THE TIES THAT BIND

A Study of Diaspora Engagement Policies in Ghana

Klas Nilsson
Abstract

The present study concerns itself with an aspect of the migration-development debate that has heretofore been surprisingly neglected in academic research. While migrants’ transnational engagement have drawn much attention, the corresponding outreach undertaken by emigration states to actively ‘court’ the diaspora has until recently escaped notice. This study advances the theoretical and empirical knowledge of so-called ‘diaspora engagement policies’, i.e. strategies implemented with the purpose of facilitating and encouraging the involvement of emigrants in the homeland. It contributes theoretically by presenting an analytical framework where these policies are classified into political, economic, and cultural brackets and also evaluated according the their degree of engagement. The framework is subsequently used to structure an empirical analysis of diaspora policies implemented by state institutions in Ghana. The study finds a remarkable range and prevalence of this kind of policies worldwide and it also shows that there has been a significant rapprochement in the most recent decade between state institutions in Ghana and Ghanaians overseas, in particular when it comes to political engagement. The Ghanaian policies of inclusion are more or less isolated instances of inclusion however, and are pursued in an ad hoc manner.

Keywords: migration, diaspora engagement policies, development, remittances, transnationalism, Ghana

Words: 19,968
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<tr>
<td>BOG</td>
<td>Bank of Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Constitution Review Committee</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>Dual Citizenship Act</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
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<td>ERPs</td>
<td>Economic Recovery Programs</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investments</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GCIM</td>
<td>Global Commission on International Migration</td>
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<td>GIPC</td>
<td>Ghana Investment Promotion Centre</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Ghana Immigration Service</td>
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<td>GPRS I</td>
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<td>GPRS II</td>
<td>Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (2006-09)</td>
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<td>GSGDA</td>
<td>Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (2010-13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISSER</td>
<td>Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research</td>
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<td>MIB</td>
<td>Migration Information Bureau</td>
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<td>MIDA</td>
<td>Migration for Development in Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINT</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
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<td>MOESW</td>
<td>Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs &amp; Regional Integration</td>
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<td>MU</td>
<td>Migration Unit</td>
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<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress</td>
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<td>NDPC</td>
<td>National Development Planning Commission</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Population Council</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>New Patriotic Party</td>
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<td>NRGS</td>
<td>Non-Resident Ghanaian Secretariat</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNDC</td>
<td>Provisional National Defence Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROPAA</td>
<td>Representation of People (Amendment) Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>RQAN</td>
<td>Return of Qualified African Nationals</td>
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<td>TOKTEN</td>
<td>Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals</td>
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Introduction

The last decade has seen a sudden and widespread reappraisal of the so-called ‘migration-development nexus’ (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2003). Back in the 1970s the conventional wisdom was that “migration undermines the prospects for local economic development and yields a state of stagnation and dependency” (Massey, et al. 1998, 272). Speaking with Frank (1966), migration from poor countries was at the time seen as little but a ‘development of underdevelopment’. This pessimistic attitude has now been turned on its head. For example, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM 2005, p.5) now argues that migrants “make a valuable economic, political, social and cultural contribution to the societies they have left behind,” and a UN report from 2006 goes one step further, asserting that “international migration constitutes an ideal means of promoting co-development, that is, the coordinated or concerted improvement of economic conditions in both areas of origin and areas of destination based on the complementarities between them.” In these reports and elsewhere, international migrants—currently estimated to around 214 million individuals, or 3.1 percent of world population¹—are increasingly being celebrated as ‘transnational development agents’ (Faist 2008).

The most immediate cause for the emergence of more optimistic views—which is in fact a reemergence (de Haas 2008)—is probably the size and growth of remittances (Newland 2007). In simplest terms, remittances are the money migrants transfer back home to their families and communities. They have been trumpeted as a significant and stable ‘bottom-up’ source of development finance and are framed by World Bank economist Dilip Ratha (2007) as “the most tangible and perhaps the least controversial link between migration and development.” According to the most recent estimates, the recorded flow of remittances to the developing world stood at a massive $325 billion last year. As a point of comparison, foreign aid (ODA) to poor countries reached ‘only’ $129 billion the same year, which is the highest level ever.² Add to this that unrecorded flows of remittances—for example all

¹ Source: United Nations Population Division, available online at [http://esa.un.org/migration/]. Note: All web-pages included in this essay were accessible and had the content referred to as of May 24, 2011.

² Remittance data are available from the World Bank at [http://go.worldbank.org/0IK1E5K7U0]. Kapur (2004) provides a discussion of the severe limitations in remittance data. Data on ODA are drawn from OECD aid statistics at [www.oecd.org/dac/stats]. Note that remittances and aid typically go to different countries, with middle-income nations, such as Mexico, China and the Philippines, receiving the lions share of remittances (see World Bank 2011).
money delivered in person—could add “50 percent (or more)” (World Bank 2006, p.xiii) to the recorded flows, thus bringing total remittances to a jaw-dropping $650 billion in 2010, but this figure is all but reliable of course. This massive redistribution of wealth from rich to poor countries has certainly done a lot to alleviate fears of migration harming Third World development. Devesh Kapur (2004) even characterizes remittances as “the new development mantra”—an epithet that could be extended to migration more generally (Castles 2008).

Monetary contributions are not the only link between migrants and their country of origin of course. Sensing a need to move beyond remittances, Newland and Patrick (2004, p.2) note that for many countries, “the Diaspora are [sic.] a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI), market development ..., technology transfer, philanthropy, tourism, political contributions, and more intangible flows of knowledge, new attitudes, and cultural influence” (see also Goldring 2003). Ties between diasporas (a concept I delineate below) and their homelands can in other words be broad and multi-faceted and should not be reduced to a business-transaction.

The impact of migration on development—and indeed the very relationship between these terms—is (of course) contested. Somewhat simplified, it is possible to pick out two contrasting views in the debate. Firstly, there seems to be a fairly widespread ‘practitioner optimism’, fueled by the global policy discourse, where migration is framed as an opportunity to be harnessed. The belief in triple wins—“for migrants, for their countries of origin and for the societies that receive them” (UN 2006, p.5)—is a cornerstone of this view (see also IOM 2005; World Bank 2006; DFID 2007). Secondly, it is possible to discern a body of ‘scholar skepticism’, that more often than not emphasizes the complex and contextual nature of the migration-development intersection (see, for instance, Skeldon 2008; Bakewell 2008; Castles 2008; Delgado Wise and Márquez Covarrubias 2009).

Juxtaposing the general conclusion from the UN report, with that of migration scholar Hein de Haas provides an illustration of the two standpoints:

“Mounting evidence indicates that international migration is usually positive both for countries of origin and of destination.” (UN 2006, p.13)

“The accumulated empirical evidence highlights the sheer heterogeneity of migration-development interactions in migrant-sending communities and regions, which should forestall any blanket assertions on migration-development interactions.” (de Haas 2008, p.49)

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3 The fact that there is an obvious fourth winner, namely the corporations that employ migrant workers, is rarely mentioned (see Boucher 2008).
1.1 Research objectives

The present study concerns itself with an aspect of the migration-development debate that has heretofore been surprisingly neglected in academic research. Optimists and skeptics may disagree on the precise impact of migration in the country of origin, but they would probably both accept the postulation that the potential benefits of migration ultimately hinge on the transnational ties between diaspora and homeland. Transfers of money, ideas, knowledge, and technology, frequent visits and even permanent return can all be interpreted as effects of the willingness and increased ability to foster relationships across state borders (de Haas 2008, p.39). However, the literature has typically focused on just one side of this relationship, namely migrant transnationalism, effectively sidelining the continued importance of states in actively creating an institutional architecture for reciprocal interaction. The overall aim of this study is therefore to advance the knowledge of so-called diaspora engagement policies, an emerging phenomenon which will be explored both theoretically and empirically. The concept has been defined broadly by Alan Gamlen (2008b, p.3) as “state institutions and practices that apply to members of that state’s society who reside outside its borders.” Simply put; diaspora policies constitute the state side of the state-diaspora relationship, and have the overall purpose of facilitating and encouraging the involvement of emigrants in the homeland.

The first and main objective of the study is to advance the basic analysis of diaspora engagement. What are they, and how can we study them? I argue that we need some kind of analytical framework in order to identify and make sense of these practices which are quite unconventional, more or less incoherent in nature, and typically spread over several different state institutions. I will present, evaluate, and expand a fairly simple typology that facilitates a systematic analysis of the phenomenon. The second, more empirical objective is to put the analytical framework to use by outlining the diaspora policies implemented by one particular state—the West African nation of Ghana. The assessment of Ghana’s engagement with the diaspora is explorative in nature and will highlight the usefulness of the proposed typology.

In accordance with the research objectives, the following research questions guide the study:

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4 They are unconventional in the sense that they approach emigrants as if they were a part of the domestic population even though they actually live under another state’s jurisdiction (Gamlen 2008b).
1. What are diaspora engagement policies, and how can we systematically investigate them?

2. What diaspora policies have been put in place by the government of Ghana to facilitate and encourage the involvement of Ghanaians abroad in the homeland?

1.2 Delimitations

This study is explicitly designed to approach migration from the emigration point of view, and state-diaspora relations from the state perspective and I argue that both these viewpoints have been sidelined in previous academic research. Firstly, despite the surge of transnational theories since the 1990s, the relationship between state and migrant has overwhelmingly been studied and theorized from the immigration side, conceptualizing migrants as ‘those who arrive’ (Bauböck 2003, p.708; Barry 2006). The skewness could have something to do with the fact that most academic research centers are located in affluent nations, where immigration-related issues shadows emigration-related ones (Fitzgerald 2006). Additionally, Gamlen (2008a, p.841) claims that many commentators have overlooked the outreach made by emigration states because of a conventional geopolitical mind-set where ‘domestic policies’ are neatly sealed from ‘external affairs’. With that understanding diaspora engagement, which is essentially “domestic policies beyond borders,” tends to be dismissed as an oxymoron. In any case, the rather one-sided immigration focus disregards the basic fact that every immigrant is simultaneously an emigrant, and thus often attached to two states (Barry 2006, p18).

Secondly, as noted above, migrants have recently been widely celebrated as ‘transnational development agents’, capable of fueling socio-economic progress ‘at home’. As noted by Kapur (2004, p.7) this idea strikes the “right cognitive chords” as ‘migrants+remittances’ thus replace ‘states+foreign aid’ as crucial drivers of development (see also Faist 2008). It is perhaps not surprising then, that the ‘bottom-up’ transnational activity of migrants has received much attention, while the ‘top-down’ diaspora policies pursued by emigration states have been less studied and theorized (Gamlen 2008b). This study argues that we should not downplay the important role played by states in institutionalizing the transnational relationship between dias-
pora and homeland (cf. Ionescu 2006). It is also asserted that migrant transnationalism—political engagement in particular—is still taking place within a system of territorially bound states. Rarely does this activity challenge the system as such; indeed, most often it depends on it (Bauböck 2003, p.701; Barry 2006, p.58; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, p.20f).

I have furthermore delimited the group of potential informants for this study to Ghanaian public officials working in various ministries or state agencies in Accra. The reason why the study will interview bureaucrats and not politicians is that it wishes to assess the experience and implications of actual diaspora engagement, rather than political views on the matter. According to Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a, p.5) “closer scrutiny of sending country capabilities to implement their promised policies of inclusion may prove an important reality check on the idea of sending state institutions as key mobilizers of transnational relations between migrants and their countries of origin.” I would add that the need for a ‘reality check’ is increased when investigating poor nations, such as Ghana, where the gap between political promises and administrative resources can be particularly problematic.

1.3 Overview of theory, method, and case

The theoretical part of this essay draws on two nascent literatures, both focusing on the sustained relations between emigration states and diasporas. There is a fairly practical literature dealing with diaspora policies directly, but the choice of terms differ. While I emulate Gamlen (2008b) and de Haas (2006) in using the concept of ‘diaspora engagement policies’, others identify this kind of cross-border interaction as ‘global nation policies’ (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003) or simply ‘bonding strategies’ (Chander 2006). The second literature is more analytical and has coalesced around the study of citizenship in an emigration context. There is no agreed-upon name for this literature, and a profusion of labels have been applied to the phenomenon itself, including ‘external citizenship’ (Barry 2006), ‘transnational citizenship’ (Bauböck 2003), ‘extraterritorial citizenship’ (Fitzgerald 2006) and ‘diasporic citizenship’ (Laguerre 1998). However, common for all these contributions is that they conceptualize diaspora policies as facets of that citizenship; “by incorporating
the diaspora into the state, these policies redefine or reconfigure what it means to be a member of ‘national society’” (Gamlen 2008b, p.3).

The empirical analysis of diaspora policies in Ghana is based on material mainly collected through qualitative interviews with public officials in Accra, the capital of Ghana, in November and December, 2010. The use of this method is justified by the fact that very little is known about these issues in Ghana, and that which is known needs more detailed analysis (Starrin and Renck 1996). Physical proximity has in fact been more or less essential as very little information is accessible from abroad. An additional strength of the qualitative research interview is that it ensures an openness to unanticipated findings (Becker 2001). The empirical inquiry has been supplemented by a review of available documentation pertaining to the subject, including documents produced by state institutions, reports from various organizations, news articles, internet sources and previous research.

The empirical analysis of this study is based on the investigation of a single case. I note that some have expressed skepticism towards the value of this research design, arguing that conclusions drawn from a ‘single observation’ is at best indecisive and at worst misleading (King et al. 1994). To be sure, I will make no attempts to generalize indiscriminately from just one case. I insist, however, that the insights gained do have potential for theory development. Instead of generalization, we should perhaps speak of “contextualized comparison” (George and Bennett 2005, p.19) or “transferability of knowledge” (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p.171).

It is my contention that Ghana provides a both interesting and relevant case to study. To begin with, emigration is a hugely pertinent issue for the country itself and the investigation of diaspora policies is therefore highly policy relevant. Fragmentary data suggest that as much as 6-12 percent of the Ghanaian populace live overseas. A substantial share of these emigrants are very well-educated, and Ghana is accordingly often used to illustrate the so-called brain drain phenomenon (see, for instance, Adepoju 1995; IOM 2005). Remittances, on the other hand, provide an external source of income that for many households makes “the difference between a reasonable standard of living and the life of deprivation,” as former president Kufuor framed it (quoted in Manuh and Asante 2005, p.296). The Bank of Ghana estimates that the recorded flow of remittances reached almost $2 billion in 2008; more than 10 percent of the GDP. Awumbila et al. (2008, p.34) has fittingly characterized Ghana’s emigration experience as ‘janus-faced’: The exodus of qualified professionals seems to have undercut the nation's aspirations for a durable socioeconomic development, but the damage is to some extent mitigated by the fact that
Ghanaian emigrants “are significantly living in a transnational context. Not only have they rooted themselves in their current places of residence but they continue to nurture their roots back home” (Orozco et al. 2005, p.38). Valentina Mazzucato (2009, p.1107) even concludes that “Ghana is probably comparable to large emigration and remittance-receiving countries such as Mexico and the Philippines.”

But I also hold that studying Ghana is relevant from an academic standpoint. In the social sciences, the selection of a case should depend less on if it is ‘interesting’ or ‘easily researched’, and more on its relevance for the research objectives (George and Bennett 2005, p.83). Following Harry Eckstein’s (1992) typology, the analysis of diaspora policies in Ghana can be characterized as a ‘heuristic’ case study. This kind of case study is “deliberately used to stimulate the imagination toward discerning important general problems and possible theoretical solutions” (ibid., p.143). This research design is in other words actively tied to theory building as it may engender refined questions and better theoretical constructs.

I argue that Ghana can provide instructive insights for the literature on diaspora engagement. I have found that most research on state-diaspora relations focuses on a limited number of countries in South-East Asia (the Philippines, India, China), the Caribbean (Haiti, the Dominican Republic) and Latin America (Mexico), and almost all of these states belong in the middle-income bracket (see, for instance, Laguerre 1999; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Newland and Patrick 2004; Barry 2006; Chander 2006). The Ghanaian case study promises to expand this kind of analysis into the sub-Saharan region and illuminate diaspora policies as they are pursued by a state with substantially less administrative capacity than those mentioned above.

1.4 Definitions

One of the main concepts used in this study is diaspora. Literally meaning ‘dispersion’, the term has typically been identified with three ‘classical’ diasporas; the Greek, the Jewish, and the Armenian ones. More recently the concept has been ‘stretched’, however, to include new emigrant communities as well as other non-dispersed groups in society (see Brubaker 2005). This study emulates Gabriel Schef-
fer in defining diasporas quite broadly as “ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homeland” (c.f. Ionescu 2006). Importantly, diasporas are communities of belonging, that sustain “a memory, vision or myth” about the homeland and are also more or less committed to its “maintenance or restoration” (Safran 1991).

The terms emigration state, country of origin or birth, and homeland are used for states with substantial out-migration of its citizens. The reverse situation, substantial immigration, creates immigration states, or countries of residency. Note that a state can be an emigration state toward ‘its’ emigrants, and an immigration state toward ‘its’ immigrants simultaneously. The study avoids the frequently used terms sending and receiving state, as they imply an activity and passivity, respectively, that is often misleading (see discussion in Barry 2006, fn.5). I argue that sending state should only be used for countries that do in fact send workers abroad, and not for those that simply witnesses the exodus of its citizens.

Finally, when speaking of migration throughout this essay, I do not refer to all kinds of human mobility. My focus lies on international migration, where the decision to migrate has been taken more or less freely, i.e. without an “external compelling factor” (IOM 2004, p.40). Migrants who fall outside this group include refugees, trafficking victims, and internal migrants. Neither do I much discuss the specific implications of irregular, undocumented migration, which is a hugely important issue around the world.

The essay proceeds as follows: The following chapter discusses the method used in this study, namely the qualitative research interview, dealing with both methodological and practical considerations. Chapter 3 then provides a theoretical assessment of diaspora engagement policies. In short, it outlines what they are, why they are, and what they imply. The chapter also introduces a typology that allows for a systematic investigation of these policies. Following that, the fourth chapter gives a brief presentation of Ghana’s experience of emigration before the analysis of diaspora engagement pursued by state institutions in Ghana is presented in chapter 5. A concluding chapter summarizes the findings and suggests worthwhile venues for additional research.

† As quoted in Newland and Patrick (2004, p.1).
2 | The qualitative interview method

2.1 Methodological considerations

The key criteria for selecting an appropriate research method is, according to Aberbach and Rockman (2002, p.673), “purpose, purpose, purpose.” As stated earlier, the purpose of this study is to advance the theoretical and empirical knowledge of state-diaspora relations. Importantly, the aim is not to predict and test, but to find out and interpret. The method chosen to accomplish this task is the qualitative research interview. More specifically, I have designed it to be semi-structured and fairly open-ended—a style not too common in political science departments, but often used when conducting elite interviews (Leech 2002).

There are several reasons behind this choice of method. Firstly, very little is known about the area of interest and as it has few other studies to fall back on—especially when it comes to the particular developments in Ghana—the research presented here is by necessity explorative. The qualitative interview has been emphasized as an appropriate means for “identifying or discovering as of yet unknown or insufficiently known phenomena” (Starrin and Renck 1996, p.54). Secondly, this study is based on the knowledge and attitudes of public officials, and some argue that educated professionals respond better to open-ended questions, where they feel they can give well thought-out answers, than to a questionnaire, where they have less control (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). A third argument for the use of the qualitative research interview is that the phenomena under investigation here; emigration, transnationalism, and diasporas, exert a significant transformative influence on the country of origin, and it has been argued that such periods of dynamic societal change increase the need for qualitative analyses (Starrin 1994, p.31).

When studying a little theorized phenomenon such as state-diaspora relations it stands to reason that we must stay open to unanticipated aspects and not let our presuppositions predetermine the results. Under these circumstances, surveys or statistical analyses risk being theoretically biased as they are insulated from all that

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6 The quote is translated from Swedish into English by the author.
which is not already included in the questionnaires or data bases. The principal strength of the open-ended research interview, on the other hand, is its inductive trait: While the interview should be guided by theoretical knowledge, it is in an important sense not restricted to the interviewer’s preconceived ideas of what is important. Proponents of qualitative work in the field, such as sociologist Howard Becker (2001, p.322), portray it as a way of “replacing speculation with observation.” Becker further emphasizes that qualitative work in the field, through its proximity to the phenomenon under investigation, can yield highly accurate and precise interpretations. The argument is essentially repeated in a more positivistic language by George and Bennett (2005, p.19-22) who highlight the qualitative case study’s particular potential for 1) achieving conceptual validity; 2) for sorting out causal complexity; and 3) for generating new hypotheses.

The qualitative research interview is not so much an interview as a “conversation that has a structure and a purpose”, as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p3) put it. In other words, the interview session has a conversational character and is not constrained by a fixed questionnaire, but neither is it entirely open and aimless; it is made purposeful by a research objective grounded in theoretical considerations, and it is typically structured by an interview guide. It would be mistaken to presume that the openness of this kind of interview relieves the need for preparation. On the contrary; “It has to be particularly well-prepared to allow it to be semi-structure” (Wengraf 2001, p5).

There is a possible tension between the theoretical and methodological demands of the open-ended interview. While a key strength of the method is its inductive character that favors observation over speculation, it is neither desirable nor possible to conduct an interview study without substantial prior understanding of the phenomenon at hand. Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p31f) suggest that the interviewer can deal with the conflicting demands of theoretical familiarity and unbiased procedure, through a “qualified naiveté” whereby an open-minded approach is engineered through awareness of one’s theoretical assumptions. In their own words, they argue that “presuppositionlessness implies a critical awareness of the interviewer’s own presuppositions.”
2.2 Practical application

For reasons developed above, this study focuses on the bureaucratic side of state-diaspora relations, excluding viewpoints from politicians, civil society, or the migrants themselves. The informants have naturally been selected on basis of their administrative experience of issues pertaining to diaspora policies. This was easier said than done, however, as the Ghanaian case corroborates Gamlen’s (2008b, p.3) impression that “few governments see diaspora policy as a distinct issue area.” Suitable officials have been hard to find, and no one is devoted solely to diaspora engagement. I have primarily made use of ‘snowballing’ as a way of finding relevant informants, asking one interviewee to suggest other people who know something about the issue at hand. At the end of my stay, I noticed that the same names started showing up, which is a reasonably good indication of that you have been in contact with the most central people. Fortunately, I encountered no bureaucratic or legal hurdles during my time in Accra, and in only three cases did I fail in ‘getting the interview’. The general accessibility to informants—which was of course ultimately dependent on their generosity and friendliness—and the fact that the study does not strive towards a representative sample of interviewees, together mitigate potential issues of systematic error (Goldstein 2002).

The interviews took place at various location in Accra, the capital of Ghana, in November and December, 2010. All sessions took place at the informants’ offices, were held in English, and ranged in time from about 20 minutes to the longest one at close to 70. The time limit of each session was decided by the availability of the informant, or the amount of information needed from that particular individual. In the end, material from a total of 15 interviews was used in this study and all but three participants work in Ghanaian ministries or state agencies. The three exceptions include two informants at the IOM, selected explicitly for their collaboration with state officials, and an administrator from Ghana’s second-biggest political party, chosen for his knowledge of transnational party ties. A full list of participants, complete with information regarding their position and relevance for the study, is

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7 One informant was traveling abroad, another was hospitalized, and a third one had too much work to do but sent me to an aide (who could not help me). I have later tried to elicit some sort of comment from these individuals via email, but been unsuccessful. The main disadvantage arising from this failure is that I have only been able to include insights from one of the two big political parties in Ghana as concerns their transnational engagement.

8 Unfortunately, this meant all sessions suffered from some degree of interruption—the oddest being the recurring screech of the dry hinges on a door to one office.
provided in appendix A. In-text citations to interviews include the surname of the interviewee and date of the session.

Interview guides were constructed in advance of each session and followed a similar semi-structured outline with a number of broad thematic areas and suggested questions. These questions were fairly direct, in the sense that they openly adhered to the stated purpose of the interview; to know more about Ghana’s diaspora engagement. As most of the informants had their own individual expertise and experience, a unique guide was created for each session and in reaction to the twists and turns of the conversation, questions were also continuously modified. In most cases, the informant wanted to know beforehand which questions to respond to. I do not interpret this as suspicion or a method of control as much as an expression of concern regarding their ability to give me ‘correct’ answers (Rivera et al. 2002 portray a similar situation). In these cases I made available a short outline of the interview guide made for that session.

As a way of getting the interview going and setting its direction, the first questions were typically broad and open-ended. This open-ended start gave me an opportunity to quickly re-evaluate the viability of my presuppositions. In one particular session it turned out that my preexisting understanding of the institution’s work was inaccurate. But because of this, that interview turned out to be one of the most rewarding ones. This example underlines the value of the flexible and inductive character of the qualitative interview method. As recommended by Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p.134) I tried to keep my questions as brief, simple, and free from presuppositions as possible. More circumscribed or analytical question were introduced only after a while, and at the end of each session I made sure to ask for additional comments on the issue discussed, encouraging the informant to highlight aspects that I had myself failed to bring up.

With a couple of exceptions, the interviews were recorded in order to enhance the conversational quality and prevent information loss. The qualitative interview method requires presence and involvement, and the recorder allows you to achieve this (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Berry 2002). Admittedly, it is somewhat intrusive to start an interview by placing a recorder in front of the informant, but once started, it easily fades from notice.

It is important to realize that the interview session is infused by an asymmetry of power, where the interviewer commands the situation by causing it, guiding it, and

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9 One interview guide is presented in appendix B.
ending it. Furthermore, it is predominantly a one-way conversation and the interviewer has usually monopoly over subsequent interpretation. None of these power-invested aspects need to imply any actual exertion of power; they are there by default (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, p33f). I believe, however, that considerations of ethics and power are somewhat relieved in the case of the present study, due to two circumstances: First, I interviewed educated bureaucrats, who plausibly are less vulnerable than, say, underage children or marginalized people; and second, the topic under investigation is not their personal lives.

In part to preempt ethical pitfalls, I presented an information sheet in advance of each interview session, which included a very basic presentation of the research, myself, how the interviews would be used, and the rights to confidentiality and withdrawal. Only conditioned anonymity could be offered as the value of each informant is tied to his or her personal experience and position. The sheet also held contact information. For the sake of transparency, the information sheet is attached in appendix C.

2.3 A note on additional material

It is good research practice to include different sources of information, and use them to verify and supplement each other. In conjunction with the material collected through interviews, I have primarily made use of two kinds of written records in this study; prior academic research and news articles. Not surprisingly, academic research focusing on the links between Ghana and Ghanaians abroad is very limited, but a small handful of articles and book chapters has proven helpful nonetheless. I have also made use of two Ghanaian news portals on the internet; Ghanaweb.com and Modernghana.com. The former has a ‘diaspora page’ where news and information for and about Ghanaians abroad are conveniently compiled. Needless to say, news articles follow journalistic demands, not scientific, and must be referred to with care.

White papers and other government documents pertaining to the issue of diaspora policies shine with their absence, unfortunately. Some significant legislation—for example a 2006 absentee voting reform—has been passed without any prior studies being commissioned. And as will be noted in the analysis, even basic information on some key issues—such as the fate of an entire Non-Resident Ghanaian Secretari-

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10 The informants seemed to be aware of this limitation as no one requested any form of anonymity.
at—is nowhere to be found. This dearth constitute a marked contrast to the (over)abundance of official documents, statistics, and reports a researcher in affluent nations typically encounters.
3 | Engaging diasporas

Hein de Haas (2008, p.46) has noted that in the migration-development debate, the “lack of theoretical rootedness and largely descriptive nature of much empirical work has haunted the improvement of theories” and he also points out that in the absence of theoretical guidance, most empirical work “remains isolated, scattered, and theoretically underexplored.” The comment has bearing also for the study of institutionalized relations between states and their diasporas, which often lack analytical rigor (Gamlen 2008a, p.841). Indeed, such relations have heretofore been more or less overlooked, possibly since they fall outside the conventional notion of states as territorial units of governance (ibid.; Ragazzi 2009). But as we shall see, they are in fact quite common. In order to explore these relations in a systematic manner, this chapter will outline an analytical framework suitable for this purpose. It will present, theorize, and refine the main concept used in the study, namely diaspora engagement policies.

3.1 What are diaspora engagement policies?

Diaspora engagement policies are defined broadly by Alan Gamlen (2008b, p.3) as “state institutions and practices that apply to members of that state’s society who reside outside its borders.” More specifically, these policies are strategies that ‘court’ emigrants by extending some rights and benefits, but explicitly or implicitly they also seek to capture some of their resources—monetary, ideational or in kind. In other words, diaspora policies foster a more or less reciprocal relationship between emigration state and emigrants. Gamlen further characterizes these practices

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11 de Haas (2006) uses the term slightly differently by looking at diaspora engagement policies implemented by governments and development agencies in the country of residence, not origin. Relations between international organizations and emigrant communities—such as the transfer of knowledge programs implemented by the UN (TOKTEN) or the IOM (RQAN and MIDA)—could also be labeled diaspora engagement. The present study emulates Gamlen, however, and look at diaspora policies only from the emigration state perspective.
as “that portion of the state machinery which protrudes beyond territory” (ibid.) but I am somewhat skeptical to this extension as many policies, even though they apply to emigrants, do not actually traverse state borders. The effort to facilitate the sending of remittances, for example, is typically a domestic affair that emigrants can then take advantage of.

To understand diaspora policies we must first know what they are, and therefore I now turn to a presentation the most prominent engagement strategies as they have been implemented by various emigration states. The outline also provides some insights regarding the range and prevalence of diaspora inclusion worldwide.

Dual citizenship

The single most important policy of diaspora inclusion is arguably allowing emigrants to retain their native nationality or citizenship as they settle abroad. The precise content of dual citizenship legislations vary from country to country, but they typically confer the right to enter and live in the country of origin, to vote, to buy property and make investments there, and to pass on citizenship to children. Peter Spiro (2002, p.19f) asserts that historically, few “societal aversions have seemed as automatic as those directed against dual nationality” but he and others have noted that the ‘distaste’ now seems to be retreating. Writes Tanja Brøndsted Seiersen (2008, p.530): “From a largely draconian attitude, toward a globally more lenient governmental approach, the history of dual citizenship is one of clear and gradual evolution” (see also Barry 2006; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). It is difficult to determine exactly how many countries allow for dual citizenship as they use different terms of eligibility. Some states, such as Germany, confer dual citizenship rights only to children and adolescents, while others give this option only to emigrants living in certain treaty nations. In what has been accused of being a ‘dollar and pound apartheid’ (see Barry 2006, p.50), India did until recently grant dual citizenship status only to Indians living in sixteen select states, “all of which were, not coincidentally, economically advanced countries” (Chander 2006, p.69). The findings of two comprehensive surveys indicate, however, that dual citizenship (with

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12 The terms are often used interchangeably and without much distinction. They are different, however, with dual citizenship typically granting more extensive rights and benefits than dual nationality (see Jones-Correa 2002).

13 It may be noted that India now extends dual citizenship to nationals everywhere, except those in (again, not coincidentally) Bangladesh and Pakistan.
reasonably inclusive terms) is currently granted by at least 50 states worldwide (Brøndsted Sejersen 2008; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010).

**Administrative support.**

Many states have instituted concerted administrative support for emigrants through a ministry, secretariat, or desk for diaspora affairs. Non-residents are then provided with a (hopefully) convenient ‘one stop shop’ of bureaucratic services, useful information and legal assistance. Such units are found in the established middle-income emigration states of course, but also in more unexpected places, for example in Mali’s Ministère des Maliens de l’Exterieur. Indeed, Gamlen (2008a) found “some kind of bureaucratic structure for dealing with expatriates” in 44 out of 64 states in his survey, and eleven of those were full ministerial bodies. In addition to such bureaucratic units, administrative services are typically provided through diplomatic missions in the host country.

**Political inclusion.**

Emigrants are sometimes invited to participate directly in the politics of the home country. The extension of political rights to the diaspora remains highly controversial in many settings, however, because it constitutes a fundamental challenge to “the traditional assumption that domestic politics is exclusively decided within the internal arenas of the nation-state” (Bauböck 2003, p.702; Bauböck 2005b; Barry 2006, p.51). In spite of this, the number of countries granting extra-territorial, or absentee voting mechanisms has multiplied. In Collyer and Vathi’s (2007) sample, as many as 115 countries worldwide make some kind of allowances for emigrants to participate in elections from abroad. Only 29 countries prevented emigrants from voting and seven of those held no elections whatsoever. A much smaller share of countries had absentee voting forty years ago (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). Other policies of inclusion give diaspora members the right to run for elective offices and some countries even have congressional seats earmarked for emigrants (e.g. Colombia) or have instituted an emigrant advisory council (e.g. Mexico) (Chander 2006, p.71).
Encouragement of remittances

de Haas (2006, p.96) notes that as all stakeholders stand to benefit from the facilitation of remitting money, this is the least controversial area of diaspora engagement. Strategies include centralized efforts to reduce the cost of remitting money and support the general availability of money transfer operators (MTOs). This typically entails some kind of public–private partnerships, but little de facto engagement with diaspora members.

Investment programs

There are reasons to believe that nationals abroad constitute good investors. They often have access to social networks both in and between the countries of residence and origin, and they are typically better informed than foreign investors about conditions ‘at home’. A prevalent contention is also that they are driven not only by maximization of returns, but also by an altruistic motive; they care for the country they are investing in (see Leblang 2010; Riddle et al. 2008). Notably, it has been estimated that as much as 45 percent of China’s multi-billion dollar FDI originates from members of the Chinese diaspora (GCIM 2005, p.30).\(^{14}\) Emigration states can encourage this kind of diaspora investments by disseminating information, providing assistance, and streamlining investment procedures. A state in need of foreign currency can also create specific ‘diaspora bonds’. These financial debt instruments present emigrants with an opportunity to invest their savings with a guaranteed rate of return while at the same time supporting national projects. Israel has reportedly raised over $20 billion since 1951 through the sale of such bonds (Chander 2006).

Development partnerships

A sophisticated strategy of engaging the diaspora in homeland development is matching-funds programs where the state pledges one dollar (or two, or three) for every dollar emigrants themselves donate to certain community projects. The Mexican ‘Tres-por-Uno’ program, where the federal- and state governments match the emigrants’ contributions, constitute a well-known example (Chander 2006, 2006).

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\(^{14}\) There is likely a considerable overlap between remittances and investments, however. A large fraction of Chinese diaspora FDI is invested in real estate, which is a common use of remittances in other countries (Kapur 2004, p.6).
p.73f). Note that such initiatives require a fairly high level of trust between the implementing state institution and emigrants.

**Pension portability**

A comprehensive study from 2005 found that a full quarter of international migrants enjoys no legal access whatsoever to social security benefits (Holzmann et al. 2005). An additional 50 percent get no such benefits, or face reductions and disadvantages, if they decide to spend their ‘golden years’ in the country of their birth. Emigration states that broker fair portability agreements for ‘their’ emigrants plausibly increases the chances of seeing them returning home eventually.15 Existing agreements are disproportionately concentrated to affluent nations however.16

**Expatriate tax**

An engagement strategy that is now more or less discredited (see GCIM 2005, p.27) is taxing remittances or emigrants’ salaries. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati was a firm supporter of such a measure back in the 1970s (see Bhagwati and Partington 1976) and the best known example is Eritrea’s ‘healing tax’, collected from expatriates as a ‘repayment’ for the country’s struggle for independence in the early 1990s (Koser 2003). Surprisingly, the US government also levies a so-called ‘expatriation tax’ on the salaries of Americans living abroad, even if they have renounced their US citizenship.

**Recognition**

When Vicente Fox assumed the presidency of Mexico he pledged to “govern on behalf of 118 million Mexicans”—100 million at home and 18 million in the US. Similar diaspora recognitions have been made by heads of state in other emigration states (see Ragazzi 2009, p.390). Symbolic statements of inclusion may seem trivial, and they certainly have to be backed up by concrete action sooner or later, but one should not dismiss their effect on the diaspora’s sense of belonging. Mexicans

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15 An extensive portability regime would furthermore realize a substantial transfer of wealth from rich nations to poor ones.

16 Holzmann et al. (2005) found a total of 2,561 bi- or multilateral portability agreements in European countries, compared to only 342 in African ones and 121 in all of Asia.
abroad, who once were los olvidados—the ‘forgotten ones’—are now increasingly reconstrued as los heroes of the nation, worthy of respect and remembrance, and this is partly due to Fox’s inclusive statements (Martínez-Saldaña 2003). Much can be revealed in a simple change of words. For example de Haas (2007, p.22) sees the replacement of the term ‘Moroccan Workers Abroad’ with the more deferential ‘Moroccans Resident Abroad’ as manifestation of a more deep-seated reinvention of the Moroccan government’s diaspora relations from a system of ‘control’ to a strategy for ‘courting’ the diaspora. More tangible policies of recognition are also available. For example in India we find the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, or ‘Indian Diaspora Day’, an annual celebration in the honor of Indians abroad.17 China, in turn, has an Overseas Chinese Museum, instituted as early as 1959, which highlights the history of the massive Chinese diaspora. These institutions can be understood as reinvigorating the socio-cultural links between homeland and diaspora.

*Cultural enrichment.*

Some states take national culture and promote it to emigrants abroad. National TV, radio and newspapers may be exported in this manner, as well as opportunities for education, religious services, and even national holidays. Irish embassies often celebrate St. Patrick’s day, for example (Gamlén 2008a, p.843). Although the British Councils and Alliance Françaises were originally a part of the colonial aim of civilizing non-europeans, they now arguably function as ‘national spaces’ for British and French people abroad, allowing them to reconnect to home. Ragazzi (2009, p.386f) provides some other examples of culture promotion. The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs has also instituted the Know India Programme, where youths in the diaspora can visit and learn about the homeland.18 The program can be interpreted as a cultural enrichment scheme with the purpose of strengthening the ties to second-generation diaspora members.

As the outline shows, many states with large-scale emigration dedicate some part of the state apparatus to nurturing a reciprocal relationship to the diaspora. The policies take many different shapes and have been implemented all over the globe, and

17 The particular date of the event, January 9, is chosen to commemorate Ghandi’s return from exile in 1915 (Chander 2006, p.61).

18 See the official website at [http://knowindiaprogram.com/].
the trend is clearly towards more emigrant inclusion, not less. Their message to emigrants is that they are still considered to be a part of the nation: They instill a notion of the country of origin as a place where you are allowed to vote and invest your savings, but perhaps more significantly, as a place where you actually belong, a place that cherishes and remembers you.

This study follows a broad definition of ‘diaspora’ as communities of emigrants who maintain strong sentimental and material links with their homeland. With such a definition it is obvious that diaspora engagement policies are in reality also diaspora creation policies. Gamlen (2008a, p.852) concludes that “diasporas and emigration states co-constitute each other: different state mechanisms shape different non-resident groups into diasporic members, and these members in turn influence the development of pieces of the state apparatus.”

3.2 Why engage diasporas?

The immediate purpose of diaspora engagement is of course to sustain and expand the interactions between the homeland and emigrants who still nurture an affinity for their country of birth. But what are the more underlying reasons for reaching out to those who have left the country? Theoretical efforts to explain the transnational behavior of emigration states are in their infancy and build more on on logical assumption than rigorous empirical investigation. This study has no explanatory ambition but I will nonetheless present a few theories of why emigration states would want to bond with the diaspora.

An important motive for bonding with emigrants is typically assumed to be the interest in capturing economic benefits. Thus Kim Barry (2006, p.28) argues that given “the current disparities in economic development between North and South ... it seems clear that emigration states’ interest in their emigrant nationals is driven primarily by economic considerations.” Emigration states have—correctly or not—picked out a promise embedded in large-scale emigration, or rather the remittances and investments it generates. In this line of reasoning, any political or cultural inclusion is ultimately meant to serve the purpose of augmenting the economic contributions of the diaspora.
Reiner Bauböck (2003, p.709) broadens the perspective somewhat, picking out three major reasons for engagement; 1) human capital upgrading, 2) remittances, and 3) the political lobbying of receiving-country governments (see also Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). Human capital upgrading is realized if emigrants return home, permanently or temporarily, and add their value-added skills and expertise to the nation. The phenomenon is popularly known as *brain gain* or *brain circulation*. The third motive refers to the political opportunity of having well-integrated diaspora members serving as ‘ambassadors’ in other countries. Examples that comes to mind include the influences of Irish, Israeli and Mexican minorities on US politics.

Some argues that such motives are too realist and instrumental, framing diaspora policies simply as strategies that can yield material benefits for the country of origin. Focusing on more structural variables, Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010, p.472) explore the hypothesis that high levels of regime competition force political parties to vie for diaspora support. They also investigate the diffuse pressures exerted by global norms: Emigrant inclusion is arguably a new international standard that some states follow more or less consciously. A related argument has pointed out that such norms, along with the global discourse on human rights, have given migrants a platform from which they state their demands. Political inclusion in particular often seems to be the result of insistent lobbying from diaspora groups (Barry 2006, p.52). This explanation can be attached to the instrumental motives above of course.

Then there are normative arguments for emigrant inclusion (see Bauböck 2005; Gamlen 2008b), so we should not summarily dismiss the possibility that states care for their diasporas simply because they believe they ought to.

Finally, some commentators are even more structural and discursive. Francesco Ragazzi (2009) uses the Foucauldian concept of *governmentality* and sees in diaspora policies evidence of a broader discursive shift in state rationality from governing territory to governing citizens, wherever they may have their residence.

### 3.3 Wider implications

In order to analyze the transnational engagements of emigration states further, some scholars have begun to conceptualize these policies as constituent parts, or
facets, of an *external citizenship*. In the mainstream citizenship discourse, nation, state, citizenship, and territory are assumed to correspond neatly to one another. But substantial migration, writes Barry (2006, p.17), “decouples citizenship and residence, disrupting tidy conceptions of nation-states as bounded territorial entities with fixed populations of citizens.” When emigration states then start to interact with diasporas ‘as if they were a part of the domestic population’, they redefine or reconfigure what it means to be a member of the state in the process. In other words, diaspora outreachs “imply a remapping of the boundaries of belonging, and constitute a new dichotomy between the ‘included’ and the ‘excluded’ which is independent of territorial considerations.” (Ragazzi 2009, p.389). The theoretical framework of external citizenship is an approach that not only acknowledges, but explicitly theorizes the increasingly extraterritorial and nonresidential nature of state-citizen relations in contexts of substantial emigration.

The most important question is perhaps what happens to nation-states as they engage domestic populations “outside of the very border that entitle them to legitimately do so” (Ragazzi 2009, p.383). Linda Basch and her colleagues (1994) argue that migration, in combination with transnational engagements, has led to the rise of ‘deterritorialized nation-states’. The concept is criticized by Fitzgerald (2006), however, for conflating and confusing the meanings of nation and state. Defining the state as “a set of administrative institutions exercising control over a bordered territory,” and the nation as a community of “state-certified national citizens” (p.104), he asserts that the former simply cannot be deterritorialized while the latter already is. Expressed differently, the argument suggests that the *state* could not exist without territorial boundaries, while the *nation* has only boundaries of imagination. What we see in the context of diaspora policies then, is a situation where the state apparatus retains “personal jurisdiction” over nationals abroad, but not “territorial jurisdiction” (Barry 2006, p.27). The point here is to avoid compounding state and nation, and instead view emigrant citizenship as a remodeling of the convergence of nation and state (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, p.20f).

From the above follows that the parameters for interaction between states and diasporas are qualitatively different from those structuring state-citizen relations in domestic settings. For example, the coercive measures of the state are very limited due to the fact that emigrants reside within another state’s jurisdiction (if not always under its protection). And because they do not usually pay taxes and often live

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19 As noted in the introduction, there is a plethora of names applied to the phenomenon. I here use the term coined by Barry (2006).
far away, emigrants themselves are also somewhat limited in what they can demand from their states of origin. As a result, the precise terms of emigrant citizenship is likely to be built on mutual agreement and “are, in an important sense, voluntary on the part of the individual emigrant or descendant of emigrants” (Chander 2006, p65). In a similar vein, Fitzgerald (2006, p.90) adds that emigrant citizenship are typically tilted towards “claiming rights rather than fulfilling obligations.”

3.4 Expanding the analytical framework

As noted earlier, the transnational relations between emigration state and diaspora has typically been overlooked or studied in an ad hoc manner. In an effort to facilitate the systematic analysis of these relations the present study uses Anupam Chander’s (2006) straightforward distinction between political, economic, and cultural policies as a point of departure. This section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of this typology and proposes an addition.

The advantages of Chander’s sectoral typology are that it is very intuitive, highly familiar for both social scientists and practitioners, and corresponds fairly well to the typical government set up. The categories are neither mutually exclusive nor all-inclusive, however, and this is somewhat problematic. One particular policy can—and most often do—combine aspects from more than one category, even from all three of them. Take diaspora consultations: To consult diaspora members before drafting a government document is characterized by this study as a political engagement, but what if the document in question is economic in nature, drafted by an economic institution? It can also be argued that the official recognition that a consultation manifests is more of a cultural aspect. Other policies can be difficult to assign to any of the three categories, for example temporary return programs. The practical solution is of course to classify a diaspora policy according to where it mostly belongs. As a result, classifications will be more or less arbitrary and open for contestation, but on the other hand, most classifications are. Their general purpose is to simplify reality to an acceptable degree, make it digestible yet meaningful, and

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20 Remember that it was ‘taxation without representation’ that gave the thirteen colonies of British America the impetus to declare their independence in 1776, or so the history goes at least. It is in fact entirely possible to interpret the whole American Revolution as a conflict over the rights and obligations of external citizenship!
facilitate comparisons. The sectoral typology used here is convenient precisely because it simplifies a multi-faceted reality into an easy model of state-diaspora interactions. In table 3.1 below, I have compiled a comprehensive repertoire of diaspora engagement policies, which includes those outlined above as well as others. The various strategies are grouped according to Chander’s categories. Note that the repertoire is not exhaustive, and the classifications I have made are open for contestation.

Another disadvantage I have identified is that while the typology is intuitive, it is not very analytical. In other words, to categorize a policy as economic says something about its type, but not much about how it is implemented. My contention is that when we study diaspora engagement it makes sense to assess just how engaging a policy truly is. My proposal is that we expand the analytical framework: Retaining the sectoral distinction between political, economical, and cultural strategies, I add degree of engagement to the analysis. To be sure, thoughts on what I call the degree of engagement figure in other analyses of diaspora policies, but it has not been explicitly included in the analytical framework elsewhere.

What do I mean by ‘engagement’? As I see it, engagement can be understood in the physical sense, in which case policies which actually locate and interact directly with diaspora members have a high degree of engagement. And it can also be understood in the institutional sense, in which case policies that thoroughly incorporate, or embed emigrants in the polity, economy, or cultural life are seen as highly engaging. To exemplify this distinction, I discern diaspora consultation as very engaging in the first sense, while dual citizenship is very engaging in the second. My focus here is to analyze degree of engagement in the first, physical sense. The reason is that my center of interest lies on the practical implementation of these strategies, which means that I am particularly interested in the way emigrants are de facto approached. Determining the degree of engagement is no exact science, of course. This study is qualitative and the essence of my argument here is simply that we should be aware of this dimension when analyzing and comparing policies of diaspora inclusion.

I further argue that degree of engagement is best used when assessing one particular policy or when comparing a similar policy in different countries, as one policy can often be implemented with different levels of engagement. Note that I see ‘degree of engagement’ as a tool for analyzing strategies, not as a litmus test of their potential ‘value’. For example, using political rhetoric that conveys diaspora inclusion is not physically engaging, but it has an importance that cannot be dismissed just because it is less tangible. And a non-engaging economic reform may have a
much greater impact than transfer of knowledge programs, even though the latter have a particularly high degree of engagement. That being said, intensifying the engagement of one particular policy does arguably translate into a greater impact on state-diaspora relations.

As noted in the methodological chapter, the semi-structured research interview is an approach that is relatively open to unanticipated findings, but it must also be grounded in substantial prior knowledge of the phenomenon at hand. The discussion of diaspora engagement provided in this chapter thus constitute the point of departure for this study’s empirical investigation. The field work carried out in Ghana was guided by the repertoire of diaspora policies, which helped me know where to search for informants and what to ask about.

The sectoral typology is furthermore replicated in the structure of the analysis, and I will include a discussion on the degree of engagement wherever applicable. The findings are subsequently summarized in a table identical to table 3.1. below.
Table 3.1: A repertoire of diaspora engagement policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual citizenship/nationality</td>
<td>Including e.g. the right of abode in origin country, unimpeded travel, the right to do business, and the right to pass on citizenship to children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absentee voting</td>
<td>Not simply the right to vote, but the right to vote from abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right of running for public office</td>
<td>Can be strengthened by earmarking parliamentary seats for diaspora candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political representation</td>
<td>Through assembly seats earmarked for emigrant candidates or through an elected emigrant council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative support</td>
<td>Realized in the establishment of a special ministry, secretariat, or desk for diasporic issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diasporic visas or membership documents</td>
<td>Making it easier for emigrants to visit their homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic protection</td>
<td>Provided on site through various degrees of embassy-diaspora engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting emigrants as lobbyists</td>
<td>Using diasporas to gain political advantages in foreign countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora consultations</td>
<td>Including the diaspora in political consultations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including diasporas in development strategies</td>
<td>Formalizing the need to engage with diasporas and leveraging their impact on national development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging formal remittances</td>
<td>Through moral pressure, facilitating policies, and cost-reducing initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora bonds</td>
<td>Representing an investment opportunity for emigrants interested in supporting the state and not only family and friends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign-currency bank accounts</td>
<td>Leading to increased savings, and growing money supply, in country of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development partnerships</td>
<td>Partnerships between state and diaspora groups in locating, funding, and implementing development projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging diaspora investments</td>
<td>By promoting, supporting, and fast-tracking them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitation of setting up enterprises</td>
<td>Through facilitation, incubation and economic support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary return programs</td>
<td>Advocating temporary visits by emigrants, doctors, scholars, and entrepreneurs in particular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension and benefits portability</td>
<td>Portable social security, and health benefits could encourage return migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxing earnings/remittances</td>
<td>Can probably only be done by states with great administrative capacity or those with strong emotional ties to the diaspora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal recognition</td>
<td>Through rhetorical inclusion, diaspora day celebrations, conferences with diaspora members at home, abroad, or digitally. Some states give diaspora members formal accolades for their work at home or abroad. Visits made by the president, ministers or party representatives abroad reinforces political ties and acknowledge the importance of non-resident nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigrant tourism schemes</td>
<td>Promoting home country tourism provides economic benefits and reinforces the cultural ties between home country and emigrant. Particularly important for 2nd or 3rd generation non-residents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious services in country of residence</td>
<td>Providing opportunities for practicing native faiths away from home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching programs (religious or secular) in country of residence</td>
<td>Sustains the knowledge of native languages and home country history among émigré communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of emigrants’ associations</td>
<td>Includes both attitudinal and financial support. Emigrants’ associations present a convenient channel for interactions between home state and the diaspora.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing national culture abroad</td>
<td>For example TV, radio channels, news papers, periodicals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebrating national holidays abroad</td>
<td>Could be led by ambassadors at the mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating remittances in kind</td>
<td>Removal of import duties on shipments from emigrant to their families at home. Best known example is the Philippines’ balikbayan box scheme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 | Migration from Ghana; a brief overview

4.1 The origin of a new diaspora

The onset of large-scale emigration from Ghana can be traced to the late 1960s and linked to the severe economic and political deterioration that then gripped the country (Anarfi et al. 2003). Between 1974 and 1981 it is for example estimated that two million nationals left the country in search for greener pastures (Rimmer 1992, p.172). Interestingly, Nicholas Van Hear (1998) traces the birth of the contemporary Ghanaian diaspora to a later date, however. In the early 1980s most Ghanaian emigrés lived in Nigeria, but when oil boom turned to bust, the Nigerian state decided to expel most immigrants. Thus, in 1983—and with just two weeks of prior notice—one million Ghanaians were forcibly repatriated to Ghana (ibid., p.76f). Van Hear’s argument is that the Nigerian crisis had a unifying impact on Ghanaian emigrés and fortified their link to the Ghanaian state, which did what it could to ease and facilitate their sudden return. And the migratory impulses of Ghanaians were not extinguished by this repatriation. On the contrary, when Nigeria closed its doors, and the homeland itself seemed stuck at an economic, political, and social nadir, they were more or less compelled to look for greener pastures elsewhere. Increasingly they did so on other continents (ibid., p.284). Formed in the 1980s, the contemporary Ghanaian diaspora could be referred to as a ‘diaspora of structural adjustment’ (Zeleza 2005, p.55). It was, if not entirely caused, at least sustained by the neoliberal Economic Recovery Programs (ERPs) ordained by the military regime of the PNDC which “saved the economy at the expense of the people” (Jeffries 1992, p.214).

21 The population stood at around 11 million in 1980 (World Bank 2010).

22 A remnant from these hard years is the expression ‘Rawlings’ chain’. Rawlings was the military leader—and later president—who ‘sanitized’ the economy in the 1980s. The ‘chain’ refers to the protruding collarbones circling the necks of the destitute masses suffering under the ERPs. Ironically then, the ‘chain’ of Rawlings made people leave the country (although the absolute majority remained ‘chained in place’ by abject poverty).
The 1990s and the 2000s have seen the Ghanaian diaspora gain diversity and complexity. Although important for early batches of emigrants, colonial and linguistic ties no longer predetermine migratory flows from Ghana. Migration corridors to other destinations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia have progressively gained importance (Awumbila et al. 2008, p.13f; Peil 1995, p.346). Quartey (2009, p.58) cites an estimate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saying that Ghanaians are found in more than 33 countries around the world, but Van Hear (1998, p.206) observes that Ghanaians were deported from as many as 58 different countries in 1993 alone. Interestingly, Ghanaweb.com, a website compiling news for and about Ghanaians in the diaspora, includes posts from more than 95 different countries, in such diverse and distant places as Fiji and Finland or Jamaica and Japan (although admittedly, there are no Ghana-related news from some of the listed countries).

4.2 The volume and characteristics of Ghanaians abroad

There are no definite data on the number of Ghanaians living abroad (see Twum-Baah 2005). Indeed, I have found estimates ranging from less than one million individuals up to seven and a half million. For the purposes of this study I emulate Quartey’s (2009, p.13) approach, estimating the Ghanaian emigrant population to between 1.5 and 3 million individuals, two thirds of which reside in other African countries. Based on population data from 2005 (World Bank 2010), this would suggest that 6–12 percent of the Ghanaian populace live outside the country’s borders. One should be aware of a conceptual slip here. All available estimates refer to international migrants of Ghanaian birth or origin, not the Ghanaian diaspora as such. A diaspora is a fluid entity built on a notion of belonging. Such a notion need not arise at all, or it can bridge many generations. If the estimate of Ghanaian emigrants corresponds to the Ghanaian diaspora or not, is therefore impossible to determine. It does provide a point of reference nonetheless.

While 6–12 percent certainly constitute a sizable share of the total Ghanaian population, what is arguably more important is the composition of this emigrant population. The exodus of the nation’s best and brightest, commonly referred to as brain drain, is a well-known concern for Ghana (Awumbila et al. 2008, p.5). The sectors

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23 The webpage, at [http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora/], is well worth a visit as it provides information on the Ghanaian community in your own country. How many Swedes knew that they had a “Ghanaian” in their own parliament 2002–06, for example?

24 Appendix D discusses the difficulties involved and presents the whole range of estimations.
particularly afflicted are health and education (see Nyonator and Dovlo 2005; Manuh et al. 2005). To give a few examples of the figures involved, Anarfi et al. (2003) reports that perhaps as many as 14,000 qualified teachers left for greener pastures between 1975 and 1981, and data compiled by Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana reveal that 487 out of the 702 medical officers trained in Ghana 1995-2002, or 69.4 percent, have migrated (Bump 2006). More generally, Peter Quartey has found that in a comparison among states with more than five million inhabitants, Ghana experiences the second-highest skilled expatriate rate in the world—after Haiti—at 46 percent. This means that for every two persons that graduate from tertiary education in Ghana, one will probably take up opportunities in foreign lands. A modest 3.6 percent of Ghanaian emigrants lack recognizable skills, according to Quartey (2009, p.61).

4.3 Remittances

The flow of remittances to Ghana is substantial in both absolute and relative numbers. According to the Bank of Ghana (BOG 2009, ch.3) the country received a record $1.97 billion in formal remittances in 2008. This compares favorably to the economy as a whole, as well as to major exports and other capital transfers across the nation’s borders. Based on data for 2008, drawn from the BOG (ibid.), remittances accounted for 13.5 percent of the country’s $14.5 billion GDP. Remarkably, remittances added almost $0.5 billion more to the economy than did the entire export of cocoa beans and related products, and this in spite of Ghana being the second-largest cocoa producer in the world. Note also that remittances “represent an inflow of foreign resources for which the economy does not have to part with any domestic resources except for the labour which has already migrated” (Barry 2006, p.29). As a third point of comparison, official development assistance (ODA) to Ghana stood at 66 percent of recorded remittances in 2008, a share that dropped to 40 percent in 2009 (see also Addison 2005). Addison (2005) claims that as much as 50 percent of the total flow of remittances to Ghana could be of informal nature.

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25 Appendix E comments on the extreme discrepancy between the estimates of remittance flows made by Bank of Ghana and those made by the World Bank.

26 ODA data drawn from OECD aid statistics, accessed online at [http://www.oecd.org].
while Mazzucato et al. (2005) suggest that the informal part to be as high as 65 percent, i.e. almost two times the size of recorded transfers. The more specific impact of remittances in Ghana is discussed by a number of recent articles. In sum, findings suggest that remittances improve the welfare of households (Quartey 2006) and finance some community-level projects (Kabki et al. 2004; Zan 2004), that they reduce poverty but increase income inequality (Adams et al. 2008; Mazzucato 2008) and that they support private-sector growth by being invested in small businesses (Black et al. 2003).

This brief overview certainly cannot do justice to the extent and variety of non-resident Ghanaians transnational involvement in the homeland, which of course go beyond remitting money. Scholars have for example noted the propensity among emigrants to finance house developments in Accra or Kumasi from abroad (see Diko and Tipple 1992; Manuh 2001), which arguably reflects a desire to return to Ghana eventually, or at least to visit the homeland on a regular basis (Henry and Mohan 2003, p.618). Many Ghanaians abroad also mobilize in various migrant associations, based on hometown, ethnicity, party affiliation, occupation, or religious faith (Orozco et al. 2005, p.30). This trait is interesting as the “close ties and interactions that migrants maintain with each other help to keep Ghana in the forefront of a migrant’s mind and actions” (Manuh and Asante 2005, p.294). Zan (2004) and Mazzucato and Kabki (2009) analyze the development impact of such associations in Ghana.

I conclude the chapter with Orozco’s et al. (2005, p.38) characterization of the Ghanaian diaspora, which deserves to be quoted at some length:

“By maintaining family, financial, and social ties Ghanaians are significantly living in a transnational context. Not only have they rooted themselves in their current places of residence but they continue to nurture their roots back home. [---] In the comparative context, the range of the Ghanaian engagement in their home country surpasses their Latin American and Asian counterparts. Latin American and Asian diasporas exhibit a strong commitment to family but the scope of their commitment to other sectors of society, while expanding, is relatively narrow. Ghanaian engagement to the homeland is realized both inside and outside the context of the family.”
Ghana’s first tangible effort to reconnect to Ghanaians in the diaspora took place ten years ago, in July 2001, to be precise. In an innovative and enthusiastic recognition of the diaspora’s contributions to society, the Kufuor administration convened a three-day *Homecoming Summit* in Accra, where reportedly some 1,600 participants—including 500 diaspora members—were gathered under the straightforward theme of “Harnessing the Global Ghanaian Resource Potential for Accelerated National Development” (Quartey 2009, p.78, 82). As Manuh and Asante (2005) provide a comprehensive review of the Summit, I will only give a short comment here.

This diaspora conference integrated political, economical, and cultural aspects of state-diaspora relations. The government, however, seemed most keen on supporting the economic side of the equation (Quartey 2009, p.78). A Non-resident Ghanaian Secretariat (NRGS), that was supposed to translate results into action, was eventually instituted at the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), an inherently economic institution. In retrospective it seems remarkably naive to expect the NRGS to be able to carry out the tasks given to it, such as “[c]oordinating *all activities* and serving as the centre for *all projects, programmes* and *issues* involving Ghanaians living abroad” (Manuh and Asante 2005, p.299, emphasis added). The Secretariat was ill-prepared to say the least for handling the multitude of cross-cutting issues that diaspora relations entail. While it is difficult to find any information regarding the fate of the NRGS it is obvious that it was never fully implemented.\(^{27}\) In any case there is no such secretariat at the GIPC now.

A decade after the Homecoming Summit took place, I conclude that it was a sophisticated outreach with a particularly high degree of engagement with diaspora members. Unfortunately, it failed to engender tangible and durable results, a failure that in the eyes of Ghanaians abroad possibly harmed the credibility of the state’s commitment to these issues (c.f. de Haas 2006, p.93). But it could be argued that

\(^{27}\) Mr. Appiah at IOM tells me that he unsuccessfully tried to track down the NRGS in 2006 and 2007 (Appiah, Nov. 11, 2010). See also Quartey (2009, p.82). With the exception of Manuh and Asante (2005) it is impossible to find much information regarding the practical outcomes of the Summit (c.f. Zan 2004, p.6).
some later policies, such as dual citizenship and absentee voting rights, were dependent on promises made by then-president Kufuor at the Summit.

5.1 Political engagement

**Dual Citizenship**

In 2002, the Kufuor administration came true on promises made during the Homecoming Summit by passing the Dual Citizenship Regulation Act (DCA, Act 591). People in the diaspora were thus given the opportunity to re-acquire lost Ghanaian citizenship while retaining their present one—or, alternatively, to keep their Ghanaian citizenship while seeking to naturalize elsewhere. Legally speaking, the either-or character of being ‘Ghanaian’ vis-à-vis ‘foreign’ was toned down. In cases where the country of residence does not allow for dual citizenship, emigrants can apply for a Right of Abode sticker to have in their passports. The sticker facilitates visits to and involvement in Ghana and Mrs. Anno-Kumi, former Director of Migration, tells me that it functions as a diasporic visa (Anno-Kumi, 2010, Nov 17).28

The DCA certainly constitutes a significant testament to the state’s willingness to institutionalize a reciprocal relationship with the diaspora. There are some practical problems with the legislation however. The application process is fairly protracted (up to six months) and the fees involved are not negligible (US$200). Furthermore, the current Director of Migration, Mr. Agorsor, cites dual citizenship applications is his “main challenge” right now, due to the diffuse and complex legal requirements involved and he is a trained lawyer (Agorsor, 2010, Nov 23; see also Awumbila et al. 2008, p.33). A restriction that many applicants may be unaware of is that while dual citizenship makes you eligible for voting in Ghana, it also disqualifies you from holding certain public offices, including being a member of parliament, minister, or president.29 It is a constitutional requirement that the holder of these offices must

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28 The right is granted by a provision in the Ghana Immigration Act, Act 573.

29 Other public offices you are barred from include: Justice of the Supreme Court; Ambassador or High Commissioner; Inspector-General of Police; Director of Immigration Service; Chief Fire Officer; Rank of Colonel in the Army or its equivalent in the other security services; and any other public office that the Minister may by legislative instrument prescribe. (As stated in the Citizenship Act 2000, Act 591, Section 16, available at [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3eda135a2.pdf].)
not ‘owe allegiance’ to any country but Ghana. I note, however, that some object to this requirement: Mr. Owiredou, Director of International Affairs at the New Patriotic Party (NPP)\textsuperscript{30}, tells me that “this is one of the things the party would want the government or parliament to amend” (Owiredou, Nov 30, 2010), and it is also one of the top 25 issues submitted to the Constitutional Review Commission.\textsuperscript{31}

Quartey (2009, p.82) reports that as of August 2008, a total of 5,903 expatriates had made use of DCA in order to combine Ghanaian citizenship with a foreign one.

**Electoral expansion.**

When it comes to general elections, Ghanaian citizens living abroad have always had the legal right to vote as Article 42 in the Constitution extends the political franchise to all Ghanaians, regardless of residency. The actual opportunity to cast a ballot, however, is limited as they must travel to their constituency in Ghana to do so. The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act (ROPAA, Act 699), passed in early 2006, grants an opportunity for absentee voting and when implemented, it will thus substantially facilitate the electoral participation of Ghanaians abroad. As a matter of fact, some groups of non-resident Ghanaians—including employees at the missions, armed forces personnel stationed overseas, and students traveling on government scholarships—have had absentee voting rights all along. ROPAA, or the ‘Burger Bill’ as it has been nicknamed in the press,\textsuperscript{32} could be interpreted as an expansion of this provision.

The debate around the bill was acrimonious, however, with the National Democratic Congress (NDC) opposition organizing demonstrations and parliamentary walk-outs in protest against the proposal. Alhassan (2010, p.62) claims that ROPAA “was introduced amid intense controversy, although not on its principle, but rather on the possible avenues for electoral fraud it would create,” and I am inclined to

\textsuperscript{30} Two parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), dominate Ghanaian politics and together they typically receive 90 percent of the popular vote. The NDC and president Rawlings ruled in the 1990s. Then the NPP and president Kufuor triumphed in the elections of 2000 and 2004, after which the NDC and president Mills regained power in 2008. These two peaceful turnovers of power, and the acceptance of the minuscule margin of victory in the presidential election of 2008 (less than 0.5 percent of nine million votes cast!), arguably make Ghana into the most democratic country on the continent. (Full election results are available at the EC website, at [http://www.cec.gov.gh/].)


\textsuperscript{32} Burger (or burgher)—pronounced ‘bogga’—is a non-derisive Ghanaian nickname for returning migrants who ‘prance’ and show off their acquired wealth.
agree. As a case in point, former president Rawlings (of NDC) saw it fit to label the act as “intended electoral fraud” and “a recipe for disaster”, even though he himself proposed a similar amendment back in 1996. So the conflict surrounding the act should probably not be interpreted principally as a protest against diaspora inclusion but as a symptom of extremely partisan politics.

The Electoral Commission (EC) is currently tasked with figuring out the exact modalities of the ROPAA, a mission that seems far from finalized. Mr. Sarfo-Kantanka, deputy chairman of the EC, says that while the Commission now has succeeded in gathering spokespersons from all parties into a committee, he has his own doubts as to the financial and operational viability of the provision (Sarfo-Kantanka, 2010, Nov 24). ROPAA was pushed through parliament without any prior feasibility study being commissioned and Mr. Sarfo-Kantanka suspects symbolic reasons for passing the bill: “You see, the law was passed like it was in a hurry and they said; «Electoral Commission; go put flesh onto the bones.» ... The problem has been left for us to deal with.”

A focus on the degree of engagement can highlight some problematic issues with the ROPAL that has importance for diaspora engagement more generally. To engage diasporas, the state (in this case the EC) obviously first needs to have an idea of the volume, characteristics, and residency of emigrants. In the case of Ghana these things are not known. Secondly, it must have a viable place of interaction, typically through the missions abroad. At the moment it is also most likely that absentee voting would take place at high commissions and embassies since voting by mail is looked upon with suspicion in Ghana due to the venues for fraud it could entail. At least three problems then arise (all of them emphasized by Mr. Sarfo-Kantanka without my influence): 1) Lack of administrative capacity, 2) geographical location, and 3) political bias. Do the embassies have administrative capacity to handle absentee voting, and diaspora contact more generally? What about Ghanaians living very far from the embassy, e.g. in a country like the US, and what about Ghanaians in countries where there is no embassy? What about irregular migrants who are less willing to pay a visit at the embassy? What about those Ghanaians in the diaspora who view the embassy as an extension of the political party in power? The answers to these questions certainly have great impact on the possibility of de

33 The full breadth of the controversy is evident in the articles compiled by Ghanaweb at [http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/dossier.php?ID=24], where the quoted lines are also found (“We will not allow electoral fraud again - J”), the Ghanaians Chronicle, Feb 21, 2006).

34 Only those included in the EC’s Voters Register are allowed to vote. That register would have to be compiled and verified before emigrants could vote from abroad.
facto engagement of the diaspora, and they are far from resolved in the case of ROPAA.

The perception of embassies as being politically biased is, by the way, widespread among Ghanaians. Dr. Amponsah, whom I interviewed about diaspora consultations, tells me that embassies...

“...can play a role, but you see in Ghana, politics is sticking out outside. The consular or ambassador who’s there now is perceived [as partisan]. Ghanaians everywhere are grouped according to their political affiliations, so if you’ve an NDC ambassador, others will think no, no, no, no, no...” (Amponsah, 2010, Nov 12).

Diasporean consultations

Ghana’s Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) has initiated a noteworthy diaspora outreach. Dr. Amponsah, who is a member of the CRC, says that because the current constitution was drafted under military rule, a paramount ambition of the ongoing review has been to make it as participatory, legitimate, and consensual as virtually possible. This necessitates inclusion of “every Ghanaian living everywhere” (Amponsah, 2010, Nov 12). Interestingly, Dr. Amponsah also emphasizes that, apart from the issue of legitimacy and fairness, members of the diaspora can provide the CRC with unique insights and best-practices gained from their exposure to foreign political systems and ideas. “One of the reasons too for the diaspora groups [to be consulted],” Dr. Amponsah continues, “is that we’ve most of our experts, like constitutional experts and others, who are professors outside there.” He furthermore postulates that if Ghanaians abroad feel that they have been included in the creation of the new constitution and perhaps been particularly valued for their unique experience and expertise, “then they’re assured that yes, now we’ve the opportunity to go back to our country”.

The CRC outreach provides a good example of a diaspora engagement strategy that has gone through several degrees of engagement. First there was no diaspora engagement at all, although an official announcement poster explicitly encouraged submissions from Ghanaians both at home and abroad. According to Dr. Amponsah, it was in response to requests made by diaspora members that the CRC then sent those posters to the embassies, and thus took engagement up a notch.35 When we spoke in November last year he also told to me that a digital consultation had

35 I personally noticed the announcement poster at the Copenhagen embassy.
been considered but dropped as it would exclude all emigrants without the necessary skills or technology. Back then, face-to-face consultations were discussed by the CRC but faced financial constraints. Dr. Amponsah could only say that “we will do it.” As a matter of fact, they have now done it. In March and April the CRC visited eleven cities in six European and North American countries. Gradually then, the CRCs has managed to increase its degree of engagement.

_The rise of transnational parties_

The most intensive political engagement between Ghana and the diaspora I have encountered takes place within the structures of the two big parties, the NDC and the NPP. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the highly educated emigrant population has developed strong political interests and pursues those through Ghana’s existing political structure. The extent to which this has unfold is nonetheless fascinating: The NPP has for example formally recognized no fewer than ten branches abroad—in Nigeria, Botswana, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Italy, Australia, the UK, the US, and Canada—among which the US branch has single-handedly spawned twenty-three chapters (Owiredu, 2010, Nov 30)! In addition there are groups of supporters in many other places that are as of yet not formally recognized as full branches.

The party-diaspora connection is very important because it means that Ghanaians abroad are able to not only exert influence in times of general elections, but also through many party decisions, such as the nomination of flag bearer, MP candidates, and policy standpoints etc. This influence is more or less constant and permeates the entire party organization. In addition, party people abroad are “free to also contest for positions, so you have a lot of the members of parliament in Ghana, within our party, who come from the diaspora,” Mr. Owiredu asserts.

Two further links between the NPP and Ghanaians abroad Mr. Owiredu brings up are the financial contributions (“it’s very, very significant”) and the frequent meetings held with diaspora members by the president, ministers, and MPs when traveling abroad, a practice that is stepped up in times of elections (“it’s a very, very strategic thing that the party tries to employ”).

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36 As announced on the CRC website, at [http://www.crc.gov.gh/?q=news/2011/03/21/crc-diaspora-dates].

37 Unfortunately I did not manage to get an interview with a suitable spokesperson for NDC so I do not know if this party has equally extensive ties to the diaspora. There are reasons to believe, however, that NPP has the most developed network overseas (see Mohan 2008, p.469).
Apart from the NRGS which is now nowhere to be found, two state institutions that provide emigrants with administrative support can be briefly mentioned. First there is a Migration Information Bureau (MIB) at the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), set up in July 2006. Its purpose is to prevent irregular migration by informing potential migrants about the substantial risks associated with this kind of travel. Mrs. Anim, who is the head of the Bureau, says that “we don't prevent anybody from traveling, we don't discourage people from migration, but we want their decision to be informed” (Anim, 2010, Nov 12). Even though this engagement takes place within Ghana and before departure, I am inclined to label it a diaspora engagement for the simple reason that it can establish primary ties between the state and soon-to-be diaspora members. Unfortunately, the MIB's focus is too narrow. Asked why the Bureau does not disseminate information on for example dual citizenship, Mrs. Anim answers: “Our people here [i.e. potential migrants] don't need that, it is for the people in the diaspora.” This limited focus on just departure is probably engendered by the administrative mind-set of GIS, an institution that deals solely with departures and arrivals across state borders. As a result, the efforts of the MIB is cut off from the state's wider diaspora engagement.\(^38\)

Secondly, there are of course the high commissions and embassies abroad. I cannot give a comprehensive account of the various engagements made by these institutions, but I would like to draw attention to two aspects of it. One; Mr. Adjei, who works with migration issues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), assures me that diaspora engagement is “a major responsibility” for the missions, but that there are currently no detailed guidelines from the Ministry or from the central government structuring these efforts (Adjei, 2010, Nov 22). The interaction between a specific embassy and Ghanaians in that country is thus discretionary and determined on site. Two; This means, in turn, that engagements between missions and emigrants take many different shapes and are pursued with different degrees of engagement. While many embassies have little or no engagement with the diaspora—apart from the required consular services—others have implemented sophisticated strategies that vigorously interact with nationals. To give a couple of examples, the embassy in Italy has literally brought its services to the doorsteps of Gha-

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\(^{38}\) In fact, IOM's Mr. Rispoli tells me that the MIB is not even present at most meetings with the inter-ministerial Migration Unit, a body that is about to formulate a comprehensive cross-sectoral migration policy for Ghana (Rispoli, 2010, Dec 7).
naians in the country, and the high commissions in Sierra Leone and the UK have created money-raising schemes and directed these funds to community-level projects back home.\textsuperscript{39} If the government is serious about engaging the diaspora, more embassies should be instructed to follow these examples and change their orientation from simply providing consular services, to becoming more sophisticated nodes for state-diaspora interactions.

5.2 Economic engagement

\textit{Remittances}

Considering the fact that remittances constitute about 10 percent of Ghana’s GDP (not counting the informal transfers) it is somewhat remarkable that I have not found any tangible public policies aimed at encouraging or facilitating remittances. Remarkable is also the fact that international migration, remittances, and return barely feature in Ghana’s major development plans (GPRS I 2003; GPRS II 2005), which corroborates the IOM’s (2005, p.33) impression that migration, “as a multi-sectoral issue barely features in national development strategies.” The most recent guiding framework, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda 2010-13 (GSGDA) does, however, include ‘migration management for national development’ as one of fifteen Key Focus Areas (GSGDA 2010, p.189). It also acknowledges the fact that substantial transfers from the diaspora have taken place, so far “without any official promotion” and asserts that “[a]ction will be taken in the medium-term to target Ghanaians in the Diaspora with incentives to improve transfers for investment” (ibid., p.24). No details are provided however.

In that context, two comments from my interviews at the the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) and Bank of Ghana (BOG) are significant. Firstly, Mr. Kroduah at the MOFEP indicates that the economic sector is deliberately open for everyone and not tailored for the diaspora: “We make it open, because the country is yearning for development, wherever it comes from. ... We’ll not

\textsuperscript{39} These and other engagements can be found at Ghanaweb’s compilation of ‘Community News (World)’, at [http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora/].
limit it to [Ghanaians in the diaspora] but broaden it” (Kroduah, 2010 Nov 11). Secondly, Dr. Addison at the BOG seems to favor solutions provided by private actors:

“I think that the most effective way of doing these things is really to allow the private sector to do it, and do it in such a way that it'll not be seen as a government-sponsored program; it never really works when it's seen as a government sponsored program.” (Addison, Nov 29, 2010)

Needless to say, I cannot assume these statements to be representative of the state more generally.

Financial instruments

In an effort to raise capital for infrastructural projects, the MOFEP launched the Golden Jubilee bond in 2007, in commemoration of Ghana's 50 year anniversary. Those in the diaspora were specifically targeted by the bond, which was marketed as an opportunity to help the home country with a guaranteed return. There is little evidence on the fate of the bond. According to the then-Minister of Finance it was “heavily over-subscribed” and due to “significant interest shown by Ghanaians in the Diaspora” the subscription period was extended in 2008. Dr. Addison, head of research at the BOG, claims that the bond was no success however (Addison, 2010, Nov 29). His standpoint is corroborated by a news article from August 2008, according to which the bond failed to meet its target at 50 million Ghana cedis. It raised ‘only’ €20 million (worth $19 million at the time) and Ghanaians in the diaspora contributed with less than 6 percent of the total.

In our interview, Dr. Addison stressed that financial instruments aimed at Ghanaians abroad must be built on a more solid and stable macroeconomic foundation. His contention is that it is perhaps easy to overplay the altruistic motive of diaspora investors, “to think that people would invest for sentimental reasons.” Investors, be they of Ghanaian birth or not, are most interested in “certainty of return and the stability in the exchange rates.” The same stand for the foreign-currency bank accounts that allow diaspora members to keep their savings in Ghanaian banks: “We have a situation in which foreign currency deposits attract very little interest, if any at all.”

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Dr. Addison further emphasizes that...

“...the general reforms are a prerequisite; without the general reforms there are no point in trying to target the diaspora because they’re not going to bring in their resources ... so the general reform is important, it’s a base line. But I think that in addition to that you need to also reach out and educate people in the diaspora on opportunities in the financial sector back at home. A lot of these people do not plan to die abroad. ... If you can convince them our financial products will help take care of their future retirement back home, I’m sure a lot of them would be interested [in returning].” (Addison, 2010, Nov 29)

Attracting diaspora investments

The purpose of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre is (not surprisingly) to attract potential investors to Ghana, and as noted in the beginning of this chapter, a Non-Resident Ghanaian Secretariat was instituted there to promote homeland investments from the diaspora. Riddle et al. (2008, p.60) find that the GIPC indeed “has taken dramatic steps” to attract, assist, and incubate such investments. The activities they investigate took place about five years ago, however, and as I have already revealed, the NRGS no longer exists. I further note that no diaspora engagement seems to be ongoing at the Centre and that there is no information whatsoever tailored for non-resident Ghanaians on the GIPC website. The conclusion here would thus be that when it comes to specifically targeting potential diaspora investors, such activity seems to have dried up in the last few years.

Riddle’s et al. analysis is nonetheless instructive. It reports that the GIPC successfully partnered with two NGOs (AfricaRecruit and IntEnt) in order to establish contact with non-residents and realize their investments aspirations. To reiterate the reasoning from above; diaspora engagement needs viable channels of interaction between state institutions and emigrants. Apparently, using NGOs as intermediaries can facilitate the outreach substantially, by locating and mobilizing potential investors in geographically dispersed diaspora communities. In short, NGOs may facilitate a higher degree of engagement. Interestingly, Riddle at al. (2008, p.62) explicitly note how partnerships with NGOs can lubricate the contact with diaspora.

In the context it can be noted that Ghana has risen to a favorable position on the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’ index: Ghana currently ranks 67 (out of 183 economies), up from 77 last year. It is fifth-best in sub-Saharan Africa, ten positions ahead of the next ECOWAS member (see [http://www.doingbusiness.org/]). The favorable rating reflects a series of reforms and general improvements in the economic climate made in the last decade. Mr. Kroduah at the MOFEP tells me that “all these things are being elaborated to our people in the diaspora for them to know that in fact, now things have changed, the investment atmosphere is very promising and very fruitful, and they are all being encouraged to invest here” (Kroduah, 2010, Nov 11).

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members and broker a trust between the parties, something that would be more difficult to achieve through the embassies.

**MIDA Ghana Health Project.**

In a sophisticated partnership not altogether different from the ones mentioned above, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Ministry of Health (MOH) collaborate to invite health professionals in the diaspora back home to work on a temporary basis. The program, known as MIDA Ghana Health Project, is now in its third phase and has so far facilitated over 150 temporary assignments in Ghana. The visiting doctors employ their often unique experience and expertise in the clinics of course, but also in training sessions and workshops with medical students and practitioners. Skills that the country once lost are thus value-added being reinvested in Ghana.44

One possible benefit of the program is that it could entice permanent return. Mr. Appiah at the IOM, who has had a leading role in the MIDA project, cites “a few cases of people returning later for good [who] hadn’t that intention of returning before they were supported to come down and work for some time” (Appiah, 2010, Nov. 9). In other words, MIDA gives professionals abroad a taste of what Ghana may offer, and “when they go back [to where they live],” Dr. Asabir at the MOH argues,

> “they’re going to play an advocacy role, and say »my fellow Ghanaians; go back and you’re going to be accepted, you’re going to be given all the recognition you deserve, people need your services, they’re crying for you. Go, and you can help build the society back home.«“ (Asabir, 2010, Nov. 29)

This engagement program would not exist without IOM. They initiated it and their diaspora-convocation abilities and expertise are absolutely essential in locating and recruiting Ghanaians abroad. As Mr. Appiah tells me, the MOH has neither the financial means, nor the transnational network needed to launch the program, but it does have the capacity to gradually adopt it (Appiah, 2010, Nov. 9). Just as above then, a non-state intermediary has proven to be critical for implementing a diaspora policy with a high degree of engagement.

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44 IOM’s Netherlands branch provides more information on the project, see [http://www.iom-nederland.nl/dsresource?objectid=1414&type=org].
Other sectors in Ghana could possibly benefit from MIDA-like programs as there are reasons to believe that repatriation of professionals in the diaspora is a more cost-effective instrument for staffing important positions than is donor-funded technical assistance where it is usually foreigners who ‘come to help’ (Ul Haque and Khan 1997). Mr. Asoalla, director of finance and administration at the Ministry of Education, tells me that no similar program is planned for the educational sector (Asoalla, 2010, Dec 12), but a news article from 2006 reports that the heads of Ghana’s six public universities have in fact met with diaspora members, promoting exactly the kind of temporary return that MIDA does.

**Pension transfers**

Ensuring bilateral agreements on the transferability of pensions has been hypothesized as an important strategy for enticing the return of retired expatriates. Although many Ghanaians seek opportunities in foreign lands, “a lot of these people do not plan to die abroad”, as I quoted Dr. Addison above. Dr. Archer at the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare (MOESW) frames this an issue of fairness: A Ghanaian returnee “should not loose out in terms of getting pensions just because he has contributed to another country and is living here” (Archer, 2010, Dec 6). Dr. Archer and the MOESW are surveying the international development in this area and disseminates materials to the missions abroad, who can then counsel emigrants directly. Dr. Archer further tells me that “[h]igh level talks are ongoing between Ghana and other countries where a lot of Ghanaians reside and work, to conclude such MOUs,” but I have been unable to corroborate this statement with other sources of information.

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45 There is in fact a twin-project; the MIDA Ghana-Italy Project, that supports and incubates business aspirations of Italy-based Ghanaians. However, Mr. Rispoli, head of technical cooperation between IOM and the Ghanaian state, tells me that this project is not government-owned: The Ministry of Trade and Industry is regularly updated, but not really involved in the process (Rispoli, 2010, Dec 7). The MIDA Ghana-Italy Project thus falls outside the scope of this study.


47 An MOU, or memorandum of understanding, is typically a non-enforceable bi- or multilateral agreement between parties. The quote comes from email correspondence with the author, from March 31, 2011.
5.3 Cultural engagement

It is a well-known fact that Ghanaians in the diaspora maintain dense cultural and social ties to their families and home communities, and that they also recreate native communities and practices in their countries of residence (see Peil 1995, p.363f; Orozco et al. 2005). It is particularly noteworthy that Ghana’s system of Chiefs and Queen Mothers has been ‘exported’. Samuel Zan (2004, p.17) writes:

“For culture and identity promotion, the Chieftaincy institution has a comparative advantage in facilitating diaspora linkages. Exchanges using the chieftaincy institution provide diaspora citizens the opportunity to reinvent themselves through diverse forms of cultural expression. It then provides incentives for diaspora citizens to want to contribute to the consolidation of their common heritage.”

This strong cultural engagement ‘from below’ is not met by cultural engagement ‘from above’, however. I managed to elicit a comment on this from Mr. Owiredu at NPP: “It’s not a deliberate effort from the government, you know, to try and engage them in this regard, no. ... The thing is that the state normally doesn’t involve itself in religion, chieftaincy matters and whatnot.”

Recognition

This study is interested in actual policies, not political rhetoric, but in spite of that I want to underline that Ghanaians in the diaspora were mentioned in president John Agyekum Kufuor’s (NPP) inaugural address of 2001: “I must also acknowledge the contributions made by our compatriots who live outside the country,” he said:

“Many of you do more than send money home, many of you have kept up keen interest in the affairs at home and some of you have even been part of the struggle of the past twenty years. I salute your efforts and your hard work and I extend a warm invitation to you to come home and let us rebuild our country.”

There are reasons to believe that Kufuor’s statement meant a lot to many Ghanaians. It has been noted that “the emergence of multi-party political systems ... results in an opening of the transnational political field between emigrants and their

48 Needless to say, the statement must be taken with a pinch of salt. The NPP is furthermore a center-right party, and it is entirely possible that the NDC or another party could have a different view.

country of origin” (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003b, p.217). In the case of Ghana, large groups of people left the country for political reasons during the Rawlings era (see Anarfi et al. 2003) and while democratic rule was re-instituted in Ghana in 1993, it proved itself to be real only when president Rawlings stepped down in 2000.50

A Ministry for Diasporean Relations?

It is very interesting to note that for a few years during president Kufuor’s second term in office, the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) was expanded into the Ministry of Tourism and Diasporean Relations. The shorter name was restored in 2009 after a change of government but one of two mission statements guiding the MOT is still to ensure a “[s]ustainable relationship with the Diaspora for resource mobilization and investments.”51 One might therefore be forgiven for assuming that the MOT is the coordinating institution for state-diaspora relations. That would be erroneous: “There was a lot of misconceptions about the ‘diasporean relations’ at the time,” Mrs. Ohene-Osei, principal tourism officer of the MOT, told me when we discussed the matter (Ohene-Osei, 2010, Nov 11): “Ghanaians thought it had to do with Ghanaians in the diaspora ... but that was not what we were doing. We were looking at Africans in the diaspora,52 related to the slave story.” Says Mr. Appiah at IOM: The name “brought in confusion to the highest level” (Appiah, 2010, Nov. 9).53

Ghana nurtures a vigorous tradition of cultural outreach to descendants of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, a tradition that emanates from the Pan-Africanist convictions of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the nation’s independence hero and first president. Relations took manifestation in 1992 with the first biannual Panafest. (short for Pan-African Historical Theatre Festival), followed in 1998 by Emancipation Day celebrations, to be held on August 1 each year to commemorate the abolition of slave trade. Expressed cynically, these are sophisticated cultural diaspora engage-
ment strategies, targeting affluent ‘friends of Ghana’ from the other side of the Atlantic.54

Unfortunately, some commentators—such as Alhassan (2010)—confound the engagement of Africans in the diaspora with engagement of Ghanaians in the diaspora, which give rise to both practical and analytical problems. For instance, there are hundreds of years separating the formation of the two diasporas, which have also evolved from very different circumstances; one may be labeled a ‘victim diaspora’, the other a ‘labour diaspora’, using Robin Cohen’s (1997) typology. It thus stands to reason that the two diasporas are very distinct from one another: Where the identity of the former emanates from a traumatic historical past—a past no one now alive has actually lived through—and is powered by a fairly fictive, diffuse, and removed entity by the name of ‘Africa’, members of the contemporary diaspora are often first-generation migrants nurturing less fictive roots, who also have to “contend with the added imperative of the modern nation-state, which often frames the political and cultural itineraries of their travel and transnational networks” (Zeleza 2005, p.55).

The point I am making here—and this carries significance for the study of diaspora engagement policies in most sub-Saharan African countries—is that the diaspora type has impact on the character of attitudes and policies utilized in the state’s outreach, which is why distinct diasporas should not be conflated with one another. One plausible hypothesis is that while Africans in the diaspora may find cultural outreach particularly appealing, Ghanaians abroad are more likely to ‘buy into’ economic improvements and political rights, as these are the immediate reasons why they chose to emigrate in the first place. That being said, the argument here does not preclude policies directed at both diasporas simultaneously, it only emphasizes the need to keep the distinctions in mind.

But this does not answer the question of why the MOT has no outreach to Ghanaians abroad. Why not celebrate a ‘Day of the Emigrant’, for example? After all, the Ghanaian diaspora has a much greater impact on Ghana—good and bad—than has the African diaspora. Mrs. Ohene-Osei’s response is intriguing and deserves to be quoted at some length:

“We already have a culture of people wanting to come back, at least for holidays, visiting friends and families, and most times, once they come visit and go they start putting up businesses, housing projects, you know that kind of things. Everybody wants to leave their mark ... So we don't

54 See also Lake (1995) and Bruner (1996).
Culturally it happens. So that’s why I think we haven’t really looked at that aspect, because we already have it, it’s existing, it’s happening, you know.”

Essentially then, for Mrs. Ohene-Osei, Ghanaians living abroad are not tourists when they visit; they are Ghanaians, so “why make a noise about it?” The attitude is one of ‘if it ain’t broken, why try to fix it’.

It is well worth to keep in mind, however, that this situation could very well change as emigrants’ children grow up. Their attachment to Ghana is perhaps not as ‘automatic’ as that of their parents. Shortly after the conversation with Mrs. Ohene-Osei, I came across an article in New Africa where Henry Bonsu, a second-generation Ghanaian in the UK, makes exactly this point. First generation Ghanaian emigrants, writes Bonsu, nurture a ‘myth of return’, even though many of them will probably never do so for good. Second generation emigrants, however, if they are even interested in (re)connecting to the homeland, must sooner or later ask themselves “whether you’re going to be a tourist, or whether you’re going to do something in this country.” Significantly, Bonsu’s engagement in Ghana took off after attending the second Panafest in 1994, a cultural event. It is thus possible that cultural outreach will gain importance in years to come as the diaspora matures. This resonates with the observation of Manuh and Asante (2005, p.302), that the concerns of Ghanaians abroad “centre around political, economic and governance demands.” Cultural issues are less salient and typically related to a perceived lack of ‘Ghanaianness’ in their children. Manuh and Asante therefore proposes “cultural enrichment programmes” targeted at Ghanaians born overseas (ibid., p.307).

5.4 Summary

As the investigation here shows, state institutions in Ghana have in the last decade pursued an array of policies seeking to create, sustain, and expand the relationship to nationals residing outside state borders. By classifying these policies into to political, economic, and cultural categories (see a compilation of implemented policies

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in table 5.1 below), it is made evident that the relations between state and diaspora have a political tilt: Political policies of inclusion seem to have been pursued more energetically than economic or cultural ones. This is perhaps somewhat counterintuitive as one would assume that the state would be most interested in harnessing the economic potential of the diaspora. The most remarkable policy void, I would say, concerns remittances. The most intensive engagement, on the other hand, arguably takes place within the party structures, which have become impressively transnational. I have not found any publication taking note of such extensive ties between political parties and emigrant communities in other countries.

There is certainly room for more engagement of the diaspora in general, and a higher degree of engagement in particular. It is typically the case that it is the state that needs to be mobilized, not the emigrants (de Haas 2006). But importantly, the investigation also shows that the lack of engagement does not automatically mean that emigrants are excluded or forgotten. This insight has implications for the study of diaspora engagement in general and I would like to substantiate it using two examples. Firstly, when asked about the possibility of earmarking parliamentary seats for diaspora members, Mr. Owiredu responded that “we see them as an integral part of the party, so why [would we] need to specially, you know, set aside some seats for them as if they’re marginalized” (Owiredu 2010, Nov 30). Secondly, as revealed above, Mrs. Ohene-Osei at the MOT finds little reason to treat returning emigrants as if they are tourists, when they are in fact Ghanaians who have come home. So Mr. Owiredu and Mrs. Ohene-Osei at least, see no sense in policies that would reconstitute non-resident Ghanaians into something that they are not, namely marginalized or tourists.

More engagement could in fact be less important than better engagement (c.f. Gamlen 2008b, p.10f). A big problem in the Ghanaian context is that the implemented policies present themselves as fairly isolated instances of ad hoc engagement. What Ghana needs is arguably some kind of unit coordinating diasporic relations. All informants I spoke to during my visit in Accra agreed to this. Said Mr. Agorsor, the Director of Migration: “I’m sure, yes, we need it. … We need a dias-

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56 It is made evident by the chapter’s analysis that the ‘state’ which I speak of in singular is not a unitary actor. Expressed differently, there is no single hand or mind behind the outreach to Ghanaians abroad.

57 I cannot out rule, however, the possibility that some indirect policies have been implemented by the MOFEP and the BOG in order to remove legal barriers, improve the financial sector environment etc. The only concrete indication of such policies I have found is a powerpoint presentation, available on the MOFEP website at [http://www.mofep.gov.gh/documents/remitances.pdf].
pora desk, because the issues coming up from the diaspora is overwhelming, so we need to have a desk to address those issues.”

Hopefully, the answer lies just around the corner. If all goes according to plan, the government will, in collaboration with IOM, set up a Diaspora Support Unit\(^8\) some time later this year. The Unit would, according to Mr. Rispoli at IOM, bring in representatives from various diaspora groups and have them meet with high-level government officials at a mini-version of the Homecoming Summit (Rispoli, 2010, Dec 7). This Unit would supplement—or possibly merge with—the existing interministerial Migration Unit which is currently formulating a comprehensive migration policy for Ghana.

\(^8\)The name is not set.
Table 5.1: A summary of Ghana’s diaspora engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY</th>
<th>COMMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Absentee voting</td>
<td>Granted by ROPAA (Act 699) which was passed in 2006. Still awaits implementation, however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dual citizenship</td>
<td>Implemented in 2002. See the Citizenship Act 2000 (Act 591) Section 16. Bars the holder from certain public offices however.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Administrative support</td>
<td>An NRGS was instituted in 2003 but is now ‘missing’. The missions abroad interact discretionarily with Ghanaians with varying degrees of engagement. A Diaspora Support Unit will hopefully be instituted in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Diaspora consultation</td>
<td>The CRC held consultations abroad in March and April 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Transnational parties</td>
<td>Party ties with the diaspora are very strong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recruiting emigrants as lobbyists</td>
<td>It is happening, according to Mr. Owiredu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Including the diaspora in the national development strategy</td>
<td>The importance of capturing diaspora contributions is emphasized in the most recent development strategy, GSGDA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pension portability</td>
<td>Ghana is set to reach agreements on the portability of pensions, according to Mr. Archer at MOESW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foreign-currency bank accounts</td>
<td>Allows emigrants to keep money in domestic banks, but has attracted little interest, according to Dr. Addison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Diaspora bonds</td>
<td>A Golden Jubilee Bond open to the diaspora was created in 2007. It attracted around $1.14 million from external buyers (Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Investment promotion</td>
<td>Engagements with diaspora members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Temporary return programs</td>
<td>The MIDA Ghana Health project is bringing home doctors in the diaspora on a temporary basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recognition</td>
<td>President Kufuor took note of the diaspora in his inaugural speech of 2001. President Mills did not, however, in his address eight years later. The president, ministers, and MPs often visit diaspora communities abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emigrant tourism schemes</td>
<td>Panafest and Emancipation Day are targeted at Africans in the diaspora, but plausibly attract some Ghanaians abroad as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Diaspora conference</td>
<td>Homecoming Summit of 2001. (Maybe a mini-version of this Summit in 2011 or 2012.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facilitating remittances in kind</td>
<td>Some reductions are available for humanitarian donations, but these apply to all philanthropists, not only those of Ghanaian origin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 | Conclusions

In the contemporary world, that which is far away is not necessarily distant any more. While a three-minute phone call between London and New York back in 1930 cost about $300, it is today possible to get in touch with practically the whole world through your cell phone for rates of under 10¢ per minute (Barry 2006, p.15f). And there are, by the way, over five billion mobile phones in use worldwide. As a result of the unparalleled ease and affordability to stay in touch, stay informed, and travel to and fro, many international migrants, who were once remembered only through yellowing photographs, have now become transmigrants, “whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state” (Glick Schiller et al. 1995, p.48). This study has made an effort to identify, describe, and analyze the range of relations between emigrants and emigration states, but it has done so from the viewpoint of the state. The prevalence and range of these ‘unconventional’ practices of state transnationalism, and the fact that they seem to be an increasingly common phenomenon worldwide, support the notion that they are indeed worthy of academic attention.

I have argued that the concept of diaspora engagement policies and a sectoral typology which groups these practices into political, economic, and cultural brackets, present us with a useful theoretical framework for analyzing state-diaspora relations in a systematic manner. This study has two specific contributions: Firstly, it expands the study of diaspora engagement into the sub-Saharan African context by looking at policies implemented by state institutions in Ghana. The analysis shows that there has indeed been a significant rapprochement in the most recent decade between state institutions and Ghanaians overseas, in particular when it comes to political engagement. The Ghanaian policies of engagement are more or less isolated instances of inclusion however, and are pursued in an ad hoc manner. The investigation thus corroborates Gamlen’s (2008b, p.3f) general impression, namely that relatively...

“...few governments see diaspora policy as a distinct issue area, and they do not deliberately pursue coherence between the different state mechanisms through which they impact on diasporas. Most of what goes on is ad hoc and arbitrary, and reflects the different interests and historical trajectories of different institutions.”

An insight from Ghana with importance for the wider study of diaspora policies in the African context is that a distinction should be made between the inclusive African diaspora and the contemporary national one, as these two communities have very different origin and probably divergent interests in the homeland. Commentators on Ghana sometimes conflate the state’s relations to these two diasporas, which is problematic.

The second contribution is that I expand the analytical framework by adding degree of engagement to the investigation. This addition augments the focus on implementation and emphasizes the fact that a diaspora policy can typically be pursued with different levels of engagement, as the example of CRC’s diaspora consultations made evident. This addition can furthermore identify the main obstacles for engagement, such as the lack of reliable data on the volume, characteristics, and residency of migrants, the lack of administrative capacity in domestic state institutions and missions abroad, and the issue of embassies being an extension of the party in power. As I have shown, the implementation of ROPAA suffers from all these problems. In short, I argue, with Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a, p.5), that “closer scrutiny of sending country capabilities to implement their promised policies of inclusion may prove an important reality check on the idea of sending state institutions as key mobilizers of transnational relations between migrants and their countries of origin.”

I will conclude this essay by highlighting a couple promising avenues for further research:

In the Ghanaian context, the transnationalism of the venerated chieftaincy institution emerges as an intriguing facet of the relations between home society and diaspora. This link fell outside the scope of the present research but could prove to be an important aspect to study in the wider context of migration and development in Ghana (cf. Zan 2004, p.16f).

I also believe it would be very informative to apply the study of emigration and citizenship to the African context. Interestingly, Margaret Peil (1995, p.346) notes that citizenship in Africa “has tended to be defined by ethnicity, so place of birth is less...
important than ancestry. ... links to ‘home’ are claimed even by second or third generation emigrant families whose members have never visited it.” It could thus very well be the case that citizenship in some African countries is more easily de-territorialized than citizenship in, say, the European context.

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) for financing my field work in Accra, and to Sara Kalm who has guided me with patience through a thesis that has somehow turned more complex each day. Apart from all informants who have graciously participated in this study, I also thank Kofi Vondolia, Syna Quattara, Kojo Asante, Dr. Kwesi Aning, and Jens Nilsson for their assistance. Responsibility for the views expressed here and all remaining errors rests in the usual place.
Executive summary

The last decade has seen a sudden and widespread reappraisal of the so-called ‘migration-development nexus’ (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2003). Back in the 1970s the conventional wisdom was that “migration undermines the prospects for local economic development and yields a state of stagnation and dependency” (Massey, et al. 1998, 272), but this pessimistic attitude has now been turned on its head. For example a UN report from 2006 now asserts that “international migration constitutes an ideal means of promoting co-development, that is, the coordinated or concerted improvement of economic conditions in both areas of origin and areas of destination based on the complementarities between them.” In the global development discourse, international migrants—currently estimated to around 214 million individuals, or 3.1 percent of world population—are increasingly being celebrated as ‘transnational development agents’ (Faist 2008).

The present study concerns itself with an aspect of the migration-development debate that has heretofore been surprisingly neglected in academic research. Optimists and skeptics may disagree on the precise impact of migration in the country of origin, but they would probably both accept the postulation that the potential benefits of migration ultimately hinge on the transnational ties between diasporas and homelands. Transfers of money, ideas, knowledge, and technology, frequent visits and even permanent return can all be interpreted as effects of the willingness and increased ability to foster relationships across state borders (de Haas 2008, p.39). However, the literature has typically focused on just one side of this relationship, namely migrant transnationalism, effectively sidelining the continued importance of states in actively creating an institutional architecture for reciprocal interaction.

The overall aim of this study is therefore to advance the knowledge of so-called diaspora engagement policies, an emerging phenomenon which will be explored both theoretically and empirically.

Diaspora engagement policies are defined broadly by Alan Gamlen (2008b, p.3) as “state institutions and practices that apply to members of that state’s society who reside outside its borders.” Notable examples of such policies include dual citizenship legislation, absentee voting reforms, facilitation of remitting money, diaspora investment schemes, formal recognition of the importance of the diaspora, and cultural enrichment programs. More specifically, these are strategies that ‘court’ emi-
grants by extending some rights and benefits, but explicitly or implicitly they also seek to capture some of their resources—monetary, ideational or in kind. In other words, diaspora policies establish a more or less reciprocal relationship between the emigration state and the part of the population that resides overseas.

These matters are worthy of academic attention on the one hand because the relationship between state and migrant has overwhelmingly been studied and theorized as a challenge for immigration states (Bauböck 2003, p.708; Barry 2006), and on the other because there is perhaps too much emphasis on the ‘bottom-up’ transnational activity of migrants, while the ‘top-down’ diaspora policies pursued by emigration states have been far less studied and theorized (Gamlen 2008b). This study argues that we should not downplay the important role played by states in institutionalizing the transnational relationship between diaspora and homeland (see Ionescu 2006).

The first and main objective of the study is to advance the basic analysis of diaspora engagement. What are they, and how can we study them? I argue that we need some kind of analytical framework in order to identify and make sense of these practices which are quite unconventional, more or less incoherent in nature, and typically spread over several different state institutions. The second, more empirical objective is to put the analytical framework to use by outlining the diaspora policies implemented by one particular state—the West African nation of Ghana.

In an effort to facilitate the systematic analysis of these relations the present study uses Anupam Chander’s (2006) straightforward distinction between political, economic, and cultural policies as a point of departure. My contention is that when we study diaspora engagement it also makes sense to assess just how engaging a policy truly is. My proposal is that we expand the analytical framework: Retaining the sectoral distinction between political, economical, and cultural strategies, I add degree of engagement to the analysis. To be sure, thoughts on what I call the degree of engagement figure in other analyses of diaspora policies, but it has not been explicitly included in the analytical framework elsewhere.

This study has two specific contributions: Firstly, it expands the study of diaspora engagement into the sub-Saharan African context by looking at policies implemented by state institutions in Ghana. The empirical analysis of diaspora policies in Ghana is based on material collected through qualitative interviews with public officials in Accra, the capital of Ghana, and it shows that state institutions in Ghana have in the last decade pursued an array of policies seeking to create, sustain, and expand their relationship to those who reside outside state borders. The relations between state and diaspora have a political tilt: Political policies of inclusion seem to have been pursued more energetically than economic or cultural ones. This is
perhaps somewhat counterintuitive as one would assume that the state would be most interested in harnessing the economic potential of the diaspora. The most remarkable policy void concerns remittances while the most intensive engagement, on the other hand, arguably takes place within the party structures, which have become impressively transnational. I have not found any publication taking note of such extensive ties between political parties and emigrant communities in other countries.

A big problem in the Ghanaian context is that the implemented policies present themselves as fairly isolated instances of ad hoc engagement. The investigation thus corroborates Gamlen’s (2008b, p.3f) general impression, namely that relatively...

“...few governments see diaspora policy as a distinct issue area, and they do not deliberately pursue coherence between the different state mechanisms through which they impact on diasporas. Most of what goes on is ad hoc and arbitrary, and reflects the different interests and historical trajectories of different institutions.”

What Ghana needs is arguably some kind of unit coordinating diasporan relations.

An insight from Ghana with importance for the wider study of diaspora policies in the African context is that a distinction should be made between the broad African diaspora and the contemporary national one, as these two communities have very different origin and probably divergent interests in the homeland. Commentators on Ghana sometimes conflate the state’s relations to these two diasporas, which is problematic.

The second contribution of the study is that it expands the analytical framework by adding degree of engagement to the investigation. This addition augments the focus on implementation and emphasizes the fact that a diaspora policy can typically be pursued with different levels of engagement. This addition can furthermore help in identifying the main obstacles for de facto engagement, such as the lack of reliable data on the volume, characteristics, and residency of migrants, the lack of administrative capacity in domestic state institutions and missions abroad, and the issue of embassies being an extension of the party in power. In short, I argue, with Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a, p.5), that “closer scrutiny of sending country capabilities to implement their promised policies of inclusion may prove an important reality check on the idea of sending state institutions as key mobilizers of transnational relations between migrants and their countries of origin.”
Bibliography

Note: All webpages included in this bibliography or in the footnotes were accessible, and had the content referred to, as of May 24, 2011.


Amponsah, Nicholas. 2010, Nov 12. Interview with author at private residence, Accra, Ghana.


## Appendix A: List of informants (in alphabetic order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION, INSTITUTION</th>
<th>PRESENTATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addison, Ernest (Dr.)</td>
<td>Head of Research Department, Bank of Ghana</td>
<td>The BOG is of central importance to the economic relationship between Ghana and Ghanaians in the Diaspora. Dr. Addison has himself authored publications dealing with the macroeconomic impact of remittances in Ghana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjei, Ernest (Mr.)</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>The MOFA, with its missions abroad, is the principal state institution when it comes to physical interactions with Ghanaians abroad. Mr. Adjei is the Ministry's representative in the MU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agorsor, David (Mr.)</td>
<td>Director of Migration, Migration Unit (at the MINT)</td>
<td>The MU is currently working on a comprehensive migration policy for Ghana and thus closely involved in all issues of migration. Mr. Agorsor is the current Director of Migration, the head of the Unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anim, Belinda Adwoa Sika (Mrs.)</td>
<td>Head, Migration Information Bureau (at the GIS)</td>
<td>An initiative of the GIS, the MIB is tackling irregular migration through engaging and informing, potential migrants. The Bureau has no contact with Ghanaians in the Diaspora, but its activities is nonetheless a sign of the responsibility of the state for the well-being of emigrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anno-Kumi, Adelaide (Mrs.)</td>
<td>Director of Finance and Administration, Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>Mrs. Anno-Kumi was the first and so far longest-serving Director of Migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appiah, David (Mr.)</td>
<td>National Programme Development Officer, International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>Established in 1951, IOM is the principal inter-governmental organization in the field of migration. Among other things, it offers technical assistance and capacity building programs to member states. Mr. Appiah has been involved in the MIDA Ghana Health Project, which advocates the temporary return of non-resident Ghanaian health professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archer, Sam (Dr.)</td>
<td>Director of Policy Planning, Monitoring &amp; Evaluation, Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare</td>
<td>The MOESW, and Dr. Archer personally, has prepared a labour migration policy which has been incorporated into the MU's broad migration policy. Dr. Archer is the Ministry's representative in the MU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asabir, Kwesi (Dr.)</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Human Resource for Health Development, Ministry of Health</td>
<td>The MOH is seriously afflicted by the exodus of health personnel. Dr. Asabir is involved in the MIDA Ghana Health Project and is also the Ministry's representative in the MU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asoalla, Salomon (Mr.)</td>
<td>Director of Finance and Administration, Ministry of Education</td>
<td>The MOE is also negatively affected by the brain drain. Mr. Asoalla is the Ministry's representative in the MU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarfo-Kantanka, Kwadwo (Mr.)</td>
<td>Deputy Chairman, Electoral Commission</td>
<td>The main assignments of the EC is to compile the Voters Register and organize Ghana's elections. The Commission is currently tasked with hammering out the modalities of an absentee voting reform, passed in 2006. Mr. Sarfo-Kantanka is chairing the working group assigned to this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kroduah, James (Mr.)</td>
<td>Principal Economics Officer, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
<td>Through formulation and implementation of financial, fiscal and monetary policies, the MOFEP is central when it comes to the economic relationship between Ghana and Ghanaians in the Diaspora. Mr. Kroduah is the Ministry's representative in the MU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohene-Osei, Josephine (Mrs.)</td>
<td>Principal Tourism Officer, Ministry of Tourism</td>
<td>Mrs. Ohene-Osei has a long experience of the MOT's outreach to Africans in the Diaspora. She is, among other things, involved in the annual Emancipation Day celebrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owiredu, Charles (Mr.)</td>
<td>Director of International Affairs, New Patriotic Party</td>
<td>The NPP is Ghana's second-biggest political party, with 107 (of 228) seats in parliament. Mr. Owiredu is the coordinating officer of interactions between the NPP Head Office in Accra and the NPP party chapters abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rispoli, Jo (Mr.)</td>
<td>Head of Technical Cooperation Department, International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>As Head of Technological Cooperation, Mr. Rispoli is substantially involved in Ghana's efforts to manage migration. Mr. Rispoli is the IOMs representative in the MU.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: An interview guide

Interview Guide: Dr. Addison, The Bank of Ghana (BOG)

Intro:

• Acquiring permission to record.
• Acquiring informed consent.

Warm up:

• Tell me about the position of the Bank in relation to the state administration.

Concerning the impact of the Ghanaian diaspora:

• How would you like to characterize the economic impact of emigration on Ghana?

• The financial contributions of the diaspora are, I presume, very obvious to the Bank. Do you consider them to be properly acknowledged by the state and society here in Ghana?

• Is there something that sets the Ghanaian diaspora apart from other diasporas? Are there reasons to be more optimistic in the Ghanaian case, or less? Are any issues particularly salient?

Concerning remittances:

• For how long has remittances been a prominent feature of the Ghanaian economy?

• Can you explain to me why the World Bank estimates formal remittances to Ghana to be $126 million in 2008, when the BoG estimate them to be almost $2 billion? How can the World Bank reach an estimation that is only around 5% of the Bank of Ghana’s? (The issue of migrant remittances being confused with private capital flows?)

• How can the Bank support the facilitation of formal remittances?

• What can be done to lower the cost of remitting? (Africa is the most expensive place to remit money to, with an average cost of 10%.)

• How many money transfer bureaus are there in Ghana? Are these services functioning properly in Ghana?

• How can the Bank support the development impact of remittances?

• How big is the informal flow of private remittances in Ghana?

Concerning other economic measures:

• One economic tie between state and diaspora that is emphasized in the Ghanaian case is the possibility of opening a foreign currency bank account here in Ghana. Tell me more about this.

• Tell me about the Golden Jubilee Savings Bond. How much has the bond raised among expats? Do you hope that private actors will also start providing these measures, as Databank has recently done?

• Are you collaborating with GIPC in order to encourage diaspora investments? Can the diaspora be provided with preferential treatment?

• Do you know if a tax on earnings or remittances has ever been considered by Ghanaian officials? What would you think of such a measure?

Concerning domestic policy challenges:

65
• What are the most important challenges right now in the economic relationship between home state and diaspora?

• Would you say that the potential of the diaspora currently is underutilized in the case of Ghana?

• What is the most important reform to be made right now?

• Do you think that diaspora-targeted policies and reforms, or more general political/economic/societal change is most pertinent?

• Do you discern any particular characteristics in Ghana’s economic climate that discourages remittances, investments and return?

• Does the government of Ghana need to set up a diaspora ministry (or equiv.) to deal with state-emigrant relations? Why/Why not? Where should this ministry be set up?

• Does the Bank in any way interact directly with Ghanaians abroad?

Outro:

• Is there anything you would like to add to the conversation?

• Inviting further comments through mail or phone calls.

• Expressing gratitude for participation.
Appendix C: Information sheet presented to the informants

Information Sheet

Who am I?

My name is Klas Nilsson and I am a political science student at Lund University in southern Sweden. I am in Accra for two months in order to collect material for my M.A. thesis. The visit has been made possible by a minor field study grant from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Please note, however, that the study is not commissioned by this agency.

What is the study about?

The purpose of the study is to map out and analyze the interactions between the Ghanaian state and its emigrant communities around the world. A significant part of Ghana's population resides temporarily or permanently abroad but nonetheless maintain important ties to the home country. They also contribute monetarily through remittances to family, friends, and community. This study uses qualitative interviews to find out how the Ghanaian state approaches this situation.

How will the interviews be used?

The material from the interviews will form an integral part of my M.A. thesis. A hard copy of the thesis will be handed in to the Department of Political Science at Lund University and constitute the basis for examination of my master program. In accordance with the guidelines of my university a digital copy of the study will also be uploaded to an open access database. As a SIDA-funded minor field study it will furthermore be uploaded to yet another open access database administered by the Swedish International Programme Office. Finally, the study will possibly be re-written into an article to be submitted to academic journals for publication.

As a participant, you have...

...the right to withdraw from participation at any time until the thesis is handed in.

...the option of not answering questions.

...the possibility of requesting confidentiality for some responses.

...the possibility of requesting conditioned anonymity.

My contact information:

TEL. (GHANA) [-]
TEL. (SWEDEN) [-]
EMAIL [-]

I will stay in Ghana until the 10th of December, at which time I return to Sweden. Until this date you may contact me on my Ghanaian mobile phone or via email. If you wish to reach me after the 10th of December, call the number to my Swedish mobile phone. (My email address is of course the same.)

The thesis will be handed in sometime during the Spring, at which point I will make sure that you are presented with a copy.

Thank you very much for your participation, which is immensely valuable to me!

With regards

Klas Nilsson.
Appendix D: How many Ghanaians live outside Ghana?

As noted in chapter 4, estimates of the number of Ghanaians living abroad are not very reliably. Data tend to be fragmentary, if not nonexistent, and different countries also use divergent definitions of migrant status. There is also the fact that much migration is irregular, meaning it strives to escape the detection of immigration authorities. Needless to say, such migration is particularly difficult to track and assess. The difference between evidence-based estimates and well-informed guesstimates is thus often substantial. While Twum-Baah (2005, p.64f) finds records of some 110,000 Ghanaians in the UK he also quotes unofficial figures four times that number. Similarly, his estimate for Ghanaians in the US amounts to no more than 65,572 while Micah Bump (2006) cites guesstimates reaching as high as 400,000, or six times the Twum-Baah figure. In 1995 Peil took note of 20,000 Ghanaians in Toronto alone, while Twum-Baah ten years later finds evidence for 20,000 in the whole of Canada.

I have here compiled estimates from various publications, which range from less than one million up to 7.5 million. Based on a current population of 24 million, the share of emigrants could then range from slightly more than 3% to almost 24%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF GHANAIANS ABROAD</th>
<th>NUMBER OF GHANAIANS IN OECD COUNTRIES</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>189,461</td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>OECD Migration Database (EU 2006, p.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>957,883</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Development Research Centre of the University of Sussex (Quartey 2009, p.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>461,549</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Twum Baah (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,720,000–3,450,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Peil (1995, p.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EU Cover Note on Ghanaian Migration Profile. (Twum-Baah 2005, p.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+3,000,000 (or 15% of the pop.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Manuh and Asante (2005, p.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000,000–4,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Bump (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Constitution Review Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments: a Estimate is based on Peil’s claim that 10-20% of Ghanaian citizens live abroad, which would at the time of her writing amount to approximately 1.72-3.45 million individuals. She also cites ‘informed estimates’ of 1.5 million Ghanaians just in Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria.

b The EU Cover Note itself is not possible to find so the reliability of this estimate is circumscribed.

Appendix E: How big is the flow of remittances to Ghana?

As reported in this study, the Bank of Ghana estimates the remittances flowing into Ghana to almost $2 billion in 2008 (BOG 2009). There is a significant discrepancy, however, between this estimate and the remittances accorded to Ghana by international institutions. The World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011 reports that Ghana received a paltry $126 million in 2008. Although estimations of remittances suffer from statistical limitations, it is still very odd that Ghana’s central bank reports a figure more than fifteen times bigger than the World Bank.

The authors of a World Bank working paper (Irving et al. 2010, p.8f) note that “the data collected by central banks sometimes do not allow them to distinguish migrant remittances from other small value payments, such as cross border trade or investment flows by nonresidents.” Ghana is in fact used as an example of such a mix-up. But according to Dr. Addison, head of the research department at the Bank of Ghana, their reporting format allows for a clear distinction between remittances and private capital flows. Dr. Addison, it should be noted, has himself authored the perhaps most comprehensive account of the size and impact of remittances in Ghana (Addison 2005), and must therefore be considered to be well-informed on the issue. He further tells me that he has even sent email to the World Bank, pointing out the discrepancy between estimations and asking where they have got their data from: “They were saying something about these are the numbers we [the Bank of Ghana] are reporting, so I’ve been trying to find out who is reporting these numbers to the World Bank from Ghana. I’m not sure where they’re getting the data from” (Addison Nov 29, 2010). I must say that it is remarkable that the World Bank (and most of the international community with it) uses data on remittances to Ghana, the source of which even the head of research at Ghana's central bank cannot track down.