign and security policy causes a chaining failure in the EU. For instance, in the issue of Iraq War, the UK’s firmness purpose to perpetuate national security cultures has adversely affected the intention to establish a European security culture and related counter-terrorism strategy and, as a result, the EU’s integration in foreign and security policy has come to a standstill. In this respect, the main barrier to the creation of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU is the contradiction between the Member States’ counter-terrorism security cultures. As Heiselberg argues, it is truism to say that national strategic cultures are the foremost obstacle in creating a common security and defense policy (cited in Howorth 2007 p. 185). In brief, it can be argued that the EU can succeed in establishing an independent European counter-terrorism strategy when it achieves to construct common ideas, norms and identity among its Member States.
8 Executive Summary

The European Union’s propensity for coordinating a common foreign and security policy started in the early 1990s. The 9/11 attacks carried out in the US created a disruption in the world and the post-9/11 environment led to an intense discrepancy between the Member States with regard to the tackling of international terrorism. The European Security Strategy introduces international terrorism as one of the key security threats to Europe. The ESS was the first key attempt aims to construct a compromise between Member States’ contrasting security cultures and strategies and to formulate a consistent thinking in the area of foreign and security policy. The global threat from international terrorism, and the EU’s efforts to introduce strategic objectives to tackle this threat by establishing common security measures among the Member States, make the prospects of a common European counter-terrorism strategy a significant research issue.

This study aims to answer to the question of whether there is a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union. The study analyzes the impact of the divergent security cultures of the Member States on the existence of a common European counter-terrorism strategy. In this respect, the study makes use of social constructivist approach in the analyses of the link of socially constructed ideas, norms and identities with the counter-terrorism strategy formation. Constructivist logic on the importance of ideas, normative ideologies and role of identity in determining security behavior, and on the mutually constitutive interaction between actors and material and social structures provides the study with the understanding of the essential function of security culture in the construction of counter-terrorism strategy.

The analyses of the security cultures are done so by comparing the counter-terrorism security discourses of the EU, the UK, France, and the US. The study conducts a comparative case study method via analyzing thoroughly the differences and similarities between the cases. The study carries out the discourse analysis method to examine the data collected from the key official documents on counter-terrorism strategies of the cases. The study compare and contrast the counter-terrorism security discourses by dint of four particular qualities based on security culture: threat perception, multilateralism/unilateralism, civilian/military means, and expression of self and other. Whilst the study analyzes the security cultures and counter-terrorism strategies, it makes conclusions about the British and French choices of Atlanticist and Europeanist approaches to their counter-terrorism strategies. The comparative analysis of the counter-terrorism security discourses of the UK and France and their comparison with the EU gives the necessary data to uncover the absence of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the EU.

First, the analysis of threat perception shows that the ESS listed international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD among the key threats to international
security without interrelating them. Although both the UK and France share the same idea by declaring international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as key threats, they put forward different ideas about the interrelation between international terrorism and the WMD proliferation. Whereas France does not establish any link between these key threats, the UK considers the WMD proliferation as a result of the state sponsored international terrorism. It means that the UK does not only find a linkage between the proliferation of WMD and international terrorism, but also add the so-called state sponsorship into this linkage. In brief, even though the UK shares the same ideas with the EU and France on the key threats, it differs from them about the relationship between these threats. It indicates that while the ideas of the EU and France are common on threat perception, the UK gives rise to disintegration in the Union with its Atlanticist ideas with respect to the understanding of threat.

Second, the investigation of the actors’ dilemmas of adopting multilateralism or unilateralism is conducted under the security approaches to international cooperation and rule of law. The analysis of the ESS indicates that the EU has committed itself to prevent international terrorism under the framework of the United Nations through international cooperation. France also shares the same normative ideology with the EU by supporting an international system consists of international cooperation and international law based on the UN mandate and by opposing to preemptive action in tackling international terrorism. The ideas of both the EU and France about the international nature of terrorism highlight the necessity of an effective multilateral system. The analysis on the UK’s security strategy shows that although the UK introduces a counter-terrorism strategy based on international cooperation and rule of law, it gives a particular importance to its bilateral alliance with the US in countering the proliferation of WMD. The UK’s idea about the link between international terrorism and the WMD proliferation means that the US strategic partnership is also crucial in tackling international terrorism. The investigation of the contrasting Europeanist and Atlanticist approaches to the espousal of multilateralism shows that the differences between the norms of Member States prevent to construct common European security norms and related counter-terrorism strategies in the EU. The study also shows the interaction between ideas, norms and strategies by emphasizing how threat perception influences the establishment of security norms and counter-terrorism strategies.

Third, the analysis of using military or civilian means in tackling international terrorism reveals that the EU pursues a long-term strategy through assistance programmes, development aid, diplomacy and dialogue with third countries to eliminate the roots causes of terrorism. Europeanist French approach also shares the same normative ideologies with the EU and supports the relations with third countries by dint of using civilian means in addressing international terrorism. Both the EU and France think that a strategy originates in the use of civilian means is the only way to overcome the core causes of terrorism, such as poor governance and poverty, and to provide security in Europe. On the other hand, the analysis of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy demonstrates that although the UK adopts long-term strategies in tackling the causes of international terrorism, it also considers the use of military power as an effective instrument in countering terrorism. The comparative analysis of the EU, France, the UK and the US
displays that the Atlanticist norms of the UK concerning the use of force contrast with the EU and France and blocked the construction of European security norms and common counter-terrorism measures in the EU.

Fourth, the study reveals that the development of common ideas and norms within the EU and the promotion of them outside the EU borders are the illustrative characteristics of the EU identity. It means that the construction of common security ideas and norms in the EU is the precondition for creating an independent EU identity. It also means that the EU aims to be a key global security actor in addressing the major threats to international security. In this respect, the analysis of the self-expression indicates that the role ascribed to the EU identity itself is “global key actor”. However, the analyses of the Member States’ perceptions of self and other show that there are differences between the security discourses of France and the UK. France counter-terrorism strategy intends both to maintain its own security and to share the responsibility in preserving international security. It also aims establishing an independent, a more integrated, and a stronger Union to make the EU a global actor in the international arena. In this respect, the analysis tells that France desires to see the EU as a global power, and that the role France ascribes to itself is “integrationist European”. However, in contrast with the EU and France, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy considers the EU as an institution with limited capabilities rather than a global actor. The British strategy sees the EU mostly as an important civilian power, supports the partnership with the EU Member States in security issues, and also identifies the US as the key strategic partner in the area of security. In this respect, the study describes the UK as an “Atlanticist European”.

As a result, the analysis of the opposing security cultures of the Member States demonstrates that this situation creates a challenge in the EU’s counter-terrorism policy area. Since, the lack of common European security ideas, norms and identity prevents the existence of a common counter-terrorism strategy in the European Union. It clearly means that the EU cannot achieve to establish a common European counter-terrorism strategy without integration in the security cultures of the Member States under the institutional framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy.
9 Bibliography


