European Union External Developmental vs. Political Democracy Promotion: The Case of the Eastern Partnership

Elvin Mejidov
Abstract

The European Union’s external democracy promotion has increasingly and widely been characterized by most of the field’s scholars, with its overwhelming focus on supporting the overall socio-economic developments rather than nurturing the political underpinnings of democracy. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has undertaken certain efforts to promote the shared values in the neighbourhood countries but has yielded marginal results at best. But this does not mean that the ENP has not promoted democracy in the neighbourhood. Though there is a huge amount of research on the ENP, little has been researched regarding which democracy promotion approach: developmental, political or mix of them- has characterized the EU’s democratization efforts in the neighbourhood.

In this regard, as an effort to advance this analytical tradition in the field of the ENP studies, this thesis has aimed to paint a picture and present a profile of the EU’s democracy promotion approach in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) that is the ENP’s Eastern neighbourhood dimension. Thus an analytical framework for developmental democracy promotion approach has been adopted from Thomas Carothers and this has theoretically informed by modernization and Europeanization theories. To conduct the study, a qualitative research design with the EaP as the exploratory single case has been established. The various sources of data have been collected and analyzed via different methods. The findings have been that the EU has determined a prevalently developmental democracy promotion approach within the EaP but the EU’s most recent embarking upon supporting ‘‘deep democracy’’ in the neighbourhood may balance the trend.

Key words: Eastern Partnership, European Union External Democracy Promotion, European Neighbourhood Policy, Modernization, Europeanization

Word Count: 19999
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AER</td>
<td>Assembly of European Regions</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Country</td>
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<td>CIB</td>
<td>Comprehensive Institution-Building</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>CoR</td>
<td>Committee of regions</td>
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<td>CSF</td>
<td>Civil Society Forum</td>
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<td>CSFc</td>
<td>Civil Society Facility</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Development Cooperation Instrument</td>
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<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<td>EaP LRA</td>
<td>Eastern Europe and South Caucasus Local and Regional Assembly</td>
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<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EED</td>
<td>European Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<td>EESC</td>
<td>European Economic and Social Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument of Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EURONEST PA</td>
<td>EU-Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>FP7</td>
<td>Seventh Framework Programme</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Society for International Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPR</td>
<td>Intellectual Property Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDA</td>
<td>Mediterranean Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>NADC</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEC</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
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<td>PAR</td>
<td>Public Administration Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>SPS</td>
<td>Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary System</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAIEX</td>
<td>Technical Assistance and Information Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCAP</td>
<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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Acknowledgement

The EaP Prague Summit was held on 7 May 2009, exactly on the day the LU notified me of my admission to the MEA Programme, and after two years, I am honored to have written this master’s thesis on the EaP as a student of the LU Department of Political Science. My best thanks to the Swedish Institute that welcomed me to Sweden awarding me with the ‘’Master in Sweden for East Europe’’ scholarship funded by the SIDA.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Research Background

This thesis is devoted to understanding the EU’s external democracy promotion strategies¹ and in their light, the EU’s democracy promotion approach in its Eastern Partnership (EaP). In order to understand the nature of the EU’s external democracy promotion, the study needs to fully consider the various definitions of democracy. Notwithstanding that “democracy is a world value and international norm” (McFaul 2004: 147, 155), it is not easy to define it. There’s still not a universally agreed definition of the concept.

The minimalist perceptions of democracy characterize democracy mainly with elections and party contestations. To name a few, Schumpeter thinks that “…democracy is a political method…a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political- legislative and administrative – decisions” (1947, p.269), and “that institutional arrangement [is] for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1975: 242). In the same vein, Przeworski sees democracy as “a system in which parties lose elections” (1991, p.10), and “a regime in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections”. Only if the opposition is allowed to compete, win, and assume office is a regime democratic. Thus “[to] the extent to which it focuses on elections, this is obviously a minimalist definition” (Przeworski et al., 1996: 50-51). Popper also says that democracy “…consists of governments of which we can get rid without bloodshed…by way of general elections…” (Popper 1963: 124), an argument which Huntington seems to add on that the “twentieth century political system [is] democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections” (1991, p.7).

Dahl’s Polyarchy (1989, p.233) that is consisted of the following elements, is an embodiment of all those approaches: 1) elected officials 2) free and fair elections 3) inclusive suffrage 4) the right to run for office 5) freedom of expression 6) alternative information and 7)

¹ ‘Approach’ and ‘strategy’ are used interchangeably throughout the thesis.
associational autonomy. According to him, democracies are “inclusive participatory regimes based on party alternation or contestation” (1971, pp. 6-7).

Championing a maximalist view of democracy, Larry Diamond (1995) argues that democracy is characterized with “not only a civilian, constitutional, multiparty regime, with regular, free and fair elections and universal suffrage, but organizational and informational pluralism; extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations); effective power for elected officials; and functional autonomy for legislative, executive and judicial organs of government”. Another prominent scholar, Fareed Zakaria, asserts the importance of liberty to go hand in hand with democracy in order to form a liberal democracy as “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property” (1997:22). The horizontal and vertical accountability, and responsibility, of the elected to the electorate, are important elements of liberal democracy. Also, “good governance” (used interchangeably with “democratic governance”) concept has been much used in democracy studies as a rather indirect expression of democracy’s elements aforementioned. According to the UNDP, “Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable […] promotes the rule of law […], and] ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources”. Thus good governance principles (Appendix 6) enshrined in the UNDP’s “Governance for Sustainable Human Development” (1997) policy document are eight, as shown in the figure.
1.1.1 EU’s External Democracy Promotion: What in Essence?

Since 1995, all bilateral contracts of the EU with third countries contain a reference to values (Knodt and Junemann 2007: 260) such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and good governance, which the EU has externally promoted under the name of democracy. There is a vast body of literature and also EU policy documents on democracy promotion, which reflect that the overall nature of the EU external democracy promotion strategy worldwide has been increasingly perceived by the academia as an integral part of the EU’s holistic account of sustainable development.

Particularly, between 2000 and 2006 in the EU’s democracy promotion, a preference remained for governance and human rights initiatives rather than a focus on the more directly political dimensions of democracy promotion (Youngs (ed) 2006: 52). That said, in most parts of the world, the “European governments support measures of social democracy [i.e., social requisites for democracy] without aiming their policy instruments at the core tenets of liberal democracy”, with the “importance of elections rather under-estimated” and “efforts [being] aimed at the dispersal of economic power”, and “prioritize social projects, civil society initiatives, good governance…in countries where they happily accept autocratically manipulated elections” (Youngs 2011: 5-8).
In other words, the EU’s indirect promotion of democracy is argued by the existing literature to have prevailed over the direct. Direct promotion (political strategy) of democracy involves methods aimed directly at political objectives; and attempts to contribute to the non-political requisites that enable or facilitate democratization through, for instance, aiding a country’s economic or socioeconomic development are considered as the indirect (developmental strategy) pathways to the same goal of democracy (Burnell 2006: 3-4).

Also many other scholars (Youngs 2011, 2008a,b, 2006, 2003a,b, 2002, 2001a, b, c; Carothers 2009, 1997; Gourevitch 1992; Burnell 2006, 2005; Santiso 2003; Crawford 2004) of the field argue that the most prevalent ideological base of the EU’s external democracy promotion strategy is the socio-economic development of a target country with a leading focus on all aspects of human rights, on good governance, and a low level application of the political leverage tools. Particularly, it is observed that the EU links democracy work with good governance, human rights support, and inclusion of social and economic rights alongside political and civil rights (Carothers 2009: 16).

According to Carothers (1997), the EU considers democracy related aid as a valuable goal of the external aid leading to the social and economic development and as such democracy is not an end in itself but an integral element of sustainable development, and though political and developmental approaches are both existent in the EU’s approach, the developmental one is clearly dominant in Europe (Carothers 2009: 16) - a strategy that is “…to support the development of the economic and social requisites that sooner or later will create domestic pressure for political opening, and will make transition to democracy more likely to stick once it does happen” (Burnell 2004: 103-4). Reiterating the EU’s socio-economic development priority, Youngs (2001c, 2003b) observes that the EU’s liberal economic and commercial policies on political change in developing countries are of primary importance to democracy promotion because economic liberalization creates fertile conditions for democratic “political reform as part of a general process of social and economic modernization…” (Youngs in Doorn and Meijenfeldt 2007: 67-8).

Moreover, according to the EU’s Political and Security Committee, “in the context of the EU’s development cooperation the term democracy is sometimes referred to, along with human rights, rule of law, civil society development, public administration etc., as an element of governance”, and “democratic governance as used by UNDP...characterizes EU support
The EU believes that “…the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will not be achieved without decisive progress in democratic governance” which “spans a broad range of issues, such as respect and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, [and] democratisation…” (SEC [2009], 58 final, p.3).

Also, the explicit developmental nature of the EU’s approach is demonstrated in other EU documents (COM (2003) 615; COM (2006) 421). A recent EU document stipulates “good governance, democracy and respect for human rights as internal to the process of sustainable development and as major objectives of EU policy” (SEC (2009) 58: 3). Furthermore, “institutional capacity-building, particularly in the area of good governance and the rule of law is one of the six priority areas for EC development policy” (COM (2003) 615: 3). Even, the EU considers term “governance” more pragmatic than democracy, human rights etc (ibid.). Because European governments together believe that political reform will come through “putting politics into governance,” much more than through easily identifiable, stand-alone, politicized “democracy initiatives” (Youngs 2008a: 168).

Therefore, recalling the Figure 1 above, the analyses shows that the EU’s democracy conceptualization foremostly matches with Good Governance that the EU supports in development cooperation to promote the overall national development: with a low propensity to directly intervene in democracy’s political confines in the partner countries. To complicate further, according to the EU document on supporting democratic governance (SEC (2009) 58: 2-3), the EU approaches the principles of good governance indicated in the figure above as holistic: democratic governance includes all of them in all areas of economic, political and social functioning.

Therefore, as Carothers (2009) puts it in its differentiation of the developmental strategy (pp.8-9) of democracy promotion from the political one, the EU’s strategy is largely developmental, understood as the following table displays, and it frames the analytical direction of the thesis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Value of democracy:</strong> Basic features of democratic governance—such as transparency, accountability, and responsiveness—contribute to more equitable socioeconomic development overall. Democracy is a contributing factor in the larger process of national development. The political principles that democracy enshrines are secondary to the core developmental rationale.</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Concept of democracy:</strong> The developmental approach looks beyond an exclusively political definition of democracy to broader conceptions that incorporate socioeconomic concerns. Economic and social rights are not less pivotal than political rights. The approach looks past political procedures to substantive outcomes such as equality, welfare, and justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concept of democratization:</strong> This is a slow and gradual process. Democratization is wound in a double helix of causality with socioeconomic development: Just as the achievement of basic features of democratic governance contributes to further socioeconomic development, so too do socioeconomic gains contribute to democratization. It is better to achieve a certain basic level of social and economic development, including an effective state and the rule of law, before proceeding with democratization.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Method of supporting democracy:</strong> Promoting social and economic development as a way of supporting democracy; emphasis on state capacity building and good governance but not on catalyzing political contestation and openness; support to civil society forces dealing with national and local-level socio-economic problems, but barely to national level political advocacy CSOs.</td>
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Conversely, political strategy\(^2\) (ibid.6-8) is characterized with the following attributes: more emphasis on the Dahl’s account of democracy, and on political and civil liberties than on economic and social rights; prioritization of political struggle and victory of democrats over the anti-democrats and thus direct support to political parties or associations, politically oriented NGOs, and indirect support to key institutions: an independent electoral commission, independent judiciary, and independent media to help level the political playing field for the democratic actors. This approach is rival to the former one, and the study has considered finding its patterns.

Now, the study shifts to problematize this research background on an identified research problem which is related with the ENP which largely applies the EU’s enlargement policy to the neighbours. The EU enlargement has been characterized as the EU’s most effective democracy promotion instrument of which root is the carrot of the EU membership coupled with strict political conditionality that successfully pushed for democratization in the CEECs. According to Carothers (2009), the enlargement strategy represented a mix of developmental and political approaches with the latter being as a part of the large package of social and economic reforms, unlike the Barcelona Process which has reflected a highly gradualist support for democratic reform up until the Arab Spring of 2011.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), on the other hand, is argued by many authors to have sought to export the European political and economic model to the neighbours through positive (incentives) conditionality (Llorente 2010: 22) directed to induce political reforms, and to have failed, and heavily admonished for its ineffectiveness to promote democracy in the neighbourhood foremostly because the lack of the membership perspective and wanting more for less. In this case, a longer-term and sustained engagement intrinsic to the developmental approach may well have been the underlying nature of democracy promotion through the ENP. It would be particularly interesting to see if the existing literature has touched upon this pattern.

\(^2\) Appendix 7
2 Research Overview, Problem, Objective and Question

2.1 ENP Research

Thus the key issue to identify in the literature is to see how and to what extent the developmental or political democracy promotion in the ENP studies is covered. But given the infeasibility of exploring each and every study, mostly the mainstream literature is consulted. Baracani (2004, in Attina and Rossi, 2004) has attempted to depict a picture of a possible democracy promotion strategy within the ENP basing on the EU and specific ENP Country Reports, and concluded that the EU did not act in compliance with its official rhetoric, quite often through incoherence and manipulation of specific EU Member State interests (Baracani 2009).

Also several studies have increasingly asserted that the ENP is a weak instrument of democratization in the neighbourhood foremostly because of the lack of membership perspective as a strong incentive for democratic reform, and also positive conditionality (complicated with the principle of joint ownership) with low-level incentives and assistance coupled with higher costs of adopting EU rules (Comelli, Greco and Tocci 2007; Emerson et al. 2005a, Emerson, Noutcheva and Popescu 2007; Dannreuther 2004; Emerson 2002; Cremona and Hillion 2006; Tocci 2005; Cremona and Melonie 2007; Gawrich et al. 2009; Reinhard 2010). Taking a slightly different view, Cremona and Melonie (2007) has argued that despite these shortages, the ENP can achieve a baseline for potential democratization by promoting the rule of law. Moreover, Baracani (2005) claims that the credibility of ENP conditionality is enhanced by the ENP’s mechanism of compliance monitoring that assures that determinacy to the political priorities listed in the APs. Another similar study on the ENP’s potential of democratization in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus has emphasized the importance of considering different phases and conditions for democratization and possibility of effective democratization without membership (Raik 2006). Taking a contrary view, Schimmelfennig (2007) has predicted that ENP will have at best uncertain and inconsistent effects as a policy of democracy promotion (p.24).
Other scholars note that the ENP borrows many of its policy instruments and democracy promotion mechanisms, particularly conditionality and socialization, from the enlargement policy, and argue that within the ENP socialization would be more conducive for bottom-up democratization than conditionality (Cremona 2004; Kelley 2006; Kratchovil 2006; Delcour 2007). However, Balfour and Missorili claim that the ‘’ENP’s impact in terms of promoting human rights and democracy in the partner countries has been very modest and has often generated contradictions, dilemmas and even negative unintended consequences’’ (2007, p.37). Also, Kelley (2006) has attributed the ineffectiveness of the ENP’s efforts to promote the ‘shared values’ in the neighbouring countries to certain factors that these countries lack: the elimination of absolute poverty; lack of gross income and power inequality; education and literacy; the resolution of domestic conflicts; a vibrant civil society and a flourishing market economy (p.44). At this point, Balfour and Missorili have argued that the EU has tended to take a dual and gradual approach: socializing elites through political dialogue and institutionalizing relations; and a ‘bottom up’ socio-developmental approach, focusing mainly on supporting those elements of civil society which are seen as important agents of change (2007: 11), in a parallel line of proven modest, inconsistent, and contradictory attitude towards human rights and democracy promotion in the neighbouring countries.

In fact, throughout the research overview process, it is observed that most ENP studies give more attention to the formal instruments of democracy promotion in the ENP, budgetary allocations for democracy projects through TACIS, MEDA, or ENPI; than to analyzing the EU democracy promotion strategy.

A few works have tried to touch upon the topic of EU’s developmental democracy promotion strategy. For instance, Michael Emerson in his ‘’Wider Europe Matrix’’ (2004) contends that the EU’s policy for the Greater Middle East and Barcelona Process has demonstrated human development, sound governance and democratisation to be part of a holistic development process and calls it ‘’active engagement’’, and ‘’passive engagement’’ if the EU supports economic development as a forerunner to democratisation in the neighbourhood - however not addressing the eastern neighbourhood. Rouda, in another study (in Emerson et al. 2005a), sets the level of GDP per capita and socio-economic conditions to analyze the democratic transition potential of Belarus.
A noteworthy research which has even explicitly considered the positive impact of socio-economic development on democracy in the neighbourhood and empirically tested this hypothesis, with the political conditionality and socialization mechanisms of democracy promotion added, has been done by Schimmelfennig (2007) - he concludes that the strategy is important for democratization in the neighbourhood.

This finds resonance in Youngs’ and Emerson’s concerns (2009): having found that the authoritarian regimes “prolong” transition periods, they claim that “a different scenario is needed, focusing on long-term socio-economic development and the emergence of new middle class and educated elite interests as the future drivers of democracy and this seems implicit in the actual policies of the European Union, which focus most attention on human rights, and barely still mention the word democracy” (p.30). But whether this approach is implicit or explicit in the ENP has barely been analyzed in the ENP literature many of which are presented and others have also been looked through, and investigating this would require an in-depth analysis of all the ENP policy documents, bilateral Action Plans (APs) with the neighbours, Country (neighbor) Progress Reports and Strategy Papers, and overall ENP policy implementation with regard to democracy promotion in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood countries since 2003: but this goes far beyond the scope and possibilities of this research.

However, in the spirit of the research background adopted, this study only delimits itself to concentrate on the policy content (set-up) of the recently (2009) adopted Eastern Partnership (EaP) – ENP’s eastern dimension, and identify whether the EU has determined a developmental or political democracy promotion approach3. The objective here is to advance a different analytical path in the studies of the EU’s democracy promotion within the ENP and thus present an alternative analytical framework for further empirical research on democracy promotion within the EaP or Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in particular, and ENP in general. The inquiry becomes more interesting after the EaP research overview in the next section observes that there has barely been any research conducted with the prism raised here.

3 Whether democracy favors socio-economic development or vice versa and whether the EU actually applies either strategy to particular ENP countries are not a research object of this study.
2.2 EaP Research


But the content analysis of the EaP exploring the developmental or political democratization patterns has not been conducted so far. Thus the research objective of this thesis envisages a degree of contribution to fill this knowledge gap in the literature, bearing in mind that it is ultimately not possible to do this with only one study.

All these studies conduce towards the following research question: *What kind of democracy promotion approach has the EU determined in the Eastern Partnership Policy: developmental, political or mix?*

2.3 Thesis Structure

To operationalize the research question, in *Chapter 3* a theoretical framework consisted of modernization and Europeanization theories, which reflect upon the research background is designed. Since the EU’s external democracy promotion displays the hinge as the prevalence
of the developmental trends, the study consults the assumptions of the *modernization theory* to understand the theoretical bases of this approach. In its turn, these analyses necessitate to be wary of the EU’s democracy promotion *mechanisms* to see whether and how the EU operationalizes the prevalently developmental approach. At this point, the *Europeanization theory*, with the empirical support of the existing literature, and with relevance to the neighbourhood, presents *conditionality, socialization, civil society support, state capacity building for good governance and development*, and *sector specific democratic governance mechanisms*, consequently embracing the arguments of the developmental approach. The proposition and hypothesis tentatively answering the research question are thus framed basing on the developmental approach against the political approach that is the rival explanation.

In *Chapter 4*, the methodology designs the research to collect and analyze the data via the means of the concepts constituting the hypothesis: developmental concepts guide the data collection, together with a focus on finding the evidence for the political approach. *Chapter 5*, the collected data on the EaP is presented, and *Chapter 6* analyzes the data in its first 5 sections exploring in the EaP the use of the aforementioned mechanisms, with each section presenting its own conclusions, and basing on these conclusive findings of the analysis, the 6-th section of the chapter reviews and confirms the tentative hypothesis but with an ex post evidence (renewed ENP’s ‘’deep democracy’’ concept) contradictory of the confirmed hypothesis, claims that the EU is looking forward to enhance the use of the political strategy. Finally, the section 6.7 takes a critical stance towards the thesis findings and recommends further research on the topic.

### 3 Theorizing Analytical Framework

The discussions so far seem to require an understanding the theoretical base of the EU’s developmental democracy promotion. This study considers the Modernization theory particularly relevant in this respect.

#### 3.1 Modernization Theory

According to Lipset, ‘’…democracy is related with the state of economic development, [and] this means the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain
democracy’’ (1959: 75; 1960: 31). He advances that “all the various aspects of economic development – industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education – are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy” (1960:41; 1959:80). Economic development and pursuant changes in the societal structures create fertile conditions for the emergence and sustainability of democracy. At the heart of this proposition is the correlation between the peoples’ material prosperity and social progress which leads to democratic transition and stability through creation of large, better educated and wealthy middle class with urbanized way of life and industrialized economy, as the diagram below depicts:

Making a stronger emphasis on education, Lipset considers that a high level of education and literacy create and sustain belief in democratic norms (1959, p.83), and large scale education of lower classes create demand for democratization. The increased and relatively equal income and wealth, even distribution of national resources mitigate the material redistributional problems especially for lower classes in the society, prevent radical stratification and class cleavages and create greater social equality, give greater economic security for the lower stratum that in turn plays a key role in the societal stability, out of which the large middles classes emerge as an impactful social demand base for democratic order. Otherwise, ”a society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite results either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny…” (Lipset 1959: 75, 1960: 31). Also Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2007) agree that the “economic development goes together with better education, less poverty, the creation of a
large middle-class, and a competent civil service. It thereby mitigates the class struggle and promotes cross-cutting cleavages” (p. 7).

These theoretical underpinnings have embraced the developmental framework in Table 1 and thus its assumptions will be used to set up the tentative hypothesis ahead.

In the proceeding section, the study concentrates on Europeanization theory that elucidates the EU-specific mechanisms of developmental external democracy promotion, with particular relevance to the EU neighbourhood.

3.2 Europeanization

Studies on Europeanization have mostly dealt with the impact of the European integration and governance on the EU members. For a reference, we can note that Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso (2001) defines Europeanisation as “the emergence and development of distinct structures of governance at the European level” (Emerson et al. 2005a: 174). This approach is also animated in the other well-known works on the topic (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2009). At the same time, the research in this area has been enriched by a considerable number of research works dedicated to the CEECs (Sedelmeier 2011, Schimmelfennig et al. 2006, Pridham 2005, Grabbe 2006, Kubicek 2003, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Vachudova 2005, Sedelmeier 2006).

But this study needs to be informed by the ‘‘Europeanization beyond Europe’’ (Schimmelfennig 2009). Democracy promotion is the most widely studied area of Europeanization in the European neighborhood (Schimmelfennig 2009: 19). P. Olsen (2002) relates Europeanization with the export of European political practices and forms of governance to the third states, and Grabbe (2003) further applies this to the accessing CEECs of the time. Then for the EU’s neighborhood, Europeanization can be defined ‘‘as a form of [the EU] external governance which consists (selective) expansion of the EU norms, rules and policies i.e., legal boundary, while precluding the…membership’’ (Lavenex 2004: 694): external projection of internal solutions (ibid.:695).
Conditionality, socialization (also Emerson et al. 2005a,b) and domestic empowerment (‘‘civil society support’’, hereafter) are considered also as the ‘‘mechanisms of EU impact beyond the Member States’’ (Schimmelfennig 2009: 8). Therefore, it is purposeful to understand these democracy promotion mechanisms of Europeanization, which have yielded different result in EU membership perspective context. When applied to the EU external democracy promotion, they provide a framework to analyze the EU’s developmental vs. political democracy promotion strategy within the EaP, which does not envisage EU membership as the target. Besides these three mechanisms the study adds ‘‘state capacity building for good governance and development’’ and ‘‘sector-specific democratic governance’’ as the additional two.

3.2.1 Conditionality

It is a mechanism for promoting policy changes in a country by expecting it to fulfill political (understood in the sense of the political strategy above) as a prerequisite for certain benefits such as financial assistance, trade or even membership (NCCR Newsletter 2008). In other words, ‘‘under the conditionality model, the EU offers advantages…[such as the] graduated economic, political and institutional incentives…[,]on the condition that economic and/or political conditions are met’’ (Emerson et al. 2005a:175). But if the conditions are not met, the incentives are either withheld (positive conditionality) or negative economic and financial conditionalities and other penalties for noncompliance (Burnell 2006: 4) follow.

Generally speaking, since pursuance of liberal democratic norms that constitute the political conditionality usually curbs the power and autonomy of governments (Schimmelfennig 2005: 9-10; Schimmelfennig & Schultz 2007: 6), it is deemed that the compliance with those norms faces manipulation or is weakened, unless the cost of the compliance is not paid by the EU with incentives worth the compliance burden. In other words, rewards are needed to reach the adoption of EU’s rules and they will have to exceed the domestic adoption costs (Gawrich et al., 2009: 6).

In the enlargement Europeanization, political conditionality’s democratic change-yielding power is rooted in the incentive of membership which pays the domestic reform costs. But ‘‘conditionality works on a very low level, [if] the incentive of EU-membership and threats of stopping accession negotiations are missing’’ (ibid.: 8). More clearly, in order the conditionality to be an effective democracy promotion mechanism, the attractiveness of the
incentives, the size of domestic adoption costs, and the credibility of political conditionality must be in place (Schimmelfennig in Flockhart 2005). Specifically, “the level of democracy in the neighboring countries of the EU increases with the size and the credibility of the EU’s conditional incentives” (Schimmelfennig & Schultz 2007: 6). Thus for conditionality as a top-down, state-centered tool to be conducive to democratization and deter anti-democratic courses, the EU incentives should be well weighed to take on value higher than that of what could the partner country lose if complied with the democratic conditionality. In case the EU membership is not offered, the cost of compliance with the political conditionality becomes much higher.

Therefore the EU political conditionality for economic and other incentives is largely positive and hence weak with limited coercive measures in the neighbourhood. Naturally then, compliance with the conditionality of economic and other incentives may become more secure than the political conditionality. “The offer of a stake in the EU’s internal market and further integration and liberalization to promote the four freedoms represents the most concrete expression of [the apolitical] incentives” (Dannreuther 2006: 191) that aim to address this pattern.

Conditionality is regarded as the EU’s top-down or direct democracy promotion mechanism, and the EU supplements this tool with the other indirect mechanisms: socialization and civil society support.

3.2.2 Socialization

“Europeanization…implies the long-term internalization and embedding of European norms and values (Gawrich et al. 2009: 6), and this is a pace in which the social learning and lesson of democracy becomes a crucial ingredient. Reinhard (2010) argues that “a mentality change of state officials cannot be reached by a state-centred top-down approach as conditionality” (p.203) but socialization or linkage. Socialization is a “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005: 804), community to be understood in this study as the EU.

Levitsky and Way (2005) considers linkage as an important element of socialization, and international democratization. They think that “the extent of a regime’s linkage to the West is defined by the density of its ties to the United States, the EU, and Western-dominated
multilateral institutions’’ (p.22), with the following types of linkage: economic, geopolitical, social, communication, and transnational civil society (contacts between people of the EU and of neighbours). As Schimmelfennig argues, these types can also be extended to intergovernmental and transgovernmental social learning.

A distinctive “European approach” to democracy promotion is embedded in the strategic significance of this socializing tool especially when there is a little room for the functioning of the political conditionality. In other words, “in light of the limits to positive and negative material measures, EU strategy [is] characterized by an aim to develop deeply institutionalized patterns of dialogue and co-operation” (Youngs 2001a: 193) that is “capable of locking third country political elites into relationships…to impact on cognitive attitudes towards democratic norms” (Youngs 2001c: 42). This thinking is noticed by Schimmelfennig & Schultz’s concept of “transnational exchange” which says that the “level of democracy in a country increases with the intensity of the…linkages that it entertains with (other) democratic countries in its international environment” (2007, p.9).

One of the socialization tools the EU has created is cooperation between the EU and partners (see section 3.2.5) through functional and sector-specific transgovernmental networks (Freyburg 2011). The EU further reinforces social learning tool via “network governance” that constitutes a hub of regular communication (meetings) between the neighbours and Brussels in many EU policy sectors. This is a result of that the ENP has made possible the “institutional extension of sector-specific governance frameworks beyond EU membership…, opening up…organizational structures within the relevant policy field” (Lavenex 2008:938).

All in all, the EU aims to inculcate democratic values, norms and habits on societal and bureaucratic actors to create a demand for far-reaching democratization of the entire political system (Freyburg et al. 2007 and 2009 in Schimmelfennig 2009: 19; Freyburg 2011). Thus socialization is a developmental bottom-up mechanism is widely used also within the ENP.

3.2.3 Civil Society Support

An additional instrument used in democracy promotion is democracy assistance (Burnell 2000: 12) that is understood as the “aid specifically designed to foster opening in a non-democratic
country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening’’ (Carothers 1999:6). Democracy assistance comprises offers of practical, technical, financial and other support in the form of democracy programmes and projects that are invariably grant-supported and, usually, consensual (Burnell 2006: 4).

There are two directions of the EU’s democracy assistance: support to civil society and technical (financial) assistance to the state administrations. The latter is covered in the next section, and in this section the focus is on the domestic empowerment. But generally, democracy assistance by the EU (through EIDHR and other instruments) and member states, is embroiled with governance, human rights and civil society support that is often not a distinctive separate category; and as such the merger of democracy-related projects into the broad development projects have been strongly advocated by the European donors (Youngs 2008: 160, 162). Also EU member state donors of democracy promotion, such as the German Stiftungen or political foundations, SIDA, NADC, German GIZ and others do not consider themselves as democracy promotion organizations but development organizations that treat democracy as a part of their development priorities (Carothers 2009: 17).

In this spirit, the ‘‘EU focuse(s) increasingly on grass roots capacity-building in relation to social development…through large, well-established NGOs’’ (Youngs 2001c: 15; Youngs 2002:195) aimed at strengthening the NGOs and empowering the citizens to exercise their formal social and economic rights, and as such the EU aid to CSOs has been human rights-centered (Youngs 2003a, 2001b, 2009, Santiso 2003, Schimmelfennig 2009). That said, the EU’s declared aim has been to build into socially relevant projects more concrete initiatives for creating organizational capacity and improving access to representative institutions, and this has engendered a series of objectives that consciously seek to marry developmental and political concepts, the key aims defined variously as 'communal self-administration', 'participation', 'rights advocacy', stronger 'local democracy', or greater 'democratic awareness' (Youngs 2003a: 130). Such an approach has been considered as ‘‘non-prescriptive primarily concerned with constructing a political will for democratic policy-making’’ (Youngs 2001b: 363) and entails ‘‘democracy promotion component, [such as] building NGOs’ capacity to engage in local democratic processes’’ (Crawford 2005: 580).

In all these regards, the EU’s support to civil society in the partner countries is theorized to focus on more the apolitical and technical underpinnings of democratic development, as a bottom-up, developmental mechanism of EU democracy promotion.
3.2.4 State Capacity Building for Good Governance and Development

The EU promotes the good governance principles provided in section 3.1 in state capacity building programmes (Youngs 2009). An important bulk of the EU’s democracy aid is channeled to strengthening or building state capacity through institutional building and good governance projects. An aim to generate greater ‘democratic spillover’ from good governance projects- the latter recognised to have more political overtones than previously assumed- has been presented by policy makers as one of the most notable developments in EU political aid (Youngs 2003a:131). That said, the EC (now, EU) defines its approach to governance in development policies as being about “increasing participation” as an alternative to a direct focus on systemic political change (Youngs 2008: 165-6). This is apparent in that the EU assistance work has gained an important impetus, including the components of democracy building into the notion of good governance. According to Youngs (2001b, 2001c), good governance that started as a technical and apolitical concept in 1980s, has gradually taken on political meaning to incorporate strengthening the policy-making and implementation capacity and know-how of the target countries administrations with the broader aim of socio-economic development, with democracy building as an important element within. “Without such efforts being labeled overtly as democracy-focused” (2001b: 363.), and being seemingly technical, they have aimed at inducing “democratic side effects” (ibid.) via linking the “building work” to the mechanisms and forums of decision-making for enhancing accountability, participation and transparency (ibid.). For example, by promoting systemic-level participation, the aim has been decentralization: strengthening the local tiers of a government for effective implementation of a policy may well overly target “boosting a general decentralization of power away from [the center] this being a prerequisite to any eventual systemic-level political change” (Youngs 2001c: 38). In a similar vein, PAR programmes have sought to link strengthening policy-making capability to shoring up access and accountability (Youngs 2001b). In linking building with good governance, the EU’s logic is to press political elites to broaden participation and accountability over the longer term (Youngs 2010: 11). Consequently, the EU good governance assistance is understood to target social and economic development through democracy. In this thesis good governance and democratic governance concepts are used interchangeably, the former constituting the whole center of gravity towards which the previously discussed EU democracy promotion mechanisms conduce. Specifically in sector-specific cooperation, the
EU most often requires the partners to accept the principles of good governance (indicated in section 3.1) to foster the democratization of sector-specific governance.

3.2.5 Sector-Specific Democratic Governance

The expansion of EU rules beyond EU borders to the neighbourhood and adoption of significant parts of the acquis by the neighbours has been defined as the EU external governance in the neighbourhood (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009: 807, Lavenex et al. 2009, Lavenex 2004, 2008, Youngs 2009). According to the authors, the expansion of EU rules within the ENP follows sectoral, policy-specific logic. These studies have also led to a bulk of studies on the EU’s promotion of democratic governance in the neighbourhood via the sector-specific or functional legislative cooperation (Freyburg et al. 2011, 2009, 2007; Wetzel 2011). As provided by all these authors, the model mainly emphasizes the EU’s observed expansion of main good governance principles (transparency, accountability and participation) embroiled in the sectoral Acquis, to each and every policy sector (e.g., competition, fisheries, environment etc.) of the neighbours, through sectoral cooperation with their sub-administrative structures responsible for diverse policy sectors of their states. Thus concentrating on the sub-administrative level rather than state as a general polity, the mechanism is horizontally applied by the EU: through “functionally oriented transgovernmental policy networks” (Freyburg et al. 2007: 7) wherein ‘transgovernmental’ refers to relations with sub-units of governments. Thus it is different from the top-down conditionality and bottom-up socialization and civil-society support mechanisms. At the heart of the mechanism lies the ‘legislation-based rule transfer’ (EU primary and secondary legislation and others) and ‘democratizing the decision- and policy-making at the sectoral [hence sub-administrative] level’ (ibid.: 9). Thus by focusing on sub-units, the center of interest is “whether the rules that provide the context in which policy and administration are carried out, meet commonly accepted democratic standards” (ibid.12), to ensure the sustainable democratic national development through sectoral democratic standards.

This study thus investigates the EaP policy papers also to see to what extent the democratic governance is fostered through the emphasis on the EaP countries’ adoption of the Acquis parts.
3.3 Conclusion: Proposition and Hypothesis

This study is not about the EU’s specific democracy promotion approach in specific EaP countries but instead, focuses on how the policy envisages promoting democracy. Basing on the existing research, the study theorizes the EU’s overarching attitude to democratisation as prevalently developmental (matching with the four developmental points of Carothers, 2009).

The literature displays that the EU mostly believes that the core objective of democracy is achieved through development and good governance and the latter serves for the former via enhancing the state capabilities to enable them to ensure the sustainable development and democracy. Thus the EU democracy promotion mechanisms studied here serve for the multi-layered social and economic development.

The top-down mechanism – EU conditionality is put forth by the EU to infer political, economic and social reform in exchange of economic and other incentives. If incentives’ value is higher than domestic adoption costs, the conditionality may induce reforms. Within the ENP, EU conditionality is weakened with the lack of the EU membership. Wary of the limits of conditionality in the neighbourhood, the also EU employs other mechanisms: bottom-up (indirect) democracy promotion mechanisms of socialization, civil society support, horizontal (indirect) mechanisms of both the promotion of democratic governance in the partners’ policy sectors and linking of good governance to states’ institutional capacity building – with the aim to implant and cultivate necessary requisites for democratization directed to the partners’ sustainable development.

Therefore, the study proposes: given the lack of the EU membership perspective for the neighbourhood, the ENP has established a long-term engagement intrinsic to the developmental approach, and in this sense, deducts the EaP hypothesis in connection with the developmental framework:

✓ In the EaP as the Eastern dimension of the ENP, the EU determines a prevalently developmental approach albeit with a low level political approach to democracy promotion, i.e.: given the lack of any explicit EU membership offer and in this case the registered experience that the implementation of an EU political conditionality potentially challenges the power of the partners’ administrations, the EU might have set the policy to employ a socio-economic conditionality stronger than the political conditionality and
hence focus more on multi-layered national socio-economic development through good
governance and other indirect mechanisms rather than on direct political underpinnings of
democracy. The table below presents the summary of the theoretical framework.

Table 2: EU’s Developmental Democracy Promotion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditionality</th>
<th>State Capacity-Building for Good Governance and Development &amp; Sector Specific Democratic Governance</th>
<th>Socialization</th>
<th>Civil Society Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political, economic and other</td>
<td>EU legislation – based democratic governance promotion in policy sectors</td>
<td>Social teaching and learning of EU democratic governance rules, norms, standards by state officials, Contacts between the peoples of EU and partners</td>
<td>Grassroots capacity building</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation level</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State and Populace</th>
<th>Grassroots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>Governments</td>
<td>National and local strata of state administration</td>
<td>Statesmen &amp; Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels of democracy promotion</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Horizontal</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of cooperation</td>
<td>Intergovernmental</td>
<td>Transgovernmental</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author
4 Methodology

4.1 Deductive Logic

For this study, the research ‘…methods derive from the theoretical approach’’ (Titscher et al., 2000: 13), of which hypotheses/assumptions form the basis for [the] scientific investigation (ibid. 15). As has been comprehensively seen above, the objective of the study is to ‘’paint a picture…and to present a profile’’ (Neuman 2006: 35) of a potential strategy. Contrasting the case study findings with the hypothesis, answers to the research question. Such a research orientation naturally frames the study with a predominantly deductive logic, according to which, ‘’the researcher, on the basis of what is known about in a particular domain and of theoretical considerations in relation to that domain, deduces a hypothesis that must then be subjected to empirical scrutiny’’ (Bryman 2008: 9). Furthermore, the logic of deduction from a concrete proposition also allows to ‘’identify the likely analytic technique(s) or anticipate the needed data…’’ (Yin 2009: 34). As Yin puts it, ‘’the most preferred strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to your case study’’ (ibid.: 130).

At the same time, it is not precluded that the analysis may reveal new patterns matching with the rival approach presented in the theory chapter, and thus generate a new hypothesis. Thus ‘’deduction [potentially] entails an element of induction’’ (Bryman 2008: 11) in the study. The study’s positivist ‘’basic orientation to the theory and research’’ (Neuman 2006: 81) relationship also necessitates a deductive approach: purpose of theory is to hypothesize a phenomenon, and of research is to test the hypothesis and explicate the reality through empirical inquiry. Furthermore, the thesis holds the positivists’ falsification doctrine, i.e., ‘evidence for a [pattern] requires more than piling up supporting facts; [but it] also involves looking for evidence that contradicts the [pattern]’ (Neuman 2006: 85). On the other hand, the research considers the interpretive social science, whereby ‘a researcher conducts a reading to discover the meaning [i.e., reality] embedded within text…and then develops deep understanding of how its parts related to the whole’ and ultimately, one understands the reality through a detailed study of the text (ibid.: 88). As such, antithetical to the positivist objectivism, the study is allied to the ontological position of constructionism (constructivism).
4.2 Qualitative Research Design

No method of research, quantitative or qualitative, is intrinsically better than any other; methods should be our servants, not our rulers (Silverman 2010: 10), and choice of method should not be predetermined (ibid.) before the research problem and question are set. In this thesis, nature of the research problem and question is the essence of the choice of the qualitative research design.

According to Silverman (1993, p.26), qualitative research means “using words instead of numbers” and stresses “meaning rather behavior”. In the same vein, Neuman argues that “qualitative researchers…look at interpretations or creation of meaning in specific settings” (2006, p.157), focusing on soft data (words, sentences, symbols, photos etc.) rather than hard data (numbers) and often relying on the interpretive social science (ibid. 151). In fact, the determination of meaning is foremost in this study, as the author aims to explore the democracy promotion approach in the EaP policy. In this respect, “the issue of interpretation is the keynote of the qualitative research” (Bryman 1988: 91). However, as the study considers that the qualitative - quantitative choice does not rest upon merely on words and numbers but on a range from more to less precise data (Hammersley 1992 in Silverman 2010:14), it does not preclude the use of relevant and precise quantitative data such as the EU direct financial allocation for each EaP. But here any numerical information is additional to the textual material, because the concepts are of qualitative nature. Thus qualitative techniques such as qualitative (semi-structured) interviewing, language based approaches to the collection and analysis of data, qualitative analysis of texts and documents (Bryman 2008: 369), are determined in the proceeding chapters.

Also, the design contains the idea that negative evidence is critical when evaluating a hypothesis (Neuman 2006: 164), and thus study gives an equal importance to the contradictory evidence.

4.3 Qualitative Case Study and Case Selection

“A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth within its real life context…, relies on the multiple sources of evidence…, and…benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide the data collection and analysis” (Yin 2009: 18). According to George and Bennett (2005), “a case [is] an instance of a class of
events’’ and the class refers to a phenomenon of scientific interest…’’ such as a policy, strategy or approach ‘‘that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of…generic knowledge’’ (pp. 17-18). Moreover, much of what we know about the empirical world is drawn from case studies (Gerring 2004: 341), that can test deductive hypotheses and suggest new elements that need to be incorporated (George and Bennett 2005: 111).

The study can be regarded as an ‘‘exploratory case study’’ (Yin 1993; 2003; 2009). Exploratory, because the EaP studies so far have barely analyzed to assess the EU’s developmental vs. political or vice-versa democracy promotion approach in the policy, and therefore, the EaP case study explores this little investigated topic, drawing on the existing research and other sources.

As a corollary, this research is a single (Yin 2009; Bryman 2008:55; George and Bennett 2005: 32, 80) case study that ‘‘can…be used to determine…whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant, and… can challenge, confirm or extend the [hypothesis] (Yin 2009: 47). Put different, the study is an intrinsic (Barbour 2008: 60, Creswell 2007: 74) and embedded case since the case entails more than one unit of analysis (Yin 2009:50), i.e., the EaP as a dimension of the larger unit ENP.

The case study’s ‘‘five components’’ of design are especially important (Yin 2009: 27):
1) Study’s questions: the research question starting with ‘‘what kind’’ is clearly set out;
2) Propositions: a proposition and a hypothesis derived from it are put forth, and a rival explanation is mentioned to adjust the data collection to gauge the negative evidence;
3) Units of analysis: the instances of the single case study are smaller policy dimension and larger policy, of which the former is a part of.
4) Logic linking the data to the propositions – relying on the theoretical proposition (Yin 2009: 130), the data collection is organized and categorized as per the concepts that comprise the proposition and the hypothesis but the concepts of the rival explanation are kept in mind to look for contradictory data.
5) Criteria interpreting the findings – the analysis findings are organized to examine the potency of the rival explanation.

The EaP is the most recent phenomenon of the ENP and of crucial importance particularly for democratization of the eastern neighbourhood. In this respect, ‘‘the primary criterion for case
selection [is] relevance to the research objective…” (2005: 83). Moreover, the author had already had a certain degree of understanding of the EaP and ENP well before the literature review and theoretical framework studies, and thus the research objective in mind, made the ‘’selection with some preliminary knowledge of case(s) [that] allows much stronger research designs…”’ (p. 24).

In this vein, the author uses purposive sampling in the case selection, with the goal ‘’…to sample cases in a strategic way so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions” (Bryman 2008: 415) and objective. That said, the EaP as a unit is analyzed together with the ENP population it is a sample of. This research does not entail a specific study of the Southern dimension (UfM) of the ENP and does not aim at generalizing the findings to the UfM also because the latter may have a context different than the EaP and EU may have different policy tools and objectives specific to the southern neighbourhood.

On the other hand, there is a subtle pitfall to be avoided: selecting a case that favors the null hypothesis. In single cases it is a must to consider the ‘’alternative hypotheses that theorists...have proposed, not only to the main hypotheses of greatest interest to the researcher’’ (ibid.: 60). Thus Carothers’ elements of political approach are considered to constitute the rival approach in this thesis.

4.4 Data Sources and Methods

Reliance on theoretical concepts to guide the…data collection for case studies remains one of the most important strategies for completing successful case studies (Yin 2003: 3). As has consistently been noted throughout the thesis, the author aims to organize the data collection in accordance with the case study’s data requirements, and ‘’data requirements should be determined by the theoretical framework and the research strategy…for achieving the study’s objectives’’ (George and Bennett 2005: 86). In this regard, the requirements of case study data are determined with reference to the analytic strategy of the thesis: theoretical proposition and hypothesis specify which data to look for in the case study, and hence, the data collection is organized as per the following concepts:

- Conditionality (political, economic and other)
- Socialization (intergovernmental, transgovernmental, transnational)
- Civil society support
State capacity building for good governance and development

Sector-specific democratic governance

The principle of the data collection in this study is to use ‘‘multiple sources of evidence’’ (Yin 2009: 114) to with a view to increase the validity and reliability of the research. Added to this, consideration of the assumptions of the contradictory explanation in data collection process, unveils an important element of the mentioned principle, as an effort ‘‘to try to prove the potency of other influences rather than rejecting them’’ (Patton 2002: 553). Because any case study finding or conclusion is likely to be more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of information (Yin 2009: 116). In this respect, using more than one source of data in the study (Bryman 2008: 379), which may converge or corroborate on and cross-check the case study findings (Yin 1994, 2009, Bryman 2008: 700), is utilized in this thesis. It could provide to examine where the different data intersect (Silverman 2010: 133). Ultimately, greater construct validity may be achieved ‘‘because multiple sources of evidence… provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon’’ (Yin 2009: 16-7).

The case study data collection has a wide array of data collection methods and sources, which Yin (2003, 2009) lists as documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts. Asmussen and Creswell (1995) outlines four types of data: interviews, observations, documents, and audio-visual materials. Some of these types bear varying importance for the study.

Official documents and interviews are primary data sources in this thesis. The secondary sources include: (a) Existing research on the EaP and ENP with relevance to the theme of democracy promotion), and (b) A few virtual media outputs such as online news on the EaP are when needed.

Official documents (EU documents on the ENP and EaP): caution is taken to treat these documents as the depictions of the reality (Bryman 2008: 521), i.e., ‘‘whether a description is mirroring or constructing the reality’’ (Potter 1996: 97) is difficult to determine but concentrating on whether and how there are patterns in the texts that match with the study’s assumptions would highly ease this work. As such, the study takes for granted the ontological position of constructivism.
Interviews: four EU officials\(^4\) have been selected and each interviewed on the phone for 30-40 minutes. The author has “sample[d]...to interview the people who are relevant for the research questions” (Bryman 2008: 458), and organized the interview questions to inform the concepts.

The interview is probably the most widely employed method in qualitative research (Bryman 2008: 436), and one of the most important sources of case study information (Yin 2009: 106). According Silverman (2010), qualitative research is characterized with open ended interview by most students (p. 189), and as such qualitative interviewing is well known for its flexibility and generality in asking the interview questions and treating the responses of interviewees. The sequence of the questions is not structured strictly and may change in connection with what answers the interviewee provides, and also the interviewer is able to formulate new questions when needed at the interview time. Generally, interviews are categorized as structured, unstructured and semi-structured (Bryman 2004, 2008; Wilkinson and Birmingham 2003:45), in depth, and focused (Yin 2009: 107).

The study uses semi-structured interviewing together with a degree of structuring to address the relationship among the theoretical concepts and rotated the interviews in accordance with the interview guide. Also in semi-structured interviews, questions may not follow the way outlined in the guide (Bryman 208: 438), and questions not included in the guide may be asked (ibid.). So the study followed pre-determined narrow interview questions and asked questions also not included in the guide to fill the gaps in the interviewees’ responses. In order to examine the responses more thoroughly, they have been recorded with the computer assisted tool “Audacity 1.3 Beta Unicode” and type-transcribed with the consent of the officials who asked the author to be mentioned as “EU officials”.

Most primary and secondary documents (official EU documents and other research) for this study have been collected via the E-research: using the internet as the method of data collection (Bryman 2008: 627). At the same time, internet has been of utmost importance to communicate with the EU officials to decide over the logistics of interviews, and thus a “communication-based research method…where email is the medium…” (ibid.632).

\(^4\) For anonymity, No1-4.
4.5 Approaching the Collected Data

As has been mentioned so far, the study contains certain concepts. These notions represent which patterns and schemes in the data (both in talk and text) to look for. The target is to identify in the analyzed data whether the pattern or discourse mirrors the hypothesis, together with open eyes and ears to gauge the patterns of negative evidence.

In this thesis, the qualitative content analysis that ‘‘comprises a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analyzed’’ (Bryman 2008: 529) is used as the analytic technique. This technique is relevant for the study in which the concepts represent categories existing in the hypothesis and the thesis needs to investigate how they are represented in the data and if there are other (rival) categories that could characterize the EU’s approach. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) call this ‘‘directed approach to content analysis [that] is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework…’’ (p.1281) or ‘‘deductive category application that works with prior formulated, theoretical derived aspects of analysis, bringing them in connection with the text’’ (Mayring 2000:5).

At the same time, the attention is paid to what actually the language of the texts is trying to construct regarding the EU’s approach to democracy promotion in the EaP. In this regard, a degree of discourse analysis is also conducted because ‘‘versions of the world… are produced in discourse’’ (Potter 2004: 202), discourse itself produced by how the language is used. As such, the analysis recognizes that the ‘‘discourse is rhetorically organized’’ to ‘‘establish one version of the world in the face of competing versions’’ (Gill 2008 quoted in Bryman 2008: 501), to persuade others.

The attention has also been paid to the pauses, sounds and rhetoric by the interviewed EU officials, with more focus on ‘‘…what alternative claims are being undermined’’ (Potter 1996: 106). In other words, one could need to understand ‘‘through what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons try to justify or delegitimize claims containing specific nominations and predications (Wodak and Krzyzanowski 2008: 99).

All in all, it is possible to present in detail how the analysis has been conducted systematically through following stages:
Recalling the concepts (categories) of the hypothesis and putting them in the Carothers’ (2009) ‘developmental strategy’ framework

Noticing the relevant parts of the data

In depth reading of the noticed texts in following dimensions:
- **Text dimension**: actual content, structure and meaning of texts
- **Discursive dimension**: examination of which discourses are constructed
- **Conversation dimension**: rhetoric, offensive and defensive statements, refusal and acceptance

Matching the analyzed data with the pre-determined concepts and the framework

Data that can’t be identified with the pre-determined categories are examined if they represent a new category or sub-category (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1282): considering Carothers’ (2009) ‘political strategy’ framework

Discussion of findings: revision and testing of the hypothesis, and generation of alternative hypothesis.

4.6 Limitations

There are certain limitations which affect the methodological and analytical issues of the study. The first is that determining the EU’s democracy promotion approach in the EaP should consider how the policy (specifically, democratization) is being actually applied to its receivers: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. At the same time, the other European donors that also support democracy, i.e., member state organizations, OSCE, CoE and others should also be considered. But since the policy is in a quite nascent implementation stage, it is not possible to draw conclusive inferences from the first two years’ policy performance. Therefore, the study mostly aims at an in-depth analysis of the policy as it is presented. Nevertheless, the study already provides a brief section on the ENP itself with some references on how the policy has been implemented and what the democracy promotion approach has been since its inception.

Though most studies aspire to generalize to wider populations, this study does not aim at generalizing the findings to the whole EU neighbourhood. Last but not least, the financial resources (travelling) have not proved sufficient for conducting mid-scale surveys and interviews both in the EU, with each of the partner countries’ officials and civil society organizations, which would largely contribute to the study. On the other hand, since the
researcher is the key instrument in qualitative studies, subjectivity is strong in such designs, notwithstanding the research has only followed the rules of the scientific community.

5 Delving Into the Eastern Partnership Policy Structure

5.1 Introduction

This section shortly traces the developments that have underpinned the establishment of the EaP and creates a ground for separate discussions of the EaP’s bilateral and multilateral framework elements in the chapter, with the aim to carve out a potential democracy promotion approach in chapter 6.

The EU’s ‘’Wider Europe’’ initiative (COM (2003)104) established a new framework for the EU’s relations with the Eastern and Southern neighbours[5], ‘’…that would not be considered as candidates for membership – at least for the foreseeable future’’ (Schimmelfennig 2009: 17), after the Copenhagen European Council Conclusions of 2002 emphasized that the EU was ‘’determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe [after the enlargement] and…expressed its wishes to enhance its relations with [the neighbours] based on a long-term approach [author’s italic] promoting democratic and economic reforms, sustainable development and trade’’ (pp.6-7), and thus ‘’…a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean…’’ (European Security Strategy 2003:8). Then the ENP Strategy Paper (COM (2004) 373) defined and enhanced the EU’s relations with the neighbours based on the shared values such as ‘’…rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development’’

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5 Eastern Neighbours include: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova in Eastern Europe; and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia in South Caucasus; and Southern Neighbours include: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Lebanon and Syria
(p. 3), and noted that in return of the neighbours’ pursuit of these values and implementation of necessary reforms and alignment with the acquis, the partners would benefit from further economic integration with the EU single markets and the four freedoms (COM (2003)104:4). This is the incentives’ conditionality mechanism on which the ENP is based also characterizes the EaP ahead. The main revisions and strengthening of the ENP (SEC (2005) 1521, COM (2006) 726, COM (2007) 774, COM (2011) 303 and Council Conclusions on the ENP on 20 June 2011) have also further reiterated these clauses on conditionality and incentives. At the same time, they have been entered into all 12 ENP bilateral APs that have been concluded between the EU and neighbours.

But through time, the ENP emerged as a catch-all approach instead of the more targeted strategy (Wallace 2009: 3), and did not differentiate between the countries covered by the policy (Wodka 2010: 151), i.e., putting the Mediterranean and Eastern European neighbors into the same basket. The EU’s Mediterranean member states France, Spain, Italy and Portugal demanded more EU focus to the South, and Poland and other Eastern EU countries intensified their demands to forge closer links with Eastern European countries Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia of South Caucasus (ibid.).

The proposal for ‘‘Eastern Partnership’’ that came a few months after the French-led Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) launched in Paris in July 2008 (Balfour 2010:3), originally emanated from Poland and Sweden (New York Times, 2008) and presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 26-27 May 2008, after when the two submitted a paper to the June 2008 European Council, on the basis of which the ‘‘European Council invited the Commission to prepare a proposal on the ‘‘Eastern Partnership’’ (EaP)...and the Extraordinary European Council of 1st September 2008 asked for this work to be accelerated, responding to the need for a clearer signal of [the] EU...following the conflict in Georgia and its broader repercussions’’ COM(2008) 823: 2). This reflects that the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 gave a sufficient impetus and reason for engagement ‘‘...by those member states whose geo-graphical positions make Eastern Europe of lesser concern’’ (Balfour 2010).

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In the pace of the policy process speed-up, Poland and Sweden later developed this idea in a far more detailed paper produced in early October 2008 (Hillion and Mayhew 2009: 4) and the Commission issued the Communication (COM(2008) 823) on the EaP in December 2008.

Upon the European Council’s request on 11-12 December 2008, the Council’s report on and approval of the idea at its March 2009 meeting approved the initiative. The European Council, ‘‘welcom[ed] the establishment of …Eastern Partnership and adopt[ed] the Declaration…on the Eastern Partnership’’ (Brussels European Council, 19-20 March 2009, pp.11, 19). The official launch of the policy was inaugurated at the Prague Summit on 7 May 2009, concluding with the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, as ‘‘the latest idea for building relations with six countries from Eastern Europe – namely, Azerbaijan, Armenia Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine’’ (Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010: 1).

The EaP upgrades the bilateral relations (already existing under ENP) through envisaged Association Agreements7 (AAs), and a distinct multilateral track that is ‘‘EaP’s main novelty’’ (Balfour 2010) aiming at the regional policy co-operation and to encourage multilateral dialogue on crucial areas, including preparation for integration into the internal market of the Union (Hillion and Mayhew 2009: 8). For these initiatives, the Commission has allocated € 600 million (2010-2013) of which € 350 million are fresh and add to the current funds available for the Six under ENPI8 (Vademecum on financing EaP, 2010: 3).

5.2 EaP Bilateral Framework

The main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the European Union and interested partner countries (Prague EaP Summit Declaration 2009, p.9). These objectives are to be served by the bilateral instruments - AAs as new contractual relations with the partners, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), visa liberalisation, and a specific Comprehensive Institution-Building (CIB) programme to boost up the partners’

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7 Previously, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) signed with the six in 1990s
8 Increasing the overall amount of ENPI funds for the Eastern partners to €1,9bn during 2010-2013 (EaP Community web-site). Info on EaP financing is attached as Appendix 2.
administrative capacity to carry out necessary reforms. The following sections will present the relevant data collected with a focus on the democracy promotion. The table below presents an overall picture of the bilateral framework, for a better clarity.

**Table 3: EaP Bilateral Track**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is on offer?</th>
<th>Will replace the basic Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and be more comprehensive in several fields such as trade and foreign and security policy, legislative and regulatory approximation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Association Agreements (AA)</td>
<td>Assistance programmes that will help countries meet commitments of the AAs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Comprehensive institution-building programme</td>
<td>New and more extensive Free Trade Agreements that go beyond trade and incorporate trade in services, investment and regulatory convergence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA)</td>
<td>Initially support mobility of citizens and visa facilitation followed by dialogue and a process of full visa liberalisation in the long run.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Visa liberalisation</td>
<td>Economy, energy, environment, transport, research etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Additional cooperation in a variety of fields and increased technical assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Boonstra and Shapovalova, 2010: 3

5.2.1 Association Agreements

The AAs, replacing the old PCAs, will establish new contractual framework of relations between the six countries and EU, and be individually negotiated and implemented through ‘‘non-legally binding Association Agendas’’ (Depo in EaP Community, 2011) to be tailor-made for each partner. The Association Agreement will have its own institutions: bilateral Council (of which decisions will be binding on the partner and EU [Hillion and Mayhew 2009: 8]), Committee, Parliamentary Committee and various working groups: these will bring politicians, civil servants and others into contact with their homologues in the EU (Mayhew 2010: 22).

They represent a step forward to democracy building and consolidation in these countries. As two of the interviewed EU officials put it, with the forthcoming AAs, the EU’s aims at ‘‘…a much… stricter engagement with and…gradual democratization and economic modernization of the six, through EaP’’ (No1), and to ‘‘align their structures with the EU them as a way
to…modernize…and ensure their sustainable development’’ (No2). In order to do so, the EaP is based on conditionality, differentiation and joint ownership, however, remaining silent on a potential future EU membership of the partner countries (Gromadzki 2010).

The EaP core incentives for the partners are their gradual integration in the EU Internal Market through DCFTAs, and other incentives such as visa liberalisation (visa-free regime as a long-term objective), labor mobility in the long-term perspective, cooperation on CFSP and ESDP matters, modernization of energy security systems, policy regulations, and support for socio-economic development basing on the EU cohesion policy.

On one hand, in exchange of the indicated incentives, the EU demands a commitment to the same shared values (in COM (2008)823:3) as mentioned in the ENP Strategy Paper, and stipulates that ‘‘the level of ambition of the EU’s relationship with the Eastern Partners will take into account the extent to which these values are reflected in national practices and policy implementation’’(ibid.). But on the other, reiterates that the ‘‘partners’ bilateral relations with the EU…will continue to be governed by the principle of differentiation, developing according to the ambitions and capacities of each’’ (COM (2008) 823: 8), as in the ENP. In fact, this flexible or positive conditionality mechanism within the lack of EU membership perspective and plus the incoherent application of the political conditionality has been indicated by many analysts to have underlied its inconduciveness to reforms in the neighbouring countries.

What’s relatively new is that that the EU stipulates that ‘‘a sufficient level of progress in terms of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and in particular evidence that the electoral legislative framework and practice are in compliance with international standards, and full cooperation with the Council of Europe, OSCE/ODIHR and UN human rights bodies will be a precondition [author’s bold] for starting negotiations and for deepening relations thereafter’’ (COM(2008) 823: 4). But whereas the free and fair parliamentary elections were the main precondition for launching (AA since September 2008) negotiations with Ukraine in 2007 and Moldova (2010) (Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010: 5), the EU started AA negotiations with Azerbaijan and Armenia in July 2010, notwithstanding their progress in the conduct of elections repeatedly criticized by the OSCE/ODIHR.
Besides, looking through all the 12 ENP APs, and also past PCAs concluded with the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus countries, the study observes a heavier EU demand for local, regional and national socio-economic development and provision of economic and social rights. This is why the ENP has been a framework for modernization (Cremona and Gabriella 2007). The EaP has rather intensified this trend by enhancing focus on ‘‘low’’ politics areas. For instance, the AAs will include policy areas for ‘‘supporting social and economic development’’ (COM (2008) 823:8) which aims at addressing the partners’ ‘‘sharp economic and social disparities between their regions and population groups’’ through economic convergence with the EU…[.]. . . building up administrative capacity at national and local level…[.]. support national development plans…[.]. pilot regional development programmes[9] addressing local needs for infrastructure, human capital, and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), modelled on EU cohesion policy’’ (ibid.). In these regards, the EU has set to conclude with each partner Memoranda of Understanding on regional policy containing these priorities.

As an answer to the author’s question regarding the assumed prevalence of economic and social modernization trends within the EaP, an interviewed EU official has argued that: ‘‘because…you can ultimately not achieve full democracy without a certain level of economic and social development’’ (EU official, No3).

5.2.2 Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

The perspective of DCFTA agreements between the EU and partners constitutes an indivisible element of the AAs for each partner country. The EU’s target is to forge a deep and comprehensive modernization of the partner’s economies and integrate them fully in the EU Single Market. The importance of the perspective lies in the EU’s belief that ‘‘open markets and economic integration are essential to the development of the partners’’ and ‘‘[AAs] will … provide for mutual market access…[to] create new opportunities on both sides and underpin

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9 They will be agreed between the Commission and the Partner Countries by mid 2012 (Vademecum on financing EaP, 2010); € 75 million out of € 600 million for the period 2010-2013, allocated for them.
political stabilisation’’ (COM (2008) 823: 4). The main pre-requisite for starting the DCFTA negotiations\textsuperscript{10} is the partners’ WTO membership\textsuperscript{11}.

The ‘‘comprehensive’’ in the concept means that the agreements ‘‘…will cover substantially all trade…[with] the highest possible degree of liberalisation…’’ and ‘‘deep’’ that regulatory approximation in trade-related areas will be done to economically modernize and create a demand for necessary economic reforms (ibid.).

DCFTAs’ difference from FTA agreements that simply base on mutual tariff level reductions, is embedded in their quest ‘‘to eliminate the majority of non-tariff barriers to trade through persuading third parties to adopt and implement EU regulation necessary for the creation and management of the Union's internal market’’ (Hillion and Mayhew 2009: 8).

According to Mayhew (2010) DCFTAs will modernize\textsuperscript{12} the partners’ economies via providing for ‘‘systemic changes for countries transitioning to the market economy’’ (p.3), addressing the key problems in the modernization of their economies\textsuperscript{13}. According to an EU official, the ‘‘real value of the economic development is the benefits that it will yield for the populations…and strengthening and consolidating these countries’ democratic tendencies…’’ (No 1), and thus ‘‘through DCFTAs we achieve several goals: those countries apply EU rules, standards and values which not only regulate their economies as understood broadly but also make their social lives much more transparent and democratic’’ (No4).

Besides pushing for DCFTAs, the EU invites the partners to establish DCFTAs among themselves basing on their DCFTA agenda with the EU (COM (2008) 823), to complement

\textsuperscript{10} Ukraine started in 2008; Moldova is in the process of preparing the launch of negotiations; Armenia and Georgia preparing for starting.

\textsuperscript{11} Azerbaijan and Belarus have not concluded the WTO accession negotiations.

\textsuperscript{12} Modern economies are generally characterised by high levels of competition, low levels of state aid and an entrepreneurial culture supporting innovation and new business and produce high levels of welfare for citizens (Mayhew 2010: 4)

\textsuperscript{13} Competition policy, state aid, public procurement, company law, financial regulations, technological development and research, customs procedures, business transparency and skills of management, corruption and inefficient public administration (ibid.)
their economic integration with the EU and consequently establish a Neighbourhood Economic Community basing on the European Economic Area Model (ibid.).

DCFTA objective is quite a challenging and long way to go, and according to Balfour (2010), even “it will not deliver those short-term benefits which would support the anchorage of these countries to the EU” (p.5). However, the observations show that the EU reflects itself keen, to a certain extent, to transform these countries into advanced market economies with solid legal and regulatory systems and institutions to ensure their sustainable economic growth and democratic development.

5.2.3 Visa Liberalization

Increasing the mobility of citizens and long-term objective of visa-free travel between the EU and the EaP partners are considered as the most tangible incentive offered to the partners, upon the conditions of well-managed borders, functioning migration policy adapted to the EU policy, and not least, good governance and advanced capacity of the law enforcement and judiciary bodies of the partners.

Free movement is one of the tests which the citizens of Eastern Europe will use to judge the value and importance of integration with the European Union (Hillion and Mayhew 2009:10), and is a policy vis-à-vis societies, and not those in power (Gromadzki 2010:10). In order to improve its image with the populations in the EaP countries (Michalski 2009:11) through facilitating “people to people contacts” that is of paramount importance for the EU (Stefan Füle14, CSF Meeting, 2010), the EU offers the partners "Mobility and Security" pacts that would include both the mobility aspect and the conditions required to ensure the secure environment (COM (2008)823:5). This is what upon some scholars (Emerson 2010, Shapovalova 2009, Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010, Balfour 2010, Kratochvil 2010) consider the quid pro quo of the incentive as a far distance to go and less conducive for the partners to reform the law enforcement agencies and judiciary. But Popescu and Wilson (2011) argues that the EU’s tough approach aims at improving border-management practices, reforming

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14 EU Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP (2010-14)
law-enforcement institutions, building functioning border, customs and police services capacity, of the partners.

The incentive requires the partners to conduct the following reforms ‘‘[in] the key policy areas...covered by [the Mobility and Security] pacts [with the partners:]...fighting illegal migration, upgrading the asylum systems to EU standards, setting up integrated border management structures aligned to the EU acquis,...enhancing the abilities of police and judiciary in particular in the fight against corruption...’’ (COM (2008)823:5).

In parallel to the security environment enhancing, the EaP paper devises the following phases of liberalizing the mobility or visa\(^{15}\) regime for the partners:

1. Separate visa facilitation\(^{16}\) and readmission agreements\(^{17}\) to be signed\(^{18}\) with each partner;
2. Additional facilitations such as visa fee reductions or waiving
3. Improving the EU member states’ consular coverage in the region, creation of common visa application centers;
4. Starting visa-free travel dialogues
5. Establishing roadmaps or action plans\(^{19}\) for visa-free travel
6. Targeted opening of the EU labor market to partners’ citizens after conditions are met.

These are supposed to ‘‘...pave a good way to...achieve modernization of the partners’ migration systems, and more responsive management by responsible institutions in this regard, and...facilitate travels...[from/to] the EaP countries and EU’’ (EU official, No 2).

5.2.4 Comprehensive Institution-Building

The capacity of the partners’ public administrations to carry out the reforms emanating from the AAs (DCFTA and visa liberalization goals as parts of them), is of paramount importance for the EaP’s effectiveness and achievement of desired impacts. Thus ‘‘to assist partners in

\(^{15}\) Short-stay visas
\(^{16}\) Facilitate access to visas for certain groups in society (Hillion and Mayhew 2009);
\(^{17}\) To accept returned illegal immigrants to the Union, who entered via these countries
\(^{18}\) Agreement with Georgia came into force on 1 March 2011 (ENPI Info); not yet with Azerbaijan and Armenia.
\(^{19}\) Currently, with Ukraine and Moldova.
meeting [the] conditions [for starting and concluding the AAs] and to help them meet the commitments stemming from the AAs, a **Comprehensive Institution-Building programme** (CIB) for improving administrative capacity in all relevant sectors of cooperation will be developed[^20] with each partner’’ (COM (2008) 823:4), and to implement the CIB projects, the **largest EaP allocation** - € 175 million for the period 2010-2013 (out of € 600 million of total EaP allocation) have been allocated for the partners (Vademecum on financing EaP, 2010).

The programme is targeted to reform the partners’ public administration systems to facilitate and intensify the regulatory approximation or convergence with, and transposition and implementation of, the EU acquis (Grajauskas & Gira 2009, Hillion and Mayhew 2009, Michalski 2009), and this study argues that the partners’ adoption and implementation of the EU legislation in specific sectors depend on the extent of their capability for good governance within their administrative structures, i.e., their conformity with the ‘’shared principles of the European Administrative Space’’[^21](see Appendix 1). In this respect, the programme aims to prevent the undermining of the rule of law principle itself (when legislation is adopted, but it does not work)^[^22].

The ‘’CIB seeks to strengthen a limited number of core institutions which are central in preparing the ground for and implementing future…AAs, including…DCFTAs, and making progress towards visa liberalisation as a long-term goal’’(Commission, EaP Implementation Report, 2010:3). According to the document, there are the following stages of tailoring the programme to the needs and priorities of the partners:

1. **Framework Documents**: Partner and European Commission jointly agree on a document of jointly identified key issues, reform areas and core institutions to be covered by the CIB;

[^20]: May 2009

[^21]: Good governance components. ‘’These components include the rule of law principles of reliability, predictability, accountability and transparency, but also technical and managerial competence, organisational capacity and citizens’ participation’’ (SIGMA Papers: No 27)

2. *Agreement is expressed through a Memorandum of Understanding,* signed by the European Commission and the respective partner country;

3. *Institutional Reform Plans (IRPs):* for each institution or cluster of institutions indicated in the Framework Documents, each partner develops IRPs reflecting reform objectives, measures (actions and indicators), and means to be provided, a clear timeframe for implementation and sources of funding.

In order to implement the IRPs in each sector and institution in the EaP countries, the EU will use its institution building instruments Twinning, TAIEX, SIGMA programmes ‘‘…which will provide advice and training to public administrations, as well as equipment and specialised infrastructure…’’ (COM (2008) 823:13). Nevertheless, the practice shows that unless there is a sufficient political will or democratic discourse for genuine institutional reforms, the institution-building projects often yield superficial results.

However, the EU believes that the programme will achieve democratic governance: ‘‘we assume that we will not only enhance capacity of these administrations but… make them more transparent, accountable and responsive to the needs of societies, in other words, make them more democratic’’ (EU official, No4). Because ‘‘…the EU institution building activities focus on rule of law, and it may well be expected that having a strong system of rule of law will help facilitate progress towards democracy’’ (EU official No3).

### 5.3 EaP Multilateral Framework

As a novelty for the EaP countries, the EU has established a multilateral and multilevel site both to provide support for and strengthen the progress in all areas of the bilateral partnership sectors and gradually achieve a intra-regional economic, political and social integration based on the EU model and thus facilitate their full political association and economic integration with the EU, or in other words, ‘’promote regional integration as a route to peace and economic prosperity’’ (Shapovalova 2009:4).

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23 Author’s own observations as a former employee of the EU’s ”Implementation of Twinning and TAIEX Operations” project in Azerbaijan
The framework that aims to “…provide a forum to share information and experience on partners’ steps towards transition, reform and modernisation[.] facilitate the development of common positions[.] foster links among the partners themselves” (COM (2008) 823:8), resembles a university with regular lectures specialized in the EU’s legislation and policy regulations. Since the “…legislative and regulatory convergence is essential to the partners’ progress in coming closer to the EU” (ibid.), the overarching target of the framework is to provide professional capacity for the implementation of the bilateral reform agendas between the EU and partners.

To this end, the “…multilateral framework will provide the setting for the systematic organisation of dedicated sessions involving the relevant European Commission services and…Member State experts…” (ibid.:9), “devoted to the presentation and explanation by the European Union of EU legislation and standards as well as its comparison with national policy and legislation”\(^\text{24}\), and “[i]n this way the EaP will initiate a \textbf{structured approximation process…”} (COM (2008) 823:9). The interpretation of the integration of the East European partner countries with the EU in terms of regulatory reforms, has thus received another boost (Kratochvil 2010).

With these ends in mind, the EU has set up the following four thematic or sector-specific platforms (COM (2008) 823; EaP MLFW GGRP) in harmony with the bilaterally agreed areas of cooperation, and they “embrace the most important issues on the road to closer ties between the EU and the partner countries” (Gromadzki 2010:3). Each platform has its “Core objectives and Work-Programme 2009-2011” documents defining specific focus areas (or panels) and matching activities and target groups, all to regulate their activities.

1. Democracy, good governance and stability
2. Economic integration and convergence with EU policies
3. Energy security\(^\text{25}\)


\(^{25}\) Since analyzing the platform is not relevant for the thesis objective, there is not a separate section on this; however, the study considers that the EaP envisages the “…harmonisation of partners’ energy policies and legislation with EU practice and \textit{acquis}…in the area of electricity, gas, oil, renewables, and energy efficiency” (COM (2008) 823:11).
4. Contacts between people

There are the following categories of participants in the platforms: full (EU member states, partner countries, Commission), permanent (European Parliament (EP), General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Committee of the Regions -CoR (1,4), European Economic and Social Committee (EESC, 1,2,4), EIB (2,3) and the EBRD\(^{26}\) (2,3)), and ad-hoc participants (IOs, financing institutions, CSO representatives etc.), of which “[m]eetings [are] held held at least twice a year at the level of senior officials engaged in reform work in the relevant policy areas” (COM (2008) 823:9), and “…report to the annual meetings of Foreign Ministers” (ibid.).

As will be seen in the upcoming sections, the platforms are also supported by “…panels [that] are expert-level working groups attached to a platform” (EaP MLFW GGRP 2009: 2). They follow more frequent meetings than the regular platform meetings (Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010; Kratochvil 2010). The emphasis of these meetings has so far been on regulatory and policy convergence with the EU, which are “…enhanced through sector-specific ministerial conferences” (COM (2008) 823).

Generally, the EaP has a simple “operational structure”, which provides for both high-level political support and a sufficient number of expert meetings ensuring its practical impact (Kratochvil 2010). Besides, the aforementioned platform and panel meetings meetings, there are also meetings at two levels:

1. Meetings of EaP Heads of State and Government every two years (EaP Summits);
2. Annual spring meetings of Foreign Affairs from the EU and from the Eastern partners, who review progress and provide policy guidance (COM (2008) 823).

Moreover, in order to support the activities of the platforms and give them substance, the EaP has set up flagship initiatives\(^{27}\) that are specific projects which “…mobilise multi-donor

\(^{26}\) Financing specific EaP goals
\(^{27}\) Indicated in Appendix 2
support, funding from different IFIs and investment from the private sector’’\textsuperscript{28}(COM (2008) 823:12). It is expected that they will reflect they will become the flagships that will bring tangible benefits for the partners’ citizens and thus their attention.

The framework is stretched to include also other actors: the EU-Neighbourhood East Parliamentary Assembly\textsuperscript{29} (Euronest PA) comprised of the EP delegation of 60 members and partners’ parliamentarians (10 members for each country), was constituted on 3 May 2011 (EP, Euronest web-site). Also the framework unites the partners’ and European CSOs and NGOs in the CSF (section 5.3.3). Additionally, the Commission has invited (COM (2008) 823) the CoR to establish the Local and Regional Assembly of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus\textsuperscript{30} (EaP LRA) as a platform for regular political dialogue, cooperation and information exchange between the partners’ and EU member states’ local and regional authorities. Moreover, other stakeholders such as the third countries (when need be), IOs and IFIs participate within the framework.

As depicted in the following table, the EU aims to promote the EaP’s multilateral cooperation in its vicinity (Wojna and Gniazdowski 2009:11): the EaP’s center of gravity is Brussels (Europa, MEMO/09/217 on EaP, 2009). In fact, the framework is a sign of direct (intentional/conscious) Europeanization in a multilateral setting addressed only to a cluster of countries without an immediate membership perspective, which is itself an unprecedented case (Pulišová 2011).

\textsuperscript{28} Financial allocations for each initiative indicated in Appendix 2

\textsuperscript{29} Without Belarus for political reasons

\textsuperscript{30} Timing of the establishment of the EaP LRA being debated.
5.3.1 Democracy and Good Governance
In accordance with the research objective, this section highlights the data in the light of the concepts indicated in Table 2 on EU developmental democracy promotion. To this end, the content of the platform 1 is presented basing on the official EU documents.

The EU’s forging of dialogue with the partners within the platform 1 targets to address their political reform shortages in the fields of stable democratic institutions, effectiveness of state structures to better serve for the citizens, and partners’ progress in meeting their CoE and OSCE membership commitments (COM (2008) 823). “Multilateral activities could thus include governance peer reviews and exchanges of best practices to address issues such as
electoral standards, regulation of the media or combating corruption’’ (ibid.:10). The core objectives of the platform\(^{31}\) are to deal with:

1. Democracy and human rights, through exchange of best practices, trainings and workshops on:
   - electoral standards
   - regulation of the media
   - transparent management of public goods and services
   - peer reviews of partners’ progress in areas covered by CoE conventions\(^{32}\)
   - training and networking aimed at strengthening the administrative capacities of the partners’ local authorities

2. Justice, Freedom and Security, with a focus on:
   - reinforcing support to the partners’ IBM establishing and related efforts
   - multilateral exchange of view on migration policy, secure and well-managed mobility (related with the objective of visa-free travel)
   - multilateral cooperation of judicial, police and law enforcement bodies and strengthening of customs administrations’ capacities.

Within the platform a specific IBM panel has been established to exchange best practices on convergence with the EU IBM standards (EEAS, IBM Flagship Initiative document), and also, a flagship initiative on IBM has been initiated to align the partners’ IBM structures with the EU standards, and for training and capacity building (ibid.).

3. Security and Stability: Multilateral information and resource exchanges directed to strengthen the prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and man-made disasters (PPRD) - this priority has set a panel on the PPRD; and a PPRD flagship initiative to ‘’[e]nhance [partners’] legislative, administrative and operational civil protection capacities’’ and ‘’bring them closer to EU Civil Protection Mechanism’’ (EEAS, PPRD Flagship Initiative document).

\(^{31}\) Commission, ”EaP, Platform 1, Core Objective and Work Programme 2009-2011” (hereafter, “’Platform 1 document’”), pp.1-6. Almost no existing literature in the field.

\(^{32}\) To do this, CoE and EU have made operational the ‘’EaP Facility’’ of €4 mln in 2011: http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/eap-facility/
The first core objective mentioned above has led to the prioritization of **Democratic Governance**, with the following focus areas (**panels** in italic) with their diverse themes:

- **Improved functioning of judiciary** with the following activity directions: establishing the independence of magistrates; increasing the judges’ accountability; training on human rights for judges; effective delivery of justice through transparency (access to case law), administrative capacity building etc.; citizens’ improved access to justice (legal aid facilitation and support from CSOs).

- **Public administration reform** (PAR): (a) PA effectiveness improvement: increasing decision-making transparency; improved cooperation among PAs and improved cooperation procedures between PAs and civil society and other sides; (b) civil service integrity improvement: political independence of civil servants, increasing their responsibility; other technical measures on code of conduct and career development; (c) local democracy promotion: decentralization of state functions, financial independence of the local and regional authorities, measures to reduce regional disparities, promoting participation of local authorities. Upon the Commission invitation of CoR to participate in the platform and establish the EaP LRA, the CoR’s Opinion has considered to “…assist the European Commission in drawing up the *programme for training and networking of local authorities* with a view to strengthening administrative capacities and promoting local governance reform” (2009, p.8), proposed the engagement of the partners’ LRAs in the CIB and EaP decentralized cooperation projects, an increasing role in good governance, administrative reform and decentralization, and called upon the EaP governments to forge “…a structured national dialogue and consultation with the sub-state (local and regional) agents…” (ibid.:7).

- **Fight against Corruption**: transparency of rules and procedures, asset declarations, and officials’ revenues; checks and balances in decision-making, internal and external audit; public access to information; measures for anti-corruption in customs and public procurement.

Each and every of these focus areas and themes involve senior officials from the partner countries, with the EU officials presenting the EU acquis, policies and standards to them. At the same time, the partners have a chance to present their reform practices and challenges. As an EU official puts it, “…socializing the officials with the EU rules and gradually enhancing democratic mentality is certainly our expectation…” (No3).
5.3.2 Economic, Regulatory, and Social Modernization

This section is devoted to the nucleus of the EaP: partners’ economic integration and convergence with the EU policies.

The content of the platform 2 is composed of its core objectives and key areas of cooperation, and panels and comprehensive presentations and explanations of work areas and themes respective for each panel. The overarching common focus of the platform’s all diverse sections is the EU’s deep emphasis on the partner’s approximation with the pieces of Acquis (each legislation is explained) in each area of cooperation, building the state institutions’ capacities to implement the adopted EU Acquis pieces. There are following objectives of the platform:

- **Trade and trade related regulatory approximation linked to DCFTAs** (hereafter, TTRA for DCFTAs): this objective prepares a ground for the work of the Trade Panel to organize its work on the discussions on the partners’ regulatory approximation with the whole body of the EU Acquis related with trade and investment, and in this regard, building the partners’ capacity; on the creation of bilateral DCFTAs among partners themselves; and on the involvement of business community.

- **Other regulatory approximation and cooperation**: improvement of Company Law (EU’s experience) and better governance of companies; good governance in taxation; transparent process of financial markets’ and ownership rights’ regulation.

- **Macroeconomic and financial cooperation**: efficient and effective management of public finances, and anti-corruption.

- **Socio-economic development**: discussions on how to achieve effective enterprise policies conducive to business climate favorable for SMEs development, and thus involving the private sector and business in the discussions; on labor market and social policies; and regional cohesion based on the EU cohesion policy; diversification of economic activity; role of research and development and innovation in economic modernization. *With the aim of further development of democracy, the objective supports the creation of the middle class, especially through SMEs’ development* (EU official No4).

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Environment and climate change;
Cooperation in the field of transport.

In accordance with these objectives, the partners and the EU have set the following panels with specific themes for each of them:

- **TTRA for DCFTAs ("Trade" Panel):**
  - *Environment and climate change:* focus is on convergence with the EU environment legislation and enhancing the partners’ capacities for environmental governance (EG). A specific flagship initiative on EG has been launched.

- **Enterprise and SME policy:** a track of the socio-economic development objective above, targets to provide necessary tools to support the partners’ growth and employment. Thus panel has launched “SME Facility” Flagship Initiative directed to the partners’ improvement of business climate (legal/policy framework) specifically through partners’ approximation with EU SME legislation; the Facility also aims to provide financial assistance (from EIB, EBRD and other IFIs) for SME development in the partner countries;

- **Labour market and social policies:** a track of socio-economic development; multilateral exchanges on development of skills, vocational training and decent work; on poverty reduction and social inclusion and dialogue.

The following explanation *themes* for the Trade Panel stem from what is needed to eventually achieve DCFTAs with the EU, and a vast array of legislative harmonization and capacity building is needed. In this regard, DCFTA perspective “… is far from being a carrot…” (EU official quoted in Popescu and Wilson 2011:3).

  a) Sanitary and phyto-sanitary system (SPS) and animal welfare: *alignment* with the EU SPS legal framework is specifically important for the partners’ export of agricultural products to the EU. Building their capacity to do so is emphasized;

  b) Customs and trade facilitation: deals with modernizing and *building capacity* of the partners’ customs authorities, following the “EU Customs Blueprints”, to advance partners’ legitimate trade and economic interaction with one another and EU. Preparation of roadmaps for accession to EFTA;

  c) Intellectual property rights (IPR): emphasis on gradual reform and modernization of the IPR protection and enforcement to ensure investment, technological progress, employment, creativity fair trading conditions etc., and eventually reach the EU level of IPR protection and enforcement.
d) Public procurement: as a component of fight against corruption under platform 1; *good governance*, notably, transparency, accountability, efficiency in how public bodies spend public and taxpayers’ money, and partners’ procurement institutions’ reform basing on the approximation with the EU procurement Acquis, are emphasized.

e) Technical regulations and standards (TRS): “better access to export to the EU is conditioned to adoption of EU [TRS]’” (Platform 2 document, p.8), alignment with the EU Directives related with each export industrial sector chosen by the partners.

Besides the economic and regulatory modernization, the EaP also aims at regular support to the improvement of the partners’ human capital to ensure their sustainable development. As the EU puts it, “'[i]nteraction between EU and partner countries’ citizens, in particular young people…[is] a promoter and monitor of change’” (COM(2008) 823: 11). This is reflected in Platform 4 on “’Contacts between People’” that is divided into education and training; youth; culture; information society; and research objectives.34

Embarking upon the vitality of *education and training* for sustainable progress of the partners’ societies via innovative knowledge brought about by the young people educated in Europe, the first priority envisages comprehensive introduction of the EU’s Tempus and Erasmus Mundus, Jean Monnet programmes and learning and research mobility instruments to the EaP universities; partial opening the EU schools’ e-Twinning programme to the partners. Emphasis is made on “’language learning as a key tool to promote mobility’” (ibid.:1). Additionally, the EU encourages the partners’ increased participation in the **FP7** activities. The EU’s is keen on the partners’ *educational modernization* particularly because better educated people will contribute to their democratization (EU official No4).

Furthermore, the EU aims to open up an EaP window to the EU’s ”’Youth in Action’” Programme to enhance inter-generational (young people) close relations and dialogue via intensifying the relations between the EU and partners’ youth NGOs, strengthen the NGOs’ capacity for increased role their societies, and in the same vein, a regular policy dialogue on sharing with the partners the EU’s standards and practice in youth development has been agreed. Moreover, since the EU recognizes “’…the importance of cultural cooperation in addressing political processes and challenges…’” (COM(2008)823:11), the Commission has

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launched the ‘‘Eastern Partnership Culture Programme’’ in 2009 to enhance the cultural (public and civil) entities’ capacity to develop more inclusive cultural policies, and to promote regional cooperation between the partners’ cultural organization and those of the EU (EuropeAid, Lucas, 2010). Interestingly, the EU also encourages the partners’ use of the ICT and EU’s regulatory model. All these are related with the EU’s efforts for ‘’…robust social modernization… of [the] Eastern neighbours’’ (EU official No2).

5.3.3 Engagement with Civil Society

The partners’ civil society and NGOs have been officially recognized by the EU as important facilitators of socio-economic and political development in these countries. The Commission’s official discourse, establishment of a specific Civil Society Forum and the emphasized necessity of its involvement in the work of the platforms show that the ‘’[c]ivil society in EaP countries is a beacon of hope (Chatham House Conference Report, 2011: 3). According to the Commission, the reforms needed under the EaP should be implemented with a close participation of the partners’ civil societies to enhance the oversight of the public services (COM (2008) 823) engaged in the reform work, and because the CSOs and NGOs are ‘’…crucial…within their societies, in providing policy input…and in holding governments accountable’’ (CSF Concept paper, p.1; CSF web-site).

In order to embark upon this demand, the ‘’Commission…support[s] the further development of...(CSOs) and to establish an EaP Civil Society Forum [CSF] to promote contacts among CSOs and facilitate their dialogue with public authorities’’ (ibid.:12), and this is widely considered as ‘’the most outstanding expression of the importance the EaP gives to relations with civil society’’ (Gromadzki 2010: 3).

In this regard, Prague Summit heralded the need and invited (Prague Declaration 2009) the Commission, to work out a possible civil society policy within the EaP, and it was decided to include of a wide range of ‘’…CSOs: trade unions, employers' organisations, professional associations, NGOs, think-tanks, nonprofit foundations, national and international CSOs/networks and other relevant Civil Society actors from EaP....[and]…EU Member States…international organisations/networks’’(CSF website) in the Forum. This is qualitatively a new enhancement with an inclusive approach to the role of the civil society.
The Forum aims to socialize the partners’ CSOs with the EU CSOs and other IOs, ‘‘with a view to sharing experiences and building capacity’’ (Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010: 7) and to represent the attitude of the civil society in the EaP platforms (through selected representatives participation in platform ministerial meetings, and also exchange of good practices and knowledge through providing regular advice and recommendations, assessments and reports to the platform activities etc.) and in flagship initiatives.

Its structure is largely based on its role in the platforms. Specifically, ‘‘security and stability’’ objective of Platform 1 document considers important the ‘‘[c]ontacts among [CSOs] to improve their capacity for advocacy and promote confidence building in areas of protracted conflict’’ (p.1). As mentioned in the preceding section, Platform 4 enhances the participation of the NGOs in ‘‘Youth in Action’’ programme. Moreover the Commission has invited the EESC to participate in the CSF (COM (2008) 823) and there is a key role given to the EESC to empower the CSOs to be active in the areas such as ‘‘…business, employment, labour and social issues’’ (CSF Concept Paper, p. 4), and thus its input in Platform 2 is deemed important.

Accordingly, the Forum functions through following thematic working groups (CSF website), around which the 6 national platforms of participating CSOs of more than 200 unite and meet yearly, and which are steered by a dedicated Steering Committee:

1. Democracy, human rights, good governance and stability

2. Economic integration and convergence with EU policies

3. Environment, climate change and energy security

4. Contacts between people

The experience of the last two Forums (2009, 2010) reflects that there is a notable propensity by the Commission and EU delegations in the participants’ selection to participate in the Forum meetings: NGOs and other organizations that are larger, stronger, more experienced and possess the needed capacity are selected, and the same ones receive more grants than others. The financial support to the partners’ CSOs is channeled through EIDHR, DCI thematic programmes and ENPI, ‘‘…granted mainly for activities concerned with the improvement of the status of groups threatened with social exclusion (e.g. refugees, people
with disabilities, women), election education and monitoring’’ (Lada 2011). Furthermore, it is observed that the CSF within the EaP is underfinanced in comparison to the other elements mentioned so far.

6 Understanding the EaP Democracy Promotion Approach

A deep analysis of the EaP’s bilateral and multilateral frameworks and selected ENP documents has been conducted. Revisiting the concepts underlying the tentative hypothesis, this chapter analytically concludes the thesis.

6.1 Conditionality in the EaP

Different categories of conditionality associated with the partners have been found: political conditionality, economic and other (visa-free travel objective) conditionality. The analysis of conditionality needs a more comprehensive coverage since it is crucial to test the political vs. developmental democracy promotion approach in the EaP.

Political Conditionality

In the EaP, the AAs with the partners are built on ENP positive conditionality (Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010), within the lack of the membership perspective: the carrot is not offered, and then the stick of fulfilling the accession criteria is not valid (Michalski 2009:5), and even the coherence of conditionality is further plagued by the flexibility to pursue the shared values depending on the capacities and ambitions of the partners. Furthermore, the official EU rhetoric does not specify what it means by ‘‘a sufficient level of progress’’ in the shared values to start and conclude the AAs. As a result, the EU has had a notable leeway to have started the negotiations with certain semi-authoritarian partners that fall short of a democratic progress, and whether it concludes the AAs with the partners democratically underdeveloped but socio-economically advanced, is a future observation to follow up.

By and large, the analysis finds that the political conditionality does not correlate with the incentives of DCFTA, visa-liberalization, CIB and other incentives such as the EU technical
and financial assistance in the partners’ regional development, but instead, each has its attached conditionality which does not directly encroach upon the political confines of the state functioning.

Moreover, throughout the analysis of all primary and secondary data, the analysis could not find much EU direct demand on “hard” democracy, such as ‘free and fair elections’ or ‘robust political (party) competition’, within the EaP. But instead, the EU urges the partners to implement their CoE membership and other obligations35, which implies that there is a degree of demand to ensure political rights and civil liberties albeit with a low propensity.

To complicate the analysis farther, the analysis of Platform 1 has found that there is a dedicated attention to the democratic governance (exactly, all principles in Appendix 1), with the element of “independence of magistrates” as the only politically-oriented focus. Also, the interviewed EU officials mostly used three concepts: good or democratic governance, gradual and indirect democratization, modernization and socio-economic development.

*The general EU discourse shows that the EU does not aim to exercise a strong political conditionality especially given the lack of an explicit EU membership perspective, and thus the EU’s low propensity to use direct political conditionality is complemented by a high propensity to embark upon democratic governance by the partners.*

**Economic, social and other conditionality**

The analysis finds out that the EU’s demand on the partners’ economic liberalization and development is as strong as its demand on the democratic governance, and stronger than the political conditionality. The DCFTA is presented by the EU both as an incentive, and also obligation to conclude within the AAs. The conditions for the incentive are the partners’ WTO membership and adoption and implementation of the EU trade and trade related regulations, and implement the necessary economic reforms. This, according to the corroboration of the primary and secondary data, is aimed at the partners’ gradual democratization. In other words, within the EaP, the “…economic liberalization necessary to

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35 All partners are parties to the Venice Commission ‘’Convention on the Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms in the Member States of the CIS”.
meet the trade and economic reform requirements of the [Association] agreements [is] expected to engender pro-democracy momentum by fostering new economic power centers, specifically in the form of more independent private sectors that would press for political change’’ (Youngs 2003b). All interviewed EU officials confirmed this assumption.

The EU’s discourse on linking DCFTAs with democracy goes hand in hand with its purpose to export the EU cohesion model to these countries, for which it allocates the second largest share in the EaP’s budget\textsuperscript{36}, to ameliorate local and regional economic and social disparities, and to improve the local and regional actors’ capacities for good governance. Socioeconomic development is one of the core objectives of Platform 2, with two dedicated discussion panels on ‘‘Labor Market and Social Policies’’, and ‘‘Enterprise and SMEs policies’’ (this includes a specific conditionality: approximation with the EU SME legislation), operationalized through a special ‘‘SME Flagship Initiative’’, which constitutes the largest share among the other flagship initiatives, in the EaP financial allocations. \textit{Thus the EaP commits the partners for a more focus on the socioeconomic local, regional and national development.}

The interviewed EU officials have confirmed that creation of large and wealthy middle classes in the partner countries is a priority of the EaP. \textit{Therefore, the analysis concludes that the EU sets economic and cohesion conditionality to contribute to the objective of socio-economic development.}

Furthermore, the conditionality for the incentive of the \textit{visa-free travel} pushes for the partners’ reform of the police and other law-enforcement bodies, customs, border management and generally, migration policies. \textit{Therefore, the analysis also concludes that the visa-free travel conditionality also aims to achieve democratic governance in these administrations.}

All in all, it is sound to conclude the analysis of the conditionality as Youngs puts it: “European policy-makers saw a more positive, incentives-based form of conditionality as more legitimate and potentially more effective” (2001a: 192), to support the development of democracy.

\textsuperscript{36} Appendix 2
6.2 Socialization in the EaP

Given the potential domestic high costs of compliance with the bulk of conditionality analyzed above, more indirect mechanisms of promoting democracy come afore. Socialization is clearly one of within the EaP which has devised a *deeply institutionalized and intensified dialogue and cooperation* on the regular basis between the partners and EU and among the partners, within both the bilateral and multilateral tracks. The former track has already been existent within the ENP. But the latter track is new and special with regard to *transgovernmental socialization*, as it is clearly depicted in Table 4. The analysis finds that the track has specialized *regularly convened dense clubs of socialization and linkage* with the Brussels bureaucrats, necessitated by the EU to enable the partners’ *senior level officials (sub-state)* to be able to conduct far-reaching legislative approximation and regulatory convergence with the EU policies as agreed in the bilateral Association Agendas. To capacitate these senior officials with the necessary hands-on knowledge, the EU has arranged multilateral *transgovernmental networks* for training, explanation, presentation, discussion and hence dialogue and cooperation, *“structured”* (COM(2008) 823:9) as per the policy areas where the partners need to implement reforms. In this respect, the EaP transgovernmental networks are the policy-specific four platforms and their objective- and sector- specific working panels: *a pattern of socialization through transnational network governance*. By such a linkage, the EU aims at “‘locking third country political elites into relationships…to impact on cognitive attitudes towards democratic norms’” (Youngs 2001c: 42), according to the triangulation of the primary and secondary data reflecting the pattern. Additionally, the analysis finds that EU has initiated an intensified *two-layered transnational socialization*: firstly, enhancing the involvement of the partners’ young people in TEMPUS, Erasmus and Youth in Action programmes, and having established the EaP Culture Programme under Platform 4, for closer cultural cooperation with Europe, all these to be further enhanced by the visa liberalization; and secondly, uniting and socializing the non-state actors (among themselves and with their counterparts from the EU) in CSF, EURONEST and EaP LRA: aiming at inculcating democratic values, norms and habits on the societal non-state actors. *Therefore, the analysis concludes that the EU aims to utilize socialization as a mechanism of indirect democracy promotion within the EaP.*
6.3 Civil Society Support in the EaP

The analysis of the EaP’s civil society support has not found an EU trend to catalyze the partners’ CSOs and NGOs to forge demands for direct democratization in the political sense against the governments. For instance, the analysis of the “CSF survey of 2011-12 civil society projects” (2011, pp.1-105; the “survey”, hereafter) finds that notwithstanding the highest number of projects are in the area of Platform 1, mostly “local democracy”, “participatory democracy”, “local community development”, “media reform”, “democracy monitoring”, “watchdogging monitoring for good governance”, “human rights monitoring”, “children rights”, “women rights”, and “anti-corruption advocacy” projects are favored, with almost no election-related project available. As such the EU aims to provide conditions for unrestrained relations between the civil societies and authorities to enable the civil societies’ participation and assistance in the democratic governance by the partners’ administrations desirable. That is why the EU fertilizes the CSOs and NGOs dialogue with their respective public authorities, through involving the CSF in the work of the senior officials’ platform meetings, either directly (representatives’ participation) or indirectly (written recommendations and assessments).

Moreover, the role of the civil society is observed to be larger in the platforms 2 and 4. In the former, the EESC is at the driver’s seat and focus on engaging the civil societies in social and economic development advocacy, which is also observed in project contents (labor policies, innovation policies, social dialogue, business capacity development in SMEs, SMEs policies, business and investment) in the survey; and in the latter the opening the Youth in Action to the EaP partners implies to strengthen the role of youth NGOs in the socio-cultural development of their countries. In platform 3, NGOs’ monitoring input to the partners’ environmental policy reforms, legislative harmonization and other more technical issues are associated with the civil society actors.

At the same time, the EU seems to attach a high degree of importance to strengthen their capacities to enable them to more professionally render advocacy activities related with the objectives and themes of the four thematic platforms. On the other hand, the EaP’s preference for well-established and experienced NGOs has also been confirmed by an interviewed EU official (No3).
All in all, the analysis concludes that the civil society support as an indirect democracy promotion mechanism within the EaP currently prioritizes to enhance civil society participation and input to good governance primarily in the area of socio-economic development area and also apolitical supplies of actually political pillars.

6.4 EaP State Capacity-Building for Good Governance and Development

The largest EaP budget has been earmarked for the CIB projects directed to reform partners’ public administration structures engaged in the AAs’ negotiation and implementation, in all the cooperation sectors (EaP Communication underlines) spanning from the themes of the Platform 1 to those of the Platform 4, or put different, inject in them the European Administrative Principles\textsuperscript{37} that make good governance the central motto of public administration. Because the adoption of the relevant parts of the EU Acquis, and convergence with the other EU policies and standards, necessitate the existence of the other side of the coin: the EU system of the rule of law to ensure their subsequent implementation and enforcement. To complicate the issue further, the institution- or capacity- building is a driver of the EaP’s success, given the scope of the approximation and convergence work to be undertaken by the partners. At this point, it especially worth to revise the EU officials’ comments regarding the role of the capacity building in achieving good governance and democracy: (1) ‘‘We assume that we will not only enhance capacity of these administrations but... make them more transparent, accountable and responsive to the needs of societies, in other words, make them more democratic’’ (EU official, No4); (2) ‘‘the EU institution building activities focus on rule of law, and it may well be expected that having a strong system of rule of law will help facilitate progress towards democracy’’ (EU official No3).

There is a high degree of tendency to build the capacities of the local and regional authorities to decentralize and promote local governance reform and participation, for which the Commission has given the CoR the key role. On the other hand, the scope of the ‘‘building work’’ in the sectors analyzed in Platform 2 (see section 5.3.2) is the largest compared to its

\textsuperscript{37} Appendix 1
scope within the other Platforms, and this implies that the EaP insists on good governance in the economic and social development. At the same time, good governance in all the sectors target gradual national development and eventual systemic changes. Thus argumentum a fortiori, the analysis concludes that the state capacity building within the EaP is a horizontal democracy promotion mechanism to promote good governance and with it, the overall socio-economic development.

6.5 Sector-Specific Democratic Governance in the EaP

The analysis finds that the EU external governance in the EaP context has been enhanced in comparison with the ENP context. The EU’s promotion of democracy via kneading the dough of the partners’ policy rules and regulations with their legislative approximation with the Acquis and regulatory convergence with the EU policy standards has been found to be the central in the EaP. The primary and secondary data have corroborated at this point. The areas of the EU’s export of democratic governance rules through legislation- and policy regulation are the following in the EaP:

1) Electoral standards, media regulation, public resources management, IBM (convergence with the EU IBM standards), migration policy, anti-corruption, civil protection, judiciary, police and other law enforcement standards, civil service, public (particularly, local) administration; and

2) EU trade, investment legislation and policy standards, EU company law, good governance in taxation, financial markets and ownership rights’ regulation, harmonization with EU environment and energy (electricity, gas, oil, renewables, energy efficiency) policies and legislation, EU enterprise, labour market and social policies (particularly, approximation with the EU SME legislation), adoption of the EU cohesion model, EU SPS, IRP, TRS, customs, public procurement standards, alignment with the EU Directives in the chosen export industrial sectors, approximation with the EU youth development and cultural policy standards and even with the EU regulatory model of ICT.

The reform necessary is supposed to be conducted by the states’ sub-administrative divisions, and the analysis finds that within the EaP, the EU aims to horizontally forge deep and
comprehensive democratic governance in the indicated areas. In accordance with the analysis of the areas in the point 2 above, the economic (see footnote 12 in section 5.2.2) modernization (coupled with direct administrative modernization as mentioned in the preceding section), looks forward to receiving the largest bulk of approximation and convergence treatment. This implies that via demanding the partners’ vast legislative approximation and regulatory convergence with the EU, the EU aims to reinforce democratic standards and rules in their policy sectors to ensure the sustainable national socio-economic development and with it assuring the partners’ sustainable democratic development.

6.6 Hypothesis Revision: Ex Ante Developmental, Ex Post Political?

This section finally revises the tentative hypothesis deduced as a result of in-depth study of the EU external democracy promotion literature and modernization and Europeanization theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The hypothesis is revised recalling Thomas Carothers’ framework of the developmental democracy promotion strategy (2009) which guided the data collection and analysis, and juxtaposing the findings inferred through operationalizing the modernization and Europeanization theories.

So far, the content, discourse and conversation analyses of the EaP policy content and interviews with the EU officials, and also the references to the EaP literature, have found that the developmental strategy understood in terms of the EU’s indirect promotion of democracy through adjusting and channeling the conditionality, socialization, civil society support, state capacity building for good governance and sector-specific democratic governance mechanisms, to the objective of the partners’ lasting sustainable socio-economic development and as a part of this process an embeddedness in the democratic development, indeed characterizes the EaP policy (in accordance with the findings indicated in bold at the end of each preceding section in this chapter). The findings of the study converge with the main features of the developmental strategy shown in Table 1.

Therefore, in the light of the supportive empirical observations, the study changes the probability expression of ‘‘might have set’’ to ‘‘has set’’ in the hypothesis set out in section
3.4 and presented in table below for the sake of clarity, and confirms the hypothesis as an answer to the research question.

Table 5: Hypothesis

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<th>Hypothesis</th>
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<tr>
<td>In the EaP as the Eastern dimension of the ENP, the EU determines a prevalently developmental approach albeit with a low level political approach to democracy promotion: given the lack of any explicit EU membership offer and in this case the registered experience that the implementation of an EU political conditionality potentially challenges the power of the partners’ administrations, the EU might have set the policy to employ a socio-economic conditionality stronger than the political conditionality and hence focus more on multi-layered national socio-economic development through good governance and other indirect mechanisms rather than on direct political underpinnings of democracy.</td>
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On the other hand, there is an interesting ex post case which directly feeds into the political approach set as the rival explanation in the section 3.3. That is, the Arab Spring of 2011, which put an end to the political stagnation in the South Mediterranean notwithstanding the ENP’s traditional large support to the status quo (Emerson 2011), has woken the EU up to revise the ENP and strengthen support to deep democracy38 (COM (2011) 303) in the neighbourhood. All interviewed EU officials have interestingly noted that ‘‘democracy was not the heart of our engagement as it is now”. In order to help the neighbors’ societies in realizing deep democracy, the renewed approach envisages establishing an EED twin of the American NED, to ‘‘…support political actors striving for democratic change in their countries (especially political parties and non-registered NGOs or trade unions and other social partners)” (ibid.4), and a CSFc to enhance the advocacy capacity of the CSOs to deal with women’s and minorities’ rights, social justice, environmental protection and resource efficiency (ibid.). In this regard, the thesis re-hypothesizes that despite the predominance of

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38 See Appendix 4
the developmental strategy in the EaP policy content, the EU may shift to support deep democracy in some of the EaP partner countries with serious democratic shortfalls. Finally, as once Frank Schimmelfennig asked the author, in an email correspondence, about how the study would differ from the existing ENP research, the research objective of this thesis, which has reviewed the existing literature, has been to try to advance a different analytical framework within the ENP democracy promotion studies, through putting the EaP case under the spotlight of the developmental vs. political democracy promotion approaches as defined by Carothers (2009). The study can be said to have accomplished the objective, and the next final section looks forward to developing the research further.

6.7 Discussion

The EU’s application of both developmental and political strategy is certainly not informed by a ‘‘one-strategy-fits-all’’ prism. Naturally, certain important factors (Knodt and Jünemann, 2007) such as the EU’s multi-level system (potential to act), interdependence (symmetric, asymmetric) between the EU and third country, structure of resonance in partner countries (political systems and peoples’ attitude to EU), international environment, and the countries’ overall development stages, condition the EU’s choice of any external democratization strategy. The EU’s current hard line against Belarus is notable in this regard: the EU may well choose to follow a hard political line depending on the context. In this regard, the future EaP democracy promotion studies may investigate whether the EU sets a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ approach in the EaP, whether a strategy varies across the Six or whether a strategy is coherent but its implementation tactics vary. In fact, though the relevant policy papers are important to understand the strategy, it would be more thorough to consider also that the EU will likely act in line with the complex phenomena surrounding each of the EaP countries and EU’s relations with each of them. The author has developed a PhD research plan on the ‘‘The European Union External Democracy Promotion within the Eastern Partnership: The Cases of the Six’’ to reconsider all these and conduct a research after a certain period of the EaP’s implementation.
7 Executive Summary

What led to the research work?

This thesis has taken its root from the author’s ‘‘outsider’’ observations of and interest in the performance and impact of the EU’s external democracy promotion: the author has observed before the thesis, that despite the shared values on which the EU has been established have been cross-written in all its policy documents as the bedrock of its international relations with the world, especially the neighbourhood countries, the EU’s impact in ensuring the respect for and enforcement of these values have proven to be marginal at best.

But for the author these pre-suppositions did still not imply that the EU had not been promoting democracy. Because the observed regularities may well have only mirrored themselves like a reality but one also would have to see the beyond the mirror since the reality may be implicit in the further layers. That said, perhaps the EU’s reality lied in how the EU had actually defined democracy and its promotion and how it had operationalized its own conceptions in this regard.

Therefore, the study focused on various meanings of democracy the former is associated with the minimalist, maximalist and liberal accounts of democracy (political), and the latter with good or democratic governance aimed at the overall socio-economic development (developmental). In order to understand the EU’s preference of either, author decided to research the track-record of the EU’s external democracy promotion in the literature and EU documents. Therefore, the study firstly buried itself into a vast body of literature composed by the works of the prominent scholars in the field.

The found regularity in the EU’s external democracy promotion was that the EU’s external democracy promotion worldwide had been an integral part of its holistic account of global sustainable development. Then a study of the relevant EU documentary sources reflected that for the EU democracy means good or democratic governance (EU recognizes the UNDP’s good governance definition) directed to support the overall national development (holistic), with a view to democracy understood in the political sense to gradually bloom within this developmental process. In other words, the EU has differentiated between the direct and indirect promotion of democracy, with the former addressed at the political objectives and the
latter targeting to support democracy’s non-political requisites such as the national socio-economic development.

In order to punctually define the contours of the ‘‘developmental’’ approach preferred by the EU, Thomas Carothers’s ‘‘developmental’’ democracy promotion (Table 1) framework defined in four dimensions (2009) (and, which actually differentiated between the American politicism and European developmentalism) was chosen by the author to frame and operationalize the study.

Yet, this was not to argue that the political approach had been completely absent in the EU’s promotion of democracy but rather that though both approaches had comprised the EU’s strategy, the developmental one had clearly been predominant. Therefore, it was also necessary to frame the political understandings of democracy. Therefore, Carothers’ ‘‘political approach’’ framework was also included in the study as a rival explanation to gauge any evidence that conducted case study could find as contradictory to the argumentation of the prevalent developmental approach.

Having established the research background with an overall analytical prism, the study decided to problematize the prism within the ENP studies. This policy that became operational in 2006 taking on a wishful thinking of utilizing the enlargement experience in the neighbourhood without prospecting an immediate EU membership for the partner countries, has repeatedly been criticized by the academia for the policy’s application of the enlargement-like conditionality that has asked more reform for less assistance, both with the weak political leverage to the partner countries and also with the costs and benefits of the neighbours’ alignment with and integration into the EU either miscalculated or unrealistically set. This informed the author’s assumption that given the lack of an immediate membership perspective, a longer-term and sustained engagement intrinsic to the developmental approach and falling short of politically challenging measures that could obstruct the partners’ integration into the EU, had probably been the underlying nature of democracy promotion through the ENP.

**Research Overview, Research Problem and Objective**

With that assumption in mind, the study reviewed a substantial amount of the existing ENP literature to see how and to what extent the prism had been raised in the studies. Having found
that only Schimmelfennig (2007) has considered the socio-economic development element in the EU’s democracy promotion within the ENP, the study identified a gap in the current knowledge with regard to what the thesis research background has defined.

But instead of tracking the huge amount of data and undertaking a research in need of a period for a doctorate level study, the author decided to problematize the prism on the Eastern neighbourhood dimension of the ENP: Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy that was adopted in 2009. The objective was to advance a different analytical path in the studies of the EU’s democracy promotion within the ENP. To do so, the study also reviewed almost all existing EaP academic research and found that the theme had not been taken up. Considering also that the EaP is crucial in the democratization of the Eastern neighbourhood, the study decided to put the EaP case under the spotlight of the developmental vs. political democracy promotion analysis. To do so, the study delimited itself to focus on the EaP policy content (set-up) and established the following research question:

What kind of democracy promotion approach has the EU determined in the Eastern Partnership Policy: developmental, political or mix?

Theory
The analytical framework pre-defined basing on the empirical knowledge in the research background chapter has necessitated to understand its theoretical justifications. Modernization theory established by Seymour Martin Lipset was found to be directly relevant in explicating the developmental approach. According to the theory, the social requisite for democracy is the socio-economic development via the enhancement of a population’s wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and most importantly, education. In order to perceive how the EU operationalizes the developmental democracy promotion based on the assumptions of the modernization theory, the study researched the Europeanization theory. A research overview on Europeanization observed that the theory had mostly been directed to the EU enlargement studies. Thus Schimmelfennig’s “Europeanization beyond Europe” (2009) conception was adopted. The conception devolves the studies of the EU’s traditional democracy promotion mechanisms into the ENP, and they are as follows: conditionality, socialization, domestic empowerment (civil society support). But with further research the author added two more mechanisms: state capacity building for good governance and development and sector-specific democratic governance. These mechanisms were analyzed to see how they apply the EU’s developmental scheme. The finally developed theory table summarized the discussions.
**Deduction**

The empirical research background plus the theoretical assumptions led to the deduction of a hypothesis tentatively answering the research question: In the EaP as the Eastern dimension of the ENP, the EU determines a prevalently developmental approach albeit with a low level political approach to democracy promotion, i.e.: given the lack of any explicit EU membership offer and in this case the registered experience that the implementation of an EU political conditionality potentially challenges the power of the partners’ administrations, the EU might have set the policy to employ a socio-economic conditionality stronger than the political conditionality and hence focus more on multi-layered national socio-economic development through good governance and other indirect mechanisms rather than on direct political underpinnings of democracy.

**Method**

Then the naturally preferred strategy to advance the research was to follow the pre-defined propositions, i.e., analytical and theoretical frameworks set above. This clearly led to the further continuation of the deductive logic governing the research design, data collection and analysis. The logic of the theory and research relationship adopted indicated the purpose of theory to hypothesize phenomena and research to reveal the reality via testing the hypothesis. The positivists social science’s falsification doctrine (i.e., gearing the research to finding the contradictory evidence: ‘political approach’ in the thesis), interpretive social science’s emphasis on ‘in-depth reading to discover meaning embedded in the texts, and thus the constructed reality’, were eventually adopted and the study allied with the ontological constructionism antithetical to the positivistic objectivism. All these determined the research design’s nature to be overwhelmingly qualitative.

The EaP was set as an exploratory single case study aimed at painting the policy’s picture and presenting a profile of a possible democracy promotion strategy. To conduct the case study, the democracy promotion mechanisms resulted from the theoretical framework and eventually framed with the developmental democracy promotion approach were converted to be the ‘theoretical concepts’ guiding the data collection and analysis. The primary data sources have been: the official EU documents and web-sites, and semi-structured interviews with the four EU officials; and secondary source has been the existing research on the ENP, EaP and related issues, and virtual media outputs of a few number. Then the method adopted the
Starting the Operation: Delving into the EaP Policy Structure
The concepts shed a light on the policy structure. Firstly, the ENP’s rationale, conditionality and incentives model was discussed. Then the developments that led to the EaP’s establishment were traced. Since the policy is divided into the bilateral and multilateral tracks, the thesis studied them separately. The data pertaining to the bilateral track’s elements: the AAs and associated with it, DCFTAs, visa liberalization (long-term objective of visa free travel) and CIB were studied in the vein of the concepts. Within the AA perspective, the EaP conditionality and offered incentives were discussed to understand their conduciveness to the partners’ socio-economic development, and the level and coherence of the political leverage. Parallel to this, 12 ENP APs, and the PCAs with the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus were looked through to grasp the ENP’s overall level of focus on the socio-economic development and political progress: overarching attention to the former was identified. In the same vein, the EaP was found to have set an enhanced support to the social and economic development. Further, the study analyzed the DCFTAs with a view to understand the scope and purposes of the economic liberalization and its impact on the overall social development; and the visa liberalization to see which strata of the partners’ state functioning need to be reformed. Lastly, the EaP reflected also a strong emphasis on the state capacity-building for the partners, through the CIB.

In the next step the study deeply analyzed the multilateral track consisted of 4 thematic platforms and their respective working panels, also CSF, EURONEST, 6 Flagship Initiatives, and to-be-established EaP LRA. The high propensity to utilize the dense socialization mechanism was particularly evident in the content, besides the emphasis on most of the social requisites of democracy: good governance, economic and social modernization, and engagement with the partners’ civil societies to empower and build their capacities to increase the citizen participation in good governance for socio-economic development. Thus all the concepts (mechanisms) were used as the tools of operation of EaP investigation.

EaP Democracy Promotion Approach: Analysis, Conclusions and Further Research
Recalling the following concepts the in-depth analysis of the data was conducted and at the end of each section named after the concepts, necessary conclusions were made in italic bold.
Put shortly, the analysis concludes that: (a) there is a low political and high developmental conditionality; (b) EU aims to utilize socialization as a mechanism of indirect or bottom-up democracy promotion (dense EaP transgovernmental networks and high transgovernmental and transnational socialization, and a degree of intergovernmental socialization); (c) civil society support as an indirect democracy promotion mechanism within the EaP currently prioritizes to enhance civil society participation and input to good governance primarily in the area of socio-economic development area and also apolitical supplies of actually political pillars; (d) the state capacity building within the EaP is a horizontal democracy promotion mechanism to promote good governance and with it, the overall socio-economic development; and finally that (e) EU’s reinforced demand on partners for vast legislative approximation and regulatory convergence with the itself, targets enhancing the injection of democratic standards and rules in their policy sectors to ensure the sustainable national socio-economic development and with it assuring the partners’ sustainable democratic development.

Hypothesis Revision: Ex Ante Developmental, Ex Post Political

At this stage the study went back to revise the analytical framework (developmental democracy promotion) in Table 1, and revised the tentative hypothesis. The hypothesis has been empirically supported. But given an ex post falsification (contradictory case): the ENP’s most recent emphasis on “deep democracy”, the study re-hypothesized: despite the predominance of the developmental strategy in the EaP policy content, the EU may shift to support deep democracy in some of the EaP partner countries with serious democratic shortfalls.

At the very end, the study made a self-criticism succinctly indicating which factors would account for the EU’s choice of any democracy promotion strategy, and the importance of observing what strategy and how the EU will apply prospectively. Consequently, the author has developed a PhD research plan to include all the mentioned self-criticisms in the future research.
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Appendices

Appendix 1: European Public Administration Space and Principles

SIGMA principles of the European Administrative space (SIGMA, 1998) are often presented as a definition of the benchmarks for the civil service, although they hardly represent the common average derived from the de facto status of public administrations in the EU member states.

They are the following:
1. Reliability and predictability,
2. Proportionality
3. Timeliness
4. Openness and transparency
5. Accountability
6. Efficiency (ratio between resources and results – input/output ratio) and effectiveness (achieving goals).

These principles are quite abstract. Hence further more detailed benchmarks were developed by SIGMA and followed by the EC. The quality of the public administration was assessed on the basis of the following benchmarks:
- the development of an impartial and professional administration (based on a civil service law);
- the development of a training system;
- an adequate policy development and policy co-ordination capacities;
- an effective accountability system (with particular emphasis on the system of Internal and External Financial Control);
- the extent to which special structures and procedures have been put in place to manage EU affairs.

The baseline assessment covered six core areas:

1. Policy-making and co-ordination machinery;
2. Civil Service;

39 Adopted from Georgian-European Policy and Legal Advice Center (GEPLAC) Discussion Paper on “Eastern Partnership in Georgia: Implications and Framework for Deeper Relations with the EU” written by Klaudijus Maniokas, 2009:
3 Financial management;
4 Public Procurement;
5 Internal Financial Control;
6 External Audit.

In each of these six areas minimum standards, ‘baselines’ have been developed.

Baseline issues for horizontal administrative capacity assessment
- Policy-Making and Co-ordination
- Coherence of the policy-making framework
- Inter-ministerial consultation mechanisms
- Agenda Planning
- Dispute resolution mechanisms
- Central co-ordination capacity
- General strategic capacity
- Co-ordination of EU affairs
- Involvement of the Council of Ministers in budget decisions
- Impact assessment

Civil Service
- Legal status of civil servants
- Legality, responsibility and accountability of public servants
- Impartiality and integrity of public servants
- Efficiency in management of public servants and in control of staffing
- Professionalism and stability of public servants
- Development of civil service capacities in the area of European Integration

Public Expenditure
- Management Systems
- Inclusion of sound budgeting principles in the Constitution, Organic Budget Law and/or related laws
- Balance between executive and legislative power
- Exact definition of the scope of the State Budget and efficient arrangements for transfers to extra-budgetary funds
- Medium term expenditure framework
- A logical, sequential and transparent Budget process, set out in clearly defined rules
- Effective arrangements for the Budget management of Public Investments
- Effective monitoring mechanisms for budget implementation
- Common classification for accounting and reporting, compatible with concepts related to the disbursement of EU funds
- Capacities for upgrading the Public Expenditure Management system

Public Procurement
- Inclusion of a defined set of principles in public procurement legislation
- Clear legal basis and adequate capacities for the central procurement organization
- Effective mechanisms of procurement implementation and training
- Presence of control and complaints review procedures
- Capacity for upgrading the Public Procurement system
- Internal Financial Control
A coherent and comprehensive statutory base defining the systems, principles and functioning of financial control
- Presence of management control systems and procedures
- Presence of a functionally independent internal audit/inspectorate mechanism
- Presence of systems to prevent and take actions against irregularities and to enable recovery of damages
- Capacity to upgrade financial control systems

**External Audit**
- Statutory authority for the SAI to audit all public and statutory funds and resources, including EU funds
- Meeting requirements set out in INTOSAI auditing standards
- Necessary operational and functional independence
- Reporting: regularity, fairness, timeliness, proper counterpart in the Parliament
- Awareness of EU accession process requirements
- Capacity to upgrade quality of external audit
Appendix 2: EaP Financing

The €600m ‘pie’ is divided up as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Partnership funds</th>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Institution Building</td>
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<td>Pilot regional development programmes</td>
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<td>Multilateral dimension</td>
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Multilateral dimension financial assistance also includes:

Flagship Initiatives
1. Integrated Border Management Programme (€44.5m)
2. Small- and Medium-Size enterprise (SME) Facility (€57m)
3. Regional energy markets and energy efficiency (€41m)
4. Prevention of, preparedness for, and response to natural and manmade disasters (€12m)
5. Environmental governance (€12m)

and also the EaP Culture Programme (€12m), participation of Eastern partners in EU community programmes, including Tempus, Erasmus, e-Twinning, Jean Monnet, Youth in Action, 7th Framework Programme, and others.

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40 EaP Community: Debating Ideas for the Partnership: [http://www.easternpartnership.org/](http://www.easternpartnership.org/); the information does not include the EU’s all financial assistance programmes to the EaP countries, such as ENPI Regional Programme East (2010-2013); thematic instruments; and EU macro-financial assistance to the EaP countries.
Appendix 3: Milestones of European Eastern Policy

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<td>Nov. 2007</td>
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Appendix 4: ENP’s new ”Deep Democracy” Approach

"The new approach…aims to:

(1) provide greater support to partners engaged in building deep democracy – the kind that lasts because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free speech, form competing political parties, receive impartial justice from independent judges, security from accountable police and army forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service — and other civil and human rights that many Europeans take for granted, such as the freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

1.1. Supporting “deep democracy”

A functioning democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law are fundamental pillars of the EU partnership with its neighbours. There is no set model or a ready-made recipe for political reform. While reforms take place differently from one country to another, several elements are common to building deep and sustainable democracy and require a strong and lasting commitment on the part of governments. They include:

– free and fair elections;
– freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media;
– the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial;
– fighting against corruption;”.
– security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.

Reform based on these elements will not only strengthen democracy but help to create the conditions for sustainable and inclusive economic growth, stimulating trade and investment. They are the main benchmarks against which the EU will assess progress and adapt levels of support”.

## Appendix 5: Interview Guide

### I. Introductory Stage
- Information: about the student and thesis purposes
- May I record our conversation?
- How would you like me to quote you in the thesis?
- What is your position?
- What has your role been in the ENP and EaP policy-making and implementation?

### II. European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
- How would you characterize the EU’s approach to democracy promotion in the ENP context?
- Has there been any strategy of democracy promotion, and if yes, has it been implemented?
- What has the extent of the EU’s focus on the socio-economic development of the neighbouring countries been?
- To what extent has the EU been impactful in the promotion of shared values in the neighbourhood?
- What has the objective of the ENP so far been, and what will it be in the near future?
- Has the EU aimed to support the socio-economic developed within the ENP to stabilize and promote democracy? And if yes, then, has the developmental approach to democracy promotion has reigned in this regard?
- Why has the EU recently revised the ENP and adopted ‘‘supporting deep democracy’’: does the aim to apply a top-down democratization in the neighbourhood?
- If yes, the in which parts of the neighbourhood: Eastern or Southern neighbourhood?

### III. Eastern Partnership (EaP)
- What is the EaP’s objective in the mid- and long-term?
- Is the EaP based on the enlargement tools, and if yes, why?
- While reading the Commission Communication on the EaP, I noticed that the EU stipulates that ‘‘a sufficient level of progress’’ in pursuit of the shared values will be a precondition for starting the Association Agreement (AA) negotiations. Please, elaborate on how the EU defines ‘‘a sufficient level’’.
- What do the AAs imply in relation to the EU’s democracy promotion in those countries?
- What are the core incentives of the EaP to stimulate the partner countries for reform?
- To what extent, does the EaP link these incentives to the partners’ progress in adopting and implementing the shared values?
- If the level of ambition and capacity of a partner country does not allow it to be supportive of the EaP, then will the partner still be expected to pursue the EaP reform?
<table>
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<th>Question</th>
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<tr>
<td>What does the EU expect to achieve via DCFTA agreements? And particularly, to what extent, does the EU expect to induce democratization from the economic liberalization?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What kind of reforms do the partners need to implement for a potential future visa-free regime?</td>
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<td>What is the purpose of the CIB and to what extent is the programme conducive to the partners’ democratization?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent, does the EU wish to forge local and regional development, capacity building and decentralization in the EaP countries?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the objectives of the pilot regional development programmes?</td>
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<tr>
<td>While reading the EaP policy documents, I noticed that the EU’s focus on the partners’ socio-economic development is wide. Is it the case? And, particularly, why does the EU wish the partners to adopt the EU cohesion model?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Why did the EU feel a need to create a multilateral track within the EaP?</td>
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<td>What does the EU mean by “structured approximation process”?</td>
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<td>Is there any democratic side effect of the legislative approximation and regulatory convergence with the EU Acquis and policies?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How does the EaP envisage the support to the civil society through CSF?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the EU aim to support their capacity building and for which activities? Particularly, will the EU continue to support the CSOs with advanced capacity and which are well-established?</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent, does the EU aim through the thematic platforms and panels, to socialize the partners’ officials with the EU democratic standards and values?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How would you consequently define the EaP democracy promotion approach as currently reflected by the EU policy papers: does the EU see democracy to gradually develop and become sustainable within the process of the partners’ overall socio-economic development?</td>
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### Appendix 6: Good Governance Principles

**Participation** - All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.

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**Rule of law** - Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly the lawson human rights.

**Transparency** - Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes, institutions and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.

**Responsiveness** - Institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders.

**Consensus orientation** - Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interests of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures.

**Equity** - All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being.

**Effectiveness and efficiency** - Processes and institutions produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources.

**Accountability** - Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organisations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on the organisation and whether the decision is internal or external to an organisation.

**Strategic vision** - Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded.

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**Appendix 7: Political Democracy Promotion Strategy**

(Carothers, 2009: 6-8)

**Value of democracy:** Under the political approach, democracy merits support above all as a positive value in itself, as the political system most likely to ensure respect for basic political and civil rights, and for political dignity generally. For practitioners of the political approach, this is reason enough to support democracy. They also usually believe that the advance of democracy in a country will contribute to social and economic development. They hold to
that belief primarily out of an instinctive faith that “all good things go together.” This additional socioeconomic reason to support democracy, however, is secondary to the core political one.

**Concept of democracy:** The political approach operates from what most political scientists would describe as a Dahlian conception of democracy. It highlights the importance of genuine, competitive elections and sufficient respect for political and civil rights to ensure that citizens can participate meaningfully in democratic political processes. Democracy promoters who follow the political approach sometimes add to this core of “elections plus rights” additional institutional features, such as an independent judiciary, strong legislature, or independent media, which they believe (usually from their own national experience) to be crucial to democracy. Wary of diluting their purely political conception, adherents of the political approach rarely extend such institutional additions to include social or economic elements.

**Concept of democratization:** The political approach sees democratization as a process of political struggle in which political actors who can be clearly identified as democrats contend with nondemocratic forces. Democratization advances when the democrats gain the upper hand and recedes when they lose out. Although democratization may extend over a long period of time, it is a process of struggle often marked by key junctures—breakthroughs, reversals, crises, and resolutions.

**Method of supporting democracy:** In this conception of democratization, the central task of democracy aid is to help the democrats in a country (that is, the actors perceived as such by external democracy supporters) in their struggle against the nondemocrats. This can be done directly through assistance (whether training, advice, moral support, or funding) to the political actors themselves—political parties or associations, politicians, or politically oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It can also be done indirectly through support to key institutions—an independent electoral commission, an independent judiciary, or independent media, for example—that help to level the political playing field by securing and guaranteeing fair procedures for the democratic actors and by checking the power of the nondemocratic actors.