A Foreign Policy Actor in the Making

Discursive Construction of the EU Self-image and Role(s)
(1999-2009)

A Aysu Muftuoglu
Abstract

Departing from the question of how the EU self-image and role conception have been constructed in 1999-2009, this study locates the analysis of the EU as a foreign policy (FP) actor within the constructivist framework of role theory combined with a discursive approach. Guided by the central assumption that identity and role conception can be analysed by studying language in the form of discourse, the study particularly aims to address the relationship between the EU’s self-image and role conception in FP and the extent of continuity and change within the EU’s official FP discourse.

The analysis; of Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meetings, two framework documents and ten speeches by key foreign policy-makers, conducted by a combination of the method of open coding and the analytical concepts borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach shows that significant change has taken place within the discursive terrain. Along with an emergent role conception of the EU as protector against transnational challenges after the launch of ESS (2003), two concomitant changes have taken place; unravelling of the articulation between self-image and role conception and a stronger articulation of interests.

Key words: European Union, foreign policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, role theory, discourse analysis

Words: 19999
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<tr>
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<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CPE</td>
<td>Civilian Power Europe</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>European Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Conference</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>NPEU</td>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
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<td>RIESS</td>
<td>Report on Implementation of the European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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1 Introduction

While the European Union (EU) is often portrayed as a distinctive polity; the distinctiveness is underlined considering the EU as an actor in international politics. The EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is an unusual phenomenon of successive development of collective foreign policy among twenty-seven European states some of which are the oldest nation states in the world (Strömvik 2005:1-3). Due to its distinctiveness, the EU’s collective foreign policy is a scholarly challenge concerning how to categorise and with which tools to analyse. The fact that the EU collective foreign policy constitutes a moving target (Strömvik 2005:19) by being a project and a process as well as a policy (Lucarelli 2006:7) contributes to the challenge.

While the vast majority of contributions on analysing and understanding the EU foreign policy seems to put more emphasis on its hardware dimensions –mainly including the development of the institutional structure- and on the specific policy areas regarding its relations with the rest of the world (Lucarelli 2006:1), there is also a continuous debate about the nature of the EU as an international actor (Elgström and Smith 2006:1). Increasingly, this debate has come to centre on the values and principles that characterise the EU and on the argument that there is a distinctive role for the EU in world politics deriving from its particular nature (Lucarelli 2006:2).

1.1 Research Question and Aim

The aim of this study is to locate this latter debate within a theoretical framework informed by role theory combined with a particular discursive approach. The study analyses the EU as a foreign policy (FP) actor after 1999 when the Union has acquired autonomous military capabilities and central reforms concerning visibility and representation have entered into force. Embedded within a constructivist theoretical framework based on the role theory with an emphasis on identititative dimension of foreign policy; the main research question of the
study is as follows; how the EU’s self-image and role conception have been constructed in the EU’s official foreign policy discourse in the period 1999-2009?

The purpose of the study can be described as two-fold. The main purpose is to analyse the EU as a foreign policy actor during a ten year period; with a particular concern to discover how its self-image and role conceptions have evolved and changed. Understanding change is deemed important as the EU is a project and a process as well as an actor. The period after 1999 is particularly significant in that respect since the Union has entered an intensive period of constructing and communicating its foreign policy after it has acquired autonomous military capabilities and the High Representative for CFSP had been appointed. The broader purpose, on a more theoretical level, is to develop ways to study a foreign policy actor by empirically applying role theory to the official foreign policy discourse of a foreign policy actor. The study also seeks to develop identitative dimension of role theory; considering how self-image relates with role conception by the help of analytical tools borrowed from the discursive approach adopted by the study.

1.2 Clarifying the Concept: The EU Foreign Policy

It is necessary to make explicit what is understood by the EU foreign policy in this study and locate it vis-à-vis the dominant expression in the literature, European foreign policy (EFP). EFP is a complex and multilayered system of foreign policy formulation and implementation. It refers broadly to three types of activities; foreign policy of the member states of the EU, external relations conducted by the Commission –comprising the policies of development cooperation, trade and enlargement- and more traditional foreign diplomatic activity conducted by the Council –comprising the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)- (Carlsnaes 2004:1, Keukeleire 2008:29). This study accepts the third as its object of analysis which might appropriately be called the EU foreign policy referring to the observable foreign policy behaviour emanating from the Council framework, denoting the fields of diplomatic relations and security (Strömvik 2005:26).
1.3 Setting the Context: A Common Foreign and Security Policy

The cooperation among member states regarding diplomatic relations with third countries has started with the adoption of the Luxembourg Report signifying the start of what was termed the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC had acquired treaty status with the enactment of the Single European Act (1986) and; with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (1993), it has been institutionalised within what was previously called the “second pillar” of the EU, the CFSP (Keukeleire 2008:44-52). Throughout the 1990s, progress has been recorded concerning institutionalisation and operationalisation of the CFSP. During the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) from 1995-1997, possible means of making external action more effective and visible had been discussed. The IGC led to the Amsterdam Treaty which was signed in October 1997. Progressive steps of the Treaty such as the establishment of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit and the appointment of a Secretary General/High Representative for the CFSP were realised in 1999 (Keukeleire 2008:54).

In December 1998, Franco-British summit took place in St Malo which marks a significant moment for the prospect of cooperation in the field of security and defence, as the British and French leaders decided on the development of the EU’s autonomous military capabilities. Cologne European Council of June 1999 has duly accepted the goal to establish European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and; military capacity objectives and plans for the institutional structure were spelled out by the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 (Keukeleire 2008:56-57) which expressed the EU’s “determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”.

After St Malo and Cologne and Helsinki European Council Meetings of 1999, the EU entered a phase of intense discussions on the development of autonomous institutional and military capacity for force generation and deployment (Howorth 2007:4). While the Laeken European Council of December 2001 asserted that “the EU should be able to carry out the full range of
Petersberg tasks\(^1\) by 2003” (Howorth 2007:207), the EU embarked on its first mission, European Union Police Mission (EUPM), in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003 which was followed in December 2003 by its first military mission Concordia in Macedonia (Howorth 2007:210-11). The European Security Strategy was also launched in 2003. In December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. Among the most significant development concerning CFSP accomplished by the Lisbon Treaty are the abolition of the pillar system -albeit only in terms of presentation not regarding policy-making-, the creation of the function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and renaming of the ESDP as the CSDP (Keukeleire 2008:62).

1.4 Delimitations

Every research question leaves out other substantial questions by orienting the research endeavour towards particular issues at the expense of others. Some delimitations of this study stemming from its research orientation should be made explicit at the introductory stage.

First delimitation stems from the multilevel and multipillar nature of the EU foreign policy (Keukeleire 2008:29-32). As this study sets its object of analysis as the EU foreign policy rather than the EFP, it leaves outside the interplay between member state foreign policies and the EU foreign policy. Although the pillar structure has formally been abolished in the Lisbon Treaty, it still persists in practice. Hence, it should once again be clarified, as the above definition of the EU foreign policy also makes clear, that the study’s focus tends to tilt towards the Council framework given its aim to capture role conceptions of a general and strategic nature rather than contextual nature.

As should be clear given the research question, this study focuses on the ideational rather than material dimension of the EU foreign policy. The material dimension can be understood as referring to tangible capabilities at the Union’s disposal, the institutional development in the

\(^1\) Defined by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1992, the Petersber Tasks correspond to ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ and are incorporated to the TEU by the Amsterdam Treaty. (Howorth 2007:98, Keukeleire 2008:177).
context of CFSP and CSDP, or the outcomes of policies in specific field and towards third countries. Rather than focusing on either of these dimensions, this study centres on how the EU foreign policy is conceived by policy-makers; the subjective dimension of foreign policy.

For the analysis of subjective dimension, the EU’s official foreign policy discourse is accepted as the main frame of reference. Another delimitation appears then; that incompatibility between what the EU says and what it does might exist. Hence, it should be clarified that it is not the ambition of this study to explain the actual foreign policy behaviour of the EU.

1.5 Outline of the study

The subsequent chapter overviews the research on the EU as an actor in international politics. Since it is a very broad field of inquiry, the overview is restricted according to the particular research question and aim of this study. Hence, the chapter looks at three particular branches of literature that focuses on the EU as “power”, the “actorness” of the EU and the role theory in IR and role(s) of the EU.

The third chapter makes explicit the theoretical assumptions of this study. It starts by explaining the ontological and epistemological presumptions of social constructivism and proceeds by the particular theory of role which informs this study’s position on how to understand a foreign policy actor. Lastly, the approach to language and discourse that this study adopts is clarified which is followed by the analytical framework which elaborates upon how theoretical assumptions translates to the analysis stage.

In the fourth chapter, the methodology of the study is explicated along with the material, delimitations and the criteria of warranting in qualitative research. The methodology is a qualitative one as the interpretive endeavour of this study requires. The analysis of textual material is conducted by integrating the method of open coding guided by central questions and sensitising concepts, and the analytical tools borrowed from Laclau and Mouffé’s approach to discourse analysis, for restructuring the material. The material is composed of Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meetings (June and December) 1999-2009,

The following chapter is the empirical analysis, conducted within the theoretical framework and by the tools provided in previous chapters. The analysis opens with an introductory section and the remaining is structured in four main sections covering; first, the elements of the EU self-image and second, the elements of the EU role conception; which are analysed by the method of open coding. Each element is analysed in a separate section which deals primarily with any change in meaning and their articulation within the discursive terrain. While the first section opens with the nodal point of “European integration”, the second concludes with articulation between interests and values, both seen as defining characteristics of the discursive terrain. The third section analyses the articulation of the nodal point of “European integration” to the EU’s role conception, both as a way of highlighting how self-image relates to the role conception and to better understand change within the discursive terrain. The last section in the chapter summarises the findings with a particular attention to continuity and change in the EU’s official foreign policy discourse in 1999-2009.

The last chapter concludes by reflecting upon the theories and methods used for the analysis in the study and upon the broader implications of the research findings.
2 Research Overview

The analysis of European foreign policy constitutes a vast body of research. As clarified in the introductory section, this study focuses on the EU foreign policy from the perspective of what kind of an international actor the EU represents in the world. Manners and Whitman identifies three distinct approaches in the research dealing with the same question. First, there are studies departing from the premise that the EU is sui generis and that its analysis requires the construction of new conceptual categorizations. Second is the body of research that seeks to explain the international significance of the EU using the theoretical tools of the discipline of IR, centering on the concept of “actorness” (Manners and Whitman 1998:232-36). These two branches of research will be dealt with in the first two sections of this chapter and the third section will briefly look at role theory in international relations (IR) and the concept of role in the research concerning the EU as a global actor.

2.1 The EU as “Power” in International Politics

After Duchene’s first formulation of the concept of civilian power in 1972, the discussion concerning the EU foreign policy has developed centering on the notion of the EU as a particular type power. Conceptual clarification concerning “power” and its articulation in the literature will follow. However, it is warranted to clarify at this stage that albeit its preoccupation with power, the literature is indeed addressing a topical subject; what distinctive role is there for the EU in the world (Orbie 2006:123) and how conceptualise the EU as an international actor.

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2 The third is the research on the international role of the EU focusing upon the content of specific policies conducted by the EU which will not be covered in this overview.

2.1.1 The EU as “Civilian”, “Military” and “Normative” power

The first contribution here is that of Duchene. Duchene’s (1972) conception of civilian power Europe (CPE) revolves around three principal hypotheses. Firstly, it refers to the transformation of interstate relations within Europe from war and conflict towards civilised politics. Secondly, it focuses on the possibility of an actor being a power whilst not possessing military instruments, which is the particular argument that has received the widest attention. And thirdly, Duchene considers the role a civilian power could aspire to play in a world characterised by the declining role of force and the growing importance of economic interdependence (quoted in Keukeleire 2008:11). Despite the negative response by Bull (1982) who considered the concept of civilian power to be a “contradiction in terms” and significantly questioned the EU as an international actor by stating that “Europe is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one” (151), the notion of the EU as a particular type of power continued to shape the subsequent contributions.  

Hence, the CPE is basically understood to be built upon two propositions; one about the means of power and the other about the objectives of European foreign policy (Orbie 2006:125, Smith 2005:65). Considering means; the fact that European Union has no military capabilities, at least before 1990s and its use of its economic and political leverage to exert influence led to its designation as a civilian power (Orbie 2006). Considering civilian objectives; while considerable uncertainty exits, these are thought to be the pacification of interstate relations along the same lines as in Europe and/or the promotion of civilian values.

With the development of the EU’s autonomous military capabilities, a new debate has developed about the prospect of the civilian power status of the EU. The general argumentative line here is that the Union continues to be a civilian power as long as its civilian foreign policy objectives remain intact; and that the Union can indeed become a more effective civilian actor with military capabilities.

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4. The concept of civilian power was further developed by Mauil (1990) without reference to the EU; to suggest a broader change in dynamics of international relations, shifting from the military-political sphere to economic and social developments.
Stavridis (2001) asserts that “thanks to the militarising of the Union, the latter might at long last be able to act as a real civilian power in the world, that is to say as a force for the external promotion of democratic principles” (43) and points to the “need to move from a civilian power Europe "by default" to one "by design"” (44). Mauill also shares the same opinion that the EU stays as a civilian force due to the fact that, after having civilised its own political realms, the EU still has as its objective of foreign policy to transform interstate relations along the same lines (2005:780). It is only Smith who departs from this argumentative line with the note of caution that the literature lacks “good, clear definition of what civilian ends are” and that it is not possible to “state uncritically that the EU is actually pursuing civilian ends and therefore is a civilian power” (2005:74).

Meanwhile, the literature entered a new phase with the introduction to the debate the concept of normative power by Manners (2002). He asserted that conceptions of the EU as either a civilian power or a military power, both located in discussions of capabilities or means, need to be augmented with a focus on normative power of an ideational nature (2002:240). Accordingly, he reframed the centre of the debate as “normative power Europe” (NPEU) referring to the ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in international relations (ibid.). Ability to define what is considered normal in international relations endorses an understanding power over opinion and moves the debate beyond state-like features (240). Since the entry of NPEU to the conceptual landscape of the literature, the debate has started to centre on the concept.

2.1.2 Critiques and Insights

Manner’s contribution ignited a rich academic debate which led to attempts to further define and understand specifically NPEU assertion, but more broadly the question of how to study and understand the EU as an international actor.

An initial criticism concerns whether NPEU was a prescriptive or descriptive category. Here the attention is called to the strategic calculations and material interests that can trump the normative agenda of the EU when material interests and normative ideals clash (Merlingen
2007:437, Diez 2005:624); or that norm projection goals might not be consistent both in terms of not discriminating between different external actor or regions (Diez 2005:624). NPEU is also questioned by calling attention to the EU’s own record of norm compliance and to the incoherence that might exist between its ambitions and achievements (Nicolaïdis and Howse 2002:788).

On a more substantial level, however, the criticism is directed against the fact that the concepts of CPE and NPEU have not been problematised or clearly defined (Pace 2007, Smith 2005, Diez 2005, Sjursen 2002). More relevant, for the purposes of this study, are the contributions that point to the constructed nature of CPE and NPEU and their link with the official EU rhetoric. This is reflected in the criticism against the literature of merely confirming the EU rhetoric (Orbie 2006:126) or at the very least; of being very similar to that used by EU officials when describing the EU’s international role (Sjursen 2006:170).

More significant, however, is the argument that CPE and NPEU can be studied as discursive constructs. Larsen (2002:289) asserts that while conceptualization of the EU as a civilian power was based on an essentialist understanding which centres on certain features of the EU, it is possible to approach it departing from the question of how the dominant discourse constructs the EU. While Nicolaïdis and Howse (2002) call for reflexivity on the notion of Europe as a more advanced model which has pervaded not only European discourse but often that of those who seek to emulate it, Diez also emphasises the need for self-reflexivity in NPEU debate and calls for a systematic discourse analysis of the construction of the EU as a normative power (2005:615). Pace (2007:1044-1054), on the other hand, aims at exploring the elements of the construction of the EU as a “normative power” in terms of its content and process.

The contributions also discuss the consequences of the construction of the EU as a normative power; both in terms of its potential to secure a role for the EU globally (Pace 2005:1059) and of power that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power; by establishing a particular identity for the EU through turning third parties into “others” and representing the EU as a positive force in world politics (Diez 2005:614).
2.1.3 The Concepts: Power and Identity

It is often repeated in the literature that central concepts remain understudied through the discussions. The conceptual ambiguity is made all the worse by the essentially contested nature of the concepts which occupy a central place throughout the debates such as power and identity.

Regarding the conceptualisation the EU as “power”, the concept of “power” is often used by reference to which means are at the EU’s disposal and, more particularly, to how the EU uses its means to achieve its ends. Within the framework of Hill’s four broad categories of ways to exercise power and influence (Hill 2003:137, quoted in Smith 2005:67), a civilian power sways another actor’s decisions, using persuasion -the carrot- and deference -latent influence- rather than compelling another actor to do something by using force -the stick- or deterrence -the threat of the use of force-. The concept of normative power, on the other hand, goes beyond denoting how the EU uses its means to achieve its ends; and denotes its ability to construct or shape the environment in which other actors also operate by its ability to define and interpret that realm according to its own frames of reference. In this framework, power appears as productive power; working through diffuse social relations of constitution rather than direct interactions with specific actors (Barnett and Duvall 2005:9-22, quoted in Bengtsson 2010:33)

A major deficit in the literature is the conceptual fluidity concerning “identity” of the EU. Albeit there exists an implicit assumption that identity impacts upon foreign policy formulation on the EU level and that it is a major source of distinctiveness of the EU as a foreign policy actor; there is almost no attempt to clarify how to define the concept of “identity” and to understand the nature of “European identity” –if there exists one-.

Moreover, the concept of identity is stretched to such an extent that it is used interchangeably with the EU’s functions, roles and its overall behaviour as a foreign policy actor (Sedelmeier 2004:125). As well as embodying an elusive meaning of identity, overall literature is also plagued with a limited conceptual understanding of the implications of identity for EFP (Sedelmeier 2004:123).
2.2 Actorness of the EU

Apart from the studies departing from the premise that the EU is sui generis and deal with the construction of new conceptual categorizations to explain its international role, the international significance of the EU has also been analysed using the theoretical tools of the discipline of IR. A social constructivist theoretical framework has informed this analysis.

Sjostedt\(^5\) (1977) introduced; Allen and Smith (1990), Hill (1993), Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006) and Larsen (2002) revisited how to conceptualise the EU as an international actor within the theoretical framework of IR.

Allen and Smith (1990) developed the notion of ‘presence’ endorsing two central assertions of a constructivist approach to understanding an international actor. First is the recognition that a set of expectations shaped by policy makers and institutions can enter into the realm of political reality and play a consequential role in unfolding events (21). This assertion refers to an acknowledgement that others’ perceptions and expectations are constitutive of the character of an actor. They define presence by a combination of factors; credentials and legitimacy, the capacity to act and mobilize resources and the place it occupies in the perceptions and expectations of policy makers (ibid.) Hence, presence can be associated with tangible attributes, but it can also be expressed in essentially intangible ways which are none the less powerful (ibid). Accordingly, their second central argument is that the establishment of “presence” in a given domain is not the prerogative solely of actors’ tangible attributes centred on people and institutions, but can be a property of ideas, notions, expectations and imaginations (1990:22).

Hill (1993) draws on this understanding of “presence” in his often cited notion of “capability-expectations gap”. While he uses the term “actornes’”, the concept is identical to “presence” and it provides a theoretical perspective which can incorporate both the internal dynamics of

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\(^5\) Sjostedt’s (1977) contribution that, an international actor must be delimited, autonomous, and possesses certain structural prerequisites for action on the international level (quoted in Hill 1993:309), can be said to be focused on prerequisites for being an actor while not incorporating a constructivist approach which will become more clear in future contributions.
institutional development and the changing nature of the international environment in which it has to operate (1993:309). Accordingly, capability-expectations gap denotes a gap between tasks which the Union is expected to perform and its actual capabilities, in terms of resources and the instruments at its disposal (315).

*Bretherton and Vogler (2006:24-35)* conceptualise “presence” as constructed through the interplay of internal factors of “capability” and perceptions and expectations of outsiders in a structure of “opportunity”. Internal factors –policy instruments and understandings about the ability to utilise these instruments- determine “capability” of an actor in an external environment of “opportunity” –composed of intersubjective understandings as well as material conditions- signifying the structural context enabling or constraining action.

Drawing on this perspective, *Larsen* posits that a constructivist approach to international actorness can be said to focus on two things; whether and how a group of states, institutional actors or others construct themselves as an international actor; and whether and how the surrounding world constructs this group as an actor (2002:287). Larsen replaces the internal capability dimension, which has been so far framed in terms of material capabilities, with intangible attributes centering on the actor’s own conceptualisation of the meaning of its action.

### 2.3 Role theory in IR

Role theory, originating in the discipline of sociology, has been introduced into the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) by a seminal article published by Holsti. In this article Holsti (1970) set out to investigate decision-makers’ perception of their own nation based on an extensive cross-national study (12). The aim here is not to provide an elaborate overview as to how role theory has been applied in the literature as there exist considerable difference among scholars with regard to the understanding of sources and factors shaping roles, ranging from an objectivist account of actors’ material or cognitive traits as determining factors to a constructivist understanding that explores language and social interaction (Harnisch 2011:7). The broader theoretical framework within which role theory is placed will be explicated in the
theory chapter. The focus here will rather be on how the concept of role has been used in the literature dealing with the EU as an actor in IR.

2.3.1 Role(s) of the EU

Throughout the literature dealing with the EU foreign policy, it is not uncommon to find the concept of role. However, the concept is rarely connected to role theory as deployed in IR literature and there is seldom a specification of what roles the EU actually engages in (Elgström and Smith 2006:4-5). Rather the concept of role is often treated as interchangeable with influence, identity or actorness and is sometimes used as an umbrella concept for general patterns of EU foreign policy behaviour (ibid.).

Hill (1990) and Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006) seem to utilise role concept in a more systematic way. Hill looks at various functions the EU performs or might need to perform in the international system. He distinguishes four functions which the EC has performed up to the present in the international system, and the six which it might perform in the future based largely on the expectations by the influential insiders and outsiders (1990:310-15). Bretherton and Vogler (2006:55-59) delineate three broad and complementary roles for the Union based on an inclusive conceptualisation of its identity; as a model, as a promoter of its (proclaimed) internal values, as a counterweight to the USA. If the EU’s identity is formulated in exclusive terms, however, the EU’s role appears as that of a protector.

It is also possible to come across instances in the literature where either civilian, normative or military power conceptions of the EU are formulated as the external role(s) of the Union (Manners and Whitman 2003:388). However, none of these examples of usage of role concept is placed within the constructivist framework of role theory, a central tenet of which is to investigate role conceptions of an actor departing from decision-makers’ own perception of that actor’s function and responsibilities on the world stage. 6

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6 One exception in this regard seems to be the research by Aggestam (2004) whereby she applied role theory to the analysis of foreign policies of three EU member states, France, Britain and Germany. Placed within a theoretical framework which aims to develop the concept of role in regard to the identitative dimension of foreign policy (13), Aggestam investigates conceptions of identity and role officially communicated through key foreign policy speeches with a general and strategic nature by policy-makers in three countries (23).
2.4 Purpose and Contribution to the Literature

Regarding “the EU as power” literature, three observations can be made. First; there is a considerable lack of conceptual clarification concerning central concepts such as power and identity. The fact that identity- FP relationship has not been examined at all is a central deficit due to the implicit reference to the EU’s identity impacting on its external action. Second, and in relation with the first point, the research proceeds almost exclusively on its own terms without borrowing from existing theories of FPA or IR. And thirdly; “discourse” does not appear as a frame of reference and the constructed nature of CPE/NPEU is not recognised or analysed–albeit a few exceptions-. As to the study of actoriness of the EU; while the embeddedness of this approach within constructivist IR theory is a considerable advantage, it does not provide analytical tools to study an international actor.

This study aims at analysing the EU’s foreign policy within the theoretical framework of role theory combined with a discursive approach. It is assumed that locating the study of the EU as international actor within the framework of an existing theory has considerable advantage for systematic analysis. Furthermore, role theory provides a framework in which identity- FP relationship can be better studied. The study is also sensitive concerning discourse and its role for constructing the EU as an international actor. All in all, in its simplest form, this study can be accepted as a contribution to the literature on the role(s) of the EU, as a systematic application of role concept combined with a discursive approach centering on change and the identitative dimension roles.
3 Theory

The aim of this chapter is to make explicit and clarify the assumptions and concepts that informs this study’s theoretical framework. The chapter opens with meta-theoretical standpoint of social constructivism and continues with role theory which is the general theoretical framework of this study. Before concluding with the analytical framework, the study’s approach to “discourse” will also be highlighted.

3.1 Social Constructivism

It should be noted that constructivism is not a theory nor is it a single approach. Indeed, it might be more accurately portrayed as a meta-theoretical standpoint in political analysis (Hay 2002, quoted in White 2004:21) and/or an analytical framework (Reus-Smith 2001:222). It should also be clarified that the constructivist spectrum is broad and complex (Bengtsson 2010:9) and the approach chosen here draws on reflectivist assumptions.

3.1.1 Ontology

Constructivism is first and foremost a statement about the nature of the world we observe. Hence, it is an ontological statement. Constructivism claims that reality is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world (Adler 1997:319). Accordingly the environment in which agents take action is social as well as material (Checkel 1998:325). Hence it is possible to speak about the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge and a material world that depends on normative and epistemic interpretations of itself (Adler 1997:322).

Social constructivism questions materialist philosophies of science which posit that behaviour is affected by outside physical forces by directing attention to how these forces are given
meaning by the social context through which they are interpreted (Checkel 1998:326). Material structures only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared meaning in which they are embedded (Reus-Smith 2001:216-17). Accordingly, normative and ideational structures are as just important as material structures in shaping behaviour of social and political actors (ibid.).

3.1.2 Theory of Structuration

It follows from these key assumptions that constructivists take up a distinctive “structurationist” position concerning agency-structure relationship. Constructivist approach claims that neither structural determinism nor voluntarism are viable and seeks to reconcile a focus on structures with sensitivity to the intentionality, reflexivity and agency of actors (Giddens 1984, quoted in White 2004:22). Constructivists emphasize a process of interaction between agents and structures; the ontology is one of mutual constitution, where neither unit of analysis -agents or structures- is reduced to the other and made “ontologically primitive” (Checkel 1998:326). Accordingly, agency and structure are mutually constitutive and only “theoretically separable” (White 2004:22).

The mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency denotes that; while agents are bound by structures which constitute their identities and interests, the structures are socially constructed by the individual agents in the first place and are open to change through intentional action (Checkel 1998:325). Agents both constitute and inhibit the structure within which they exist (Bretherton and Vogler 2006:21). Accordingly, agents can be conceived as rule-makers as well as rule-takers and structures do not determine behaviour but provide action settings or patterns of opportunity and constraint within which agency is displayed (ibid.).

3.1.3 Identity and Interests

The central ontological assumption of social constructivism based on a process of interaction between agents and structures also posits that agents –in IR; international actors- are constituted throughout their existence in the social realm. Hence, social constructivist theory in IR claims that normative and ideational structures shape social identities of agents which,
in turn, shape their interests and consequently actions (Reus-Smith 2001:21). This depiction of social world and individual agency posits an alternative to rationalist assumption that agents’ interests are fixed and exogenously given –and mainly derived from material positions-. Constructivism holds that society is a social rather than strategic realm whereby actors are social agents rather than atomistic egoists and interest formation is endogenous to social interaction and social world in which agents are embedded (Reus-Smith 2001:219). This opens up what for most theorists is the black box of interest and identity formation; as state interests emerge from and are endogenous to interaction within intersubjective social structures (Checkel 1998:326).

3.1.4 Epistemology

The research conducted within a constructivist theoretical framework changes the research agenda by asking different sorts of question. Different from rationalists –embracing methodological individualism and an agent-centred view– who are concerned with why particular decisions are made and actions taken and with explaining choices and behaviours, constructivists are concerned with how such decisions are possible and what are their bases in subjective and/or intersubjective domains composed of dominant belief systems, conceptions of identity, and perceptions (White 2004:23). Rather than why questions, constructivism embraces what or how possible questions (Lupovici 2009:200), in a direction to understanding rather than explaining behaviour. Central notion here is that action should be understood from within, in terms of subjective meaning given to that action. (Hollis and Smith 1991:72) Accordingly, constructivist epistemology is hermeneutic or interpretivist in its research orientation.

Constructivism’s embrace of constitutive rather than causal theorising also links with its interpretation the nature of scientific knowledge. The absence of ‘why’ questions generally reflect an assumption that in the social sciences, it is not possible to arrive at generalisations or near-law statements and a rejection of the possibility and desirability of formulating covering laws (Lupovici 2009:210). This is due to the inherently variable nature of constitutive forces they emphasise such as ideas, norms and culture and the elements of human agency they stress, such as identity and to the recognition that a universal, trans-
historical, disembedded, culturally autonomous idea or identity cannot exist (Reus-Smith 2001:222).

3.2 Role Theory

It is important to underline beforehand that role theory is more a research framework rather than a powerful theory which provides coherent answers as to why, when and how certain role phenomena occur (Aggestam 2004:13). Role theory originated in the discipline of sociology, mainly as a tool to discover how human action is conditioned by her social environment by the role she adopts. Moreover, role as a cognitive construct framing the concepts of self in the social world provides guidance and predisposes an actor towards one purposive behaviour rather than another (ibid.).

3.2.1 Role Theory in IR

Holsti (1970) introduced the sociological concept of role into FPA by calling attention to the utility of a sociological understanding of role for understanding an actor’s characteristic pattern of behaviour. He (1970) set out to investigate decision-makers’ own perception of their own nation, thereby focusing on the subjective dimension of foreign policy (Aggestam 2004:12).

Holsti argued that a state’s foreign policy was influenced by its national role conception which could help explain the general direction of its action as an international actor (Holsti 1970:40). National role conception serves as a cognitive map enabling policy-makers to organise perceptions into meaningful guide for behaviour (Aggestam 2004:12). Hence by role analysis, an actor in international system can be analysed inductively in terms of subjective meaning of its external action.

7 Although Holsti’s work has recognised interaction between agency and structure and adopted a position that might be classified as constructivist (Breuning 2011:18), substantial differences can be found between epistemological foundations of empirical applications of role theory (Harnisch 2011:7). However, this study places role theory within a social constructivist ontology and epistemology as the remaining sections will further clarify.
Role conception also reflects the state as a situated actor; guided both by reason and rules in foreign policy (Aggestam 2004:36-8). Hence, it is embedded within constructivist ontology, encompassing how individual agents and social structures are dynamically interrelated (Aggestam 2006:12). Thus, a major advantage of the theory is that it can reflect the complex and dynamic interplay between actor’s own role conception and structurally guided role expectations of others (Elgström and Smith 2006:5).

3.2.2 Structurationist Approach

Accordingly, role theory shares the ontological position of the theory of structuration incorporating both the intentional and structural nature of behaviour. To make structuration theory applicable to empirical analysis, role analysis incorporates three perspectives; institutional, interactional and intentional (Aggestam 2006:14).

The predominant approach to role analysis is the institutional perspective which focuses on how and to what extent institutions\(^8\) determine roles by providing a set of norms and expectations (Aggestam 2006:15). Institutions provide the intersubjective domain in which role formulation and role performance take place.

Interactional perspective incorporates into analysis how roles are learned and socialised in a process of negotiation. (Aggestam 2004:60) This perspective brings out agency and its capacity for defining its own roles, and also how these subjective accounts of roles have been adapted to the intersubjective norms and expectations (ibid.).

Intentional perspective calls attention to how actors themselves are involved in defining roles and attributing meaning to their actions (Aggestam 2006:17). Hence, the analytical focus is on the subjective domain and on agency. However this view of agency does not mean that role conception can be formulated without any regard to the interactional and institutional realms.

\(^8\) Institution is understood broadly here as, "social practices consisting of easily recognised roles coupled with clusters of rule of conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles" e.g. the states system (Young 1989:33, Aggestam 58).
Instead, purposive roles are the result of an interaction between intersubjective and subjective domains (Aggestam 2006:18).

3.2.3 Identititative Dimension

According to Holsti, a role conception is largely a product of a nation’s socialisation process and the influence of its history, culture and societal characteristics (1987:38-39, quoted in Aggestam 2006:21). Despite Holsti’s indication of the importance of the cultural sources of roles, few studies have explicitly linked the role concept with identity in foreign policy (Aggestam 2006:21) While it is recognised in the literature that FP rests on a shared sense of identity, scant attention has been given how collective identities can provide a system of orientation for self-definition and political action (Aggestam 2004:39).

While the concept of national identity itself is compound with definitional problems, supranational identity is a greater academic challenge. A certain level of conceptual clarification seems warranted here. In the first place, it should be specified that in this study, identity is accepted as political identity rather than cultural identity. While cultural identity is accepted as pre-given resting on cultural similarity, a position regarded as essentialist; political identity can more appropriately be seen as a constructed phenomenon that does not necessitate common cultural roots. (Lucarelli 2006:11-12). From such a perspective which posits the significance of processes of self-identification, foreign policy is particularly important as the foreign designates a boundary between inside and outside (Jorgensen 2004:32)

Another important clarification concerns the relationship between identity and roles in FP. As asserted above, this issue can be accepted as a blind spot of role theory and indeed the field of IR in general. The general tendency is to recognise identity as offering or circumscribing roles available to an actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2006:40) and supplying these roles with meaning (Nabers 2011:82); while the relationship is conceived to be important but indirect (Bretherton and Vogler 2006:55). However, the relationship between identity and role is better characterised as co-constitution or reciprocity since actors, by formulating plans and

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performing certain activities within the boundaries of their roles, reinforce, support or confirm their identities (Nabers 2011:82). The relationship of co-constitution is also recognised by Lucarelli (2006:62) who asserts that role conception is not simply the result of a particular self-image but also an instrument in constructing a political identity as role performance and impact feed back into the process of self-identification, particularly in the case of imperfectly consolidated polities.

Moreover while the assumption is that identity and role constructions impacts significantly upon practices towards third parties; the relationship neither simple nor linear (Bretherton and Vogler 2006:37). A straight causal arrow from identity to role and from role to behaviour is impossible to draw (Aggestam 2004:14). However, role concept can be accepted one of the few conceptual tools to study how identity serves as a context for an actor’s foreign policy (ibid.).

3.2.4 Concepts of Role

There are a number of ways in which the idea of role can be analysed and understood. The way we understand the role concept is closely related whether we focus on the actor’s subjective understandings, others’ expectations from the role beholder or the actual performance (Aggestam 2006:18). It is possible to make four distinctions of role concept; role expectation, role conception, role performance and role-set. While the concepts of role are closely interlinked in practice, delineation is necessary when role theory is applied to the empirical analysis of foreign policy (ibid.).

Role expectation pertains to those expectations that other actors prescribe and expect the role-beholder to enact (Aggestam 2006:18, 2004:64). The idea of role expectation is found in studies that highlight how institutional structures generate expectations which tend to set limits to the range of roles that policy-makers perceive.

Role conception refers to the responsibilities and obligations that the role-beholder expresses towards itself. Hence, it pertains to the subjective dimension of foreign policy. It tends to reveal intentions and motives of a foreign policy actor, in other words, the meaning of action. Holsti, in his seminal article in which he introduced the concept, defines role conception as
follows; “a national role conception includes the policy-makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems” (Holsti 1970:40). In a more simplified manner, role conceptions can also be defined as the “images that foreign policy-makers hold concerning the general long-term function and performance of their state in the international system” (Aggestam 2006:19). Whilst role conceptions concern the actor’s subjective understanding of foreign policy action, these are assumed to be more or less intersubjective, partly constituted and reflecting the expectations of others of the role-beholder (Aggestam 2004:65).

*Role performance* indicates actual foreign policy behaviour; decisions and actions undertaken in specific contexts. It is a central assumption of the theory that role performance is guided by the role conceptions held by decision-makers (Aggestam 2006:20). However, it is important to note that role conceptions do not necessarily determine outcomes directly, but define the potential range of options and strategies available to the foreign policy actor (*ibid.*).

Considering the fact that actors tend to hold multiple roles which vary in overall importance and according to the situation and institutional context (*ibid.*), more general roles can be accepted as providing a clearer view of why an actor adopts a particular orientation in international relations. However, it should be kept in mind that they are broad categories that allow some flexibility of interpretation (Aggestam 2004: 65). Moreover, due to the multiplicity of roles that policy-makers conceive, a certain level of sensitivity is also necessary concerning the situational context and the particular role which is selected and particular objectives attached to it (*ibid.*).

3.3 Approach to Language and Discourse

Departing from the basic assertion that language is the primary expression of social meaning (Hollis and Smith 1991:69), this study assumes that meaning can be studied by studying language in the form of discourse (Larsen 2002:287). Discourse can be understood as the structure of patterns regulating statements not as the statements themselves (Larsen 1997,
quoted in Diez 2001:13) and the researcher should uncover these patterns to understand the subjective meaning of actor behaviour.

Within the particular theoretical framework of this study, the basic assumption is that the frame of reference for both identity and roles is their meaning transported by discourse (Nabers 2011:83) and that discourse analysis would provide an appropriate tool for an analysis of roles (Nabers 2011:92) and the relationship between role and identity.

It is also necessary to clarify that this study accepts discourse as representation due to its research orientation to analyse subjective meaning of foreign policy. However, it is also possible to study discourse as process (Schmidt 2008:309) or as practice (Milliken 1999:230). While the former looks at how discourses are constructed and communicated – in terms of actors, means, mechanisms – (Schmidt 2008:309), the latter looks at how they impact upon the social world by constraining and shaping the actors’ choices (Neumann 2008:62). The analysis of discourse both as process and practice can be said to have a close association with the concept of power. Considering discourses as process the question of who constructs them, for what purposes and against what resistance (Dunn 2008:82) can be read as related with power relations; while power can also be thought of as working through discourses in social practice by enabling certain policies and practices at the expense of others (Milliken 1999:240). However, as already clarified, the research orientation in this study takes discourse neither as process nor practice, but as representation through which subjective meaning of action can be studied.

### 3.4 Analytical Framework

The analysis will be embedded within a social constructivist framework and will mainly be founded on the self-image and role conception. Departing from the assumption that the frame of reference for both identities and roles is their meaning transported by discourse, the study incorporates a discursive approach to the analysis; discourse accepted here as representation rather than process or practice.
Rather than identity, the analysis will use the concept of “self-image”, denoting shared understandings of what the EU is as reflected in the EU’s official FP discourse. For role conceptions, defined as the images that foreign policy-makers hold concerning the general long-term function and performance of their state in the international system, the analysis will seek to uncover the shared understanding on the level of policy-makers on what the EU does and/or should do. The relationship between self-image and role conception on the discursive level will be analysed by analytical tools of Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to discourse analysis. Before proceeding to the explanation of the methods used for analysis in the methodology chapter, several remarks concerning the scope of analysis within the overall theoretical framework seems necessary.

Three points should be made here regarding the delineation of the scope of analysis. The analysis is centred on role conception, with a focus on the ego part, (Harnisch 2011:7) which denotes conceptualisation of the EU’s role by policy-makers, rather than the alter part, which denotes role expectations of the other actors from the role-beholder (Nabers 2011:78). However, role conception and role expectation is only separable for the purposes of analysis and this study acknowledges that role conception is partly constituted by and reflects the expectations of others of the role-beholder. Within the framework of the structurationist approach of role theory, it can be said that this study has its focus on the intentional dimension of the role concept; that is how the actors themselves formulate their role. Second delimitation stems from the recognition that an actor holds multiple roles depending on the specific social context and issue area (Breuning 2011:32). It should be made explicit that role conceptions of a general and strategic nature will be analysed rather than issue-specific and contextual role conceptions. And thirdly, the analysis centres on role conceptions rather than role performance and has no ambition to study neither correlation nor incoherence between role conception and role performance.
4 Methodology

The methodology of this study is a qualitative one, as the interpretive endeavour of this study requires. It seems necessary to elaborate upon three central characteristics of qualitative inquiry which also have a strong imprint in this study. (Creswell 2007:39) Firstly; in qualitative inquiry, researcher uses a theoretical lens to build her analysis. The theoretical lens refers to the ontological and epistemological understanding of the social world by the researcher on a general level, and more specifically it refers to the particular theory and analytical concepts that guide her study. Secondly, in qualitative research, data is analysed inductively. That is to say, the researcher builds her patterns, categories and themes from the bottom-up by organising the data into increasingly more abstract units of information. Thirdly, qualitative inquiry, in each of its variants, is based on an interpretivist epistemology (Bryman 2008:15) and involves interpretation.

4.1 Methods

This study has an integrative approach to methodology combining the method of open coding and Laclau and Mouffé’s discursive approach. Coding is the starting point for most forms of qualitative data analysis (Bryman 2008:551). Accordingly, the first step of qualitative analysis in this study aims at coding the material. However coding should not be equated with analysis, it is only a part of analysis albeit an important one. It is a mechanism for thinking about the meaning of the data and for reducing the vast amount of data that the researcher is facing. Findings after the coding step has still to be interpreted (Bryman 2008:552). The second step in the analysis will involve restructuring the coded material with the analytical tools borrowed from Laclau and Mouffé’s approach to discourse analysis.
4.1.1 The Method of Open coding

The method of open coding is the first procedural step among a number of procedures for working with texts identified by grounded theory. The process of interpretation begins with open coding; coding understood as representing the operations by which data are broken down and conceptualised through a process of close examination and asking questions about phenomena reflected in the data (Strauss and Corbin 1990:62).

In this study, the elements of the self-image and role conception will be analysed by the method of open coding. Open coding of the material will be conducted guided by central questions and with the help of sensitising concepts which can be defined as concepts that suggest directions along which to look and rest on a general sense of what is relevant in the texts (Flick 2009:473). The central questions are as follows; what are the shared understandings on 1) what the EU is and 2) what it does and/or should do. The empirical analysis will take note off all statements with reference to both how the policy-makers define and represent the EU and how they define the “duties, functions, responsibilities and commitments of the EU” (Aggestam 2004:78).

By an open coding guided by central questions and sensitising concepts, the data can be ordered into units of meaning in the form of concepts (Flick 2009:307), which constitute, in this study, the elements of self-image and role conception. The sources for constructing the labels are taken from the material itself. So the data is not forced into predetermined thematic categories.

Open coding is the first basic analytical step without which the rest of analysis could not take place (Strauss and Corbin 1990:62) where the main goal is to break down and understand a text by developing concepts in line with research aims. By the method of open coding, the analysis of the textual material becomes methodologically realised and manageable (Flick 2009:317). The combination of open coding with increasingly focused tools of analysis can contribute to the development of a deeper understanding of the content and the meaning of the

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10 Although the method of open coding conducted in this study is developed within the grounded theory framework, it should be explicit from the theory chapter that this study does not have the ambition of formulation of theory from the data, the central aim of grounded theory.
text (ibid). Now, it is possible to turn to Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to discourse analysis, the conceptual tools of which will be used to restructure the findings after the first step of open coding.

4.1.2 Laclau and Mouffe’s Approach to Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is not just one approach, but rather a series of interdisciplinary approaches (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:1) which might be built upon distinctive philosophical and theoretical premises. Hence, in every application of discourse analysis, meaning and scope of discourse and its application are relative to the different theoretical systems in which it is embedded (Howarth 2000:3). In the same vein, Jorgensen and Phillips accept discourse analysis as a package containing philosophical premises, theoretical models, methodological guidelines and specific techniques for analysis (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:4). Accordingly, an inquiry involving discourse analysis can have its theoretical and methodological framework deeply intertwined with a multiperspectival outlook (ibid.). As already asserted, this study has such a multiperspectival outlook. The theoretical assumptions and concepts as well as the meaning of discourse as employed in this study are made explicit in the theory chapter. Here, I aim to explain the analytical concepts used for analysing the EU’s official foreign policy discourse.

For analysing the EU foreign policy discourse, the analytical concepts borrowed from the Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to discourse analysis will be used. This particular approach to discourse analysis is deemed to be the most appropriate for the purposes of this study due to its focus on understanding change within the discursive terrain. Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach attributes the central place to the contingency of meaning (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:25-26). By contingency, Laclau and Mouffe remark that any fixation of meaning in the form of a particular discourse is possible but not necessary (ibid.) and the task of discourse analysis is to uncover constant attempts to fix meaning. Due the centrality it attributes to the contingency of meaning, Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach is equipped with analytical tools that can capture change within the discursive terrain.

Discourse has been defined (in the section 3.3) as the structure of rules regulating statements. Discursive terrain here refers to the discourse that operates in one particular realm; that of EU’s foreign policy. Discursive terrain and the EU’s official foreign policy discourse are the terms used interchangeably throughout the analysis.
According to Laclau and Mouffe, a central entry point to a discursive terrain is to identify discursive nodal points (DNPs) (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:29-30). A *nodal point* can be defined as a privileged sign around which other signs are organised; and indeed, due to its centrality, other signs acquire meaning through their relationship with the nodal point (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:112, quoted in Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 26). Hence; looking at which signs have a privileged status, and how are they defined in relation to the other signs in the discourse constitute one central step of entering the discursive field. (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:29-30).

Another entry point to the analysis of a discursive terrain is to focus on specific expressions in their capacity as articulations. *Articulation* refers to the positioning of signs in relation to other signs (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:105, quoted in Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:28). As Laclau and Mouffe (1985:105) accept “discourse” as the structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice (quoted in Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:26), articulation can be accepted as the central discursive practice characterising the discursive terrain. Hence, the analysis of the discursive terrain can proceed from the central step of asking the question of what meanings have been established by the positioning of different signs in particular relationships with one other (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:29-30).

As already clarified, a nodal point is a privileged sign around which other signs are organised. Looking at the broader picture, it can be said that the meaning of the overall discursive terrain is stabilised around discursive nodal points (Diez 2001:16). The main mechanism for the stabilisation of meaning is through the articulation of DNPs to others signs of the discourse. Diez states that the central function of the DNPs is the stabilisation of meaning by their articulation with more general concepts (*ibid.*). As the articulation of DNPs within the discursive terrain constitutes the central mechanism for the stabilisation of meaning; by analysing how nodal points are articulated in relation to other signs in the discourse throughout a period of time, it is possible to identify change taking place over meaning within the discursive terrain (*ibid.*).

The analysis of the discursive terrain by using the analytical concepts of “discursive nodal point” and “articulation” renders the researcher sensitive towards any change in meaning within the discursive terrain. For a foreign policy actor such as the EU, which is in the process
of making, this approach is particularly appropriate to uncover whether and how the EU’s self-image and role conceptions have evolved. Accordingly, by using the conceptual tools borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe, the study aims to find out continuity and change in the EU’s official foreign policy discourse.

4.2 Material

The data of qualitative analysis is composed of texts. While studies in the field of international relations often have official texts as research material, the scope of material can be much broader according to the research questions and the ambition of the study. This is so, particularly if foreign policy formulation is thought to be taking place within a larger political and public sphere; hence drawing upon representations articulated by a large number of individuals, institutions, media outlets and if an intertextual understanding of foreign policy is adopted holding that texts build their arguments and authority through references to other texts (Hansen 2006:7). Taking into account contemporary dynamics of communication, it can also be questionable to exclusively deal with the written material at the expense of visual sources. However, this study limits itself to a narrow scope material to be analysed.

4.2.1 Documents Selected for Analysis

According to Flick, after deciding to use documents in the research and specifying the sort of documents that will be used, a major step will be to construct a corpus of documents. This step, in turn, refers to the selection of documents that will be used in the analysis (Flick 2009:258). As this study does not have any ambition of generalisation and has a totally interpretive endeavour, the documents have been selected with a view to their relevance to the research aims. Accordingly, the documents chosen cover the period from 1999 to 2009 and

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12 The empirical analysis covers the period of 1999-2009. A brief historical outline considering the development of the CFSP is provided in this study in the introductory section. Based on this outline, this study’s selection of the period for analysis is based on the assumption that the period after 1999 represents a time frame in which the EU has been particularly active in communicating the nature and objective of its foreign policy. A central institutional reform seeking to address the problems of visibility and coherence of the EU external action has been realised with the appointment of Solana to the post of High Representative for the CFSP. It is also in 1999 that a
are principally of three types; Presidency Conclusions of the Council Meetings\textsuperscript{13} (those held in June and December each year), framework documents about CFSP and the speeches of key foreign policy actors of a general and strategic nature. The selection of the foreign policy speeches merits a few more notes.

Aggestam (2004:23) states that the key official foreign and security policy speeches, to have the format of a key FP speech; should necessarily be of a general and strategic nature with the policy-maker setting out the broad outlines of foreign and security policy. They should also be necessarily delivered by principal policy-makers. The term foreign policy-makers, in turn, refer to politicians and officials involved in the policy-making process (\textit{ibid.}).

Javier Solana has been the High Representative for CFSP and Secretary General of the Council of the European Union during the period 1999-2009. His appointment to the post coincides with other major developments in the progression of CFSP and CSDP. As High Representative for CFSP, one of his central aims has been to communicate the nature, functions and objectives of the common foreign policy to the public. Accordingly, speeches of Solana constitute the major documents to analyse to understand the subjective dimension of the EU foreign policy. The foreign policy speeches also include one speech by Benita Ferrero-Walder, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy from 2004 to 2009. The fact that speeches by Commissioners are rather about specific policy areas or third countries and regions has precluded their incorporation into the analysis, as the aim here is to look for broader role conception of the EU rather than contextual or situated role conceptions.

\textsuperscript{13} The European Council gathers together the heads of state or government of the member states of the European Union and the President of the Commission at least twice a year under the chairmanship of the Head of State or Government of the Member State which holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. In practice, the European Council meets at least four times a year, and special European Councils are also organised. Presidency conclusions are published after each meeting. The European Council provides the impetus for the major political issues relating to European integration in different policy fields by issuing guidelines and declarations or resolutions including those related with external relations in the context of the common foreign and security policy. (European Council Website) Sections entitled 'External Relations' and 'European Security and Defence Policy' as well as related annexes in Presidency Conclusions reflect the general consensus among member states about diverse issues related with the progress concerning CFSP.
The list of material is as follows:

- Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meetings, June 1997-2003

4.2.2 Documents as Sources: Methodological Considerations

The general methodological precaution when using documents as data is not to treat documents as simple representations of fact or reality and to ignore the contextual situatedness of the documents referring both to the actors who produced them, for which
purposes and for whom (Flick 2009:257). The interpretivist endeavour of this study makes this precaution unwarranted, since documents are not employed here as means to understanding facts or reality but for the very purpose of understanding the subjective meaning of foreign policy behaviour, thus accepting documents as communicative devices prepared for expressing certain messages to an audience.

It is also important to assess the quality of documents, criteria of authenticity and credibility are the central criteria to use when deciding whether or not to employ specific document for research purposes (Scott 1990:6, quoted in Flick 2009:257). The documents chosen for analysis have been accessed in the archives of the institutions composing them via their official websites. As to representativeness of documents, due regard has been given to the paralleling the purposes of the study and the nature of the documents. The documents have been selected with regard to the author, the content and the audience.

4.3 Methodological Delimitations

This study adopts an integrative methodology, combining the method of open coding with the analytical tools borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach. The fact that this study adopts an integrative methodological approach can be seen as a weakness of the methodological framework. However, two methods have been combined within a common epistemological framework centring on qualitatively understanding subjective meaning reflected in the discourse. While the method of open coding compensates for the fact that discursive approach Laclau and Mouffe is short on methods but long on concepts by reducing and orienting the material, the analytical concepts of discursive approach are used for a deeper analysis of the material in line with research aims.

It is a delimitation of the analysis in this study that not all the empirical material in the relevant time frame have been examined. Due to the limitation of time, the material to be analysed has been narrowed down. However, due regard is given to the research orientation
and aims to make a sound selection of empirical material. Another limitation considering the empirical material is that it does not embrace an intertextual outlook holding that texts build their arguments and authority through references to other texts; an approach which would significantly broaden the ambition of the study.

The criticism of objectivity is expectable given the interpretive endeavour of the analysis. To ensure objectivity, it is important that the methods used have been highlighted to enable the reader to follow how the analysis has been done. This is also a central point concerning the warranting criteria of validity and reliability. The proceeding section on reliability and validity concludes this chapter.

### 4.4 Reliability and Validity

Any research endeavour has to be assessed against objective criteria. The central question concerning criteria for assessment in qualitative research, is whether or to what extent standard criteria and concepts for assessment in quantitative research can be employed in qualitative research (Flick 2009:384). Reliability and validity are two standard criteria in standardised or quantitative research. Reliability concerns whether any repetition of same research methods would lead to same results (Flick 2009:473). Validity, on the other hand, denotes whether the researcher actually sees what she thinks she sees when analysing the material (Flick 2009:387).

The discussions concerning the ways of reformulating these criteria and proposals for alternative conceptions of criteria for qualitative research are long (Flick 2009:392-395 and need no elaboration here. However, there seems to be a consensus on the point in methodology literature that the criteria of validity and reliability should be understood in a way which do justice to the specificity of qualitative research and hence understood more in

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14 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meetings which were held in June and December are selected as June and December sessions can be accepted as the central ones. However, I could not access the Presidency Conclusions of 2005 December, 2006 June and 2008 December. The speeches of Solana and Ferrero-Waldner have been selected according to their content. However, the fact that the speeches of External Relations Commissioners before 2006 have not been published limited the range of documents included for analysis.
procedural terms. Ensuring reliability and validity in qualitative research depends on whether the research process is documented in an adequate way and made as transparent as possible for the reader (Flick 2009:387,391) and whether the reader can follow the steps that have been taken in order to reach the result, thus giving the reader the opportunity to make his or her own evaluations (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:146).

To ensure validity and reliability, due attention is given to clarity both in the methodology and analysis chapters about which tools have been used and how the analysis has been undertaken. It is often the case in interpretive qualitative research that analysis proceeds in a back and forth manner rather than linear which makes it more difficult to communicate the steps of the analysis with the reader. However, the proceeding chapter of analysis will seek to be explicit both considering the steps undertaken for analysis and the structure of presentation of the findings. Moreover, a considerable number of quotes have been used in order to render the empirical material more accessible to the reader and to substantiate the findings. It is with the analysis chapter that the study now continues.
5 Analysis

5.1 Introduction

Before proceeding to the analysis, some central issues have to be clarified. One is the difference between coordinative and communicative discourse. Schmidt (2008) makes a distinction between coordinative and communicative discourse. Coordinative discourse emerges in the policy sphere where policy-makers engage one another about policy construction. Communicative discourse, on the other hand, emerges at the political sphere in which political actors engage with the public about the necessity and appropriateness of particular policies (Schmidt 2008:310).

Among the three types of documents that are analysed, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meetings represent the coordinative discourse. Here the discourse is expected to be rather fixed. This is because; the documents can be viewed as reflecting the general contours of consensus among the member states without a deeper elaboration on concepts. The foreign policy speeches along with key framework documents, on the other hand, can be accepted as communicative discourse aiming to communicate the objectives, nature and progression of the EU foreign policy to a general public. Hence it is expectable that the speeches deal more deeply with various issues and are more open to an elaborate analysis.¹⁵

¹⁵ The distinction is made for better reflecting the differences that might occur between different types of material. Although no inconsistency is observed between coordinative and communicative discourse in terms of their overall message, some elements have appeared central in the former while secondary in the latter –or vice versa-. The analysis will be sensitive to these kind of differences.
What follow is an analysis of the EU’s official FP discourse. The elements of the EU self-image and role conception are found by the conducting an open coding of the material guided by central questions and sensitising concepts. Open coding has reduced and oriented the material in line with the research question and aim. The elements are found inductively from the material without forcing the data into pre-determined categories. The labels for the elements of the EU self-image and role conception are constructed from the material itself. The central questions are as follows; what are the shared understandings on 1) what the EU is and 2) what it does and/or should do. The empirical analysis will take note off all statements with reference “duties, functions, responsibilities and commitments” of the EU.

Each element has been analysed with the analytical concepts borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to discourse analysis. Hence, the central focus has been on whether or how the meaning of an element has changed and how it is articulated to other signs in the discourse. Another central focus concerning the overall discursive terrain has been to identify the nodal point(s) if any and to uncover how they have been articulated to other signs. As already made explicit, two central entry points to the discourse are the identification of the nodal points and of expressions in their capacity as articulations. The questions that guide the analysis here are; how the meaning of each element of self-image and role conception has changed? What are the nodal points and how are they articulated within the discursive terrain? And, how are the elements of the EU self-image articulated to the EU’s role conception?

The analysis is structured in three main sections covering; first, the elements of the EU self-image, second, the elements of the EU role conception and third, the articulation between the EU self-image and role conception.

5.2 The EU Self-image

It has been clarified within the theoretical framework that identity here is understood in political terms; as a construct and as a process rather than a given. Such an understanding of

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16 Discourse and discursive terrain is used interchangeably throughout the analysis. Hence, discursive terrain denotes the EU official foreign policy discourse.
identity calls attention to the processes of self-identification by the individuals in a group, in which foreign policy is particularly important (Lucarelli 2006:13). Discursive representation constitutes a major part of collective identity formation. Hence, identity can be analysed discursively in terms of the meaning that policy-makers give to it on a symbolic level. Self-image here refers to the shared understandings on the level of policy-makers of what the EU is as reflected in the EU’s official foreign policy discourse.

5.2.1 Nodal Point of “European Integration”

It has been asserted in the previous chapter that one central entry point to the discursive terrain is to identify the discursive nodal points. Nodal points can also occupy a central place concerning the discursive representation of identity. Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that identity is discursively constructed by way of identification with a cluster of signifiers with a nodal point at its centre (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:43).

The analysis of the self-image of the EU has led to the designation of five different elements which together constitute how the policy-makers conceive the EU. The analysis shows that the EU is conceived as a responsible actor, an actor in demand, the prime example of regional integration, a pole of attraction and as a Union based on particular values.

The analysis also shows that all elements of the EU’s self-image are organised around “European integration”. Indeed, “European integration” can be accepted as the nodal point in the discourse in that it is the privileged sign around which other elements are organised.

While all elements of the EU self-image are linked with the nodal point, the strongest articulation of “European integration” is with the self-image of the EU as based on particular values. The values are conceived to be based on the foundation of European integration while at the same time being consolidated throughout the process. The nodal of point of “European integration” is at the centre of all the elements of the EU’s self-image by way of which the EU is discursively represented, hence acquires its identity by identification on a discursive level.

In the remaining part of the analysis, I aim to examine the elements of the EU’s self image as reflected in the Council’s foreign policy discourse.
5.2.2 A Responsible EU

A responsible actor is the central element of the EU self-image throughout the coordinative discourse. Articulation of responsibility to other signs in the discourse is reflective both of its source—why the EU is conceived as responsible—and its operational aspect—what is responsibility directed at.\(^{17}\)

An important question concerns the source of the EU’s responsibility or why policy-makers conceive the EU as a responsible actor. There might be different sources of responsibility.\(^ {18}\) In the official EU discourse, responsibility is largely stemming from the capacity principle. There are several references particularly to the size and the economic weight of the Union in the same context with its responsibilities.\(^ {19}\)

Early on, responsibility is expressed within the context of the development of a common European security and defence policy and common operational capabilities. Presidency Conclusions of 1999 states the necessity of the development of operational capabilities to enable the Union “to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.”\(^ {20}\) Responsibility is also emphasised in the context of the development of operational capabilities but directed at crisis situations; centering on the development of crisis management and conflict prevention tasks. The content of crisis management and conflict prevention is made explicit by reference to Petersberg tasks. By 2003, responsibility seems to have shifted its focus; it is now directed at guaranteeing a secure Europe by

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\(^{17}\) It can also be seen as referring to role conceptions of the EU. However, it is included here as it is indicative of change that will be further explained in the subsequent sections.

\(^{18}\) One of the principles that are serving to identify those agents who stand out as most likely candidates incurring certain duties, is the capacity principle. Capacity principle can be read as the assertion that all those capable have a duty to do X. (Szigeti 2006:27)

\(^{19}\) The EU grows to encompass 25 countries with some 450 million inhabitants producing one quarter of the world's GDP, we have a duty to assume our responsibilities on the world stage. (Solana 2003)

\(^{20}\) We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence. (Presidency Conclusions June 1999 Annex III)

\(^{21}\) The European Council underlines the Union's determination in its approach to conflict prevention and crisis management to assume fully its Petersberg task responsibilities as referred to in Helsinki. (Presidency Conclusions June 2000)
maintaining a sound international order. This shift can be located within the broader framework of change within the discursive terrain that has taken place with the launch of the ESS (2003) which will be further explained in the section 5.3.4.

5.2.3 The EU in Demand

This element of the EU self-image as an actor “in demand” reflects how perceptions and expectations of others have been acknowledged and have been constitutive of the way policy-makers conceive the EU’s self-image; as proposed by the constructivist perspective of “actorness”. This is also acknowledged by role theory which formulates expectations of others as “role expectation”. The demand for the EU seems to come from both the EU citizens and third parties in international politics.

The role expectation of other actors from the EU is often articulated as the need for the EU’s action in various contexts. The element of the EU’s self image as an actor in demand is portrayed as linked with its “readiness to address humanitarian crises” and “to the values of inclusiveness and social tolerance” that are common to the member countries, and with its “know-how in regional integration”. European integration is perceived as both a “source of inspiration” for third parties and as what enables the EU to be a global actor.

Apart from the expectations of third parties, the discourse reflects another dimension of expectation; the expectation of the public for more effective European foreign policy. Solana refers to the “pressure, from leaders and public alike, for a more effective Europe in key policy areas”. Public is also assumed to expect the EU’s “full role on the strategic issues of

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22 Our Union is committed to facing up to our responsibilities, guaranteeing a secure Europe and a better world. To this end, we will contribute relentlessly to strengthening and reshaping the institutions of global governance, regional cooperation and expanding the reach of international law. (Presidency Conclusions June 2003)

23 There is a “demand for Europe”: linked to our know-how in regional integration; to our readiness to address humanitarian crises; to the values of inclusiveness and social tolerance that are common to all our countries. (Solana 2002)

24 Many regions see European integration as a source of inspiration. Around the world, people call for our assistance, for our presence and for our action. (Solana 2005)

25 This sense of shared responsibility for the fate of our planet is reflected in the pressure, from leaders and public alike, for a more effective Europe in key policy areas, notably the environment and foreign policy. (Solana 2002)
today and tomorrow’ by ‘acting together’. Ferrero-Waldner also refers to the role expectations from the EU when she posits EU citizens’ and partner countries’ expectation from the EU to play a greater role on the international stage. Solana articulates expectations of third parties and the EU citizens as two reasons for the development of the common EU foreign policy.

5.2.4 The EU as the Prime Example of Regional Integration

The representation of the EU as a successful example of regional integration is one central element of the EU self-image and has a direct articulation with the nodal point of “European integration”. Its articulation – in terms of its primary effects- within the discursive terrain has been changed; from an emphasis on its capacity to promote stability and wealth to that of alleviating conflict and building peace.

It can be understood that policy-makers perceive the EU as “one of the most sophisticated and advanced examples of regional integration in the world”. The regional integration is often emphasised for its capacity to create stability and economic wealth, by reference to the EU’s being the “largest trading bloc in the world and a major actor across the whole range of global, financial and economic arena”. But it is also cited primarily as an endeavour undertaken for the purpose of building a peaceful relationship and alleviating the prospect of

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26 Only by acting together can we Europeans exert meaningful influence on key global trends and issues. Our publics understand this very well. Indeed they insist that Europe should play its full role on the strategic issues of today and tomorrow. My view is that we have no choice but to heed this call for action. (Solana 2005)
27 Opinion polls have shown both EU citizens and our partner countries want the EU to play a greater role on the international stage. (Ferrero-Waldner 2006)
28 There are many reasons for this (development of the common EU foreign policy). Here are just two: The first is that the rest of the world has great expectations of the European Union's global role. The second is that so do our own citizens. (Solana 2007)
29 Over the last forty years, the European Union has become one of the most sophisticated and advanced examples of regional integration in the world. (Solana 1999)
30 The EU is now the largest trading bloc in the world and a major actor across the whole range of global, financial and economic arena. (Solana 1999)
violent conflict among member states\textsuperscript{31} with reference to Europe’s progress “from conflict and disarray to freedom, peace and stability”.\textsuperscript{32}

It is possible to observe that the development of the security component of the EU foreign policy has changed the way regional integration has been articulated as an element of the EU self-image; successful European integration has come to be articulated in its capacity to build a secure and stable Europe rather than a prosperous and wealthy Europe. The ESS (2003) reiterates the role of European integration project in achieving peace and stability that the continent currently enjoys, by stating that the creation of the European Union has been central to the unprecedented period of peace and stability in Europe’s history.\textsuperscript{33} The ESS (2003) also refers to European integration in terms of a confidence building regime among member states.

5.2.5 The EU as a Pole of Attraction

The EU’s self-image as a pole of attraction appears in the early stages in the formulation of official discourse on foreign policy. This element of the EU self-image is directly related with the nodal point of European integration and the element of the EU’s self-image as based on particular values.

The EU is conceived as “a pole of attraction to those in Europe seeking stability within a regional framework” and this element of self-image is linked with the process of enlargement given the explicit reference\textsuperscript{35}. The self-image of the EU as a pole of attraction is closely linked with another element of its self-image as a Union of values; as can be understood from

\textsuperscript{31} The European Union was founded by those who sought peace and reconciliation (Solana 2000)
\textsuperscript{32} It (the EU) had been founded on the basis of essentially economic instruments, but for an overriding political purpose: the prevention of conflict. (Solana 2001)
\textsuperscript{33} In Western Europe, the last 50 years have seen spectacular progress: from conflict and disarray to freedom, peace and stability. (Solana 2002)
\textsuperscript{34} Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. (ESS 2003)
\textsuperscript{35} It (the EU) continues to play a key role as a pole of attraction to those in Europe seeking stability within a regional framework. The EU has responded to this by embarking on its most ambitious programme of enlargement ever undertaken in its history. (Solana 2001)
the conception of the EU at the same time as “a pole of stability, democracy and prosperity”, participation to which is “dependent on a commitment to common values.” 36

5.2.6 The EU as a Union Based on Values

Another element of EU-self image appearing in the official foreign policy discourse portrays the EU as a holder of particular values. It will be analysed in the section 5.3.3 how this element of the EU self-image is articulated to the role conception of the EU. Here, the focus will rather be on the meaning of this element in terms of the nature of values emphasised and their articulation to the nodal point of European integration. Emphasis on this element as part of the EU self-image has been weakened in 2003 accompanied by a change in nature of the values emphasised.

The EU is conceived to be holder of such values as human rights, tolerance, inclusiveness, compassion, solidarity, peace and reconciliation. 37 The values are seen as originating from the integration process itself, indicating that they are conceived as being constructed through a political process rather than being based on a pre-given common culture. Official discourse posits that these values “lie at the foundation of the European Union”38, that “the European Union is based”39 on them and that the EU was “founded by those who sought” these values40. It is clear that values’ articulation to the self-image of the EU is centres on the process of “European integration”, indicating the strong link of the discursive nodal point to this particular element of the EU self-image.

36 In this new geo-political landscape the European Union is an attractive pole of stability, democracy and prosperity. We have maximised our status as a “net exporter of stability” by acknowledging legitimate aspirations to join our Union; while emphasising that this is dependent on a commitment to our common values. (Solana 2002)
37 And we need to be able to assert our values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights in all areas where peoples’ lives depend on relief assistance, because they are the victims of natural catastrophes, or of man-made crises. (Solana 1999)
38 The values of solidarity, of tolerance, of inclusiveness, of compassion are an integral part of European integration. (Solana 2002)
39 And it (the CFSP) is about promoting the values which lie at the foundation of the European Union. (Solana 2000)
40 It (the world) is interested in the role we (the EU) can play internationally, in the impact we can have in support of the values on which the European Union is based. (Solana 2000)
40 The European Union was founded by those who sought peace and reconciliation. (Solana 2000)
It is also important to note that emphasis on values as an element of the EU’s self-image has weakened after 2003. Articulation of values within the discursive terrain has continued, in a form detached from the EU self-image. The emphasis seems to shift from those values on which the European integration is based to the principles of good governance. As will be further elaborated in the section 5.3.4, values of good governance are articulated, not as part of the EU self-image, but within the framework of maintaining a sound international order and with.\textsuperscript{41}

5.3 Role Conceptions of the EU

Role conceptions can be defined as the images that foreign policy-makers hold concerning the general long-term function and performance of a foreign-policy actor in the international system (Aggestam 2006:19). The role conceptions in the official foreign policy discourse is analysed to uncover the shared understanding by policy-makers on what the EU does and/or should do. The analysis led to the designation of four role conceptions. The fact that an emergent role conception of the EU as a protector against transnational challenges has largely replaced the EU’s role conception as the promoter of the values the Union is based on is the most significant aspect of change within the discursive terrain.

5.3.1 The EU as Contributor to International Peace and Security

Maintaining international peace and security can be seen as a very broad expression that might encompass any other role conception. While this role conception is regularly seen throughout the coordinative discourse due to its very broad nature, it is through communicative discourse that it is located within a specific meaning frame. In the context of the official discourse, the expression is important for referring to the multilateral aspect of the EU’s external initiatives.

\textsuperscript{41} If we are to preserve an international order based on the rule of law and respect for those values we hold dear – human rights, democracy, good governance – we need to be using all means at our disposal to persuade emerging powers to sign up to it now. (Ferrero-Waldner 2006)
The fact that its meaning has been specified with reference to the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris, reflects the EU’s adherence to the principal of multilateralism. The position of the UN at the apex of the international system has been reiterated both in the ESS (2003) and the Report on the Implementation of ESS (2008).

5.3.2 The EU as an Actor of Conflict Prevention and Crisis-Management

We have seen that the operational dimension of the self-image of the EU as a responsible actor has been formulated as against crisis situations. The role conception of the EU as an actor of conflict prevention and crisis management is a prevailing one both through the coordinative and communicative discourse. While the meaning of this role conception is rather fixed concerning the former, the latter deals with it in a more elaborate manner. The role conception of the EU as an actor of conflict prevention and crisis management has been located within a regional framework centering on humanitarian and human rights crises. After 2003, reference to crises has come to include an emphasis on interdependency and transnational character of security challenges.

While we have seen an explicit delineation of the meaning of crisis management and conflict prevention by reference to the Petersberg Tasks throughout the coordinative discourse, communicative discourse has a broader formulation of the EU’s security related tasks. In a 1999 speech in which he also refers to the full responsibility of the EU across the whole range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks, Solana also mentions the responsibility for regional security and the necessity to use all legitimate means to project security and stability beyond borders. Here crisis management is situated within a regional framework and has a broader implication.

42 The European Union is committed to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris, as provided for in Article 11 of the TEU. (Presidency Conclusions June 1999 Annex III)
43 The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. (ESS 2003)
44 The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. (RIESS 2008)
45 As the Union enlarges, and as we face new challenges in the next century, we have to be prepared to take more responsibility for regional security, particularly in those areas bordering the Union where we have direct interests.
It is also important to note that crises are understood mainly in terms of humanitarian and human rights crises. It is observable when Solana (1999) mentions the necessity to assert “the values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights in all areas where peoples' lives depend on relief assistance, because they are the victims of natural catastrophes, or of man-made crises”\(^{46}\) or when he states (2002) that “it is an age when humanitarian or human rights crises in a distant part of the world appeal not only to our conscience but also to our own sense of security and stability”.

It is also possible to observe that what is meant by crisis and conflict is located within a broader framework of an increasingly interdependent world, as Solana (2002) openly refers to an interdependent world.\(^{47}\) Solana also states (1999) that in an increasingly interdependent world, crises cannot be ignored.\(^{48}\) Accordingly, it is possible to observe an emphasis on interdependency and transnational character of security challenges; an emphasis which will intensify later on and particularly with the launch of the ESS in 2003.

5.3.3 The EU as Promoter of Values

The promotion of values has been articulated to the EU foreign policy discourse as a central element of the EU role conception.\(^{49}\) In the section 5.2.6, both the emphasised values and how they have been articulated to the nodal point of “European integration” have been analysed. Here, the focus is rather on their articulation to the role conceptions of the EU.

While the reference to values is very limited throughout the coordinative discourse, communicative discourse depicts one central role of the EU as ensuring respect for the

\(^{46}\) And we need to be able to assert our values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights in all areas where peoples' lives depend on relief assistance, because they are the victims of natural catastrophes, or of man-made crises. (Solana 1999)

\(^{47}\) The world has changed also in the sense that today we live in a global age, an age characterised by the degree of our interdependence, and our consciousness of this fact. (Solana 2002)

\(^{48}\) We are witnessing instead a proliferation of more limited and regional security threats. In a world which is increasingly interdependent, we cannot ignore these crises, and we cannot ignore their terrible fall-out in terms of human suffering, and of regional instability. (Solana 1999)

\(^{49}\) Protecting and promoting European values, which are part of our history and very dear to the heart of our citizens, must continue to be a priority. (Solana 2002)
principles and values that the EU is based on and promoting them. Solana (2000) states that the EU should increasingly be able to ensure that particular values are respected, and that other people could also enjoy them\(^{50}\) and that the EU must continue to promote the values and principles on which it is founded in its relations with the rest of the world.\(^{51}\) However, it is not made explicit with which means and under which frameworks the EU would engage in the promotion of values.

However, the official EU foreign policy discourse increasingly becomes clarified considering the articulation of values to the EU’s role conceptions. With the emphasis increasingly shifting towards the principles of good governance after 2003, values have started to be articulated within the framework of maintaining a sound international order. Hence the ESS (2003) posits that ‘Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order’. Ferrero-Waldner (2006) also refers to the necessity of preserving an international order based on the rule of law and respect for those values of human rights, democracy, good governance\(^{52}\).

This role conception of the EU as promoter of values has been refined with an increasing emphasis on the principles of good governance which is indicative of a broader change within the discursive terrain; an emerging role conception of the EU as a protector against transnational challenges. As the analysis will shown in the next section, the principles of good governance are articulated within the framework of maintaining a sound international order, which in turn is seen, as the ultimate means to protect the EU against security challenges.

\(^{50}\) We should increasingly be able to ensure that the rule of law and human rights are respected, and that people throughout the world can, like ourselves, enjoy the benefit of freedom, democracy and prosperity. (Solana 2000)

\(^{51}\) The European Union was founded by those who sought peace and reconciliation. We must continue to promote these values and principles in our relations with the rest of the world. (Solana 2000)

\(^{52}\) If we are to preserve an international order based on the rule of law and respect for those values we hold dear – human rights, democracy, good governance – we need to be using all means at our disposal to persuade emerging powers to sign up to it now. (Ferrero-Waldner 2006)
5.3.4 The EU as Protector against Transnational Challenges

We have seen that the operational dimension of the self-image of the EU as a responsible actor has shifted its direction from crisis situations to transnational challenges; and that the crises have increasingly come to be understood by reference to interdependency and transnational challenges. This evolution should be located within the broader framework of the emergence of a new role conception of the EU as protector against transnational challenges. This role conception becomes observable within the discursive terrain with the launch of the ESS (2003). While the ESS (2003) affirms the EU’s “responsibility for global security and in building a better world”\(^53\), Solana (2003) also reiterates that “As a global actor the Union must now face up to its responsibility for global security”.

With the emergence of this new role conception, an underlined reference to the process of globalisation and the transnational character of security challenges becomes observable. Solana’s statement (2005) that, “Ours is a globalising world. It offers many opportunities for millions to better their lives. But is also one of diffuse threats, which no one can tackle alone” and the ESS’s assertion that global solutions are required for global problems\(^54\) are indicative of emphasis on the necessity of concerted action to address security challenges.

The need for integrated action is also underlined by reference to the EU several times. The ability of Europe to respond to contemporary challenges is portrayed as being dependent on collective action. Departing from global trends and transnational nature of contemporary problems, “acting together” is depicted as being the only way of exerting influence\(^55\) and of taking effective action\(^56\). The EU is seen as the platform through which Europe can respond to global problems.\(^57\)

\(^{53}\) Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world. (ESS 2003)

\(^{54}\) The only way to tackle global problems is through global solutions. (ESS 2003)

\(^{55}\) Only by acting together can we Europeans exert meaningful influence on key global trends and issues. (Solana 2005)

\(^{56}\) These days, if you want to solve problems, you must bring together broad constellations of international actors. (...) Effectiveness requires us to group together. (Solana 2008)

\(^{57}\) In this new world, a large part of politics can only be conducted at a continental scale. For us in Europe that means through the European Union. The only way to tackle global problems is through global solutions. (Solana 2009)
It is possible to observe that the protection of the EU has been formulated as lying in sustaining a sound international order by promoting principles of good governance. The ESS (2003) particularly underlines that the way to protect the EU is to promote principles of good governance and to sustain an international order of well-governed democratic states.  

Sustaining a sound international order, on the other hand, is clearly defined as being in the interest of the EU. Hence, with this emergent role conception of the EU, interests have come to be more strongly articulated within the discursive terrain. Paralleling the stronger articulation of interests, the articulation of values has also changed. From here, we can move on to the articulation of interests and values within the discursive terrain.

5.3.5 Articulation: Interests and Values

With the launch of the ESS (2003) and the emergence of the role conception of the EU as protector against transnational challenges, the interests of the EU have begun to be explicitly mentioned in the official discourse, contrary to the period 1999-2003 when the articulation of the EU’s interests had almost been absent in the EU’s official foreign policy discourse and when the values have been central both as constituting an element of the EU self-image and one of the EU’s role conceptions.

The articulation of interests is within the framework of the emergent role conception of the EU as protector against transnational challenges and by reference to the process globalisation and the transnational nature of challenges. Solana refers to the need for the EU to be more outward looking concerning events beyond the EU’s borders which can nevertheless impact upon its interests.  

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58 The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order. (ESS 2003)

59 Increasingly events beyond our borders are having an impact on our own interests. This means that we have to be more outward looking in all areas where we have interests at stake. (Solana 2001)
The EU’s articulation of its interests tend to focus on milieu goals rather than possession goals as reference to wider international interests make clear. Interests have been articulated through the argument that it is in the interest of the EU to have a ring of well governed states at its periphery due to the transnational character of challenges in a globalising world. Both the ESS (2003) and the Report on the Implementation of ESS (2008) have stated that, the best protection for the security of the EU is a world of well-governed democratic states. 

The articulation of interests is not wholly detached from values, as the strong emphasis on principles of good governance indicates. Moreover, interests have openly been depicted as to be based on values. However, it is starkly clear that interests have come to be more strongly articulated within the discursive terrain contrary to the period of 1999-2003 when interests’ articulation within the discursive terrain has been much weaker and exclusively in terms of the promotion of its values. While the promotion of interests had once been formulated exclusively in terms of values and principles that the EU is based on, after the launch of the ESS (2003) promotion of a system of rules has come to be formulated mainly in terms of benefiting the EU.

Considering the articulation of values within the discursive terrain; the emphasis shifts towards the principles of good governance from those values on which the “European integration” is based. This, in turn, indicates that values’ articulation is detached from the discursive nodal point and from one central element of the EU’s self-image as a Union based on values. This is, indeed, a reflection of the broader change within the discursive terrain regarding the articulation between the EU’s self-image and role conception.

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60 Our responsibility is not just to defend the national interest but to put this in the context of wider international interests. (Solana 2008)
61 It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed. (ESS 2003)
62 The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based on our core values. (RIESS 2008)
63 By developing military capabilities, and enhancing its existing civilian capabilities, the European Union will be in a unique situation to draw on a comprehensive range of instruments to support its interests world-wide. We are not in the business of doing this for its own sake. But in support of the values and principles for which the European Union is respected world-wide. (Solana 2000)
64 Mind you, all this (promotion of institutions and rules) is not some naïve do-goodism. We know that all of us, including the strongest, benefit from having a system of rules. And we know that rules need to be enforced. (Solana 2007)
5.4 Articulation: Self-image and Role Conception

We have seen that, the relationship between identity and role can be accepted as a blind spot of role theory and indeed the field of IR in general. The assumption here is that relationship between self-image and role conception can be studied on a discursive level with the help of the concept of “articulation” borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis; to see whether and how elements of the EU self-image have been articulated with the EU’s foreign policy role conception.

The discursive approach adopted in this study posits that examining how discursive nodal points are articulated to other signs in the discourse is central for analysing change. We have seen that “European integration” has appeared as the nodal point of the official foreign policy discourse of the EU; around which all elements of the EU self-image has been organised. It is equally important to look at whether and how the nodal point of “European integration” is articulated to the role conception of the EU during 1999-2009.

The analysis shows that with the emergent role conception of the EU as protector against transnational challenges, the articulation of the nodal point to the role conception has been relaxed which indicates that the projection image of foreign policy has weakened.

5.4.1 “European Integration” & the EU as Promoter of Values

In the early phase –before the launch of the ESS (2003)-, the nodal point of “European integration” has been articulated to the role conception of the EU as promoter of values that the EU is based on.

The articulation between the nodal point and role conception had been through the values which can be seen as the central signifiers of both the EU self-image and role conception. The values are depicted as to be based on the foundation of the European Union, stemming from and consolidated through the integration process itself. As such, the nodal point of “European integration” is strongly linked with the EU self-image as a Union based on values. The EU’s role, on the other hand, is conceived as promoting and projecting these values. The EU’s role
conception in foreign policy had been framed as “promoting the values which lie at the foundation of the Union”\textsuperscript{65}, support of these values had also been formulated as constituting the role expectation from the EU.\textsuperscript{66}

Hence, it can be suggested that the discursive terrain has been characterised by a strong articulation between the self-image and role conception which indicates that the EU’s role conception has been strongly influenced by its self-image. The overall discursive terrain, in turn, can said to be characterised by the projection image of foreign policy\textsuperscript{67}.

5.4.2 “European Integration” & the EU as Protector against Transnational Challenges

After the launch of the ESS (2003), the articulation of the discursive nodal point “European integration” to the role conception of the EU has significantly changed. It has come to be articulated with the emergent role conception of the EU as protector against transnational challenges through capacity dimension. European integration has been articulated in terms of providing Europe with the capacity to respond to transnational challenges in a globalising world through the argument that the transnational nature of challenges requires a joint effort to be coped with.

The fact that the articulation of the nodal point of “European integration” to the EU’s role conception is no longer through “values”, which is a central signifier of the EU self-image, but through capacity dimension – which does not figure out as among the elements of the EU’s self-image, suggests that the strong articulation between self-image and role conception

\textsuperscript{65} And it is (CFSP) about promoting the values which lie at the foundation of the European Union. (Solana 2000)
\textsuperscript{66} It is (the world) interested in the role we can play internationally, in the impact we can have in support of the values on which the European Union is based. (Solana 2000)
\textsuperscript{67} Jorgensen (2004:48) describes four different roles of foreign policy. First is the inside-outside function of foreign policy which works to demarcate the self from the outside. Second is the projection image of foreign policy which refers to the projection of one’s own model. Third is the protection image of foreign policy, while the fourth refers to the role of “symbolic representation” of FP, in terms of its ability to represent an actor’s self-image in front of a domestic constituency. Among four roles of foreign policy described by Jorgensen, projection and protection images of foreign policy seem to provide the means by which the discursive terrain can be characterised very generally.
has been dissolved. Moreover the fact that the EU is formulated as the ultimate platform for protecting Europe from global problems or transnational challenges suggest that the discursive terrain has come to be characterised with the protection image of foreign policy.

5.5 Conclusion: Change and Continuity

It is possible to conclude from the above analysis that the EU’s self-image and role conception have been open to change in the period of 1999-2009. A new role conception of the EU as protector against transnational challenges has emerged with the launch of the ESS (2003), which replaced the hitherto prevalent role conception of the EU as promoter of values on which the Union is based.

The analysis of the EU’s self-image has shown that the discursive nodal point is “European integration”; as a privileged sign around which all elements of the EU self-image has been organised. It is possible to argue that, with the emergent role conception of the EU, the nodal point’s articulation to the role conception has significantly changed.

Early on, the nodal point has been articulated to the role conception through “values” which constitute the central element of the EU self-image. The values that are thought to be based on the European integration are also at the centre of the EU self-image as a Union based on values and its role conception as the promoter of these values. As such, articulation between self-image and role conception has been strong which suggests that projection image of foreign policy has shaped the discursive terrain.

With the emergence of the EU’s new role conception as the protector against transnational challenges, however, the articulation of the nodal point to the role conception has changed. “European integration” is articulated to the role conception in terms of providing the capacity for Europe to cope with transnational challenges in a world increasingly characterised by interdependency and transnational challenges. As the articulation is no longer through the EU self-image, the articulation between the EU self-image and role conception can said to be unravelled. Projection image which had hitherto shaped the discursive terrain has given way to the protection image of foreign policy.
A concomitant change taking place within the discursive terrain concerns the articulation of interests and values. After 2003, the EU’s interests have come to be more strongly articulated within the discursive terrain contrary to the 1999-2003 period when the articulation of the EU’s interests had almost been absent in the EU’s official foreign policy discourse. Interests have been framed as protection against transnational challenges by ensuring respect for principles of good governance, particularly in the immediate neighbourhood of the Union. Hence, interests’ articulation is not totally detached from values as the principles of good governance enter the discursive terrain. The emphasis on values centering on maintaining a system of rules and sound institutions, however, are articulated as detached from the EU self-image.
6 Conclusion

6.1 Reflections

It has been argued that although the EU is assumed to be sui-generis both as a polity and an actor in international politics, the analysis of the EU as a foreign policy actor by tools of the existing theories of FPA or IR has considerable merit. Moreover, a focus on identity is thought to yield important insights both to the study of foreign policy in general and specifically to the study of the EU foreign policy.

From such a perspective, role theory is chosen as the theoretical framework of this study as it can be accepted as one of the few conceptual tools to study how identity serves as a context for an actor’s foreign policy. However, the analysis stage has shown that, to be able to draw on this advantage, role theory needs to be developed with regard to the identitative dimension; that is concerning the question of how identity and role relates to one another and what are the tools to discover this relationship.

This study firmly endorses the argument that the frame of reference for both identity and roles is their meaning transported by discourse. Hence, discourse analysis has much to offer for the empirical application of role theory. As highlighting the dimension of how identity and roles change and uncovering the relationship between identity and FP can be deemed as major shortcomings of the existing role-theoretical work, the discursive approach of Laclau and Mouffe has much to offer for the empirical application of role theory. However, Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach is rather weak in terms of tools of analysis it provides and should be combined with more traditional methods of text analysis.

The latter point can indeed be located within the broader framework of discourse analysis as a method. The fact that discourse analysis usually comes with a specific theoretical baggage and is devoid of robust methodological and research design criteria, severely restricts its
potential as a central method that can be used in constructivist research analysing the constitutive forces of social realm.

6.2 Conclusions

For a conclusion, it is not the aim here to repeat the findings of the analysis; but rather to think about the broader implications of the research findings.

One interesting issue concerns the source of change within the discursive terrain. The analysis shows that the change has started to take place with the launch of the ESS (2003). The role of the ESS in prompting change can be indicative of the effect of the EU’s “militarisation”. From such a perspective, the fact that the real change has taken place with the ESS is interesting; while the decision of building autonomous military capacities has been taken in 1999 and CSDP has been declared operational in Laeken Declaration in 2001. Hence, the ESS, should be accepted as a defining document, considering the broader context of EU foreign policy. It should also be emphasised that throughout the ten year period, apart from the general direction of change identified by the analysis, a considerable level of consistency and continuity characterise the discursive terrain.

Another significant question is whether and how the change in the discursive terrain considering the EU role conception impacts upon the actual foreign policy behaviour of the EU. Suffice it to say here that the question constitutes a totally different research focus for the purposes of which the present study can only set the scene. However, alternative to a prioritisation of explanatory and causal theorising, which would centre on the question of whether and to what extent the discourse matters in terms of actors’ choices and behaviours, the theoretical framework of this study posits that the theorisation of the constitutive relationship is as significant to discover actions’ bases in subjective and/or intersubjective understandings and the constitutive relationship between agents and structures.

Within such a framework, it would be interesting for further research; to look at how the changing discourse impacts upon the perceptions and expectations of others, that is; to what extent other actors are conscious of the change concerning the official FP discourse of the EU.
and whether and how the "role expectation" of third parties from the EU has been modified. What would also be interesting; departing from relationship of co-constitution between role performance and identity, is looking at how the FP discourse and role performance impacts upon collective identity-formation processes; how, the messages that the EU citizens receive from the official FP discourse and the EU’s role performance in the world, shape their sense of a common European identity.

As the last point, it should be asserted that reification of the EU as a particular type of actor can hamper the development of ways to better understand the EU as an international actor. Hence, this study firmly shares the view that an approach which recognises the socially constructed nature of the EU foreign policy and which focuses specifically upon the dynamics of that process from the perspective of the actors themselves has evident promise; particularly in light of the fact that the EU foreign policy is in the process of construction and the EU is a foreign policy actor in the making.
While the European Union is often portrayed as a distinctive polity; the distinctiveness is underlined considering the EU as an actor in international politics. Due to its distinctiveness, the EU’s collective foreign policy is a scholarly challenge concerning how to categorise and with which tools to analyse. The fact that the EU’s collective foreign policy constitutes a moving target by being a project and a process as well as a policy contributes to the challenge. The aim of this study is to analyse the EU as a foreign policy actor after 1999, when the Union has acquired autonomous military capabilities and central reforms concerning visibility and representation have entered into force, within a theoretical framework informed by role theory combined with a discursive approach. The central question to be answered is as follows; how the EU self-image and role conception have been constructed in the EU’s official foreign policy discourse in the period 1999-2009?

The purpose of the study can be described as two-fold. The main purpose is to analyse the EU as a foreign policy actor during a ten year period; with a particular concern to discover how its self-image and role conceptions have evolved and changed. The broader purpose, on a more theoretical level, is to develop ways to study a foreign policy actor by empirically applying role theory in combination with a discursive approach which centres on capturing change and the relationship between self-image and role conception.

To place the study in its scientific context, a research overview has been conducted which looks at three particular strands of literature that focuses on the EU as “power”, the actorness of the EU and the role(s) of the EU. Three observations can be made considering the existing research. First; there is a considerable lack of conceptual clarification concerning central concepts such as power and identity, and on how identity impacts on foreign policy (FP). Second; the research proceeds largely on its own terms without borrowing from existing theories of foreign policy analysis (FPA) or international relations (IR). And thirdly; “discourse” does not appear as a frame of reference in the research—albeit a few exceptions-. This study aims at analysing the EU’s foreign policy within the theoretical framework of role
theory combined with a discursive approach. It is assumed that role theory provides a framework in which identity-FP relationship can be better studied. The study is also sensitive concerning discourse and its role for constructing the EU as an international actor. All in all, in its simplest form, this study can be accepted as a contribution to the research on the role(s) of the EU, as a systematic application of role concept combined with a discursive approach centring on change and the identitative dimension roles.

The study is embedded within a theoretical framework informed by social constructivism and role theory. As a meta-theoretical standpoint in political analysis, social constructivism assumes the mutual constitution of structure and agency, which translates to the field of IR as the recognition that international actors are constituted through their existence in the social realm. Social constructivist theory in IR claims that normative and ideational structures shape social identities of agents which, in turn, shape their interests and consequently actions. Epistemologically, social constructivism is hermeneutic or interpretivist asking “what” or “how possible” questions instead of “why” questions due to their preoccupation with analysing actions’ bases in subjective and/or intersubjective domains composed of dominant belief systems, conceptions of identity, and perceptions.

Embedded within constructivist ontology, role theory encompasses how individual agents and social structures are dynamically interrelated. A central advantage of the theory is that it can reflect the complex and dynamic interplay between actor’s own role conception and structurally guided role expectations of others within an intersubjective social structure. Based on its identitative dimension, role theory also recognises identity as offering or circumscribing roles available to an actor and supplying these roles with meaning. Hence, role theory can be accepted one of the few conceptual tools to study how identity serves as a context for an actor’s foreign policy. Role conception, defined as the images that foreign policy-makers hold concerning the general long-term function and performance of an international actor in the international system, is the central concept of role theory for the purposes of this study which focuses on the intentional perspective of how actors themselves are involved in defining roles and attributing meaning to their actions. It is a central assumption of this study that identity and role conception can be analysed by studying language in the form of discourse. Here, discourse can be understood as the structure of patterns regulating statements that the researcher should uncover this pattern to understand the subjective meaning of actor behaviour.
The methodology of the study is a qualitative one centring on interpretation as the research aim and orientation necessitate. An integrative approach is adopted combining the method of open coding with the analytical concepts borrowed from Laclau and Mouffe’s approach to discourse analysis. The documents for analysis have been selected with a view to their relevance considering the research aims. Accordingly, the documents chosen cover the period from 1999 to 2009 and are principally of three types; Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Meetings (June and December), two framework documents about CFSP – European Security Strategy (ESS) 2003 and the Report on the Implementation of the ESS (2008) and the speeches of key foreign policy actors of a general and strategic nature – nine speeches by Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP (1999-2009) and one speech by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy (2004-2009).

The analysis is conducted in two central steps guided by the methods chosen for the analysis. By conducting an open coding of the material guided by central questions and with the help of sensitising concepts, the elements of the EU self-image and role conception are found. The central questions are as follows; what are the shared understandings on 1) what the EU is and 2) what it does and/or should do. The empirical analysis will take note off all statements with reference to both how the policy-makers define and represent the EU and how they define the “duties, functions, responsibilities and commitments of the EU”. The open coding reduced and oriented the material in line with research aims.

The second step is the restructuring of the material with the help of analytical concepts of Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach. Here, the central focus has been on whether or how the meaning of each element of the EU’ self-image and role conception has changed. The central focus concerning the overall discursive terrain, however, has been to identify the nodal point(s) if any and to discover their articulation to other signs in the discourse as this is accepted as central entry points to the discursive terrain. The questions guiding the analysis at this step are; how the meaning of each element of self-image and role conception has changed? What are the nodal points and how are they articulated within the discursive terrain? And, how are the elements of the EU self-image articulated to the EU role conceptions?
The analysis is structured in three main parts. In the first part on the EU self-image, it was found out that the EU is conceived as a responsible actor, an actor in demand, the prime example of regional integration, a pole of attraction and as a Union based on values. More significantly, the analysis of the EU self-image led to the designation of the nodal point of the discourse as “European integration”. The nodal point of “European integration” is at the centre of all elements of the EU’s self-image by way of which the EU is discursively represented and hence acquires its identity by identification with certain attributes on a discursive level.

The second part of the analysis concerns the EU’s role conception. Four role conceptions have been found out; the EU as contributor to international peace and security, as an actor in crisis management and conflict prevention, as promoter of values that the Union is based on and as protector against transnational challenges. The fact that, with the launch of the European Security Strategy (ESS) (2003), an emergent role conception of the EU as protector against transnational crises has largely replaced the EU’s hitherto prevalent role conception as the protector of values is the most significant aspect of change accompanied with a stronger articulation of interests within the discursive terrain. The interests of the EU have come to be more strongly articulated, contrary to the period 1999-2003 when the articulation of the EU’s interests had almost been absent in the EU’s official foreign policy discourse and or have exclusively been in terms of values. Interests and values are not totally detached however, but rather linked through the principles of global governance.

The third part of the analysis looks at how the nodal point of “European integration” has been articulated to the EU’s role conception. Within the framework of Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach, this is accepted both as a way of highlighting how the EU’s self-image relates with its role conception and of understanding change within the discursive terrain. The finding here is that the articulation of the nodal point of “European integration” to the role conception of the EU has significantly changed with the emergent role conception of the EU as a protector against transnational challenges.

The nodal point of “European integration” has been articulated to the role conception of the EU as promoter of values through the values which can be seen as the central signifiers of both the EU self-image and role conception. The values that are thought to be based on the process of European integration are also at the centre of the EU self-image as Union based on
values and its role conception as promoter of these values. However, the nodal point is articulated to the role conception of the EU as protector in terms of providing the capacity for Europe to cope with transnational challenges in a world increasingly characterised by interdependency. The fact that articulation is no longer through the EU self-image, indicates that the strong articulation between self-image and role conception has been dissolved. While the discursive terrain has so far been characterised by the projection image of foreign policy, after the launch of the ESS (2003) and the emergence of a new role conception of the EU as a protector against transnational challenges, the protection image has started to shape the discursive terrain.

The analysis concludes that the discursive construction of the EU’s self-image and role conception have been open to change in the period of 1999-2009. With the launch of the ESS (2003), the emergent role conception of the as protector against transnational challenges has replaced the hitherto prevalent role conception of the EU as promoter of values that it is based on, accompanied by two central changes within the discursive terrain; the unravelling of the articulation between the EU self-image and role conception and a stronger articulation of interests.
8 References

8.1 Primary Sources


8.2 Secondary Sources


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