Military Recruitment in the Age of “Globalization”
– Perception Management, Circulation of Non-Knowledge and the De-Politicization of the Swedish Armed Forces

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Abstract
This thesis investigates what the abolishment of the National Military Service (July 2010) meant for the content of what, and the manner in which, the Swedish Armed Forces communicates to the Swedish public. The main theoretical and methodological approach of the thesis lies within discourse analysis. Additionally, theories of globalization and perception management (propaganda) are used to analyze the result of the discourse analysis. The empirics used are two types of “texts” – military doctrinal texts and commercial texts (used for marketing or branding The Swedish Armed Forces) – which originates either from the Swedish Armed Forces or the Swedish Government. It is demonstrated that there exists grave discontinuities between what is communicated in the two types of “texts”. It is also shown that the Swedish Armed Forces uses various perception management techniques in attempts to steer the public’s understanding of their organization. It is concluded that the Swedish Armed Forces understanding of the “globalized” post-Cold War world meant that, in order to reach their targeted defense ability, they thought it necessary to misinform the Swedish public about their mission, values and political considerations.

Keywords: Swedish Armed Forces, Propaganda, Globalization, Perception management, Military recruitment

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1. Introduction

With the end of the Cold War almost fifty years of military strategy based on the threat of Soviet invasion had played out its role in Sweden. The doctrine of neutrality in war and nonalignment in peace, that had provided unbroken peace since the end of the Napoleonic wars, was overnight outdated. This also meant that the so called “invasion defense”, built around the idea that Sweden should remain a credible neutral force, able to stave off or deter threats to national security with a “Peoples Defense Army” [Folkförsvarsarmén]¹, lost its purpose. The borders around the political middle ground in which Sweden had thrived, climbing a high moral stature and gaining international status, crumbled at the same rate as the Cold War’s bipolar system (Boëne 2000:27). Far from ending the history of animosity and armed struggle as some suggested, it left politicians and the military leadership grasping for new narratives that could guide them in the creation of a military doctrine for the twenty-first century.

The answer to the search for a new narrative of world order came in the form of “globalization”. Former Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) Håkan Syrén, describes how the fall of the Berlin wall became the starting point of a new era of increased interdependence between nations called globalization (2006:15ff). An era under which the welfare and security of Sweden (and indeed most countries) had gotten so tightly knit together with developments in other, sometimes far away, parts of the world, that both the geographical and interest frames of military engagement had been vastly expanded (ibid:16ff).

This analysis of globalization also prompted some serious reconsiderations of how the armed forces were to be organized. With the immediate threat of invasion and “big war” out of picture, SAF embarked on a transformation that would fit the new globalized world. The transformation aimed at a defense that could protect Swedish interests wherever they occurred. It called for a slimmer and more professional organization which could mobilize and deploy fast in any part of the world (Göransson 2009a). The idea of a rapid-response defense [insatsförsvar] was born².

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¹ The Peoples Defense Army carried the ability to mobilize extensive parts of the population.
² This development is far from unique to Sweden. The same ideas have proliferated in most West European armed forces (Haltiner 1998, Dandeker 1999:3). States with mass armies have been reduced to a military historical epoch and replaced by militaries where the forces should be easily mobilized and capable to respond to various types of threats. Cost effectiveness and flexibility have become key words
Recently this transformation has also shone through to the Swedish public: As one step towards the rapid-response defense the National Military Service [allmän värnplikt], which had been the backbone of the invasion defense since 1901 (Agrell 2010:191), was abolished in June 2010. With the duty conscription system of the National Military Service out of the picture SAF had a newfound need to recruit. Marketing and branding to recruit, therefore, became an integral part of SAFs efforts to meet the security targets of the nation. They started reaching out with great intense. Their budget for marketing and public relations increased with 500 percent from 2009 to 2011 (Godmorgon, världen! 2011-07-07). And today, we find SAFs commercials on public billboards as well as on TV or internet services like Spotify. If we get interested in their massages we might join their group on Facebook, follow them on Twitter or surf on to their YouTube-channel. This marks a historical change in the relation between the citizens and SAF. A new combat space complementing the traditional ones – air, land and sea – have gained importance. It is the combat space of information. And SAFs activities in it during the last couple of years have clearly impacted the civil-military relations in Sweden.

This thesis serves to investigate what the new direction in Swedish defense policy after the Cold War meant for a central part of civil-military relations in Sweden; it is a study of how and what SAF communicates to the Swedish citizens. I intend to demonstrate that there exist grave discrepancies between how SAF communicates their missions, values and work in different texts. I will also highlight techniques through which SAF try to portray themselves in a favorable light. Moreover, incorporating an explanatory piece to the puzzle, I intend to show that the narratives that SAF communicates (and techniques with which these are communicated) have its basis in SAFs analysis of the effects of globalization.

Accordingly the overarching aims of the thesis are: To investigate how SAF communicates their goals, values and work in different type of texts – commercials and doctrine. And, to connect the results of this investigation to SAFs analysis of the post-Cold War world that they conceptualize as globalization.
1.1. Research Question and Operationalization

In order to operationalize the aims of this thesis I have constructed both a research question and three operational questions. First, the **research question**: How have SAFs (and their constituent the Swedish government) interpretation of the post-Cold War world, what they call the globalized world, affected the *content of what* and the *manner in which* they communicate their mission, values and work to the Swedish public?

To answer the research question it is broken down in three **operational questions** which will guide the analysis.

1. How is the post-Cold War development, conceptualized as globalization, interpreted and described in Swedish defense doctrine?

2. How has this understanding of the world under “globalization” impacted the current transformation of the way SAF are structured, organized and carry out their activities?

3. What implications have this transformation had on the ways SAF communicates their interests, values and work to the Swedish public?

The first two operational questions will be dealt with briefly in the analysis. They are meant to provide the setting and background to the third question, enabling a well-grounded analysis of SAFs communication. The third operational question then represents the major focus of the analysis. It is first with this operational question that the research question gets its answer. The logic of, as in the third question, comparing doctrines with commercials lies in that, for SAF, commercials are a qualitatively new type of communication that comes as a direct result of the transformation. While doctrines on the other hand, always have been an integral part of the armed forces communication.

Further, the second operational question is not constructed in such a manner that it is possible to answer in its entirety. It is simply impossible to overlook and its answer might be argued in a number of ways. However, the reason of posing this question is instead to set out the direction for the analysis, helping to highlight some of the impacts that are relevant for this thesis.
1.2. Why Study Civil-Military Relations?

To start with, there are some obvious reasons, of why to study civil-military relations, connected to the type of organization SAF is. In terms of economy and man power SAF are one of the largest civil services in Sweden. SAF stand as the main guarantor of the state’s security and have monopoly on the use of violence (in situations that surpasses the borders of the state). They wield exclusive access to the use (and knowledge of how to use) heavy weapon systems, or in other words, the hard power resources of Sweden. SAF is also an important tool in Swedish foreign policy. Military cooperation in areas such as technology, military strategy and training as well as peacekeeping missions has great actual and symbolic impact. It affects both the country’s basic security as well as other related spheres such as trade and public relations.

Secondly, the process towards a rapid response defense – with the abolition of national military service and the resulting focus on marketing – marks a historical change in Swedish military affairs in general, and in civil-military relations specifically. In relation to the importance of an institution like SAF for the society as a whole, and its role as an essential part of the modern national project in Sweden, what SAF communicates becomes a question of transparency, and in prolongation, democracy. It becomes a question of what the state (in capacity of SAF) shall do to its citizens, and what the citizens must accept in the name of the state. Further, the need to recruit personal on the labor market also drives SAF to develop a new identity. They have at least in part to become (or rather be seen as) an entity separate from politicians and the government in order to stand out as a strong independent brand.

Finally, directing attention outside the borders of Sweden, the processes this thesis investigates have wider bearing because they have plenty of mirror images across Europe. SAF are yet only one actor in a concerted move towards rapid-response defenses in Europe, with professional armies, market based forms of recruitment and increased emphasize on branding.

1.3. Disposition

This thesis consists of four main chapters: After the first chapter, which is the Introduction you just read, comes the chapter Theory of Science, Method and Material. This chapter is divided into five sub-chapters which discusses the epistemology and ontology
of this thesis. This most importantly includes discussions on discourse analysis, the empirics I use, research ethics and the work process leading up to this thesis. Additionally, key concepts such as text, globalization and perception management are also defined or discussed. The third main chapter is the Analysis. In this chapter, which consists of six sub-chapters, the results of my investigation will be presented. Since the results come from an analysis of the empirics, and the final analysis builds on the results, results and analysis, inseparable as they are, will be presented together. This chapter is also where my research question gets its full answer. Finally, in the fourth chapter, Executive Summary, the main results of the analysis – i.e. the answers to the research question – are summarized.
2. Theory of Science, Method and Material

It is of uttermost importance for the understanding and evaluation of this thesis that there is clarity on which ontological and epistemological traditions it is based. The aim of this chapter is therefore to present the scientific approach of the thesis. It includes: 1) Basic assumptions on the possibility of knowledge and discourse analysis. 2) Explanation of the epistemology of two different approaches to discourse analysis and how these can be operationalized. This section also includes discussions on how I use globalization as an analytical category, and a short introduction to poststructuralist theories of perception management. 3) A discussion on the empirical material – what it consists of (content and type), on which grounds I chose it, how I collected it and how I intend to use it. 4) Description of the work process. 5) Elaboration on research ethics and my, the researchers, role in the research process.

2.1. The Nature of Knowledge and Discourse

First, I would like to define or label the basic scientific approach of this study, and then move to a more detailed review of it. The discourse analytical focus of this study can be placed within a broader scientific current, which has variously been called social constructivism, post-structuralism (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:5f,10f) or constructivist structuralism (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999:32). These labels all maintain that even though social structures are real, important and often relatively consistent, structuralist theory is not sufficient for explaining agency and change. The focus is instead on researching the dialectic between structure and agency – both how structures shape agency, and how agency reshapes structure. This approach sets the object of study (individuals, groups, organizations) at center stage as a subject in a constant process of social positioning. Its main interest lies so forth in how meaning is constructed about the world, not in the world as such.

Having made an attempt to place my approach in the bigger scientific field, I will now elaborate on it in greater detail, starting with its view on the nature of knowledge. As is
obvious from the last statement above, I reject the positivistic dream of getting to know absolute facts of nature (or as in the case of social science – human meaning making). I side with Bruce Kapferer who argues that there is no such thing as value free interpretations. Humans are always in culture and, therefore, our interpretations of the world are always en-cultured (Kapferer 2000:186). The fundament of this perspective is the idea that “seeing” of reality is only attainable through perception with cultural “membranes” (Bucchi 2002:26), which has, by various authors and in different contexts, been called paradigms, discourses, life worlds, etc. Elaborating on what this means for the nature of knowledge, Donna Haraway stresses that facts or understandings of the world should be seen as narratives – narratives about how the world is dispositioned. These narrated facts are situated in the context of its author, i.e. her/his conception and perception of reality and the culture and expectations of her/his social surrounding (Haraway 1992:4).

The status of factual knowledge hinges from this approach so forth on if the audience of a narrative accepts it as a truthful description of reality. A “fact”, so to speak, has to be recognised as a fact to become a fact. Without believers and users there is no fact outside your own person, and to make a wider recognized fact, one relies on the influence and resources of one’s supporters just as much as on the nature of one’s message. The only thing that ultimately separate fact from illusions is the number and status of its believers. Reality and objectivity in this constructivist sense follows the logic that Pierre Bourdieu lays bare by commenting on the establishing of quality in the field of history: “a ‘good historian’ is someone good historians call a good historian” (1996/2011:57).

The relativistic leaning of this conclusion does not mean that reality is non-existent or impossible to say something about. Actions are real, physical objects are real, social structures are also real, all in the sense that they have real effects on our lives. But, as mentioned above, one can only make sense of their meaning through cultural membranes. Thus, if we erase these membranes there is no seeing at all – we need them, but we also need to acknowledge that they are there – without them we would be lost and by deliberately forgetting about them we would become liars. Therefore, to see facts as narratives is not to dismiss them. It is rather to acknowledge that we only find “objectivity” through engaging with our own and others subjectivity (Haraway 1992:290).

Knowledge is attainable, but not universal, only particular contextualized – that is – situated knowledge. With this said, we can start moving beyond the relativist truth that there is no look from nowhere, and focus on the look we got – the look from somewhere.

Judging from my argument, what I need to do is to clearly narrate my scientific outlook. This includes, not least, serious considerations upon my role as creator of the thesis and the pre-conceptions with which I enter this study. This will be dealt with in the last part of this chapter (2.5.). But first, let us take a closer look on the thesis theoretical key concept – discourse.
To start the search for a definition of discourse I will quote Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, who draw out the logic with which discourses work. They argue that “discourses, by representing reality in one particular way rather than in other possible ways, constitute subjects and objects in particular ways, create boundaries between true and false, and make certain types of action relevant and other unthinkable” (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:145). If adding my earlier conceptualizing of discourses as membranes between reality and understanding to this, it implies that discourses become an integral part of agency since actions and practices are always based in pre-conceptions about the specific situation in which they are played out (Ibid:35f). As an attempt to define discourse that catches both the force of structure on agency, and agency on structure, I would propose that discourses is to be understood as: *Interpretive repertoires with which we make sense of our impressions and, as a logical prolongation, also direct how we think about and act on the reality that the impressions stem from.* The usage of the concept “interpretive repertoire” is intended to underline that, in the interpretation of an event, subjects are often not locked to one absolute discursive frame/understanding. Moreover, it is also supposed to highlight that subjects in most situations strategically and creatively play into a number of discourses in the framing of an event or argument.

Before moving on to the practical use of discourse analysis I will elaborate further on the nature of discourses by introducing the concepts hegemony and struggle. Hegemony, in this context, refers to when the interpretive repertoire of a specific impression is depleted to only consist of one possible way of interpretation – i.e. one specific discourse has hegemony over the interpretive prerogative. This condition is the dichotomous twin of the other concept – struggle. Struggle exists and takes place as long as the repertoire is filled with adverse discourses to draw from in interpretation and play into while arguing. According to one of the chief theorists behind the use of these concepts in discourse analysis Ernesto Laclau, struggles are ever present in all discourses although at specific moments one subject position (a particular in Laclaus language) can become so dominant that it gets misrecognized as objective truth, i.e. a hegemon (a universal) (Laclau 1996:50). The basic logic of hegemony and struggle can be explained by this most trivial example: Once most people in Europe knew that the sun, the stars, in deed the entire “skies” revolved around the earth – believing something else was unthinkable, even laughable. The frames of interpretation where set. The discourse was hegemonic. However with new technology and some ingenious scientific work, the struggle of the universe was on. It was a fierce struggle, standing between the growing power of rational modern science discourse and the power of the old hegemonic theo-

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3 To add to this, there are also grand discourses like for example “relativism” (or the one I am “writing” from – “discourse theory”) that has an internal logic of multiple choices of “seeing”.

4 See Jørgensen & Phillips 2002 for a thorough discussion of Ernesto Laclaus usage of the concepts hegemony and struggle.
logical discourse. The nature of the universe was destabilized, no one was laughing anymore. But as centuries and debates passed the contender turned out victorious. The universe was once again stable, this time according to the new victors’ discursive frames. Hegemony was reinstated. The adversary were again laughable (or put under the control of modern psychiatry).

2.2. Approaches to Discourse Analysis

Leaving the more abstract discussion on the nature of knowledge and discourse, I will now discuss the two traditions of discourse analysis that I make use of. I will also connect them to the specific parts of the research that they are used in. In this process of connecting, two important themes, which need a more detailed elaboration before the analysis, will also be discussed: globalisation, and poststructuralist theories of perception management.

Carol Bacchi maps out what she argues are two related but distinct analytical traditions within discourse theory: analysis of discourse and discourse analysis (2005:199). The former has as its main focus on identifying what I earlier called “the force of structure on agency” or what Bacchi calls “interpretive and conceptual schemas (discourses) that produces particular understandings of issues and events” (Ibid). While the latter rather focuses on “the force of agency on structure” or how arguments is constructed in discursive struggle (Ibid). According to Bacchi they differ mainly in their stance towards agency where the first approach understands subjects as “constituted in discourse” and the second see them as “discourse users” (Ibid:200). To keep these two traditions apart more clearly, I maintain the term analysis of discourse from Bacchi for the first one, but import the term discourse psychology from Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) for the second. These two traditions will both be useful when analysing the empirics and answering my research question. The analysis of discourse approach applies to the first operational question, which is concerned with the discursive frames that SAF draw on to make sense of globalisation. While the discursive psychology tradition applies to the third operational question whit its intent on investigating the discourses SAF play into in their communicative practices.

Before going into further detail of my usage of the two traditions one last aspect of the discourse theoretical approach will be touched on. This aspect refers directly to the empirical material and is a vertical order of discourse, structured in micro, meso and macro level. I adopt these concepts from Marianne LeGreco and Sarah Tracy who structure
them accordingly: micro level refers to everyday talk and practices, meso level refers to organizational and institutional practices and policies, and macro level refers to broader social narratives and cultural norms (2009:1519,1525). In relation to the thesis this implies that the empirical material I use is to be understood as meso level text. And what I do in my analysis is to lay bare the dialectic between meso and macro level of discourse: First how SAF draws on macro level discourse in their conceptualization of globalization, and secondly how SAF play into power infested macro level discourses in their communicative practices.

2.2.1. Analysis of Discourse and the Concept of Globalization

Using a highflying term such as globalization as an absolute analytical category to describe a broad array of processes (or an entire scheme of processes – economic, political and cultural – that are constituting an epoch) since the cold war is prone to oversimplification. In order to analyse *with* globalization, it must always be grounded in cases – i.e. situations or subject positions. I intend to ground it in a subject position, treating globalization as an emic category constructed by SAF. Globalization in this usage functions, from an analysis of discourse perspective, as a key signifier: i.e. an empty conceptual frame that SAF fill with meaning in their struggle to create a new master narrative of world order (see Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:28,50 for discussion on key signifiers). Posing questions about globalization to the empirics, such as: When did it start? Which are the major processes? Which are the driving forces? What are the effects? Is it good or bad? I will be able to map out which discourses, available in the interpretive repertoire on globalization, SAF draws on, respectively excludes, in this struggle.

The analysis of SAFs conceptualization of globalization will function as the backdrop to the rest of the thesis. It will be the force that sets my narrative going and the ideological underpinning of the processes I research. Therefore I intend to already here give a brief introduction to three strands of globalization theory. This will in no way be a fully representative picture of the debate on globalization, and no writer might adhere solely to one of the stereotypical strands.

A first dividing line can be drawn between hyper-globalist and sceptics by answering the question, when did globalization start? Sceptics argues that what many refer to as globalization processes in the form of increased speed and quantity of global flows of goods, people, communication, social relations and capital are clearly exaggerated. Where the hyper-globalists see something qualitatively and quantitatively new, the sceptics see a fluctuating continuum of flows and multi-regional processes rather than global (Dicken 2007:7). Some of them argue that the world economy was more integrated and “free” around the turn of the twentieth century than at the turn of the twenty-
first (Hirst & Thompson 1999), others claim that globalization is at least as old as commercial society (Friedman 2006:110).

Hyper-globalists agree on the revolutionary force of globalization, let loose by market capitalism and information technology, to remake the conditions of human existence. Still, they can be divided into two major strands. Both these strands understand globalization as “neoliberal” – or in other words as the assimilation of society to the capitalist market – but differ in their understanding of its consequences. By the proponents of neoliberal globalisation, let us call them “neoliberals”, capital is seen to be flowing over the globe wherever it is let, reducing the importance of states, nationality and other “past” forms of organization and identity. Market driven competition also spurs new technology which (time-space) compresses the world, freeing people of geographical boundedness. The process is indeed seen to be under way even though not completed (Dicken 2007:5f). By the neoliberals globalization is also perceived as the road to development (understood as growth) and it is supposed to come through deregulation of state intervention in (almost) all economical spheres, national as well as international. As soon as the market is left to its own devise it is supposed to erase grave global and local economic inequality (Hunter Wade 2008:190).

For the second hyper-globalist strand, let us call them “critics”, market driven globalization is not making the world more equal, for them the opposite is true. While the income share of middle income groups remains virtually stable in most countries, the gap between the many poor and few rich has kept rising the last twenty-five years (Sutcliffe 2007:48,62f). The critics accentuate one trend, most visual in countries that have implemented neoliberal policies: the opening of pockets of affluence in poor countries and pockets of deprivation in rich countries (Brah 2002:37, Peterson and Runyan 2010:194).

Far from seeing the end of geography, the critics argue that there is an enhanced geography where old borders are being complemented or replaced by new (Bauman 1998:101, Walker 2006:80). The global cosmopolitan society proposed by influential writers such as Anthony Giddens (2002:19), and popularly imagined through the “global village” metaphor, is according to the critics, rather a global gated community. For them the globalized money, heralded by the neoliberals, does not flow over deregulated global markets spreading wealth. It neatly hops in and out of pockets, bank accounts and prosperous highly securitized enclaves of mineral extraction, up-market neighbourhoods, “wall streets” and parliaments. Neoliberal globalization is from this perspective “globe-hopping” (Ferguson 2006:37f) – indeed spanning but not covering the globe, leaving places and peoples in between untouched by its wealth.
2.2.2. Discursive Psychology and Theories of Perception Management

As stated above, discursive psychology will be used to investigate the discourses SAF play into in their communicative practices. It will be a comparison of which macro-discourses SAF play into in two types of meso-level texts – doctrine and commercials. It is a way to map how SAF create diverging versions of themselves. How they use discourses as building blocks in the active creation of their identity (Potter & Wetherell 1987:33f). The comparison will enable me to evaluate if and how SAF strategically constructs narratives about themselves in the commercials (which are targeted at the public) that cannot be found in the doctrine (which is not specifically aimed at the public). Connecting back to the concept of struggle, it here relates to how SAF tries to establish truths concerning the nature of their organisation. The comparison will be done by comparing how SAF narrates their mission, objectives, activities, actions and values in the two types of texts. More specifically this can for example be seen in the way they participate in debates about gender equality or the reasons behind SAF’s mission in Afghanistan.

Just as globalization was briefly introduced, I will also make comments on theories of propaganda (or perception management) which will be helpful to be acquainted with before the analysis. There has been plenty written on the subject in connection to military affairs. Dating back to realist classics such as Machiavelli, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss to more recent theorising by poststructuralist (especially since the Gulf War). While the former exposed propaganda by educating it, the latter exposes it by criticizing. The emphasis here will be on the poststructuralist, not least, because they provide apt tools for the technicality of exposing perception management techniques in the twenty-first century.

To start with, a basic definition of propaganda would be in place: “Propaganda is the conscious or unconscious attempt by the propagandist to advance their cause through the manipulation of the opinion, perception and behaviour of a targeted group” (Wilcox 2005:21). The content meaning of this definition provides a useful working concept. However, since the term propaganda carries a whole range of negative connotations, I will from now on use the related but more neutral term “perception management” to refer to the same process.

Turning to the poststructuralist writing about military perception management, one of their basic presuppositions is that technological development, together with military/political strive towards escaping the so called Vietnam Syndrome⁵, has resulted in a merging of the entertainment-media industry and the military. This new complex, it is

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⁵ The Vietnam Syndrome is the belief that the U.S. had to withdraw from Vietnam because the home-front was persuaded by gruesome (and unfair) TV-images – i.e. wars cannot be won if they are played out uncensored in front of the home-crowd (Carruthers 2000:111).
argued, is capable of producing virtual representations of war that makes them seem efficient, bloodless and void of any political/ethic uncertainty. As one of the chief representatives of this theory, James Der Derian (2009) retains: the dream of liberal peace, through the fighting of virtuous wars, has become possible by making the representations of war virtual. What is aimed at is the notion that even though faraway wars appear more real than ever for the, through the media on-looking, western public what they get served is carefully directed and produced staging’s of war. This is exactly what is reflected in another of the theory’s chief representatives, Jean Baudrillard, contention that “the Gulf War did not take place” (1991/1995). The advantage of this perspective for this thesis is that it directs focus on the perception management techniques – the battle techniques – that are used in the increasingly important military combat space of information.

2.3. Empirics and Text

Before discussing the empirical material as such, I will make a definition of the term “text”, which I will use to refer to the individual pieces of empirics. Text has been defined to refer to anything from purely coherent pieces of written language to everything that a person can make meaning of in a specific situation (Titscher et al 2000:20,29). For this thesis a definition between these two poles is suitable. According to Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough a text is “a contribution to a communicative interaction which is designed for travel, so to speak – which is designed in one context with a view to its uptake in others” (1999:45). This definition both set frames around the concept in terms of that there must be an agent, and opens up for a variety of communicative interactions which are not written – i.e. signs, photos, speeches and moving images (or the combination of these). In connection to my use of discourse theory the texts selected for analyzing are also to be understood as representations: both of discourse, and of use of discourse.

The empirical material, on which this thesis is built, consists of various types of texts published by official political channels or SAF, that concerns everything from analyses of globalization and the nature of war, to policies on discrimination and gender. The material adheres in time from 1995 to 2012 and in scope from SAFs annual reports and defense department propositions to YouTube commercials and blogs. I understand the material to consist of two overarching types of texts that have to be read in specific ways according to their targeted audience and intended use. First, there are formal or official texts which will be referred to as the doctrine. Secondly, there are commercial
and semi-commercial texts published by SAF that is aimed at strengthening SAFs brand and recruiting personnel. Both types will be dealt with in greater length below, and the individual texts that they consist of will be listed in the bibliography according to their type.

In order to make the results of the discourse analysis transparent, the analysis chapter contains quite a number of quotes from the empirics. However, since most of the texts are written in Swedish the quotes had to be translated into English. The Reader should be notified of that I have made these translations.

2.3.1. The Doctrine

The first clarification that has to be made concerns what a doctrine is and what it consists of. This will be done with inspiration from peace and conflict historian Wilhelm Agrell, who in his dissertation wrote about Swedish defense doctrine during the Cold War. Agrell argues that doctrines are to be understood as overall conceptions that can be used to analyze specific problems and specify guidelines for future action (1985:19). Further, the defense doctrine should be seen as a sub-doctrine, together with for example trade doctrine and aid doctrine, in the overarching doctrine of security (Ibid:20). Agrell also maintain that the defense doctrine is made up of declarations that can, in one way or the other, be seen as official statements of persons or institutions with direct influence over the defense organization (Ibid:32). It is important to point out that the doctrine that is referred to here, so forth, is more than just the text that SAF publish as “Military Strategic Doctrine”.

The sample that I call the doctrine is made up of the following types of texts: speeches and three “small books” from the Commander-in-Chief; annual reports, budget information, military strategic doctrines and other reports on military strategy from SAF; reports from the Swedish Defence Commission; propositions, public investigations, proclamations from the Swedish government. The texts are chosen for two reasons: they fit the frame of “a doctrine” (laid out above) and they are easily accessible (and so forth, without doubt, declared) on either SAFs or the Swedish Defense Ministry’s homepage. Even if the full spectra of texts stay within the frames of doctrine it contains some variations regarding form and intended receiver. For example, the “small books” from the Commander-in-Chief which are (officially) directed to SAFs employees have a much more easygoing and personal form (which is closer to the commercial texts) then

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6 Agrell also makes the distinction between declared and un-declared doctrine. The declared doctrine is the type of official available texts that are discussed here, while the un-declared doctrine refers to classified material and narrowly circulated texts (Agrell 1985:22f). The texts I use consist solely of what can be referred to as declared doctrine.

7 The full list of texts analyzed as “doctrine” is listed in the bibliography under the heading Doctrine.
for example the Public Investigation Reports. Moreover, it is important to point out that some of these texts, although foremost being used as part of the discourse analysis, also stands as sources in the discussion of the organization and transformation of SAF. This is not least true for the older texts which serve to give a historical overview of the transformation process.

As is obvious from the description of doctrine it functions as discourse or interpretive repertoire through which the world is understood and acted upon. It is built on implicit assumptions of world order and is often fronted with as neutral and objective (Ibid:24f). By mapping out the interpretive repertoire through discourse analysis I intend to pick apart these assumptions to extract the macro discourses they are built on.

While using doctrines there are some methodological pitfalls to keep in mind. Doctrines, even if they are declarations, should not be seen as straight descriptions of reality. They are as Agrell reminds often constructed in a very tight political maneuver space. They can be used both as a way to position oneself towards, and communicate to, other states, as well as a tool in the legitimization of an institution and its expenses (Ibid:25,36f). However, while acknowledging and keeping these pitfalls in mind I intend to use the doctrine as a declaration of the world view and will of SAF. It can so forth function as a raster against which the commercial texts can be evaluated (according to the logic that if the commercial texts differ substantially from the doctrine they can be suspected to be cases of perception management, and not the other way around).

2.3.2. The Commercials

The commercial texts that will be used have, compared to the doctrine, not as many senders and do not go back as long in history⁸, but come from a greater variety of media. The main reason behind this is that it is only in the last couple of years – after the abolishment of conscription – that SAF has started marketing to any greater extent. Concerning the media that these texts adhere from we find written texts and photos in the form of blogs, billboards, newspaper campaigns and information-recruitment campaigns on SAFs homepage, as well as moving images and simulations such as TV-adds, information videos and a smartphone application.⁹ Some of these texts might at first sight not appear as commercials. The blogs for example are not traditional commercials in the same sense as a recruitment add. Anyhow, all the texts that are “read” as commercials share the trait that they, in one way or the other, function as a channel through which SAF either direct market or in a broader sense “brand” themselves.

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⁸ SAF is the sender of all of the texts and they only date back to 2007.
⁹ The full list of texts analyzed as “commercials” is listed in the bibliography under the heading Commercials.
The texts being quite new, and their purpose being informative/influencing, they are all easily accessible through SAFs webpage. The process of collecting the empirics was so forth, thanks to SAFs databases, more a question of sorting for relevance than searching. Even if certain interesting texts might be excluded in this process, if they are not archived in the databases (this would probably mostly be billboards, flyers and shorter internet ads), there is no reason to go over the bridge for water. The quantity and, even more so, the quality of the texts is substantial enough for the investigation that is intended in this thesis. It includes the bulk of the commercial texts that SAF have produced as well as the main ideas of the recruitment and information campaigns they have carried out during the last five years.

“Reading” photos and moving images, or the combination of written, spoken, photographed and videoed text, prompts some further considerations of the nature of such text. Pictures and, even more so, videos give the air of being epistemologically superior to written text and talk. They produce “eye-witnesses” of people sitting in front of the TV or reading the newspaper. The image scopes from natures (the senses) pool of unbiased authority. As Susan Sontag asserts a photo have the label of objectivity stamped on it from the start as it is a machine that does the registering straight from reality, seemingly without a mediator – a photo is not made as talk and written text it is “taken” (2003/2004:32,52). Of course cameras are directed and excludes, settings are staged and voices and images are handled to fit a purpose. It is so forth important to remember to treat text centered on images as produced construction just like other text, and to keep in mind the argumentative power that images hold with their chimaera of authenticity.

2.4. The Research Process – Coding and Structuring

Once I had decided upon the interest of my thesis and started collecting empirical material, the processes of coding began. Trying to map the overarching themes – types of texts as well as ruptures and key signifiers in the text – getting hold of what was going on in the empirics. Already at this point I developed a good understanding of which categories and meaning-making themes that could be found across the texts. The analysis of the empirics unavoidably started as soon as I began collecting and thinking about it. I also wrote notes, analytical threads and theoretical standpoints throughout the research process. In this way the research grows in an organic fashion where reading and writing merges and become the groundwork on which further reading and writing builds.
Directing focus on the third operational question, and the comparison between which macro-discourses the doctrinal and the commercial texts play into, it can be argued that a kind of cut-up is done. This technique was originally used in literature to avoid hegemonic frames of interpretation that constitutes every text and that neither reader nor writer can escape. By intermixing unrelated written textual outtakes, in order to destroying their initial meaning, semantic loopholes were created through which alternative associations could be imagined (Magnusson in the afterword to Burroughs 1964/2005:165-171). The cut-up practiced here is not nearly as radical. Instead, by putting textual outtakes from the two types of texts, that touch on the same issues, at the side of each other, new ways of reading them can be invoked. Not by destroying their initial meaning and escaping the frames of interpretation, but rather through contrasting them and distorting them by applying theory – highlighting the discourses they build on. By reading the different texts intermixed and putting them side by side it is so forth possible to escape the naturalizing common-sense-phrasing that both types of text are built around. It becomes a way to unlearn logics in the text – to see them – for example (with risk of forestalling the analysis), the discourse of realism that is latent in the doctrine or the discourse of humanitarianism that is equally persistent in the commercials.

The whole of this process, from initial free writing, gathering and reading of the empirics, research proposal writing, to, coding, reading of theory and earlier research, and finally writing up is in the end what lead me up to the analysis (and the results that stems from it). It cannot be stressed enough that in this process, of interpreting, analyzing and writing, I am creating the narratives that I give to the reader – I am not giving observation straight from “reality”.

2.5. Research Ethics and Critical Notes

As the last line above hints at, I am in the role as researcher under the same ontological and epistemological limitations as those outlined under the headline The Nature of Knowledge and Discourse (2.1.). In order to even come close to produce the situated knowledge Haraway proposes one have to acknowledge that since theories are made by scientists they are necessarily social products steaming from the scientist’s preconception of reality (Bloor 1991:16). As Haraway puts it “[f]acts are always theory-laden; theories are always value-laden; therefore, facts are value-laden” (1992:288). With this follows that we have to show, in full light, how our “social positioning” is embedded in the creation of scientific (indeed any) knowledge. This is saying that we should make clear who we are, where we look from and what we think we are looking at in order to
show the conditions under which we produce knowledge, and so forth situate it in those specific contextual settings (Fox 2006:248f,357).

What I argue for writing about situated knowledge is not in any way a full description or reflexivity that would totally situate the arguments. That would be as impossible as the positivist mission – to extract facts straight from reality – that I write against. Instead I share the simple rule of thumb with Howard Becker (1996:64) that a fuller description is always better than a thinner. In order to make such a “fuller” description Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips advise the discourse analyser to stick to some basic procedures:

- The analysis should be solid. It is best if the interpretation is based on a range of different textual features rather than just one feature.
- The Analysis should be comprehensive. This does not mean that all aspects of the text have to be analysed in all possible ways one could – which would be impossible in many cases – but that the questions posed to the text should be answered fully and any textual features that conflict with the analysis should be accounted for.
- [...] The analysis should be presented in a transparent way, allowing, the reader, as far as possible, to ‘test’ the claims made. (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:173)

Apart from these procedures I should also state my preconceptions going into the research: As is clear from the argument about the basic scientific approach of this study, I am of the view that social science, if not all science, inevitable take sides in political issues and debates. I also take side – by investigating the communicative practices of SAF from a critical perspective with the aim of disclosing and explaining discrepancies that I have sensed between what SAF communicates in different channels. At the basis of this aim is also the value assumption that, if grave discrepancies exists, there is an ethical problem (apart from a purely democratic problem) when state institution lies to the citizens (especially in matters such as war, conflict and security). It is only in the light if these problems that this thesis gets truly interesting and urgent.

Turning back to the creation of this thesis it is important to point out that from a strictly methodological perspective an alternative definition of discourse is possible: discourse is an analytical concept which the researcher “projects onto reality in order to create a framework of study” (Ibid:143). This can for example be seen through that I from the empirics construct discursive themes around important nodal points, like “the circulation of non-knowledge” or “the de-politicization of SAF”. This is not to say that the discourse theory outlined above does not hold. It is merely to point out that the researcher inevitably also lives by and construct new discursive themes in the research process. From this also follows that when I write about “virtual realities” or “perception management” they are my conceptualizations of features in SAFs communication. They are not absolute, but they are hopefully well argued and defined.
Finally, I am well aware of that there exist many narratives about the nature of SAFs work. The narrative that I present concerns the combat space of information. And this combat space is best studied from the armchair. I am “being there” by sitting in-front of the computer. SAFs employees for example, which work concerns other combat spaces, might derive a lot of their understanding of SAF from their everyday work, but not at all from the sources I get my understanding from. This is natural, but it should be clear that many might not recognize the picture I paint and feel that their understanding of SAF is not represented. It is so forth important for me to acknowledge that my “facts” are situated in an argument about how reality is and they become plausible first with the acceptance of this argument by the reader. This gives the full chain of creation running as follows: the empirics together with my interpretation and representation of them write this thesis in dialogue. Taking it one step further with the entry of the reader of the text (you), the reader experience a “trialogue” as another level of interpretation is laid on the already existing dialogue.
3. Analysis

The text that you are about to read is built on two major rupture points in the form of historical events. The first is the end of the Cold War. The second, which comes as a consequence of the first, is the abolishment of the National Military Service in Sweden. It is important to highlight these two events specifically since they are the contextual changes that set the processes which I investigate in motion. The end of the Cold War is the mother rupture of the thesis; it is where both number one and two of the operational questions are based. The second rupture, the daughter of the first, is the departure point of the main part of the analysis, concerned with SAFs communication to the citizens.

The analysis consists of six sub-chapters: 3.1. *Post-Cold War – Globalization to the Fore*: in this chapter SAFs analysis of security and society after the Cold War is discussed. 3.2. *The Extended Concept of Security – The Globalization of Threat*: here the altered understanding of security, which acts as a conceptual bridge between the analysis of globalization and the transformation of SAF, is discussed. 3.3. *The Transformation of SAF*: under this heading central parts of the transformation from an invasion defense to a rapid-response defense are highlighted. 3.4. *Working the Media – Branding the Military – Selling a Job*: this sub-chapter focus on the rationale with which SAF move into marketing. 3.5. *Communicative Practices – Narratives in the Doctrine and Commercials*: this sub-chapter is the start of the most central part of the analysis. It concerns the communication of SAF to the citizens. 3.6. *Contours of the Combat Space of Information*: this last sub-chapter consists of a critical discussion where I draw out some implications from the results of the analysis.

The analysis should be read as a coherent story, where there is a consistent line of argument running from the first sub-chapter to de last. With this in mind, the cub-chapters can still be sorted according to the operational questions. The first operational question – *How is the post-Cold War development, conceptualized as globalization interpreted and described in Swedish defense doctrine?* – will mainly be answered in sub-chapters 3.1 and 3.2. The second operational question – *How has this understanding of the world under “globalization” impacted the current transformation of the way SAF are structured, organized and carry out their activities?* – will be discussed in sub-chapters 3.3 and 3.4. Finally, the third operational question – *What implications have this trans-
formation had on the ways SAF communicates their interests, values and work to the Swedish public? – get its full answer in sub-chapter 3.5.

3.1. Post-Cold War – Globalization to the Fore

*Sweden is an integrated part of Europe and one of the world’s most globalized countries*

(Ds 2008:48: 20)

We can be sure that when catch-it-all concepts like globalization are used virtually without context, as in the quote above, no one knows what it means but everybody feels what it means: we are modern, we are connected, we are on the train heading for the future. But where is the future? That is what this analysis sets out to investigate, treating, as mentioned above (2.2.1.), globalization as an emic category derived from SAF.

As pointed out in the introduction globalization became the key signifier around which a new narrative of world order could be built after the Cold War. The most persistent descriptions of the main characteristics of globalization that can be found in the doctrine are: that there is an increased interdependence and contact between a multitude of actors on a global level, that globalization is happening right now, and that globalization is driven by democratization processes and integration of markets. For example, in 2000 SAF wrote: “The world is to a great extent characterized by globalization which is the result of democratization and market economy. This leads to an increased interdependence between different actors” (SAF 2000:42). Further, the dominant stance towards these processes is that the increased global interdependence through market integration, although carrying new security challenges, is positive and should be defended and encouraged (Ibid.13f).

These descriptions have been persistent throughout the new Millennia. However, in later updated versions of the doctrine new concepts are introduced to expand the analysis. These come in form of geographical (space) compression (an event in one part of the world get consequences in a totally different part of the world) and time compression (the effects of an event in one part of the world is felt much faster in a related part of the world) (MSD 2011:32). With these concepts of interdependence and compression as a backdrop SAFs Commander-in-Chief Sverker Göransson also introduce the metaphor of “flows”: 

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A globalized economy is dependent of functioning flows. These flows have to be secured in one way or the other. The one who controls the flows also have an advantage. The flows do not stay within national borders but are transnational. (Göransson 2011)

Many [...] conflicts affect the global flows. This reality underscores the need of more systematic interventions with both military and civilian actors, and that SAFs actions [upprådande] have to be robust. (Göransson 2012)

The strong emphasize on handling global flows suggests that, under the current economic globalization, SAFs role is to act as a barrier cutter and lubricant on the world market ensuring the flows of energy, capital and goods that the nation is depending on. SAF seems to follow what have been described in other western armed forces as a move from geopolitics to geo-economics (Moskos 2000:17.

Connecting this analysis of globalization back to the three strands of globalization theory outlined above (2.2.1.), it is plain to see that it rests firmly within the hyper-globalist framework rather than the skeptic, as they understand globalization to be something qualitatively and quantitatively new following on the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Whether the doctrine is to be put within the neoliberal or critical hyper-globalist strand is not entirely clear cut, although it heavily leans towards the neoliberal. It sees challenges and new threats (more about this below) which could be connected to the critics, but in the endorsement and defense of market integration and “flows” neoliberalism becomes the dominant theme. The connection made between market capitalism, democracy and security also points towards that a liberal stance is taken (Hoffman 1995:174f).

It is however not absolutely clear on which ground the authors of the doctrinal texts endorses the “free” market. Is it because its exclusively positive effects, or rather because market driven globalization is seen as an unavoidable process (and therefore we better convince ourselves that it is positive and jump on the bandwagon). As Craig Calhoun asserts, discourses of global society often build on the notion that they are (weather good or bad) demanded by the market – “as a force of necessity rather than an object of choice” (2002:170).

Turning to how the human or sociological consequences of globalization are portrayed in the doctrine one finds that it is understood as working against inner cohesion of the nation. It suggests that as Sweden is developing into a multicultural society (not only in ethnic terms) values and needs are not as homogenous as they ones were. Persons will tend to rely less on authorities and put individual development as a primary target in life (SAF 2000:59). Borders of nation-states start losing their significance as identity markers, and the trust towards state authorities is likely to be reduced as they face a harder time being the number one provider of information (Ibid). Globalization is so forth understood to create heterogeneous societies in which there is no place for traditional military ethics that are conservative and instrumentalist (built around values such as obedience, discipline and hard power) (see Huntington (1957:79) for discussion on military
ethics). It suffices to say that the doctrine also regarding the human consequences of globalization draw on liberal discourses in the interpretation of its effects. They side with liberal writers such as Giddens (2002) in arguing that we are moving towards a global bourgeois society based on the sacred tenant of individualism, rather than with critics such as Zygmunt Bauman (1998) who argues that globalization is taking us towards a restructured and deepened global class based society.

3.2. The Extended Concept of Security – The Globalization of Threat

As pointed out above, in the doctrine globalization is understood to be favoring Sweden’s security but at the same time bringing new security challenges. At the turn of the Millennium SAF argued that single states had a harder time than ever protecting their own interests. What went on outside the close vicinity had become increasingly important. Globalization had made interests global and therefore also made threats and strives for peace global (Swedish Defence Commission 1998:3f, SAF 2000:19). It was concluded that Sweden’s security, to a large extent, was constituted far away from our national borders, that lines between here and there had been blurred, and that the need had arisen to go out in the world to secure our national homeland and way of life (Swedish Defence Commission 2003a:15f, Syrén 2004:18). As former Commander-in-Chief Syrén writes “[t]hat which happens far away have gained significance for us in Sweden. The threats are new and borderless. Civil and military threats become harder to separate. National security interests are not necessarily isolated to our own country” (Syrén 2006:17).

As a consequence of globalization the Russian doll geography\(^\text{10}\) of security, that formally dominated the security outlook of Sweden, seems to have lost some of its significance. The military frontline has been moved from Gotland to Afghanistan. But the basic mission of SAF remained: the security and wellbeing of the nation. Hence, a preemptive security outlook formerly connected with big powers has now become a reality even for Sweden.

Except from the need to protect global trade flows the inability to control the security “future shadow”, or in other words, the difficulty of making a long term well-grounded

\(^{10}\) Doreen Massey argues that, at least in western countries, there has been a hegemony surrounding the discourse of the geography of care and responsibility that has taken the form of a Russian doll. First we care about the immediate neighborhood, then about the close vicinity, then about … (Massey 2004).
analysis and strategy, have been a recurring theme in the doctrine (see for example Swedish Defence Commission 1998:13 & Göransson 2012). Where the threat before always could be connected to the conflict between “East” and “West” the doctrine now uphold a multitude of actors and situations that can pose threats: Refugee flows, global economic divides, shortages of valuable resources, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trafficking of weapon, drugs and people, small and large scale terrorism, global warming, IT-warfare, economic crises (Fö 2008:16: 6ff, Ds 2004:30: 52), the list could be made longer, and it is all part of what today is understood as threats in a world where far away has become near both in terms of reach and interests11.

As a result of the analysis of the new threat picture there has been an alteration of the security concept in the doctrine12. Where national security during the Cold War was put under a hegemonic lid, as a, to large extent, un-debated question with strong focus on the ability to handle an armed attack from a foreign nation (Agrell 2010:27), the concept has today expanded into new spheres. The new security concept reaches outside of state borders and put emphasize on the ability to carry out international peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions. It also introduces new areas of military engagement in non-war situations such as terrorist attacks or environmental disasters (SAF 2000:74f, Bill 1999/2000:30: 4).

3.3. The Transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces

As a logical continuation of the analysis that was made of threats and challenges in the (globalized) post-Cold War world SAF was put up for an extreme makeover13. The main areas of the transformation has according to SAF themselves been: A changed system for personnel supply, from duty conscription to recruitment on the labor market;

11 Mark Duffield, writing about global governance in the context of post-Cold War conflicts, accentuates this trend (of western countries) towards securitizing underdevelopment, actors and events in faraway “poor” countries (which before had been seen as merely peripheral, or by best as pawns in the Cold War power “game”). He also points out Sweden as a country that has fully endorsed these ideas (Duffield 2001:15f,36ff).
12 Agrell (2010:91) points out that the emphasis on an extended security concept came with the installation of the Social Democratic government in 1996. The changes of the new security concept were virtually a mirror of changes that had been made in NATO’s security concept five years earlier (see Terriff (2002:99) for changes in NATO’s security concept).
13 Even if I retain this basic logic of “changed threat picture leading to transformation of SAF” Agrell has showed that the threat picture can also be (or rather, was in Sweden during the Cold War) the outcome of the funding available in the defense appropriations (2010:60,147). I.e. threat according to wallet, or in other words, a flexible defense demands a flexible threat, and not the other way around.
large cuts in the quantity of military material\textsuperscript{14}; and, increased focus on international cooperation and interoperability with other western states military systems (PERP rapport 2009:24). Not surprisingly, the costs of the invasion defense were without the Cold War considered both economically unacceptable and ideologically and operatively unnecessary (Bill 1999/2000:30: 4). Further, in a market oriented and high-tech society, with increased private ownership over strategic resources and technologies, SAF could not count on being able to supply itself with the material they needed. Instead they would have to act like a regular company and purchase on the market (SAF 2000:74), or through technological exchange with NATO countries be able to obtain the intellectual property needed for a continued defense/war material development (Boëne 2000:34).

Hence, the idea of a neutral and non-aligned Sweden that was nurtured very carefully (at least rhetorically\textsuperscript{15}) during the Cold War had become economically unfeasible if SAF was to live up to the defense capability that they understood the globalized world to demand. Instead, to reach the goal of a highly professional and a well-equipped army, that should be flexible, mobile and instantly deployable in any part of the world, SAF opted for a closer cooperation and interoperability with the EU and USA. Indeed, the emphasis on the need for a closer cooperation with USA and the EU has been the most recurrent theme throughout the 15 years of documents that I read. From the Swedish Defense Department department-series \textit{Sweden in Europe and the World} in 1995 (Ds 1995:28), and in almost every doctrinal document up to the current decennium (see for example PERP rapport 2009), there has been a constant argumentation for Sweden’s dependence on U.S. as the guarantor of peace and a constant urge towards a closer cooperation with EU and NATO\textsuperscript{16}.

The move away from the invasion defense and the non-alignment principle to a rapid-response defense was not, and is not, without challenges. Questioning neutrality and the National Military Service was for a long time taboo (Boëne & Dandeker 2000:158). Looking at the non-alignment principle which traditionally has been upheld as very important – resting firmly in a narrative about Sweden as a country that has not been to war for two-hundred-fifty-years – we can see a discursive struggle between the two central values neutrality and international cooperation. Still in the nineties non-alignment was upheld as an integral part of Swedish security policy (Prop. 1996/97:4: 30) and it was said to, among other things, depend on “the national competence and capacity to \textit{independently} [my italics] use and maintain our defence matériel [sic!] in a crisis or war situation” (Swedish Defence Commission 1998:13). As the transformation to-

\textsuperscript{14} Agrell has pointed out that the cuts that occurred towards the end of the twentieth century were the largest in all of the century as half of the war organization was decommissioned (Agrell 2010:134,140).

\textsuperscript{15} During the Cold War, even if not outspoken, Sweden’s invasion defense built on the reassurance that “help from abroad”, i.e. from NATO, was to be expect in case of Soviet invasion (Agrell 2010:29f).

\textsuperscript{16} A slight change of emphasize can be seen in the most recent doctrinal texts in that EU has gained importance in relation to the USA, as a consequence of the economic crisis in the U.S. and their increased focus on the pacific region (Göransson 2012).
wards the rapid-response defense started and Sweden signed the, so called, the EU solidarity clause, SAF and the defense department still argued that the non-alignment policy was in play. The balancing act between keeping the neutrality and integrating the defense policy with the EU and NATO grew shakier. In 2008 the defense department described the EU, in connection to the solidarity clause, as a “political alliance where the member countries take a solidarity responsibility for Europe’s security […] EU:s member countries promise to assist each other in the most appropriate way in case of terrorist attack, natural disaster or a catastrophe caused by people” (Prop. 2008/09:140: 17). The “catastrophe caused by people” cannot be read in other manner than as a way of saying war, without saying war. It is an actual denouncement of the non-alignment principle without literally denouncing it. The argument seems to suggest in a mind twisting logic that since Sweden with free will entered the alliance they are still alliance free. Of course, no one could ever maintain that a country which ties itself in binding military engagements with other countries, and openly state that they depend solely on cooperation with other countries for retaining their defense capability, is free of alliances. However this logical error, I argue, is beside the point. Because by refraining from stating the obvious they can still maintain the narrative about Sweden, as a country that is free to decide by itself what to do and where to go, when building their brand. As SAF states in the commercial text Till vårt försvar: “Sweden is military alliance free […] But we are not neutral” (SAF 2009a:20). Eating the cake but still keeping it.

In the wake of the transformation questions were also raised about what would happen with public trust and support for SAF if the conscription system was abolished – and it became the private choice of a few military professionals, instead of the duty of every male citizen, to serve in SAF. As argued above, according to the logic in the doctrine the abolition of conscription came as an inevitable effect of globalization. However this was not only because of operational and economic reasons but also because globalization would reduce the citizen’s sense of solidarity towards the nation’s security – the twentieth-first-century-man would expect national security to be provided by the state like any other societal service (SAF 2000:59). It was argued that, with the new all-voluntary force, “the restrictions on the freedom of movement of the individual will cease. Consequently, the [defense] committee’s proposal benefits personal integrity” (SOU 2009:63: 59). Once again liberal values were understood to be imprinted in the citizens by increased marketization of society. This was used as an argument for abandoning the old defense. The conscripted soldiers, and the citizens in the defense reserve of the invasion defense, were ontologically always potentially on duty, and therefore a constant threat to the sacred tenant of individualism. The all-voluntary forces of the rapid-response defense solved this problem. As long as one could sell one’s time and work on contracts by “free” will the market was still in play; and the bourgeois man would be contempt – his/hers universal right to choose kept intact.
This argument can be traced back to neoliberal thinkers such as Friedrich von Hayek who draw out a dichotomy between individualistic commercial society and communitarian military society. The second threatening the first by taking the individual soldier out of the sphere of the market and letting the state provide him/her with “everything” (Cowen 2008:14). This is also a line of thought that has got hold in academia amongst military sociologists (see for example Haltiner 1998, Boëne & Dandeker 2000, Pfaffenzeller 2010) and acquired its most influential conceptualization through Charles Moskos theory of a post-modern military. Moskos and his colleagues argues that the post-Cold War globalization push commercial society to the fore. This in turn results in, not only a post-modern military (corresponding well with the transformed SAF described here), but also post-modern individuals. These were said to lack values that correspond to the military ethics (see above 3.1.), and instead generally be ambiguous about society at large, and tend to focus on self-centered experiences (Moskos, Williams & Segal 2000:1-6)

Anyhow the question marks remained. As manning the international operations (that the new defense doctrine called for) arose as the market adjusted SAFs “single most important and difficult task” (SAF 2011c:3), trust and support of SAF was urgently needed in order to assure the recruitment of competent personal out of the allegedly post-modern individuals. SAF believed that increasing the respect, credibility and support of themselves among the citizens was absolutely essential. They saw a direct correlation between the strength of their brand and the number and quality of recruits:

> Recruitment on voluntary basis means that SAF will compete with other employers to attract, recruit and keep employees. […] Trust, credibility and attractiveness are decisive if SAF shall be able to compete. The duty systems influence on recruitment declines gradually which means that recruitment from the target group, young without previous relation to SAF through National Military Service, becomes impossible. The branding [varumärkesarbetet] will be influential for the target group’s perception of SAF as organization and potential employer.”17 (SAF 2011d:16)

Accelerating this urgency of “strengthening the brand” was that, according to their own research, trust levels for SAF had been in decline during the last twenty years (Försvarsmakten Kommentarer 2010.02.04)18. In their brand analysis (see SAF 2010b:9) SAF points out that knowledge about SAF generally is very low. Often people do not separate between the actions of SAF and other countries armed forces. They feed on narratives of “Lumpen”19, American movies and daily news reports. The general im-

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17 Similar descriptions of the stressing need to raise attractiveness and prestige of SAF can be found in for example Göransson 2010a.
18 Further increasing the seriousness of this trend, trust and prestige normally decrease in countries after abolishment of conscription (Boëne & Dandeker 2000:140).
19 “Lumpen” is the most popular and commonly used term for National Military Service. It carries a complex set of connotations, both positive and negative, but definitely calls up pictures that are far from the modern professional defense SAF market towards today.
age of SAF as a place to work is negative – un-modern, hierarchical, risky and unequal (ibid). To handle this situation SAF underline the importance of including an analysis of the consequence for their brand in all decisions and communicating practices of the organization (SAF 2011d:45). Accordingly the (labor) market has become a new most important “actor”. Its logic has invaded all spheres of SAFs decision making, prompting them to consider it in the same strategic manner as Russia, Middle Eastern oil, or melting poles.

3.4. Working the Media – Branding the Military – Selling a Job

Recapitulating what have been argued so far: The political and military leadership’s analysis of the post-Cold War spurred SAF into transformation. With the threat of Soviet invasion out of the picture, and a market driven globalization that made national interests global and far away threats local, the invasion defense was seen as economically unjustified, operatively inept and ideologically outdated. SAF went into what has been described as a cultural revolution\(^{20}\) when they, with the end of the conscription system, were thrown out on the labor market in search of fulfilling the recruitment goals of the new “outgoing” professional armed forces. SAF faced their biggest challenge. They had to become an attractive organization to work at (which they not were) in order to deliver the demanded defense capability. This acknowledgement was necessarily to change the way SAF related and communicated to the citizens (i.e. the possible employees as well as their employers, families and friends).

With national military service out of the picture, not only had the old channel for recruitment disappeared, but also the arena which most people had gotten their knowledge of and emotional attachment to SAF from. Societal legitimation and support had now become a question of information and marketing (Agrell 2010:205). SAF understood that they had to get more visible and started viewing their information activities as an increasingly important strategic tool for winning the trust of the citizens. They acknowledged that in a globalized world increased speed of – and channels for – information spreading made it harder to filter the information that reached the citizens. Instead they had to become the dominant voice. SAF had to establish their narratives regarding issues and events connected to themselves through using all possible channels and relevant actors (PERP rapport 2009:27, MSD 2011:117f). Further, SAF understood the information environment as a non-physical combat space where struggles are won by

\(^{20}\) Jan Salestrand (SAFs Headquarter Commander [Chef för ledningsstaben]) described the transformation as a cultural revolution (Försvarsmaktens kommentarer 2010.05.26).
“changing the content, extent and access of information” (MSD 2011:37f). This combat space is so forth a social space\(^ {21} \) where SAF, in a constant state of conflict, tries to win the discursive struggle, laying down the interpretive prerogative regarding how they and their actions are supposed to be perceived. In other words SAF, in their perception management efforts, opted for what has been termed “information dominance”, which is reached through producing, upholding and over-communicating “good” information while debasing and under-communicating “bad” information (Miller 2004:10).

In SAFs annual report for 2010 they draw out the lines for how the information dominance was to be reached. First they aimed at erasing negative stories about closedowns, Afghanistan and neutrality, and instead produce positive narratives about efficiency, an active SAF and SAF as a first class employer. Secondly, the language and themes in their marketing campaigns had to be adjusted to persons less than twenty-six years of age since marketing had been found to have very little effect on persons over twenty-five. The recruits were to be attracted by humanitarian notions of “a chance to make a difference” and help others, as well as by self-centered notions of personal development, adventure and big own responsibility (SAF 2011b:9-13).

3.5. Communicative Practices - Narratives in the Doctrine and Commercials

This sub-chapter contains the presentation and discussion of which discourses SAF play into in their marketing and their doctrine. It contains comparisons between narratives in the commercials and the doctrine, as well as further exploration of these narratives with the help of perception management theory and earlier research. This sub-chapter is also where the third operational question gets its answer. It is structured into three overarching parts. In the first part, A New (Post)Modern Defense, the image SAF want to purvey of their organization is investigated. The second part, The De-Politicization of SAF, digs deeper into how SAF tries to communicate their activities in a favorable light. And finally the third part, Authenticity, Virtuality and Virtuousness, develops the results of the analysis by applying perception management theory.

\(^ {21} \) According to David Harvey (2006) there are three types of spaces: Absolute, relative and relational. Absolute space refers to physically measurable space. Relative space is vector dependent space defined by times relation to space. And, relational space is the social space constructed by people engaging with each other in a place. Hence absolute and relative space is the main features of traditional combat spaces like air, land and sea while the combat space of information, based in the struggle over discourse, is foremost a relational – social space.
3.5.1. A New (Post)Modern Defense

As stands clear from SAFs understanding of the attraction of their brand, the dispositions of possible recruits and the need to man their forces, something needed to be done in order for SAF to deliver the results demanded by the government. In short, this meant that they had to become popular. SAF had to get the average citizen and the possible recruit to understand that they are an, in every sense, up-to-date institution – i.e. they had to get the allegedly (post)modern individual to identify with them.

The Open SAF

In the commercials one can find a number of dominant themes that SAF play into. One such is about an open organization – transparent, anti-hierarchical and liberal. Most strikingly SAF very often communicate at a personal level. In the blogs, the YouTube-videos and the marketing ads we get to know SAF by following individual SAF employees who talk about their life in general and everyday experiences in the forces. A twenty-eight-page recruitment add produced by SAF and distributed with Sweden’s biggest daily newspaper is case in point. Here we get to listen to voices of regular soldiers; hear their opinions on the value of taking part in military missions, get to know them in civilian clothes while they walk the dog and see pictures of a day in Kosovo – playing football with children and eating waffles at camp (SAF 2007). Taking this trend to the next level, SAF has made breakthroughs into social media. According to themselves they were 2011 the biggest government institution on Facebook and their popular YouTube-channel contained in May 2012 more than 150 videos. Adding to this, their move into the blogosphere – where SAF now runs 30 blogs, many in the form of individual soldiers tales of their everyday life – is according to themselves a “big step towards an even more open SAF” (försvarsmakten.se 2001-09-13).

Part of the “open SAF” picture, which is promoted in the commercials, is also that SAF is a listening organization based on equality and respect for the individual. Two examples of this recurring theme are: Sofia, a soldier working at law firm in her civilian life, who was surprised by the “great responsiveness” in the organization (SAF 2007:5) and another young women in an information video assures us that in SAF “everyone is equal!” (Soldat vid Luftvärnsregementet). In the commercials SAF is also very straightforward with that they want to obliterate macho attitudes. This can, for example, be seen in SAFs presence at Stockholm Pride, under the banner “OPENNESS: part of our real-
ity” (Flygvapenbloggen 2011-08-04), where we could meet the Commander-in-Chief as he got to experience how it is to “come out” (ÖB på Pride)\(^{22}\).

Reading the commercials it seems clear that SAF is an organization that invests equality, transparency and individual freedom with great inner value. However, all these concepts flow well into the discourse surrounding the idea of postmodern soldiers, and it follows SAFs strive towards erasing the picture of themselves as a hierarchical and unequal organization. Therefore, not surprisingly, when turning to the doctrine a different picture emerges. In a number of doctrinal texts a more equal as well as gender and ethnicity integrated organization is described as an instrument to raise the attraction of SAF (see for example SOU 2009:63 297, SAF 2011d:46). In the doctrine the essential value that was given these themes has so forth disappeared. Instead a realist instrumental outlook takes its place. The same can be said about the concept of transparency. In the commercials it is defined in terms of openness while in the doctrine it relates to the ability to create a coherent narrative of their organization (MSD 2011:67). In other words, more about winning the discourse struggle concerning the nature of their organization than opening up for insight.

**Experience SAF**

Other recurring marketing themes, which slightly go against the notion of an anti-macho SAF, but still stay within the frames of the postmodern soldier, is personal development, challenge and a highly capable SAF. Two marketing ads (SAF 2007, 2008) contain many examples of how personal development is emphasized. For example, we get to meet Caroline a Swedish soldier who has been in Afghanistan. She maintains that: “[...] it was the most important job I ever had. It was extremely instructive and developing, an experience that I will carry with me forever” (SAF 2007:15). Other SAF employees speak about SAF missions as a great way to see the world and learn about new cultures (SAF 2007:7f,14, 2008:8).

Connected to notion of personal development are the themes of challenge and adventure. As mentioned above (3.4.), in the doctrine SAF has specifically pointed these out as key themes for getting recruits interested. Not surprisingly, the commercials are abound with such narratives, especially in form of pictures and videos. SAFs first major marketing campaign is case in point. It runs as its main message “[d]o you have what it takes to have an opinion” and the six videos that were part of the campaign are all based entirely on action and challenge. To exemplify with one of them, in “Reklamfilm Internationella insatser” we get: thrilling music reaching crescendo, computerized graphics, a

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\(^{22}\) It should be noticed that the Commander-in chief only came out in a reversed metaphorical sense by stepping out of a military locker (and that the short article made sure to repetitively mention that he was there with his wife [sic!]).
high speed boat chase, close ups on soldiers in sunglasses dressed for fight and a ragged gang of pirate enemies with Kalashnikovs.

To complement this filmic picture that oozes coolness and action, the commercials also contains a lot of stories about an organization that is highly capable, internationally appreciated and high tech:

Sweden is a small country with top class defense. The truth is that other countries ask us to demonstrate our abilities and participate in their military training missions. They think we have a lot to offer. A rather good credential for a small country from an outskirt of northern Europe. (SAF 2009a:12)

Sweden, this small appendix on the European body, they argue, has a top class defense organization which others want to learn from – we should be proud. Further, together with photos of SAFs most heavy war machines in action we get reassured that Swedish submarines and tanks carry “totally unique abilities”, that the Swedish developed fighter jets are “one of the worlds most advanced” and that Sweden is “the first country to build stealth corvettes” (SAF 2009a:14-17). SAFs Commander-in-Chief summarizes well the picture they want to purvey: “It is not with a small portion of pride that I receive praise for how we solve our missions. We are considered as extremely professional, reliable and capable” (Sverker Göransson tar befälet).

Reading these commercial narratives together with what was written in the doctrine about the need for SAF to erase the picture of an un-modern organization and appear as a place for adventure; one can only conclude that SAF delivered what they set out to do. Throughout the commercials there are definitely a lot of challenges communicated but hardly any faults or problems. All in all, in the commercials SAF pass as the dream workplace for the modern man described in the doctrine.

3.5.2. The De-Politicization of the Swedish Armed Forces

The personal approach of the commercials, being part of the picture of the new (post)modern defense, also is a key component of an underlying, but still major, theme found in SAFs marketing: the de-politicization of SAF and its activities. In this rather extensive sub-chapter I will under four headings explore the techniques through which this de-politicization is carried out. Further, I will also highlight discontinuities that exist between the commercials and the doctrine regarding how SAFs work and missions are described in relation to political context. This will essentially serve to answer the third operational question through highlighting new types of narratives that have entered SAFs communication as a result of the transformation to a rapid-response defense.
From Information to Relation

The headline “from information to relation” is copied straight from the headline of a blog post written by SAFs information (relation?) director Erik Lagersten (Försvarsmakten Kommentarer 2011-09-13). In four words it manages to nicely pinpoint SAFs move away from the role of informing the citizens (as a government institution) to marketing a brand (like a regular company) that this thesis serves to highlight. Information on issues like national security is by default to take into consideration questions of political nature such as power balance, alliances, and economic relations. Relation building on the other hand does not entail that such questions are scrutinized, they might be, but they might just as well not – the question is rather what favors the relation. Judging from the themes of marketing that I found in the commercials and highlighted above – adventure, challenge, personal development, equality, transparency and capability – SAF seems to stay away from discourses of national security and power. Instead they play into discourses that can all be placed within the macro-discourse of a liberal bourgeoisie society (although the theme of capability is somewhat ambivalent).

As already pointed out, one way that SAF do this is by producing narratives driven by individual life stories. Two recruitment movies Linda Johansson – soldat and Andreas Lovén – sjöman epitomize this approach: During two and a half minute each we get to follow Linda (soldier) and Andreas (marine) in their homes, in the food store and as they perform a hobby. We get to know their personalities (Linda is happy and engaged as a person), what they like in life (Andreas likes to spend time with his girlfriend and hang-out with his buddies) and why SAF is a good place to work at (both of them literally agree on that SAF is a place “where there is every possibility” and where you get a chance to “help out”). We get all this “important” information but the videos seem void of any political substance.

Pierre Bourdieu offers an interesting interpretation of the proliferation of such depoliticized narratives in media at large. He argues that if a broader audience is to be reached, in a media environment that is overflown with information, all stories that can cause disagreement has to be erased. Instead stories that touches “everybody” and that the general public can agree on has to be told (Bourdieu 1996/2011:44). The best of all such stories is the so called “human interest story”. It is told in such a way, that everybody shall be able to draw lessons from it, at the same time as it “de-politicize and reduce what goes on in the world to the level of anecdote or scandal” (Ibid:51). In SAF commercials we see the human interest story at work when reducing SAF to a workplace where “there is every possibility”, or reducing the military missions in the bay of Aden and Afghanistan to a chance to “help out”. We also see it when following artists visiting a Swedish camp in Afghanistan who talk about “the fantastic journey” (Fältart-
I Mazar-e-Sharif) or a blog post about an inauguration of a playground that Swedish soldiers sponsored out of their own pocket (Afghanistanbloggen 2011-12-22).

Rather the opposite of what Bourdieu proposed about personal anecdotes and individual stories Lagersten, commenting on the blog portal and the shift from information to relation, claims to know that “the most trustworthy narrative comes from individual co-workers. [...] The more voices, the stronger the organization” (Försvarsmakten Kommentarer 2011-09-13). Anecdotal or not, one of the soldiers who write a blog that is published on SAFs blog portal agree with Lagersten, and argues for the independence (i.e. trustworthiness) of his words: “This is a personal blog that is written by me as a private person. All opinions and ideas that I present is my own and shall not be seen as a statement of a representative of SAF” (I skuggan av Hindu Kush 2011-08-07). The epistemological trick here, he seems to argue, is that even though he is on the inside he will write as if standing outside – producing the ultimate (and impossible) authentic narrative: both emic and objective. Accordingly, even if this soldier tries to write away his role as a representative, he still unavoidably becomes a representative of SAF as he is an employee of SAF, published on SAFs webpage with the stated purpose of giving information about life in SAF.

It should also be mentioned that SAF has specific regulations concerning their activities in social media (including the blogs). It is pointed out that every “co-worker that use social media is an ‘ambassador’ of SAF and an important resource for conveying an accurate and complete picture of the institutions activities to the Swedish public” (SAF 2011e:7f). And that this “complete” picture not shall include, amongst others: “Unlawful depictions of violence, [...] Information about drugs, doping or betting, [...] [or] Other material that SAF regard as provoking, offensive, damaging etc.” (Ibid:7). Without drawing to far conclusions it does appear as if an “ambassador” is a representative, and, that opinions, even if they are your own, are strongly circumscribed and supervised in SAFs social media.

Further, in the doctrine, social media is described as something akin a sub-arena in the combat space of information

The importance of and the influence of mass media has therefore increased, for example through the increased impact of so called “social media” on the internet. The effects that can be accomplished in this environment are achieved through changing content, quantity and access to information. Through creating, changing or stopping the flow of data and information, individuals’ different psychological processes and actions will be affected.

For example, a distortion of available information [beslutsunderlag] can lead to a certain desired behavior. (MSD 2011:37f)

Judging from this description of possible areas of strategic use of social media, together with the regulations that SAF puts up for social media use, it strongly suggest that, the
social media heralded in SAFs commercials as increasing transparency and “openness” might primarily serve other interests – much more strategic and political.

*The Un-Political Mission*

Another level on which the process of de-politicizing is carried out is in the description of SAFs missions and activities. The most common way of doing this in the commercials is by portraying the missions as motivated by humanitarianism. This will be discussed separately later in this sub-chapter, but for now I will focus on how political context is erased by describing the missions, and the conflicts they are situated in, in simplified terms.

In the doctrine where the nature of wars and conflicts are thoroughly described, a number of causes and driving forces are identified. The basic assumption is that economic, political and social forces interoperate and create a complex weave of conflict causes. Further, the role of the state and struggle over natural resources are highlighted as important and it is concluded that “[a]ll conflicts have, more or less, political root causes and driving forces” (MSD 2011:17f). Finally the question of social identity is brought up:

> Social identity – in form of ethnicity, culture and religion – is sometimes described as causes of conflicts. There is nothing that indicates that these factors alone could provide real root-causes of wars or conflicts. [...] Wars and conflicts can take on ideological, ethnic, cultural and religious features, but these should be seen as symptoms rather than root-causes. (ibid:19)

Hence, reading the doctrine it is beyond doubt that SAF has an understanding of conflicts that are multifaceted and highly sensitive for questions of politics and power. However, turning to the commercials, the *very few* occasions causes of conflicts are brought up it is done in an entirely different manner. For example Anders Lindström, task-force-commander at the time, provides the following analysis “[t]he conflicts of the world have through the years changed from being dominated by the power balance of the Cold War to instead be about conflicts between ethnic groups” (SAF 2007:2).

Now what is to gain by describing conflict as “ethnic”? First of all it erases any suggestion of that we (Sweden) should have any stakes in it. The conflict is after all about internal, and probably, age old primordial animosity. Not about power politics, economic resources or any other thing that stretches outside state borders in our globalized world. We are only there to monitor, separate and stabilise – to help. Hence, by playing into the discourse of ethnic wars SAFs missions become entirely uncontroversial. And since this
discourse has become a well integrated macro discourse among the general Western public, through extensive usage of it in media reporting (not least after the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda which were (wrongly) depicted as essentially ethnic wars) (Carruthers 2000:44f, Duffield 2001:41,111), it should work as the natural choice for anyone who wants to de-politicize a military mission.

Another way in which SAF simplifies its military missions becomes evident in the talk about friends and foes in Afghanistan. Reading the commercials a dichotomy emerges. The enemy are Talibans or insurgents (see for example Operation Shafaf 2, Försvarsmakten Kommentarer 2010-09-21) while the friends are Afghans (see for example Forsvarsmakten.se 2011-11-04). This erases the complexity that otherwise often is highlighted when the “human geography” of Afghanistan is discussed. And the everyday-Afghan that decides to give up his status as friend (and therefore Afghan) to become an insurgent is corrupted by “Taliban-money” (Afghanistanbloggen 2011-09-05). The Afghans become a homogenous group of people that are defined by the status as friend irrespective of the fact that the enemy certainly comprise persons that are Afghans in any legal or cultural sense. The point being, that as soon as one become enemy the status of Afghan is taken away, and so forth also the righteous claim of the political power in Afghanistan. One becomes the enemy of the true inheritors of the land, our friends, the “Afghans”.

This dichotomy, irrespective of how spurious it might be, works well in constructing a clear cut boundary around which an easily understandable enemy image can be structured. It plays into discourses of nationhood (sons-of-the-soil) and the concept of “Taliban”, which after 9/11 has grown in to connote anything from terrorists to conservative Muslim bigotry or whatever can be considered “extreme”23. In short, this dichotomy fills the role of de-politicizing SAFs mission to Afghanistan since it manage to strike up a clear divide between enemy (Taliban), victim (Afghan) and rescuer (SAF), which by its own serve as justification for the mission. Adding to this we shall not forget that, as Susan Carruthers argue, the popularity of a military mission normally hinges on if the citizens perceive “us” as just and the “enemy” as monstrous (Carruthers 2000:5).

The dichotomy is also in play when SAF recently decided to release videos – from helmet cameras worn by soldiers – without editing or commentary added. Ambushed and in live battle, bullets fly overhead and rip holes in the uniforms (Videoklip från Svenska styrkan i Afghanistan, Beskjutning Afghanistan). Although these videos, I

23 A quick Google search in Swedish leaves one with hits for Taliban “offspring” such as “environmental Taliban’s” [miljötalibaner], “vegan Taliban’s” [vegantalibaner] or “feminist Taliban” [feministtaliban] – which also includes the less well known sub-group “equality Taliban’s” [jämställdhetstalibaner].
would argue, is a big step towards showing the most essential part of war – the use of violence – it still passes without reference to why these shootings are taking place. Instead we follow “our guys” as they fight an unseen enemy attacker. As Deepa Kumar eloquently points out concerning this type of footage:

Far from making the war more realistic, it position viewers, quite literally, to witness the skirmishes from the point of view of the military. If you shoot the action from the side of the US or British forces [read SAF], it becomes very clear who the “good guys” and “bad guys” are and whom to support. (Kumar 2006:61)

Hence, even if silent, the dichotomy is still present. The discourse which it constructs, of evil enemy attacker and just peaceful defender, still serves as the interpretive raster for the videos. In this situation “they” always become the initiators of violence regardless of the wider context or actual course of events. “Our” violence is merely the response to the violence already inherent in the (concept of) Taliban24.

Circulation of Non-Knowledge

So far the exploration of SAFs communicative practices in the commercials has, to a great extent, shown to be void of political context. One see a SAF that play into a number of themes that can all be connected to their analysis of what the modern liberal man likes. And a SAF that actively tries to de-politicize their mission and activities. One does not learn much about the official stance of SAF and the Swedish government as presented in the doctrine. To paraphrase Baudrillard; it is as if the doctrine did not take place when one reads the commercials.

Hence, the explosion of words and images released by SAF in the last couple of years, describing their work and missions, tell us very little about the political and strategic considerations behind it/them. The overflow of information that SAFs engagement in marketing and social media has brought, I would argue, is in itself one of the main techniques of perception management – the way to win the discursive struggle concerning the nature of SAF. Yet, another example of this is when Lagersten argues that “[w]e always strive towards telling as much as possible. Our objective is to tell fuller and deeper. As part of this we have decided to increase the number of press officers on ground in Afghanistan” (Försvarsmakten Kommentarer 2010-10-08). Ironically what Lagersten argues is that SAF would get more open by increasing the number of information filters. Press officers or other types of professional information handlers are not only vectors of information, but more importantly, they are vectors of “the right” information. This is at least the conclusion we can draw if taking into consideration research

24 See Potter & Wetherell (1987:114) as well as Feldman (1994/2004:213) for discussion on this type of “mirror image” where an “other” is understood as violent and threatening per se and, therefore, seen as the initiator of act of violence even if it is inflicted on him/her.
done on other armed forces communication during mission. Susan Carruthers has shown that as a reaction to the “Vietnam syndrome” (see note five) western armed forces have since the nineteen-eighties invested substantially in production and control of information meant for the home-front. The main point being that by introducing filters like press centers, press officers and embedded journalists, they can give the regular media a lot of controlled information to report on (which is cheap and often selling) which will keep them away from stories that are potentially “harmful”. In this way the regular media gets both satisfied and cut off without them knowing or caring to know25 (Carruthers 2000:108-162).

Scaling out to conceptualize the perception management techniques of SAF, which have so far been outlined and argued in this analysis, I propose that Cynthia Webers concept of “circulation of non-knowledge” is very useful:

The circulation of non-knowledge is the incessant, conscious exchange of some narratives, images, and ideas so that others remain unconscious, even when we are reading stories that engage them or are viewing images that portray them. […] non-knowledge [is circulated] not by ignoring news stories but by representing them in such a way that their exclusive focus on one aspect of the story makes it possible to neglect other, potentially more important aspects of the some story. (Weber 2003:190)

As pointed out, in the case of SAF, the circulation of non-knowledge in the commercials come through over-communication of narratives that play into liberal, humanitarian and generally un-political discourses, while under-communicating the narratives of national interest, power balance and alliances that are found in the doctrine. It is, so to speak, a large output of information, but small output of content.

Drawing out the argument about circulation of non-knowledge one get following logic: In a country such as Sweden in which freedom of speech and press is constitutional and the recent technological development has made information more available than ever, the state cannot put hard repercussions on either the press or information in general. And since SAF need recruits – and think that today’s society under market led globalization produce bourgeois individuals that are de-politicized and interested in self-centered experiences – they need to produce and circulate a lot of non-knowledge. Further, the narratives that are circulated play into well-established and popular macro discourses. They are what Bourdieu called pre-thought cultural “fast food” (1996/2011:29) that never has to be analyzed in order to be interpreted/received.

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25 A number of authors have pointed out that since the private media houses are primarily interested in selling copies, raising the viewer ratings or “clicks” there is often no will to go against dominant narratives or narratives that portray the own society and its people in a positive light. In short, as long as the story sells and it is cheap and quick to produce its truthfulness or political relevance is of less importance (Kumar 2006:51f, Bourdieu 1996/2011, Wilcox 2005:50f).
The theme of the next and last of the four sub-headings concerning the de-politicization of SAF is arguable one of the best established macro discourses among the general Swedish public concerning the nature of swedes and Sweden. It is also the most salient narrative in the commercials. It is the theme of humanitarianism (and its dichotomous counterpart of the doctrine – realism).

SAF – Humanitarians, Realists or Both?

In the commercials humanitarianism is by far the most proliferate narrative of why SAF participate in foreign missions. It feels quite normal. Sweden has not been a warring part in any conflict throughout its modern history. And all the foreign missions Sweden has participated in have been ratified by the United Nations. However, reading the doctrine the discontinuity from this picture is obvious. Another theme which is standard in foreign relation and military discourse emerges: Realism (i.e. national interest, and in prolongation national survival, as the only rationale for action). It should however be mentioned that there is not pure doctrine – pure commercials that correspond straight to pure realism – pure humanitarianism. Hence, there are certain texts both within the commercials and doctrine that contain a mix of humanitarian and realist arguments. The logic of these intermediate texts will be discussed further below. However, as I will demonstrate, the overarching trend is clear – humanitarianism in the commercials, realism in the doctrine.

First, to start with, some examples of the humanitarian narratives that dominate the commercials: The cover page of the oldest commercial text that I use (SAF 2007) is a prime example. It focuses on foreign missions and it do not communicate any realist motives. Instead it fronts with a photo of a Swedish soldier who helps a child read (or write) while the underlining text proclaims “MISSION PEACE”. The front page also includes a quote from SAFs task-force-commander for international missions stating that “[w]e cannot stand at the side while people destroy each other”, as well as another quote from a SAF unit commander in Afghanistan “[w]e succeeded in achieving a big difference in the short time we were there” (SAF 2007). Similar narratives are frequent in the commercials and they often include voices of people that have been helped by SAF. For example, a Seychellian resident sends the following message: “There are not many who understand how difficult our situation has become with the pirates. Thanks for the things you Swedes do” (Flygvapenbloggen 2011-07-10). Further, as have been brought up before in this sub-chapter, needy children are also often part of the humanitarian message (for further examples see amongst others SAF 2008 and En dag med Delta Papa). Even if this thesis does not suffice for portraying all the extensive commercial material which leaves out references to other political considerations than humanitarianism, the videos from SAFs foreign missions work as a representative exam-
ple. While many of the total 54 videos (Kosovo 3, The Bay of Aden 23, Libya 6, Chad 5 and Afghanistan 17) contain a lot of narratives about the humanitarian causes and nature of the missions, only one mentions Swedish national interests.

The texts that carries both humanitarian and realist narratives of reasons for foreign missions often intermix these narratives. No reason is more important than the other – they are both essential. These texts are not as common, especially not among the commercials, and they often use realism as a clause after the humanitarian message, i.e.:

Sweden’s engagement in international peace-supporting missions ultimately aims at contribute to upholding international peace and security and thus further a fair and sustainable global development. Swedish participation in peace-supporting missions is in prolongation also about furthering our national security and Swedish interests. (Skr. 2007/08:51: 3)

Another narrative appears when one turns to the texts which are dominating the doctrinal documents – the texts that put realist ideas at center stage. The line of thought in these texts has not changed substantially since 1995: By taking part in foreign missions SAF can reduce the risk of that a certain conflict would create spillover effects which could have consequences for Sweden. Further, being an active part of foreign missions also strengthens Sweden’s military credibility, provides insight into important security political forums, and gives vital experiences that strengthen SAFs capability (see amongst other SAF 1995:64ff, 2010a:8,13f). To make the distinction (or hierarchy) clear between how realism and humanitarianism usually are structured in the doctrine I will quote a government proposition in length:

Through preempting and managing conflicts and wars the military defense shall as primary objective be able to secure Sweden’s existence, survival and independence. Today however, conflicts and wars outside the borders of our country can have serious repercussions for Sweden and the Swedish society. The military defense shall, therefore, alone and together with others through interventions on our own territory, in our close vicinity, regionally and globally defend Sweden and further our security. Our participation in crisis and conflict management internationally is primarily based on our will to contribute to crises’ and conflicts being prevented or impeded so that stable and enduring solutions can be achieved where democracy, rule of law and human rights can be guaranteed. (Prop. 2008/09:140: 35)

As this quote very clearly shows realist goals of national survival/security is the underlying reason for participation in foreign missions and the essential and primary aim

26 In this video (Överbefälhavaren i Afghanistan) SAFs Commander-in-Chief speaks about the national security interest of destroying “breeding grounds” for terrorist and heroin production in Afghanistan. Although, the argument about fighting heroin seems a bit misplaced. According to a report from the United Nations opium production has roughly doubled in Afghanistan during the war if compared to the years previous to the intervention (UNODC 2011).
of Swedish defense policy. Humanitarian objectives on the other hand are – even if positive in their own regard – merely instruments for the fulfillment of this aim. The basic assumption I am using here is that it is the intention of an act that makes it realist or not. If the intention primarily is national security, the act primarily is realist. The act might be masked in humanitarian rhetoric (in Machiavellian fashion), or/and actually favor humanitarian causes, but still be realist. In short, realism is not a certain way of acting, it is a certain logic to act on. The act varies according to context while the logic is consistent. The point being that, even if there are clear humanitarian objectives of SAFs foreign missions, the communication in the commercials get skewed when these instrumental sub-objectives are over-communicated while the primary realist objectives are (non- or) under-communicated.

However, I would suggest that, since SAF (as pointed out above (3.4.)) believes that the possible recruits will be attracted by humanitarianism and not by notions of national security or patriotism, this bias should not come as a surprise. It could instead be read as a perception management technique to strengthen SAFs brand and attractiveness. It is a way of SAF to play into a macro discourse that is well-established in Swedish society. Accordingly, a number of authors have argued that the self-image of many Swedes includes the notion of being more peaceful than other “people” (Boëne & Dandeker 2000:153f, Johansson 2007:57). Studies has also shown that Swedes are in favor (or at least have been in favor) of peace support operations to a greater extent than citizens of other European countries (Boëne & Dandeker 2000:166). And that the general trend in Western Europe is that if humanitarian values come to represent the army, prestige goes up (Ibid:140).

When SAF reproduces pictures of soldiers that help children in a Chadian bush or school children in Afghanistan, they not only confirm Swedes idea of themselves as humanitarians, they do it through mimicking pictures of aid workers. They play into what Höijer et al has termed “the discourse of global compassion”. This discourse is well integrated into western societies through decades of media coverage where poor (often non-white) women and children have been portrayed as helpless victims of apparently nonsensical wars (Höijer et al 2002:5). In SAFs commercials – through playing into the discourse of global compassion – conflicts in Afghanistan, Chad and Somalia becomes the projection surfaces for the reenactment of Swedes humanitarian self-image.

Connecting back to the de-politicization of SAF and their activities, it also becomes a way to create compassion without political understanding of the causes of the conflicts. The picture of a humanitarian intervention that is purveyed instead gives the impression

27 The same description of the aims of SAF as in Prop. 2008/09:140 can also be found in SAFs latest updated version of their Military Strategic Doctrine (MSD 2011:76f).
that the intervening states intervene only because of humanitarians reasons. The stripping of political context serves to naturalize the mission beyond every possible choice – and we are left with an entirely virtuous mission.

3.5.3. Authenticity, Virtuality and Virtuousness

In this fifth sub-chapter of the analysis – in an attempt to answer the third operational question concerning how SAF communicates its interests, values and work to the Swedish public – a number of perception management techniques have been highlighted. They all relate to how SAF in one way or the other play into themes they think possible recruits identify with. In discourse analytical language, it has been argued, that SAF, with their extensive marketing, are trying to make a hegemonic intervention on the discourse surrounding their organisation. Their marketing shall in this light be seen as part of the struggle for interpretive prerogative about the values and work of SAF. They want to be (has to be) popular in order to recruit today’s allegedly (post)modern individuals. So naturally, they try to associate themselves with, and play into, popular discourses such as equality, transparency, humanitarianism, high technology, personal development, adventure and more generally, ideas of representing a non-political common good.

However there is one final perception management technique that I will highlight. It does not refer to a specific discourse that is played into, but instead highlights a technique that SAF uses in the mediation of their commercial messages. It relates to how SAF uses virtual representations of their activities to create “authentic” reality-representations. As pointed out above (2.2.2.) James Der Derain (2009) demonstrates that the merging of the entertainment-media industry and the military has resulted in a complex capable of producing virtual reality-representations of wars, that makes them seem bloodless and void of any political or ethic uncertainty. He argues that in this way perfect or virtuous wars have become possible through carefully staged reality-representations – virtuousness through virtuality. Or in other words, virtuality makes wars virtuous by making them appear as that for the, through the media on-looking, public.

Of course Der Derian who takes the United States (U.S.) army as his starting point writes from a perspective that is very different from if one starts with SAF.28 Anyhow

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28 For example whereas Der Derian points out the necessity of erasing every trace of bloodletting, SAF have, not least because of the nature of their missions (the amount of bloodletting is substantially lower), not the same need of this. The U.S. army and political administration have also had much greater use of this kind of perception management when considering that they have had an all-voluntary armed force since the early nineteen-seventies, and more importantly, during the same period have partaken in a number of more or less controversial wars.
the U.S. is an important forerunner in this area. There, the connection between the entertainment-media-industry and the military has been substantial and goes back at least to the Gulf War (Carruthers 2000:131-145, Ottosen 2000). To exemplify, one of the better (known) examples of a virtual-virtuous staging that has come out of the U.S. army is the “rescue” of 19-year-old American soldier Jessica Lynch (during the latest war in Iraq). According to the official American story Lynch had been captured by Iraqi forces, tortured and held captive in a hospital. An edited video clip was released by the U.S. military of the “rescue”. Through night vision cameras we could see U.S. Special Forces heroically storming the hospital and saving young Jessica. However the Lynch story was revealed as a hoax for the Western public when BBC started investigating it. They found out that Lynch, who had been injured during an ambush, had been taken to the hospital where she received treatment for a broken arm and thigh. They also found out that two days after the Special Forces stormed the un-protected hospital – shooting pictures and blank “bullets” – an ambulance had been arranged to take Lynch back to the American camp (Ottosen 2004:25). The Lynch story – the perfect human interest story – staged, recorded and edited, played straight into popular American war discourses of the enemy’s gruesomeness (torturing this young blond girl), patriotism and military heroism (never leave a fallen comrade behind).

Even if not as spectacular and outright propagandistic as the Lynch story most of SAFs marketing and social media activities levitates in the same direction. As been argued, the information that SAF mediate through their marketing or branding channels has been shown to contain narratives that differ substantially from SAFs official stance. And more importantly these narratives are produced specifically to give the public a picture of how and what SAF really are. The story repeats itself irrespective of if it is censored blogs where we get to follow the individual (life)story of a soldier or a carefully edited YouTube video. Even if the discourses that are played into differ from the Lynch example the logic is consistent – it is the hunt for authentic virtuousness through virtuality.

29 Recently SAF has taken the merging of reality and virtuality to a new almost ironic level. In one of their marketing campaigns “Our Reality” SAF has constructed a smartphone application through which (as they literally declare) one can try their reality: “As soldier or marine you live and act in SAFs reality. A reality that is both challenging and developing. It demands great commitment, but it is very rewarding. And not least a possibility to make a difference, for real. In our application you can try our reality. Download it to your phone and begin” (Prova vår verklighet). As part of trying SAFs reality, the info-video for the application shows us that, you get to offload supplies (by shaking your phone), tail someone without getting noticed (any regular person on town) or infiltrate a hostile area (could be your local neighborhood), “welcome to our reality” (Vår verklighet ny app). Needless to say, most people would understand that this is not Afghanistan or any other of SAFs mission. Still the campaign is built completely around the idea that you can get insight into SAF “reality” through a highly unreal virtual reality.
Since our perceptions of the world govern our actions in it, there are essentially two perception management techniques that one can use in order to get someone to act the way one wants. Either one change or alter the discursive membranes through which a person interprets the world. Or one, as in the cases of Lynch and SAFs marketing, change reality through create virtual reality-representations of the world that corresponds to the person’s already existing discursive membrane. In both cases the virtual reality-representations were constructed in such way as to get the public support of the organization and its missions. In the Lynch case through military heroism in facing a gruesome enemy and in the case of SAFs marketing through, for example, portraying their missions as primarily humanitarian. The virtual reality-representations break of the circle that goes from an event, perception of the event, to action on the event. The public perceives the virtual reality, but acts on the real reality.

This perception management technique is efficient not least because people have been shown to be more than happy to live with the virtual reality-representation even if they seem doubtful. After all, they are a mirror of what one wants to believe about oneself – a reenactment of one’s own positive self-image (Taylor 1998:xxi). Or as Baudrillard puts it: “We prefer the exile of the virtual […] to the catastrophe of the real” (1991/1995:28).

Connecting back to SAFs interpretation of globalization: The market oriented society that globalisation brings, they argue, inevitably produce liberal individuals – and getting them to enlist demands virtual reality-representations. As James Duffield argues, wars do not easily mix with liberal consumer societies. People are generally not prepared to lose their lives over such inglorious things as protection of flexible labour markets or free flows of capital and goods (Duffield 2001:51). It is in this light we shall understand SAFs contention that today the moral victory is as important as the physical (MSD 2011:68f). It suffices to say that SAF is the perfect virtuous institution – doing power politics, while speaking humanitarianism.

3.6. The Contours of the Combat Space of Information

By now it should be clear that the understanding of the “globalized” post-Cold War world that is found in the doctrine, together with the transformation of their organization, has prompted SAF into developing and performing perception management. In this last sub-chapter of the analysis, I will use the results gained so far to conduct a critical discussion and draw out possible implications.
To start with, considering SAFs use of perception management, what does the doctrine have to say about the responsibilities of SAF in terms of information to the citizens? First, it is made clear that in order to get the citizens to endorse SAFs activities, they have to be informed about the goals of Swedish defense policy and how they are to be achieved (SOU 2009:63: 208). Further, it is also underlined and recommended that “SAFs communication should at all occasions be characterized by openness and honesty” (Ibid:291). As been shown in the analysis these recommendations are often far from being fulfilled. Instead the information gap that exists between citizen and state is filled with favorable stories that under-communicate substantial parts of the reasons and background for the decisions taken.

The constant discursive struggle over interpretive prerogative in the combat space of information ends up in a situation where SAF not only fight critics (textually), but also the people they want to recruit. We are left with a Kafkaesque situation in which SAF, in order to fulfill the commissions given to them by the citizens, has to lie to the very same citizens. Still this is the logic outcome of perception management carried out in a democracy. Where decoys of this type in non-democracies or between states aims at deceiving an “other”, in democracies it aims at deceiving itself.

Obviously this must be seen as a democratic deficit. It is the right of the citizens to get information about what their government and their institutions do that is not consciously distorted. This is not least the case when it comes to an institution like SAF. They have no mandate to influence public opinion on any political issue – that includes portraying military missions in a favorable light – yet this is indirectly what they are asked to do.

If one consider SAFs role in society, Commander-in-Chief Sverker Göransson makes it very clear: “the aim of our [SAFs] activities is to fulfill the targets for the military defense as laid down by parliament and government” (Göransson 2011). If SAF are asked to do something they have the responsibility to do it, period. That is, a job well done, disconnected from the job’s outcome. It is the logic of the instrument. A logic empty of ethics, and a logic SAF believe are far of tune with the citizens. Therefore, it is also the logic that SAF think it has to escape in order to become popular. Or in actual sense to become at all – to become a subject, to get a will, to become personal and, what it comes down to in the end, to recruit.

Still, it is also the logic right in tune with the purpose of SAF. In constitutional sense they are supposed to be an instrument - an instrument of the nation, of democracy, of the citizens who are their actual constituents. Unfortunately SAF cannot fully be an instrument anymore. It/They are stuck in Catch 22 – between its traditional role as a defense policy instrument and their new additional role as a subject on the labor market. The democratic state has started dismantling itself – globalization demands it, or so it is suggested.
4. Executive Summary

This summary serves to conclude the results of the analysis and highlight how my research question was answered. The contextual setting in which this thesis is situated, builds on two ruptures. The first one, the end of the Cold War, prompted SAF to find a new master narrative of world order in form of “globalization”. It also drove SAF into an extensive organizational transformation, from invasion defense to a rapid-response defense. The second rupture, the abolishment of the National Military Service and its duty conscription system, came as a consequence of this transformation. This in turn created the need for SAF to invest heavily in, what they call, the combat space of information – marketing and branding in order to recruit to their all-voluntary force. This is the context in which my research question is situated: How have SAFs (and their constituent the Swedish government) interpretation of the post-Cold War world, what they call the globalized world, affected the content of what and the manner in which they communicate their mission, values and work to the Swedish public?

To be able to answer the research question I first examined SAFs understanding of globalization, and how they understand it to affect security and society. I demonstrated that SAF thinks that:

- Globalization is a process driven by democratization and integration of markets which increases the interdependence of states. It is happening right now and is a powerful (almost un-stoppable) force. Globalization must be defended since Sweden’s wellbeing depends on it.

- Globalization redirects the focus of Sweden’s security and national defense. Without the threat of (Soviet) invasion, SAF instead became concerned with preempting a multitude of threats far away from the national borders. For example, stopping flows of “terrorists” and refugees, while ensuring flows of energy, capital and other “goods”.

- Market driven globalization creates societies, and more importantly individuals, which are individualistic, self-centered and liberal. These individuals do not conform to traditional communitarian military ethics.
In the next step of the analysis, lines were drawn out between SAFs understanding of globalization and the transformation from invasion defense to rapid-response defense. Important aspects of the transformation were highlighted and discussed:

- As the invasion defense was decommissioned, extensive cuts in the military budget and the war organization were made to make way for a slimmer and faster defense, which the new globalized security environment called for. As SAF now had to work closer together with other states armed forces to reach their security targets the non-alignment principle that had served Sweden for centuries were dissolved.

- The National Military Service that had provided SAF with both recruits and public support for centuries was abolished. SAF argued that, with the increased focus on foreign missions and with a nation of individuals (rather than citizens) it would be economically unjustified, operatively inept and ideologically intolerable to keep the old system of conscription.

- It was shown that, as a logical continuation of the abolishment of the National Military Service, SAF started branding and marketing to win the discursive struggle surrounding their organization. They had to improve their popularity in order to be able to recruit. In accordance with the analysis they made of the disposition of individuals under globalization, they aimed at over-communicating narratives that played into individualistic and liberal discourses.

As the final step in answering the research question, I examined SAFs communicative practices in the form of commercials (marketing and branding). Through discourse analysis and comparison between commercials and military doctrine, a number of conclusions were drawn concerning how the transformation affected SAFs communication to the Swedish public:

- Except from the fact that SAFs marketing and branding in itself was an outcome of the transformation; I showed that SAF, in order to be recognized as modern and attractive, played into discourses that could be directly connected to their understanding of “modern” liberal individuals. Hence, in the commercials SAF tried to associate their organization with themes and values such as equality, transparency, individual freedom, adventure, personal development and humanitarianism. However, in the doctrine these themes were either absent, or described as instruments for raising the attractiveness of SAF.
• I also argued that, in comparison with the doctrine, the commercials lacked any reference to the political context surrounding SAF activities. The commercials served to de-politicize SAF and their missions, and instead purvey the picture of SAF as representing a non-political common good.

• A number of communicative techniques that SAF used in order to mediate the commercial themes were highlighted. I argued that SAFs commercials were used to flood and circulate “empty” information in the media that lacked political content and context. This flooding was, not least, done through social media channels such as blogs, YouTube and Facebook. Often the information was mediated in form of individual, so called, human interests stories, which were meant to feel authentic and create a relation – rather than to give information – to the reader.

• Further, I demonstrated that another communicative technique SAF used was to produce virtual reality-representations of their activities. The point being to make the unknowing public perceive a virtual reality, from which they would draw conclusions of the real reality.

In short, SAFs analysis of the “globalized” post-Cold War world meant that, in order to reach their targeted defense ability, they thought it necessary to misinform the Swedish public about their mission, values and political considerations.
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Blogs
Afghanistanbloggen

Armébloggen

Debattbloggen

Flygvapenbloggen

Försvarsmakten Kommentarer

I Skuggan av Hindu Kush
Marinbloggen

Utvecklingsbloggen

Videos
Videos from the Swedish Armed Forces media/youtube player: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Mediaspelaren/ or http://www.youtube.com/user/swedisharmedforces. There are more than 150 videos of varying length and interests for my study. This list includes the videos that are referred to in the thesis, even though others might have contributed to my understanding of the subject.

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