“Inflexible to Flexible Diplomacy in Taiwan”

A Qualitative Analysis of Foreign Policy Change in Taiwan

Ulf Hansson
Abstract

Taiwan is in many ways an excellent example of how an authoritarian country can overcome much of the associated difficulties of successfully transitioning into a healthy and well-functioning democracy. In spite of this undisputed fact, Taiwan can only be characterized as a diplomatic orphan, an outcast, shunned by the international community because of events dating back to before World War II and the fact that two regimes have for various intents and purposes claimed to represent the one true China. Different foreign policies have been employed by Taiwan to best cope with this situation.

The purpose of this thesis is, through the use of a theoretical model situated on the state and individual level, with the added assistance of a number of conducted interviews and material collected from secondary sources, to analyze the foreign policy change (FPC) that Taiwan underwent, starting in the 1980s, and discover why Taiwan decided to implement a foreign policy that would come to be known as ‘flexible diplomacy’.

Key words: Taiwan, China, Foreign Policy Change, Flexible Diplomacy, One-China policy
Words: XXXXX
# Table of contents

List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 1

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 3
   1.1 Research Question and Purpose ......................................................................................... 3
   1.2 Structure of Thesis .................................................................................................................. 4

2 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................... 6
   2.1 The Study of Foreign Policy ................................................................................................. 6
   2.2 Selection of Framework ......................................................................................................... 8
      2.2.1 The State-level Approach ............................................................................................ 9
      2.2.2 Disadvantages of the State-level Approach ................................................................. 10
      2.2.3 The Actor-Driven Approach ....................................................................................... 11
   2.3 Measurable Sources of Change ............................................................................................ 12

3 Methods and Material .............................................................................................................. 14
   3.1 The Case Study ..................................................................................................................... 14
   3.2 Material ................................................................................................................................ 14
   3.3 The Semi-structured Interview ........................................................................................... 15
      3.3.1 Selection of Respondents ............................................................................................ 16
      3.3.2 Collection and Management of Data ........................................................................... 17

4 The China and Taiwan Dilemma ............................................................................................... 18
   4.1 Historical Overview .............................................................................................................. 18
      4.1.1 Territorial Sovereignty ............................................................................................... 19
      4.1.2 Transfer of Sovereignty ............................................................................................. 20

5 Foreign Policy .......................................................................................................................... 23
   5.1 Taiwan’s One-China Policy ................................................................................................. 24
   5.2 China’s One-China Policy ................................................................................................. 26
   5.3 United States’ One-China Policy ....................................................................................... 27

6 Sources of Change .................................................................................................................... 30
   6.1 External Sources of Change ................................................................................................. 30
      6.1.1 Lack of Diplomatic Recognition for Taiwan ................................................................. 30
      6.1.2 Taiwan’s inability to Join Intergovernmental Organizations ......................................... 33
      6.1.3 The power Asymmetry between China and Taiwan ..................................................... 35
      6.1.4 International Legitimacy ............................................................................................. 37
   6.2 Internal Sources of Change ................................................................................................. 39
      6.2.1 President Lee Teng-hui ............................................................................................... 39
      6.2.2 The Need to Strengthen Taiwan’s Economy ................................................................. 41
      6.2.3 Democratic Opposition Forces in Taiwan ................................................................. 43
7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 46

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... 48

References .......................................................................................................................... 51
    Books and Articles ......................................................................................................... 51
    Internet links: ............................................................................................................... 54

Appendix ............................................................................................................................. 57
    Interview Guide .............................................................................................................. 57
        Introduction ............................................................................................................... 57
        Questions ................................................................................................................... 57
    Transcripts ..................................................................................................................... 60
        Representative Abraham Wen-shang Chu from the Taipei Mission in Sweden. Conducted 2010-10-20 .................................................................................. 60
        Director of Consular Affairs Michael Lee from the Taipei Mission in Norway. Conducted 2010-11-24 ..................................................................................... 64

Interview Guide .................................................................................................................. 57

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 57

Questions .............................................................................................................................. 57

Transcripts ............................................................................................................................ 60

Representative Abraham Wen-shang Chu from the Taipei Mission in Sweden. Conducted 2010-10-20 .................................................................................. 60

Director of Consular Affairs Michael Lee from the Taipei Mission in Norway. Conducted 2010-11-24 ..................................................................................... 64
List of Abbreviations

ADB  Asian Development Bank
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum
CCP  Chinese Communist Party
CFP  Comparative Foreign Policy
DPP  Democratic Progressive Party
FCDM  Foreign Policy Decision-making
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FPA  Foreign Policy Analysis
FPC  Foreign Policy Change
FRG  Federal Republic of Germany
GDR  German Democratic Republic
IGO  Intergovernmental Organizations
IR  International Relations
KMT  Kuomintang
NSC  National Security Council
PRC  People’s Republic of China (China)
RAM  Rational Actor Model
ROC  Republic of China (Taiwan)
TECO  Taipei Economic and Cultural Office
TRA  Taiwan Relations Act
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
U.S.  United States
U.S.S.R  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO  World Health Organization
WTO  World Trade Organization
Dedicated to T. Nilsson

For the help
1 Introduction

1.1 Research Question and Purpose

Analyzing the foreign policy of a country like Taiwan is no easy task, though it can be rather interesting. Maybe the reason for that is because of the fact that Taiwan is quite a remarkable little country. Taiwan was – together with Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea – known as one of the Four Asian Tigers, and it soon found itself in the international spotlight after posting exceptionally high growth rates and going through rapid industrialization from the 1960s and forward. Since then it has also been recognized for its remarkable democratic progression. Taiwan is unique in the sense that it has been described as the first democratic transition of power in the 5000 year history of the Chinese (Ko 2004:1).

The Kuomintang party’s (KMT) win in the island’s first and free presidential election in 1996 marked a stunning development for the country’s democratic transition as voters chose to retain the government that in the end instigated democratic reform, but nevertheless also were the ones that had oppressed the population for decades. Taiwan is now recognized as a fully democratic country. Its democratic track record speaks for itself. Accordingly, appraiser of democratic development, Freedom House.org, has rated Taiwan as fully Free in regards to both political rights and civil liberties. This is a telling contrast when compared to China, which Taiwan has had such a volatile past with.

In spite of Taiwan’s progress, it faces considerable adversity on the international stage. Mainly because Taiwan can be characterized as an orphan of the international community, a diplomatic outcast barred from many of the world’s international organizations because of events dating back to before World War II. Since the 1950s Taiwan has seen its diplomatic support dwindle as the numbers of countries that have switched recognition from Taiwan to China, steadily increase by a few countries every year. The reasons lies in the foreign policy that Taiwan and China, at the time, chose to pursue. This foreign policy, known as the one China policy, meant that both Taiwan and China regarded themselves as the one true China, despite the existence of two states that claimed this.

While Taiwan have not yet officially abandoned its One China Policy in principle, it has switched to, what the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry has labeled, ‘flexible diplomacy’. The foreign policy change has had a significant impact on the development of Taiwan in the past couple of decades. This study will therefore try to discover the chief sources of change. In other words, the factors
that had the most influence on Taiwan’s decision to implement flexible diplomacy.

The specific research question that will thus try to be answered is:

Why did Taiwan decide to abandon its previous foreign policy strategy and create ‘flexible diplomacy’?

The chosen research question is no doubt an interesting topic. Partly because the treatment endured by Taiwan has been in large part imposed by the international community – a community of which states are the central players. This is interesting because of the way many institutions of the international community purport to present themselves as – in this case as not only working towards the spreading and protection of democracy and human rights, but also actively encouraging inclusiveness and state participation. This kind of behavior is especially perplexing when nations of the international community continually chooses to recognize China, a country with questionable democratic track record, as opposed to a democratic country like Taiwan, all the while acquiescing to China’s demands concerning Taiwan status as a state, and therefore, by extension, are excluding Taiwan from international organizations such as the U.N.

Thus, the purpose of this thesis has in large part not only been driven by an interest to learn more about the reason for Taiwan’s decision to implement flexible diplomacy as their new foreign policy, but also because of the interesting discrepancy between how the international community presents itself and its actual policies.

1.2 Structure of Thesis

In order to best answer the research question I have divided this thesis into several different chapters. There are seven chapters in total and an appendix at the end. The research question and purpose of the study are introduced in chapter one. It is important to note that the introduction briefly explains why Taiwan is an interesting case to study and why the research question has been worded the way it has been worded. Chapter two offers a brief rundown on the history of the chosen theoretical field and the theoretical framework that will used in order to answer the research question. The theoretical model in this section is central to understanding this thesis’ theoretical approach. And will take into account for sources of change, not only from the state-level, but also from an actor-perspective. Chapter three is a methodological section which tries to clarify the methodological tools that were used. Since the research question is touches upon a contentious subject a section was devoted to clarifying how the material that was eventually used was obtained. Considerable time is also spent on how interviews were set up and conducted. Chapter four provides a historical background concerning China and Taiwan in regards to the research question. In chapter 5, the U.S, China and Taiwan’s foreign policy and the interplay they have had in regards
to flexible diplomacy and the one-China policy is explained. This section is important in order to understand the underlying causes of the situation Taiwan is in. In chapter 6 the analysis is presented and possible external and internal sources of change are given. Finally, chapter 7 will feature a conclusion which will round up the study’s findings. The appendix is located at the very end of the thesis. The interview guide and the transcript can be found here.
2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 The Study of Foreign Policy

Whenever relationships between states are involved, it is not unreasonable to conclude that situations that affect a large number of people may arise from the inherent differences that exist between states. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 is an excellent example of how an international crisis between superpowers, with the use of nuclear weapons and its devastating consequences always close by, hinged on crucial decisions made by respective countries’ leadership. The study of foreign policy is therefore important in order to identify and understand the processes that made crises such as the Cuban crisis end in in such a fortuitous way.

The process has now evolved into something that can now lay claim to an entire subfield within the field of International relations (IR), now known as ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’ (FPA). FPA, which this thesis is an example of, is the study of the processes that determine the resulting outcome of a nation’s foreign policy.

The study of decision-making in FPA as a school of IR is still a relatively young field. At best it can be dated back to the 1950s where the work of Snyder, Bruck, and Sypin (1954) jumpstarted FPA’s traditional emphasis on foreign policy ‘decision-making’ (FPDM). Decision-making in this context should be viewed as ‘organizational behavior’, where the competence of actors, motivations of various players and access to information and information-flow was to be the main factors in play, not the nation-state. With this approach Snyder tried to move down, below the nation-level, when analyzing the results of foreign policy in the political system (ibid:13). With this reasoning, but never so explicitly compared to coming condemners, Snyder set off the first of a long line of criticisms toward FPA’s increasing and previous reliance on adhering to the nation-state as the standard level of analysis.

And the criticisms were to an extent unavoidable since it targeted a particular approach that has traditionally been so pervasive and widespread that it could, after a while, come to be regarded as the ‘traditional” approach. Perhaps the most recognizable use of this approach was by Graham Allison in his very influential study, originally from 1971, entitled The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1999). Part of Allison’s traditional approach can be summarized into the ‘rational actor model’ (RAM). This model, according to Allison, assumes that the nation or the government, conceived as a rational, unitary decision-maker, is the sole agent. And it will act as if were an individual
agent with one set of preferences, capable of making rational choices (Allison 1999:24).

If the work of Snyder (1954) inspired researchers to focus on the decision-making process (FPDM), then James N. Rosenau’s influential contribution to FPA in the 1960s inspired researchers to focus on the comparative study of foreign policy (CFP). According to Rosenau, even though FPA was devoid of grand generable theories, and oriented toward single-country studies, what it really needed was ‘middle-range’ theories that could identify certain types of states and their foreign policies (Rosenau 1980:120-121). The best way to find these theories would be through the aggregation of large statistical variables, from individuals and their preferences to group orientations and institutions, all tied into the base of society, the economy and politics (Rosenau 1974).

Snyder’s FPDM focus and Rosenau’s CFP focus was quite distinct from one another, but both well within the study of FPA, and more could be fitted into this umbrella. Another different avenue of study was pioneered by the research under Harold and Margaret Sprout in the 1950s. They wanted to examine the relationship between human behavior and the environment, or milieu in which these occur (Sprout, Harold – Sprout, Margaret 1956). The milieu in this context is acknowledged as the environment that is affecting decision-makers of states, this includes societal, political and sociological factors. The study had a big impact because, although an agreement over the fact that milieu affects foreign policies existed at that time, very little work had been done in that area.

In spite of this, at least in previous literature, the use of fully rational decision models have been prevalent in both levels of analysis. Snyder’s seminal decision-making study from 1954, mentioned above, credited for its focus on actors below the nation-state, have in some ways even reinforced the ‘rational’ decision-maker assumption by assuming a rational decision-making process at this level as well (Clarke – White 1989:12). This distinctive assumption of human behavior, with roots in economics, was for a long time the dominating paradigm. But exactly how well does this assumption really mirror decision-making and foreign policy creation? Advances in cognitive psychology allow new insights into decision-makers and their decisions, and seem to challenge the existence of the rational decision-maker in analyses below and above the nation. Therefore decision-making is now not as straightforward as previously thought.

Other research done concurrently focused on human cognition. Cognitive psychology, which is the study of how people perceive, think and solve problems, showed an alternative explanation for how people act and make decisions. This may come as a surprise to many as we humans, tend to regard ourselves as rational creatures. Not surprisingly, studies have followed suit, the decision-making field is now filled with concepts such as “bounded rationality”¹,

¹ Herbert Simon used this term to indicate situations where the rational decision-makers in organizations are limited by their cognitive ability and access to information. Since they only have access to a portion of the objective reality, any behavior will be in response to ‘bounded rationality’ (McGrew – Wilson 1982:57).
“muddling through\textsuperscript{2}” and “satisficing\textsuperscript{3}”, all of which modify the original concept of the rational actor.

Strong evidence from the laboratory has challenged classical rational models of behavior and that decisions rarely conform to the rational decision model. Emotions may, for instance, consciously and unconsciously affect the cognitive mind’s decision making process in such a way that emotional reactions can no longer be said to be the result of complete rationality (McDermott 2004:695).

For example, Robert Jervis (1976) paints a telling picture of the pressures faced by those who are responsible for the crucial decisions in our society. He spends considerable time on the tendency of decision-makers to misperceive key features of the international environment, particularly the interests and behavior of potential opponents, suggesting that views of the world are influenced by past experiences, established beliefs, and other cognitive influences. Jervis also mentions how cognitive dissonance, first developed by Leon Festinger, explain why people, and therefore decision-makers, will go to great lengths to justify their behavior post decision, and thereafter unconsciously rearrange their beliefs so that they provide increased support for their taken action (Jervis 1976:382; Festinger 1957:3; Tetlock 1998:649). Example of this includes how proponents of invading Iraq, will after the war, no longer justify the invasion from a WMD perspective, but that it was the right thing to do in order to topple a dictator like Saddam Hussein.

2.2 Selection of Framework

When analyzing government behavior or foreign policy, most approaches tend to advance one particular perspective or model, usually the one most preferred by the analyst (Yetiv 2004:8). How he attempts to approach the research question is often up to the analyst. Though I would like to point out that it is not entirely his own prerogative as there is an obvious need to design an approach that also conform to the various methodological and conceptual issues that may surround the research question. Suffice to say, there are several different factors which affect the approach a study takes, even more so for FPA studies when compared to other forms of inquiries. I say this because even though there are several ways to approach FPA studies. Most of them, if not all in some way or another, cannot get around the recurring dilemma of deciding which analytical level to place the study on. The debate between the pros and cons of analyses focused on different levels, such as the nation-state or the systemic level vis-à-vis the individual or below the nation-state level, has been waged for decades. Similar dilemmas have

\textsuperscript{2} A term used by Charles Lindblom (1959:87) to denote less than rational actions by administrators.

\textsuperscript{3} Herbert Simon used this term to indicate the principle of ‘satisficing’ instead of ‘optimizing’. In other words, decision-makers will to only search for alternative courses of action until one is found which meets the minimum criteria, not optimum criteria.
been observed in other fields, between personality-oriented and culture-oriented anthropology, social-psychology and sociology and micro- and macro-economics (Singer 1961:77).

With this in mind I have initially chosen a theoretical approach situated on a higher level of analysis. While the approach shares several similarities with Allison’s Rational Actor Model it was ultimately chosen because there is a good and practical reason for applying it. Basically, the approach makes foreign policymaking much easier to understand. If decision-makers behaves rationally, the analyst, knowing the rules of rationality and knowing the decision-maker’s goals, can then, at least in some way, understand why a particular decision was made (Clarke – White:13). Furthermore, because the inherent nature of models at this level is to capture the totality of the interactions within the system, common features and factors of IR and FPA studies, such as the grand geo-political and socio-economic factors that are in play between countries, is something that plays well into the strengths of them.

2.2.1 The State-level Approach

In this approach the ‘state’ adopts a very prominent and central role. It is the pre-eminent actor and all other types of actor are of lesser importance. It has one set of specified goals and objectives. In this approach the state is comprised of a politically unified people occupying a definite territory – a political concept in other words.

This kind of state that will evaluate its perceived options and choose the one that best correspond to value-maximizing behavior. Analyzing the state from this level is quite like enveloping it in a ‘black-box’. We are not concerned with the minute interactions within this black-box that ultimately lead to a decision. The relevant analytical material used here is the aggregated decision, or output, of all decision-makers within this black-box.

This approach’s core concept lies in the assumption that disaggregated decisions made by decision-makers inside the ‘black-box’ are value-maximizing and rational. Rational in this sense does not imply making the ‘right’ decision single time – far too many real world examples of foreign policy gone horribly wrong exist for that to be possible. Instead, it is said that even though hindsight may be 20/20, right or wrong, a decision can hardly be irrational if the decision-maker went through an analytical process that pitted several options against each other, evaluated possible alternatives, and then chose the option that best was deemed the optimal course of action.

Furthermore, the main principle that governs any taken decisions of states is that of the state’s national security, or to put it bluntly, its survival. All other goals that are more of strategic in nature, such as economic prosperity, are secondary (Baylis – Smith 2001:176). This is extra true in an international system in which competition between states has created an environment in which decisions have tangible consequences, and where no other state or institution can be totally relied upon to provide assistance in times of crisis.
**Graphical Model:** I have adapted and condensed the core principles of the theoretical framework described above into the following graphical model in order to better visualize the theoretical framework and the level of analysis that has been chosen.

2.2.2 Disadvantages of the State-level Approach

While a higher level of analysis offers a more comprehensive study of the totality of interactions that takes place within a system and its environment. The price one pays is through the loss of detail this comprehensiveness entails. Eventual findings may be too broad or general in nature, and thus not really achieving the relevant in-depth knowledge that was sought after. Details that are located on lower levels are then glossed over and many times disregarded in order to capture the ‘larger picture’ in the grand scheme of things. The approach is also inherently generalizing because it often tends to assume that all actions of individuals are the result of rationally and carefully calculated utility maximizing decisions, and thus often exaggerates the impact of the system and discounts the impact of actors within the system (Singer 1961: 80).

There are ways to complement this kind of approach. One way is to apply the analysis from different levels side-by-side. Graham Allison did this in *Essence of Decision*. Because, in spite of liberally employing the use of the state-level approach of RAM, and therefore also its disadvantages, which Allison was highly critical of, he could keep them in check by complementing his rational actor model with other models. In his case that meant developing the ‘Organizational Process’ and ‘Bureaucratic Politics’ models, whose focus was directed towards large organizations within the state and the political actors whose ‘wheeling and dealing’ constituted the main process of policy-creation (Allison 1969). This is
also the reason why this study has chosen to include an analysis from a lower level as well – a level of analysis where the actions of agents and actors in positions of prominence, and where their decisions and actions have tangible impact, into account.

2.2.3 The Actor-Driven Approach

Because of the nature of this study’s research question, an analysis that is in line with previous rationality models, or even models situated on the state-level is not enough. The reason can easily be found if we take a look at what foreign policy specifically is, and how it is defined. Valerie Hudson in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* offers a good definition. Here foreign policy is defined as the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities, and this includes decisions to do nothing (Smith et. al. 2008:12).

The thing that immediately jumps out with this definition is that foreign policy is a strategy or approach chosen by the national government. What this implies is that foreign policy, through the government, must be the result, or output of human decision makers, acting singly and in groups. Consequently actions taken below the state-level must also be taken into consideration. The implication of this is that this study, alongside the state-level approach, must thus also conduct an analysis from a level of analysis below the state. Thus, the actor in this approach, contrary to the approach detailed above, is not the unitary nation, but instead the decision-makers. These are the very small clique of individuals that have the power to affect a country’s foreign policy, for example the dictator, the president or the select few in the upper echelons of power. The fact that these players do become the agent for particular government actions is primarily explained by the fact that they occupy critical positions within an administration and have the ability to affect policy outcomes (Allison 1969:709).

If we are to illustrate this process with the model used in the state-level approach, the effect can be likened to opening up the black box of decision making and peering into it in order to discover which sources of change contributed to the foreign policy outcome that we have seen.

It should be noted that that looking at all potential decisions and all individuals involved in the decision-making process would be extremely time-consuming. It is for practical reasons necessary to concentrate on a more limited number. In Gustavsson (1998:24) analysis of the Swedish reorientation on EC membership he limited the investigation to those individuals to that can have be assumed to have had the greatest impact on the decision. Who these were, according to Gustavsson, would have to depend on the circumstance. This is admittedly an unsatisfactory but pragmatic solution.

One which I will follow, but with one difference – and that is that consideration has to be taken to not just the level of analysis where individual decision-makers’ circumstance or situation is located at, but also, and this is primarily because of study’s focus on the state-level as well, the predicament and
circumstance the state was in. By this I am referring to considerations that take into account the particularly unusual situation a state may be in, for example any eventual ostracizing it may have been subjected to, or the democratic development it had achieved at the time. For instance, decision-makers in dictatorships would assumably have a larger say in policy outcomes that democratically elected presidents. This is because as a government democratizes, so does the decision-making process. Forcing it to become more open to a wide variety of institutional actors, including legislative bodies, ministries, and agencies, and let us not forget, the behavior and actions of involved in the global system.

2.3 Measurable Sources of Change

Change implies that a transformation has taken place and that something has altered or modified itself from its original form to something different. Capturing such variations would usually be desirable. However, this study is not concerned with various possible foreign policy changes, but only one change that has already happened. Thus, it is after all the identified sources of change that need to be clarified, and how those sources of change can be attributed to the subsequent foreign policy change.

These sources of change come in different shapes and sizes and must therefore be evaluated based on the context that brought about change. A country that replaces one of its ambassadors abroad has certainly changed something, but is the change relevant to this study? What about replacing a foreign minister with a new one? Such an act is certainly significant and may very well bring about changes to a country’s foreign policy, especially if the new foreign minister is proactive, but it does not need to mean that the changes made were relevant to what was being studied. And finally, what is the effect of geopolitical sources of change such as establishing official relations? Thus, when conducting the analysis extra care will have to be taken to make sure that the foreign policy change that is being analyzed, not only is significant, but also relevant.

Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that sources of change attributed to a foreign policy change are different depending on the level of analysis the source is located on. For example, change at a lower level of analysis is harder than an analysis situated on a higher level. This is primarily because when the actions and decisions of decisions are attributed to decision-makers, consideration must be given to the cognitive process. Decision-makers are after all people, they have different personality and different styles.

Predicting and explaining decisions becomes problematic at this level as there are no tools that are sufficiently accurate to encapsulate the decision-making process which resides in individual human beings (Clarke – White 1989). Thus, the effects of generalizing any behavior should be kept to a minimum. With this in mind, it is still unavoidable that certain assumptions have to be taken – and that is that sources of change need to be perceived by individual decision-makers and trigger a change in their beliefs, which later will result in a policy outcome
(Gustavsson 1998:24). The criterion for potential sources of change at this level is highly subjective, and somewhat inadequate, but this is one of the effects when dealing with individual cognitive processes. It does help that the policy outcome is from a historical viewpoint already known. However, to adequately explain the policy outcome intersubjectivity must be strived for as well.
3 Methods and Material

3.1 The Case Study

It is important to make clear that this study is a case study of Taiwan. Usually a single country case study tries to focus on certain problematic themes or aspects of a certain country. In this case this has resulted in the examination of the factors leading up to Taiwan’s implementation of flexible diplomacy. Case studies are descriptive in nature and will not try to make any larger inferences from the scrutiny of the particular case it is examining. The latter point does fit well with the chosen interview method of this study as it does not hide the fact that it will not generalize its findings (more on this further down). Additionally, other things considered equal, the fewer cases investigated, such this one that only feature one particular case, the more information can be collected for it (Hammersley – Gomm 2000:5). This is something that is desirable as immersing oneself into one subject does provide for a deeper understanding of the case.

It does help of course if the case is interesting to study as well, which as I also mentioned in the introduction. Taiwan does present an interesting case study because of the unique situation it is in. Very few countries in the world are in the situation Taiwan is in. One of these that most recently share some similarities with Taiwan in the sense that it has split the international community in two is The Republic of Kosovo. On one side there are those that recognize The Republic of Kosovo’s formation as an independent state – currently numbering 73 – and those that do not. The State of Palestine is another state that shows limited recognition from the international community as well. From this we can infer that Taiwan presents an unusual deviant case in the international community. It is an aberration, an abnormality that makes it an excellent candidate for the case study method where an intense examination and scrutiny is performed, and where study that is more detailed and more open-ended in character is available to explaining particular situation.

3.2 Material

The material used was based off both first hand and second hand sources. Primary sources were desirable because they allowed access to better and closer information regarding a particular subject. These sources consisted of interviews conducted with individuals possessing unique insights and knowledge pertaining to the research question, and original documents originating from various
Taiwanese governmental agencies detailing the purpose and extent of ‘flexible diplomacy’. Original documents such as China’s White Paper on Taiwan and vice versa are excellent examples of such sources. In foreign policy contexts, a White Paper usually denotes an authoritative piece of document, or documents, used by policymakers to educate readers in a particular subject, which said owner of the document wishes to further clarify. Consequently, these White Papers were a valuable source of information as they had the unique fortune of originating directly from the people that implement and carry out different policies for their respective governments. However, it is important to keep in mind that because of the function that White Papers play in foreign policy contexts they are often biased. The problems that could arise from using such materials were hopefully minimized by remembering that they were in fact biased and by using White Papers from both sides of the strait.

The study was not entirely composed from primary sources. A large part of the study’s material was collected and fleshed with a significant number of secondary sources. Secondary sources usually interpret and analyze primary sources and are often printed in various publications, but possess the disadvantage of possibly being distorted, or having lost some of its initial information after being rewritten and passed down the line. Most secondary sources used in this study were collected from scientific articles in political science journals and books on China and Taiwan regarding cross-strait relations.

Newspaper articles have been used on some occasions, but have been largely absent from this particular study as the change that is being studied here, while still present and relevant to this day, occurred decades ago. For those same reasons I have sometimes been unable to use the very latest and most up-to-date sources as one could wish for. This is also why the interviews conducted were such a welcome addition to this study as they injected an element of freshness, and a perspective from people who could step back and take a good look at the topic at hand and offer insights in where the results of the change were readily available. As opposed to views and insights made in the time period immediately following the change, where the results would have been much more uncertain.

### 3.3 The Semi-structured Interview

Interviews conducted for this study are often called the semi-structured interview. This means that the interviews have to be somewhat structured and follow a guide that includes an outline of topics to be covered with a host of suggested questions (Kvale – Brinkmann 2009:130). The interview guide that was constructed followed this concept, but with one addition. And that was the

---

4 Too see the interview guides used in this study refer to the appendix
choice to make the interview guide available to interviewees prior to each interview.

By choosing to make my interview guides available prior to each interview I allowed my interviewees to get a reasonably clear idea of the discussion topics that would be discussed, and therefore also the chance to prepare themselves appropriately. This design certainly made the interviews more structured than open. That is not exactly wrong from a methodological standpoint as semi-structured interviews themselves can have different intensities of structure and openness (ibid). And the choice certainly reflects a clear decision on my part as I was not looking for descriptions of personal experiences, or any life narratives. In such cases spontaneous or unexpected answers arising from a more open interview might have been preferred.

The interviews were instead conducted with the express purpose of obtaining the conceptual analysis of the interviewees’ understanding of this study’s area of inquiry. Thus, this choice enhanced the interviewee’s ability to answer questions, hopefully up to the point that they got a good feel of the tone and nature of the interview. On the other hand, an argument could be made that answers might suffer from being too thought out, or too pre-fabricated up to the point that one is being fed canned responses. This was never the purpose of the interview guide, it was not sent in advance so that the interviewees could take their time to internally debate the pros and cons of each answer, edit them and then release in a canned response. This is also one of the reasons not to take ever everything at face value and why several interview strategies, or tactics if you will, were taken into consideration prior to interviewing. For example, instances were interviewees deviated into other topics, albeit slightly related ones, did happen from time to time. At such times a subtle and appropriate question, interjected appropriately, was enough to bring the interview back on track.

3.3.1 Selection of Respondents

Two interviews were ultimately conducted. The interviewees were employed by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The selection of interviewees is not statistically representative of the general population. This is generally not a problem in qualitative interviews as a larger number of interviewees will not necessarily make any gathered material better (Esaiasson 2005:286). One could instead say that interviewees were ‘strategically’ chosen because of the knowledge and answers they could provide.

Furthermore, answers that were obtained should not be viewed as generalizable as the answers given, together with the nature and number of interviews that were conducted, precluded any chance of discerning any general pattern that could be inferred to a larger population. This was never the aim of the interviews. Furthermore, it does not mean that the answers collected were inferior or any less useful. Social sciences recognize that generalizability has its uses, but that each situation also can be unique, and that each of these situations has its own intrinsic value in the knowledge and experience it provides. The answers given by
this study’s interviewees should therefore be looked upon mainly for the knowledgeable insights they provided.

3.3.2 Collection and Management of Data

An electronic audio recorder was present for each interview because it was important to concentrate on the dynamics of the discussion. I did bring paper and pencil for my first interview, but I quickly found myself putting them aside as I wanted to focus my entire attention on encouraging and responding to the interviewee’s answers.

The possibility that a recorder could be an intrusive element during an interview was also considered. Can a recorder inhibit an interviewee’s capacity or willingness to answer certain sensitive questions? Sure, the possibility exists, but I was always on the lookout for this. I also believe there is a balancing aspect one has to consider. How does the disadvantage that taking notes with paper and pencil weigh against the intrusive and perhaps inhibitive element that is the recorder? The latter was chosen as the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Never was any part of an interview recorded without the interviewee’s knowledge or consent.

Methodological discussions often feature comprehensive discussions around the quality of interviewing, but rarely about the quality of transcription, which is just as important. Transcribing interviews might seem like a clerical task, but is often an interpretive task process, where the differences between oral speech and written texts gives rise to a series of practical and methodological issues (Kvale - Brinkmann 2009:177). Mainly because nobody speaks in the same way as they write. An interview is a live social interaction between two people where interpretative tools such as facial expressions and tone of voice are readily available to the participants. Acknowledging this fact might be an argument for transcribing in verbatim. And transcribing in verbatim was also exactly what I first set out to do. But I quickly found it counterproductive to what I was trying to accomplish. While transcribing in verbatim might capture more of the intricacies and nuances of an interview, it degrades the readability of the answers. Since the aim of the interviews was to enhance the knowledge surrounding the topic of the study, I ultimately settled on cleaning up the transcript by, for example, removing crutch words.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the transcribed parts only encompassed the relevant portions of the interviews that were used in the analysis. The rest were omitted. Analyzing the interviews was carried out by carefully reading each interview in order to gain a heuristic understanding of the contents, and then removing relevant information into the analysis.
4 The China and Taiwan Dilemma

4.1 Historical Overview

There is no doubt today that Taiwan today is culturally Chinese. Yet hard words and distrust have dominated the rhetoric between Taiwan and China since the split in 1949, much of it originating from the dispute over whether Taiwan belongs to China or is a sovereign independent country. The less than amicable relationship that both countries enjoy with each other has its roots in the Chinese civil war fought during and after World War II between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the ruling Republic of China (ROC) government led by the Kuomintang party (KMT). Though World War II ended in victory for the KMT and CCP, since both had at the time formed an uneasy alliance against Japanese invaders, hostilities quickly resumed afterwards, and the KMT would soon find itself fighting a losing battle against the CCP on the Chinese mainland. The KMT’s subsequent move to Taiwan in 1949 was therefore a last ditch resort to avert total defeat at the hands of the CCP. The CCP would go on and form the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that same year while the KMT and remnants of the ROC government would continue to survive in Taiwan.

At that time, it seemed like the ROC government on Taiwan was doomed as the PRC’s made itself ready to attack from the other side of the strait. Originally, the U.S had no intention of intervening and had seemingly left the ROC to the PRC’s fate. But with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the island once again resurfaced as a potential ally in the region and became an important strategic asset overnight. And Taiwan could for almost 20 years enjoy the support and protection of the U.S (Klintworth 1995:55). A support largely based on U.S efforts to “contain” communism around the world. In this case, Taiwan provided a convenient alternative to an unwanted communist regime in China.

Unfortunately for Taiwan, after decades of promoting the KMT as the rightful ruler of “Free China”, it finally became painfully obvious to the U.S that diplomatic ties with the PRC could no longer be put off (Ko 2004:1). Changing geopolitical and strategic factors in the region lead to U.S overtures to China in 1972, and set off a wave of international recognition in favor of the PRC, at the expense of Taiwan. Soon Taiwan had not only lost its seat in U.N Security Council to the PRC, but was no longer a member of the U.N at all.

Though the U.S had for several decades been presenting Taiwan as the ‘Free China’ alternative to communist China, there was not much of anything that was considered ‘free’ in Taiwan. Taiwan was still a one-party state and subject to martial law, and it became increasingly clear to many observers that KMT’s authoritarian practices were downright unsustainable (Ko 2004:137). This,
coupled with a substantial amount of internal clamor for reform would ultimately bring about the democratization of Taiwan. According to an interview conducted with Representative Chu of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Stockholm, Taiwan is “the first example of Chinese democracy in the whole Chinese world.” (Interview Representative Chu 8). The several decades long martial law which had granted the KMT controlled government far-reaching constitutional powers was ended in 1987 (Hood 1997). Prohibition against opposition parties and the free press would from henceforth successively improve little by little. Basic human rights were improved. Amendments to the constitution were made to improve the island’s democratic practices.

Economic development plans were put into effect to strengthen Taiwan’s economic competiveness as well. Taiwan’s annual growth rate soared and together with Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea became known as one of the Four Asian Tigers. There was still a long way to go until Taiwan resembled a western democracy, but the reforms were significant.

4.1.1 Territorial Sovereignty

The issue of sovereignty is an extremely important matter for Taiwan. For the PRC, it is equally important. Mainly as they view the resolution of the Taiwan issue as a “struggle to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. The PRC has on a number of occasions not shied away from clarifying their side of the argument. In 1993 the PRC published a White Paper entitled The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China. An updated version was released in 2000 entitled The one-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue which provides an excellent source for the PRC’s official position on this matter (Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, 1993).

According to the White Paper the Chinese civil war constituted “a replacement of an old regime by a new one”. According to international laws, sovereignty of all of China’s inherent territory was at that moment transferred to the PRC, thereby rendering the PRC the only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena.

The legality of the civil war in this claim is seldom challenged as there is no established rule against civil war in international law. In the 19th century international law allowed states to acquire territory by conquest, mainly because no imposed limit on this right existed at the time. A growing movement in the 20th century culminating with the United Nations Charter did eventually restrict this right in most cases except when the right to self-defense was invoked (Akerhurst 1997:151). Since this particular case does not involve two sovereign states, but instead of a situation where a rebel uprising (CCP) from within usurped the sitting

---

5 A White Paper is often used by policymakers as an authoritative document to educate readers in a particular subject. China’s official administrative body that handles the Taiwan issue is Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. For direct link to the White Paper see references.
government (ROC), China’s claim does seem to hold water. Especially if we do consult the United Nations Charter, more specifically article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which only prohibits the use of force in international relations. In light of this, PRC’s claim that the Chinese civil war constituted a transfer of territorial sovereignty of all of “China’s inherent territory” from one defeated regime to another is principally correct.

While the PRC’s transfer of sovereignty claim is essentially correct, it fails to consider the fact that the ROC was never defeated. There is a general agreement that when a state loses temporary control over its territory as a result of war, rebellion or similar upheavals it does not cease to exist (Kuijper 1997; Akerhurst 1997). In fact international law recognizes that the invasion of another country’s territory is not immediately equivalent to “annexation,” but only represents “military occupation” (Hartzell 2004:2). Instead, territory is usually ceded territory to the victor by treaty of peace (Oppenheimer 1905:270). Such peace treaties are final. They are also usually heavily in favor of the victor as it is logically one of the advantages of winning a war. This was demonstrated in the Treaty of Shimonoseki which was heavily one-sided in Japan’s favor.

Here, Taiwan was “ceded in perpetuity” by China to Japan according to article two of the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Taiwan Documents Project6: The Treaty of Shimonoseki 1895). History presents innumerable examples of transfers of sovereignty between states, and international law generally views cessation of state territory through bilateral treaties as possible (Oppenheim 1905:268). Western powers of that time period did not object to the treaty, viewed it as legally binding and generally regarded Taiwan’s secession from China as legitimate (Copper 1996:29).

Thus, conquest alone, without a treaty can confer territory to the victor, but only if it is clear that a war has come to a complete end (Akerhurst 1997:151). This is also why Germany’s annexation of Poland during World War II was invalid. Polish state never ceased to exist when its government lost control over its territory because Poland’s allies continued its struggles against Germany (ibid). This same principle can be applied to the ROC government. Post World War II, the ROC’s territory encompassed most of mainland China. As the civil war progressed the ROC government relocated its capital several times in order to evade PRC forces before finally retreating to Taiwan. While ROC territory was constantly changing, the ROC government and its territory never completely ceased to exist.

4.1.2 Transfer of Sovereignty

While the above section tried to address legal aspects of the civil war and whether or not sovereignty was transferred to Taiwan with the replacement of a

---

6 Taiwan documents project was established in 1999 to provide researchers and other interested persons a non-partisan and comprehensive source of primary material relating to the dispute over Taiwan.
regime, it failed to consider the fact that Japan through the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 possessed sovereign ownership of Taiwan prior to the conclusion of World War II, and may therefore provide some guidance in this issue.

In the final days of World War II Allied leaders convened in Cairo to make decisions about postwar Asia and to discuss the Allied position towards Japan (Copper 1996). Concluding the conference a communiqué was sent to Japan. Apart from mentioning the need for Japan’s unconditional surrender, it stated that “all territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, had be restored to the Republic of China” (The National Diet Library 7. The Cairo Communiqué).

Therefore, in line with the Cairo Declaration and Japan’s unconditional surrender, ROC forces occupied Taiwan in 1945. So far so good, but another problem arises from the fact that the Cairo Declaration of 1943 was just a declaration of intent from Allied leaders. No treaty or other agreement had yet to formalize the transfer of sovereignty from the Japanese.

The actual peace treaty and formal end to hostilities was achieved with the San Francisco Peace Treaty 8 of September 8, 1951, in which Japan formally renounced any claim on Taiwan (Taiwan Documents Project: San Francisco Peace Treaty). But by this time the ROC had already managed to lose the mainland and was firmly entrenched in Taiwan. The U.S had originally planned to invite the ROC, but subsequently changed its mind following objections from the U.K and other countries that now recognized the PRC as the new legitimate government of China (Chui 1997). The peace treaty was signed by 51 states and in article 2(b) stipulated that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores”. In contrast with renunciation of territories from Japan to states other than Taiwan, for example Korea, the treaty failed to specify who acquired sovereignty over the island.

The reason for this is simple. Following the KMT move to Taiwan, there were two Chinas. The essential question here is to whom did Japan renounce its claim on Taiwan to? The ROC, backed up by the U.S, or the PRC, backed up by the Soviet Union? The treaty was unclear regarding this. Thus, jurisdiction over Taiwan seemed to exist in some kind of legal limbo. This seems to be confirmed by a U.S statement made in 1954 which stated that “technical sovereignty over Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores has never been settled” (Chiu 1997:5).

At the time, this oversight did not seem to matter much anyways. The debate over Taiwan’s sovereignty seemed purely academic considering the fact that PRC were amassing their forces right across the Taiwan Strait in preparation of an invasion (Copper 1996). ROC leadership had lost what little international pull it had and had been seemingly been left to fend for itself.

---

7 The National Diet Library is the sole national library in Japan, it has been has been building its collections mainly by the legal deposit of Japanese publications in accordance with the Legal Deposit System of Japan. See references for direct internet link.
But as the outbreak of the Korean War forced the U.S to intervene, the status of mainland China and Taiwan would start to solidify. Since the legal arguments were unclear, and practical considerations in regards to who currently governed Taiwan had to be accounted for, the PRC would henceforth design their foreign policy objectives around seeking international recognition for its sovereign claim to Taiwan, and the ROC would continue their rule of Taiwan.
5 Foreign Policy

Since 1949 Taiwan’s approach to foreign policy has gone through three separate phases of development. Each of these phases were markedly different from each previous iteration of foreign policy.

The three phases of foreign approach that the ROC government have underwent started with active participation in the international community, moved to diplomatic isolation and retreat, and finally to a period of diplomatic readjustment and zealously-like need to participate.

First phase (1950-1971): This phase was characterized by a period of diplomatic expansion and success in which the China could not match. Much of this can be attributed to combination of strong international support which Taiwan as one of the major allies that won World War II could draw upon. Though international support was varied, Taiwan’s biggest contributor, not just diplomatically, but also economically and militarily, was the U.S (Ko 2004).

China’s failure to secure recognition from most of the international community was mirrored by the Taiwan’s success in occupying the Chinese seat in the U.N and other international organizations. For several decades Taiwan and friends, with assistance from of the U.S, was successful in warding off China’s efforts to supplant the Taiwan in the U.N.

During the 1960s the Taiwan turned its attention towards Africa and Central and South America to garner support for its increasingly insecure UN seat (Chao 2002). In spite of the one-China policy still in full effect, all in all, this phase should be considered the golden phase of Taiwan’s diplomatic history as Taiwan managed to gain the recognition of nearly 70 countries (Chao 2002:180).

Second Phase (1971-1988): The second phase can only be described as nothing short of disastrous for Taiwan. The post-World WAR II international system was going through drastic changes as détente displaced containment as key component in anti-communist countries (ibid).

U.S overtures to China in 1972 seemed like the final nail in the coffin as this seemed to set off a wave of de-recognition of Taiwan in favor of international recognition of the PRC. This disastrous second phase was capped off with the normalization of Sino-U.S relations in 1979. This was a devastating development for Taiwan as the U.S was its most important ally and a heavyweight in the international system. Able to bring its full diplomatic weight to bear on those that

---

9 The division of Taiwan’s foreign policy into different phases is a popular and frequent approach. For further reading: (Chao 2002; Hickey 2007; 1997)
were critical of Taiwan or entertaining the notion of switching allegiances. As well as providing military protection and economic assistance in the form of weapons and funds.

For several countries this meant that their official stance to Taiwan had to be reevaluated. Together with the disastrous U.N debacle of 1971, where Taiwan lost its seat in the U.N to the PRC, which also meant the loss of representation in from most of the world’s international organizations, left the ROC government reeling.

In all this, one bright spot managed to remain. Namely, in absence of diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, the U.S drafted the Taiwan Relations Act\(^{10}\) (TRA) P.L. 96-8, which would thereafter grant Taiwan special privileges (such as future arms sales), stipulate certain assurances from the U.S and govern future U.S relationship with Taiwan (Lee 2000).

Third Phase (1988-Present): The third phase can be described as period of diplomatic recuperation and readjustment of foreign policy. Taiwan began to promote a flexible or pragmatic approach to international relations which emphasized the importance of consolidating existing relations and improving relations with non-allied countries.

This new policy also started governing relations between Taiwan and intergovernmental organizations which featured the PRC as a member. To join Taiwan often had to accept membership on the premise of not being able to use its official name, often joining organizations as Chinese, Taipei – as demonstrated in the Olympic Games and other intergovernmental organizations (IGO).

The IGO:s which Taiwan now enjoys full membership, while still low, numbers in the 30s. In addition, Taiwan has observer status in 20 other IGO’s. Most of the countries that recognize Taiwan are presently located in central and South America, Oceania and Africa. Despite their lack of formal diplomatic ties, Taiwan and the United States, EU and Japan have a strong and primarily rewarding relationship (The Republic of China: Yearbook 2010).

5.1 Taiwan’s One-China Policy

The core element of the one-China policy, which both China and Taiwan have in various degrees employed, states that there can only be one true China, despite the fact that there are two governments that claim to be ‘China’. Hence, different interpretations are being applied to the term ‘China’. To Beijing, the term refers to The People’s Republic of China (PRC). To Taipei, the term refers to the Republic of China (ROC), now residing in Taiwan.

The ROC government has for a very long time believed that the majority of the territory of this ‘China’ was being held by “Communist bandits”, and that they

---

\(^{10}\) Copy of the Taiwan Relations Act can be found at Taiwan Documents Project.
themselves were the remaining holdout of the legitimate government. This belief and conviction of their own legitimacy would often lead the ROC government breaking to break off diplomatic relations with allies that developed relations with the PRC (Chao 2002:181). The one-China policy was so inclusive and total that it permeated every facet of Taiwan’s foreign policy.

This is somewhat demonstrated whenever tentative reunification talks is initiated and concrete headway between the two governments is never really achieved. In recent years Taiwan has made it clear that reunification can only commence “once appropriate period of forthright exchange, cooperation, and consultation conducted under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity” has been established (Mainland Affairs and Research Center: Official Guidelines for National Unification). In addition, before talks could take place, three conditions had to be satisfied. These were 1) that Beijing would recognize the overall world trend toward democracy 2) implementation of democracy in China 3) renunciation of military threat against Taiwan and an undertaking not to interfere with Taiwan’s development of its foreign relations on the basis of the one-China policy (Leng 1996:47). It is clear that these preconditions were unacceptable to the PRC as it would require a fundamental change in their political system. Still, in many ways, the fact that some kind of dialogue was being conducted at all proved that both countries’ one-China policy, and therefore also their relations, were changing – at least compared to the relations that existed between the two countries right after 1949.

Back then Taiwan’s one-China policy was characterized by a complete refusal to even acknowledge the PRC, even going as far as implementing a ‘three noes policy’: “No contact, no compromise and no negotiation” (Peng 2010). Much of the bad blood between the two governments can be attributed to the civil war that was at the time still fresh on everybody’s mind. It was therefore not shocking to see Taiwan make it a habit to reject all negotiation proposals emanating from the PRC. stating that “the Chinese government has already had too many painful experiences in negotiating with the communists” (Chiu 1973:149). Taiwan’s distrust of China would continue. In 1979 Taiwan would strongly denounce China’s diplomatic outreach as a bad faith offer to engage in peace talks (Office of the President of Republic of China). But in 1987 calls for provisions to the no contact part of the ‘three noes policy’ in order to allow mainland Chinese who fled with KMT to Taiwan and their descendants an opportunity to visit family and relatives left behind in China were made (Hood 1997:82). In the end, changes were made, but not without significant opposition and a clear reaffirmation of the ROC government that opposition to communism, adherence to the goal of recovering the mainland, and continued maintenance of national security was still a priority (Office of the President of Republic of China).

---

11 In president Lee’s inaugural address 1992
12 See section 5.2
Clearly, Taiwan’s distrust and suspicion of PRC motives are substantial – no matter the time period. This is somewhat understandable considering the PRC’s less than peaceful, often even outright hostile, overtures toward reunification. Taiwan’s long-standing commitment to their original one-China policy did eventually change in the late 1980s when Taiwan abrogated a law which had previously regulated the country’s dealings with the PRC and had required them to strictly treat the PRC as an enemy to be eliminated. At the same time Taiwan completely dropped its insistence on exclusive recognition as the legitimate government of China (Chao 2002:181). This decision was made during a time where the PRC’s ardent claims of one China, in this case represented by themselves, forced the ROC, in large part because of changing international conditions and their own democratic transition, to acknowledge that there were two concepts of China even though Taiwan quietly retained the claim of being the true ‘China’.

5.2 China’s One-China Policy

The PRC’s one-China Policy is similar to the ROC’s one-China policy above following the move to Taiwan in the sense that it claimed total recognition as the legitimate and sole government of ‘China’. According to the PRC’s White Paper on this issue, they regard themselves as the “only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in in the international arena”. Since the PRC regards Taiwan as an inalienable part of China, reunification is seen as a ‘sacred task’, which must be accomplished (Swayne – Mulvenon 2001). As much as reunification might be seen like a ‘sacred task’, there might be other underlying reasons Beijing does not wish to see an independent Taiwan. According to the Director of Consular Affairs at TECO in Oslo an independent Taiwan could set a precedent for minority cultures or people inside China, for instance Tibet, to struggle for independence, even more so than presently. “If Beijing government let Taiwan go independent then the minority people in China, 64 of them, will want to go independent –especially Tibet and Xin Jiang” (Interview with Lee: 1).

Because of Taiwan’s implementation of a new and complex foreign policy strategy comprising of pressures and various enticements through which the current status quo, a state permanent separation from China, is continually being solidified, the PRC believes that reunification of Taiwan with China should begin as soon as possible. How reunification will proceed is still largely unknown and subject to change. This is a side-effect that can be attributed to the constant evolutionary transformation this plan has been subjected to throughout several decades based on a constant changing political climate.

This change can be observed if one follows the rhetoric used by the PRC since the ROC moved to Taiwan. From outright threats of forceful liberation following the immediate decades after 1949, to reunification through peaceful means starting in the 1970s and forward. The softening rhetoric can be seen in the White Papers published in 1993 and 2000. Here the PRC states that “China will do its
best to achieve peaceful reunification, but will not commit itself to rule out the use of force”, but is not above using military if it deems Taiwan’s commitment to reunification talks is half-hearted, or if Taiwan tries to permanently separate itself from the mainland.

The White Papers also confirm the PRC’s one-China aspirations to integrate Taiwan as a “special administrative region”, like the one employed in Hong Kong and Macao after 1997 and 1999 respectively. This shows that the PRC now acknowledges the differences between Taiwan on one hand and Hong and Macao on the other, and is now therefore willing to “apply a looser form of the ‘one country, two systems’ policy.

This shows a softening of rhetoric used across the Taiwan Strait – despite the intermittently thrown in threats of force – and can in many ways be attributed to the developments in both mainland China and Taiwan. For China, it started with normalization of Sino-U.S. relations in 1979 at the expense of formal U.S-Taiwan relations, and economic reform which came with western discovery of the potential economic powerhouse of China. These developments created a need for more amicable ties with western powers, more specifically the U.S which wanted to foster stability in the Taiwan Strait. (Swayne – Mulvenon 2001). At the same time, the PRC did not want to push Taiwan into a corner and drive the country towards declaring formal independence.

Together with a newfound belief that loss of U.S recognition would make Taiwan more inclined to accept solutions such as the “one country, two systems”, or at the very least be open to establishing direct links (direct mail, trade and shipping, air services), and the aforementioned developments – normalization of Sino-U.S relations and a fear that Taiwan might proclaim independence – China saw it fit to change their strategy regarding its reunification element of its one-China policy (the one-China policy which stipulates that the PRC still represented the one true ‘China’ was and still is nonnegotiable) towards Taiwan and increase its efforts to establish political dialogue with the ROC (ibid).

Despite this, rarely have any headway been made whenever these two governments have decided to sit down and negotiate. The closest to such an occurrence was in the early 1990s was when the two governments arrived at a consensus in which both governments agreed to acknowledge that there is only one China (in line with both countries’ one-China Policy), but that both sides were free to verbally express their own definition of that one China (Kan 2009). Such breakthroughs are usually the exception rather than the norm. Negotiations held in recent years, the late 2000s, compared to previous negotiations, have also yielded some fruitful progresses.

5.3 United States’ One-China Policy

As a superpower, the U.S has always been the most important third party member in cross-strait relations. Also, as Taiwan’s official and later unofficial chief ally,
and who wields significant leverage over Taiwan’s foreign policies, the U.S.’
vested interest in the well-being of Taiwan in this issue has been substantial.

U.S. policy on the one-China concept is primarily based off three
communiqués\(^\text{13}\) signed and sent between the US and China (Kan 2009). These
include the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, the Sino-US normalization
Communiqué of 1979 and the Joint Communiqué of 1982. In these communiqués
the United States recognized “the Government of the People’s Republic of China
as the sole legal Government of China.”

The first communiqué, the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, established an
important framework for the establishment of eventual normalization of Sino-U.S
relations seven years later. A second communiqué was cabled out 1979, this time
coinciding with the normalization of relations between the two countries. This
communiqué was the culmination of intense and on and off negotiations that had
been taking place behind locked doors for several years and which had ultimately
enabled the historic mutual recognition between the two countries (Lee 2000).

Because of the historic event that accompanied the second communiqué, it
was foreseeable that it also had to settle a number of issues regarding the status
and future relationship between Taiwan, the U.S. and China. Among others, it
stated that the “United States of America and the People’s Republic of China
reaffirm the principles agreed in the Shanghai Communiqué”, that the “United
States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize
each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979”, but that
“[…] the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.” These formulations were repeated
in the 1982 communiqué and since 1978 each Administration has reaffirmed this
policy (Kan 2009).

It is important to note that in spite of these communiqués, the U.S has never
explicitly stated the sovereign status of Taiwan. Only going as far as
“acknowledging”, “understanding” or having to “take note of” the PRC’s version
of the one-China policy, and thus also never really having to “recognize” the PRC
position, which is a stronger form of statement in diplomatic circles. As of today,
official U.S policy still considers Taiwan’s status as undetermined (ibid).

U.S official policy toward Taiwan is in largely governed by the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979. Enacted on April 10, 1979, the TRA stipulates that “peace
and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the
United States” and “that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful
means”. Furthermore, it is “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
caracter”. Finally the TRA stipulated that an ‘American Institute’ would be set
up in Taipei to act as an unofficial embassy.

Just like the second communiqué between the U.S and China certain parts of
the TRA was intentionally left ambiguous. For instance, it was left unclear the

\(^{13}\) The communiqués can be found at Taiwandocuments.org. For more information lookup Shanghai
Communiqué, Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, Joint
Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan
exact circumstances in which the U.S would come to the aid of Taiwan in an eventual armed conflict with the PRC, and it did not either clearly define the U.S position on whether Taiwan is a renegade province or not. And (Ko 1997:147). The ambiguity has served as the foundation of U.S strategy in maintaining the status quo of the region. Whether this was an intentional construction can only be speculated upon. What is clear is that the TRA has always been a thorn in the eye for China as it has during its entire existence enabled the continued arms sale to Taiwan.
6 Sources of Change

Graham Allison’s *Essence of decision* did not just analyze the ‘pulling and hauling’ side of decision-making, but also the effects of collective psychology in decision-making within key institutions. While analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis from the dynamics of group behavior turned much of the academic world upside down, many still prefer to focus on the individual when analyzing and contend that foreign policy is more the result of the personal characteristics of the leader. Yet, countless stimuli influence states’ foreign policy decisions, and foreign policy analysts need to be cognizant of this fact. Thus, the explanation most applicable to any foreign policy decision might be dependent on the nature, or the situation, that is present.

This of course problematic as foreign policy change emerges from governmental actions, which of course is located at a lower level of analysis. In spite of that, it does appear that external variables are particularly relevant when one is seeking to explain Taiwan’s foreign policy and overall situation in the international community. The structure of the international system, the behavior of states, and the characteristics of global politics does exercise some kind of influence on Taiwan – a fact not lost on Taiwan’s leaders who have complained over the fact that “excessive external pressures are being subjected to them” (Hickey 2007).

The following sections will try to explain why Taiwan decided to change its foreign policy, from a quite inflexible one, characterized by a detrimental adherence to the one-China policy, to a flexible diplomacy policy. This will be done primarily by trying to identify the most significant sources of change that would sufficiently impact and bring about this foreign policy change. The sources of change are located at different levels of analysis. I will first start off by detailing the sources of change located at a state-level. After the most significant external factors have been identified, internal factors will be highlighted. These are essential in order to understand the entire process that finally tipped the balance and made it possible

6.1 External Sources of Change

6.1.1 Lack of Diplomatic Recognition for Taiwan

Taiwan had since the split in 1949 continually found itself placed in an exceedingly precarious situation and international recognition was becoming
harder and harder to come by. Though Taiwan had managed to retain most of its diplomatic recognition the first two decades, Taiwan was aware that no small number of countries had already decided to switch recognition. The Soviet Union and much of the eastern bloc countries was the first to do so following the immediate creation of the PRC in 1949 (Rawnsley 2000:11). According to Taiwan’s MOFA the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Indonesia and a host of other countries followed in 1950. A steady trickle would continue in the 1960s. Nevertheless, China’s international recognition was still small compared to Taiwan’s.

This would soon change as more and more countries decided to switch recognition in the 1970s. As many as five countries switched diplomatic recognition in 1970, 15 in 1971 and 18 in 1972 (Kim 1994:150). Michael Lee at TECO in Oslo said that “From 1970 we cut missions almost every day, some days we closed missions in five countries” (Interview: Lee: 2). From 1970-1975 the Taiwan saw more than 56 countries establish diplomatic relations with the China, and thus, over a period of 5 years, most of the head start Taiwan had amassed in the 1950s and 1960s had evaporated (Kim 1994:150). Today, the number of countries that recognize Taiwan has dwindled to 23. Even the stature of the states that recognize Taiwan has suffered. Taiwan used to be able to enjoy diplomatic recognition from powerhouses such as the U.S, Japan, France and South Korea. Nowadays most of their diplomatic allies are made up of smaller states residing in South America, Oceania and Africa.

The following table shows the number of official embassies and missions – the latter are represented by Trade Offices headed by a Representative taking the place of the traditional Ambassador – which Taiwan currently supports.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>Nauru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Missions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Brunei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium(European Union)²</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Taiwan has 91 representative offices in 57 countries as well as Hong Kong, Macau and the World Trade Organization.

2. The mission to Belgium also serves as the mission to the European Union.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 2009

Not since the 1970s have Taiwan’s loss of diplomatic recognition proceeded at a faster rate. Much can be attributed to the rigid and inflexible foreign policy that was employed at the time. Taiwan’s stubborn claim to all of mainland China’s territory and their determination to break off all diplomatic relations with countries that recognized China are examples of this. The latter policy, which would come to be known as “han zei bu liang li”, is very reminiscent of the Hallstein Doctrine, named after the German State Secretary of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The doctrine called for the curtailment of diplomatic recognition – with the obvious exception of Soviet Union – to any state that granted diplomatic recognition to the GDR (Winrow 1990:39). The doctrine was put into practice in 1957 against Yugoslavia and in 1963 against Cuba (ibid).

And just like the Hallstein doctrine, Taiwan and China, in accordance with their one-China policy would sever diplomatic relations with any country that established relations with the other. Michael Lee from TECO in Oslo seems to agree: “If we took diplomatic allies from China, and then China went away
[breaking off relations], that is called Han zei bo liang li. The government had this policy that we don’t negotiate with China because of the three noes. No contact, no…” (Interview Lee: 4).

Han zei bu liang li turned the international stage into a zero-sum game, where one country’s success was another country’s failure. And it was a game that Taiwan wound up losing when more and more countries started supporting mainland China. Unlike the two Germanies (until 1990) and the two Koreas (to this date) there has been no dual recognition. Taiwan dropped the Hallstein/Han zei bu liang li policy completely once flexible diplomacy was implemented and started gaining traction. But by that time China was sufficiently influential and large enough to demand sole recognition. Michael Lee from TECO in Oslo: “A lot of developing countries, especially in Africa, started to support China, we then accepted the one-China one-Taiwan system [dual recognition], but it was too late” (Interview Lee: 3). Too late for Taiwan to hold on to diplomatic recognition, and too late to keep Taiwan from getting expelled from the U.N – in spite of years of U.S efforts to the contrary.

The lack of diplomatic recognition that Taiwan suffered from was a major source of change if we want to look at what affected Taiwan’s decision to implement flexible diplomacy. This is because diplomatic recognition, even though the concept of it is no doubt a psychological boost for a country, goes beyond that. It is a political act that brings with it legal and political consequences. A state is not required to formally recognize another state in order to enter into bilateral relations, but it certainly facilitates the creation of such modes of relationship. Diplomatic recognition brings with it clear advantages that states need to adequately function as well-functioning states in the international community. It implies that there is a willingness to deal with the state. From this, the weight of a states’ word, the legal backing a state can attribute its treatises, the persuading or coercive force it can bring about is has both political and legal backing. Without it Taiwan’s freedom of movement on the international stage, or should I say their options to influence other states, was significantly reduced. This is a nightmare for states, maybe not so much for failed states, but definitely for states that consider themselves democratic, or as in Taiwan’s case at that time, partly democratic.

6.1.2 Taiwan’s inability to Join Intergovernmental Organizations

Taiwan has since its exclusion from the U.N frequently submitted bids to be allowed to return. The nature of these bids has always been in the name of the Republic of China. The bids always fail as they invariably get shot down in the UNGA (United Nations General Assembly). While 2007 marked the 15th consecutive year that Taiwan's United Nations application was rejected, the year also marked the first time Taiwan, in a move to highlight the island’s de facto independence, applied for membership under the name of Taiwan (The China Post 2008).
According to Taiwan, the recent formal change in name reflects the pragmatic and non-confrontational approach that has formed the basis of flexible diplomacy in order to gain broader support from the international community. Others, the U.S and China in particular, viewed the stunt as a ‘provocative’ move (BBC, 2007).

At a press conference on August 30, 2007, White House (cited in Kan 2009:76) stated that:

The United States supports Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations whenever appropriate. [...] Consistent with our long-standing One China policy, the United States does not support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations where statehood is a requirement, so it cannot support measures designed to advance that goal. We believe that efforts to urge UN membership for Taiwan will detract from our goal of advancing Taiwan’s involvement in international society.

Even though the U.S currently does not support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations, it was still the U.S that fought to keep Taiwan in the U.N in the beginning of the 1970s. U.S efforts consisted of significant pressure exerted on other members to prevent proposals calling for admission of China and the expulsion of Taiwan (TIME 1971/11/08b). But diminishing international support and recognition meant that more and more countries were keen to vote in favor of China whenever a resolution was on the table. Admitting China meant the expulsion of Taiwan because, as pro-China forces argued right before the U.N vote, if both claims to rule and represent mainland China, only one can be right, and therefore also remain in the U.N (Hung 2007).

Representative Chu, when talking about dual representation in the U.N, remarked that “during the 60s there was a two-china idea being discussed in the United Nation. We were one of the five initiators of the United Nation […], but because of ‘han zai bu liang li’, which was a very stupid ideology, we had to abandon the idea of United Nation. And that has created a lot of Taiwan’s problem nowadays” (Interview: Representative Chu 2). This is true. There was talk of dual representation in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. Representative Chu continues:

From 1960 to 1970 all of our diplomatic force was focused on the U.N; that we had to stay there even though we were getting weaker day by day. Even the French and the United States said that we had to face reality of China being there. How can two Chinas join hand in hand in the United Nations? (Interview: Representative Chu 3).

The quote indicates that the U.S was aware that China could no longer be kept out of the U.N. In fact, the U.S started drafting a resolution that would make the 127 members of the U.N not have to choose between Taipei and Beijing (TIME 1971/08/16a). But because of the nature of the U.N voting system a number of different scenarios were possible. On the eve of the vote one U.S expert said: “This opens the way to an almost infinite number of tactical possibilities. With good staff work, we might come up with 5,000 scenarios and miss what actually
happens” (Cited in TIME 1971/08/16a). There may have been 5,000 scenarios, but only one outcome. The end result was that before the end of 1971 Taiwan was no longer a U.N member. It is a telling example of the type of negative repercussion the previous rigid foreign policy Taiwan had could lead to.

While the immediate effect was that Taiwan was expelled from the U.N and all its satellite organizations, the long-term effects were more unclear. However, what is clear is that any self-respecting state in the 21st century regards UN membership as obligatory. The organization’s added importance comes from how the U.N has developed since World War II. There were 51 original U.N members in 1945. Three surges have marked the organization’s three largest membership count increase (United Nations). First surge saw 16 states join in 1955. 17 states from newly formed post-colonial states joined in 1960. And lastly, by the end of the Cold War, 13 states consisting primarily of former USSR states joined in 1992. There are only a handful of states that have limited diplomatic recognition. And even fewer states, much fewer actually, that are not members of the U.N. This inclusiveness have made UN membership the de facto seal of approval of concerning international recognition and legitimation, especially for newly formed states (Kim1994:158).

Thus, not being able to be a part of the international community, which membership in the U.N would certainly entail, and therefore not being able to achieve, or attain this de facto seal of approval, was a huge factor in why Taiwan implemented flexible diplomacy. The fact that Taiwan, at the time, was in the process of democratizing is another reason why Taiwan needed of this seal of approval, just like many other newly formed or democratized countries.

Additionally, one cannot forget the fact that membership in various IGO:s, such as the U.N and all of its specialized agencies, the conferences, mechanisms and conventions that goes with that, and thus also the ability to participate on the international stage comes with many added benefits to a state. This was a major source of problem for Taiwan as IGO:s such as the WHO, where resource-pooling and organizational synergies allows for better preventative and active healthcare cooperation at an international level, and the WTO, where access to better international markets and the infrastructure to bring forward potentially unfavorable trade disputes, are just some examples of international participation where membership is directly beneficial to states and their wellbeing. Getting access to these benefits was also a top priority for Taiwan.

6.1.3 The power Asymmetry between China and Taiwan

Another source of change can be attributed to the power asymmetry that existed between Taiwan and China. The fact that China was so much larger, both geographically and in terms of population, coupled with the fact that the country was a dormant economic powerhouse, skewed the power relations between the two countries dramatically. For all intents and purposes, Taiwan’s ongoing democratic process, while ambitious and admirable, had little effect on this power
relationship. Taiwan was much smaller compared to China. A fact not lost on the western powers.

Even though China was still quite underdeveloped at that time, western powers knew that the size of China would preclude it from being just another country among others. This train of thought was just not limited to economic terms. The increasing importance and power of China would make it a major geopolitical player as well.

Britain had already come to this conclusion when it switched recognition in 1950 on the premise that delay in proceeding with recognition might seriously prejudice western interests in China without any compensating advantages being obtained, or provoke the permanent alienation of China from the West (Rawnsley 2000:11).

A similar development was seen with the U.S, the only difference was that U.S stuck with Taiwan for an additional 30 or so years. It started in the 1970s when the U.S started considering closer ties with the PRC. At first glance this could seem odd, especially considering the anti-communist sentiments residing in the U.S at the time. But China was growing fast and it was just downright impossible for the U.S to ignore such a large and populated country. The U.S came to view that the exclusion of a country the size of China would, at least diplomatically, equate to operating internationally with one hand tied behind its back (Rawnsley 2000:16). Similar to Britain the U.S also feared that refusal to acknowledge China could provide Beijing with a valid excuse to avoid future discussion, negotiation and potential commitments on a wide range of issues (ibid:15). It was thus becoming increasingly clear that any past loyalties to Taiwan or differences between the U.S and China had to give way for practical considerations.

This, together with a convergence of strategic needs and changing U.S policy, the latter originating from the newly formed Nixon doctrine, also served to drive the U.S and the PRC closer together (Sutter 1994). The Nixon doctrine meant that the U.S policy of actively participating in combat in allied territories or other areas of interest was swapped to a policy of passive support. Friends and allies would still be supported through financial and military means, but wars on the ground had to be fought by themselves (Reeves 2001:144). And as troops were pulled back – from Vietnam as well – the U.S had to maintain a favorable balance of power in Asia.

Consequently, the need for balancing a triangular power relationship between the U.S, the PRC, and the Soviet Union became even more important. This put a strain on U.S foreign policy as the standard U.S containment policy against the communist entity, coupled with Chinese xenophobic tendencies, had previously doomed such endeavors. However, worsening Sino-Soviet relations and subsequent outbursts of conflict along the northern border between the two served to accelerate the PRC’s effort and drive them to seek new modes of relationship with the U.S (Lee 2000:5).

To solidify U.S relations with China the U.S had to appease China by cutting back its military presence in Taiwan, as well as paving the way towards the normalization of Sino-U.S relations. The latter meant recognizing the PRC as the
sole legitimate government of China, and cutting off official relations with Taiwan in 1979. Considering that the U.S had been Taiwan’s staunchest supporter since 1949 this was an extremely serious blow, not just to Taiwan’s self-esteem, but also to Taiwan chances of asserting themselves internationally.

Thus, one of Taiwan’s staunchest supporters had seemingly abandoned them in support of communist China on the premise that no contact with China would be detrimental to the U.S. This is certainly the prerogative of the U.S, though it does show that the U.S did consider security implications arising from the status and future potential power of China. Such considerations were most likely also taken into account by Taiwan when developing flexible diplomacy. Taiwan knew that it could not compete with China on this issue, that the power asymmetry that existed was a major consideration that other countries had to consider.

### 6.1.4 International Legitimacy

Another reason for Taiwan’s decision to implement flexible diplomacy was to increase its international legitimacy. Legitimacy itself is a value whereby something or someone is recognized and accepted as right and proper (O’neill 2004:36). When something is widely recognized as right and proper, authority and power is conferred to it. For states this means that it can then be considered to have the right to rule. Thereby making it possible to levy taxes, impose drug restrictions and call a draft, and people will comply, not out of the fear of punishment, but because people assume that the state has the authority to ask these things of them (ibid).

The definition above is a favorite among researchers and we have all seen it used this way plenty of times. Yet the word has been strangely absent from the international relations discourse. As Ian Clarke (2005) put it: “[...] this consistent marginalization has not been disciplinary oversight, but rather a positive rejection of a concept widely considered inappropriate to an international setting”. Inappropriate because, if legitimacy means “the right to rule”, then what place does it have in an international setting which many times has been described as devoid of government, anarchical, or existing in a ‘state of nature’?

The latter term was actually a term used by Hobbes (2004), an English philosopher from the 16th and 17th century, to describe a hypothetical situation where societal order was absent and life was defined as a constant struggle between individuals. According to Hobbes, once the formation of the state was secured, societal order could be created because legitimate use of force had then been transferred from the individual to the state.

One of the most classical and difficult question for those who work with international relations to answer is whether this kind of civility can be transferred to the international system. The realist international theorist would probably say no as to him or her the international system is governed by anarchy, meaning that there is no central authority to impose order between states (Baylis – Smith
2001:350). Yet this does not explain why states, foreign ministries and diplomats devote so much effort in debating what constitutes acceptable state behavior.

One explanation put forth argues that while wars certainly have been a recurring feature of states in their quest to secure national interests, it is a highly disruptive way to do so. States realize that some degree of order in the international arena benefits all parties. It is therefore a common interest for states to devote as much effort as possible into upholding some kind of ideal in which the sanctity of agreements and the concept of right and wrong exists (ibid).

If legitimacy brings forth compliance through societal consensus within the state in regards to what is considered right and proper, appropriate forms of conduct, and so forth. Then the common interest between states, described above, suggests that the international system should also be able to work toward a shared interstate consensus of what is considered appropriate behavior of states. It is this normative effect that many seems to think have been imposed within the structural principle of anarchy (Clarke 2005:14)

The concept is obviously not as evolved as what legitimacy within a state connotes, but international intervention in Kosovo, Bosnia and Haiti seems to suggest some form of normative power, which is malleable and certainly subject to change depending on which way the normative wind blows, affect states and the interstate system. Justifying intervention in these cases was possible because of the growing consensus between international actors that made intervention legitimate in the eyes of the international community.

The former UK ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, in response to questions posed by a British inquiry looking into the background to the 2003 invasion of Iraq in 2009, had this to say about international legitimacy: “When you get to legitimacy, it is a very fair way of describing, that if you’ve got broad reasonable opinion behind you, you are doing something that is defensible in a democratic environment. To some extent the United Nations is a democratic environment […]” (BBC 2009). He went on to say: “I regarded our [British] invasion of Iraq, our participation in the military action against Iraq in March, 2003, as legal, but of questionably legitimacy in that it didn’t have the democratically observable backing of a great majority of member states” (ibid).

Maybe not the absolute best example of the interplay between legality and legitimacy, especially since the legality of the Iraq war is still a source of contention. In spite of this, international laws are important and do affect state behavior. However, in the case of Taiwan, neither has furthered Taiwan’s cause in any significant way. First of all, neither Taiwan nor China have made any moves indicating that they are willing to settle any differences through international law, regardless of that taking the form of a judiciary ruling, an arbitration court or something of similar design (Lovelace 2000). Such a ruling is something that would have been unthinkable during both countries’ one-China policy era, and still is for China.

Secondly, much of Taiwan’s problem stems from the inability to be recognized internationally. And just like China, who have always been extremely persistent of its various claims, often backed by international law, concerning Taiwan’s totally inseparable status, so has Taiwan been in its claim, also backed
by international law, of their right to exist as a state. The problem is that recognition of states in the real world has often also been a question of political will rather than just international law. This is also why I posit that Taiwan was in such incredible need for international legitimacy, because many of Taiwan’s problems stems from a lack of international recognition – such as the inability to gain diplomatic recognition, the inability to gain access to IGO:s and the economic troubles Taiwan experienced. This exerted a significant amount of pressure on the Taiwan do change its foreign policy.

6.2 Internal Sources of Change

6.2.1 President Lee Teng-hui

The impact of Taiwan’s dictators and presidents has to be considered as well, primarily because leaders do matter and can be a decisive element in the making of foreign policy (Hickey 2007:110). Many foreign policy analysts actually remain convinced that leaders’ beliefs can be a powerful explanation of foreign policy, especially in times of hardship and crises. This is most true if applied to powerful leaders who do take control and do play a central role in a country’s foreign policy (ibid). And each of Taiwan’s leaders can be said to have taken a central role in role in this process, in spite of their leadership styles differing in some aspects, some can be said to have been more pragmatic while others more direct.

It started with Chiang Kai-Shek and his son Chiang Ching-Kuo, who both came over with the KMT party and some two million mainland refugees, whereby they quickly took control over island and established a powerbase consisting primarily of the so called ‘mainlanders’. At the moment, current ethnic make-up of Taiwan puts mainlanders at around 12% of the population, 86% as Taiwanese (those living on the island before the Chinese civil war) and the remaining as native aborigines.

Compared to his successors Chiang Kai-Shek was a particular ruthless dictator. After arriving at the island, martial law was put in effect, democratic and human rights were curtailed, and a particular ruthless communist witch-hunt was initiated. Internationally, Chiang Kai-Shek, or the Generalissimo as he was also known as, instituted a highly inflexible one-China policy. Chiang Kai-Shek’s extreme distaste for the CCP was very well known – often using terminology such as “Communist bandits”. Sometimes even stating that “the Chinese government has already had too many painful experiences in negotiating with the communists” (Chiu 1973:149). Even the literal translation of Taiwan’s version of the Hallstein doctrine is quite telling. “Han” denotes his Republic of China with Han Chinese as the majority of its population. “zei,” literally means “bandit,” and in this case refers to Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China (The China Post 2008). The three words after translates into “no coexistence” (ibid). Together they show how much distaste Chiang Kai-Shek had for the Chinese communists, but
no one dared, or had the means, to challenge Chiang Kai-shek’s authority or rigid foreign policy positions.

As a mainlander in exile in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-Shek still viewed himself first and foremost from China, not as a Taiwanese. And he still clung to the notion that someday, mainland China would be reclaimed. Representative Chu had this to say about him:

In Chiang Kai Shek’s mind, in his map, drawn by our government, still claimed sovereignty over China. This was because Chiang Kai-Shek used to be the leader of that continent, so he had this kind of mindset […] That he was the emperor of the whole China and that he would recover the ‘motherland’. We called that the ‘mandate of heaven. And because he was still alive, that he still survived. He thought that he would come back one day (Interview: Representative Chu 9).

One of Taiwan’s foreign ministers in the 1960s was even sacked for daring to suggest to Chiang Kai-Shek that dual representation in the U.N was probably for the best. According to the Representative Chu:

One of our top, the best foreign minister, Mr Yeh Gong-tsao […]. He suggested to the president [Chiang Kai Shek] to face reality, to accept the formula of two Chinas being represented in the United Nations. And he was sacked immediately […]. When he touched down to Taipei he was sacked and removed. All his ministerial jobs, everything (Interview: Representative Chu 3).

Chiang Kai-Shek did live to experience Taiwan getting expelled from the U.N. When he died his son, Chiang Chin-kuo, took over. Like his father, he was a mainlander, but had the foresight to at the very least understand that change was needed. He therefore dropped martial law, decided to not move against the, at the time illegal formation of an opposition party in Taiwan, and placed Taiwan on the first steps to democracy. He even shelved his father’s plans to retake mainland China. In spite of all that, as a mainlander, he still had trouble accepting the reality of the situation Taiwan was in (Ko 2004).

A paradigm shift took place when Lee Teng-hui took over the presidency from Chiang Chin-kuo in 1988. Just like Lee’s two predecessors he had been attained the presidency undemocratically. Whereas Chiang Ching-Kuo’s ascension to presidency was pretty much assured as the proclaimed successor of his father, Lee Teng-Hui had to fight tooth and nail before finally becoming president – in spite of being Chiang Ching-Kuo’s successor himself. The increasing difficulty of passing the torch along and naming a successor could be a sign of Taiwan democratizing, but in the case of Lee Teng-Hui should probably be a sign of his background and upbringing.

As a U.S educated technocrat Lee Teng-hui had an entirely different world view than his two predecessors, and this would affect the direction he steered KMT and Taiwan towards. Representative Chu had this to say about him:
Representative Chu: Lee Teng-hui himself knew a lot about international affairs. He was educated in the U.S. He was a Ph.D. of Cornell university. And he knew the outside world. And as an island nation, it was impossible not to allow your own people to engage with the outside world (Interview Representative Chu: 5).

Compared to his Chiang Kai-shek, Lee Teng-hui was a pragmatist often willing to compromise on a number of issues. This resulted in him launching a serious of bold initiative – including flexible diplomacy – in order to bolster Taiwan’s position in the international community (Hickey 2007:111).

In Lee Teng-Hui’s inaugural address in 1988 he said:

“We will continue to promote pragmatic diplomacy in compliance with the principles of goodwill and reciprocity. By so doing we will secure for our 21.3 million people enough room for existence and development as well as the respect and treatment they deserve in the international arena.”

The fact that Lee teng-Hui was not a mainlander, without any ties to mainland China, did give him a unique perspective on how foreign policy should be developed. Petty personal opinions concerning “communist bandits” which had characterized the two previous presidents’ stance regarding China had no place in Taiwan’s foreign policy once Lee Teng-hui took office, especially considering Taiwan precarious situation. This fact, coupled with Lee Teng-hui and the trade sector’s economic concern proved to be significant sources of change. The latter of which will be addressed in the next section.

6.2.2 The Need to Strengthen Taiwan’s Economy

Another source of change can be found in how Taiwan’s economy was performing, or was predicted to perform in the future. Taiwan was at that time still far from being able to flex its economic muscles, even though the potential for a future economic powerhouse was still there. Unfortunately for Taiwan, the means it had in its disposal to encourage sustainable economic growth was limited, even being stifled by the situation it was in.

Much of this can be attributed to the power asymmetry, which I mentioned earlier, that existed between China and Taiwan and. China was at the time closing in on a billion people, with more to come. The fact that China’s population was a future source of potential customers and income was not lost on the western countries. Not on Taiwan for that matter as well.

Businessmen in Taiwan did experience several obstacles when they tried to conduct business, especially when abroad. Much of this can be attributed to the fact that Taiwan had previously, starting in the 50s and 60s, made the decision to specialize and foster an environment in which cheap and simple goods could easily be produced for international sale – in essence turning Taiwan into a world plant. According to Representative Chu:
So we were so focused on domestic improvement. During the 50s and 60s we were an agrarian society, but we transformed into a light industry society. We transformed our living room into a family plant. For example, I was very young, and we were commissioned to do the crafting, during the Christmas times, the tree lights. It was very labor intensive, but at that time we just did that kind of menial jobs to do our living. And the other people they just do knitting, or ornamental decoration. I remember that, and the government encouraged to forget about tragedies of diplomacy and refocus. We have to reserve our strength economically. (Interview: Representative Chu 4).

[...] Manufacturing, all kinds of toys, costumes, clothes, even umbrellas. So Taiwan was very rich. (Interview: Representative Chu 6).

It did not take a long time until the ubiquitous “made in Taiwan” text, often located in the back of seemingly uncountable goods, became synonymous with cheap toys, simple electrical devices and goods. Because international sale was the end destination for a lot of these products, the dramatic drop in foreign direct investment (FDI), having Taiwanese diplomats relegated into Trade Offices, which to this day still acts as their de facto embassies, not having Taiwanese passports accepted by most countries, and the increasingly difficult task of getting visa applications approved for Taiwanese businessmen, all originating from Taiwan’s rigid foreign policy, resulted in markedly lower ability to conduct commerce and contribute to Taiwan’s economic growth.

[...] Because our foreign policy was very rigid and where only political things could be caught. That was very, very impractical. It was very difficult for our business people to get a proper visa in order to visit the outside world if you want to do business during the 70s. The government should have helped them, but they didn’t do that, they didn’t have that mindset: “Why should I help you”? (Interview: Representative Chu 5)?

Embassy services such planning cultural events, seminars, exchange of scholars and assisting on economic legal issues, which are self-evident to any well-functioning country, could not be offered.

[...] we learned that foreign policy does not only focus on the political agenda. You have to focus on business and you have to take care of legal dispute issue. You know, that’s the real world. [...] We have cultural events, exchange of scholars, or even all kinds of seminars, or even the news media, everything. So that’s the market function. Nowadays a good government should supply this kind of service to their own people (Representative Chu 7).

It is behind this backdrop that Taiwan’s foreign policy change should be evaluated against. It was because of Lee Teng-Hui’s background that made him realize that trade and economy could not be neglected. Thus, flexible diplomacy was developed to help in this regard as well. Whereas the Chiangs were very
much concerned with the political aspect of Taiwan’s situation, and pretty much neglected the economic issues, Lee Teng-Hui did almost the opposite.

[...] Chiang Kai Shek and his son was in power for over 30 years. Not until Lee Teng-Hui came to power. Lee Teng Hui himself, the first time he adopted flexible diplomacy, wanted to help, by establishing some kind of trade office, economic office or missions in other countries to do a service for our own people, making it more practical for our own taxpayers. These kind of ideas happened in the 80s the very first time we tried to establish an office, globally, in a major country. But, because we were not allowed to use the word embassy, we just used the word Taipei, because Taipei is the capital city of Taiwan. So we use this kind of more flexible idea (Interview: Representative Chu 5).

Furthermore, the development of flexible diplomacy in this way, where trade offices where created to help the businessmen and the trade sector was developed not just by Lee Teng-Hui, but by Lee Teng-hui in conjunction with various scholars and prominent individuals of the trade sector. When asked when and by whom flexible diplomacy was developed by, representative Chu said “During the 80s” and “by the private sector, by our scholars […]” (Interview: Representative Chu 5).

Thus, while Lee Teng-Hui is often credited with implementing flexible diplomacy, an overlooked fact is that he developed it in conjunction with several other prominent actors within Taiwan – such as the private sector and various scholars. Lee Teng-hui’s decision to invest in trade offices in order to help the Taiwanese businessmen, their private and trade sector, was a smart move. Nowadays, enormous amount of trade and investment flows across the strait. Cumulative Taiwanese investment on the mainland since the late 1980s stands at more than US$100 billion, and trade — mostly Taiwanese exports — now exceeds US$110 billion annually (The China Post 2009). With increased trade comes mutual reliance on each other, further decreasing the prospects of war.

6.2.3 Democratic Opposition Forces in Taiwan

When Lee Teng-hui took control of the KMT party and the Presidency of Taiwan, his power was anything but consolidated. At first he was regarded as a weak leader, or passing political figure that could fill the power vacuum until a stronger leader would emerge. However, Lee Teng-hui was deceptively strong. His native Taiwanese ethnicity gave him the advantages of understanding, not only the expectations of the Taiwanese, but also their aspirations (Ya 2002:56). In the late 1980s Lee was involved in a series of power struggles within the KMT, primarily with ‘mainlanders’, not just for the control of KMT, but also over major policy issues (ibid).

The power struggles revolved around the mainstream faction, spearheaded by Lee, and the non-mainstream faction consisting of the ‘old-guard’ fearful of the democratic changes Lee was proposing, and his flirtation with politics that was moving away from the one-China policy(Hood 1997). Conservative hardliners
were afraid that the goal of recovering mainland China was being sacrificed for Lee’s “Taiwan-first” policies. Even Madame Chiang Kai-shek returned to Taiwan from the U.S in an effort to block Lee’s appointment as party chairman.

However, Lee succeeded in rallying enough influential party members to support his bid as party chairman. In the end, many party hardliners of the ‘old-guard’, including Madame Chiang Kai-shek embarrassed themselves in in their efforts to block Lee’s ascension, not only by causing internal party strife, but also by giving opposition forces ammunition in their contention that the upper echelons of KMT was anti-Taiwanese, and only a club for ‘mainlanders’ (Hood 1997). Consequently, Lee defeated his political opponents and between 1990 and 2000, Taiwan, under Lee’s direction, changed its constitution six times in its quest to reform the country into a democratic state.

Opposition forces consisted primarily of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP had been illegally formed in 1986. Luckily, one of Chiang Ching-kuo’s contributions to Taiwanese democracy was one of restraint. Instead of using the Temporary Provisions Act (Martial Law) that had been in place since 1948, Chiang allowed the formation of DPP. Quite a different approach when compared to Chiang’s father, who had thrown Lei Chan, the leader of another would be political opposition party in jail for ten years (Ko 1997:153). Ignoring the calls of KMT conservatives Chiang announced, not in Taiwan, but in U.S press that he would allow the formation of the new political party, and future parties (ibid).

When Lee Teng-hui was consolidating his power in 1988, he thus had to contend and take into account for some of the wishes of the DPP – a party primarily consisting of the ‘Taiwan-first’ mentality and ethnic Taiwanese individuals like himself. This fact had a moderating influence on his position against them. The DPP made no secret of their wishes for Taiwan to abandon its reunification aspirations and proclaim independence. The latter move was generally not supported by moderate Taiwanese fearful of Chinese retaliatory moves, and definitely not supported by most mainlanders who even wished for Lee to move against the DPP just because of their stance on this issue (Ya 2002:57). Lee ignored these calls.

Neither did he acquiesce to DPP wishes for independence. Instead he declared Taiwan a “separate political entity” that would only push for reunification when the PRC started abiding by Sun Yat-sen’s three democratic principles (Ko 1997:153).

Furthermore, when Lee was reforming the presidential voting system, two choices appeared. DPP had proposed system where the people directly elected its president. The other choice, an electoral system resembling the one used in the U.S in which the people elected an electoral college which would then cast its vote in accordance with how the people had voted, had been proposed by conservative forces within the KMT. This electoral college would include some mainlanders in an effort to calm China of the separatist tendencies voting would have (Ya 2002:57). The same forces demanded Lee’s support of this system, which he gave. But a few days before the scheduled reformation of the constitution Lee suddenly switched and announced he was for the DPP proposal.
Lee would later be well known for such Machiavellian tactics (ibid). In the end, the DPP supported election system would win.

As previously mentioned, Lee Teng-hui, just like the DPP, were Taiwanese and not the so-called mainlanders. This shows that Lee Teng-hui was well aware of the DPP and their political stances, he had the political clout to use them to further his own goals, which probably did not differ much from his own – in spite of the fact that the DPP was an opposition party against his own, the KMT.

The role of the DPP in affecting Lee cannot be understated as well. The DPP gave him the political backing of large portions of the Taiwanese population, in his fight to consolidate his power within KMT and institute various reforms such as the flexible diplomacy. The DPP’s Taiwan-first mentality enabled Lee to implement a flexible diplomacy which for example stopped Taiwan from using the Hallstein doctrine abroad.
7 Conclusion

There seems to be little question of Taiwan’s de facto status as a country. It governs well, has a territory, a permanent population and is able to provide well beyond the basic services for its people. Yet Taiwan is consistently met with difficulties stemming from its international status. This incongruence between what Taiwan de facto constitutes and its role as the diplomatic orphan shunned by the international community is puzzling. Therefore it should have come as no surprise that Taiwan changed it foreign policy. But what exactly were these sources of change? This study has tried to find these sources of change from several levels of analysis. While a lower of analysis is traditionally what one might conduct when examining foreign policy change, a higher level of analysis has also been conducted, and motivated by the unique situation Taiwan was in – a situation that undoubtedly exerted massive pressure to change Taiwan’s foreign policy.

These external changes were of course firstly, the inability to gain diplomatic recognition from other countries. This was a major problem because it is from diplomatic recognition that states agree to exchange formal recognition with one another. Unfortunately from 1970-1975 Taiwan saw more than 56 countries establish diplomatic relations with China, and thus, over a period of 5 years, most of the diplomatic head start that Taiwan had amassed over China was gone.

Secondly, the inability to gain membership in various IGO:s, such as the U.N, WTO and WHO had an adverse effect on Taiwan as a state as well. IGO:s facilitates participation between states. It brings about a wide range of advantages ranging from better health prevention or solving trade disputes, all of which has a positive effect on a state’s wellbeing. Taiwan not only considers the impact of meaningful U.N and other IGO participation a direct precondition to the wellbeing of its 23 million people, but also a democratic right for those same people to be internationally represented, participation is therefore of paramount concern to Taiwan. Additionally, one cannot forget the status that being part of IGO:s confers. Membership in the U.N has become the de facto seal of approval of concerning international recognition and legitimation, hence why Taiwan is and was so adamant in seeking U.N membership.

In addition to these sources of change, one cannot dismiss the effect that the prevailing power asymmetry between Taiwan and China at the time. The enormous size difference between these two countries would most definitely affect the political decisions and the behavior of other states, probably many times in favor of China. Considerations such as these did affect the decision to implement flexible diplomacy.

The internal factors were different if compared to the external ones. The leaders of Taiwan, the presidents and dictators did do their part in bringing forth
the decision to implement flexible diplomacy. The president who had the strongest impact on this decision was of course Lee Teng-hui, who is often credited with developing flexible diplomacy. It was because of Lee Teng-hui’s upbringing, his education and Taiwanese ethnicity that made him more aware of the situation Taiwan was in. His lack of ties to mainland China enabled him to be aware of what policies that were needed. Together with the trade communities, which was screaming for change, largely in part of the increased difficulty Taiwan’s situation had made conducting business internationally; he was able to develop flexible diplomacy. Finally, the role that DPP played cannot be understated. Their political wishes did seem to coincide with some of Lee’s reform aspirations, and they had the backing of many of the Taiwanese population. This gave Lee the power to actually implement his changes – such as a flexible diplomacy.

Together, these factors serve to bring about the decision to change Taiwan’s foreign policy and bring about flexible diplomacy.
In the 1980s Taiwan, together with Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, would impress the world with their exceptionally high economic growth rate – so much in fact that they would later be known as the Four Asian Tigers. Years later in 1996, the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT) would win in the island’s first presidential election that marked a stunning development for the country’s democratic transition as voters chose to retain a government that in the end instigated democratic reform, but nevertheless also were the ones that had oppressed the population for decades – a powerful proof of democratic development indeed.

Since then Taiwan has also been recognized for its remarkably impressive democratic system, enabling it to boast the fact of being the first transition to democracy in the 5000 year history of the Chinese. As of now, Taiwan is recognized as a fully democratic country.

In spite of Taiwan’s progress, it faces considerable adversity on the international stage. Taiwan is a diplomatic outcast on the international stage. Barred from many of the world’s international organizations and only recognized by a handful of countries around the world. The reason is found within the troubled history that China and Taiwan share with each other. During and after World War II China was embroiled in a particularly nasty civil between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). Rather than admit defeat when the CCP gained the upper hand in mainland China, the KMT party and some two million followers fled to Taiwan in 1949 in order to continue the fight there.

U.S communist containment policy at the time meant that significant support for Taiwan was given, not just militarily and economically, but also diplomatically. Resulting in two ‘Chinas’, on one side the usurper and newly formed People Republic of China (ROC), on the other side the previous government of mainland China, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The following foreign policy that Taiwan and China, at the time, chose to pursue, known as the one-China policy, meant that both Taiwan and China regarded themselves as the one true China, despite the existence of two states that claimed this.

Consequently, both countries’ foreign policy molded itself around this central issue by trying to outdo each other by maximizing international recognition from other countries on the international stage. This zero-sum game was the main focus of China and Taiwan for many decades and led to some “check-book diplomacy” situations where other countries switched allegiances back and forth depending on
how much aid respective country could offer. The fight for allies was a corrupt practice that many countries have abhorred.

Taiwan ultimately lost this contest with China and starting in the 1970s Taiwan suffered increasing international setbacks when more and more countries started recognizing China instead of Taiwan. One of the biggest blows to Taiwan came in 1971 when the country was expelled from the U.N in favor of China. These developments spurred the Taiwan to develop a new kind of foreign policy which ultimately came to be known as ‘flexible diplomacy’. It would be based on pragmatism and flexibility, and had been created out of the various developments in the international community which, in turn, had created different challenges for Taiwan to overcome.

It was hoped that flexible diplomacy would no longer constrict Taiwan’s operational freedom in regards to foreign policy strategies. That it would be able to combat the loss of diplomatic recognition and cease the vast amount of resources the two governments had expended to win support for their respective stances. Flexible diplomacy was finally launched in the late 1980s to seek pragmatic ways to further participate in international organizations and activities in order to raise the international status of Taiwan.

This thesis tries to discover the main contributing cause to why Taiwan decided to implement this new foreign policy. The research question then becomes: Why did Taiwan decide to abandon its previous foreign policy strategy and create ‘flexible diplomacy’?

This thesis tried to answer the above research question by utilizing a theoretical approach situated on the state-level and a lower level of analysis. This was done in order to capture both the external and internal factors involved. The state-level analysis, in which external factors were analyzed, was primarily done because this study acknowledges the unique international situation Taiwan was in. At this level the model assumes that a nation or the government is a rational, unitary decision-maker. It will act as if were an individual agent with one set of preferences, capable of making rational choices, effectively enveloping the decision-making process in a “black-box”. Using this kind of theoretical approach is riddled with risks and vulnerabilities. For example, the approach is usually regarded as inherently generalizing because it often tends to assume that all actions of individuals are the result of rationally and carefully calculated utility maximizing decisions, and thus often exaggerates the impact of the system and discounts the impact of actors within the system. The advantage lies in the fact that it makes foreign policy simpler to analyze and has the added benefit of being able to capture the ‘big picture’.

However, this study cannot discount the fact that foreign policy is traditionally the outcome of government and individuals. Thus, an analysis below the state-level has to be performed as well, one where internal factors are captured. Once the study goes below the state-level, the ”black-box” is effectively peeled open in order for us to see the sources of change that was present at the lower level of analysis.

The material that was used for this study was based off both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources consisted predominantly of interviews
conducted with individuals, primarily diplomats and embassy employees, possessing unique insights and knowledge pertaining to the research question, and original documents originating from various Taiwanese and Chinese governmental agencies.

In the end, the theoretical approaches that were sued, together with the material that was gathered, found that the factor that caused Taiwan to drastically change their foreign policy to ‘flexible diplomacy’ was a combination of external and internal factors situated on different levels of analysis.

External factors included the enormous international de-recognition in the 1970s where Taiwan saw more than 56 countries switch and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, the inability to join various intergovernmental organizations (IGO), such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund and the World Health Organization where Taiwan lost out on a number of benefits directly beneficial to the country, and their lack of international legitimacy on the international stage.

Internal factors consisted primarily of the role Taiwan’s leaders had prior and during the formation of flexible diplomacy – especially President Lee Teng-hui who is often credited for implementing flexible diplomacy. The economic considerations the trade sector and businessmen had can also be filed under internal factors that contributed to Taiwan’s foreign policy change. Primarily because Taiwan’s precarious international situation had made it harder to apply for visas and the assistance from the government in trade related matters.

Together, these sources of change all contributed to Taiwan’s decision to change its foreign policy and implement flexible diplomacy.
References

Books and Articles


Tetlock, Philip, E., 1998. “Close-Call Counterfactuals and Belief-System Defenses:


**Internet links:**


Appendix

Interview Guide

Introduction

I am currently doing research for my Master’s thesis in political science. The field of research I have focused on is foreign policy analysis (FPA). The purpose of this interview is to twofold. First: To learn more about the reasons as to why Taiwan decided to abandon its previous foreign policy strategy and create ‘flexible diplomacy’. Second: To find out if the usage of ‘flexible diplomacy’ has the capacity to further Taiwan’s agenda of gaining added international recognition. If you feel like adding something or interrupting me, please go ahead, my intention is not to have a question & answer session, but more of a conversation. The following questions should be more viewed as general guidelines and possible areas of inquiry instead of individual questions per se.

Questions

1) First, can you tell me a little bit about yourself? What do you do as the Representative of Taiwan to Sweden?

2) What exactly is ‘flexible diplomacy’?

3) How does ‘flexible diplomacy’ work? How does it modify or affect the way you carry out your job duties?

4) How was ‘flexible diplomacy’ developed and why was it implemented?

5) What concrete strategies has ‘flexible diplomacy’ brought with it when dealing with diplomatic officials of other countries?

6) Taiwan’s international status is ambiguous. Do you believe ‘flexible diplomacy’ has the capacity to further Taiwan’s agenda of gaining added international recognition? What advantages and disadvantages do you see ‘flexible diplomacy’ possess compared to formal diplomacy?

7) What diplomatic strategies will Taiwan carry out in the near future? Will focus lie on increased bilateral agreements, more visits by foreign dignitaries, more cultural exchanges, etc?
8) President Ma has emphasized on numerous occasions that flexible diplomacy is rooted in pragmatism, and its core component is soft-power. What is the soft-power?

9) The government has reiterated on many occasions that Taiwan is no longer a trouble maker, but a peace maker, and that Taiwan today is no longer engaged in dollar diplomacy or checkbook diplomacy, but rather in **decent diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy**.

   a) Can you tell me a little about ‘Check-book-diplomacy'? Its history and what it is? Is check-book-diplomacy still used in Taiwan?

   b) What about Taiwan’s humanitarian aid? How is it incorporated into its diplomatic strategies? I am thinking of Taiwan providing recipient countries emergency rescue and relief, as well as humanitarian aid. A good example of this was how Taiwan handled the recent earthquake in Haiti.

10) What kind of cooperation exists between MOFA and NGO’s in general? Is that an area that MOFA have been focusing on?

11) Do you believe China’s intentions to be pure? Taiwan and mainland China have competed with each other on the diplomatic front for decades, and it is indeed a daunting task to attempt to reach a comprehensive diplomatic truce and reconciliation in a short period of time.

12) and there are also people in Taiwan who remain concerned that mainland China has not completely stopped suppressing Taiwan in the international arena, and that flexible diplomacy is just wishful thinking on the government’s part. Do you find any truth in these concerns?

**Relations with other countries**

1) If a country wished to have diplomatic contact with China, does this mean severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan? Is diplomatic status is zero-sum game?

2) How has relations with the US affected Taiwan in its development of ‘flexible diplomacy’? What about China’s effect on Taiwan?

3) What are your views on Taiwan’s sovereignty? Why should Taiwan be regarded as a sovereign nation?

4) Is important is formal recognition? Is it really that vital to effective diplomatic relations?
5) Has relations between China and Taiwan improved in the last couple of years? If so, what reasons would you attribute this improvement to?

6) Your views on the diplomatic history between China and Taiwan?

7) What do you think of the recent improvements of cross-strait relations?

8) How do you see future relations between Taiwan and China will develop?

9) Taiwan’s relationship with their diplomatic allies.

**Leadership and organizations**

1) Your views on Taiwan and its participation in the U.N and other organizations (WTO, Olympics, ADB).

2) Chiang Kai-Shek leadership during Taiwan’s loss of UN membership.

3) Lee Teng-Hui – Democratic reforms

4) Flexible diplomacy during different presidents. Lee Teng-Hui, Chen Shui-Bian, Ma Ying-jeou
Transcripts


1) 00:01:00 Interviewer: It’s about flexible diplomacy. More exactly the foreign policy change. So what and why did this change happen so that Taiwan implemented Flexible diplomacy?

Representative Chu: In a simple word: survival.

Interviewer: Survival?

Representative Chu: Yes, that was the major reason.

2) 00:27:13 Representative Chu: During the 60s there was a two-china idea being discussed in the United Nation. We were one of the five initiators of the United Nation.

Interviewer: And Taiwan was in the Security Council.

Representative Chu: Yes in the Security Council as well. But because of ‘han zei bu liang li’, which was a very stupid ideology, we had to abandon the idea of United Nation, which created a lot of Taiwan’s problem nowadays. We left the United Nation in the 1970s.

Interviewer: I read about that. You were voted out or did you leave?

Representative Chu: No, when they cast the vote we abandoned the U.N.

Interviewer: They cast the vote and the results were clear and then you were kicked out?

Representative Chu: Yes right. In reality we were kicked out, but in our terminology we were just abandoned, you know? We left before they cast the vote.

3) Interviewer: Oh, the results were already clear, so then you left voluntarily.

Representative Chu: That’s right. Yes, but for what, for what? From 1960 to 1970 all of our diplomatic force was focused on the U.N; that we had to stay there even though we were getting weaker day by day. Even the French and the United States said that we had to face reality of China being there. How can two Chinas join hand in hand in the United Nations?
Interviewer: Was there ever talks or discussions about having Taiwan and China in the United Nations? Because I know that both North and South Korea are both in the United Nation.

Representative Chu: That’s right, that’s right. That’s the formula. One of our top foreign ministers, Mr Yeh Gong Tsao, was very good at international affairs. He suggested to the president to face reality and accept the formula of two Chinas in the United Nations. And he was sacked, sacked immediately.

Interviewer: What year was this?

Representative Chu: I remember it being sometime in the 60s. He was removed from his job when he touched down in Taipei. He was treated unequally. He lost his job, he became nothing. And that was the situation during the 60s. No one dared to tell the truth to the president. He still remembered that he was the emperor [Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek was never emperor in name] of China and that he would reclaim the throne any day. And that was a pity.

4) 00:38:00 Representative Chu: So we were so focused on domestic improvement. During the 50s and 60s we were an agrarian society, but we transformed into a light industry society. We transformed our living room into a family plant. For example, I was very young, and we were commissioned to do the crafting, during the Christmas times, the tree lights. It was very labor intensive, but at that time we just did that kind of menial jobs to do our living. And the other people they just do knitting, or ornamental decoration. I remember that, and the government encouraged to forget about tragedies of diplomacy and refocus. We have to reserve our strength economically.

5) 00:40:17 Interviewer: I know that Taiwan went from an agrarian society to producing a lot of toys made in Taiwan.

Representative Chu: Yes, we were the world plant, like China nowadays.

Interviewer: But then this kind of changed into like how it is today, producing computer products.

Representative Chu: That’s right, because our foreign policy was very rigid and where only political things could be caught. That was very, very impractical. It was very difficult for our business people to get a proper visa in order to visit the outside world if you want to do business during the 70s. The government should have helped them, but they didn’t do that, they didn’t have that mindset: “Why should I help you”?

Interviewer: They only thought about politics, not trade?
Representative Chu: That’s right, that’s right, diplomacy related to political things. And that was a pity.

Representative Chu: About flexible diplomacy. We had to figure out what our national strength was. That was the first move.

Interviewer: When was flexible diplomacy first thought of?

Representative Chu: During the 80s.

Interviewer: By?

Representative Chu: By the private sector, by our scholars, and the government was then pushed.

Interviewer: They were at first not interested?

Representative Chu: A bit, mainly because Chiang Kai Shek and his son was in power for over 30 years. Not until Lee Teng-Hui came to power. Lee Teng Hui himself, the first time he adopted flexible diplomacy, wanted to help, by should establishing some kind of trade office, economic office or missions in other countries to do a service for our own people, making it more practical for our own taxpayers. These kind of ideas happened in the 80s. The very first time we tried to establish an office, globally, in a major country. Because we were not allowed to use the word embassy, so we just the word Taipei, because Taipei is the capital city of Taiwan. So we use this kind of more flexible idea.

Interviewer: So a lot of pressure from business organizations, and then the Lee Teng-Hui administration put that in?

Representative Chu: Lee Teng-hui himself knew a lot about international affairs. He was educated in the U.S. He was a Ph.D. of Cornell university. And he knew the outside world. And as an island nation, it was impossible not to allow your own people to engage with the outside world.

6) 00:51:29 Interviewer: Lee Teng-hui was ok with check-book diplomacy?

Representative Chu: Yes, because during the 1980s Taiwan was very rich and we were the world plant.

Interviewer: The world what?

Representative Chu: World plant. Manufacturing, all kinds of toys, costumes, clothes, even umbrellas. So Taiwan was very rich.
7) 00:51:47 Representative Chu: During the time China still remained a closed door, and it was at the height of the cold war. So that gave Taiwan a very good an opportunity, through our foreign policy, to stick close to the U.S. So Taiwan was small, but the American market was very big, so we earned a lot of money from that market. Through this we learned that foreign policy does not only focus on the political agenda. You have to focus on business and you have to take care of legal dispute issue. You know, that’s the real world. That is what an embassy should do. We have cultural events, exchange of scholars, or even all kinds of seminars, or even the news media, everything. So that’s the market function. Nowadays a good government should supply this kind of service to their own people.

That was the problem of Taiwan nowadays. That we left the United Nations in the 1970s

8) 01:02:23 Representative Chu: We are so lucky, though many of our people don’t know, because we were influenced by America. We are an open society now. And we are the first example of Chinese democracy in the whole Chinese world. In the last 5000 years.

9) 00:20:00 Representative Chu: During the cold war period. In Chiang Kai Shek’s mind, in his map, drawn by our government still claimed sovereignty over China. This was because Chiang Kai-Shek used to be the leader of that continent, so he had this kind of mindset.

Interviewer: A mindset that he was going to take back China.

Representative Chu: That he was the emperor of the whole China and that he would recover the motherland. We called that the ‘mandate of heaven. And because he was still alive, that he still survived. He thought that he would come back one day. That was his mindset.

Interviewer: Did he do Taiwan a disservice? Maybe diplomatically, if he was always thinking that China would be mine someday?

Representative: Yes, so that is why he stuck to one-China policy. And that created a lot of troubles.

10) Representative Chu 30:00 One of our top, the best foreign minister, Mr Yeh Gong-tsao. He was very good in international affairs. He suggested the president [Chiang Kai Shek] to face reality. To accept the formula of two Chinas being represented in the United Nations. And he was sacked. Sacked immediately

Interviewer: What year was this?
Representative: I remember it to be around the 1960s. Sometime like that. He was sacked immediately. When he touched down to Taipei and he was sacked and removed, all his ministerial jobs, everything, and he was treated very unfairly. He lost his job, he became nothing. And that was the situation during the 60s. He still No one dared to tell the truth to the president [Chiang Kai-shek]. He still remembers that he is the emperor of China and that he will reclaim his throne any day now. And that is a pity. Because in Chinese leaders’ teachings, I can say it is a pity, because in China the government is only a mechanism of the emperor himself, or herself, it is a tool, and the emperor is the son of heaven. He is the above the law, above the government, so in China. [Inaudible].

Interviewer: I mean, if Chiang Kai-Shek was sacking everyone that was giving him advice he did not want to hear, I guess at the end no one wanted to tell him anything.

Representative Chu: Yes, that is good. If you told the truth to Mao Tse-Tung he could kill you. This was a transition period. When Chiang Kai-Shek came to power, or when Mao Tse-Tung came to power, they all took advantage of nationalism. Because at the time, during the 19th century, China was under constant humiliation from Western Powers. Colonial powers had colonized Chin. China had been divided by the major powers. The Yang-Tse River was under the influence of Great Britain, Fukian and Canton was under the sphere of influence of Japan, and Manchuria was under the influence of Japan. The inner and outer Mongolia was under the influence of Russia. So you can see how China, even during the 1930s, was governed by other powers. Great Britain had a billboard outside their embassy which said that dogs and Chinese are not allowed to enter into this garden. These kinds of signal, everywhere, trying to remind the Chinese that ‘you are nothing more than an animal – equal to a dog’. So Chinese people were very angry during that period. So if any leader says that ‘hey look, I can unify you and defeat the western evil’. Then you will become a popular leader. So this is the historical background as to why they have this kind of historical burden. So when we come to power, even left-wing or right-wing, all the leaders of the younger generation, we were taught in history like this, we were trained like this, that you have make or safeguard the mother country into a great power, and you have to defeat them. You know? To lead us to national glory. This is the teachings in China.

11) 00:41:00 Representative Chu:

1) 00:10:00 Interviewer: What reasons do you see believes that China belongs to them? They seem to think this is an extremely important reason. They are not willing to compromise at all.

Michael Lee: If Beijing government let Taiwan go independent then the minority people in China, 64 of them, will want to go independent –especially Tibet and Xin Jiang.

Interviewer: I see, so it might set a precedent.

Michael Lee: Yes, because they have the history and independent background. So they will want to go independent. So we understand why the Beijing government does not want Taiwan to go independent.

2) Right before Lee Teng-Hui our missions abroad was at 70. From 1970 we cut missions everyday, some days we closed missions in five countries. We had to cut embassies until 1988 when President Lee Teng-hui instituted pragmatic diplomacy.

3) 00:32:00 Michael Lee: At that time, 1970. Chiang Kai-Shek knows the situation is changing. A lot of developing countries, especially in Africa, started to support China. We then had to accept the one-China one-Taiwan [system], but it was too late.

Interviewer: Ohh?

Michael Lee: Yes, didn’t have any other choice.

Interviewer: Was this after or before Taiwan was removed from the U.N.

Michael Lee: About the same time, maybe a few months before Taiwan were expelled from the U.N assembly.

4) 00:33:40 Michael Lee: If we took diplomatic allies from China, and then China went away [breaking off relations], that is called Han zei bo liang li. It was a confrontational policy from the past. [Inaudible] The policy was for the Taiwanese people, it was not for international countries. Because Chiang Kai-Shek government had to have his own legitimacy in Taiwan. Ruling legitimacy. The government had this policy that we don’t negotiate with China because of the three noes. No contact, no…