Migration and Asylum in the Accession Process of Turkey to the European Union

A Case of ‘Securitisation’ According to the Copenhagen and the Paris Schools of Critical Security Studies?

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Abstract

This study contributes to the current literature on migration and asylum as an empirical study that evaluates the increasing claims about their securitisation, in the context of membership negotiations between the EU and Turkey. Departing from the theoretical frameworks of the Copenhagen and the Paris Schools of critical security studies, the study moves onwards to propose an analytical framework that comprises both discursive and non-discursive practices. Accordingly, the study analyses official EU and Turkish discourse on migration and asylum as well as particular security technologies and bureaucratic policies (namely visa policy, border controls and readmission agreements) which are required to be implemented by Turkey as part of its accession to the Union. The study concludes that, although migration and asylum is not securitised in the accession process of Turkey to the EU in the Copenhagen School’s sense of the term; insecurity is inscribed into migration and asylum related themes through complicated linkages between policy issues, and negotiations in favour of the short-term political interests and fears of the EU and Turkey.

*Key Words:* European Union, Turkey, migration and asylum, critical security studies, critical discourse analysis

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<td>EC</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>AJFS</td>
<td>Area of Justice, Freedom and Security</td>
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<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (The Kurdistan Workers’ Party)</td>
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<td>NAPAA</td>
<td>National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
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<td>ECHR</td>
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1 Introduction

The European Union is facing many challenges; challenges that I will work hard to address during my mandate as Commissioner. Responsible for the Home Affairs portfolio, I will focus on two main areas: migration and security (Cecilia Malmström, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs).

Assigning one Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, in charge of both migration and security, the European Commission (EC) draws an implicit link between the two policy areas. This link has widely been called ‘migration-security nexus’ by numerous observers including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists and scholars (Leonard 2007). ‘Migration-security nexus’ refers to the growing tendency to view migration flows as a security threat which has an influence on the development of restrictive and preventive European Union (EU) policies on migration and asylum (Kirişçi 2003). The nature of these policies has been leading many to argue that the issues of migration and asylum have been securitised in the EU. Even the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in its publication the State of the World’s Refugees, has claimed that

The emergence of new security concerns for states, particularly since the events of 11 September 2001, has led to the ‘securitisation’ of asylum practices. Increasingly refugees and asylum seekers are perceived as harbingers of insecurity, rather than victims of it (UNHCR 2006: 5).

In this context, since September 11, security oriented policies on migration and asylum have moved to the very top of the EU agenda (Apap et.al. 2004).

1.1 Purpose of the Thesis

Given the growing articulation of migration, asylum and security in the EU; the purpose of my thesis is to explore the security aspects of migration and asylum practices. That being said, it is not my aim here to evaluate whether the political identification of migration and asylum, as threats to the member states or to the

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2 The post was created in 2010 by splitting the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security (AJFS) into two Directorates-General: the Directorate-General for Home Affairs and the Directorate General for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship. Migration and asylum policy is managed by the former. AJFS was formerly known as the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which was established as one of the EU’s three pillars in the Maastricht Treaty (came into force in 1993). AJFS and JHA are used interchangeable in the thesis.
internal security field of the EU, rests on a true or imagined danger. Nor is my aim about developing instruments for rectifying a misperception. What matters more here is that threat perceptions create a view of the world that reflects and determines at least at part of our dealing with it. Perceptions, thus, have real effects by influencing the definition of the policy problem and the nature of the proposed measures (Tekofsky 2006). Likewise, I argue that defining migration and asylum in security terms in the EU implies particular ways of arranging social and political relations and have important implications for the choice of policy instruments. For instance, whilst defining refugee as a humanitarian question allows for relating to the refugee as a rights holder, defining refugee as a security question sustains fear of refugees and policies of territorial and administrative exclusion (Huysmans 2006). Departing from these basic assumptions, the purpose of the thesis is to research the EU discourse and practice on migration and asylum in terms of security. The thesis also aims to contribute to the literature as an empirical study that evaluates the increasing claims about securitisation of migration in the EU. To my knowledge, such claims have not been supported by detailed empirical studies, and therefore, my thesis aims to address this problem by looking into the securitisation of migration in terms of EU’s relations with third countries, and more specifically, in the light of the importance of migration and asylum issues for the accession process of Turkey to the EU. In order to do so, I will analyse the official EU and Turkish discourse on migration and asylum as well as particular bureaucratic and technocratic practices which provide with the ways of managing the discourse, namely visa policy, border control measures and readmission agreements.

The securitisation of migration has had important repercussions for Turkey, in terms of channelling increasing numbers of migrants who want to reach the EU through Turkey, or to remain in Turkey. Related to this, the EU has demanded from Turkey, since its candidature to the Union membership in 1999, to align to the EU acquis (İçduygu & Yükseker 2008: 16). The following sections will provide the thesis with the background information which explains why Turkey has been chosen to realise my research objectives.

1.2 Research Questions

Given the prominence of the concept of securitisation in the literature on migration, I have formulated my research questions as follows:

To what extent and in what ways are migration and asylum securitised in the EU? What are the practices of defining migration and asylum in security terms in the EU? How does the securitisation of migration and asylum work in the light of the importance of these issues for the accession process of Turkey to the EU?

1.3 The Choice of Theory
The concept of securitisation is at the core of my thesis, and therefore, the empirical study will be guided by the framework of the two variants of critical security studies, which will be referred to as the Copenhagen School and the Paris School. Although categorised with the geographical prefix, there is enough common ground leading to dialogue between the so-called schools as the proponents of each theory are concerned with the meaning of security itself, the practice of security and also the role of the analyst vis-à-vis security policies. (Floyt & Croft 2007; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006). However, the thesis also acknowledges that the two schools of thought differ in their focus on the kind of practices and explain different ways of securitisation. Whilst the Copenhagen School is interested in the discursive production of security, the focus of the Paris School is on the ways of managing the discourse through institutional and political arrangements. Thus, both schools of thought will be employed in order to grasp a comprehensive analysis for understanding the extent and the practices of securitisation of migration and asylum in the EU.

1.4 Why Turkey?

The EU has increasingly sought to address migration and asylum issues through cooperation with migrant-sending countries and the transit countries through which migrants and asylum seekers travel, and to this aim, migration and asylum goals are integrated into the EU’s external policy. This area of cooperation with third countries has been known as the ‘external dimension’ of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Boswell 2003: 619). Similarly, in the case of the EU candidate countries, the most immediate impacts of enlargement have been thinking on immigration, free movement, border management and related issues of police-cooperation (Apap 2001: 2). Efficient asylum systems and measures aimed at migration control are perceived by current member states as an essential condition for accession, and thus, JHA is included in the accession negotiations to ensure the internal security of the enlarged EU (Alp 2005: 84). As the purpose of the thesis is to expose the dynamics of securitisation of migration and asylum, looking into the EU requirements for candidate countries and the commitment of the latter to comply is likely to exhibit existing security/political dynamics. However, the thesis examines only the case of Turkey due to time and word constraints. By focusing on Turkey, my aim is to make an empirical contribution to the literature on the securitisation of migration and asylum in the context of the relationship between the EU and Turkey. Amongst the candidate countries, Turkey is chosen for the following reasons:

Firstly, Turkey is by far the largest candidate country in terms of area and population. The country has a 2,949 km land border and a 8,330 km sea border. The geographical terrain of the country facilitates illegal entry and exit. The sheer length and diversity of Turkey’s frontiers as well as the challenges these two factors would involve in Turkey’s EU membership are fundamental questions under debate. The EU has been concerned about the difficulty of managing such extensive land borders and coastlines, and having an external border with countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Caucasus (Apap et. al. 2004: 1).
Secondly, Turkey is strategically important in terms of policing the future south-eastern border of the EU, and the routes asylum seekers take from further east. Generally known as a migrant-sending country, since the 1980s, the country has transformed into a destination and transit country; receiving a steady influx of migrants from the Middle East, Asia, Eastern Europe and parts of Africa (Biehl 2009).

Located at the heart of a troubled region, Turkey has received thousands of asylum seekers fleeing from several major wars, including the Islamic revolution in Iran, the 1991 Gulf war, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and most recently refugees from countries such as Somalia and Sudan (Biehl 2009: 2).

Thus, the recent influx of refugees at the Turkish border fleeing the violence of the Syrian uprising is not the first in the history of the country. Turkey’s socio-cultural, political, religious, historical, and economic (and even familial) ties with the neighbouring countries should also be considered here. Thus, for an Iraqi, Iranian, or Afghan refugee Turkey is often an intermediary destination in their attempts to move to Europe (Rittersberger-Tılıç & Erdemir 2008).

Likewise, Frontex has recently reported that the increase in the detections of illegal border crossings at the border (land and sea) between Turkey and Greece is up 45% between 2009 and 2010. As requested by Greece, Frontex deployed 175 specialist border personnel on the Greek-Turkish land border at the end of 2010. Frontex’s Annual Risk Analysis 2011 records Turkey as the main transit country for illegal migration to the EU. As a consequence, cooperation with Turkey in the prevention of illegal migration and setting up an efficient asylum system in the country are of paramount importance to the EU.

The pressure of migration from the East is certain to increase once Turkey gains EU accession, and therefore, Turkey constitutes a very important country in terms of controlling the future south-eastern border of the EU and the main migratory channel between the East and the West. Accordingly, the management of migration and asylum flows arriving in the country and many issues associated with it have become vital for the accession negotiations of Turkey.

1.5 Disposition

The following chapter aims to provide a background to the empirical analysis as well as a literature review on the basis of my research purposes. The chapter explains the processes of Europeanisation and externalisation of migration and asylum policies in the EU, and their impact on candidate countries with a focus on

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Turkey. Chapters 3 & 4 present the theoretical framework of the Copenhagen and the Paris Schools of critical security studies, respectively, which will guide the empirical analysis. In order to grasp a comprehensive analysis for understanding securitisation processes, an analytical framework that comprises both discursive and non-discursive practices is proposed on the basis of the two schools of thought. Therefore, official EU and Turkish discourse on migration and asylum as well as particular security technologies and bureaucratic policies, which provide the ways of managing the discourse, are analysed through a combination of elements from Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews with the experts on migration and asylum in Turkey. Chapter 5 on Methodology starts with introducing the underlying theoretical assumptions of CDA, which aims to clarify the approach to language and discourse adopted in the thesis. The chapter also explains why Fairclough’s CDA is chosen amongst the several approaches in discourse analysis, and attempts to illustrate the social context in which the security language is in action by drawing linkages between the discursive and non-discursive elements of security framing. Although the study employs only the concept of recontextualisation of CDA, the concept is not presented in an isolated manner but within the methodological framework of Fairclough’s CDA. Chapter 5 also introduces the official EU and Turkish documents on migration and asylum which are analysed in Chapter 6. The last section of the Methodology Chapter covers the aims of and practical considerations on semi-structured interviews, and introduces the interviewees.

In Chapter 6, discourse analysis of the official EU and Turkish documents is conducted, first, according to the framework of the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School, and then, with a broader approach to security and in the light of the concept of recontextualisation. Chapter 7 moves a step from discursive to more technocratic interpretations of security framing, and conducts an analysis of the three policies which are required to be implemented by Turkey as part of its accession to the Union, namely visa policy, border control measures and readmission agreements. The analysis of these three policies in Chapter 7 is conducted, according to the framework of the securitisation theory of the Paris School, by means of the first-hand data gathered through semi-structured expert interviews. The Conclusion aims to provide answers to the questions formulated at the outset by drawing together the analyses in Chapters 6 & 7. The results of the study are also discussed in a broader perspective.
2 Migration and Asylum in the EU and Turkey

2.1 Europeanisation and Externationalisation of the Internal Security Project

Until the establishment of an internal market in 1992, immigration was firmly a national prerogative of the EU member states. However, the creation of an internal market and the abolition of internal border controls urged member states to initiate a cooperation in asylum and immigration matters as a compensatory measure to safeguard internal stability and security (Keser 2006: 117). For this purpose, the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993, introduced for the first time a framework for intergovernmental cooperation on matters of JHA, including asylum and immigration. Since then, JHA has been the most dynamic area of activity of the EU (Anderson & Apap 2002: 6). The cooperation amongst member states in this area has undergone both significant widening and deepening first in the Schengen framework, then under the pillar structure of the EU, finally in the inter-pillar context of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) outlined in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Not only is cooperation now undertaken in more policy areas, but it has developed from being entirely of an intergovernmental nature to being increasingly supranational (Macmillan 2007: 130).

The central assumption underlying the first moves towards cooperation in immigration and asylum matters was the belief amongst the member states that after the removal of internal borders; transnational flow of goods, capital, services and people will challenge public order and the rule of law. It was expected that the market would facilitate illegal and criminal activities by terrorists, international criminal organisations, asylum-seekers and immigrants (Huysmans 2000: 758-60; Kartal 2008). The perceived internal security risks, previously tackled exclusively at the national level, came to be regarded as a field for European cooperation (Anderson & Apap 2002: 6). Thus, the moves towards JHA cooperation were partly motivated by internal security concerns (Anderson & Apap 2002: 4; Kartal 2008). In a similar vein, Guild et. al. (2008: 2) suggest two processes that have been decisive in the evolution of cooperation in this area. First is the discursive construction of certain categories of people and practices as threats to the internal security. Second is the resort to technology as the ultimate solution to any issue that is constructed as threatening. Huysmans (2000: 759), on the other hand,
explains the process that has led to the cooperation on matters of JHA by the spillover of the socio-economic project of the internal market into an internal security project. In this process, immigration and asylum have been integrated into a policy framework that defines and regulates security issues arising from the removal of internal borders. In other words, immigration and asylum have been connected to criminal and terrorist abuses of the internal market (Huysmans 2000; Soykan 2010). In this regard, Huysmans (2000: 758) argues that the securitisation of the internal market is the key dynamic through which the European integration project is implicated in the securitisation of migration.

Thus, these initial security concerns shared amongst the member states have led to the process of ‘Europeanisation’ of the asylum and immigration matters. However, throughout the literature, the emergent Europeanised asylum and migration regime is described as restrictive that seeks to control migration flows and reduce the number of asylum seekers through limitation of access to the territory, strengthening of the external borders of the Union, and the introduction of extensively strict visa policies (Keser 2006: 118-9). Lavenex (1998: 143) argues that the process of Europeanisation, which was limited originally to the aim of realising the internal market project, has triggered "the development of a regional system of redistribution for the handling of asylum claims that is based on the perception of the refugee problem as a threat to internal security". This restrictive approach has placed the Europeanisation of refugee policies between two conflicting paradigms: "The commitment to international human rights law on the one hand; and the preoccupation with the safeguarding of internal security on the other" (Lavenex 2001: 3; quoted in Alp 2005).

Another process that was initiated in parallel to the Europeanisation of the migration and asylum policy, has been the ‘externalisation’ of internal security concerns. In the process of externalisation, the European system of cooperation in migration and asylum matters has moved closer to the field of common security and foreign policy (Lavenex 1998: 141). The member states have focused their cooperation mostly on formal external aspects which concern:

in the first place the question of access to their territories: the adoption of common strengthened control standards at the external borders, the common restriction of visa policies, and the common adoption of the ‘safe third country’ notion as a means to deny access to all those asylum seekers, who, on their way to the common territory, have passed through a country which observes the Geneva Refugee Convension (Lavenex 1998: 140).

In this context, the externalisation process has also affected the dynamics of enlargement of the EU since externalisation mainly concerns the management of the EU’s external borders. The lifting of internal controls within the EU has been accompanied by the reinforcement of controls at the external borders where the strict application of the Schengen acquis concerning border controls and visa regimes has been required from the candidate states (Apap et. al. 2001: 2). In the literature, such policies are described as a response to widespread fear on the part of the current member states of uncontrolled migration from beyond EU territory (from both candidate and non-candidate countries), and criminal activity by foreigners within the EU. Those fears have strongly influenced the mode of policy formulation in the area of JHA and determined the nature of the external borders (Apap et. al. 2001: 2). The process of externalisation has affected not only the
relations of the EU with candidate countries, but also those countries’ relations with their non-EU neighbours. In the context of the abolition of internal borders and tightening of external borders, JHA policies have framed the question of refugees and immigrants predominantly as a threat to internal security and European integration (Lavenex 1998).

Before the removal of internal borders in the mid-1980s, migration in the EU was mostly considered in the context of social and economic rights. However, this focus has changed since the abolition of internal border controls and the creation of a single market, and resulted in the Europeanisation and externalisation of internal security. This change in focus has been reinforced in the wake of the attacks of September 11th, as a result of which migrants and asylum seekers to Europe are increasingly viewed as potential contributors to the perceived insecurity surrounding Europe. Some political leaders and media outlets have even described migration and asylum as a security threat (Leonard 2007: 3). This threat perception has brought the politicisation of migration through asylum, or more precisely the construction of asylum as an alternative route for economic migration in the EU through which asylum has widely been connected to illegal migration (den Boer 1995; quoted in Huysmans 2000). It is within this context that migration and asylum discourse has shifted towards an emphasis on security which is commonly referred to in the literature as ‘the securitisation of migration and asylum’ (İçduygu & Yükseker 2008: 15).

2.2 The Creation of a Security Continuum

The previous section explained the processes of Europeanisation and externalisation in asylum and migration matters which were triggered by the expected side-effect of the removal of internal borders and the creation of an internal market. In the literature, it is argued that the discourses articulating this side-effect have produced a ‘security continuum’ where border control, terrorism, and international crime are connected with migration and asylum (Huysmans 2000: 760). According to Bigo (1994; quoted in Andreas 2003), political cooperation in the field of internal security in Europe has created a network of security professionals who produce and distribute internal security knowledge. Their knowledge, which has a capacity to define security questions, has articulated a security continuum between borders, terrorism, crime and migration. This is also signified by the EU’s JHA agenda which covers the following diverse range of policy fields: asylum, external borders, migration, organised crime, fraud and corruption, drugs, terrorism, police cooperation, customs cooperation, judicial cooperation in civil matters, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the funding of activities, and issues related to human rights. Thus, as Bigo (Bigo 1994: 164; quoted in Huysmans 2000) states “The issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs, crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe”.

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This idea of a security continuum has been sharply criticised in the literature for linking very different activities, profiling of certain groups and criminalising migration. It also impoverishes the policy debate by risking the categorisation of different problems as security issues (Anderson & Apap 2002: 5). It has led to the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, drug trafficking, and money-laundering to the area of migration (Huysmans 2000: 760).

2.3 The Changing Conception of Security

Throughout the literature, the blurring of the traditional distinction between internal and external security in Europe is salient (Bigo 2006; Grabbe 2000; Anderson & Apap 2002). One of the reasons for this blurring is the decline of a threat, on Europe, by conventional military means. However, the ever-increasing globalisation of economic and social processes, part of which are the removal of internal border controls and the creation of a single market in the EU, are presented as the main driving force that has led to the merging of internal and external security in Europe. The policy issues covered under JHA are now viewed as security threats, which have both internal and external dimensions and need to be treated together. This view has contributed to the creation of a security continuum in the EU that was explained in the previous section. The security continuum was only possible with a broader conceptualisation of security which has had a powerful influence over the mode of tackling issues in the area of JHA (Anderson & Apap 2002: 4). All the competences and instruments at the disposal of the EU started to be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the area of JHA (Anderson & Apap 2002: 5). Thus, an ‘integrated approach to security’ has been adopted which necessitates that the military, the intelligence services and the police, irrespective of their traditional spheres of action and competence, are required to cooperate in the area of JHA (Bigo 2006: 389).

2.4 The Impact of Europeanisation and Externalisation of the Internal Security Project on Candidate Countries

In the context of the processes mentioned in the previous section of the chapter, the EU’s internal security agenda for candidate countries was proliferated to include a wide range of policies, from migration to transnational crime to asylum policies and police cooperation. The EU has been exporting its border control technology and practices, visa and migration policy, and its methods of handling asylum claims and refugees to candidate countries. Apart from these policies, externalisation of internal security in the EU has also comprised of a series of provisions for facilitating the return of asylum seekers and illegal migrants to third countries. One main instrument here is the readmission agreements which commit third countries to readmit illegal migrants who had passed through their territory to the EU (transit countries), or were their nationals. The EU has been keen on
signing readmission agreements with candidate countries most of whom are countries of origin or transit. Another instrument is the concept of ‘safe third country’\(^5\) which allows EU states to return asylum seekers to ‘safe’ countries from which they came or through which they passed (Boswell 2003: 622).

It is widely referred to in the literature that as a consequence of these externalisation policies, candidate countries have become ‘buffer states’.

buffering western Europe both by providing an additional control zone protecting or distancing western Europe from actual or potential refugee movements or other kinds of migration from more unstable or less prosperous areas further east or south and by absorbing asylum seekers and other migrants who would otherwise be destined for western Europe (Collinson 1996: 79).

### 2.5 The Case of Turkey

In order to understand the impact of Europeanisation and externalisation of migration and asylum policies on Turkey, Turkish approach to migration and asylum will be touched upon very briefly. This will illustrate the context upon which the EU policies have had an influence.

Turkey, though a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, maintains a ‘geographical limitation’ under the Convention which excludes non-Europeans from recognition as refugees. Turkey has no legislation regulating asylum, and the procedure is covered by the regulations from administrative bodies and governmental circulars. In an effort to harmonise with the EU acquis, the draft law on foreigners and international protection has recently been finalised and will be presented for Parliament approval.

Described as such, it has been argued in the literature that the asylum system in Turkey conveys a security concern that draws a clear distinction between asylum seekers and refugees, and European and non-European refugees. This security oriented approach sees the asylum seekers from Middle East as a potential threat to the public order and national security in Turkey (Baklacıoğlu 2009: 2; Biehl 2009: 7). Concerns over the ‘floods of refugees’ waiting at Turkey’s borders have led to the development of ‘securitising’ and ‘criminalising’ language in policy developments regarding migration and asylum (Biehl 2009: 13). “Even the mere fact that all dealings with asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey, as such social and economic rights, are left in the hands of police forces should speak for itself” (ibid). The pro-nationalist ideological formation and attitude of top officials in the asylum team at the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) and the fact that officials at the local level are not informed enough on asylum matters have contributed to the development of this security oriented approach (Baklacıoğlu 2009: 4).

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\(^5\) The principle of safe third country of the Asylum Procedures Directive of the EU is further explained in Chapter 7.
As for the impact of externalisation of AJFS policies on Turkey, the EU gives priority to border security, fight against illegal migration, organised crime, and drug trafficking (Baklacıoğlu 2009: 4-5). Turkey also prioritises the EU criteria concerning these areas under Chapter 24 of the accession negotiations, because they address Turkey’s concerns on its fight against the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) whose activities are mainly based along the southeastern border. This is also reflected by the fact that a substantial part of the National Harmonisation Programme of 2008-2011 covers expenses on building administrative and technological capacity in fighting illegal migration, data management, deportation and detention, strengthening border management and security through technological innovations in the sphere of information exchange, and the training of specialised police forces (Baklacıoğlu 2009: 4). These developments have contributed to the mere adoption of technical/technological practices in JHA matters in Turkey, and human rights and freedom aspects of migration and asylum reforms have been postponed (ibid).

In this regard, it has been argued that the harmonisation process of migration and asylum matters in Turkey is caught between two contradictory trends: one is efforts to move asylum-related issues to a human rights policy agenda in Turkey and the adoption of Western humanitarian values and norms; and the other is the increasing securitisation of migration in the EU and the import of increasingly restrictive EU policies which fit well with the securitarian approach of the Turkish state (Apap et. al. 2004: 25; Biehl 2009: 5). As a consequence, Baklacıoğlu (2009: 3-4) argues that Europeanisation, caught between these two contradictory trends, has institutionalised and legalised the migration-asylum nexus in Turkey. Migration-asylum nexus refers to the blurring of the distinction between irregular migration and migration for asylum purposes (Castles 2007). Migration-asylum nexus in Turkey leads to a process whereby the issue of asylum often takes place beneath the reforms in border management and fighting against illegal migration (Baklacıoğlu 2009: 4).

2.6 Implications for the Current Thesis

In an attempt to provide a background to the empirical analysis as well as a literature review on the basis of my research purposes, this Chapter has important implications for my thesis in terms of indicating the following: First, it is necessary to adopt a two-sided perspective where the approaches of both the EU and Turkey are taken into account. Second, the literature review indicates which practices to look into in order to disclose the dynamics of securitisation. Third, there is a lack of empirical studies that support the increasing claims about securitisation of migration in the EU. Thus, this thesis aims to contribute to the

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6 In the accession negotiations the EU acquis is divided into 35 chapters, each related to a specific policy area. To date, 13 chapters out of the 35 has been opened to negotiations, and only one chapter has been provisionally closed. AJFS is covered under Chapter 24, which is frozen by the EU.
literature as empirical research on the securitisation of migration and asylum in the EU. The rest of the section provides further explanation for the first two points.

First, my thesis adopts a two-sided perspective as indicated in the literature that the asylum policies both in the EU and in Turkey show significant resemblance in the general perception of refugees as a source of threat and insecurity (Baklacıoğlu 2009: 2). The central pathways that lie at the basis of the asylum and migration systems both in the EU and in Turkey are identified as follows: strengthening of external borders and building internal ones in fighting illegal migration, and the perception of asylum as a social and economic burden based on the migration-asylum nexus (Baklacıoğlu 2009). Both the Turkish National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis (NAPAA) in the field of asylum and migration and the EC emphasise mutual interaction and connection between illegal migration and asylum (Kale 2005: 280; quoted in Baklacıoğlu 2009). Considering these claims, official documents from both sides are analysed to address my research questions. These documents are specified in the Methodology Chapter of the thesis.

Guild et. al. (2008: 2) argues that the resort to technology, as the ultimate solution to any issue that is constructed as threatening, has been decisive in the evolution of Europeanisation in asylum and migration matters. Technology for enhancing control and surveillance has been presented at the EU level as the ultimate solution to any threat perception (ibid: 4). Since the recent adoption of the Stockholm programme on AFSJ for the period 2010-14, the reliance on technology within the context of EU security policies has been overtly emphasised (Bigo & Jeandesboz 2009: 1). In this context, externalisation has also brought about the transfer of surveillance and security technology to Turkey, and therefore, it is significant to look into these technocratic policies on the basis of their potentiality to reveal the security aspects of migration policy.
3 The Securitisation Theory of the Copenhagen School

The essence of the Copenhagen School of critical security studies is the idea that in international relations something becomes a matter of emergency politics and a security issue, not because something constitutes an objective threat to the state. Instead, something becomes a security issue when a powerful ‘securitising actor’ argues that something constitutes an existential threat to the ‘referent object’, which needs to be dealt with immediately if the referent object is to survive (Buzan et. al. 1998: 24). The Copenhagen School, associated with Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, retains a traditional understanding of security in the sense that security is about survival. In other words, an issue is securitised when it is presented as posing an existential threat to a referent object. For instance, an attempt to securitise state B in state A would be to present state B as posing a security threat to the very survival of state A (Leonard 2007: 8).

The logic whereby something becomes a security issue because it is spoken of in the language of security is a ‘performative speech act’ (Austin 1962; quoted in Floyd & Croft 2010: 4). Securitisation of a policy issue derives partly from the language itself and from the capacities of various actors to engage in performative speech acts. Security questions arise from ‘successfully’ speaking or writing security in relation to a policy problem (Buzan et. al. 1998: 26), and therefore, securitisation does not simply come into being when one actor declares an existential threat. This performative side is half of the story, and securitisation is completed only at a point when a designed audience accepts the performative speech act (ibid). Once an issue has been ‘accepted’ by an audience, the powerful securitising actor is in the position to evoke emergency measures and go beyond established rules in an effort to address the threat (ibid). The focus of the Copenhagen School is then “to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitises, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitisation is successful)” (ibid: 32).

The interest of the analyst here is in the discursive production of security which is significant in terms of constraining the political debate in that it becomes difficult to propose serious policies that do not exclude or are not directed against the Other that constitutes the threat (Diez & Huysmans 2007: 25).

3.1 The Copenhagen School in the Context of Migration and Asylum in the EU
The Copenhagen School has been criticised for not being able to capture the complexity of real world processes of securitisation, including the securitisation of migration. Applying the basic premises of the Copenhagen School to the context of migration and asylum policies in the EU, two aspects of the theory need to be discussed here. One is the narrow conceptualisation of security; and the other is the focus on security ‘speech acts’ at the expense of other non-discursive security practices (Leonard 2007: 11). These two aspects need further explanation. The Copenhagen School is based on a narrow conceptualisation of security, by mere extension of the security dynamics at work in the military sector to other sectors or referent objects concerned (such as environment, society, etc.). Such a narrow approach to security, however, may hamper the understanding of the complexity of the security dynamics in other sectors than the military (ibid: 12). Security, in its narrow sense, also sustains a sharp dichotomy between ‘normal’ everyday politics on the one hand and the realm of security characterised by emergency and extraordinary measures on the other hand (ibid). The former can be transformed into the latter by a successful act of securitisation at a certain point in time. Applying this narrow approach to security to the context of the EU, Neal (2009: 337) raises the question of whether the EU institutions have the constitutional, institutional, political or legal capacity to evoke emergency measures and violate rules that otherwise would bind. It has also been argued that in the complex institutional field of EU politics in general, identifying the key securitising speakers and the audience of an EU securitising discourse is extremely difficult (Neal 2009; Floyd & Croft 2010).

The Copenhagen School has also been criticised for focusing on security ‘speech acts’ at the expense of other non-discursive security practices. Wæver and Buzan note themselves that there are cases of securitisation even though there is no securitising discourse uttered in the public sphere to justify it (Buzan et. al. 1998: 28). Therefore, a comprehensive analysis for understanding securitisation processes cannot only focus on speech acts of security. Security threat can be attributed to a referent object not only by a speech act, but also by other types of acts (Leonard 2007: 14). For instance, Huysmans (2006: 150) argues that although security language was being used in the formulation of migration and asylum policies in the EU in the 1980s and 1990s, it was difficult to understand this as a straightforward process of securitisation as understood by Wæver and Buzan. Speech acts that propose the use of extraordinary measures by explicitly defining migration and asylum as major existential threats to the EU did not play a central role in the securitisation of migration and asylum. Instead, their securitisation has resulted from being listed together with border controls, international organised crime, terrorism, and trafficking in drugs in the institutional framework of the AJFS which is dominated by policing and customs concerns (ibid). In that sense, securitisation theory is criticised for focusing on security ‘speech acts’ at the expense of other non-discursive security practices.

3.2 Implications for the Current Thesis
3.2.1 A Broader Approach to Security

Considering the criticisms pointed out above, my thesis adopts a broader approach to security instead of confining it to the extreme situation of ‘existential threats’ and ‘survival’ (Leonard 2007: 13). Security is seen, here, as “[moving] on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and existential threat – and conversely, from threat to risk and back to normalcy” (Abrahamsen 2005: 59; quoted in Leonard 2007: 13). In other words, securitisation is a process moving along two poles: normality and emergency/extraordinary measures. Therefore, ‘existential threats’ and ‘survival’ are located at the end of the security continuum, on which security issues can also be located at a lower level of intensity (ibid). That being said, I am aware such an expansion of the concept of security may render it meaningless; however, it also captures the nuances of security practices and discourses more accurately than the narrow conceptualisation.

3.2.2 Extending the Analysis to Non-discursive Practices of Security

From a methodological point of view, the above criticisms require that the analysis does not focus on security discourse per se; rather, it is necessary to extend it to non-discursive security practices. Drawing upon the securitisation theory of the Paris School, my thesis puts a particular emphasis on bureaucratic and technocratic practices, as it is claimed here that, securitisation discourses are embedded in particular technological devices and policies (Huysmans 2006). The resort to technology, as the ultimate solution to any issue that is constructed as threatening, within the context of EU security policies has also been underlined in the literature (Bilgin & Bilgiç 2011; Guild et. al. 2008).

Taken together, the above criticisms will be taken into account in the application of the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School in the analysis. The next section presents the securitisation theory of the Paris School which has been empirically applied, to date, almost exclusively within the political framework of the EU (Floyd & Croft 2010: 22).
4 The Securitisation Theory of the Paris School

The main aim of the Paris School of critical security studies is to unpack the nature and modalities of the political construction of insecurities, which fits well with the purpose of my thesis. The Paris School provides a useful conceptual framework that will guide the empirical analysis.

4.1 Insecurity both as a Threat Definition and a Domain of Practice

The basic assumption of the Paris School is that insecurity is the outcome of a process of framing, which integrates social and political relations on the basis of security knowledge (Huysmans 2006: 145). In other words, insecurities emerge from framing certain developments and events in a security way (ibid: 146). Framing, however, is not simply a matter of introducing a different language but also of mobilising certain perceptions through the use of security language. The notion of insecurity, then, covers not only the definitions of certain events or developments as threats, dangers, or risks but also the ways of managing the threat definition through institutional and political arrangements. In this interpretation, “threat definitions are embedded in more complicated linkages between policy issues” (ibid: 13), and thus, insecurity is conceptualised both as a threat definition and a domain of practice.

4.2 Security Framing

The concept of security framing is defined as

a multidimensional process of interconnecting diverse policy issues through institutional codifications (such as the Area for Freedom, Security and Justice), the application of certain skills and routines, the use of particular technologies, and the dominance of particular policy orientations and methods (especially Justice and Home Affairs ministries in the case of the Europeanisation of internal security) (ibid: 150).

In other words, security framing is a multidimensional process in which various policy questions are brought together by means of security discourse, security technologies, skills, and expert knowledge. Considering the definition of security framing, Huysmans (2006: 150) states that “Speech acts of insecurity are less important in securitisation than various social and political processes that govern
migration and asylum on the basis of logics of insecurity.” In other words, the key element in securitisation is institutional and discursive intertwining of different policy areas by means of applying routines, institutionalised knowledge, and technologies to the regulation of these areas. Accordingly, threat definition is not at the heart of security framing.

4.3 The Technocratic Viewpoint of the Politics of Insecurity

Departing from the above conceptual definitions, the Paris School draws a conclusion that, a purely discursive approach of analysing speech acts does not tell us anything specific about how to conceptualise the embedding of the security discourse in particular social practices (Bourdieu 1982; quoted in Huysmans 2006: 91). In other words, it does not theorise the power of the language in relation to a broader political process, which is pointed out as the major weakness of the Copenhagen School.

The Paris School conceptualises the capacity of security not simply as a symbolic capacity of discursively defining dangers for a community, but also as a technocratic capacity of structuring social relations, through the implementation of specific technological devices in the context of specific governmental programmes (ibid: 91). The Paris School, thus, emphasises the importance of a more technocratic understanding of the politics of insecurity. The technocratic viewpoint of the politics of insecurity is based on the argument that “technology and expert knowledge have been central to the formation of modern society and its governance of conduct” (ibid: 9). The technocratic viewpoint embeds discursive processes of securitisation in security technologies (such as visas, CCTV and databases) and bureaucratic policies.

Employing a technocratic understanding of the politics of insecurity, my thesis seeks to embed political security discourses in technologies of government that are practically realising European security modalities of governing free movement (ibid). Technology, here, does not simply refer to a “device (i.e. material or immaterial artefact) in isolation but also to the forms of knowledge, skills, diagrams, charts, calculations and energy which make its use possible” (Barry 2001: 9) as well as to the development and implementation of bureaucratic and other technocratic procedures and instruments. This conceptual framework accounts for the development of the new European modality of government that one refers to as Justice and Home Affairs, internal security, or the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice through detailed sociological and historical unpacking of the specific nature and reach of the connections between security and freedom as it is embedded in technological devices such as visas and databases and professional or technocratic routines, knowledge and practice (Huysmans 2006: 101).

4.4 Ban-opticon as a New Form of Governmentality
Employing a ‘Foucauldian lens’ of analysis, the development of the politics of insecurity have allowed for the emergence of a new form of governmentality at the transnational level, which Bigo & Guild call Ban-opticon (2005: 259). This new form of governmentality is not a Pan-opticon (Foucault 1979), in which global surveillance is placed upon the shoulders of everybody, but a form of Ban-opticon, in which technologies of surveillance sort out who needs to be under surveillance and who is free of surveillance (Bigo 2002). Pan-opticon was territorially rooted and “[R]outinisers were not truly fully free to move. In effect in the Panopticon model the surveillants were assumed to be ‘there nearby in the controlling tower’” (Bauman 2000: 4; quoted in Ceyhan 2005: 228). In the Ban-opticon era, however, “[S]urveillance is realized extraterritorially through a network of transnational supervisors, mobile border police forces, and databases and does not occur with neither surveillants nor surveilled fixed to a single place.” (Ceyhan 2005: 228).

This new form of governmentality seeks to control free movement over time rather than in space (Bigo & Guild 2005). It tries to predict which people and developments in the population have a predisposition to jeopardise optimal developments and practices, and therefore, are more likely to become dangerous in the future. If these can be identified, the risk of dangerous developments can be monitored and prevented. The new form of governmentality, in this sense, is a technology of surveilling and controlling the future through present (Huysmans 2006: 101).

Ban-opticon has also led to the development of forms of policing at a distance which are deterritorialised by a process of externalisation and digitalisation. Policing at a distance has provided the EU with ways of controlling the movement of people who want to enter or transit through the territory of the EU before they travel, instead of checking the identity of people when they arrive. Policing at a distance moves the locus of the controls and delocalizes them from the borders of the EU. It has imposed a different vision of frontiers in which borders are no longer defined in terms of the territory which they contain but of the people moving across them (Bigo 2006; Guild & Bigo 2010).

4.5 Security Framing is Political, and Thus, Needs to Be Exposed

Inherent in the securitisation theory of the Paris School is the importance of understanding that, it is a political choice to frame issues in security mode, rather than simply a response to perceptions and realities (Floyd & Croft 2010: 21). Security knowledge is seen as political in the sense that, it sustains security policies and develops instruments to deal with the security threat (Huysmans 2006: 31). Security knowledge shapes a phenomena into a security question, and thereby, changes the political understanding of the nature of the policy problem, and its evaluation of adequate methods of dealing with it (ibid: 23). In other words, security framing makes issues intelligible as insecurities, and thus, as concepts of security policy. For instance, the security knowledge of migration is
politically relevant because “it can feed into policy-making and implementation, thus contributing to a continuous administration of immigration and asylum on the basis of security routines and knowledge” (ibid: 35).

Security framing, therefore, needs to be exposed and critiqued to show how policy problems are made intelligible as an object of government by applying security knowledge to them (Floyd & Croft 2010: 21; Huysmans 2006: 22). In order to do so, the Paris School sheds light on the securitisation process by employing a ‘Foucauldian lens’ of analysis. Securitisation theorists share a strong concern for those groups that are marginalised by security practices, and aim to unravel existing security/political dynamics responsible for the insecuritisation of those groups.

4.6 Implications for the Current Thesis

From a methodological point of view, the technocratic viewpoint of the politics of insecurity implies that the analysts move away from an exclusive focus on the political speech acts, discourses of danger or language games, and do not rely on discourse analysis per se (Huysmans 2006; Floyd & Croft 2010: 21). The necessity of extending the analysis to non-discursive security practices has also been underlined in my critique to the Copenhagen School.

Accordingly, my thesis employs discourse analysis in conjunction with semi-structured expert interviews. In order to unpack the security language, official EU and Turkish documents on migration and asylum policies will be analysed, first, within the framework of the Copenhagen School, and then, by employing a broader approach to security with the help of the concept of recontextualisation7 of Fairclough’s CDA. Departing from the Paris School, the second part of the analysis focuses on security technologies and bureaucratic policies which are analysed by means of semi-structured expert interviews.

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7 CDA has taken the category of ‘recontextualisation’ from Bernstein’s sociology of pedagogy (Bernstein 1990, 1996).
5 Methodology

I will adopt a flexible approach to how the application of Fairclough’s CDA should be, as the research design will be tailored to meet the objectives of my research. Therefore, I will create my own package by combining elements from Fairclough’s CDA and semi-structured expert interviews. This multiperspectival research framework provides a broader understanding of a phenomenon from different angles, and is correspondingly popular among discourse analysts (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 154-155; Wodak & Meyer 2009: 2).

First and foremost, the conceptual framework of CDA cannot be applied without accepting the underlying theoretical assumptions, and therefore, I will start with introducing the central aspects of CDA.

5.1 Two Basic Assumptions of CDA

5.1.1 Discourse is both Constitutive and Constituted

Any method of discourse analysis engages in questioning the scope of discourse, i.e., whether the discourse constitutes the social completely or is it partly constituted by other aspects of the social. Fairclough defines discourse as “language use as a social practice” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 66), and considers it as just one among many aspects of any social practice, which is in a dialectical relationship with the other aspects of that social practice. In other words, discourse contributes to the construction of social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and meaning; whereas, at the same time, it is shaped by other social practices and structures. In this sense, discourse is both constitutive and constituted, which is the central aspect of Fairclough’s approach. Together, the discursive dimension and the other dimensions of social practice form the social world we live in (ibid: 18-19). Thus, the scope of discourse in CDA is defined as “a form of social practice which both constitutes the social world and is constituted by other social practices” (ibid: 61-62).

5.1.2 Discourse Functions Ideologically

Another central aspect of Fairclough’s CDA is that discourse functions ideologically (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 63), in the sense that, it maintains
specific social patterns, policies and relations by playing a part in producing the social world. Discourse imagines possible social practices which can be thought of “as ways of controlling the selection of certain structural possibilities and the exclusion of others, and the retention of these over time, in particular areas of social life” (Fairclough 2003: 23). These imaginaries may be enacted as actual practices which are called materialisations of discourses (ibid: 207). Knowledge is circulated through discourses and the process through which discourses become operationalized in societies is precisely the dialectics of discourse, which translates discourses into non-discoursal aspects of social life (ibid: 126, 207).

5.2 Methodological Considerations

The above definition of the discursive dimension, as one kind of mechanism working in combination with other mechanisms to constitute a social practice, points to an important methodological implication. The definition implies that, some aspects of social world function according to different logics from discourses, and should be studied with tools other than those of discourse analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 18-19, 71). It is worth quoting Fairclough here at some length:

My approach to discourse analysis is based upon the assumption that language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research always has to take account of language. This means that one productive way of doing social research is through a focus on language, using some form of discourse analysis. This is not a matter of reducing social life to language, saying that everything is discourse – it isn’t. Rather, it’s one analytical strategy amongst many, and it often makes sense to use discourse analysis in conjunction with other forms of analysis, for instance ethnography or forms of institutional analysis (Fairclough 2003: 2).

Taking this into consideration, I will employ discourse analysis in conjunction with semi-structured expert interviews. Security framing has discursive, technological and institutional dimensions which cannot be studied with the tools of discourse analysis per se (Floyt & Croft 2010). Therefore, security technologies and bureaucratic policies will be analysed by means of semi-structured expert interviews.

5.2.1 Why Fairclough’s CDA?

Critical discourse analysis is a broad movement within discourse analysis of which several approaches, including Fairclough’s, are part of (Fairclough & Wodak 1997). Amongst the several approaches, my thesis will employ Fairclough’s CDA because, first of all, his methodological concepts provide a useful framework for analysis. Secondly, as explained below, the central aspects of Fairclough’s CDA share significant similarities with the basic premises of the Copenhagen and the Paris Schools of critical security studies in terms of their aims and approaches. In order to employ Fairclough’s CDA, the researcher has to
accept the basic theoretical assumptions behind it; which in this case overlap with the assumptions of the securitisation theories employed in the thesis.

Fairclough’s CDA takes the side of the oppressed groups, and critically aims to uncover the role of discursive practices in the maintenance of unequal power relations with a political commitment to social change (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 64). In a similar approach, the Copenhagen and the Paris Schools of critical security studies share a strong concern for those groups that are marginalised by security practices, and aim to uncover existing security/political dynamics responsible for the securitisation of those groups (Floyd & Croft 2010).

Further similarities between the approaches of Fairclough’s CDA and the securitisation theories employed in the thesis are discussed in the next section of this Chapter. The discussion also aims to illustrate the social context in which the security language is in action, and thus, it is titled as ‘Social Context of the Security Language’. Discourse analysis has to be conducted within the specific social context in which the language is in action, and therefore, it is necessary to illustrate the social context of the security language.

5.2.2 Social Context of the Security Language

As outlined in the previous sections of the Chapter, social practice is constitutive of both discursive dimensions and other dimensions (Fairclough 2001). In a similar vein, security framing as a social practice brings together various policy questions by means of discourses, expert knowledge, security technologies and skills (Huymans 2006: 150). Accordingly, security discourse is one aspect of security framing which is in a dialectical relationship with the other aspects. Security framing, in this sense, is both a matter of introducing a discourse of danger and threat, and of governing policy issues through the implementation of specific institutional techniques (ibid). The introduction of security language becomes materialised in the instruments of these specific institutional techniques, i.e., security technology, including Schengen Information System, biometric passports, etc. Security language reproduces or changes security technology just as security technology shapes security language. This is called the dialectical relationship between discourse and other elements of social life (Fairclough 2003: 126). In other words, discourse is socially embedded (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 78), and therefore, security language is embedded in security technologies and bureaucratic policies, which constitute the social context of the language.

Security language is political on that account, meaning that, it makes issues intelligible as insecurities and sustains security policies (Floyd & Croft 2010; Huysmans 2006). This is how discourse functions ideologically (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 63).

5.2.3 Why Interviews?
As mentioned in different sections of the thesis, discourse analysis does not suffice to realise my research objectives, i.e., it is necessary to draw on other analytical perspectives to shed light upon the non-discursive aspects of the social practice in question. This is also underlined by the Paris School itself that the analysts have to move away from an exclusive focus on the discourses of danger, and therefore, do not rely on discourse analysis per se (Floyt & Croft 2010: 21). The capacity of security includes both discursively defining threats for a community, and implementing specific technological devices and bureaucratic policies in the context of specific governmental programmes (Huysmans 2006: 92). In this sense, it is important to shed light upon these security technologies and policies, and to this aim, I have conducted semi-structured expert interviews with the staff from the Turkish MoI Migration and Asylum Bureau; the staff from the Directorate General for Public Security of the MoI Department of Foreigners Borders and Asylum; the staff from the UNHCR Turkey; representatives from various civil society organisations working for refugees and asylum seekers; and academics who have done extensive research in this field. Consequently, Fairclough’s CDA is employed here in conjunction with semi-structured interviews.

5.3 Methodological Framework of CDA

Fairclough’s CDA has a number of methodological concepts; however, only the concept of recontextualisation will be employed for the analysis. The concept will be employed, not in an isolated manner, but within the methodological framework of Fairclough’s CDA; which is briefly explained below.

Fairclough argues that every instance of language use consists of three dimensions (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 68-69):

The first dimension is the analysis of the linguistic structure (the level of the text), which necessitates the exploration of the linguistic dimensions of the text. That being said, the scope of the current study cannot be extended to the detailed identification of linguistic and grammatical features in the text, and therefore, the analysis will not focus on the first dimension.

The second dimension is the analysis of the discourses which are articulated in the production and the consumption of the text (the level of discursive practice). At the consumption end, audience research has to be carried out in order to find out how readers interpret the texts (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 82), which is excluded from the objectives of my research, and therefore, the focus will be placed upon the production end. Here, the concept of recontextualisation will be taken up and employed as an analytical tool for the current thesis.

The third dimension is the considerations about what consequences the first two levels have for the broader social practice in question (the level of social practice). It necessitates the analysis of the relationship between the previous two dimensions (analysis of text as text and as discursive practice) and the wider
social practice to which they belong. The third dimension is interested in identifying the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality, i.e., how discourse takes part in the shaping of new forms of politics which are not exclusively discursive ((Jørgensen & Phillips 2002). That being said, I am aware of the fact that one has to be cautious about attributing causal effects to particular linguistic and discursive forms because these effects do not work mechanically or in a simple, regular way. Consequently, my aim is to map the partly non-discursive practices and structures which are in a dialectical relationship with the discursive dimension and constitute the wider context of it, i.e., the practical field of security technologies and bureaucratic policies. In order to do so, I will conduct discourse analysis in conjunction with the semi-structured expert interviews.

5.3.1 The Concept of Recontextualisation

CDA has taken the concept of recontextualisation from Bersteins’s ‘sociology of pedagogy’ (Bernstein 1990, 1996) and sought to use it in discourse analysis in order to explore the processes through which external discourses are internalised within particular organisations (Fairclough 2010: 368). Recontextualisation is defined as a matter of how elements of one social practice are appropriated by, relocated in the context of, another (Fairclough 2003: 222). In other words, the concept of recontextualisation identifies the meanings which are moved from one field to another. An example can be the ‘marketisation’ of higher education through a recent shift in the way in which the practices of teaching and research are networked together with the practices of management in the institutions of higher education. (ibid: 24).

I find the concept of recontextualisation potentially capable of revealing the transformation of meanings, which belong to distinct fields, in the institutional framework of the AJFS. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the EU’s AJFS agenda covers distinct policy fields where border control, terrorism, international crime are connected with migration and asylum (Huysmans 2000: 760).

Employing the concept of recontextualisation to analyse the following documents in 5.4, my aim is to present discourses and unravel their security dimensions. To this aim, a broader approach to security will also be adopted to capture the security dynamics at play which are not necessarily characterised by emergency and extraordinary measures.

5.4 The Choice of Material

The second chapter of the thesis has indicated the necessity of adopting a two-sided perspective where the approaches of both the EU and Turkey are taken into account. Therefore, I have chosen the following official documents on migration and asylum from both sides:
5.4.1 Regular Progress Reports on Turkey

Since the first Progress Report on Turkey of 1998, the EC has prepared annual progress reports to be presented to the Council and the Parliament as part of the pre-accession strategy of Turkey. Each report evaluates the progress achieved during the year, and outlines the reforms that are yet to be undertaken by Turkey. In each report, EU acquis is categorised under different chapters. The issues of migration and asylum are covered under Chapter 24 of Justice Freedom and Security. My analysis will focus on the Chapter 24 of each Progress Report from 1998 to 2010.

Regular Progress Reports are based on information gathered and analysed by the EC. Therefore; the author of the texts, the one who puts the words together and is responsible for the wording, is the EC as the mouthpiece of the EU.

5.4.2 Accession Partnership Documents

The Accession Partnership is the main instrument providing candidate countries with guidance in their preparations for accession. It covers the priorities for accession preparations, and provides a reference framework for directing pre-accession assistance. As part of the framework of the pre-accession strategy, the first Accession Partnership document on Turkey was prepared by the EC and adopted by the Council in 2001. Since then, it has been revised three times (in 2003, 2006 and 2008). The EC is the author of the Accession Partnership Documents. My analysis will focus only on the sections on JHA/AJFS.

5.4.3 National Action Plan for the Adoption of the EU Acquis (NAPAA) in the Field of Migration and Asylum

NAPAA indicates in detail how the candidate country envisages implementing the Accession Partnership priorities. In this way, the NAPAA complements the Accession Partnership. Turkey prepared its NAPAA in 2001. Since then, it has been updated in 2003 and in 2008 according to the Regular Progress Reports and the revisions in the Accession Partnership. My analysis, however, will focus only on the NAPAA in the field of migration and asylum, which was prepared by the Turkish authorities in 2005.

The new draft law on foreigners and international protection has recently been finalised and published on the website of the MoI Migration and Asylum Bureau; however it has not yet been presented for parliamentary approval. Therefore, this document is not included in the analysis.

8 http://gib.icisleri.gov.tr/
5.5 Semi-structured Interviews

Departing from the first-hand data gathered by means of semi-structured interviews, my aim is to relate the discursive dimension of official documents (Regular Progress Reports, Accession Partnership documents, NAPAA on migration and asylum) to the practical field (security technologies and bureaucratic policies) in which it is employed. I will embed the discursive dimension of the texts in security technologies and bureaucratic policies (Huysmans 2006). The central idea here is that language does not only describe an event but it also mobilises certain expectations and reactions to that event. (ibid: 7-8).

Accordingly, through semi-structured expert interviews, I will move a step from discursive to more technocratic interpretations of security framing. In this interpretation, discursive dimension sustains and triggers the mobilisation of security agencies and leads to particular security policies (ibid: 6). Therefore, the focus of the analysis will move from the discursive dimension to the ways in which security language is managed. In order to do so, I will employ the first-hand data gathered through semi-structured interviews to analyse particular security technologies and bureaucratic policies which are implemented in the context of the governmental programme of the EU. In this context, the following policies are explored on the basis of the importance given to their implementation in the accession process of Turkey to the EU:

- Visa policy
- Border controls
- Readmission agreements

5.5.1 Practical Considerations

The interviews were conducted on the basis of the above mentioned themes, and a list of questions to cover them and broader issues related to the research topic. Having conducted the first two interviews, the interview guide was slightly modified which can be found in the Appendix translated into English. The interview guide was not followed too rigidly for the benefits of openness and contextual information (Flick 2006: 165). Thus, the interviewees were given as much scope as possible to unfold their views. At the same time, they were asked relevant questions when the answers remain too general or if they missed the point that was intended. The participants were all asked the same questions; however, some questions were adapted to the specifics of the institution represented by the interviewee.

The interviewees were recruited based on their capacities of being an expert in the field of migration and asylum (ibid). In order to be able to present as diverse views and experiences as possible, experts from academia to civil society
organisations and governmental institutions were approached. The participants were informed on the background and objectives of the research both on first contact by email and at the beginning of the interviews. In general, the contacted experts were easily accessible and willing to participate, except for the General Secretariat for EU Affairs in Turkey who has not replied to the interview request and the members of the Cabinet of the Home Affairs Commissioner were hesitant to conduct phone interviews which was the only possible way to include their opinions.

In total, nine face-to-face interviews were conducted in Turkey and each lasted around thirty minutes. Face-to-face interviews facilitated the development of trust on the side of the participants to reveal more information and personal thoughts. During the interviews, participants presented their views and thoughts based on experience which do not necessarily represent the official positions of their institutions. The list of the participants with their professions and affiliated institutions are provided below. The direct and indirect quotations from the interviews will be included in the analysis in an anonymous form as it was requested by some of the participants. Therefore, the interview numbers indicated below will be employed when referring to an interviewee. The affiliated institution of the interviewee will also be mentioned when it is deemed necessary.

**Interview 1:** Chief Superintendent in the Turkish MoI Migration and Asylum Bureau; Lecturer in the Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara.
**Interview 2:** Superintendent in the Turkish MoI Department of Asylum Migration and Citizenship, the Directorate General for Public Security, Ankara.
**Interview 3:** Superintendent in the Turkish MoI Department of Illegal Migration and Fight against Human Trafficking, the Directorate General for Public Security, Ankara.
**Interview 4:** the UNHCR staff member, Ankara.
**Interview 5:** the UNHCR staff member, Istanbul.
**Interview 6 (Ayşe Bilgin):** Human Rights Research Association, Ankara.
**Interview 7 (Muhtar Çokar):** The Human Resource Development Foundation, Istanbul.
**Interview 8 (Lami Bertan Tokuzlu):** Academic staff member, Faculty of Law, Bilgi University, Istanbul.
**Interview 9 (Cengiz Aktar):** Academic staff member, Chair of European Union Relations Department, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul; former UNHCR staff member.

All the interviews were recorded and transcribed except for the two interviews conducted in the Directorate General for Public Security. During the two interviews, the participants were often interrupted by work related questions of their junior colleagues, which they did not want to be recorded as well. Therefore, during the interviews, I could only take notes on the points which I thought were relevant for the analysis. Once the interviews were complete, I added more recollections.
6 Discourse Analysis

6.1 Introduction

As explained earlier, in the country Progress Reports and Accession Partnership documents, the EU *acquis* is categorised into chapters, each covering distinct policy areas. Progress Reports evaluate the progress achieved during the year, and point out the reforms that still have to be carried out. The Accession Partnership, on the other hand, sets the short and medium-term priorities for accession preparations, and provides a framework for pre-accession assistance. The current analysis focuses on Chapter 24 of Justice Freedom and Security (the former Justice and Home Affairs) of each Progress Report from 1998 to 2010; and of Accession Partnership documents of 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2008. On the Turkish side, the analysis focuses on the NAPAA in the field of migration and asylum, which was prepared by the Turkish authorities in 2005. The document explains how the country envisages implementing the Accession Partnership priorities. Before moving on to the analysis, the next paragraphs briefly outline the contents of the documents chosen for the analysis in terms of migration related issues.

Throughout the documents, Turkey is described as a country of transit and destination. Each Progress Report presents statistical data on the annual number and the origin of people who are caught whilst transiting illegally through Turkey. Thus, the reports and the Accession Partnership priorities call for reinforced cooperation with Turkey in the fight against illegal migration and combating human trafficking. In this context, the EC puts particular emphasis on the strengthening and upgrading of the technical equipment for border management strategies. Turkey is also urged to sign readmission agreements with the EU and the third countries of origin. Regarding the alignment with the Schengen visa regime, Turkey is encouraged to adopt the EU negative visa list. As for asylum matters, Turkey is expected to lift the geographical limitation to the Geneva Refugee Convention that the country maintains. Turkey is also required to develop a new asylum law and institutions in line with the *acquis*.

NAPAA, on the other hand, covers the legal arrangements that should be put into force within the harmonisation process, and measures and investments essential for the development of administrative set-up and physical infrastructure in order to align Turkish asylum/migration legislation and system with the EU *acquis*. Regarding the priorities of the Accession Partnership, the source countries are primarily targeted in concluding readmission agreements. No opinion is expressed on the conclusion of a readmission agreement with the EU. The lifting of the geographical limitation to the Geneva Refugee Convention is kept conditional on
the commitment of the member states on burden sharing, and the setting up of the necessary infrastructure to prevent the direct influx of refugees to Turkey following the removal of the limitation.

Thus, the above paragraphs have briefly outlined the contents of the documents chosen for the analysis. As explained earlier, the EU has increasingly sought to address the regulation of the movement of people within the EU and across its borders through cooperation with migrant-sending countries and the transit countries. Therefore, concerns related to the issues of migration and asylum became firmly part of the external relations policy of the EU. As the purpose of the current thesis is to expose the security aspects of migration and asylum practices in the EU; analysing the EU requirements for candidate countries and the commitment of the latter to comply is likely to exhibit existing security/political dynamics. The importance of Turkey in these terms has already been explained. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent and the discursive practices of securitisation of migration and asylum in the accession process of Turkey to the EU within the context of the above mentioned documents. The discourse analysis is divided into two parts. In the first part, the documents are analysed by using the framework of the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School. In the second part, a broader approach to security is adopted and the CDA’s concept of recontextualisation is employed for the analysis of the documents.

6.2 Migration and Asylum in the Accession Process of Turkey to the EU: A Case of Securitisation According to the Copenhagen School?

As explained earlier, securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School argues that an issue is securitised when it is presented as an existential threat by a powerful securitising actor through a performative speech act (securitising move), and accepted as such by the audience of the speech act, which justifies extraordinary measures to address the threat (Buzan et. al. 1998). When analysing the Progress Reports and the Accession Partnership documents prepared by the EC on the subject of migration and asylum in the accession process of Turkey to the EU, one does not find any instance of securitisation according to the framework of the Copenhagen School. Throughout the documents, issues of migration and asylum are not constructed as existential threats that need to be dealt with emergency and extraordinary measures. Instead, migration and asylum are framed in ‘humanitarian terms’ in the context of the concerns which are related to the improvements in the refugee status determination in Turkey, and strengthening of the system for admission and assessment of asylum claims, enhancement of reception conditions and integration of asylum seekers, and their access to state health care and education facilities, and establishment of fair procedures for the detention and removal of irregular migrants.
In the NAPAA prepared by the Turkish authorities, however, asylum is framed by two contradictory discourses: on the one hand, as a matter of public order and national security concern; and on the other hand, as a matter of humanitarian concern. The below quoted sentences illustrate the former, and as such could be classified as ‘securitising moves’ as understood by the Copenhagen School.

Where a positive decision is made about aliens who have illegally entered Turkish territory to seek asylum in a third country and are held in a province at the border, they are transferred to and allowed to reside in a province where there is no public order-related problem and temporary asylum seekers are controlled more easily (NAPAA in the field of migration and asylum 2005).

A refugee or an asylum seeker steadily living in Turkey may only be deported due to reasons of national security and public order as decided by the Ministry of Interior within the framework of the provision of 1951 Geneva Convention (NAPAA in the field of migration and asylum 2005).

This securitarian discourse is competing with humanitarian concerns similar to the EC’s which are mentioned above. Thus, it can be concluded that the harmonisation process of migration and asylum in Turkey is caught between these two contradictory trends on the basis of the analysis of the NAPAA. The EC, on the other hand, does not express any element of existential threat concerning migration and asylum on the basis of the analysis of the Progress Reports and Accession Partnership documents.

The above conclusion, however, does not completely rule out the presence of securitisation dynamics that cannot be captured by the conceptual narrowness of the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School, which confines security to the extreme situation of survival. Thus, the below analysis adopts a broader approach to security where securitisation is defined as a process moving along two poles: normality and emergency/extraordinary measures. From this point of view, situations of existential threats and survival are located at the end of the security continuum, on which security dynamics can also be located at a lower level of intensity (Leonard 2007: 13).

Adopting a broader approach to security, the below analysis employs the CDA’s concept of recontextualisation because of its potential to reveal the transformation of meanings, which belong to distinct policy fields, in the institutional framework of the AJFS. In analysing the materials, the concepts of the securitisation theory of the Paris School are used.

6.3 Migration and Asylum in the Accession Process of Turkey to the EU: A Case of Securitisation According to a Broader Approach to Security?

EU policies in the area of justice and home affairs aim to maintain and further develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice. On issues such as border control, visas, migration, asylum, drug trafficking and money laundering, combating organised crime, the fight against terrorism, fraud and corruption, police and judicial co-operation, customs co-operation, data protection and the mutual recognition of court judgements, as well as human rights legal instruments, Member States need to be equipped to ensure they achieve adequate and acceptable
standards of implementation. Administrative capacity must be up to these standards by the date of accession (Progress Report 2004).

As the above passage shows, the EU’s AJFS covers diverse policy areas. This has previously been mentioned in the thesis. In an attempt to compensate the expected side-effect of the removal of internal borders and the creation of an internal market, the policy areas mentioned in the passage became to be treated together (Bigo 1994: 164). To some eyes, linkages between the policy issues might seem obvious. For instance, put the EU aside, Turkey has been concerned about controlling its borders in the fight against the PKK whose activities are mainly based across the southeastern border of the country. In that sense, illegal migration is connected to terrorism. Illegal migration is also partially to do with border crossing and human trafficking. Accordingly, drawing linkages between the policy issues is likely, as the AJFS deals with them all. This interrelational approach, however, also sustains a relationship between the practices of the above mentioned policy fields. The CDA’s concept of *recontextualisation* is interested in this very relationship between different social practices which are networked together within particular organisations (Fairclough 2010: 368). Through the networking of different policy fields, discourses of one field are appropriated by, relocated in the context of, another (Fairclough 2003: 222). Thus, the concept of *recontextualisation* explores the meanings which are moved from one field to another during the networking process, and shows how the discourse of one social practice is recontextualised in another.

When considered from this perspective, the practices of migration and asylum related issues are recontextualised in the practices of controlling of borders and of dealing with drug trafficking, organised crime, terrorism, etc. in the institutional framework of the AJFS. As quoted earlier, in a similar approach, Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000; 2006) argue that the creation of an internal security area in the EU has articulated a security continuum on which the field of migration and asylum has discursively and administratively linked up with more traditional security fields. They further argue that the networking of the discourses and the practices of distinct policy fields has facilitated the transferring of security concerns from terrorism, organised crime and border controls to the free movement of immigrants and asylum seekers. (Bigo 1994; Huysmans 2000).

When analysing the documents in the light of the concept of *recontextualisation* and with a broader approach to security, no explicit links have been drawn between the policy fields covered under the AJFS, as each policy field is discussed under separate subtitles. However, the discourse of active cooperation with Turkey on immigration is dominant and disseminates across the other fields. Immigration here is mainly mentioned in the context of illegal transit migration through Turkey to the EU. Turkey, in the NAPAA, also expresses its commitment to prevent illegal migration over Turkish territory. In this context, agreements on police cooperation and readmission arrangements between Turkey and the third countries (especially Greece) are given particular importance by the EC. Focusing on combating crime, illegal migration is paired together with terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking in the agreements (Progress Reports 2001 & 2002).

Illegal migration is also paired with border controls particularly in the context of the establishment of working groups within the Turkish MoI to deal with border
management, asylum and migration (Progress Report 2002). The sentence below quoted from the Progress Report of 2008 is a good illustration of the networking of these practices.

The asylum and migration task force formed a high-level working group bringing together agencies responsible for border tasks connected with irregular migration. It aims for closer inter-agency cooperation by conducting common risk analysis.

In this context, different security agencies such as coast guards, land forces, gendarmerie, the police as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MoI are required to cooperate irrespective of their traditional spheres of action, which constitutes an ‘integrated approach’ to the control of migration and border management. The importance of the development of expertise and a non-military body specifically responsible for the control of borders is emphasised throughout the reports. As exemplified by the below sentences; efficient and coordinated use of databases, speedy transmission of information and risk analysis at the borders are presented as the key elements of this ‘integrated approach’ to the control of migration. The below sentences are quoted from the subtitles concerning migration and external borders.

The Gendarmerie is completing its Integrated Communication System Project (JEMUS) aimed at the speedy transmission of information between all its units (Progress Report 2001).

Turkey has established control checkpoints to monitor movements from the East to the West throughout the country and contact points are open for 24 hours in order to monitor movements at sea. The controls on the movement of vessels have been strengthened. At the same time some limited equipment has been installed at sea contact points and border checkpoints. Neighbouring countries have been contacted to establish an early warning system (Progress Report 2002).

Turkey continued to participate in the activities of the Centre for information, discussion and exchange on the crossing of frontiers and immigration and its early warning system (Regular Report 2005).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Customs have started to share databases for the screening of persons crossing the borders. A risk analysis unit was established within the Customs Administration (Regular Report 2007).

When thinking about the implications of these key elements of control of migration, the establishment of an ‘early warning’ system as a means to an efficient and coordinated use of databases discursively implies the existence of a possible danger or a problem, especially the one which might occur in the future. In these sentences, the EC constructs migration as a policy concern that needs to be dealt with urgency through ‘speedy’ transmission of information. Likewise, the establishment of a ‘risk analysis’ unit assumes the existence of factors that may endanger the success of the construction of the EU as an internal security field, and necessitates the taking of pre-emptive measures to reduce the probability of these factors from occurring. It seeks to control the future suboptimal developments through the present which is at the heart of risk analysis and probability calculations (Huysmans 2006: 101).

It is interesting to note here that, focusing on border control mechanisms in the prevention of illegal migration, the aim is not to address the deep causes of the problem but simply to divert the international routes for migration flows away from Turkey. This approach is notable in the NAPAA which presents the shift in
the routes of smugglers and would be migrants as an achievement of the intensified efforts and initiatives of the Turkish security forces, and welcomed as such by the EC in the Progress Reports.

In conclusion, the analysis of the documents by employing the concept of recontextualisation and a broader approach to security has shown that certain linkages have been drawn between migration and ‘urgency’ in the context of an integrated approach to border controls. This indicates the perception of a ‘danger’ or ‘risk’ (in contrast to an existential threat) that ought to be tackled rapidly. Some could argue that this approach is justified since migration is mentioned in the documents within the context of illegal migration. It is necessary here, however, to consider the fact that asylum seekers migrate, also by illegal means, to the country where they claim international protection. When considered from this aspect; the networking of the discourse of the fight against illegal migration with the discourses of combating crime and the fight against terrorism might construct asylum seekers as suspects of criminal activity and obscure their legitimate intentions of movement. Adopting a broader approach to security, the documents interpreted as such have arguably framed migration issues as having some aspect of security, but only to a limited extent. This is especially the case because, first, both the EC and the Turkish authorities propose measures for the training of border personal on the issues of refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, the NAPAA presents the training projects such as the Project for Increasing Police Capacity in the Fields Pertaining to Refugee/Asylum Seekers and the Project For Country of Origin and Asylum Information System, as improvements in the field of migration and asylum. Second, Turkey is requested to establish “a nation-wide screening mechanism to identify asylum-seekers among detained illegal migrants and improved access to asylum procedures” (Progress Report 2003).

Earlier in the thesis, it was argued that an issue can be securitised not only through speech acts but also through practices, and therefore, an analytical framework that comprises both discursive and non-discursive practices was proposed. Drawing upon the securitisation theory of the Paris School, particular emphasis was placed here on bureaucratic and technocratic policies, as it was argued that, securitisation discourses are embedded in particular technological devices and policies (Huysmans 2006). On these theoretical grounds, it is now necessary to analyse the bureaucratic and technocratic policies on migration and asylum by means of the first-hand data gathered through semi-structured expert interviews.
7 Analysis of the Bureaucratic and Technocratic Practices

This chapter aims to analyse whether particular security technologies and bureaucratic policies, which are required to be implemented by Turkey as part of its accession to the EU, have constructed migration and asylum in security terms. Thus, the analysis in this chapter moves a step from discursive to more technocratic interpretations of security framing, as understood by the securitisation theory of the Paris School. The analysis is conducted on the basis of the first-hand data gathered through semi-structured interviews with the experts in the field of migration and asylum in Turkey. The chapter starts with presenting the main characteristics of migration and asylum policies in Turkey with reference to the EU membership process as interpreted by the interviewees. This brief introduction also aims to set the background of the analysis of the three policies which are required to be implemented by Turkey, namely tight visa regulations, border control measures, and readmission agreements with the member states and the EU itself as well as with the third countries of origin and transit. The chapter is concluded with a discussion about whether migration and asylum in the accession process of Turkey to the EU, on the basis of the analysed policies, constitute a case of securitisation according to the Paris School of critical security studies.

7.1 Migration and Asylum in Turkey as Interpreted by the Interviewees

As pointed out by almost all the discussants at the beginning of the interviews, prior to any discussion on the Turkish approach to migration and asylum, it is necessary to be reminded of the fact that Turkey has one way or another had to deal with migration flows since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey has constituted a country of source, destination and transit at different times in its history, nevertheless “it has been hesitant to take the responsibility on its part. This is evident by the geographical limitation maintained under the Geneva Convention” (Interviewee 8) as well as by the fact that the country has never had a comprehensive asylum law. Instead, “Turkey has tried to get rid of the problem through a number of administrative measures adopted in practical terms” (Interviewee 8) such as regulations from administrative bodies or governmental circulars. As a consequence of the geographical limitation, a clear distinction is drawn between a refugee and an asylum seeker resulting in problematic definitions of the terms. Due to the fact that Turkey grants refugee status solely to those who were fleeing events in Europe, applications of asylum seekers coming
from outside Europe are assessed in cooperation with the UNHCR. Asylum seekers are granted temporary protection until a decision is reached, and those who are recognised as refugees are then expected to be resettled in third countries. This practice is criticised by some of the interviewees. For instance, Interviewee 8 states that

First of all, who is an asylum seeker? A person who seeks refuge and becomes a refugee in the recognised country. Therefore, asylum is a temporary status. However, this is not the case in Turkey. Asylum is a final status in Turkey because the person who is recognised as an asylum seeker cannot become a refugee and stay in Turkey.

However, according to the interviewees, the EU membership negotiations, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and closer cooperation with the UNHCR have been the three driving forces leading Turkey to revise her irresponsible approach since the beginning of the 2000s. The decisions of the ECHR has had a positive effect on Turkey in terms of urging the country to provide higher standards of international protection (Interview 8). Likewise, closer cooperation with the UNHCR and the training activities, focusing on the international protection of refugees, provided by the organisation for the Turkish security personal are listed as positive developments (Interview 2). As for the impact of the EU, the interviewees express contradictory views. For instance, Interviewee 9 mentions the improvements made to the asylum system in Turkey as part of the EU accession process; however, he also underlines that positive measures have only been undertaken with the ultimate goal of EU membership, and not for the sake of refugee rights. Interviewees 3, 4, 7 & 8, with an opposing view, argue that the EU has constituted an obstacle to the improvements in the asylum system in Turkey since the country is concerned about “becoming the EU’s buffer zone for refugees, if she develops a well-established system of asylum.”

The priorities of the EU in the accession negotiations with Turkey in the field of migration and asylum constitute another salient topic discussed during the interviews. The requirement of the development of new asylum law and institutions, and related issues of concern to the EU are linked to the transit migration flows through Turkey to the EU. Almost all the interviewees agree upon the point that the underlying motivation behind the requirements is to reduce the demand of migration to EU territory by ameliorating the conditions in Turkey. In this context, the priorities of the EU in its negotiations with third countries in the field of migration and asylum, including Turkey, are explained by a UNHCR staff member during the interview, as

first border controls, second these [referring to the third countries, author’s note] have to become a safe third country so that readmission is possible, and third the signing of the readmission agreements. These are the priorities of the EU. The protection of refugees is not an EU priority (Interviewee 4).

Interviewee 8, in a similar context concerning the EU priorities, argues that security-oriented policies are intertwined with protection-oriented policies in the EU and there is no mechanism that could keep the two apart.
The transfer of security technology to Turkey in the field of migration and asylum is also touched upon by some of the interviewees. For instance, a refugee fingerprint database which is similar to Eurodac\(^9\), has been constructed as well as the latest technological improvements in border security have been imported to the country with the contribution of the EU funds (Interview 8). Linking security with technology, Interviewee 4 defines the former as a technological, and thus an economic sector by pointing out the growing usage of expensive technological devices in an effort to achieve internal security in the EU. Although acknowledging that the EU’s security concerns are not unjustified, he argues that “Many good things could have been done in the refugee-producing regions with the money that was spent on the EU’s border security over the last 10 years” (Interviewee 4). In a similar discussion on the relationship between security and technology, Interviewee 8 states that “All technological improvements reduce the asylum seekers’ probability of succeeding in their asylum requests.”

As a way of conclusion, this section has presented the main points of discussion during the interviews concerning migration and asylum in Turkey with reference to the EU accession process. Some of the issues touched upon in this section are discussed at further length in the following analysis of the above mentioned policies which are required to be implemented by Turkey as part of its accession to the EU.

### 7.2 Visa Policy

Since the adoption of common rules on visas among the EU countries with the entry into force of Amsterdam Treaty and the incorporation of the Schengen Agreements into the mainstream of European Union Law, the Union has determined the world in four categories: 1. member states whose nationals have a right to enter and reside on the territory of one another; 2. countries with a privileged relationship with the EU and whose nationals enjoy equivalent rights (the European Economic Area); 3. favoured countries who appear on the ‘white list’ of the EU visa regulation, and whose nationals do not require visas to enter the territory of the Union; 4. countries who appear on the regulation’s ‘black list’ and whose nationals must always have a visa obtained before arriving at the borders of the Union (Bigo & Guild 2005: 235-6).

In this context, Bigo & Guild (2005) discuss the EU’s visa policy as the main example of current border control technologies. Their focus is therefore not on the

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\(^9\) The Eurodac system enables the EU member states to identify asylum applicants and persons who have been apprehended in connection with an irregular crossing of an external border of the Union. By comparing fingerprints, the EU member states can determine whether an asylum applicant or a foreign national found illegally present within an EU country has previously claimed asylum in another EU country or whether an asylum applicant entered the Union territory unlawfully. See Council Regulation No 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention.
official physical border of the state but on the transformation of meaning of the border to the individual. From this perspective,

depending on whether the individual has the nationality of a member state of the Union, a third country, a country subject to a visa obligation, he or she will meet any border, will meet it only once or twice on the territory of the arrival country, or will meet it within his or her home state at the consulate and at the airline counter (ibid: 234).

Thus, for the latter category of people, the real border of the Union has moved to their own state and is no longer at the border of the state they want to enter (ibid: 239). As explained in the Chapter on the securitisation theory of the Paris School, this control of the movement of people, through specific procedures and technologies, before they enter a given territory is referred to as policing at a distance (ibid). According to Bigo & Guild (2005), policing at a distance has become a way to block the movement of people who want to reach the EU countries which is done not by blocking them at the borders but by preventing them from departing. The analysis of the visa policy in the accession process of Turkey to the EU will be conducted on these theoretical grounds.

Throughout the interviews, visa policy is discussed in terms of the EU requirements for Turkey in order to align with the Schengen acquis, and the EU visa regulations for Turkish citizens are put aside. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the former which includes the introduction of the following policies in Turkey: uniform visa policy towards all EU citizens, alignment with the EU positive and negative visa list, airport transit visas, abolishment of the issuance of sticker- and stamp-type visas at the borders, improvement of the security features of visas, and biometric identifiers in visas and other travel documents.

To begin with, throughout the interviews, tight visa regulations are described as “an element of the European security policy” in the words of Interviewee 8. Regarding the EU requirements on visa policy, the interviewees point out a clash of interest between Turkey and the EU (Interviewees 7, 8 & 9). Turkey, as a country of tourism and with a strong interest in inter-regional trade, favours mobilisation and visa facilitation. For this reason, alignment with the EU negative visa list is not considered as an urgent matter in Turkey, but conditioned on the prospect of EU membership. In this context, Interviewee 9 states that it will be long time before Turkey becomes a member. We are now at the very beginning of the alignment process. Turkey goes on her own way but of course she will reconsider [her policies, author’s note] in the future. For the moment, in my opinion, there is no need for urgency.

Therefore, Turkey still maintains a visa-free regime and has recently agreed on visa exemptions with the countries some of whom are on the EU negative visa list. In this sense, Interviewee 8 argues that Turkey’s securitarian approach is not as strict as the EU’s. Turkey has removed visa requirements with a lot of countries. Look at those countries who are exempt from visa such as Georgia, Russia and Syria; they are themselves refugee producing countries. Therefore, if Turkey had a security-oriented approach, she would not do so [removal of the visa requirements, author’s note]. However, the EU urges for the reintroduction of visas.

The discussion on whether visa policy, together with the other practices that are analysed below, in the accession process of Turkey to the EU constitute a security
practice, as understood by the Paris School of critical security studies, will take place in a separate section at the end. Therefore, the analysis of the border control measures and readmission agreements will follow now.

7.3 Border Controls

As explained earlier, throughout the interviews, border control measures are pointed out as one of the priorities of the EU in its negotiations with third countries in the field of migration and asylum. In the context of the negotiations on Chapter 24 of Justice Freedom and Security, Interviewee 8 states that “The priority area for the EU is of course border controls because the problem of the EU will be sorted out if Turkey controls its borders no matter if the country maintains her irresponsible approach towards the issues of migration and asylum.” Departing from the importance attached by the EU to the improvements in border control measures in Turkey, discussions during the interviews focus mainly on two topics. One is the measures taken in border control and their impact on migrants and asylum seekers. Second is the relationship between illegal migration, asylum, and border management.

On the former issue, the interviewees mention the increased cooperation among various agencies of security such as coast guards, gendarmerie and the police in the framework of an EU-funded project on integrated border management in Turkey. The aims of the project included resolving the lack of contact among border security agencies and the usage of advanced technology in border surveillance (Interview 8). In terms of the impact of these measures on asylum seekers, Interviewee 8 states that technological improvements limit asylum seekers’ access to a country where they can seek refuge and lead them to resort to more dangerous methods of migration.

On the relationship between illegal migration, asylum and border management, discussions have revolved around the issues of illegal migration of asylum seekers and lack of a mechanism to identify asylum seekers among detained illegal migrants. Interviewees argue that illegal migration is partially related with border crossing, and thus, it is necessary to control the borders. However, “Refugees and asylum seekers have to be put aside here. They also cross the borders. And most of the time, they cross illegally. If they cross legally, then we treat their claims with suspicion.” (Interviewee 8). In other words, “if the people hold passports with an exit stamp of the country from where they flee, then it is possible to think that their relationships with the state might not be that bad.” (ibid). In this context, a UNHCR staff member states that “We can’t expect legal migration from these people. These people are forced to flee with no money leaving behind their families. Naturally, they might not have passports. Naturally, they try to cross illegally” (Interviewee 5). Interviewee 8 also brings up the Article 31 of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees which protects the right of a
refugee to be free from penalties pertaining to the illegality of their entry to a country. 10 “Therefore, there are legal grounds for the illegal entries” (Interviewee 8).

In a similar discussion on the illegal entry of asylum seekers, Interviewee 4 points out the linkage drawn by the EU between illegal migration, asylum and security. The interviewee argues that “everything that is illegal necessarily also related to security” (Interviewee 4). However, almost all the discussants come to the same conclusion that security-oriented policies label refugees and asylum seekers as illegal migrants. Most of the interviewees also argue that there is a lack of mechanisms, both in the EU and Turkey, to separate asylum seekers from illegal migrants. For instance, Frontex is mentioned by Interviewees 1 & 8 in this context. “Frontex is a new method in border management in terms of the prevention of illegal migration far from the borders of the country” (Interviewee 1). Through Frontex operations on the high seas, illegal migrants are pushed back without a consideration on who needs international protection (Interviewees 1 & 8). In this context, Interviewee 8 states that

there should be a mechanism to separate the two. Turkey does the same. Two days ago there was a meeting and I asked the commander from the coast guard: ‘What do you do when you see a boat in international waters coming towards Turkey and they are shouting that they are refugees?’ He said they don’t let them in. They send them back. There might also be refugees on the boat. But no separation is made. They are all illegal migrants. That is very simple.

The same approach was also noticeable in the interview with a superintendent from the Department of Illegal Migration and Fight against Human Trafficking of the Directorate General for Public Security. The superintendent stressed during the interview that “Don’t make any separation. Think of asylum seekers and refugees as illegal migrants.” (Interviewee 3).

On the basis of the discussions during the interviews which are outlined above, a further discussion on whether border control measures taken in the accession process of Turkey to the EU constitute a security practice, as understood by the Paris School of critical security studies, will take place in the concluding section. The next section now focuses on readmission agreements.

7.4 Readmission Agreements

The signing of bilateral and Community readmission agreements with the countries of origin and transit is another EU priority in its negotiations with third countries in the field of migration and asylum. Therefore, interviewees were also

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10 “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” (Article 31(1)).
asked about their opinion on the negotiation of a readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey. Departing from the discussions during the interviews, the section starts with explaining the emergence of readmission agreements in relation to the principles of ‘first country of asylum’ and ‘safe third country’ of the Asylum Procedures Directive of the EU. The dynamics of the negotiations will also be touched upon in terms of the contexts in which readmission agreements are proposed by the EU and Turkey’s demands in return for a Community readmission agreement. Other issues of concern such as whether the country is prepared for signing the agreement and possible consequences of it for asylum seekers will also be discussed.

To begin with, a brief definition of the above principles is necessary in order to understand the context in which readmission agreements have appeared in the negotiations of the EU with third countries. Under the principle of ‘first country of asylum’; refugees, who previously requested asylum in another country or who had the opportunity to do so, will not be granted asylum in the member states and readmitted to that country. The principle of ‘safe third country’, on the other hand, covers instances where the asylum applicant could or should have requested asylum in one of the transit countries which is considered to be a ‘safe third country’. Applications in these cases are considered to be manifestly unfounded without an examination on the merits, and thus, the applicants are returned to the third country, or subjected to accelerated asylum procedures. As set forth in the Asylum Procedures Directive, one of the criteria of being a ‘safe third country’ is to provide international protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention. In this context, Turkey is not considered as a ‘safe third country’ because of the geographical limitation maintained under the Convention. Interviewee 8, in this context, argues that the principle of ‘safe third country’ constitutes an obstacle for Turkey to lift the limitation because the country is concerned about becoming the EU’s buffer zone for refugees, if the limitation is lifted.

However, as explained by Interviewee 8, these principles contain an admission requirement by a third country for implementation. In other words, in cases where the third country refuses to admit the asylum seeker concerned, the member state in question must bear the responsibility of the asylum seeker and provide access to an ordinary asylum procedure. Furthermore, “there is no obligation under international law imposed on States to take back persons other than their own nationals” (Interviewee 8). As a consequence, “the EU has to conclude separate agreements containing readmission provisions with the transit countries” (Interviewee 8), and this is how readmission agreements have appeared as a way out to make the above principles applicable in the EU.

However, as stated by Interviewee 8,

12 Ibid. Articles 27 & 36.
13 Ibid. Article 27 (1d).
14 Asylum Procedures Directive Articles 26, 27(4) & 36(6).
no State would want to be in such an asymmetrical relationship which leaves the burden of asylum seekers to the transit countries. There must be mutual interest. Therefore, bilateral as well as multilateral readmission agreements have always been proposed by the EU in larger contexts.

Thus, as explained further on by Interviewee 8, third countries have agreed to conclude readmission agreements in exchange of certain benefits granted by the EU “such as development aid in the case of Asian-Pacific States or sometimes in return for visa facilitation agreements” (Interviewee 8).

In this regard, Turkey as a transit country is also obliged to sign a Community and bilateral readmission agreements in return for the country’s membership to the EU. Turkey, on the other hand, expects the EU to share the burden of asylum seekers and conclude a visa facilitation agreement (Interview 3). It is worth noting here that interviewees point out the initial Council Decision of 2002 on the criteria for the identification of third countries with which Community readmission agreements need to be signed. The second criterion of the Decision states that “given the European Union’s forthcoming enlargement, countries with which it is negotiating accession agreements should not be included.” However, beginning with the membership negotiations of Turkey, the Union took a different approach and started proposing Community readmission agreements in the context of enlargement (Interview 8).

Turkey is also requested to sign readmission agreements with the third countries of origin. Interviewee 8 describes this as “the distribution of the burden also by Turkey [to the third countries, author’s note]. In other words, the further the refugees go away from Europe, the better it is for the EU.”

The interviewees have also argued that Turkey does not have the necessary asylum system in order to deal with the readmitted asylum seekers with the entry into force of a Community readmission agreement. Therefore, as argued by the interviewees the country is not prepared to sign the agreement. On the impact of a possible Community agreement with Turkey upon asylum seekers, Interviewees 2 & 5 argue that as a consequence of the agreement, migrants will try to reach Europe not through Turkey but through different international routes. Therefore, it is stated that the real problem cannot be solved out by concluding such agreements. In this regard, Interview 8 compares the Central and Eastern European States (CEECs) with Turkey. According to the above mentioned Council Decision, these countries were only required to sign bilateral readmission agreements with the EU member states. However, Interviewee 8 argues that readmission agreements were concluded without proper asylum systems established in the CEECs.

In the same time period, let us say the percentage of persons granted refugee status is around 18 in Germany and 0.3 in Hungary. Applications are from the same country. That means those countries [CEECs] are doing their best for not granting refugee status. They were not prepared to

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16 Ibid (2)
17 Ibid.
handle the applications but still they were given the burden of asylum. And the provisions of Geneva Convention are, now, interpreted very broadly by these countries (Interviewee 8).

Departing from the case of CEECs, the interviewee expresses his concerns for the Turkish case.

I am concerned if Turkey is faced with a burden that she cannot cope with, Turkey will also resort to the same means. Turkey might accept on paper all the standards; however in practice she might follow a rigid policy and not accept anybody. In that case, since Turkey will be a ‘safe third country’, asylum seekers cannot go to Europe either. This will be a scary situation for asylum seekers (Interviewee 8).

Next section concludes the analysis with a discussion on whether the policies mentioned above have constructed migration and asylum in security terms as understood by the Paris School of critical security studies.

7.5 Migration and Asylum in the Accession Process of Turkey to the EU: A Case of Securitisation According to the Paris School?

As explained earlier, securitisation theory of the Paris School argues that an issue does not have to be explicitly defined as a major threat to a society to become a security question. Its securitisation can emerge from the context within which it is embedded rather than from the threat definition itself. Thus, even when not directly spoken off as a threat, migration and asylum can be rendered as a security question through institutional and political arrangements that emphasise policing and defence (Huysmans 2006: 3). On these theoretical grounds, the policies discussed above can be said to provide the tools and technological devices for management of migration and asylum on the basis of policing and defence in the EU. In this regard, the movement of migrants and asylum seekers is controlled whilst they are still residing in their countries of origin through Schengen visa policy; on the physical borders of the EU through border control measures; and inside the EU territory through readmission agreements. When analysing the visa policy, border controls and readmission agreements in the light of the securitisation theory of the Paris School; one can conclude that, insecurity is inscribed into asylum and migration related themes through complicated linkages between policy issues, and negotiations in favour of short-term political interests and fears of the EU and Turkey.

Regarding visa policy, the EU requirements are mainly based on the implementation of technological devices and expert knowledge (for instance, improvement of the security features of visas or biometric identifiers in visas) which aim to control the legitimate means of migration. As explained earlier, visa regulations of Turkey are not as tight as the EU’s, and therefore, it can be concluded that Turkey’s securitarian approach is not as strict as the EU’s (Interview 6 & 8). However, one should also bear in mind that Turkey is now more of a transit country, and has regional interests related to tourism and trade.
which favour mobilisation. Turkey might adopt a more security-oriented approach to visas in the future when the prospect of EU membership is more concrete.

Border control practices, as argued by the interviewees, became highly technological as well, without a proper distinction made between illegal migrants and asylum seekers (Interviewees 1, 3, 4, 5 & 8). Securitarian aspect of these practices label refugees and asylum seekers as illegal migrants (Interview 8). Frontex is here mentioned as an example (Interview 1 & 8). Since “everything that is illegal is necessarily also related to security” (Interviewee 4), asylum in this context is also considered in security terms.

Readmission agreements, on the other hand, facilitate the implementation of the principles of ‘first country of asylum’ and ‘safe third country’ which provide the procedures through which asylum seekers are prevented from entering the regular asylum system without denying the right to seek protection from persecution. As explained earlier, readmission agreements are negotiated in larger context where, in exchange of readmitting the asylum seekers, the third country receives favours from the EU such as financial help, or becoming an EU member state. The context in which readmission agreements are proposed and signed shows how the right of asylum has become a matter of negotiation between the EU and the third countries of origin and transit, which reflects their short-term political interests and fears.
In an attempt to research the dynamics of securitisation of migration and asylum in the light of the EU’s relationship with Turkey, this thesis has analysed the official EU and Turkish discourse on migration and asylum as represented in the Regular Progress Reports on Turkey (1998-2010), Accession Partnership Documents (2001, 2003, 2006, 2008), and NAPAA in the field of migration and asylum (2005). Drawing upon the Copenhagen and the Paris Schools of critical security studies, a discursive approach to security is adopted as well as a technocratic interpretation of security. Accordingly, apart from the discursive analysis of the official documents; visa policy, border controls and readmission agreements are also analysed as technocratic practices which provide the ways of managing the discourse.

It is concluded that the EC has not securitised migration and asylum in the accession process of Turkey to the EU, in the Copenhagen School’s sense of securitisation, on the basis of the analysis of the Progress Reports and Accession Partnership documents on Turkey. In other words, the EC has not cast them as existential threats. In the NAPAA prepared by the Turkish authorities, on the other hand, asylum is framed by two contradictory discourses: on the one hand, as a matter of public order and national security concern; and on the other hand, as a matter of humanitarian concern. This contradiction can also be interpreted as reflecting the fact that humanitarian measures are undertaken by Turkey as part of its accession to the Union whilst, for instance, geographical limitation to the Geneva Convention is still maintained because of the fear of becoming the EU’s buffer zone for refugees. As explained earlier, principles of ‘first country of asylum’ and ‘safe third country’ of the Asylum Procedures Directive of the Union have also contributed to the emergence of the two contradictory trends in the harmonisation process of migration and asylum matters in Turkey.

On the basis of a critique of the Copenhagen School’s traditional and narrow definition of security, official documents are also analysed with a broader approach to security and in the light of the concept of *recontextualisation*. Adopting a broader approach to security, it has been concluded that migration and asylum are securitised in the institutional framework of the AJFS, not through explicit threat definitions, but through certain linkages drawn between policy issues that emphasise policing and defence. Earlier in this section of the analysis, it was argued that the discourse of fighting against illegal migration through active cooperation with Turkey is dominant throughout the documents, and disseminates across other fields including asylum. In this regard, illegal migration of asylum seekers was emphasised, and the measures taken by the EU and Turkey in order to separate asylum seekers from illegal migrants were highlighted; namely the training of border personal on the issue of refugees and asylum seekers, and the establishment of a nation-wide screening mechanism in Turkey to identify asylum seekers among detained illegal migrants. However, the interviewees, on the
training of border personal, have pointed out a lack of expertise in the MoI and the reappointment of border personal for limited period of time, which undermine the efforts to train. In this regard, a UNHCR staff member during the interview states that “Let’s assume there is a well-informed police officer on the border. He will be appointed to somewhere else when his mission is complete. The person who is appointed in his place would not know anything about his job” (Interview 5). Despite the discourse of the establishment of a mechanism to identify asylum seekers among detained illegal migrants, interviewees have argued that security oriented policies label asylum seekers as illegal migrants and there is no mechanism in practice to separate the two (Interview 8). A UNHCR staff member has also argued that the causes of migration for economic purposes and migration for asylum have become closer, and therefore, it is becoming harder to separate the two. On this basis, he concludes that the problem of illegal migration can only be dealt with by improving the living conditions in the source countries (Interviewee 5). He supports his point by stating that

If there is hunger and the poverty is intense in a country, then, as a consequence there will be wars and fights between people. People will flee their country with the hope for a better life. In my opinion, what is important here is to provide them with the means of subsistence in their own countries. Only this can be a solution. Otherwise, poverty leads to ethnic conflicts and all the other problems (Interviewee 5).

Drawing upon the securitisation theory of the Paris School, it is also analysed whether particular security technologies and bureaucratic policies, which are required to be implemented by Turkey as part of its accession to the Union, have constructed migration and asylum in security terms. In this regard; visa regulations, border control measures, and the readmission agreements with the member states and the EU itself as well as with the third countries of origin and transit are analysed through semi-structured interviews with the experts on migration and asylum in Turkey. The analysis has concluded that insecurity is inscribed into asylum and migration related themes through complicated linkages between policy issues, and negotiations in favour of short-term political interests and fears of the EU and Turkey.

Whilst visa policy subjects migrants to bureaucratic procedures, and thus, makes it difficult to travel to the Union; in some cases it might even encourage them to resort to illegal methods of migration. Strict border control measures, on the other hand, limit asylum seekers’ access to a country where they can seek refuge and encourage them to resort to more dangerous methods of migration (Interview 8). As for readmission agreements, considering the Turkish case, they do not stop migrants from wanting to reach the territory of the Union but, as argued by Interviewees 2 & 5, result in the shift in international routes for migration. Therefore, in so far as people continue to want to migrate or seek asylum they will try to circumvent the measures. This brings us to the conclusion of the UNHCR staff member where he argues that the problem of illegal migration can only be dealt with by improving the living conditions in the source countries, and not through political and institutional arrangements that emphasise policing and defence.

In order to draw more general conclusions on the integration of migration and asylum into the EU’s external policy, the relationship of the EU with other third
countries of origin and transit has to be analysed. The new draft law on foreigners and international protection, which has recently been finalised and will be presented by parliamentary approval in Turkey, can be included in the future research.
Given the prominence of the concept of securitisation in the literature on migration, this study aims to explore the extent and the modalities of defining migration and asylum in security terms in the European Union (EU). Numerous observers including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), journalists and scholars have pointed out the growing tendency to view migration flows as a security threat to the EU, which they widely refer to as ‘migration-security nexus’. To my knowledge, such claims have not been supported by detailed empirical analysis, and therefore, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature as an empirical study by looking into the securitisation of migration in terms of EU’s relations with third countries, and more specifically, in the light of the importance of migration and asylum issues for the accession process of Turkey to the EU. The purpose of the thesis is based on the argument that threat perceptions create a view of the world that reflects and determines at least at part of our dealing with it (Tekofsky 2006). Likewise, defining migration and asylum in security terms in the EU implies particular ways of arranging social and political relations and have important implications for the choice of policy instruments (Huysmans 2006). Departing from these basic claims, the study aims to answer the following research questions:

To what extent and in what ways are migration and asylum securitised in the EU? What are the practices of defining migration and asylum in security terms in the EU? How does the securitisation of migration and asylum work in the light of the importance of these issues for the accession process of Turkey to the EU?

The most immediate topics of discussion during enlargement negotiations of the EU have been regarding immigration, free movement, border management and related issues of police-cooperation (Apap 2001: 2). As the purpose of the thesis is to research the EU discourse and practice on migration and asylum in terms of security, looking into the EU requirements for candidate countries and the commitment of the latter to comply is likely to exhibit existing security/political dynamics. However, the thesis examines only the case of Turkey due to time and word constraints. Amongst the candidate countries, Turkey is chosen because of its strategic importance in terms of policing the future south-eastern border of the EU and the routes asylum seekers take from further east. Frontext’s Annual Risk Analysis 2011 records Turkey as the main transit country for illegal migration to the EU. Accordingly, the management of migration and asylum flows arriving in the country and many issues associated with it, have become vital for the accession negotiations of Turkey.

As the concept of securitisation is at the core of my thesis, the empirical study is guided by the framework of the two variants of critical security studies, which are referred to as the Copenhagen and the Paris Schools. As the two schools of thought differ in their focus on the kind of practices and explain different ways of
securitisation, the thesis employs both, in order to grasp a comprehensive analysis for understanding the extent and the practices of securitisation of migration and asylum in the EU.

Securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School argues that an issue is securitised when it is presented as an existential threat by a powerful securitising actor through a performative speech act (securitising move), and accepted as such by the audience of the speech act, which justifies extraordinary measures to address the threat (Buzan et. al. 1998). Applying the basic premises of the Copenhagen School to the context of migration and asylum policies in the EU, two aspects of the theory needs to be emphasised here. One is the narrow conceptualisation of security; and the other is the focus on security ‘speech acts’ at the expense of other non-discursive security practices (Leonard 2007: 11). The Copenhagen School is based on a narrow conceptualisation of security, by sustaining a sharp dichotomy between ‘normal’ everyday politics on the one hand and the realm of security characterised by emergency and extraordinary measures on the other hand (ibid). Such a narrow approach to security, however, may hamper the understanding of the complexity of real world processes of securitisation, including the securitisation of migration.

The Copenhagen School has also been criticised for focusing on security ‘speech acts’ at the expense of other non-discursive security practices. Wæver and Buzan note themselves that there are cases of securitisation even though there is no securitising discourse uttered in the public sphere to justify it (Buzan et. al. 1998: 28). Therefore, security threats can be attributed to a referent object not only by a speech act, but also by other types of acts (Leonard 2007: 14).

Considering the criticisms pointed out above, the thesis adopts a broader approach to security instead of confining it to the extreme situation of ‘existential threats’ and ‘survival’ (Leonard 2007: 13). Security is seen, here, as “[moving] on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and existential threat – and conversely, from threat to risk and back to normalcy” (Abrahamsen 2005: 59; quoted in Leonard 2007: 13). In other words, securitisation is a process moving along two poles: normality and emergency/extraordinary measures. Accordingly, ‘existential threats’ and ‘survival’ are located at the end of the security continuum, on which security issues can also be located at a lower level of intensity (ibid). From a methodological point of view, the criticisms also require that the analysis does not focus on security discourse per se; rather, it is necessary to extend it to non-discursive security practices.

The securitisation theory of the Paris School, on the other hand, argues that an issue does not have to be explicitly defined as a major threat to a society to become a security question. Its securitisation can emerge from the context within which it is embedded rather than from the threat definition itself. Thus, even when not directly spoken off as a threat, migration and asylum can be rendered as a security question through institutional and political arrangements that emphasise policing and defence (Huysmans 2006: 3). In this interpretation, the capacity of security is not simply a symbolic capacity of defining dangers for a community, but also a technocratic capacity of structuring social relations through the implementation of specific technological devices in the context of specific
governmental programmes (*ibid* : 91). Therefore, as a critique to the Copenhagen School, the Paris School draws a conclusion that a purely discursive approach of analysing speech acts does not tell us anything specific about how to conceptualise the embedding of the security discourse in particular social practices (Bourdieu 1982; quoted in Huysmans 2006: 91). Departing from the framework of the securitisation theory of the Paris School, my thesis seeks to embed political security discourses in technologies of government that are practically realising European security modalities of governing free movement (*ibid*).

On the basis of the two schools of thought, the thesis proposes an analytical framework that comprises both discursive and non-discursive practices. Therefore, official EU and Turkish discourse on migration and asylum as well as particular security technologies and bureaucratic policies, which provide the ways of managing the discourse, are analysed through a combination of the concept of *recontextualisation* of Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and semi-structured interviews with the experts on migration and asylum in Turkey. Amongst the several approaches, my thesis employs Fairclough’s CDA because, first of all, his methodological concepts provide a useful framework for analysis. Secondly, the central aspects of Fairclough’s CDA share significant similarities with the basic premises of the Copenhagen and the Paris Schools of critical security studies in terms of their aims and approaches. For instance, Fairclough (2001) argues that social practice is constitutive of both discursive dimensions and other dimensions. In a similar vein, securitisation as a social practice brings together various policy questions by means of discourses, expert knowledge, security technologies and skills (Huysmans 2006). In order to employ Fairclough’s CDA, the researcher has to accept the basic theoretical assumptions behind it; which in this case overlap with the assumptions of the securitisation theories employed in the thesis.

As explained earlier, discourse analysis does not suffice to realise my research objectives, i.e., it is necessary to draw on other analytical perspectives to shed light upon the non-discursive aspects of security framing. This is also underlined by the Paris School itself that the analysts have to move away from an exclusive focus on the discourses of danger, and therefore, do not rely on discourse analysis *per se* (Floyt & Croft 2010: 21). In this sense, it is important to shed light upon the non-discursive practices, and to this aim, I have conducted nine semi-structured expert interviews in Turkey. In this context, visa policy, border controls, and readmission agreements are explored, through semi-structured interviews, on the basis of the importance given to their implementation in the accession process of Turkey to the EU. Consequently, Fairclough’s CDA is employed here in conjunction with semi-structured interviews.

As a last point on methodology, Fairclough’s concept of *recontextualisation* needs to be defined here. Fairclough (2003: 222) argues that through the networking of different policy fields, discourses of one field are appropriated by, relocated in the context of another. Thus, the concept of *recontextualisation* explores the meanings which are moved from one field to another during the networking process, and shows how the discourse of one social practice is recontextualised in another within particular organisations. I find the concept of *recontextualisation* potentially capable of revealing the transformation of meanings, which belong to
distinct fields, in the institutional framework of the AJFS. The EU’s AJFS agenda covers distinct policy fields where border control, terrorism, international crime are connected with migration and asylum (Huysmans 2000: 760).

The discourse analysis focuses on Chapter 24 of Justice Freedom and Security (the former Justice and Home Affairs) of each Regular Progress Report on Turkey from 1998 to 2010; and of Accession Partnership Documents of 2001, 2003, 2006 and 2008, which are all prepared by the European Commission (EC). On the Turkish side, the analysis focuses on the National Action Plan for the Adoption (NAPAA) of the EU Acquis in the field of migration and asylum, which is prepared by the Turkish authorities in 2005. Discourse analysis is conducted, first, by using the framework of the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School, and then, a broader approach to security is adopted and the CDA’s concept of recontextualisation is employed for the analysis of the documents. The analysis has concluded that the EC has not securitised migration and asylum in the accession process of Turkey to the EU, in the Copenhagen School’s sense of securitisation, according to the analysis of the Progress Reports and Accession Partnership documents on Turkey. In the NAPAA prepared by the Turkish authorities, on the other hand, asylum is framed by two contradictory discourses: on the one hand, as a matter of public order and national security concern; and on the other hand, as a matter of humanitarian concern. Adopting a broader approach to security in the light of the concept of recontextualisation, the second part of the analysis has concluded that no explicit links have been drawn between the policy fields covered under the AJFS, as each policy field is discussed under separate subtitles. However, throughout the documents, certain linkages have been drawn between migration and ‘urgency’ in the context of an integrated approach to border controls. This indicates the perception of a ‘danger’ or ‘risk’ (in contrast to an existential threat) that ought to be tackled rapidly. Some could argue that this approach is justified since migration is mentioned in the documents within the context of illegal migration. It is necessary here, however, to consider the fact that asylum seekers migrate, also by illegal means, to the country where they claim international protection. When considered from this aspect; the networking of the discourse of the fight against illegal migration with the discourses of combating crime and the fight against terrorism might brand asylum seekers as suspects of criminal activity and obscure their legitimate intentions of movement. The documents interpreted as such have arguably framed migration issues as having some aspect of security, but only to a limited extent. This is especially the case because, first, both the EC and the Turkish authorities propose measures for the training of border personal on the issues of refugees and asylum seekers. Second, Turkey is requested to establish “a nation-wide screening mechanism to identify asylum-seekers among detained illegal migrants and improved access to asylum procedures” (Progress Report 2003).

Drawing upon the securitisation theory of the Paris School, it is also analysed whether particular security technologies and bureaucratic policies, which are required to be implemented by Turkey as part of its accession to the Union, have constructed migration and asylum in security terms. In this regard, the analysis of tight visa regulations, border control measures and readmission agreements with the member states and the EU itself and the third countries of origin and transit has concluded that insecurity is inscribed into asylum and migration related themes.
through complicated linkages between policy issues, and negotiations in favour of short-term political interests and fears of the EU and Turkey. These policies provide the tools and technological devices for management of migration and asylum on the basis of policing and defence in the EU. In this context, the movement of migrants and asylum seekers is controlled whilst they are still residing in their countries of origin through Schengen visa policy; on the physical borders of the EU through border control measures; and inside the EU territory through readmission agreements.
1 References

10.1 Books/Articles


10.2 Official Documents

Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (2001/235/EC)

Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (2003/398/EC)

Council Decision of 23 January 2006 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (2006/35/EC)

Council Decision of 18 February 2008 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing decision 2006/35/EC (2008/157/EC)


‘Turkey’s 2005 Action Plan on Asylum and Migration’ prepared by Task Force for the Asylum-Migration Action Plan bringing together officials from relevant Ministries Institutions and Organisations entered into force on 25.03.2005 upon the approval of the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan of the document no. B.05.1.EGM.0.13.03.02.

10.3 Interviews

Anonymous, Chief Superintendent in the Turkish Ministry of the Interior Migration and Asylum Bureau; Lecturer in the Turkish National Police Academy, Ankara, 13 June 2011.
Anonymous, the UNHCR staff member, Ankara, 9 June 2011.
Anonymous, the UNHCR staff member, Ankara, 12 June 2011.
Aktar, Cengiz. Academic staff member, Chair of European Union Relations Department, Bahçeşehir University, İstanbul; former UNHCR staff member, İstanbul, 1 June 2011.
Tokuzlu, Bertan Lami. Academic staff member, Faculty of Law, Bilgi University, İstanbul, 30 May 2011.
Appendix 1

Interview Guide

General Questions

- What progress has been made in the last five years in the field of migration and asylum in Turkey? In your opinion, what role do humanitarian concerns play in the progress made? What role does security play?

- How do you evaluate the impact of the EU accession process?

Readmission Agreements

- Why do you think the EU wants to sign a readmission agreement with Turkey? Why has Turkey not signed it?

- Do you think Turkey should sign a readmission agreement with the EU? Why?

- What would be the impact of a readmission agreement between the EU and Turkey on asylum seekers?

Chapter 24 of the Accession Negotiations

- Chapter 24 of the EU screening process covers policy fields such as migration, border controls, asylum, the fight against terrorism, judicial cooperation, drugs, etc. How do you evaluate the tackling of such diverse policy fields together in the accession negotiations?

- What do you think the EU’s priorities are in the negotiations on Chapter 24? What do you think Turkey’s priorities are?

- What do you think the extent of resorting to technology in the tackling of issues under Chapter 24 is?
Visa Policy

- How does the EU accession process affect Turkey’s visa regulations? What is the impact on Turkey’s relations with the neighbouring regions?