The institutionalisation of political parties in Malawi

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Abstract

One important part of democratic consolidation is the institutionalisation of the party system and parties as they are central in that process. Party system institutionalisation in Africa has been a growing subject the last 20 years. In this paper I will present my theory and my findings from interviews with 24 interviewees including politicians, journalists and academia in Malawi during April and May in 2011. The findings will show a clear problematic institutionalisation process. The five areas of research; ideology versus personalisation, connection to other groups in society, intern democratic function, funding, partisanship and coherence all show a systematic lack of institutionalisation.

Central parts of issue are the neopatrimonial system, the misuse of parties as personal properties and tools for power. There are no strong ideological bonds to other groups in society, a lack of registered members and democratic primary elections and a political culture holding on to the history of one-party rule are all contributing factors to the Malawian party system we see today.

*Key words:* Malawi, Parties, Institutionalisation, Ideology, Democratisation

Number of words: 10 525
Abbreviations

CCAP - Church of Central Africa, Presbyterian
DPP – Democratic Progressive Party
MCP – Malawi Congress Party
MDP – Malawian Democratic Party
MEC – Malawi Electoral Commission
MP – Member of Parliament
NDA- National Democratic Alliance
PaPe – Presidential and Parliament election
PP – People’s Party
UDF – United Democratic Front
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1 Introduction & question

“Political parties created modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties”, Schattschneider (1942:1) once wrote. What I and others do believe the essence of the quote is that in the democratic development, parties do play a dominant role in structuring the political arena; they distribute candidates and compete for public office; and, ultimately, parties form and structure the functioning of democratic governments (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966).

The transition from authoritarian rule to a stable democracy is a long and often delicate process. Important parts of that process towards democratic consolidation are the elites’ and the public’s acceptance and trust in the institutions of democracy (Hermanns, 2009). The political parties are one of many vital institutions of that transition. Maybe the most vital part of the parties’ role in the democratic development is elections, (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966, Sartori, 1976, Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007) but they are also the teachers and voices of politics and representatives of the parliament. The parties chart the possible choices in a democratic election.

There is however a difference between the parties and the party systems in the developed and developing world. The most important difference is that the industrial democracies’ party systems are institutionalised in a larger extent than in less developed countries (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005:24f). Theoretical literature until the 80’s focused on industrial democracies, as there were few democracies or semi-democracies in the less developed countries. We could however see a development of literature observing the less developed worlds’ party institutionalisation at the start of the third wave of democratisation (Huntington, 1991). With democratisation, party competition became a part in these countries. Even after 20 years since Huntington’s “third wave of democratisation” in Africa started, some literature argue development of these party systems has not been institutionalized as many Western democratic parties had in their countries’ democratic consolidation (Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005:3f).

The area of investigation in this paper has been the party system institutionalisation in Malawi by benchmarks from my own new theory. My main question is:

- How strong or weak is the institutionalisation of the three major political parties in Malawi?
1.1 Method & Material

A qualitative, interview based, case study has been chosen since the aim is to reach a greater knowledge about individuals’ views. The reason to not base the method in secondary data merely is most of all due to the lack of reliable facts as well as it is a changing process easy becoming old (Svåsand & Khembo, 2007:228).

The collection of data consists of 17 interviews with politicians from different parties in Malawi:

• 7 from the ruling party DPP
• 5 from the former ruling party UDF
• 4 from main opposition party today, which also is the former one-party and former dictators party MCP
• 2 independent candidates

I have also interviewed three journalists, two from The Nation and one from The Guardian. Three interviews have also been done with people within the academic area. This research consists 24 interviews in total.

Since the aim of my own research is to understand the view of partisanship, ideological grounds and democratic values I see a qualitative research as the appropriate. Amundsen (2001:44) is furthermore stating that quantitative data is pre-mature in the observation of political party institutionalisation. Qualitative research has an ambition to study something in its normal surrounding and trying to interpret it as well as give it meaning (Snape & Spencer, 2003: 2f). The choice of method has given me a good opportunity understanding contexts (March and Stoker, 2002:197), e.g. the process behind decisions as well as more sensitive subjects like leadership culture. A qualitative research is also positive in terms of answers opening up for new views and ideas (Esaiasson et al., 2007: 288). The method gives possibilities of unexpected answers, opening up for new questions and (Esaiasson et al., 2007:298) the possibility of asking questions depending on what the participant is answering can give more complete and correct answers (Esaiasson et al., 2007:288).

The interviews were semi-structured. I believe it is very hard with no structure; which as form is rather unique (Kvale, 2007:74). On the other hand with too much structure I would not have the possibility of re-questions if I get an interesting answer that I did not have in mind (Esaiasson et al., 2007:89). The structure additionally let me ask contemporary questions, e.g. political happenings developed during my research period.

Language can be a barrier in these kind of researches but it has not been an issue as English is the official language and MP need to have either a diploma in English or have to go through an English test to be MPs (Patel & Torstensen, 2007:88) and the respondents were all working in English in their jobs as journalists or at universities.

As known, the personal chemistry is important for successful interaction; this is also the case in research interviews. The so-called interviewer effect
(Mikkelsen, 2005:177) can have an impact on the responses, a fact important to bear in mind. As a white person, European, academic and in some sense a representative of the donor community could my position as an authority be significant. However, considering the fact that I am younger than the whole group of interviewed, in a cultural context where age is an important indication of authority can the relation between the interviewer and the interviewees still be regarded to be somewhat balanced in my point of view. This is also my experience in similar meetings during my earlier visits in Malawi. To reduce the impact of the interview effect I was wearing the normal dress code, suit and tie, during every interview. In case of an interview effect, the effect should be same in at least that sense. The place of the interviews has been in different places even though the majority with MPs have been in the parliament’s lounge. The reason not having all MPs’ interviews at the same place was because all MPs were not feeling comfortable having the interview in a public place like the parliament’s lounge as well as MPs did not always live close to the parliament. The informant interviews were held at their offices, at the newspapers headquarters or at the university of Malawi, Chancellor College.

My choice of respondents and informants has been based on two methods, random selection and the snowball sampling. Informants are interviewees that have certain knowledge or certain roles that are of specific interest for the study. Their profession or earlier studies in the subject were the reason of selection. The selection of respondents started at random by sending out a request to MPs having an e-mail. Through these informants and respondents I did get in contact with other respondents, with the method of so-called snowball sampling (Esaiasson, 2003: 286f). I did have in mind that this method could be misleading, as the interviewees probably would lead me to allies and friends of them as well as maybe a younger group due to the use of e-mail. To counteract these risks I did also seek opponents, by help from informants, of the respondents to get a broader picture in the research.

The purpose of interviewing, normally seen as neutral sources, like academia and media is to get another point of view to confirm the politicians’ view but also to see if there is a difference between politicians and other institutions in society. The choice of academia and media as alternative sources is based on that they both are important players in a democracy and at the same time seen to be the one having a guardian purpose in a democracy.

With a couple exceptions due to privacy, were all interviews recorded. The Swedish research council has been the foundation of my ethical aspects during the whole process (Vetenskapsrådet, 2011).

My second source was academic articles and literature. This source has been chosen due to that it gives a good picture of what is already stated about the countries party institutionalisation and democratic consolidation in an academic view as well as comparison to other countries. The decision of using academic sources is also based on the criteria of cumulatively. I used already, based assumption to see differences and possible developments within the party institutionalisation. The research is in an area very up-to-date and the study can be seen as a continuity of already made academic writings. The literature has been
collected first of all at the Malawian parliament’s library and secondly through Lund University’s LibHub.

1.2 Purpose

Many see the institutionalisation of parties as one vital part of the process towards democratic consolidation (Kalua, 2011:48).

Elections are vital for democracy, as we know it today. Political parties can be considered to the most important part of an election (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:265; Chisinga, 2009:136; Svåsand & Khembo 2007:209; Randall & Svåsand, 2002:5) and as Lipset (2000) concludes it; political parties are indispensible for democracy. They are the glue between the citizens and the leading institutions of a state. The parties articulate and advocate diverse preferences and views, something a democratic system requires someone is doing (Kalua, 2011:48). Political parties have always played a key role in the democratisation process (Maliyambono, 2003:255). O’Dwyer (2006: 22, 29) also see an institutionalised party system as the only hinder against patronage politics, a widespread issue on the African continent and the formation of a more effective and less expansive state.

Many democracies emerging during the early 1990 have been struggling with democratic consolidation and many of them have turned into defective democracies (Chisinga, 2009:117). My purpose of investigating the political parties is appropriate due to their role in a democracy and the general weak democratic consolidation we have seen in Africa.

The aim of this study is to understand the party institutionalisation in Malawi through the politicians themselves as they are the main actors within the political parties.

In the following chapter I will explain the theoretical framework and the operationalisation of party institutionalisation.
2 Theory

2.1 Definition and framework

Carothers (2002) argues that transition from a non-democratic system is not always the same as transition towards democracy and democratic consolidation. Their and similar statements opens up the area of research in this paper as it questions the term of democratisation. My theory is concentrated to one of many parts of democratisation, the institutionalisation of the political parties.

The definitions of parties are many as well as the definitions of institutionalisation. My definition of institutionalisation derives from Huntington’s (1968:12) definition of institutionalisation “as a process where organisations or procedures acquire stability and value”. Kalua (2011:47f) supplement his proclamation by saying that organisations are not always institutions and vice versa, but organisation over time, to an irregular level, become institutions. In summary should this lead to a process where political parties after some time transforms into institutionalised parties but Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) declare that party system volatility is not affected by time in creating a less volatile party system. Party system institutionalisation is by these inputs a process leading to stability and more value-based organisations over an unpredictable time.

Khembo (2004:89) defines parties as “a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election”. Maliyambo (2003:259) defines it as “an organisation aimed at holding political office; a platform for people to express their views; and an apparatus for democratic governance”.

Mangolowondo and Svåsand (2009:266) see the difference between political parties and other forms of collective activity as an organisation which is a private association but they produce a public output i.e. values, candidates and policies.

The institutionalisation of parties and party system is widely seen as a hand in hand process (Randall & Svåsand, 2002:6). In this paper I will not see a difference in party system institutionalisation and party institutionalisation, I will see the processes as hand in hand succession.

2.2 Operationalisation

The qualities needed to create institutionalised parties are extensively argued (Kalua 2011:49). I have, as explained before, chosen a qualitative method and
benchmarks based on qualitative inputs. The theory based on a mix from different
theories and scholars.

My starting point has been Magolowondo’s and Svåsand’s definition of an
institutionalised party system as a continuity of party alternatives across elections,
a close relationship between party constitution and the way the party de-facto
operates and predictability of party competition and cooperation.

The theory of this paper is based on three main chapters and two sub-chapters
• Ideology vs. Personalisation
  o Connection to other groups in society
• Intern democratic function
  o Coherence & partisanship
• Funding

The theory’s three main and two sub guidelines are all connected. In terms of
ideology and personalisation is the funding as well as intern democratic function
very important and they all affect each other. To be noted is that I will not define
what creates what instead will the benchmarks function as indicators to where we
can set Malawi’s party institutionalisation today.

2.3 Ideology versus personalisation

An institutionalised party should be a “social organisation apart from its
momentary leaders, while regularly engaging in valued patterns of behaviour”
(Kalua, 2011:47). Ideology is an important part of a party as this defines the basic
values of a party and function as a compass as in what direction the party can go
in party’s realisation of their politics (La Palombara and Weiner, 1966). Kings M.
Phiri uses following definition of the term ideology:

“an ideology we will take to mean a broad articulation of vision
about the national situation or reality a given people would
like to have or to live under” (Phiri, 2000:69)

He also clarifies the difference between party programme and
ideology;

“an ideology is a broad statement of goals, a programme is an
outline of specific steps and means that need to be taken in
order to entrench the goals of the state” (Phiri, 2000:69).

During a longer time in the political life where we find ideological valued
based politics can also voters see a predictable future for the parties coming
policies (Svåsand & Khembo, 2007:208)
This first benchmark is defining the maturity of the party and existence without its members and leaders. An ideological based party makes a party system institutionalised as it gives stability. Stability can also generate less volatility. This will in the long run make it easier for politicians bounded to a party to become for example MPs, than independent candidates as the party radiate stability and can acquire trust to a larger extent than independent candidates (Svåsand & Khembo, 2007:208).

“Parties should be more than its leader” (ibid). The opposite kind of party in my theory is called personalised parties. Personalisation of a party is when the party is less than its leader. Instead of a party created around an idea or ideology, is the party created around one person and that person’s ability to get into power. Maturity in terms of ideology and personalisation as Randall & Svåsand (2002:6) defines it, is when the party loses its form of being a tool for some persons to become valuable in itself. An institutionalised party should have a leading group that subordinate private interests for the sake of the party (Basedau & Stroh, 2008:10).

The difference between an ideological, institutionalised party and a personalised, not institutionalised party in terms of ideology is, e.g. if the party can persist a leadership change without a total change of that party’s agenda or in the long run a total collapse of the party. Panebianco (1988) states that even a successful party leading the government during many administrations, still do not need to be considered being institutionalised. That is why for example leadership change can clarify the institutionalisation of a party in terms of personalisation.

Many scholars see the personalisation of parties as one part of neopatrimonialism. One part of neopatrimonialism is politics and parties resolved around “big men”, often gifted with charisma. Typical politics in a neopatrimonial system is based on short-term, populist, and patronage decisions. Political control is basically the only source of getting economic wealth and status (Cammack, 2009:157). Fluid alliances where politicians only seek power to control power as long as possible for their own winning is common (Chisinga, 2009:120). In summary is a personalised party where the greed for power never can be stopped for the sake of its ideological roots, where parties are tools of power instead of value based organisations.

To understand the parties’ ideology or lack of ideology I asked the respondents how they themselves would describe their party’s ideological foundation too see if I could find a red line within the parties.

The meaning of having different parties in a democracy is to give the citizens different political policies to choose between (Svåsand & Khembo, 2007:208). This gives the parties a special role in the democracy. This difference is usually creating dimensions like left and right politics, which also are the basics for possible alliance buildings. We can talk about a need of party polarisation in the system (Svåsand & Khembo, 2007:212-213). Svåsand & Khembo (2007:214) states the need of parties differ “along one or more significant policy dimension”. To force the respondents to really show their view of their ideology I did also ask what party they saw as closer and which once were seen as further away.
Another way to define ideologies in the parties has been to see connections between parties and groups in society, something I will explain in the following chapter.

2.3.1 Connection to other groups in society

The connection to groups in society is a clear way to understand ideological grounds and an easy way for politicians to define their political value basin as well as their parties’. It should be possible for a party to define one group in society they see close to themselves. These groups could be based on e.g. class, ethnic group, geographical area, urban or rural, labour unions, business, farmers or the poor.

It is as well important for parties to define their networks and to show which groups in society they support as this can give them a strong voting base which can contribute to less volatility (Basedau & Stroh, 2008:10).

My way to get an understanding about the connection was to ask the respondents how they defined their party’s connection. I wanted to see how the party’s leading members were defining their own party’s connections. This would in a in-direct way force the MPs to clarify their ideology as well.

2.4 Intern democratic function & level of organisation

As parties are the main players in many democratic institutions is of course the intern democracy within the parties vital. A democratic elected president candidate within the parties is very vital for the whole election, as the parties’ candidates usually become the strongest candidates. Khembo (2004:110) see the need of a democratic intern function as the foundation of power distribution within the party. Patel and Svåsand (2007:228) argue it as the most important part and function of a party.

Intern party democracy means that party activities must be guided by tolerance, equality, transparency, popular participation and constitutionalism. (Chisinga, 2009:137) Intern democracy is mostly defined by the election of leaders and what that leader can do within that party. In reality can it be the number of meetings where the members have a possibility to influence the agenda of the party and to what extent meetings are open and democratic.

The intern democratic function is also analyzing the feeling of openness during caucuses and the openness towards intern critics towards leadership and party policy.

I asked the MPs how they saw upon democracy in the party, how open and how critical you could be during meetings.
2.4.1 Partisanship – coherence

The essence of partisanship and coherence is to understand how united the parties are e.g. how members accept losing a battle within a party or the possibility of criticising your colleagues without leaving the party and the number of party members crossing the floor. Partisanship and coherence reflects the respect of members towards the party, e.g. procedures for resolving disputes (Kalua, 2011:49). It could be seen as the opposite from intern democracy, where it is about looking at the parties handling of its members, is partisanship about members respect to its own party.

To see the level of partisanship and coherence I asked all questioned about their political history, which political organisations they have been a member of and how MPs respect the party line in e.g. parliamentary votings.

2.5 Funding - membership & autonomy

Economy is important for the survival of a party but as well an easy way to control a party. Membership is one way to give parties an income as well as giving it a larger group of ”workers” within the party. A membership fee also gives the members the right to vote in the party as they support the party economically. A strong membership base is argued to give parties autonomy from other interests in society (Kalua, 2011:50).

Decisional autonomy, as Randall and Svåsand calls it, is the possibility of making independent decision without pressure from sponsor organisations and national bodies having a relationship with the party (Kalua, 2001:50).

This benchmark is generally looking at the funding of the party, which is hardly connected to membership autonomy. To understand the funding as well as the autonomy I asked how transparent the process of funding is in their parties and how the MPs saw on the need of membership and autonomy from other interests. This benchmark could be seen as the opposite to the benchmark connections to other groups in society (2.3.1). It is however mostly pointing at the funding and its relationship to the party’s autonomy. The earlier benchmark concerning connections in society is looking at connections in terms of values and ideology.

I will now explain in short the historical background of Malawi and afterwards present the findings of my research.
3 Malawi

The history of the country has shaped the parties of today, I will shortly present the last 55 years of the country’s political development.

3.1 Malawi, from independence to one party rule

Malawi became an independent country in 1964. Similar to other countries in the region democracy was not the first development. Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda became president for life just after the independence. The president was though forced to democratic reforms during the 90’s and lost the multiparty election in 1994. Malawi was one of few countries in Africa during the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), having a change of governing party. (Rakner & Svåsand, 2010: 1254f)

During Dr. Banda’s regime had media, civil society and any political organisation or people obstructing his rule been forced away in different forms. Malawi during this era was called the “culture of silence” (Mkandawire, 2003: 17). Membership in the ruling one-party MCP was mandatory to use public buses, get treated in hospitals or to buy food in stores. The four pillars of MCP were unity, discipline, loyalty and obedience. Malawi Young Pioneers was the paramilitary group controlling ordinary citizens to purchase these cards, collect contribution to the honourable president and they were always looking for nkhope zachilendo, strange faces and rebels. Some organisations were banned, for example Jehovah’s Witness were banned due to that they did not let its members to buy the MCP membership cards. Big demonstration in the honour for Dr. Banda was also common and during these meetings would all be obligated to show their Kamuzu flower, MCP’s membership card (Muula & Chanika, 2005:27).

3.2 Multi-party democracy

The 14 of June 1993 a National referendum was held in which Malawians were given the choice of one-party rule or multi-party rule. The result for the referendum in 1993 was an overwhelming support for the multi-party system and the year after Malawi held its first democratic elections in modern time. Different pressure groups, church organisations, donors, students and labour organisations had organized against the one-party rule. Three parties were formed from being
pressure groups during the early 90’s (UNDP, 2001). They were AFORD, UDF and MDP and these parties are today together with MCP the only one that have participated in all presidential and parliament elections in Malawi.

Bakili Muluzi, Muslim, and from the ethnic group of Yao in the southwestern part, became the first elected president in 1994. Muluzi had earlier been part of MCP, The Young Pioneers and was a close ally to Dr. Banda for long time. MCP was defeated by Muluzi’s UDF and Dr. Banda left the power and the president post without argues.

During his first term Muluzi did change the country drastically, it was a time when Malawi opened up and the poor developed Malawian economy rose. Muluzi won the election 1999 as well but in the election of 2004 he was barred from running again due to the constitution. Handpicked by Muluzi, Bingu wa Mutharika became UDF’s new leader and in the election 2004 Mutharika became the third leader since independence as he won the presidential election. After the election Mutharika resigned from UDF and started his own party called DPP. From 2004 until 2009 we could see a struggle between DPP and UDF, Mutharika and Muluzi. Muluzi had believed to control Mutharika from his position as chairman in UDF but when Mutharika broke out of the party he lost all his power over the president post (Chisinga, 2009:123ff).

The move from UDF to his own DPP created tension (Report MEC, 2009:51). To get power in the parliament, Mutharika got a lot of MPs to cross the floor and join his newly started party. This started a long fight as the constitution’s section 65 state that MPs crossing the floor should be declared vacant of their seat (Chinsinga, 2009:128). The issue of section 65 lead to a crisis where the opposition did not want to let the budget go through if not MPs that crossed the floor were declared not being welcomed to the parliament (Chinsinga, 2009:126). The section 65 cumulative result was a paralyzed parliament and increased expenses (Rakner & van der Walle, 2009:113).

In the election of 2009 DPP was the winning party and Mutharika won the presidential election (Rakner & Svåsand, 2010: 1254f). DPP and Mutharika won the election with a significant majority with twice as many votes as his closest rival John Tembo (Chisinga, 2009:115). This was the first time a president and party won with substantial majority since 1993. A new trend were the independent candidates getting more and more seats (second largest group behind DPP in parliament). The three first elections, in 1994, 1999 and 2004, had a clear three party construction with regional based parties but in the latest of 2009, we can see a more fragmented party system with lots of independent candidates and more parties but with one strong leading party, the DPP. (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:289)

PP is the newest registered party started by vice president Joyce Banda after a conflict with president about the issue of his successor many argues (Khumbo, 22/5; Kayuni 28/4). The president was said to wanting his brother, Peter Mutharika, taking over but Banda and former 2nd vice president Khumbo wanted a democratic election.
In the tables 1 and 2 you can see the results from the presidential and the parliamentary elections since 1994 to 2009. Remarkable numbers are the loss of mandate for UDF, MCP and Aford and the growth of DPP and independents.

**Table 1**

% of seats for the parties/independents (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:291)

**Table 2**

% in presidential election, winner and runner-up (Patel, 2010:7)
4 Findings

4.1 Ideology

Parties founded in a clear ideology would not have the same problems as the parties in Malawi, states Maliyambono (2003:262). Phiri (2000:68) and Maliyambono (2003:234) argue that some of current problems in Malawi are due to the lack of ideology in the parties. This includes fuzziness and the opaqueness among political leaders. The authors also state that the lack of ideology is seen in the many switches between parties. Khumbo (22/5) former 2nd vice president and MP has moved from MCP to UDF, continued to DPP and are now in the start-up of PP. The handling of the parties as personal property makes it very hard to stay in one, was his answer to his behaviour. Personal gain is usually the reason and not political change switching party, Maseko (13/5) argued. The editor at Malawi’s biggest newspaper, the Nation, Edward Chitsulo (25/4), talked about a tragedy in terms of ideology. No ideological bonds make the parties unpredictable and they seek opportunistic and short-term solutions as they have no values to follow (Cammack, 2009: 158). Malawian parties are “issue pushers” and by that unsystematic, declare Khembo (2004:103).

During 2004 to 2009 Malawi had a rise in economic terms. Chisinga (2009:139) argued however that the politics were characterised by politics of survival and opportunism. The parties are, states Cammack (2009:157), more centred around one leader, than one ideology and all party platforms are almost the same. The politics is more about a personal career than achieving anything in a political, ideological way. The lack of ideological identity of the parties makes it hard to recognize them in terms ideological differences and therefore do people need other substitutes to choose party. Politics in Malawi have been recognised of being based on regionalism and ethnicity but especially personalisation of the parties based on its leader (Kayuni, 28/4).

Malawian parties are weakly founded in any political ideology (Phiri, 2000:73) and by that lack any kind of vision for the future in a long term. It could though be argued that MCP has been a rather conservative party during democracy as well as during the one-party system. (Phiri, 2000:74) UDF has been seen to be grounded in Western liberal ideologies; the problem is that the leaders seem to be against these ideals today (Phiri, 2000:75). Jagieya (11/5) viewed UDF as a socialistic party but others saw it as a liberal party and Kamba (8/5) saw UDF as a party without any ideology. Hon. Kayembe do not think there is an ideology within the party of MCP even though he would say that it is a more conservative party compared to UDF and DPP. He argues that his party, MCP, always has been routed around a view of it as the mother party. The other parties have all
developed in some way from MCP, a reality everyone interviewed agree upon. Loyalty, obedience, discipline, unity are the four cornerstones of the party. Kayembe and Gwengwe agree that it is challenging to use these words in democracy. The party leadership can use these cornerstones in the wrong way like the word of loyalty when someone goes against the party leadership. An anonym MP in DPP describes party politics as personalised and especially leader centred. Most MPs cannot define their parties’ ideology and not either the difference between their party and others. Hon. Chiumia explain this by the will to be in the middle of the political spectra. Hon. Asibu however wants to describe DPP as a more right, liberal party, his UDF as more socialistic and MCP is just still in politics due to their history as a strong party. Kamanya (10/5) see the problems in too many parties even though he wants do describe DPP and UDF as similar and MCP as the more conservative party. Herbert Bokosi (10/5) believes it will take a will for his party to form ideological roots as it started as a party most of all against UDF.

Ibrahim (29/5) said it is very hard to understand the differences between the parties. No one of the informants can see a clear ideological difference between the three parties, instead do they see a strong connection between leader charisma and party’s result in elections. Kayuni (28/4) described it as a lack of value basis. He takes DPP’s birth as an example where a personality clash did DPP to emerge. DPP was not formed with another ideological agenda. Due to this he believed that before the next election, we will see many MPs leaving DPP as the party has become so unpopular since the last election. It is another sign of parties without identity, “they are not rigid”, he states.

Chirwa (1994:93ff) talks about too election centred parties. Parties come to life in time of election (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:276). Party manifestos are usually produced very late in election time and has a weak input to the election campaign as e.g. are produced in English and in limited quantity. Scholars do generally see no real ideological red line in the manifestos and usually are same ideas mentioned in all parties’ manifestos. (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:284ff)

It is clearly hard to predict possible alliances between parties. The parties’ relationship to each other could almost be seen as self-destructing (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:291). An example was the quick alliance between UDF and MCP in the last election when the both parties criticised allied to each other party even though they together were one big alliance at same time as MCP and UDF for long time been antagonists. The quick alliance of the former enemies was clearly an example of using the parties as tools to reach greater political power neglecting the parties’ history and values (Mussa, 26/4).

Chitsulo (25/4) see MPs as very locally based. Serving your own constituency is the best way to get re-elected (Patel & Torstensen, 2007:95). That is also the general opinion from questioned MPs; they see the commitment to their constituencies as more important compared to their parties. This makes party ideology even less important.

To summarise we can see a personalisation of the parties. A clear sign of this has been during the change of leadership. We could see this during the switch in
UDF when Mutharika replaced Muluzi and DPP is already starting to break as vice president Joyce Banda is breaking out and is in the start-up of her own party, PP (Kalua, 4/5).

4.1.1 Connection to other groups in society

It is hard to see any strong connection between any party and any group in society in terms of values. There is though still a strong voting pattern in the areas of Mangochi and Machinga where UDF got its voting base. In the last election they only won constituencies in these areas. The same geographical connection we can see in MCP’s stronghold, the central region. MCP did not win in any constituency outside the central region.

It is clear that MPs’ connections are stronger connected to their home area in comparison to their parties. Constituencies are more important for a large majority of the interviewed MPs (Gwenge 2/5; Ladi, 9/5). They see themselves as mostly representing its home area and it is their will that should be most important for them as MPs. The party and the nation will always come in second place says most of them.

In terms of religion, there are some respondents and informants that want to state that the Muslim community is strongly connected to UDF due to that Muluzi is a Muslim and that the Yao tribe is a Muslim tribe (Kamba, 8/5). The Muslim community is also strongly connected to the two strongholds of UDF. Few would state that this is a relationship based on ideological foundation. It is more based on the personal belief of its founder and members of the party, the village’s son in heart of the political system. Kamba (8/5) says “Let me be frank, Muluzi came from my district, I did not have a choice in choosing party. I could not look at ideology or policies”.

The relationship between Bingu wa Mutharika, who is a member of the catholic community, and John Tembo, who is a member of the CCAP community, seems nevertheless to be weaker than Muluzi’s and UDF’s connection to the Muslim community. It seems like these religious connections are based on the leaders’ belief and to what religious he belongs to. Kings M. Phiri (2000:68) argues that Malawian political parties are not strongly connected to any religious class or ethnic group. He makes this conclusion in comparison to other African countries were these connections are stronger in e.g. Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Cote d’Ivore and Senegal. Kahero (12/5) though state that it will take a long time before a Muslim or a Yao can be the leader of MCP.

In the first three elections we could see a voting pattern based on region, e.g. voted 70 % of the northern population on the same president candidate (Ferree & Horowitz, 2009:537). The election in 2009 gave DPP a landslide victory where the regional voting pattern seemed to have disappeared (Chisinga, 2009:148). Kayuni believed the ethnical aspect has moved into the parties as the party leadership surrounds themselves with “ethnical friends”. Kayuni also believed the last election result was due to an opposition’s struggle in the issue of section 65.
which resulted in crises for people in Malawi. It was a new trend where the good rule by DPP gave them votes breaking the regional voting pattern. However, two years after the election almost no one would vote for DPP in the northern region, he says. No recent data were though found to strengthen his statement. The broken voting pattern has been replaced by a more volatile voting pattern.

Malawi has not a large middle class population and the largest part of the population is still farmers. One effect of this has been that strong sense of class identity has not been created and no class-based demand like rule of law, fiscal reforms or predictable politics been pushed for, states Cammack (2009:164). Gwengwe (2/5) see the lack of connections due to the lack of ideology. With no ideology is it very hard to build connections to other groups, he told me. Many see politicians as a person coming every five years to pay them so they vote for that person. There is a lack of knowledge in many parts of Malawi talking about ideology and the role of the political parties, there are few interests groups in society (Patel & Mpesi, 2009:310). That is also why we do not have these connections, Gwengwe (2/5) states.

To sum it up, we can see connections between religion and parties but it seems like it is based on the leaders’ religious faith more than an ideological similarity between a specific party and a specific religion. Connections in terms of similar agendas or ideologies were not found in my research or in the literature.

4.2 Intern democracy

The president and the MPs are the most powerful entities in a party. That is also making the process of electing them very important. None of the three parties, MCP, UDF and DPP has in their constitution a procedure for nomination of parliamentary candidates which makes it rather easy for the parties themselves to look democratic as they have no rules to follow (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:276). Munthali (27/4) is claiming that it has not been a real democratic convention in any of the big parties. Kalua (4/5) agrees and he see a lack of any kind of forum were the members can give their approval of the leadership.

“You either need to be hand-picked or start your own party to become the leader that is only way to reach power in politics in Malawi, to become a powerful man”,

said Vitima Mkandawire (20/4). The leaders of today are too paranoid what will happened to them after leaving their post so they either want their hand-picked person to take over or they die at the post protecting it, even if it will destroy the party, Munthali (29/7) and Hon. Luka (17/5) state.

Tenthani (2009:4) states that political parties in Malawi “have operated as single intolerant and antagonistic entities”. They also argue that culture within the parties have led to inter-party violence and the split of many parties. Rakner and Svåsand (2010:1259) believe this is because of party leaders being too dominant
on a personal level. “A few people’s game” is Edward Chitsulo (25/4) portrayal in terms of democracy within the parties. “It is clear that the leaders are shaping their parties strongly” is Eprahim Munthali (29/7) stating.

In interviews with MPs, I could recognize two groups; one that saw democratic parties and one group of critical voices describing a very negative picture in terms of internal democratic function. The group of negative voices were clearly larger. Chiumia (3/5) and Luka (17/5) however thought the election of Mutharika as party president was acceptable even though he was the only candidate. That nobody went against the president was not about fear, they both state, everybody he has the best possible candidate. Chiumia (3/5) also states that the party is in the hands of its members and they are the ones choosing its leader. Asibu on the other hand described it like this,

"..."democracy is new thing in Malawi. There is some kind of dictatorship within the leadership in the parties. It is too much respect towards the leaders.” (Asibu, 11/5)

Khumbo (22/5) described a party, free and open as long as you did not criticise the leadership. In 2005, when the party started with some members, DPP did choose their leader but since then has nothing happened, he appoints everyone personally and no one questions his appointments or decisions. Khumbo (22/5) argues that the leaders see themselves as semi-gods. Anonyms MP does not see DPP as democratic party and plans to leave the party for the newly started PP. (Anonym 2) Hon Kamba see UDF as non-democratic, especially as the conventions are just giving a good look but everything is prearranged. He also states that the leader and his closest allies are deciding the party’s line. Gwengwe (2/5) and Kayembe (4/5) have a similar view as the anonyms MP in DPP and Kamba (8/5). The parties are top-controlled with no consensus building with members or with other MPs. Kayembe (4/5) takes the last election as an example where MCP had done a really bad result but no one dared to face the leadership with critic. In MCP does it seems to be an age gap states both Kayembe and Gwenge, the younger generation is starting to be too loud for the older and more powerful group in the party, a possible split is near, they said. They both left or were about to leave MCP during the time I was visiting the country.

Generally it seems to be a more positive views from members from the ruling party’s MPs (e.g. Hon. Bokosi, Hon. Kamanya, Hon Chiumia) but those who are anonyms in DPP are very critical. In one interview the interviewed ask me to stop the recording and after that he told me about fear and lack of democracy in DPP. Kahero (12/5) and others were talking about the leadership in DPP already started to impose the president’s brother to take over after his retirement. Former 2\textsuperscript{nd} vice president Khumbo (22/5), tried to stop this but got expelled with vice president Joyce Banda as they were seen as problems supporting democratisation of the party’s leadership election. They both later started PP with Banda as party leader.
“We are now friends at the moment but when Banda is getting more power I will not be her friend anymore if I am going against her, you do not criticise a leader with power in Malawi”

Khumbo (22/5) stated in our interview. Power seems to create problems but it seemed to be more conflict in the opposition parties stated Maliyambono (2003:262) in 2003. My findings are pointing at a more open opposition today, both MCP’s and UDF’s MPs were highly critical but were not afraid of criticising their leaders even in newspapers, e.g. Gwengwe and Kayembe.

Blessings Chisinga (2009:137) see a lack of democratic approach by leaders in all parties looking at conventions and primary elections during 2009. No one challenged John Tembo or Muluzi as presidential candidates in their parties, in UDF was this maybe because Muluzi paid the whole convention (Chisinga, 2009:136). Annual conventions are rare. DPP has still not held any convention since their enormous growth and UDF held one 1994 and one in 2004 and MCP’s are prearranged (Kamba, 8/5; Bokosi, 10/5; Khumbo, 22/5). Too expensive and opens up for critic against the leaders says Svåsand & Khembo, (2007:227) is the reason for the lack of conventions. Munthali (30/4) says this is a clear sign of the lack of democratic parties. The editor of the Guardian (owned by the president indirectly), Bakili Maulidi (29/4) is not very critical towards the democratic function within the parties even though members could have more to say but it is too costly in his point of view. Chitsulo’s (25/4) view of the democracy within the parties is an open and vibrant organisation until decisions are taken, then is it only about the leader and the group around him. Yona (12/5) believes the conventions that have been held so far has been democratic in MCP and in other parties as he understands. Ibrahim (29/4) is though highly critical and he is not alone. What we though could see in 2003 was UDF going against its leader when Muluzi strived for a third term as president, the constitution declared only two terms were possible and the party voted against Muluzi’s attempt to make it to a third term. Ladi (9/5) see this as a clear sign of democratic roots in the parties.

In UDF many primaries were never held due to the leadership’s happiness with members in those constituencies (Chisinga, 2009:137f). Inadequate primary elections are the reason for the growing number of independent candidates (Patel & Mpesi, 2009:307; Kamba (8/5)) At the same time do many independent candidates winning seats in the parliament seek for partnership with the leading party. Abele Kayembe (4/5) explained it like this “If you support the government you will get development in your constituency”. We can see this structure in the parliament where DPP get most of the independents to join their side.

A lack of grassroots is a general problem within the parties. (Patel & Mpesi, 2009:315). Party membership is important as a communication tool and keeps the party together beyond elections. (Khembo, 2004:105) Lack of membership register makes it also possible for non-members in primaries to vote for a candidate, compromising the trustworthiness of all elections (Patel & Mpesi, 2009:307).
In summary we can see a political culture still hanging on to the history. Personalisation of the parties influences the democratic part of party in a bad way. The openness and possibility of criticising your own leaders are not many, sometimes even leading threats and violence. There is a lack of real democratic functions within the parties affecting the primary elections making many party candidates to go for an independent candidature, which in the long run can destroy the now leading parties from within. Mkandawire (20/4) believe we will see more parties emerging because MPs and politicians see a lack of democracy and do not see a possible way to develop within the established parties if you do not have right connections.

4.2.1 Coherence and partisanship

“Power struggles tare the parties apart” said Jagieya (11/5). In 1994 there were seven political parties registered, in 2009 was that number 35. Most parties have emerged from one of the mainstream parties and actually all have been a response to MCP from the beginning. It is only DPP that have had a significant impact on the politics of Malawi after the emerge of UDF (Chisinga, 2009:136).

Cammaack (2009:156) talks about “politics of chameleons”. As an example one member in UDF left the party, criticized the unfair elections and misuse of state resources in the party but he later on re-joined the party’s leading function. Brown Mpinganjira is another example of the lack of coherence and partisanship. From being in UDF he formed NDA, his own party, in 2004. He left NDA and joined Mutharika’s cabinet after the election in 2004. He later left the cabinet to re-join the UDF and became organising secretary just so he before 2009 became MCP’s president candidate Tembo’s running mate as vice president candidate (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:278).

Generally in my research I could see a strong partisanship talking to MPs, but Mkandawire (20/4) argued this due to fear of losing its position in the party. Mussa (26/4), Kalua (4/5) and Kayuni (28/4) say that MPs going against the party line will lose in business or in other personal interests as the party leadership usually have a strong impact even outside politics. Munthali (30/4) state however that there is a line where MPs can go against their parties’ leadership. An example was when Muluzi wanted to go against the constitution but his party voted against him in 2003.

Chiiumia (3/5) says “it is good to criticize, but you have to do it in the right forum”. She explains this as in the parliament; the party has to be uniformed against the other parties. “In the democratic and open caucuses can you go against the leadership but in the house you need to go with the party’s line”, says Hon. Asibu (11/5). Maseko (13/5) does not agree and would not define the caucuses as democratic. Kamanya (10/5) says that he was threaten in his former party MCP, also stating that his former colleague Kayembe (4/5) was beaten when he went against the party’s leadership. DPP is much more open, he says. Kayembe himself said “some are afraid in open elections to go against the leadership but
not me”. Kayembe is by e.g. an anonym MP (Anonym 1, 17/5), criticised going against an older MP and party president as it is against the Malawian culture.

A development the last years has clearly been the growth of independent candidates who do not want to belong to a party or who are not allowed. The number of registered parliamentary candidates by year can be seen in table 3. We can see a fluid and unsettled party system. As said earlier do most believe this is due to the lack of democratic primary elections.

We can see a procedure where it is not very hard to first stand as a candidate for a party in a primary election but loosing that and then run as an independent. Kahero claimed the primary election in his constituency was so dirty and another member got imposed but he won the post in the parliament on an independent ticket. We can also see many independent candidates re-joining parties after they become MPs. Not everybody do though re-join but instead join another party. MPs know that if they join the ruling party they have a bigger chance to get anything done in their constituency and by that get re-elected. Whether many signalled the possible shift of party is hard to tell (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:281), but it is clear that constituencies are more important for the MPs than their parties (Kayembe, 4/5). First of all you represent the constituency and the party is not so important. Parties are though still important as Hon Gamah (23/4) says. Almost all independents in the parliaments have attachments or relationships to one or more parties.

In summary can we see a weak coherence and partisanship where many MPs, stands as independents even though the party has chosen someone else. The reason is rather clear that we can see a connection between the high number of independents and weakly democratic primary elections. The primary elections seem to have lost their function as the trust for these democratic institutions are very weak. Another indication is the parties low value for politicians who most of all see themselves as representatives for their constituencies most of all.

Table 3
Registered parliamentary candidates, by year, party and independents (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:280)
4.3 Funding – membership & autonomy

Like everywhere else has the party with most resources the best chance to win. The difference from Malawian parties and other parties is the big amount of capital coming from the leadership in the parties even though we have seen times of rich bwanas (big men) helping parties’ funding. (Cammack 2009:179)

According to the constitution, parties with at least 10 % of the national seats are permitted to state funding, since 2009 are only two parties, DPP and MCP entitled to the funding. There is no follow-up or transparency of this funding. No one of the interviewed politicians does know what the parties spend the money in the last years. It is a sensitive subject and many argue that questioning the funding is the same as questioning the leadership. It is impossible for a member to question the lack of transparency of the funding if they want to stay in the party, state Magolowondo & Svåsand (2009:281).

The contribution to parties having access to state funding is not enough to run a party (Khumbo, 22/5). This makes external funding from members and others vital. MCP’s finances are based on incomes from properties from the one-party era. DPP is now trying to establish a similar income generations project to make its economy more sustainable (Khumbo, 22/5). UDF has having it very hard financially since Muluzi’s power weakened (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:281).

The only six year old ruling DPP were able to pay the nomination fee for all its parliamentary candidates. DPP had most candidates of all parties. The party was also contributing 2000 t-shirts, 10 rolls of cloths and 30 bicycles for all its candidates for their election campaign in 2009. By far does it seems like DPP has the strongest economy at the moment. Many interviewed argued that much of the resources come from state funds and in majority they get the most bribes from companies like the Mulli Brothers (Jagieya, 11/5). A similar system was also UDF accused for during their era (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:281).

It is not just state funding that biases the economical and political possibilities for parties. When one party is out of power it is no longer getting money from other actors, says Kayuni (28/4). We can see that parties getting no seats in the parliament weaken and usually disappear (Maliyambono, 2003:233). This shows lack of economic stability as well as the economical power is very controlled by parties’ power at the moment.

The parties have no national membership registers (Maliyambono, 2003:235), that many other countries have as an important part of their funding and control function of their grassroots level (Cammack, 2009:178). Earlier counting based on the parties’ own assumption has showed a membership amount almost double of Malawi’s total population, about 18 million members (Magolowondo & Svåsand,
Maliyambono (2003:235) states that without strong grassroots, can the elite control the party without any obstructions.

“There is a connection between the funding and the power of these parties. The one funding the party is the one in power. If he is leaving the party it will be paralyzed. The president absorbs the money.” (Asibu 11/5).

Gwengwe (2/5) argues it is a basic issue how parties are formed with few, often rich, persons. They absorb a lot of money but when they get power they want their money back and the party’s financiers as well. “Parties are born dependent on few persons” (ibid). Gwengwe believes broad grassroots organisations and a membership fee could change this. Then the party would be accountable to its members. The parties are only accountable to the one funding it, state many MPs.

A problem is how people see upon politicians. People see them as moving banks. When UDF was a pressure group we had a free membership but it disappeared. Politics is usually run by parties buying votes through food. That is why parties need money most of all and why the richer population has so much control in Malawi. That puts the party in government or parties in a special position, says Kayuni (28/4). That gives Malawi a reality where the ruling party is always the strongest as they can use the state funds to run their party on another level compared to the other parties.. The only time we have seen a winner who is not the strongest economically was in 1994. ”In 1994 did UDF become strong due to the long rule of dictatorship, UDF was a mass movement at that time against the dictatorship, and people wanted change” (Asibu, 11/5).

Kayuni see one main problem of party funding. All funds today go through the leader, who by this way is getting very much power. It seems like the distinction between personal and state finances for the leaders has weaken radically. (Cammack, 2009:163) Transparency is needed say many informants (Kayuni 28/4; Chitsulo 25/4) and MPs (Maseko 13/5; Ladi 9/5; Jagieya 11/5). Membership fees are also needed to give the parties some basic income many argue (ibid). This is sensitive due to Dr. Banda’s forced membership during the dictatorship. Maliyambono (2003:235) does not believe this is due to the force of membership cards during the dictatorship. He sees it as a clear lack of connection between parties and possible members. It is a way for the elite within the parties to have unquestioned control For example was UDF’s last convention covered by Muluzi (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:281; Basedau & Stroh, 2008:10) which many says he also controlled totally (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:281)

Transparency of the funding in parties is lacking (Rakner & Svåsand, 2010:1269). Talking to many MPs they see a need of a more open funding process to decrease the possibility of bribes and to control parties through money from specific interest, to have autonomy. No one of the MPs seemed to have any idea who supported them within the business area, even though some still had some ideas. Funding is not regulated in Malawian law (Magolowondo & Svåsand, 2009:270), even though the European Union’s (2009) observation in the last
election reported a need of a transparent rule for distribution of money from state and other actors.

To summarize we can see a lack of transparency making the MPs unaware where the party spend their money. The party leadership has a strong grip around the economical aspect and by many scholars argue that this is their way to control the party. It could be seen as a combination where money leads to power and more power to more money and so on.
5 Analyse, discussion & conclusion

Already in 1995 Chirwa said Malawi had undergone a “transition without transformation” (Cammack, 2009: 153) Blessings Chisinga (2009:150) summarize the last twenty years in terms of party institutionalisation as the parties have not functioned as they were expected to do when Malawi became a democracy.

What we could see in the third multiparty election in Malawi, 2004, was an increased turbulence in the party system. An indication of problems in the institutionalisation process is that the system appears fractionalise even more instead of stabilising (Rakner & Svåsand, 2010:1112f). Van de Walle (2003) explanation of this development in many African countries is personalised parties with rent-seeking behaviour of power. This condition hamper or the politicians need for more clearly defined parties ideologically and the possibility to acquire values and stability, both vital for Huntington’s (1968:12) definition of institutionalisation. Few MP could as well define differences between the parties. The reality could today be defined as the absence of ideological contrasts and party polarisation (Svåsand & Khembo., 2007:212-213).

The findings show an unmistakable lack ideology in the parties. Few politicians could point out an ideological foundation and often people from same party described very different ideological grounds. The personalisation of the parties is strong and is also affecting the other benchmarks, like the connection to other groups in society. The weak connections are based on personal level between leader, e.g. the Muslim community in the case of Muluzi and UDF. Omar Sanchez (2008:318) says in his study that democracies from the first and second wave of democratisation have a bigger possibility than the third wave democracies as they were created in another era. “In a post-cold war world ideology no longer acts as a powerful glue binding citizens and parties” (Sanchez, 2008: 317). Parties are in these countries “simply less central in fostering identity”.

Kayuni (28/4) stated that the civil society has an important role in educating the population, an education in how parties should be shaped and their function. Ordinary citizens do not understand what the parties should do and how they are not function nowadays. They do not know what they should demand. The parties could also do this but as they lack any kind of stronger to most ordinary citizens in terms of education is this outcome probably not happening. Kayuni (28/4) argues that there is no link between the political parties and the grassroots.

The intern-democracy is also highly affected by the personalisation. The example where members are afraid to criticise their leaders is common in every party. Conventions are unique and if they are held it does seem to be questionable when the leaders pay them from their pockets like in the case of Muluzi. The
political culture in Malawi does not seem to be formed by democratic values. Unity, discipline, loyalty and obedience are in some ways not only the four cornerstones of MCP. All parties have connections to MCP and the slogans from the one-party era. Non of Chisinga’s (2009:137) demands on intern democracy; tolerance, equality, transparency, popular participation and constitutionalism are fulfilled.

A real issue is that some influential party members have been seen in different parties and it seems like a process sanctioned by many. The turbulent party system in itself does not need to hamper institutionalisation but lack of accountability will affect voters. Possible outcomes will in long run breed cynicism and apathy within the population. Voters can never be sure what they get as there is so much movement between elections (Cammack, 2009:159)

Funding of the parties is in many ways the fertilisation of the leaders greed and possibility to keep a strong grip around their parties. The possibility for the ruling party to control states funds and the leaderships’ possibility distributing its party’s resources unquestioned in a non-transparent way is withholding the personalisation of the parties and the lack of parties with autonomy. The elites are not letting the members be a part of the democratic process within the parties on an equal ground, as they are not dependent in any way of them. A membership base with accountability could be one step towards a more balanced power and control within the parties. Membership registers would also create more reliable primary elections within the parties. The party elites will though probably refuse to give its members more power as they are in very good position in today’s system.

Many scholars (Burt & Mauceri, 2004; Drake & Herscberg, 2006) are talking about a movement towards democracy without parties. Parties are however still the most important players in the parliament and the many independents do always need to have an approach towards the parties.

In summary is the institutionalisation process going in a wrong way and I believe we could almost talk about a de-institutionalisation, something we have seen in e.g. South America (Sanchez, 2008:315). The future is hard to predict but the preparation and the PaPe in 2014 will be a crucial crossroad for Malawian party institutionalisation.
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