To understand the negotiations leading to the Good Friday agreement 1998

The development of integrated frameworks on negotiations theory
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Abstract

This article uses negotiations theory to analyze the Good Friday agreement negotiations in 1998. Negotiations theory is often divided into either rational choice or cognitive perspectives whereas negotiations in fact constitutes of both. The article uses framework models, inspired by the work of Kjell Hausken who includes both rational and cognitive factors to analyze the negotiations leading to the Good Friday agreement with the aim to develop a good analytical tool for the understanding of negotiations. The conclusion will be that besides the rational choice and cognitive perspectives, a third perspective or factor is necessary if you are to understand the Good Friday negotiations. To explain the outcome of the negotiations, the influence of the mediators must be taken into consideration and the framework- models developed to constitute the mediating factor.

Keywords: Rationality, Cognitions, Mediator, Negotiations, Integrated frameworks, Good Friday agreement

Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>The democratic unionist party</td>
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<td>GFA</td>
<td>Good Friday agreement</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish republican army</td>
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<td>OIRA</td>
<td>Official IRA</td>
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<td>PIRA</td>
<td>Provisional IRA</td>
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<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary (Northern Irish police force)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service (British military special force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>The social democratic and labour party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>The United Kingdom of Great Britain (Northern Ireland) belong to the UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UUP</td>
<td>The Ulster unionist party</td>
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1 Introduction

During the 80s when Margaret Thatcher was prime minister in Great Britain, the Northern Irish policy was simple and strict, crush Northern Irish republicanism militarily and politically (Pettersson, 2002, p 17). SAS conducted raids against IRA- members and killed many of them and the political branch of IRA, Sinn Féin was forbidden to speak to the media and its members were criminalized (Catterall, McDougall, 1996, s 113). However IRA could not be defeated militarily, the support among the Catholic working class was far too great and a deadlock existed during the 80s (Pettersson, 2002, p 20- 22).

In 1990, Thatcher resigned and was succeeded by John Major, the long wanted resignation was welcomed by a three- day long truce by IRA, the first since 1975 (Pettersson, 202, p 31). Sinn Féin and IRA never admitted defeat; however the general view is that PIRA and violent republicanism would never achieve its goal to force the English out of Northern Ireland by force. In 1994 IRA/Sinn Féin proclaimed a ceasefire and focused on achieving their goal of a united Ireland politically (Holland, 1999, p 261- 264). Protestant loyalist paramilitary groups declared a ceasefire shortly afterwards. After the declaration of the ceasefire, Sinn Féin leaders received a phone call from US vice president Al Gore, explaining that the administration was lifting its ban to meet with Sinn Féin and they should expect an invitation to the White House shortly (Holland, 1999, p 264).

Between 1994 and 1998, the IRA’s ceasefire would be interrupted on several occasions and the peace- talks were going slowly. The British government moved cautiously and put several demands on Sinn Féin if serious meetings between them and the British government ever would commence (Holland, 1999, p 267). In 1997 the British Labour party won the elections and the newly appointed Prime Minister Tony Blair quickly involved Sinn Féin in the peace- talks, which renewed its cease- fire and the parties agreed to a deadline for a peace- settlement on the 9th of April 1998, the day before the Good Friday (Holland, 1999, p 279-281).

Northern Ireland is a deeply divided society where Catholics and Protestants live parallel in two societies going to different schools, hospitals and live in different neighborhoods. The neighborhoods are sometimes divided by big walls to protect the inhabitants from hurting each other and some neighborhoods are very dangerous to enter of you belong to the wrong community. Mixed marriages between Catholics and Protestants are rare and religion has a big part of the people’s lives, further deepening the gap between the two communities (Jakobsson, 1993, p 15- 18). The period known as the Troubles was the most violent period of the Northern Ireland conflict and between 1969 and 2007, the conflict claimed around 3700 lives and about ten times as many wounded (Edwards, 2011, p 7). In a population of 1.8 million, few are left unaffected by the conflict (Edwards, 2011, p 86).

The conflict has been terrible and devastating for the entire Northern- Irish population. The violence and division between the two communities have caused
great mistrust between Catholics and Protestants and made it difficult for them to interact. The opponents of the segregation policy argue that it creates an environment where prejudice and violence against the ‘other side’ is tolerated, and sometimes even encouraged (Dixon, 2008, p 21). The distrust between the two sides is devastating for the peace process where agreements and ceasefires constantly are interrupted by attacks from the extremist paramilitary groups, and the whole community is blamed for the attacks of a few extremists. However the degree of segregation should not be overestimated as both sides do shop and to some extent work side by side in the major cities (Dixon, 2008, p 31).

Both communities distrust the English as well where the Catholics feel a historic suspicion against the British and many feel harassed by arbitrary searches by the armed forces in their search for IRA sympathizers (Jakobsson, 1993, s 15).

Before a settlement was reached on the 10th of April, few people believed an agreement could be reached so soon (Holland, 1999, p 287) and this study will try to provide us from a negotiation- theory perspective, with a tool that can make us understand how the Good Friday agreement came to be.

1.2 Problem discussion

Christer Jönsson writes in the Handbook of international relations that research so far, at the time when the book was written in 2002, has failed to reconcile rational- choice perspectives and cognitive perspectives in negotiations. The perspectives are often construed as rival; however most scholars and practitioners maintain that they are more complementary and negotiations encompass elements of both perspectives (Carlsnaes et al, 2002, p 228).

In such a complicated conflict as the Northern Irish, it is crucial to integrate both perspectives to be able to understand the peace- negotiations between Catholics, Protestants and the British government. The conflict is so infected by emotions, mainly negative ones that you can’t analyze the talks and assume that the actors would be capable of being completely rational. Neither should you analyze the talks from a strictly cognitive point of view and disregard the human capability of not letting your emotions get the upper hand but to act rational for the better sake of the society.

1.3 Hypothesis

The starting- point of this text is to analyze the Good Friday negotiations from both a cognitive and rational point of view based on integrated frameworks on negotiations theory. The frameworks, presented by Kjell Hausken (1997) and later explained in this text have incorporated both cognitive and rational aspects in negotiating theory, and emphasizes on one of them depending on the nature of the negotiations. Hauskens frameworks reconcile rational- choice and cognitive perspectives and according to me prove that Jönssons claim that such an attempt never has succeeded is wrong. The framework- models are chosen because they
offer an interesting contradiction to Jönsson’s claim that I think is worth investigating. Hausken also write that his aim is to generate a foundation for future research, and my intention is to use that foundation and develop the frameworks even further.

My hypothesis is that although the frameworks give us two perspectives in an analytical tool towards negotiations, it is still not adequate to use on the case Good Friday agreement negotiations in 1998, and another perspective is needed to be able to understand the negotiations. That perspective is the role of the mediators.

1.4 Questions

- How well can rational and cognitive perspectives explain the Good Friday negotiations?

- How can a developed integrated framework provide us with a better analytical tool for negotiations, based on the Good Friday negotiations 1998?

2 Theories

2.1 Earlier research- Theoretical frame of reference

2.1.1 Rational actor model

The rational actor model is central to the study of politics, economics, psychology and several other fields (Mintz, Derouen, 2010, p 67). The model assumes that the actors are rational and are assumed to rank preferences “according to the degree of satisfaction of achieving these goals and objectives” (Sage, 1990, p 233). Rational individuals are expected to be able to make utility-maximizing choices based on the most preferred alternative. They are also assumed to employ purposive action motivated by goal-oriented behavior and move with the intention of reaching that goal (Mintz, Derouen, 2010, p 57-58).

One central concept in the model is opportunity cost, which means that whatever choice you make, there is an opportunity cost linked to that choice. For example, if you are involved in a negotiation and get what you want in one particular matter where your opponent makes a concession, you probably have to make a concession yourself on another point to make your opponent satisfied. As long as the thing you got is more satisfactory for you than the thing you gave up in your concession, you have made a rational choice (Mintz, Derouen, p 61-62).
2.1.2 Psychological factors in decision making

Decisions are usually made by a relatively small number of people where psychological factors can have a great impact on the decisions made by the individuals. Leaders must gather and process information and the decisions are sprung from that process. There are several psychological factors to take into consideration when you analyze the decisions made by leaders, prior images or beliefs, emotions, personality, leadership style etc (Mintz, Derouen, 2010, p 97-98). I will focus on three factors:

*Cognitive Consistency:* This theory highlights how the leader’s earlier perceptions matter when they face new information. Incoming information is processed according to pre-existing images and the leader might filter away or ignore information that is not compatible to pre-existing beliefs (Mintz, Derouen, 2010, p 99). Put simple, the leader’s earlier beliefs and experiences influence the decisions they make.

*Emotions:* Emotions often play an important role in decision making and leaders are easily influenced by mass-opinion or other important individuals with power. Emotions also trigger retaliation when one part is subject to provocations, and fear or anger can make it more difficult for leaders to be objective. Positive feelings like love or sympathy can have a positive influence for the decisions (Mintz, Derouen, 2010, p 99-100).

*Leaders Personality and Leadership Style:* Studying the personality of leaders can help to understand why some of their decisions are made. Personality can be broken down into four elements: Temperament, cognitions, motives and the social context. Mintz and Derouen write that leaders who demonstrate the elements of power motivation, belief in ability to control events, cognitive complexity and self-confidence are regarded as ‘influential’ and desire to impact foreign policy affairs (Mintz, Derouen, 2010, p 114-115).

Leadership style also affects the decisions made, and a distinction can be drawn between goal-driven and context-driven leaders. Goal-driven leaders are ‘task oriented’ and are focused on solving a problem, less likely to change position or ideology. Context-driven leaders are more adaptable to the current situation and are more likely to consult, discuss and be flexible in their positions (Mintz, Derouen, 2010, p 115-116).

2.1.3 Bargaining and negotiating

Bargaining is often described as one identifiable mode of joint decision making; parties are left to combine their conflicting points of view to one single decision. A bargaining situation has three characteristics; the first is that both parties realize they can improve their situation by a struck bargaining, second, mutual action is required to achieve an agreement and third, there is more than
one possible agreement. Bargaining situations occur often in our everyday life, but when a bargaining becomes a formalized process the term negotiation is used (Jönsson, 1990, p 1-2).

Christer Jönsson, author of *Communication in international bargaining* distinguishes three different conceptualizations of the bargaining process; the cybernetic, manipulative and the cognitive. I shall focus on the two latter.

The *manipulative* bargaining process is characterized by attempts by the bargaining actors to outwit the other by ‘strategic moves’ such as commitments, threats and promises. The purpose of this is to manipulate the information the other actor possesses and thus change the opponent’s calculation of probabilities and utilities in order to improve the outcome for one self. The conception is therefore based on the assumption of uncertainty rather than complete information for the actors (Jönsson, 1990, p 3-5). Together with the *establishing of a contract zone* where the actors focus on identifying a space where both parties can prefer an agreement and not ending the negotiations, manipulative bargaining is seen as closely connected with game-theory and its assumptions of rational choice (Carlsnaes et al, 2002, p 224-225).

The *cognitive* process focuses on the actors and their beliefs. Emphasis is drawn from the actors’ actions and laid on their internal, mental processes. Fisher and Ury explains; “[a]s useful as looking for objective reality can be, it is ultimately the reality as each side sees that constitutes the problem in a negotiation and opens the way to a solution” (Jönsson, 1990, p 5). Every actor brings a set of beliefs and expectations about themselves to a negotiation based on previous experiences. In order to understand the negotiations, an exploration of the actors’ belief systems needs to be done. Belief systems are considered to be resistant to change, only peripheral beliefs can be modified, central beliefs are considered stable and unaffected by persuasion.

The two different concepts offer different explanations of change in bargaining, a successful manipulation in the first and modified belief systems in the last (Jönsson, 1990, p 3-5).

### 2.1.4 Mediation

Mediation is an instrument of conflict resolution and must be acceptable to both parties in a conflict (Carlsnaes et al, 2002, p 221). It is a method where one or several persons help the actors of the conflict to solve the problem through a structured process (Hareide, 2006, p 17). The traditional approach is that the ideal mediator in international relations should be a small, neutral and independent state (Jönsson et al, 1992, p 157), however most analysts agree that mediators generally do not act out of true altruism but of self-interest as well, there are proof that a biased mediator with closer ties to one part can do a good job as well and be extra motivated to solve the conflict as long as they have the confidence of both parties (Carlsnaes et al, 2002, p 222).

One kind of mediation model is the *agreement-focused* which had influence over political peace-mediation and juridical mediation. The model assumes that the actors are rational and the scientists Roger Fisher and William Ury give
various advices for those who wish to reach an agreement, for example divide the personal and factual problems and present multiple solutions for greater success to create a ‘win win’ situation for the actors (Hareide, 2006, p 300).

One strategy that Fisher and Ury present in the agreement focused mediation model is the one text procedure where a non partial mediator is used to better separate between the people and the problem and focus the discussion on interests and options. The mediator outlines a paper with the actors’ interests and asks them in turn to make amendments that suit them. A negotiating process begins where neither of the actors has to part from their positions and the paper transform as the amendments are made. When the mediator has tried to combine the interests of both parts as much possible, he offers a final paper to the actors who can chose to accept or decline the agreement (Fisher, et al, 1992, p 109- 113).

The one text procedure is often used in bilateral and multilateral negotiations which include mediators such as peace processes and in the UN (Fisher et al, 1992, p 113).

Mediators have been attributed by analysts several roles in a conflict, communicator, manipulator and a facilitator of cognitive change. Although no formal assessment for successful mediators has been developed, scholars regard mediators to be successful if they make a great difference to the dispute, initiate a dialogue without violence, allow both parties to save face and resolve the underlying roots of the conflict (Carlsnaes et al, 2002, p 221- 222).

2.1.5 Game theory and behavioral frameworks

Kjell Hausken from the University of Chicago present in his article Game theoretic and behavioral negotiation theory (Hausken, 1997) two interdisciplinary frameworks for game-theoretic and behavioral negotiation theory (see annex 1) with the objective to bring the disciplines closer together and generate a foundation for future research. The frameworks contain elements from both disciplines and provide a good foundation for further research in interdisciplinary negotiation theory. Hausken claim that the two disciplines reinforce each other and contribute to interdisciplinary research designs which combine explanatory factors from different schools and perspectives. One framework is from a game-theoretic point of view where the psychological (cognitive) characteristics are filtered through game-theoretic (rational) parameters, and vice-versa on the other. Apart from the actors, negotiator A and B, other parameters play a part in the model, cognitive parameters like structural influences and interaction processes, and dynamic and static structures as game-theoretic parameters. The models contain eight game-theoretic concepts and eleven behavioral concepts in total (Hausken, 1997, p 521) which makes them rather extensive.
2.2 Simplified and developed integrated frameworks

Below are two simplified integrated frameworks, inspired by Hauskens frameworks however consisting of five concepts which are *manipulations, reservation price, perceptions, emotions and individual differences*. Manipulations and reservation price can be seen as rational concepts, while perceptions, emotions and individual differences can be seen as cognitive or psychological concepts. The analysis will only focus on the negotiators and not on the various structural influences that Hauskens models include; however the structural influences affect the negotiators indirectly in terms of perceptions and price.

![Figure 1: An integrated rational and cognitive framework from a cognitive point of view (Based on Hauskens strategic frameworks, 1997)](image)

In figure 1, the cognitive aspects of negotiation are emphasized and rational game-theoretic parameters like manipulation-tactics and price are filtered through the cognitive parameters in the negotiation process. According to Hausken, this model is more appropriate to apply in negotiations which involve high charged feelings and emotions, few technical and quantitative issues and in an early stage of the negotiations before the problem is adequately formalized (Hausken, 1997, p 520).
Figure 2: An integrated rational and cognitive framework from a game-theoretic rational point of view (Based on Hauskens strategic frameworks, 1997)

Figure 2 is basically the opposite of figure 1 where the rational parameters are emphasized and play a larger part for the negotiated outcome than the cognitive parameters. In contrast to figure 1 according to Hausken, this model should be preferable in negotiations which are more technical and formalized and charged with fewer feelings.

2.2.1 Game-theoretic and behavioral frameworks with integrated mediation

Hausken succeeded to integrate behavioral and game-theoretic parameters into negotiations theory; I would like to take one step further to integrate the role of the mediator(s). My argument is that although the ultimate decision-making authority remains with the negotiators (Carlsnaes et al, 2002, p 221), the role of the mediator often has such an impact on negotiations that it cannot be ignored within a negotiation model. An integration of the mediator-role is of course only applicable when a mediator is in fact used.
The mediator contributes with various properties into a negotiation: I have chosen to apply the three main properties that I find central for the mediator role, the role as a communicator, manipulator and facilitator of cognitive change (Carlsnaes et al, 2002, p 221). A successful mediator can with these means affect the disputants both on a rational and cognitive level, and therefore indirectly have influence over the outcome of the negotiations. Mediators have of course a different degree of influence over the negotiations and the negotiators. That is why some arrows in the models have parenthesis; if a mediator has a lot of influence they may have a direct impact on the outcome of the negotiations, hence the arrow above the mediator box. If the mediators have less influence they may only affect the negotiators through the less emphasized box, that will say the mediators influence are filtered through two boxes before the outcome of the negotiations. This argument will be defended by using the empirical case to show how the role of the mediator can be integrated into a framework in negotiations theory.

2.3 Theoretical discussion

In my three figures I have integrated rational choice theory, psychological factors in decision making and aspects from bargaining and negotiations theory. In figure 3 I have also integrated theories from mediation research to explain the impact mediators have on negotiations. All figures are inspired by Kjell Hauskens interdisciplinary frameworks and I have taken the liberty to simplify and develop them to suit my analysis. Negotiations are studied from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and negotiation theory have drawn insights from diplomatic history, economics, management, sociology, social psychology, law and other fields.
It is therefore natural to collect inspiration from various fields to the further development of negotiations theory. It is vital for the understanding of complex procedures like negotiations not to exclude elements crucial both for the procedure itself and for the outcome. The concepts in the frameworks are chosen to give a good overview over the negotiations and offer a broader understanding of the procedure and outcome than a deeper analysis would do which neglects vital parts of a negotiation procedure, for example only to take psychological parameters into the analysis with disregard to the rational side of human behavior. The purpose of the model is to provide negotiations theory with a tool to facilitate the understanding of negotiations and its outcome by applying the model on a negotiations-case.

3 Method

3.1 Choice of method

This analysis is intentioned to be a qualitative case-study in which I test and develop Hauskens Theories about integrated frameworks on negotiations theory. The fact that the analysis combines theory-testing and developing is not regarded as a problem and is quite common in social sciences (Teorell, Svensson, 2007, p 52).

The link between theory and empiricism is often divided into two approaches, deduction and induction, where deduction prove its theories by the use of axioms and theorems (mathematical expressions), while induction prove them by many observable phenomenon’s (Teorell, Svensson, 2007, p 49). This analysis will be characterized by a hypothetical-deductive method where the hypothesis is presented and the empirical consequences are derived and have to apply if the hypothesis should stem. After the analysis, a conclusion can be formulated and contain generalizations regarding the theory or hypothesis (Teorell, Svensson, 2007, p 50). Empirical generalizations are not suitable for qualitative analyzes (Bryman, 2001, p 270-271) and I have no intentions to do so.

3.2 Source criticism

Peter Esaiasson and his co-authors describe four source-critic rules in their book *Metodpraktikan* one should take into consideration: authenticity, independence, concurrency and tendency.

Because almost all of the sources I use are relatively new, scientific and written by well-regarded authors with probably no intention to falsify information (Esaiasson et al, 2007, p 307-308); I believe my sources have strong authenticity and concurrency.

The main source in the description of the negotiation procedures is the chapter ‘negotiating the Belfast agreement’ by Dr Thomas Hennessey, from the book *The Northern Ireland question, the peace process and the Belfast agreement*. Hennessey is lecturer in history at Canterbury Christ Church University College.
in Kent, UK (exploringfamilyorigins.com). This section about the negotiations is an important part of my study because it is the negotiations that I apply my theories upon and draw conclusions from. Because Hennessey is a doctor at a reputable English university and author of several academic books (exploringfamilyorigins.com), I see no reason to doubt his independence. I use other sources as well to describe the negotiations and they all tell the same story, which strengthens Hennessey’s credibility as a source. The fact that he is British could make him biased in the sense that he sympathizes more with the unionists and could unproportionally emphasize Tony Blair’s and the British contribution to the signing of the agreement, and therefore the source would have tendency. However several sources once again agree that Blair contributed to the agreement, and my opinion is that the unionists are not put in a more favorable position than the nationalists in the description of the agreements.

The fact that I use Blair’s memoirs as a source as well is more risky (Thurén, 2005, p 50) because he might very well have incentives to make himself look more favorable in the story. This has been taken into consideration and Blair is only used as a reference on few occasions where the event described is interesting and reasonable. The negotiations are similarly described in Blair’s memoirs as they are in the other sources.

3.3 Operationalization

I will use three concepts from psychological factors in decision making to operationalize the psychological factors during the negotiations presented by Minz and Derouen (2010), perceptions, emotions and individual differences. Perceptions are a form of information processing and affect is a form of emotional state. The concepts are very similar to Hauskens operationalization (see annex 1), but slightly different based on the latest research on psychological factors in decision making.

To measure the degree of rational aspects in the talks the concepts price and manipulations are used. Price is also used by Hausken and is the level of concessions you are ready to make in order to reach an agreement, simply put the indifferent point regarding obtaining/not obtaining the objective, for example selling/ not selling a house for a specified price (Hausken, 1997, p 519). Manipulations are as described above a rational attempt to manipulate the information the other actor possesses. Christer Jönssons definition of the concept will be used (1990) (Carlsnaes, 2001) which is similar to the concept Hausken uses, ‘subjective probability distribution over opponent’s reservation price’, however simplified and easier to identify in the negotiation process.

In the analysis, mediation will be regarded as the actions by the persons I regard as mediators to help the negotiators to reach an agreement. I have added the concepts communicator, manipulator and facilitator of cognitive change in the box with the mediators because it is good examples of how a mediator can affect negotiations. Another role a mediator can have is formulator, for example when
the one text procedure is used (Carlsnaes, 2002, p 221). The broad definition of mediation is justified because when the relevance of mediators is examined, all of their actions to impact negotiations matter. The impact can be lesser or greater, but that is also relevant and one can draw conclusions from that as well when the integrated framework is used, which will be explained further in the analysis.

3.4 Comment to the method

According to Esaiasson and his co-authors there are no obvious operationalizations of theoretical concepts. What decides whether they are good or not is your ability to present strong arguments for your choice of operationalization (Esaiasson et al, 2005, p 57). The operationalization of the concepts used to analyze the empiricism is strongly connected with the more general conceptions rationality and psychological factors, which are used in the research question. This strong connection justifies my operationalization and thus gives my analysis strong validity (Esaiasson et al, 2005 chapter 4). The reliability of the text is determined by the accuracy of the analysis, the ability to actually correctly identify examples of the concepts in the empiricism.

4 Empiricism

4.1 The Good Friday agreement (GFA):

4.1.1 Main elements

The Northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour party recognized in the 80s three issues called strands that were crucial if the conflict ever was to be solved: Relations within Northern Ireland, relations between Northern Ireland and the republic of Ireland and relations between Northern Ireland, the republic of Ireland and the UK (Tannam, 2001, p 505). The agreement eventually comprised the following main issues.

A Northern Ireland Assembly: As a solution to strand one, a 108 member assembly would be created with legislative and executive power over the matters that Northern Ireland had responsibility over before Westminster took over during the Troubles. The voting procedures are constructed so both unionists and nationalists must agree before an issue can be decided and the First minister and Deputy First minister must have cross-community support (Dixon, 2008, p 265-266).

The North-South Ministerial Council: To tackle strand two, a council that would develop ‘consultation, cooperation and action within the island of Ireland’ was created (Tannam, 2001, p 505). The council comprises the first and deputy
minister of Northern Ireland, the prime minister of the republic of Ireland and relevant Irish and Northern Irish ministers where both sides must agree and are held responsible to their respective parliament (Tannam, 2001, p 506).

The British-Irish Council and Intergovernmental Conference (BIC): To cover strand three, BIC was created to meet at summit level twice a year with representatives from the assemblies from the island of Ireland and the UK (Tannam, 2001, p 506). The aim is to promote the ‘totality of relationships among the peoples from these islands’ (Dixon, 2008, p 266).

A key unionist concern was the decommissioning of IRA if Sinn Féin ever was to participate in any assembly (Tannam, 2001, p 505). Ultimately, the agreement said little about decommissioning and the parties would simply use the influence they had to persuade the paramilitary groups to decommission and lay down their arms. It was agreed that if the paramilitary groups did so, a number of prisoners, mainly republicans would be released within two years.

4.2 The main political parties in Northern Ireland during the time of the Good Friday negotiations

4.2.1 Unionist parties:

The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP): The party is center-right and was the ruling party during fifty years before the Troubles (Jakobsson, 1993, p 18) and it lacked a serious rival until the early 60s. During the Troubles, the party began to fragment and the division is between ‘devolutionists’ who favor a strong Northern Ireland assembly and ‘integrationists’ that want to be ruled more directly from Westminster like any other part of the UK. There was also a split in the party after the GFA into those who supported it and those who thought that GFA was not explicit enough regarding the decommissioning of the IRA (Dixon, 2008, p 15).

The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP): The party was founded in the 70s by the reverend Ian Paisley and some of his church members of the Presbyterian Church as a reaction to, as the thought were the softening in the UUP attitude towards Catholics and the republic of Ireland. The party is right-wing conservative in social issues and is more opposed to power-sharing with Catholics and influence from the Irish republic than UUP. DUP opposed GFA (Dixon, 2008, p 16) and did not participate in the GFA negotiations.

4.2.2 Nationalist parties:

The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP): SDLP was founded in 1970 and is a centre-left party with overwhelmingly Catholic supporters. The party supports a power-sharing Northern Irish assembly with a strong Irish dimension
Sinn Féin/Irish Republican Army (SF/IRA): In 1969, the IRA split into the Official IRA (OIRA) and the provisional IRA (PIRA). OIRA was left-wing and emphasized on unity between working class Catholics and Protestants, and they declared a ceasefire in 1972. The Provisional IRA was more aggressive and more right-wing militaristic. Sinn Féin is the political wing of PIRA and had long been subordinate to the military wing, but evolved during the 80s to contest elections and taking seats in local councils. Sinn Féin grew and supported a united Ireland and did not oppose violence as means to achieve their goal of a united Ireland. They opposed a power sharing Northern Irish assembly but nevertheless, Sinn Féin leaders agreed to the GFA. PIRA has been responsible for about 50% of the 3700 deaths related to the Troubles (Dixon, 2008, p 11-12).

4.2.3 List of participants in the Good Friday negotiations

Bertie Ahern- Taoiseach (Prime minister of Ireland)

Bill Clinton- President of USA (Did not participate physically)

David Trimble- Leader of UUP

Gerry Adams- President of Sinn Féin

John Hume- Leader of SDLP

John Taylor- UUP negotiator

Jonathan Powell- Blair’s chief of staff

Martin McGuinness- Sinn Féin’s chief negotiator

Tony Blair- Prime minister of Great Britain and leader of the British Labour party

Source: (Barton, Roche, 2009, p 38-56)
4.2.4 Comment to the GFA and the political parties

Not only did the Catholics and Protestants have different views on the conflict, their parties had different ideologies as well where the nationalists are more left on the political scale and the unionist to the right. Two of the different parties can be regarded as rather extreme where Sinn Féin has strong connections to a terror organization responsible for thousands of deaths, and conservative DUP which are very provocative in their actions and words against republicans. DUP did not participate in the negotiations because they regarded any talks with the, as they regarded treacherous Sinn Féin to be a treason against their cause. The Sinn Féin representatives Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness had both been members of the IRA and participated in the organizations actions (Edwards, 2011, p 40). This meant that the UUP representatives mainly refused to be in the same room as Sinn Féin and deep mistrust characterized their relationship. UUP and SDLP were more moderate and motivated to initiate talks.

Bill Clinton, not distracted by the cold war showed a great interest in the Northern Irish peace process and he made efforts to solve the conflict no US president had done before. He had also managed to get the trust from both nationalists and unionists and established significant connections with Sinn Féin (Williams, 2010, p 27) The British Labour party´s win in the 1997 election meant a fresh wind in the British Northern Irish politics where Tony Blair who had spent a part of his childhood in Northern Ireland, was determined to find a solution to the conflict, for example by bringing Sinn Féin in from the cold and include them in the peace- talks (Edwards, Bloomer, 2008, p 201). It would not only be a great personal win of prestige for him to bring peace to Northern Ireland, it would also be an economic and administrative relief for the British government to have the Northern Irish govern themselves and be able to send troops home.

Other relations that were improved were the Anglo-Irish, where after a half a decade of distrust between the Irish republic and the UK, the European and economic integration created trust between the countries and the republic of Ireland started to share some of the responsibilities for Northern Ireland together with the UK (Williams, 2010, p 21-22).

4.3 The Negotiations (Main source: Ch 2 in Barton and Roche, 2009)

A multi party talking process had been going on since 1996 with no result. A paper was hammered out by the British and Irish governments in January 1998 to have a text as a basis for discussion, with an approximate deadline for an agreement on April 9th. Negotiations began and another document was produced by the Irish and British governments published on the 6th of April called the “Mitchell document”, after the chief negotiator US senator George Mitchell. The document was received by the unionists with disapproval, calling it a “Sinn Féin wish list” (Holland, 1999, p 288). Blair embarked for Belfast in order to save the talks and was disappointed with the way the negotiators had handled UUP and that he and Bertie Ahern had not approved of the document. The document was too dominated by strand two according to UUP and if the negotiations were to continue, the Irish must be persuaded to back down on the heavy emphasis on
North-South cooperation. Blair was negative towards the continuation of the negotiations and afraid that UUP would walk away, the anxiety was shared by Bill Clinton who offered to do “anything we can to help” (Holland, 1999, p 288). Blair called David Trimble to reassure him that he would get the proper amendments from the Irish the following day.

Ahern’s mother had recently passed away and he was further depressed by the message from Blair that the Irish had to rewrite the whole strand two part of the document. The Irish republic had agreed to a constitutional change where they removed their territorial claim to Northern Ireland and Ahern wanted something in return to present to his voters. However Ahern was prepared to make amendments to keep UUP from leaving the negotiations. Blair left for Stormont castle to inform Trimble about the Irish amendments, and an angry DUP leader Ian Paisley appeared outside the castle calling the negotiations a “monstrous treason” (Blair, 2010, p 214). It was at Stormont the negotiations would take place the following three days.

**Day 1: April 8- Stormont Castle**

Blair sat down with Trimble to discuss the amendments UUP wanted, and he assured Trimble that if they wanted their amendments on strand two; they had to move on other matters like strand one. Ahern was trying to persuade the Irish to make the proper amendments to keep UUP in the negotiations. Ahern succeeded and the unionists were pleased with the rewriting on strand two. It was decided that the Irish and unionist would stay up all night to negotiate a text. In the evening, Gerry Adams talked to Blair, reassuring him that Sinn Féin wanted an agreement but it was perhaps too difficult under the current circumstances. Blair was worried for the main part of the negotiations that he never would get Sinn Féin to sign an agreement.

**Day 2: April 9- Stormont castle**

The following day the disappointment was great when Blair realized that the unionists and Irish had not agreed on a text on strand two. They had only talked around the question and now it was the time for swift action. Blair suggested the unionists to work on a text and let the Irish make the proper amendments. The main issue was still strand two, but policing and decommissioning would also be tough issues. The Irish were suspicious towards the unionists and thought they might use every trick in the book to get what they wanted. The unionist amendments was handled over to the Irish and Ahern managed to persuade the Irish to work from that text. Apart from a few further amendments, the Irish accepted it and Blair felt that they were back on track. Adams and McGuinnes was unhappy and told Blair that “all the big concessions had gone to the unionists” (Barton, Roche, 2009, p 46). Blair pointed out that everything was protected by mutual destruction, if the unionists did not fulfill their promises on North-south cooperation bodies, then the strand one assembly would fall as well. Adams and McGuinnes were still dissatisfied but when they left, Jonathan Powell
reminded Blair that Adams and McGuinness negotiated with “at least a modicum of worry that someone will come along and blow their brains out if they go too far” (Barton, Roche, 2009, p 46). Hume was also dissatisfied and the Irish became further downcast by the fact that the unionist seemed to be in a good mood. The Irish withdrew and came back in the evening with more amendments on strand two. Blair was devastated, but they eventually made it clear to the Irish that they could only keep the most important amendments; otherwise the unionists would walk away. Once again, the Irish removed many of their amendments and an agreement could finally be reached on strand two. The negotiations continued and there were better progress on strand one where SDLP and UUP were the main actors. John Taylor and David Trimble managed to convince the rest of the unionists to accept parallel consent in the assembly, which meant that both communities had to agree if a decision were to be made. The unionists also accepted Hume’s argument that the heads of the departments should be called ‘ministers’ instead of the unionist preference ‘chairman of the committee’. When Hume found out that he practically had gotten everything he wanted in strand one, he was delighted and started hugging people in sight. This was around midnight and Good Friday was just about to emerge.

**Day 3: Good Friday- Stormont castle**

Sinn Féin did not like the fact that SDLP made an agreement with UUP; they appeared with a list of concerns with 78 points on which they wanted answers from the British and Irish governments, the main issue where prisoner releases. The rest started doubting whether Sinn Féin wanted a deal or not, but it was crucial that they were a part of the agreement because SDLP would never participate in an assembly without Sinn Féin, and UUP would never participate in an assembly with a Sinn Féin that had not fulfilled its promises regarding decommissioning of republican paramilitary groups.

The 78 points were reduced to only a few important ones by a negotiator and Sinn Féin accepted because the negotiator had without Blair’s knowledge promised a prisoner release within one year. Blair became very worried how the news of him setting people free who were responsible for the death of many Britons would be received in the UK, not to mention of how the Northern Irish Protestants would react. Blair realized that the only way to justify a prisoners release would be if Sinn Féin were to sign a broader agreement. Blair spoke to Bill Clinton and explained the situation and his problem with Sinn Féin. Clinton called Adams and detected a feeling that Adams was nervous about being blamed for the collapse of the talks. Adams loosened up, explaining that the release made it easier to sell the deal to the IRA, Clinton understood and told Adams that he on his part had to understand Blair’s dilemma as well. Adams and Blair eventually agreed to an official version of a two year release, but Blair would work unofficially for a one year release (Blair, 2010, p 221).

Another crisis blew up; two nationalist negotiators turned up and told Blair they had persuaded UUP to agree to additional amendments on strand two. Blair saw no reason to doubt their word but when UUP found out they were upset. It
turned out that the two nationalist negotiators had cornered a UUP minister in a bar where he had agreed to the amendments. An upset Trimble and Ahern discussed the matter and after a rude discussion where they shouted at each other, matters were cleared out.

Around midday, a new text of the agreement was released, the first since the “Mitchell document” four days ago. UUP were in riot and dissatisfied with the prisoner releases and the decommissioning. UUP demanded that there would be a link between the decommissioning and Sinn Féins participation in the assembly. Sinn Féin declared that it was impossible, however they accepted to start a decommissioning as a part of a process, but with no binding agreement. Blair tried desperately to keep UUP from walking away, explaining that they would sort it out. UUP reflected while Blair asked Clinton to call Trimble to make him accept a compromise (Holland, 1999, p 289). Blair and his staff also wrote a letter to Trimble as a last resort, in the letter Blair assured that the decommissioning would begin straight away and if no progress had been made in 6 months, they would support changes so no Sinn Féin people would be able to hold office. The letter was delivered to the downcast UUP members and Trimble and Taylor read it together. After a tense waiting period, Taylor confirmed he was satisfied with that and Trimble thought they had reached an agreement, not unanimous though. Trimble called Blair to inform him that after some difficulties, he and UUP were ‘ready to do the business’.

After three days of almost constant negotiating and very little sleep for the participants, an agreement had finally been reached.

4.3.1 Comment to the GFA negotiations

The talks before Stormont castle under the supervision of US Senator George Mitchell were described as a ‘charade’ (Barton, Roche, 2009, p 54) and both republican and loyalist paramilitary groups tried to cause the talks to crash down by putting pressure on the parties with bomb and mortar attacks against both the police and civilians (Holland, 1999, p 287). Barton and Roche writes that it was the combined efforts of the Prime ministers of Ireland and Great Britain that kept the negotiations from crashing down by UUP walking away after the release of the ‘Mitchell document’, Tony Blair by backing Trimble in his demands for changes and Ahern in his renegotiating of strand two, despite opposition from his officials (Barton, Roche, 2009, p 54). The role of Bill Clinton is described as crucial and George Mitchell commented afterwards that “[t]here would not have been a peace agreement without the efforts of Bill Clinton” (Holland, 1999, p 290). Benjamin Williams writes in his book *The Northern Ireland peace process and the international context* that Clinton and Blair offered a “positive Anglo-American external influence on the development of the peace process, culminating in the 1998 Good Friday agreement” (Williams, 2010, p 35).

The Unionists who favored GFA claimed that the agreement was a success because it entrenched the union with Great Britain. The nationalist who favored GFA claimed that it was a first step towards Irish unity because of the cooperation
with the strand two north–south council (Dixon, 2008, p 268-270). However there was dissatisfaction on both sides who thought the whole agreement was a big treachery towards their struggles. Especially in the unionist camp, many felt a bitter taste after they realized that they agreed on the release of the very persons who had planned and executed many deadly attacks on protestant policemen and civilians. And unionists would now sit in an assembly with Sinn Féin whose very leaders had been active in the IRA (Edwards, 2011, p 40).

4.4 Empirical analysis from a theoretical point of view

This analysis will analyze the negotiations with the integrated framework on negotiations theory. The analysis will be divided into three categories where you can see traces of psychological factors, rational factors and events in which the mediators had direct influence over the negotiators behavior. The analysis is divided to make it easier to discern the different theoretical categories and to get an overview over the behavior of the participants in the negotiations. The analysis ends with a summarize and a final discussion.

4.4.1 Psychological factors during the negotiations

- **Leader personality:** The fact that Aherns mother passed away just before the negotiations should leave the Taoiseach more vulnerable and fragile because of the emotions he felt. However based on the material used in this study, Ahern behaved rational and objective and worked towards an agreement with determination. You could imagine that perhaps the other participants sympathized with Aherns loss and listened more carefully to him and treated him more carefully than otherwise, which could have facilitated Aherns attempts to persuade the nationalists to compromise in the strand two issues.

- **Emotions:** When DUP leader Ian Paisley appeared outside Stormont castle and called the negotiations a treason towards the unionist cause, he was trying to influence Trimble and the other UUP leaders by putting emotional pressure on them, reminding them of what many unionists would feel like if they were to sign an agreement with the republican Sinn Féin.

- **Leader personality, emotions:** Sinn Féin leaders Adams and McGuinness were unhappy with the negotiations and expressed their dissatisfaction to Blair, Powell later explained the dissatisfaction by the fact that Adams and McGuinnes actually belonged to an organization not unaccustomed of violent methods, especially not towards traitors. If Adams and McGuinness made too many concessions that their associates in IRA would disagree with, they might in fact get physically hurt. This probably affected them in the way that Sinn Féin could not compromise about the prisoners’ release, and they had to make the agreement look like there is a chance of a future united Ireland.
• Perceptions: It is described how the nationalists were downcast when the unionists were satisfied, and vice versa. The emotions and perceptions played a big part where the actors felt that they could not agree on something that made the other side happy which lead to a zero-sum game in which neither side were ready to make too many concessions. It is also described how the nationalists distrusted the unionists, expecting them to use every trick in the book to get what they wanted.

• Leader personality, perceptions and emotions: When the final draft was presented, UUP rioted and were appalled to the idea of prisoner releases and no direct link between the releases and the decommissioning of IRA. The thought of the murderers of Protestants roaming the streets was too much for the UUP leaders, regardless of the prospect for peace. UUP did not trust Sinn Féin to hold their part of the bargain unless it was explicitly expressed in the agreement that IRA were to be decommissioned.

4.4.2 Rational factors during the negotiations

• Price: Much of the negotiations about strand two were characterized around prize, if the Irish were to agree on the amendments proposed by UUP, the unionists had to move on other matters. The bargaining around how extensive the North-South bodies proved to be tough.

• Manipulations: Sinn Féin approached Blair on two occasions expressing their pessimism over the chances to reach an agreement. This could be an attempt to make Blair insecure and to work harder for concessions towards Sinn Féin to keep them to stay in the negotiations.

• Manipulations, price: When Sinn Féin appeared with a list of 78 concerns they wanted Blair and Ahern respond to, that may have been an attempt to get back in the game after SDLP and UUP made the agreement on strand one. Sinn Féin quickly agreed on the 78 points to be reduced to only a few; however these were the important ones like prisoner releases. But the fact that they already reduced their points that they may not even care about made it look like they already had made concessions, and that increased their chances to get the prisoners released.

• Manipulations: The event where the two nationalist negotiators persuaded the UUP minister in a bar should be considered as an attempt to manipulate the agreements on strand two. It looks like a clumsy attempt and it is hard to imagine how the nationalists could get away with it. However the amendment on strand two was kept and the nationalists got what they wanted, even if the price was very upset UUP leaders and a very rude discussion between Ahern and Trimble.
4.4.3 Comment to the empirical analysis from a theoretical point of view

After an analysis of the negotiations to find traces of either rational or psychological factors, it is hard to see what factors that made the largest impact on the outcome of the negotiations. Both factors influenced the negotiations and it is crucial to view the events from both perspectives to get an insight of what went on during the three days at Stormont castle. The negotiations were quite technical and most of the negotiations circled around strand two issues (Barton, Roche, 2009), and it was definitely charged with many feelings. The strand two issues can be regarded as rational and psychological; rational in the sense that it was negotiations around price, how much influence the republic of Ireland would have over Northern Ireland. The negotiations about strand two were psychological as well because the negative perceptions and emotions the unionist negotiators had about Irish influence did not match the reality; the Irish had just changed their constitution and had no goal towards a united Ireland. Other issues like prisoner releases and decommissioning can be regarded as more psychological and characterized by more emotions.

One can see that all the factors and events described above are factors that more or less create a gorge between the negotiators, dragging them further away from each other and an agreement. For example the unionist’s negative feelings about the prisoners release or the nationalists attempt to manipulate the UUP minister at the bar to get more out of strand two. An integrated framework with only psychological and rational factors simply does not offer a good explanation to how they reached the negotiated outcome. So what was the force that dragged them constantly back and towards the agreement?

4.4.4 Mediating factors during the negotiations

One thing you must take into consideration when you analyze the role of the mediators in this case is that two of the three mediators were actors in the negotiations, Ireland was a part of the strand two negotiations and Great Britain’s government represented the highest authority in Northern Ireland that had to approve the content of the agreement. The Irish and British governments used the ‘one-text procedure’ where the both governments created a text which the Catholics and Protestants would negotiate about. Therefore Blair and Ahern had a lot of influence over the negotiating procedure, more than a normal neutral mediator would have. Bill Clinton, representing the worlds’ only remaining superpower also was an unusually influential mediator, one could wonder if they rather were negotiators instead of mediators?

Still, this was a peace process and the negotiations aimed for peace between unionists and nationalists, therefore the key negotiators were the representatives for these groups. Even though there is lack of consensus on Britain’s primary interest with Northern Ireland, most agree that the UK simply strived for stability in Northern Ireland and the British opinion is weary of the union with the troublesome neighbor (Dixon, 2008, p 276-277). This view makes the British
more neutral in the sense that their primary objective in the negotiations is peace, potential other interests are secondary.

My starting-point for the analysis from the integrated framework point of view is to consider the Nationalists and unionists as the negotiators and the British, Irish and American governments as mediators.

Examples of where the mediators played a part of the negotiations are plentiful in Hennessey’s description of the negotiations. The overall impression is that Blair, Ahern and Clinton were the forces that both kept the negotiators from leaving, and persuaded them to see beyond the problematic issues and aim towards the goal of achieving peace.

- **Communicator, formulator:** The ‘one-text procedure’ was used during the negotiations where the nationalists and unionists made amendments in turn. The method allowed both side’s arguments to be taken into consideration; however it demanded some persuasion by mediators to make them accept compromises.

- **Manipulator:** Blair on several occasions had to persuade the negotiators not to leave the negotiations, sometimes by rational arguments like when he said to Adams and McGuinness that ‘everything is protected by mutual destruction’, and sometimes just by appeal to their feelings when he tried to persuade UPP not to walk away from the talks after the final draft was presented on Good Friday; he simply argued “we haven’t come this far to fail now” (Barton, Roche, 2009, p 51).

- **Facilitator of cognitive change:** Clinton spoke to both Sinn Féin and UUP to convince them to stay in the talks. Clinton had earned the respect of both sides in his efforts to the peace process during his presidency and therefore managed to get Adams to loosen up and make him understand Blair’s point of view, which in turn helped to reach an agreement of prisoner releases between Sinn Féin and the British. To get UUP to accept the prisoner releases, Clinton spoke to Trimble and understood that he would not be able to maintain his leadership role if it looked like he was being played for a fool on the decommissioning and prisoner releases (Barton, Roche, 2009, p 52). Based on Clinton’s information, Blair and his staff could write a letter to assure Trimble of Great Britain’s support in the decommissioning and prisoner releases issue.

4.4.5 Comment to the impact of the mediators

The material regarding the negotiations clearly indicates that the mediators were crucial for the continuation of the talks. The negotiations would have crashed if not Blair, Ahern and Clinton had been involved in the talks. Apart from the direct participation in the talks, the Irish and British governments played a part in the sense that they constituted the text the parts negotiated around.
To reconnect with different criteria to see if a mediator was successful or not, I would consider these mediators to be successful based on the low expectations before the negotiations. The agreement did not resolve any underlying roots to the conflict; the dispute runs far too deep in the hearts of the Northern Irish to be solved by the signing of an agreement. However the mediators did manage both sides to save face because Trimble is convinced that he saved the union by the signing of the agreement, while the nationalists thought that the agreement is a first step towards a united Ireland. Most importantly, the mediators initiated a serious dialogue and included Sinn Féin in the talks which in the long run could lead to a decommissioning of IRA, which in turn would lead to less violence and the prospect of peace.

4.5 Conclusion

Based on the case ‘the Good Friday’ negotiations, rational and psychological factors like in Hauskens integrated frameworks cannot alone explain the negotiated outcome. The mediators’ role in the negotiations was crucial and must therefore be integrated in an analytical framework as well if the framework is to be able to apply in an analysis on the case. The inclusion of the mediator’s role is relevant in basically all of the negotiations where a mediator is used; however the relevance of the mediator is very different. In the GFA negotiations the mediators played a very central role both in the process and the negotiated outcome, the question is whether the mediators should be connected directly to the negotiated outcome box as well as to the psychological and rational factor boxes. In a case where the mediators operate in the periphery of the negotiations, the connection should only go through the least emphasized box.

Which framework to be used is therefore dependant of the nature of the negotiations, if the negotiations are characterized by rationality, emotions or by strong influence by the mediator. In the GFA negotiations I would argue that the negotiations were characterized by strong feelings, however the strong influence of the rationality of the mediators caused the nationalist and unionist negotiators to put their many and deep differences aside and sign the agreement. I argue that the signing was rational and the actors would never have compromised or reached an agreement if it was not for the mediators who time and time again convinced the actors not to let their emotions gain the upper hand and leave the talks.

In summarize, Hauskens integrated frameworks do not alone offer a good analytical framework to the GFA negotiations and an integration by the mediator’s role can provide us with an additional analytical tool to the negotiations where mediators are used.
References:

Literature


**Articles**


**Electronic sources**

Annex 1

Figure 4- Integrated behavioral and strategic framework for negotiation theory from a behavioral point of view (Hausken, 1997, p 518).