Patterns of Nordicity

A case study on the existence of a Nordic profile in the OSCE

Irina Pavlova
Abstract

This thesis explores the state of regional cooperation, particularly in the field of security, among Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Norden). The author examines correlation between a set of socially constructed factors and the creation of a common Nordic profile in a regional security organization, the OSCE. Formally, Norden is divided in the EU and the non-EU members, but unofficial Nordic cooperation is the one with the real consequences, developing Norden as a social power in the OSCE. The author concludes that despite no formal grouping in the OSCE, Norden acts as a unit for a common Nordic “good”.

By creating a checklist of indicators as the model of analysis, combining four different theories – small states theory, imagined security community theory, identity activation theory and institutional measurement theory, the author intends to discuss the degree of Nordicity in the case of the OSCE and relation between a Nordic identity and lack of a formal institutional profile in the organization. The empirical material is based on the interviews with the EU and Nordic officials as well as examination of documents on Nordic cooperation from Norwegian and Swedish governments.

Key words: OSCE, security cooperation, Nordic identity, Nordic profile, Norden, social power

Words: 19631
# Table of contents

1 Introduction..............................................................................................................1
   1.1 Research problem............................................................................................3
   1.2 Key concepts......................................................................................................4
   1.3 Limitations.........................................................................................................6
   1.4 Research overview............................................................................................8

2 Theoretical discussion.............................................................................................12
   2.1 Theory chose....................................................................................................13
      2.1.1 Small states..............................................................................................15
      2.1.2 Imagined security communities...............................................................16
      2.1.3 Institutional performance.........................................................................18
      2.1.4 Identity activation.....................................................................................20
   2.2 Concluding remarks on theoretical indicators..............................................21

3 Methodological approaches.....................................................................................22
   3.1 Clarification of methodological choses.........................................................23
   3.2 Research strategy.............................................................................................25
      3.2.1 Document analysis....................................................................................27
      3.2.2 Interviews..................................................................................................28
   3.3 Operationalization............................................................................................29

4 Empirical data............................................................................................................32
   4.1 What is the OSCE?.........................................................................................32
      4.1.1 Nordic groupings in the OSCE.................................................................34
   4.2 Nordic cooperation in Norway and Sweden.................................................37
      4.2.1 Written communications from the Norwegian Stortinget...............37
      4.2.2 Written communications from the Swedish Riksdagen...................41

5 Analysis of findings..................................................................................................45
   5.1 Indicators one by one......................................................................................45
      5.1.1 Social organization....................................................................................45
      5.1.2 Informal, non-institutional cooperation...............................................47
      5.1.3 Systematization of common objectives.................................................49
      5.1.4 Legitimation of commitments.................................................................51
1 Introduction

Today, Norden can be seen as a leading edge for a sub-regional development, forming new inner dynamics within the foreign and security dimension among Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (from now on collectively referred to as Norden).

But it must be noted that the Nordic cooperation is nothing new and goes far back in time. The first official Nordic institution was formed already in 1952 (The Nordic Council), which was later institutionalized also on the intergovernmental level in 1971 (The Nordic Council of Ministers). Establishment of a Nordic Passport Union (1957), a Nordic Common Labour market (1954) and a Nordic Social Security Agreement (1955) showed that Nordic regional cooperation in the 50s was far beyond any other cooperation in Europe. But collaboration on Nordic foreign and security policies has remained outside the scope of traditional value-driven community cooperation (Gísladóttir, 2009:37), and even absent on the common Nordic agenda. This trend continued, officially, until publication of the Stoltenberg report in 2009, suggesting strengthening of Nordic cooperation in foreign and security policies. Creation of a Nordic declaration on solidarity signed in 2011 was a follow up to the Stoltenberg report concerning the internal approach of the sub-region, focusing on meeting future international and national challenges.

Some will argue that the Nordic profile has become increasingly blurring with a European profile, while at the same time there is a belief in Nordic exceptionalism as a central part of its external identity (Browning, 2007). Others argue that “in the relations to the rest of the world Norden probably exhibits more differences than similarities” and that it would be hard to argue that there is “distinguishable Nordic identity in international politics” (Strömvik, 2006:199).
Norden composes an interesting cluster within the European region, where despite being often seen as a one single cohesive group, Nordic countries have opted for different security solutions during the last 60 years. Sweden and Finland are non-NATO members but are members of the EU (since 1995), Denmark is a member of the EU (since 1973) and is one of the founding NATO member states, but appears very cautious in sensitive security areas and is known for its opt-out in areas connected to military and defense, and last but not least Norway and Iceland are both founding members of NATO and non-EU members but still complying with the most of the EU policies through the EEA agreement. Interestingly, both the EU and NATO have shown growing interest and support for regional security cooperation between the Nordic states in the recent years (initiatives such as Smart Defense, NORDEFCO, Nordic Battle group and NB8 Wise men report), despite their different forms of association with the EU and NATO and their previous rather negative attitude towards fragmentation within their zone of influence. The question arises if there is an existing Nordic profile on the global security arena now that the Nordic states have received goodwill from NATO and the EU. I will use this type of reasoning in my thesis, where I choose to investigate possible factors leading up to the creation of a Nordic profile (or lack of it) within one of the Norden’s largest partners – namely the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). Although I choose to investigate patterns of Nordicity within the OSCE as my main case study, it does not mean that the structure of Nordic dynamics could not be found in other organizations. The same type of study can be conducted by looking at any other big partner of the Nordic countries as for example the EU, NATO or the UN. However my choice fell on the OSCE - firstly, because all five Nordic countries are founding members of the OSCE since the creation of the organization through the Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975; secondly, because the OSCE is a looser security community than for example the EU (Rieker, 2001:7) and one can expect Nordic countries to be less predictable and fixed in their positions; thirdly, because all countries in the OSCE are members on the same conditions (no veto or other institutionalized rights are given to specific countries because of their size, economic or political power, etc.); and fourthly because the OSCE is also the world’s largest regional security organization with “a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic,
environmental, and human aspects” (OSCE website 1), something that matches my intention of studying a broader approach of security by looking at a wide range of concerns related to it.

Investigation of this topic is relevant and is of contemporary importance. This year marks 60 years since the creation of the Helsinki Treaty (1952) that represented an important stepping stone for future Nordic cooperation; also this year (2012) is the Danish turn to lead the Presidency of the EU which can bring the Nordic dimension closer to the decision-making process and create more room for a Nordic way of external relevance. And last but not least, with several changes in recent years concerning internal Nordic interaction (as f.ex Solidarity declaration and the Stoltenberg Report) the rhetorical question is if one can expect more common Nordic action outwards after the internal changes and political initiative taken within security and foreign affairs policies within Norden?

The development in the last years has been an interesting evolvement showing that the Nordic identity does matter. By conducting a case study on the Norden’s cooperation in the OSCE I will look at the correlation between different socially constructed factors and the existence of a Nordic profile on the international arena. The main purpose of the paper is to uncover official and unofficial arrangements, creating patterns of Nordicity within regional security framework, by discussing the possible existence of a Nordic profile in the OSCE and social factors affecting it.

1.1 Research problem

Norden has developed new areas of partnership, forming new security agendas and seeking for an institutionalization of a Nordic sub-system, based on a value-driven Nordic community. But do the Nordic countries have a common external profile in a broader European or international framework? I have chosen to investigate if there is a pattern of Nordicity to be found within the OSCE since this is an
international organization where all the Nordic countries are members.

My main research question goes as following:

*Are there any patterns of existence of a common Nordic profile to be identified in the framework of the OSCE and how can socially constructed factors affect the position of this profile embedded in organization’s and countries’ institutions?*

The focus of the study is to examine how socially constructed factors influence Norden’s work in the OSCE and to find out if one can identify a Nordic profile embedded in Norden’s cooperation and institutionalization in the OSCE.

### 1.2 Key concepts

Three main concepts will be explained in this section – the concept of a Nordic identity, the concept of a Nordic profile, as well as the difference between them, and what is here meant by the concept of socially constructed factors.

Generally speaking the Nordic identity is common and shared historical, political and economic norms and values, linguistic roots, shared heritage and a long lasting tradition of social democracy that bind the Norden group together; while the Nordic profile represents continuing and redefining of these roots in more specific areas, and more concrete measures such as promotion of human rights, equality and democracy in international organizations or cooperation in certain areas to promote and show common standpoints and strengthen the external view of the group. Closely related to each other, the concepts of identity and profile are affecting each other and changing interactively; in this paper I will distinguish between their feeling of a group (identity) and the actual grouping (profile) in an international organization.

“Identities are central to understanding international relations since they provide a basis for interests and consequently also behavior; identities simply have effects”
(Andersson, 2010:46). These effects can often be seen as the Nordic profiling in the areas outside its own region.

Identity, on the other hand, is something that defines a subject of analysis, and how this subject can be seen to be different from others; it is a very tricky concept, creating both limitations and possibilities. “The Nordic model stands for progress, modernization and for being better than other models. Usually this refers to the socio-economic organization of the Nordic countries. However, foreign policy elements have also been evident, especially in notions of being bridge-builders and trying to teach people how to build a proper security community” (Browning, 2007:3). This so-called Nordic model has for example given Nordic countries a “reputation” of supporting peace keeping by civilian means and implying Nordic engagement in some types of international action and not others; this so-called “reputation” is also a part of the Nordic identity.

Nordic identity can be seen as an internal concept in the region. It concentrates on the norms and values in Norden – often related to historical and linguistic factors as well as the creation of a Nordic welfare system and other domestic matters; but it also concentrates on economic and political issues creating a list of acceptable ways of Nordic behavior, which refers to a cluster structure creating Nordic “standards” and trends that are seen from the outside as being specifically Nordic.

A Nordic profile can be seen as an external concept in the region. Do countries act as their shared identity suggests? The concept of the Nordic profile is understood in constructivist terms, where it is not fixed or pre-given, but can change and transform through time. The division between Nordic identity and Nordic profile can often be problematic. The use of Nordic profile in this paper is a mix of definitions used by different scholars (Eriksson&Rhinard, 2009; Browning, 2007) – where common strategies are being created through development of institutional links, which form a potential platform for future cooperation between countries on common issues; Nordic profile is about working together and combining resources on collaboration between Nordic governments towards a common strategy on international issues, or issues not concerning a specific Nordic state but of a more global or international importance that can affect the region as a whole.
Nordic identity is a description of what is expected of a Nordic group on the international arena, while Nordic profile is how the group acts in reality and if it lives up to the stereotypes or reputation it has.

The last key concept is the social construction (or socially constructed factors). “To say of something that it is socially constructed is to emphasize its dependence on contingent aspects of our social selves” (Boghossian, 2001). Social construction is the beliefs about certain items that could not have existed without societies themselves. Idea with this thesis is to expose the way these beliefs have been shaped by analyzing socially constructed factors surrounding them. More specifically – I believe that the Nordic profile is a socially constructed item and I will therefore try to make invisible socially constructed factors, shaping this profile, to visible analytical indicators.

1.3 Limitations

Several limitations was needed to be made in terms to fit this thesis into an already made up format of 20.000 words as well as the limitation related to the time and budget available. In this part I will not talk about these, rather obvious limitations, but the choices I made due to what to include and what to leave out in this thesis and in terms to explain the reasons for choosing this specific framework for my investigation.

First limitation is concerning the time scope that will be analyzed. I decided to study Nordic profile in the OSCE from 1995 and onwards. 1995 was the year of institutional and symbolic change, where the OSCE went from being a conference to an organization; and where Sweden and Finland entered the EU, which meant that a majority of Norden became members of the Union. One could have taken different decisions on the time scope, as for example looking at the OSCE all the way from the start after the signing of Helsinki Final Act in 1975, creating a road map before and after the CSCE/OSCE change, before/after the Cold War, before/after 9/11, etc. My second reason for choosing 1995 as my starting year for this research is more a technical matter, the official database of the OSCE
documents has more detailed and various types of information in the latest years, the further in time the researcher wants to go, the less information available is it to be found. 1995 was also the year of reforms in organizational structures within the Nordic Council (St.melding 30, 2000:5) – these structures focused on increased Nordic relevance and political flexibility. Publishing of the report “Nordic cooperation in a new time” in 1995 was an important stepping-stone to show that traditional Nordic cooperation was willing to change with the surrounding environment. The report concentrated on 3 main areas: cooperation in Norden; Norden and Europe (EU/EEA); and Norden and its neighborhood (St.melding 30, 2000). This decision included a formal confirmation of the development since the beginning of 1990s, leading to the conclusion that it would no longer be reasonable to limit or reduce the official Nordic cooperation only to the internal level but also carry it out and expand it externally (St.melding 30, 2000). In other words the motto was to widen perspectives for further cooperation rather than concentration on one specific dimension. Finally, 1995 was a year of Nordic identity crisis, where Nordic states, specifically the ones outside the EU scope (Norway and Iceland) experienced changes in their intra group organization and therefore lost some of the vision for closer future cooperation in high politics (Interview 2, 2012) and therefore making the time after 1995 and until today unpredictable and interesting. My intention is to look on how Norden was perceived after the identity changes in 1995 and how it has adapted to these new situations on the international arena, mainly looking at its common identity profile in a wider framework.

One of the fundamentally important things to mention before continuing with the theoretical and methodological part of this paper is to point out that there are no common Nordic foreign and security affairs institutions. The Nordic Council does not cover security and defense issues, meaning that there is a clear need for more concrete measures as well as further institutionalization in this type of cooperation. Due to no common institutions in those areas one need to make a choice for which organization to involve in terms of getting the best picture of the patterns of Nordic external identity in the international framework. Due to the four reasons mentioned in the introductory part I have chosen to investigate Nordic interaction in the OSCE. But even though my focus is strictly connected to Nordic profile within the OSCE one could carry out similar types of studies using other organizations where
most or all Nordic countries are a part of; where one might get different results from this study. Another reason for choosing the OSCE and not other organizations is that Nordic integration in the EU and NATO are two well-discussed topics as well as the issue of Europeanization of the Nordic security policies. No studies about the existence of a Nordic profile within the OSCE have been carried out hitherto, which makes this topic new within the fields of international relations, regional security and dynamics within Nordic states foreign and security policies.

The final issue to be mentioned is a problem related to the definition of Nordicity in specific - if Nordicity is a distinctly Nordic approach or if it is rather a complex of identities that can be found also outside the Nordic countries. I want to make clear that I limit my study to look at Nordicity as a clear Nordic term where I include the five Nordic states only. But as well as identity, Nordicity is “an ambiguous concept in the sense that its scope and depth changes according to time and the policy in question”, meaning “not all Nordic projects have the support of all Nordic countries” (Korhonen, 2011:13), something to keep in mind when trying to find patterns of a Nordic profile in the OSCE.

Christopher Browning (2007) was the first talking about Nordicity\(^1\) in Norden, in his view Nordicity was a brand that created a Nordic identity and a Nordic model for others to follow. Browning concludes in his article that the exceptionalism of the Nordic brand has declined after the end of the Cold war, where Norden has become “less exceptional and less particularly Nordic” (Browning, 2007:36). With this being said Nordicity for me is not a brand or a model that is made for others to copy; in this paper Nordicity is a shared identity-feeling between the Nordic countries, a way of talking about Nordic countries behavior in a broader international framework as well as a framework of norms and ideas that are particularly important for the Nordic region. Patterns of Nordicity are patterns of similarity, patterns of close cooperation, patterns of socially constructed factors and a wish for creating a common good for the Nordic region.

\(^1\) Nordicity as a phenomenon in Norden. Previously Nordicity was a concept developed in Canada in the 60s on geographical northerness of regions with condition of high latitude (The Canadian Encyclopedia, website)
1.4 Research overview

Reports, articles and books have been written on the topic of regional security cooperation, several also directly or indirectly related to Norden. Some of these have been used to get started and to develop this paper and will be mentioned in this short research overview. I have learned from previous researchers and got my own ideas on what parts of the subject, considering Nordic security cooperation, have not been analyzed in previous papers and will therefore be closer examined here. Next paragraphs are debating previous research on the topic of security cooperation (mainly related to Norden).

The question about security cooperation is normally best understood by “starting the analysis from the regional level, and extending it towards inclusion of the global actors on the one side and domestic factors on the other” (Buzan&Wæver, 2003:47). This statement is a suggestion for how to study security issues in a region, regarding regional institutions or regional penetration of the external powers. This is also how the research is usually done related to the EU member states’ foreign policy in general, by discussing cases in a multilevel fashion: national foreign policies, European foreign policies and the effects of the international order. The report done by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA report 2011) was done in this way. The FIIA report has served me as a starting point when considering what specific theme of the subject about Nordic security that has been investigated in the latest years and what themes that have not been debated on quite much yet. It represents a discussion on Nordic cooperation and how it has “remained in the shadow of other forms of international cooperation during the past decades”, as well as on how an increased amount of decisions taken within the emerging informal forums can redefine the rules of the game (FIIA report, 2011:6).

"European security is not a field lacking institutions and cooperation”, where Europe can be seen as a rather “hyper-institutionalized region (Buzan&Wæver, 2003:370). This statement also explains the situation in the research field connected to security institutions and cooperation in Europe. The EU, NATO, the OSCE, the
UN and other but smaller regional cooperation areas such as the Northern Dimension, the Baltic States Council, the Arctic Council, etc. are all dealing with different types of security issues; some more directed to civil issues, some towards political, geographical, military or environmental issues. The scope of security issues is big and there has been done a lot of research on these various types of institutionalization. A book under the name “The Nordic countries and the European security and defense policy” edited by Alyson J.K. Bailes et al. in 2006 concentrates specifically on the Nordic approach to security in Europe and their relationship to NATO and the EU describing parallelism and convergence among the five Nordic countries.

Another important contribution to this paper is previous research on the role of the EU with and within other international organizations, an issue that has received a growing interest from scholars in the last decade. One book in particular has been inspirational for my thesis, written by Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith in 2006 “The European Union and the United Nations”. This book looks at interaction between two multilateral organizations, underlining the importance of coordination of state diplomacy; this does not directly relate to Nordic security cooperation but shows the importance of the EU in the global context and has an interesting discussion about the EUs position as a coherent and effective international actor.

It should be mentioned here that the field of Europeanization of security has recently become more popular among scholars, considering national security country-by-country before/after EU admission (Rieker, 2001) and through studies on adaption of European integration in Nordic (and other) countries (Hanf & Soetendorp, 1998; Manners & Whitman, 2000). Pernille Rieker’s study on Europeanization of Nordic security is the first to look at how the EUs security development has influenced security identities inwards in the five Nordic countries (how national security in each Nordic country has experienced an identity change due to the Europeanization), opening up for the discussion continuing in this thesis – namely the effects of Nordic identity outwards (does the Nordic identity have effects in international organizations). Both books by Hanf and Soetendorp
(“Adapting to European integration: small states and the European Union” from 1998) and Manners & Whitman (“The foreign policies of the European Union member states” from 2000) describes political institutions and their responses to evolvement in the EU, by looking at countries individually and comparing them by looking at differences and commonalities in their behavior due to the integration process.

After Swedish and Finish entrance into the EU most of the Nordic countries became a part of the Union, and one could start speaking about how Nordic countries became Europeanized. Research on regional identities in Europe has for a long time been focusing on this type of Europeanization, and how European integration within the EU framework has affected its member states and neighboring countries. Europeanization has been traditionally conceptualized as the domestic impact of the EU integration/membership and in the later years more as “a domestic change in states’ political structures, induced by interactions performed on European governance structures” (Marciacq, 2011:3). This paper intends to make a reflective contribution on the theme of Nordic diplomacy and institutionalization within the OSCE and discuss signs and patterns of an existent Nordic profile in this broader framework.
2 Theoretical discussion

Apart from this short introduction, this chapter will concentrate on chosen theories, namely a small states theory, imagined security community theory, identity activation theory and institutional performance theory as well as creating a checklist of indicators and themes as being the most important variables that derives from theories above. By doing so I intend to create a proposal for the existence of a Nordic profile and its role in the OSCE.

The purpose of combining theories is to construct a typology and discuss their role in measurement (Ahquist&Breunig, 2011). The typology in this thesis is about relation between a set of socially constructed factors and their influence on a group of states. Through examination of knowledge presented in all the theories I will focus on observing various aspects of a phenomenon instead of articulating general assumptions about it. “A theoretical framework specifies which key variables influence a phenomenon of interest” (Escalada, 2009). The key variables will be discussed in more detail in parts 2.2.1 - 2.2.4 of this chapter.

Before going into to the theoretical discussion I need to take a look at the challenges connected to the choice of theoretical approaches for this study. The first challenge is to understand clearly what it is the research is studying when looking at regional security cooperation and development of Nordic profile. This can be related to a discussion about what Buzan and Wæver often describe as confusion between “the locations, of where to seek explanation, with the explanation itself” (Tonra, 2001:6). A relevant question is where to start when carrying out research on regional security cooperation in Norden and common security identities; in the personalities of politicians and diplomats, in the nature of the 5 states under the consideration, in the EUs integration process or in the nature of the international system?
“Researchers that stress the importance of concepts such as ideas, norms and identities take the standpoint that international politics should be understood to a large degree as socially constructed” (Andersson, 2010:48). A constructivist approach is therefore the starting point in this study focusing on “consideration of actors not as rational utility maximisers but instead as role players” (Tonra, 2001:11). Changes in security concepts and policies are a contributing factor towards establishment and evolvement of a certain Nordic group identity.

Constructivism regards “state action not only dependent in a state’s power position but as guided by norms and values - value-based, shared expectations about appropriate behavior”, it also focuses on international organizations and their organization or constitution of state identities and how this affects their behavior (Rieker, 2003:27). In other words, operationalization of mutual ideas can constitute interests and structures and lead to creation of common identities; furthermore these shared identities among states can affect their cooperation and performance in international organizations and other forums. Therefore the natural point of departure when studying security cooperation for me will be the identification of a frame of possible factors constructing or effecting a construction of a common security profile.

2.1 Theory chose

Concepts of security and foreign policy have gone through a lot of changes, especially after the end of the Cold War, creating a more broad and comprehensive understanding of these concepts and therefore taking in use a wide variety of instruments (Keukeleire&MacNaughtan, 2008:27). The framework of foreign policy has also been evolving throughout the last decades, where definitions have been varying from “the very narrow relations between states”, through “the broader governmental activity” to the very broad “notion of external relations” (Manners&Whitman, 2000:2).
Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008) have created a model for foreign policy, which makes it easier to “link concepts from various approaches in International Relations research to the study of foreign policy” without focusing on one single perspective (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008:17). A broader type of perspective is also the framework for my chosen analysis, where the Keukeleire & MacNaughtan model serves as a starting point for studying foreign and security policies.

The model by Keukeleire & MacNaughtan is divided into five main parts: 1 - actors, 2 - interests, 3 - security, 4 - power and capabilities and 5 - focus. These 5 parts have summed up all factors affecting any given foreign policy. When discussing actors, authors argue, “the state is no longer the sole reference point for foreign policy because a wider spectrum of subnational and transnational actors and entities are increasingly relevant foreign policy actors” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008:21). As there has been an evolving process of the nature of actors in international relations, so have the interests of these actors moving from traditional state centric self-regarding goals to collective goals involving several states enjoying their common advantages. One of the main tools of foreign policy is the security aspect, which has been changing in accordance with the agenda connected to it, which has become more broad and deep, and can “no longer be defined solely at a state level” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008:22). The security aspect is closely related to power and capabilities of the actor to react in threats but also prevent other conflicts. Last but not least is the focus of a foreign policy, which not only involves the actor and the conflict of a policy, but also its underlying structures and processes. It also takes into account the role and influence of culture and identities, which help shaping the actors’ behavior (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008:24).

The Keukeleire and MacNaughtan’s model have been used when going about to find theories representative for all five parts and at the same time fitting them into the scope of the chosen case study. The choice fell on a combination of four different theories, which I believe are broad and comprehensive enough to encompass the entire process behind the relationship between socially constructed factors and corresponding Nordic profile in the OSCE.
The four chosen theories are: Small states theory, Imagined security community theory, Identity activation theory and Institutional performance theory.

2.1.1 Small states theory

Small states theory is the first chosen theory for this thesis. The name of the theory reveals that states themselves are important, where networks of these states are in the main focus of this research.

Starting off as “small state – small power” and evolve to be referred to as “normative entrepreneurs influencing world politics”, small states theory has gone through a major transformation in the last decades (Neumann&Gstöhl, 2006:13-14). One can study small states in three different manners: in a neo-realism way discussing small states capabilities in international relations; in a neoliberal institutionalism fashion discussing institutions looking for ways of political dialogue and great-power negotiations; and in a social constructivism way focusing on relations between states themselves rather than “investigating them in terms of great-power bargains or as already established arenas where great powers may manage international affairs” (Neumann&Gstöhl, 2006:21). The last way is the way used in this thesis, focusing on the social organization between states in a broader framework.

“Small states are proactive in those sectors of greatest importance to them, while being reactive in other sectors because they do not possess sufficient resources to follow all negotiations” (Neumann&Gstöhl, 2006:26). In other words, small states choose to cooperate on issues they find to be of mutual importance and interest and where they enjoy a feeling of common normative framework. Small states can be influential despite their small size and limited power and capabilities due to commitment to certain policies.

As mentioned above the network of states or the region as such is the main actor in the small states theory. But small states should not be confused with weak states because they may be strong in the sense of being a model for other states as well as
having a great issue-specific power (Neumann&Gstöhl, 2006:8). Also, from a legal point of view “all sovereign states (big or small) are equal before the law. From a political stance, however, they are far from equal” (Neumann&Gstöhl, 2006:5). It should therefore be clarified that it is “the actual state of political affairs which is thought to matter, not the legal one” (Vital, 1967:80). This means that small states can often have the disadvantage of not cooperating with each other because separately their voices are less important than other (bigger/greater) states’ interests; in other cases they have to follow greater powers even if they do not completely agree with their politics. Sometimes, small states see the cooperation between themselves or cooperation with greater powers as the only ways to be heard on the international arena and are therefore often acting in different groups.

When talking about security related issues “a small state is one that itself recognizes that it and cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities” (Hanf&Soetendorp, 1998:4). Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp argue further that “small states can only be effective at the international level if they are well organized in preparing their positions on an issue, relying on the force of persuasion and argument” (Hanf&Soetendorp, 1998:4). Instruments used by small states and the aspects of an issue are therefore as important as the issue of interest itself. It is for example easier to cooperate on immaterial basis, where states share common identity, culture and normative framework, or where instruments such as networks and common institutions are established in order to coordinate cooperation and conflict management between these states.

The main indicator deriving from this theory and relevant for my case is the social organization of states.

2.1.2 Imagined security communities

The second chosen theory is the theory of imagined security communities, which represent a status of states framing international social reality around the imagined structure of belonging together and can create informal but real groupings in an organization. Imagined communities focus on common interests towards different
types of security – territorial/national security, global security, military/non-military security, human security, etc. From a constructivist perspective, different types of security are not fixed to a community; they “evolve from diffusion and convergence of causal and normative understanding across national boundaries” (Adler, 1997:252).

Security communities are socially constructed evolutions through development of subjective emotions of certain “we-ness” and are therefore also a proof of the existence of a shared profile or identity. It makes therefore sense to look at what is meant by common identity formation within a region as well as to mention that a state can have several identities. For example: Sweden can be seen as a Scandinavian, democratic, European, neutral, etc. country implying that ”identities are situational, although in politics one identity may come to dominate” (Owen, 2000:77). Common identity relates to security and foreign policies often in presence of common enemies, in a contemporary situation this type of enemies can be seen as transnational enemies committing acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, human rights violations, etc. Due to the fact that traditional state enemies are no longer existing in Europe has changed conditions for creating security communities, especially concentrating on the countries differences in normative and identity frameworks rather than on the existence of a third party enemy.

Emanuel Adler’s imagined community theory is a consequence of people’s evolving concept of “social epistemes” or a community that people collectively call for “home”, usually being a nation-state; but due to changes in economic, political, social and institutional relations people have started to think of new communities, or “homes”, imaging that their security and well-being is a factor they share with other “nations who share their values and expectations of proper behavior in domestic and international political affairs (Adler, 1997:249-250). By joining a certain security community nation states examine and redefine their interest and meaning of sovereignty (Adler, 1997:251), concluding that even though states are fixed territorial entities, today’s security aspects exceed and unbundle these territorial borders.
Shared transnational understanding, identities and norms are main forces for construction of security communities and their practices. Shared cognitive structures help constitute and reproduce common interests, where “communication helps to thicken the social environment of cognitive regions and promote the development of shared identification” (Adler, 1997:276). Communication and multilateral dialogue are socially constructed institutions based on a collective normative knowledge among participating states.

Furthermore, the importance of and relation to other external actors is gaining more importance in imagined communities. The role of external actors in the emergence of security communities was clearly in need for more exploration, as stated by Raimo Väyrynen. His major argument related to this was that "in real life, the outside environment has an impact on the security community, and the community can, in turn, influence that environment” (Väyrynen, 2000:125). This can be directly related to the relationship between a Nordic security community and its representation in the OSCE (which will be further discussed in the analysis part of this thesis).

The main indicator or theme deriving from this theory is non-institutional cooperation, specifically focusing on the social institutions such as communication and collective knowledge.

2.1.3 Institutional performance

The third chosen theory is the theory of institutional performance, referring to a measurement of actual actions of states. Informed by a definition of “performance” as the ability to achieve preset objectives (effectiveness) in an efficient, relevant and viable manner (NUPI website). In this thesis it is especially important to measure institutional performance, in security and foreign policy objectives, to systematize and conceptualize for achievements of preset actions as well as to highlight and discuss variation of actions taken by states (Græger & Haugevik, 2011).
A study by Charles Lusthaus et al from 2002 suggests unpacking the concept of performance into four core elements: effectiveness (goal achievement); relevance (for priority stakeholders); efficiency (ratio between outputs accomplished and costs incurred); and financial/resource viability (the ability of the performing organization to raise the funds required). These elements are to be seen as the base for the institutional performance in my own case study, but will be slightly changed in the empirical part due to the course of findings on the issue.

The four indicators as Lusthaus identifies them are: effectiveness, relevance, efficiency and financial/resource viability. Effectiveness relates to goal achievements and how well institutions work in practice, as well as their contribution to common goals. This type of effectiveness can be measured by looking at intended amount of finished negotiations or wanted development with the real outcome, in short - goal achievement (Græger&Haugevik, 2011). Actor’s objectives towards institutional performance are sometimes not as clear and explicit as one could hope for, creating therefore a challenge to measure them. Objectives can also be too broad or too far in the future to be able to measure them in a good manner. Relevance is related to unity, representation and coordination of stakeholders in an institution, these stakeholders or actors must see relevance in what they are doing in order to perform, but also that other actor see them as relevant enough to let them perform. Usually member states are the stakeholders in international organizations, in our case the relevant stakeholders are the 5 Nordic states in the OSCE. These are to find their cooperation as a group important enough to coordinate, unite and represent their security interests as a common ground for all. Efficiency and financial/resource viability are closely related to each other where viability refers to the ability to collect financial and other resources for an institution to work and perform well, while efficiency compares if the resources spent on certain goals have given wanted results (Græger&Haugevik, 2011). My intentions are to look at goal achievement rather than on how efficient and costly these achievements have been I will therefore exclude the efficiency and viability factors from my case study from now on.

The main theme deriving from the institutional performance theory is the
systematization of common objectives, with a focus on goal achievement and prioritization.

2.1.4 Identify activation

The last chosen theory is the identity activation theory, which involves structures and processes that can lead up to favoring of certain identities above others. It can be a challenge to measure which identity prevail the other, but it can be possible to identify the activation in certain specific cases, especially when states themselves are open about their shared identity or make legitimized effort to promote a certain identity. Legitimation, in this paper, is the process that provides legitimacy to a certain concept or idea. An organization, or in this case a profile, “is said to be legitimate to the extent that its means and ends appear to confirm with social norms, values, and expectations” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990:177).

The general concept of identity has a wide range of definitions; where I decide to look closer exclusively at the phenomenon known as collective identity. This type of collective identity “is the result of the conception of belonging to a group, (…) where the group’s needs are seen as one’s own” (Andersson, 2010:47). These needs are usually connected to something with a greater symbolic value (welfare system, human rights, democracy, etc) lying at heart of what identity essentially is (Andersson, 2010:48). Identities have effects and provide a basis for interests and behavior, but also differentiate between one’s conception of Self from Other (Andersson, 2010:46).

Hans E. Andersson suggests that the identity activation theory builds upon two main concepts – situational relevance and commitment. The logic behind this conclusion is that the sum of different interests a state pursues is the result of its states activated identity (Andersson, 2010:47). Situational relevance is the “fitting” of a situation or action to specific identities more then to others, a state has many identities where it chooses which ones are suitable to every situation. When discussing trade, for example, a capitalist state identity may be the more important one than the democratic state identity. Also the issue area here is important or the
difference between high and low politics, where it can be more difficult to cooperate on defense and other security issues than on economic considerations. The commitment indicator, as the other main concept in the identity activation theory, implies that not all identities are equally important. “Commitment to a collective identity may be differently affected due to how cooperation within a policy area is legitimized” and is justified through advantages that would not be achieved if a state acted alone (Andersson, 2010:49) This type of legitimation can also vary depending on the issue area, where certain policies are in need for more explanation and justification than others.

The main theme or indicator deriving from this theory is the *legitimation of commitments*. The situational relevance is also an important part of identity activation but in my case the situation, under which circumstances the identity activation will be discussed, is clearly defined. Nordic states ability to activate a visible Nordic profile in the OSCE is the situation of relevance in this paper.

2.2 Concluding remarks on theoretical indicators

Four chosen theories have been presented above. Each of them suggests indicators or themes to look for when considering empirical facts in the next chapters. Indicators for small states, imagined security communities, institutional performance and identity activation will be discussed in a collective manner, where together they create a model for how to discover a Nordic profile by looking at socially constructed factors only.

Chosen themes and indicators will be summed up beyond. These points can be seen as some sort of typology or theoretical modeling, which provide the focus for further analysis and define the boarders of my analysis.

Themes and indicators to be analyzed are: *social organization, non-institutional cooperation, systematization of common objectives* and *legitimation of commitments*. 

21
3 Methodological approaches

Methodology is all about tools and techniques a researcher takes in use during his or her study, this chapter will present and defend my personal choices. But before going into a methodological discussion it is necessary to establish some basic guidelines, as an overall standard, between general facts and values in social science (Grønmo, 2007:17). There are two important guidelines, which represent the choices made throughout the research; these guidelines are ontology and epistemology. Awareness about and combination of these factors lead to the most justifiable truth relationship between methodological choices made and new realities discovered.

The first is the ontological principle, which concerns the existence of certain social conditions and is based on finding truth as an overall value. Tom’s Gruber definition of ontology is “a specification of a conceptualization”, meaning that an “ontology is a description of the concepts and relationships that can exist for an agent or a community of agents” (Gruber, 1993). Making a connection between the abstract created theoretical models and concrete objects in reality, ontology refers to “our assumptions to how the world is made up and the nature of things” (The PhD blog, 2009).

The second guideline is the epistemological principle, where perception of justified truth belief must be theoretically, methodologically and contextually constructed. Epistemology is a study of knowledge and development of science on existing social conditions (Grønmo, 2007:17) Social conditions that form people’s understanding of reality are always affected by several factors, the same way as a scholar’s procedure for collection of data and later the analysis of material is affected. Theoretical angles, social background and variety in contextual validity are all important when justifying a certain truth belief in a study. Epistemology has
“to do with our beliefs about how one might discover knowledge about the world”
(The PhD blog, 2009)

3.1 Clarification of methodological choices

In this paper I will deal with my research problem through a single case study. My case is to look for patterns of Nordicity in a broader framework, by examining the main social factors that affect Nordic security profiling in the OSCE.

There is no common methodological approach existing for the constructivist analysis (Rieker, 2003:29) and as mentioned in chapter 1 one could choose other alternatives when conducting studies with similar research problem. There are three main reasons for choosing a case study approach to this specific subject, these go as following: first of all regarding the achievement of a high conceptual validity – it is hard to measure effects of Nordic identity through statistical studies or formal models because these concepts require detailed consideration of contextual factors, namely what is considered to be a common Nordic profile, looking for equivalent issues expressed in different terms and across different contexts (George&Bennett, 2005:19). Secondly, a case study approach can detect or identify new variables that the researcher has not thought about before, these variables are most likely to be discovered through work with primary sources - interviews with participants and area experts or through archival research (George&Bennett, 2005:10). Thirdly, case studies are flexible and can serve as guides to an investigation and due to this flexibility there are no limits for what type of phenomenon that can be studied by a case study method (Rieker, 2003:29).

As with every other type of method there are several limitations or trade-offs related to the use of a case-study approach. I will here mention the most common limitation for the use of a case study approach – namely the ”case selection bias”.

---

2 To read more about statistical methods and formal models look at ”Strength of Case Study Methods”, in George&Bennett 2005, Chapter 1
This limitation is related to a complication of selecting right cases for a specific research problem. I believe that my foreknowledge of the general situation in the Nordic area will help me to escape the selection bias by identifying conditions for limitation of the scope of my study on an early stage. But it should be kept in mind that "biased case selection can also arise from the fact that evidence on certain cases is more readily accessible than that on others" (George&Bennett, 2005:51). When discussing accessibility of information, as a related issue to the case selection bias, the situation in my case is quite interesting since I choose to investigate an organization with the least opened documents existing on security cooperation within it, compared to other international organizations dealing with security issues such as NATO, UN and the EU. This can be seen as a challenge when it comes to finding enough information to be able to generalize my findings about the existence of a Nordic profile in OSCE; and on the other hand can be seen as a problem of "overgeneralization of results" (George&Benett, 2005). To my defense in choosing a single case study it must be said that all research designs can experience pitfalls, but as long as the researcher himself is aware of them, these negative outcomes can be minimized.

There could be other ways of dealing with finding patterns of a Nordic grouping in an international organization and the one represented above is my personal choice. Other alternatives could be to compare Nordic behavior or performance in several cases, as in organizations like UN, NATO, the EU and other types of smaller regional security cooperation, or to look at specific international events and then at the reactions towards them from a Nordic perspective (if there were any). One could for example take the Iraq war or another type of external intervention and identify reactions from the Nordic countries; one could also discuss establishment of new alliances or splits related to that specific issue. This type of method would not commit the research to investigate one specific organization but rather look at the external identity from a broader perspective; but the problematic part of the method comparing organizations or international events is the difficulty of finding good cases and escape being too subjective while doing the selection of potential material, as well as different events will most likely give different reactions and
make it difficult to make any common statement on the patterns of the Nordic behavior.

My research approach in this study is of a deductive character. Deductive reasoning works from something general to something more specific and its conclusion follows logically from available facts (Burney, 2008). This reasoning has a following course of actions – starting off with a problem formulation on the basis of already existing theory, secondly implement an empirical study connected to the formulated research problem and ending up with a theoretical interpretation of results from the empirical analysis (Gronmo, 2007:37). This commuting between theory and empirical material is a way to establish links and connect the reality to more abstract theoretical assumptions.

3.2 Research strategy

My research objective in this thesis is the Nordic profile in the OSCE. This research objective is coupled to my research problem or to the so-called bigger "puzzle" (George & Bennett, 2005:74), namely patterns of Nordic coordination in regional security cooperation. This research objective can be adapted to the needs of the research on this phenomenon, where for example, common identity variables can be incorporated in the state of research on regional security in general. When the research objective is identified the next stage is to define the type of study, which will be undertaken below.

George and Bennett (2005) identifies six different types of theory building research objectives³, where the "building block” study method will be the one undertaken in this study. "Building block” study is a type of study, which can serve as a component part of a bigger phenomenon. Its main purposes are of heuristic

³ Arend Liphart and Harry Eckstein identify five of them, while George and Bennett add the sixth type. The types are following: a theoretical/configurative idiographic case study, disciplined configurative case study, heuristic case study, theory testing case study, plausibility probes and "building block” studies of particular types or subtypes (George & Bennett, 2005:76).
character, referring to the process of learning and discovery. I choose to work with a specified subclass of Nordic security cooperation instead of developing general theories about this phenomenon and identifying and analyzing all possible factors for regional cooperation. My aim is to investigate socially constructed factors possibly affecting patterns of Nordicity in the OSCE. This type of factors can be seen as one “building block” within a bigger study addressing different factors (economic, environmental, historical, etc.) affecting Nordic regional security cooperation and their working patterns in different organizations. To sum up “the building block developed for a subtype is self sufficient; its validity and usefulness do not depend upon existence of other studies of different subclasses of that general phenomenon” (George&Bennett, 2005:78). In other words a “building block” study method can be seen as a contribution to the overall theory and as an independent research at the same time.

After deciding on a type of research object one should continue with developing a research strategy in order to achieve these objectives (George&Bennett, 2005:79). My objective is to find signs of alignment and cooperation between Nordic countries in an intergovernmental organization deployed in security-oriented goals. But since there is no voting procedure in the OSCE like in other security organization, it is not possible to measure Nordicity by looking at countries’ voting behavior. To solve this limitation one need to analyze the Nordic states’ separate declaratory politics related to the organization at hand, where “the OSCE, after all, is an organization, which very much relies on shame and fame politics, and the participating states do engage, rather intensively, in declaratory politics” (Marciacq, 2011:6). I will here look for signs and patterns of possible declaratory alignments or alliances, as a diplomatic instrument, between Nordic states in the framework of the OSCE. I intend to investigate this through two types of analysis. Firstly a document/textual analysis looking at governmental documents in Norway and Sweden and documents from the OSCE. Secondly I will conduct interviews with two experts on the area of a Nordic security profile, both people previously working in the OSCE, one as the ambassador of the Norwegian national delegation to the OSCE and the other as the ambassador to the EU delegation in the OSCE. More
information on measures of collecting information will follow in the two next sub-
sections (3.2.1 and 3.2.2).

3.2.1 Document analysis

“The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations” (Buzan et al., 1998:25). Here I will use different types of documents to look for signs of Nordic discourse or common Nordic constellation within the framework of the OSCE. This document analysis procedure can be summed up in three main points. The first point can be seen as a preparation phase and concentrates on finding the focus for the analysis and by choosing prioritized themes and types of texts to analyze; the second point is the completion of data collection concentrating on finding and registering relevant information and later categorize this in a systematic order relating these to chosen theories; the third point is to consider typical problems during the data collection, problems such as researcher’s subjective perspective when interpreting the material or like in my case a problem related to parts of material being classified and not open to the public (Grønmo, 2007:188).

I intend to work with primary sources by looking through the official OSCE archives for any indication of Nordic alliance or cooperation in the organization. Through the review of existing information my intent is to get a hint about which groupings are formed within the Nordic region in the scope of the OSCE and if there are any specific issue area leading up to signs of Nordicity. The amount of documents (besides declarations and regulations) opened for public is not great, where meeting documents and countries’ reports are almost all confidential; something that leads to alternative document analyses, or parallel data collection, which will be the analysis of documents from Nordic governments. Where I intend to look at official documents (written communications) from Norwegian Stortinget and Swedish Riksdagen for indication of any identity markers pointing in the direction of common security identity. I found Norway and Sweden to be two good representatives for in-depth document analysis, due to the fact that they represent a EU and non-EU member, a NATO and a non-NATO member, and due to the fluent
language skills in both to be able to read official documents and notice ”behind the lines” details if needed.

This document analysis is not a serious discourse or content analysis focusing on text’s structure or a systematic analysis considered in relation to already made and structured categories. This document analysis is rather a tool to find any signs of Nordicity in official documents in a general matter, something that can be seen as a light version of a qualitative document analysis. This analysis will serve as a tool to find “identity markers”; a concept described by Hans. E Andersson (2010) and paying attention to certain perceptions and motives, such as ”we are similar” or ”we trust each other”, when looking for collective identities in empirical data.

In this part of the data collection the element of interpretation will play a very important role. It will therefore be important to keep in mind historical and organizational factors behind the Nordic cooperation in general.

3.2.2 Interviews

After going through the documents related to the research objective I will continue my data collection by questioning selected interview objects. My chose fell on conducting informal interviews with two experts on the area of study. Informal interview is a conversation with an interviewee with no given prepared answers in advance; the interviewer uses an interview guide, which provides general guidelines for the implementations of the conversations (Grønmo, 2007:127).

My interview objects represent two different approaches of the research object; my first interviewee was the former Norwegian ambassador and head of the Norwegian national delegation to OSCE - Guttorm Vik; and my second interviewee was the former EU ambassador and head of EUs delegation to OSCE – Lars-Erik Lundin. My choice of interviewees was a strategic consideration taken after a theoretical and analytical review and had as purpose to find the most relevant and interesting interview objects. Since Norden is in the focus for this study a Nordic non-EU country’s position was of great importance as well as the position of the EU and its considerations of existence of a Nordic profile in the OSCE.
These two interviews would therefore contribute with an insight of the informal relations between the Nordic states within the OSCE. The most important questions were related to the informal contact between Nordic countries and were conducted in order to fill in the gap of information that could not be found by reading official documents.

The interviews had a flexible character, because of uncertainty to what responses I would get from the interviewees; follow-up questions were more or less dependent on the information received by the interviewees and I was always open to detect new or unforeseen aspects of my topic as well as to give interviewees possibility to take initiative to discuss aspects of importance in their opinion. The preparation before the interviews consisted of the creation of an interview guide being both a starting point as well as a red thread during the interview. The main emphasis of the interview guide was based on what information I wanted and needed from the interviews as well as specification of themes for discussion. The language used during the interviews was English so the interviewer would not have to translate the interviews afterwards; collected material would therefore be more precise when indirectly or directly cited in the paper.

As mentioned in section 3.2.1, because of the issue area analyzed in this paper there are some shortcomings related to material availability. Some topics are not officially published but are formally discussed during the meetings between diplomats, while other topics are classified and are not officially discussed at all and are taking place only in informal settings between political elites. So considerations must be made in terms of this limitation, especially when making concluding remarks in the last chapter of this paper; both interviewees confirmed existence of this problematic aspect but did not see the need to be anonymous in this specific study.

3.3 Operationalization
In this part of the paper I will describe how my research question will be operationalized in practice. To operationalize means to create clear criteria for how units and analytical concepts can be represented and what results or conclusions can be provided from the empirical data collection.

Since norms and identities are not easily observable, the operationalization link between theoretical and operative level will be the most important in this thesis. My intention is to detect patterns and role of Nordicity in the OSCE by looking at different socially constructed actions by Nordic states; these actions are divided into 5 themes or indicators that were identified in the theoretical part above - social organization, constructed institutions, systematization of common objectives and legitimation of commitments. I will test these theoretical approaches to reality by using two sets of data collection – document analysis and interviews.

The first approach is the *social organization* of states, which relates to the Nordic states position in the OSCE as well as their formal and informal links between themselves and towards others; existence of fixed or flexible Nordic alliances, identify coordination mechanisms and guidelines for future cooperation. I intend to find data to this approach by examining written communications from Norwegian and Swedish governments, discuss Nordic cooperation with my interviewees as well as look for secondary sources identifying Nordic institutionalization in international organizations in general.

By studying *non-institutional cooperation* I intend to find out if communication between Nordic states is efficient and proactive for creating common Nordic approaches. How can countries be effective and promote their Nordic priorities? And how much does existence of a Nordic identity affects Nordic institutionalization and coordination in the OSCE? Answers to these questions are most likely to be found in written communications from Norway and Sweden, where I will look for expression of a diplomatic dialogue and active interaction between countries on the issue of regional security in the OSCE; also the interviews can help to discover possible structures and processes not visible in official documents.
Systematization of common objectives is a sum of priorities made by Norden in terms of creating common security cooperation in the OCSE; I will also look on if Nordic objectives have evolved since the 1995. Nordic priorities will be discussed with my two interviewees while I intend to look for Nordic priorities in governmental archives in Norway and Sweden.

Legitimation of commitments is the last theoretical indicator to be analyzed, here I intend to look for which structures and processes have been used by Norden to justify or defend its actions as a group. How can one perceive the aspect of Nordicity in a broader framework and what commitments are being made by the countries to do so? The issue of legitimation will be discussed with my two interviewees; I will also look at written governmental communications from Norway and Sweden, secondary sources on the issue of legitimizing instruments and search for Nordic commitments that has become legally binding for participants.

My theoretical ambition is to try out or test my theoretical indicators to the reality. The opportunity to discover other important factors that are not described above are fully possible and will be accounted for and analyzed in the same manner as my 4 chosen indicators. As mentioned above on the topic of choosing a case study approach – the researcher can detect new variables that she/he did not think of before hand and use them in terms of broadening the spectrum of analysis. I will use a theory testing approach, where in the end I will conclude if all theoretical approaches fit my case and what other themes could have been discussed.

The purposes of this analysis are to discover a pattern of Nordicity or Nordic common group action in the OSCE that can create a Nordic profile and to discuss what role does this profile play in the organization.
4 Empirical data

This chapter consists of two main parts: first, a brief introduction of the OSCE to give a better understanding of the Nordic states’ position and space of maneuver in the organization; second, a presentation of main findings from the Swedish and Norwegian governmental archives, these findings are all existing written communications on the topic of Nordic cooperation in the period between 1995 until 2012.

4.1 What is the OSCE?

The OSCE is the largest intergovernmental security organization in the world. Previously the OSCE was the CSCE and was established during the Cold war in the period between 1973-75. At that time Nordic countries were divided into two groups – a NATO members group (Denmark, Norway and Iceland) and the non-aligned group (Sweden and Finland). The CSCE was renamed and restructured to the OSCE in 1995. 1995 was the year Sweden and Finland joined the EU and the non-aligned group basically disappeared, whereas the EU coordination developed more and more over the years (Interview 1).

Today the organization consists of 56 participating member states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. All states are equal and all decisions are made on the consensus-based practice. Decisions made in the organization are politically but not legally binding and there are also no sanctions for states that do not follow the OSCE guidelines (OSCE website 1).
The Nordic states are now divided into two groups, the EU (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and the Like-minded group (Iceland\textsuperscript{4} and Norway). The relationship between these groups is a very close one and I will examine it further in a subsection below.

There are 10 main principles that guideline cooperation between states in the OSCE, these principles are:

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
3. Inviolability of frontiers
4. Territorial integrity of States
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
9. Co-operation among States
10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law” (Helsinki Final Act, 1975)

The organization represents a “forum for dialogue and a platform for action” (OSCE website 1). “It offers a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and puts the political will of its participating States into practice through its unique network of field missions” (OSCE website 2).

\textsuperscript{4} Iceland is no longer a member of the LMG because it is a candidate country to join the EU (negotiations formally began in 2010)
Today the OSCE consists of three main dimensions; these are the politico-military dimension, the economic and environmental dimension and the human dimension. Due to this the OSCE has the opportunity to address a wide range of security-related concerns, “including arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism and economic and environmental activities” (OSCE website 1)

OSCE is known for promoting transparency, gender equality or mediation, democratic and human rights, rule of law and civilian crisis management, something that is extremely closely related to Nordic values and priorities. This close relationship between normative frameworks of the OSCE and Norden is a win-win situation for Norden, where Norden promotes OSCE values and by that also gain support for their national interests.

4.1.1 Nordic groupings in the OSCE

The current situation of Nordic states in the machinery of the OSCE is two-folded; Norden is split between two groups – the EU group and the Like-minded group (LMG). Due to this division, Nordic states act neither as a group separately from the EU nor in concert with the EU, they act as part of the EU group or as part of a LMG group; meaning that an independent Nordic group is non-existing in the OSCE. On the other hand the Nordic countries are not an independent unit because they are so affected by the domination of the EU, which plays a central role in the negotiations and the decision-making in the OSCE.

The like-minded group is the formal grouping of the Nordic non-EU members. The group went official in 2004 but was established in the mid-90 due to two different factors. The first factor was the change from the CSCE (conference) to the OSCE (organization) and the second factor was the enlargement of the EU in 1995, which included Sweden and Finland.
States composing the like-minded group are: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Canada, in other words all EFTA countries + Canada\(^5\). The LMG is a forum of consultation. The LMG cooperates closely with other actors in the OSCE; the LMG has weekly meetings with the EU, meetings with the Chairmanship, with the US ambassadors as well as with deputy heads of missions and with Russia (Interview 2).

“The like-minded countries have no common borders, nor do they share the same geography or the same history. They do not speak the same language and they do not all belong to the same international or regional security and economic arrangements” (Kothbauer&Kongshem, 2004:89). Due to all these differences, the countries have somehow managed to create strong ties to each other and comprise a “fairly homogenous group”. Why so?

Firstly, the LMG attaches the utmost importance to multilateral and international cooperation, where these countries are known for being consensus builders and problem solvers; secondly, all countries have overlapping interests in their foreign policies, all related to the US, Russia and the EU; and thirdly, most of the countries are small states and are therefore viewed as not pursuing their self-serving national-agenda but rather working for strengthening the OSCE.

The LMG is a forum for consultation but on occasion the LMG can have a common appearance and be a record with a common statement, the LMG is a group that will defend typically Nordic values and will speak on the matter of principle. When speaking it will not describe it as a statement of the LMG but as a statement on the behalf of delegations of Canada, Norway, Liechtenstein, etc (Interview 2).

The LMG has been strongly advocating the importance of the three OSCE dimensions mentioned above. Related to the second dimension, on economic and environmental issues the LMG has been open for new initiatives and has been giving the largest per capita contributions to the OSCE of all states. When related to

\(^5\) The LMG has been evolving before it got its current participants: it started off with Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, where Liechtenstein joined in 1999, Iceland joined in 2000 and Turkey left the group in 2000 because it was accepted as a candidate member for the EU.
the third dimension, on humanitarian issues, the group has been known for taking principled and independent approaches (Kothbauer & Kongshem, 2004:90). The third dimension has also clearly been the most important dimension for Norden.

The LMG has traditionally taken an active part in the work of the OSCE, where countries have been chairing different working groups, being active in the discussions on the OSCE reforms, bridging positions, bringing in new ideas for consensus solution and have therefore been holding a high profile within the organization in general. (Kothbauer & Kongshem, 2004:92).

It has also become clear by discussing this issue with my interviewees that the potential for cooperation between the LMG and the EU in the OSCE is used as much as possible.

The EU plays an extremely central role in the OSCE negotiations, because of its almost usual “right” to speak first at all meetings in the Permanent Council, leaving other members the choice between either supporting the EU’s position or oppose it. A negotiating process before the actual meeting is therefore very important for all member states. In theory, all countries have an equal right to speak in the plenary meetings and are looking for alliances to support their issues of interest in the OSCE Permanent Council, but when talking to my interviewees there is a somewhat different approach that is used in practice. The country holding the EU Presidency is usually the one to speak first in the meetings and is therefore a quite dominant actor in the Permanent Council. It is usually the representative from the EU that puts forward a statement on behalf of its member states, meaning that a lot of countries are therefore intercepted from talking about their national positions, apart from what the EU official has already said. When it comes to the non-EU countries it seems that the alliances between them are usually built in the informal

---

6 “OSCE decisions have to be taken by consensus. This means that there is no voting on issues, where the Chairman rather seeks approval from all delegations. In the case of one or more delegations opposing a decision, the issue goes back into negotiation. If all delegates agree, the decision becomes politically binding for all member states” (OSCE website 2). This is how things are decided on in the Permanent Council in the OSCE, where all decision-making takes place.
consultations such as between the LMG and the EU, the LMG and Russia, etc. All countries agreeing with the EU statement can choose to align with it.

“With the Lisbon Treaty, the interpretation of alignment has shifted to a more exclusive interpretation. Non-EU states may no longer speak in their national capacity if they choose to align themselves. This new practice of alignment puts non-EU states in front of severed choices, since their alignment automatically implies their individual behavior being fused into collective action” (Marciacq, 2011:8).

All in all, the Nordic group is playing on the same team despite being in two different groups in the OSCE, due to the fact that Nordic countries in the EU and Nordic countries in the LMG support the same issues. And if for example Norway decides to speak in a formal meeting it is seldom seen as a Nordic input but rather as an initiative to an idea.

4.2 Nordic cooperation from the Norwegian and Swedish perspectives

This section represents all existing written communications on the issue of Nordic security cooperation from the Norwegian and Swedish governments (Norwegian Stortinget and Swedish Riksdagen), where a total of 30 reports have been written on this issue, 14 in Norway and 16 in Sweden. Findings are presented below, where these create an empirical base for the Nordic states’ relations and historical development of Nordicity in one non-EU and one EU Nordic member state.

Several communications repeat previously stated ideas and are therefore either connected with another similar document or have a little paragraph about what new initiatives have been taken in the Nordic cooperation that specific year.

Is there in this material any mentioning or hints of a common Nordic security profile or description of patterns of security and foreign policy cooperation between those countries? Findings are presented as bullet points from each written
4.2.1 Written communications from the Norwegian Stortinget

These are the findings from the Norwegian governmental archives on patterns of Nordicity in security and common foreign policies. There were 14 written communications in the period 1995-2011 on this specific topic in Norway.

**Written communication 1, St.melding 30 (1996/1997)**

Written communication 30 approved in 1997 was the first document on Nordic cooperation in Norwegian Stortinget since 1995.

- With Denmark having the OSCE Chairmanship, Finland leading the Council of Ministers in the European Council and Sweden as a member of the UN’s Security Council, Nordic interests have become more visible on the international arena. Informal cooperation between states on foreign and security questions is seen to be in the center of the Nordic cooperation (St.melding 30, 1997:ch.3).

- Under the 49th Nordic Council’s annual session in Helsinki, the defense ministers from all Nordic countries were, for the first time, invited to join in discussions in the Council. Defense ministers now had the opportunity to share their security concerns as well as create common statements on Nordic issues (St.melding 30, 1997:ch.3).

- EU coordination and joint EU-posts have been prioritized by the Nordic EU members, which means that Norway and Iceland now must make an extra effort and find new ways of collaboration to keep the Nordic profile in the OSCE. (St.melding 30, 1997:ch.3).

**Written communication 2, St.melding 30 (1997/1998)**

- The glue in Nordic cooperation is first and foremost the cultural and linguistic similarities, democratic society models and consistent valuations, and it can hardly be found other regions where cooperation between nations is more conductive than in Norden (St. melding 30, 1998:ch1).
Written communication 3, St.melding 30 (1998/1999)

- In most of the cases there is a common Nordic position to the issues on the EU agenda. A common Nordic approach is used especially in the human dimension of security (St.melding 30, 1999:ch.3.3).
- Nordic Chairmanships and Presidencies in the OSCE and the EU is creating opportunity for greater impact in achieving Nordic goals and priorities (St.melding 30, 1999:ch.3.3).
- The Norwegian government concludes that Nordic cooperation in the OSCE is functioning quite well, both between the capitals and at the headquarter in Wien. Cooperation is expanding to include the Baltic States in the OSCE Nordic consultation. This type of cooperation is and will be a good information source for Norway on the status and development in the EU (St.melding 30, 1999:ch.3.3)


St.melding 30 (1999/2000), 56 (2000/2001) and 50 (2000/2003) are very similar to each other and are therefore combined in one single sub-section.

- When it comes to the EU politics there is no formal Nordic approach to it, but informal consultations and information exchange are undertaken when needed (St.melding 30, 2000:ch.1).
- Nordic cooperation approach is seen to be a supplementing instrument in how Nordic countries follow European policies (St.melding 30, 2000:ch.4).
- The Nordic governments unanimously believe that their partnership character is best suited for the informal structures (St.melding 56, 2001:ch.4.1)

Written communication 6, St.melding 5 (2002/2003)

- Norden has developed similar security and foreign policy interests, where different connections to international organizations can be used to achieve a common Nordic “good”. At the same time, Nordic cooperation in international organizations has changed its character after Denmark, Sweden and Finland joined the EU, where amount of Nordic statements has decreased considerably, and due to that it is now more difficult to maintain
a visible Nordic profile in the organization. Norway is actively participating to preserve the spirit of a traditional Nordic profile through cooperation on current foreign policy issues (St.melding 5:2003:ch.6.21).

- Common Nordic inputs in the OSCE have become impossible after Finnish and Swedish entrance into the EU. Despite this, weekly Nordic consultations between Nordic OSCE delegations are still in place. (St.melding 5:2003:ch.6.21).

**Written communication 7, 8 and 9, St.melding 48 (2003/2004), St.melding 43 (2004/2005), St.melding 26 (2005/2006)**

For the first time in written communications in Norwegian Stortinget there is a whole chapter dealing with Nordic cooperation outside the Nordic Council of Ministers, starting off with St.melding 48 in 2003/2004. Next written communications are done in the same manner.

- Nordic countries cooperate on suggestion and supporting Nordic candidates to different international positions; Nordic countries are having an internal rotation scheme for candidates in the UNs Security Council (St.melding 48, 2004:ch.6).

- Administrative cooperation in common Nordic foreign offices has been deepened and developed; after co-location project of Nordic embassies in Berlin and Maputo there is an intensification of finding new places to co-locate shared Nordic embassies as well as other consular cooperation (St.melding 43, 2005:ch.8.1).

**Written communication 10, St.melding 41 (2006/2007)**

- Cooperation on foreign policies gets the name of N5 (Nordic five). The Nordic governments have decided to create guidelines for future Nordic cooperation; to be more open and efficient and to increase the relevance of their cooperation (St.melding 42, 2007:ch.5.1).

**Written communication 11, St.melding 36 (2007/2008)**

- Thorvald Stoltenberg is appointed as the responsible researcher for an independent study on the possibilities of Nordic foreign and security policy
cooperation for the next 10-15 years. The purpose of this study is to stimulate a broader debate on the issue (St.melding 36, 2008:ch.5.1).

**Written communication 12 and 13, St.melding 23 (2009/2010), St.melding 6 (2009/2010)**

Two reports were written in the year 2009-2010 due to Stoltenberg’s efforts, bringing Nordic cooperation to a completely new level. It was also the first time that a whole chapter was dedicated to common foreign and security cooperation in Norwegian written communication.

- Practical cooperation techniques are being improved, and governments can now witness a real additional value of the close cooperation (St.melding 23, 2010:ch.4.1).
- The development during the last 15 years in the Nordic countries and internationally has led to a broader scope and greater potential for Nordic cooperation. This Nordic cooperation must be strengthened by more commitments towards closer coordination of Norden in the EU, NATO and the OSCE (St.melding 6, 2010:4.1).

Efforts for modernization and efficiency of cooperation processes are helping to deepen and develop existing cooperation areas as well as to expand it to new fields. Nordic countries share experiences and "best practices” to achieve the most of their cooperation (St.melding 6, 2010:ch.4.1).

**Written communication 14, St.melding 5 (2011/2012)**

- A solidarity Declaration is signed by N5, which marks the new dynamics that are taking place in foreign and security policy in Norden. Previously limits on security cooperation due to the countries’ different characteristics as well as historical development are now changing and shared Nordic interests are becoming more clear and important. Closer cooperation is changing structures and attitudes and open up for new opportunities (St.melding 5, 2012:ch.4.1).
4.2.2 Written communications from the Swedish Riksdagen

These are the findings from the Swedish Riksdagen on patterns of Nordic cooperation within security and common foreign policies. There have been published a total of 16 written communications in the period 1995-2012.

Written communication 1 (Skrivelse 147 (1996/1997))
First official written communication from the Swedish government on the specific theme of Nordic cooperation was Skrivelse 147 (1996-1997) approved on the 01.01.1997.

- This document is specifically affected by three earlier events: the fall of the Soviet Union creating new prerequisites for Nordic foreign and security policies, the EEA agreement opening for new rules in the traditional inter-Nordic relations, and finally the Finish and Swedish entrance into the EU that leaves only two Nordic countries outside the membership circuit. Nordic cooperation from 1995 has three main dimensions: first, cooperation within Norden, second, cooperation between Norden, the EU and the EEA countries, and finally cooperation between Norden and its neighboring countries (Skrivelse 147, 1997:ch.1).

Written communication 2, Skrivelse 73 (1997/1998)
- The debate on the issue of security or foreign policy and action within the Nordic Council has been intensified. It culminated in a conference in Helsinki on security in Norden and its neighboring countries, but still no institutionalization on common security policies has taken place (Skrivelse 73, 1998:ch.3).

Written communication 3, Skrivelse 67 (1998/1999)
- There is a desire to include a Norden in the formation of a new Europe that act together, when possible, on issues related to the EU, the EEA and broader international cooperation. The Schengen agreement is an example of excellent negotiation to include Iceland and Norway in the EU
regulations and still keep passport freedom in Norden (Skrivelse 67, 1999:ch.3.6)

- There is an undergoing active exchange of information on common security and defense between Nordic countries in the Nordic Council, this is done to obtain shared knowledge on different security issues as well as considering acting together in other forums (Skrivelse 67, 1999:ch.3.6).


- Sweden embraces security cooperation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in promotion of democratic rule of law as well as information exchange (Skrivelse 90, 2002:ch3)

**Written communication 7, Skrivelse 90 (2002/2003)**

- Cooperation between Nordic EU members’ prime ministers is developing further, where they have internal meetings before the actual European Council meetings and Norway and Iceland are informed about the discussions that are taking place. Nordic governments’ cooperation on issues of security and defense character are outside the framework of Nordic Council of Ministers, but since 2001 both foreign affairs ministers and defense ministers from respective Nordic countries will give their statements to the Nordic Council of Ministers. Due to a more visible change of threats, Nordic countries need more dynamic coordination of their security policies (Skrivelse 90, 2003:ch.3.21).

**Written communication 8, Skrivelse 90 (2003/2004)**

- Informal meetings before European Council meeting are still in place, and from 2003 also Estonia’s, Lithuania’s and Latvia’s heads of states are welcomed to join these meetings (Skrivelse 90, 2004:ch.2.2).

Written communications from years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, do not mention Nordic security or possibilities for Nordic cooperation in international relations; areas of Nordic cooperation that are pointed out in these years are culture, education, research and to some extent energy and economy. Cooperation with Baltic States is described to be of the utmost importance to Sweden.

**Written communication 13, Skrivelse 90 (2008/2009)**

- Nordic solidarity is of high importance for the Swedish government. Working together with their neighbors, creating networks and information exchange has become an important tradition for Norden. The interest for Norden and commitment within Norden has increased significantly throughout 2008 (Skrivelse 90, 2009:ch.1).

- Coordination is a factor for Nordic regional cooperation, the countries’ goal is to develop and improve coordination between Nordic and national institutions and between Nordic governments (Skrivelse 90, 2009:ch.2.1).

- Nordic countries act as a group in the OSCE and in the European Council to solve the conflict in Georgia. Norden has been closely cooperating with the EU on this issue (Skrivelse 90, 2009:ch.3).

**Written communication 14, Skrivelse 90 (2009/2010)**

- The year of Swedish Presidency in the EU has showed the importance of Nordic cooperation as a long Nordic tradition. In areas, such as climate and sustainable development the relationship between the countries’ statements was specifically visible. Also, the Icelandic request to join the European Union was accepted under the Swedish Presidency (Skrivelse 90, 2010:ch.1).

- Nordic foreign ministers are positive to the Stoltenberg report; they are also willing to act together in the spirit of solidarity in areas of mutual interest. This close cooperation in Norden strengthens the European and even Euro-Atlantic coordination. Foreign ministers underlined initiative to improve democracy, human rights, equality between sexes and a sustainable development as the main dimensions for Nordic foreign politics (Skrivelse 90, 2010:ch.4).
Written communication 15, Skrivelse 90 (2010/2011)

- The follow-up of the Stoltenberg report has been an important issue for Nordic countries. Nordic solidarity is seen to be an obvious dimension because of the geographical and strategic interests in Norden. Ambition about increased civil and military coordination between the Nordic states in the international organizations have also increased in the last years. The administrative cooperation between Nordic foreign offices abroad as well as between foreign ministries in Nordic capitals will be increased in the upcoming years (Skrivelse 90, 2011:ch.5).

Written communication 16, Skrivelse 90 (2011/2012)

- The solidarity declaration was signed in Helsinki in 2011 as a verification of political solidarity and fellowship in Norden, which has influence on all security dimensions. Closer cooperation between diplomats and ambassadors, as well as more discussion and closer administrative coordination have increased in the last year bringing Nordic countries even closer together (Skrivelse 90, 2012:ch.5)
5 Analysis of findings

This chapter will analyze findings in the empirical chapter and contribute with other empirical knowledge and analytical thinking. Firstly, I will discuss separate indicators as they were identified in the theoretical part of this paper, secondly I will present a pair of new indicators identified during the empirical analysis of the findings. Thirdly, when concluding this analysis I intend to combine all indicators and give the reader an answer to my research question, being a common result of the analysis.

5.1 Indicators one by one

My indicators, as they were identified in Chapter 2 are: social organization, constructed institutions, systematization of common objectives and legitimation of commitments.

5.1.1 Social organization

Norden is a group of small states creating strategies of joining coalitions, which are necessary in order to follow diplomatic negotiations that are taking place in international organizations.

Norden is a geostrategic region of small states with great diplomatic skills, despite their size Norden is often seen as a model to follow for others, where “there is no other group of countries that has so strong commitments and that has achieved so much in their own backyard” (Interview 2). Due to tighter connection between domestic and external affairs in small states (Vital, 1967) Norden can be committed to certain policies more than to others and since all of the important OSCE values
are norms that are very much promoted by the Nordic countries, cooperation on these is being prioritized (see St. melding 30, 1998).

There are hardly more than nuances of opinion between for instance Nordic states and the EU (see St.melding 30, 1997 & Skrivelse 90, 2009) in the framework of the OSCE, because the LMG and the EU are usually bargaining with Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Belarus; these countries’ views are so different from the EU’s and Nordic views that any inner nuances of opinion disappear. Some members of the LMG group (i.e Norway and Liechtenstein) can therefore happily subscribe to the EU statements and does so in 90% of the cases. Other countries that are somehow in a position to aspire for membership can also affiliate with the EU statements, an offer they usually tend to accept. This means that EU statements in the OSCE are usually made on behalf of well over half of the OSCE participating states, and sometimes more than 40 of the 56-state membership (Interview 2).

Like-minded small states gain on cooperating with each other and can also receive issue-specific power on topics with shared Nordic value (see Skrivelse 90, 2010). Norden is definitely pioneering in the areas of transparency, democracy, gender equality, human rights and environment, areas where Nordic countries have traditions of well-organized positions and an excellent record of promotion and persuasion.

The period before the majority of Nordic countries entered the EU was the time of a more intensive cooperation between the Nordic states in international fora, especially the UN, in order to get more weight in negotiations or coordinating strategies with other states or groups of states (Interview 2). Today, it is hard to organize formal links of coordination between countries, written communications show there is a growing interest to develop common approaches for security but these must be created as supplementing and not alternative dimensions to already existing institutional arrangements.

Continuity of Nordic informal meetings in the OCSE despite different group
membership and lack of a formal Nordic group is a very good sign and means that meetings serve a useful purpose for all parts involved. Nordic consultations are held on a weekly basis and are mostly attended by the ambassadors. Chairmanships are rotating in the alphabetic order, where the chair is sending out the invitation proposed agenda (Interview 2). Even if there is no official Nordic profile within the OSCE, these weekly informal meetings have defended their place on a busy agenda important and show that there is a special relationship between Nordic countries with a long cooperation tradition that they want to hold on too.

But can the role of informal meetings replace usual formal and institutionalized regional dynamics? Is it enough to have informal practices to create a common profile within the OSCE? Answers to these questions are rather a mix, but scholars do agree that the non-formal part of Nordic cooperation is very important – “Nordic institutionalized cooperation is very impressive, especially due to underpins by a lot of informal coordination” (Neumann, 2012). An informal coordination mechanism or informal constellations are important but Nordic countries also show commitment to work together when creating official documents on security issues. Both interviewees argue that there is no Nordic profile in the OSCE per se, because the norms that carry this profile, and which are being promoted, are not referred to on regular basis as Nordic. They are presented as general norms, ideas and initiatives and are a powerful part of the Nordic profile, as we know it, where “Nordic countries are very advanced in their words and their actions” (Interview 2).

The informal coordination between Nordic countries sometimes includes formal or informal exchange of reports in Norden, where reports from other Nordic delegations may replace national reporting (Interview 2).

Social organization of and between states is a relevant factor for the Nordic profile because it represents a base or a framework for interaction between states and creates guidelines for the future. Due to this social organization Nordic states have well-organized positions in the OSCE and elsewhere.

5.1.2 Informal, non-institutional cooperation
The last 4 years in the OSCE have been extremely positive in the direction of more Nordic influence and active participation in the decision-making in the organization. Finnish OSCE Chairmanship in 2008 followed by the Swedish EU Presidency in 2009 has created a high Nordic involvement and visibility on the international arena (see St.melding 30, 1997; St.melding 30, 1999; Skrivelse 90, 2010). The Danish EU Presidency in the first half of 2012 can be seen as another factor leading to more Nordicity on the EU and the OSCE agenda.

The role of the Chairmanship in the OSCE is very important. In most other organizations it is the secretariat that runs the business and the chairmanship chairs the meetings, but in the OSCE there is a tradition that the Chair is much more active by taking initiatives and has a number of special representatives that one appoints for various purposes. When one Nordic country holds the OSCE Chairmanship, other Nordic countries try to promote and support it as best as they can and expect to be even better consulted and kept in the picture than other member countries (Interview 2).

“Nordic states have a long history of very close cooperation in the international forums”, where “(...) even if no common positions are reached it is seen as self-evident that a Nordic discussion took place, this informality may in itself indicate an activated collective identity” (Andersson, 2010:53). This is a very interesting and true statement on the position of Nordic cooperation. Coordination between states is often more practical and informal than institutionalized and formalized, for several reasons. Development of bureaucratic networks and a possibility to speak one’s own language is the base that gives Norden the opportunity to work more efficiently, making communication and exchange of information smoother and easier. It has also been stated that Nordic countries unanimously believe that their partnership character is best suited for the informal structures (St.melding 56, 2001:ch.4.1)

The nature and degree of institutionalization between actors is an important factor, where Norden is organized in a non-official grouping with real structures of cooperation. Structures in the OSCE create the basis for Nordic behavior with a prevailing group identity. Controversies can arise because states are often members
of several communities at the same time, for example members of the OSCE share their security space with members of the EU, who in turn share norms with citizens in countries such as Norway and Denmark which are also members of the NATO and are important actors in Scandinavian and Nordic alliances. Nordic security cooperation is closely related to a Nordic common profile, officially non-existing in the OSCE but highly related to agenda setting, identity formation, institutional power to exclude and include and to legitimize and authorize.

Because of close Nordic cooperation new structures are being created in parallel with the information exchange in the EU using practical cooperation techniques such as exchange of notes, common analysis and knowledge. Methods of cooperation are therefore important for the existence of a Nordic profile, especially because it is shaping the best practices for Nordic cooperation (St.melding 6, 2009/2010). Informal, non-institutional cooperation between Nordic countries and Nordic Chairmanships and Presidencies confirm the “we-ness” approach to be existent on all levels of cooperation. A wish for a common “Nordic good” (St.melding 5, 2002/2003) is the engine behind the existence of the Nordic profile.

Informal cooperation gives more effect to Nordic ideas and Nordic diplomacy both in the OSCE and in general, it creates an environment for active interaction and dialogue and expresses a high degree of informal institutionalization.

5.1.3 Systematization of common objectives

It might be expected that similarity or difference of Nordic countries’ performance in the OSCE would show signs or patterns of a Nordic profile, but does the absence of similar behavior mean absence of a common profile? What if countries do not react to proposals at all? Will no reaction mean agreement or disagreement with a statement? What if there is no information available on different countries’ reactions but only on the final consensus decisions? How can one then measure achievement made by Nordic countries? As an answer to these questions my argument goes as follows: Nordic performance, which here builds on institutionalization of priorities and goal achievements, is not a uniform picture,
there is no expectation-capability gap in the way Nordic countries act in the OSCE because there are no expectations or requirements to Norden in how to perform because of no formal agreements or arrangements between states. One cannot measure performance of Nordic actions because they do not act together as a group, neither have there been any Swedish, Danish, Finnish or common Nordic positions proposed in the OSCE since 1995 (see 4.1.1 on alignments with the EU & St.melding 5, 2003); I will therefore look at Nordic common security objectives and priorities as my indicators for wanted performance.

After 1995 Norway has been associating more and more often with the position of the EU. The Icelandic government on the other hand, had a more negative position towards the EU in the start, but after the financial crisis in Iceland the government became interested in joining the EU and then quickly became a candidate country (Interview 1). At the same time as stated in St.melding 30, 1996/1997, Iceland and Norway were also expected to make an even bigger effort to keep the Nordic profile existing in the OSCE, where the Nordic countries have been front liners on the issues concerning human rights, gender equality, rule of law and respect for minorities.

But clearly, there are also different interests in the Nordic countries. For example Norway has a very strong position when it comes to the Arctic area and it will not give it away to other countries just in the faith of solidarity or group affiliation, Norway will cooperate and negotiate about the Arctic area both with Nordic states and the EU (Interview 1). Different historical and geostrategic links between Norden and its partners is another sphere of Nordic interest diversity. Sweden, with has been much tougher on Russia and Belarus and came out much more strongly in support for the Georgia than the rest of Norden; Denmark appears more transatlantic and supports the US even more than Norway, which did not participate in the war in Iraq and has been more generally critical towards the US than Denmark.

Apart from differences and similarities between Nordic goals and priorities there is another factor affecting Nordic objectives, namely the relevance of Nordic
cooperation. Is it relevant for countries to cooperate when Norden does not have any formal position in the OSCE? After analyzing written communication on Nordic cooperation during the last 15 years, the answer is “yes”; the relevance even seems to increase with time and countries find out that there strategic partners are their closest neighbors. Nordic security has become an important issue in the Nordic Council, even if it officially does not cover security as a prioritized area. The peak of cooperation in 2009 was the Stoltenberg report, which brought more thought and weight to Nordic cooperation. The main common objective for Nordic cooperation is the political will – a wish to strengthen Nordic commitment in international organizations (St.melding 6, 2010).

And even if it is impossible to clearly systematize Nordic positions on security matters, due to the facts mentioned above, I conclude that there is a will in Norden to coordinate common Nordic objectives in the future as well as to promote their norms and values to other countries and regions. I will not go into detail and rank different priorities for the Nordic states, but it is clear that the human dimension is of highest importance to Norden.

5.1.4 Legitimation of commitments

After 1995 the Nordic meetings started to diminish, because of active discouragement from the EU concerning regional groups inside the union, especially regional groups with countries standing outside the EU, since this would not promote further development. A Nordic grouping was therefore quite controversial at that time, but ending the traditional Nordic cooperation was basically not acceptable for Norden. The Finnish EU Presidency promoted a so-called Nordic Dimension to focus on issues important for Nordic states (Interview 2). The main purpose was for Norway and Iceland to be integrated in projects carried out by the EU as well as to encourage further development of the Nordic profile. Seen from national state perspective participation in this EU-led project and harmonization of Norwegian legislation towards the EU was a sign of a political will to keep Nordic states as similar as possible, despite no intentions of becoming a member. As a Nordic bureaucrat wanting to change a regulation in a Nordic
country one would always check what was done on that issue in other Nordic countries (Interview 2).

Of two main concerns related to legitimation of Nordic commitments there is first the common problem of difference between formality and reality. This was and is a problem because there is a wide spectrum of issues that are discussed between and among Nordic states but not publically (Interview 1). Confidential information, such as reports between countries’ officials and head of states are a commonality in Nordic cooperation. This is a fact derived from interviewing previous OSCE ambassadors.

The second concern related to legitimation of commitments in Norden is the choices between legally and politically binding processes or structures. There are several reasons for using either political or legally binding institutional processes in the Nordic group. Firstly when discussing political rather than legally binding instruments it shows an intention to test political credibility and promote mutual trust. A rigid legal structure might instead be an invitation to search for legal loopholes. Also, politically binding instruments lead to more changes in practice, political interests, and public policies than the use of legal instruments; this is due to the fact that more accountability imply that “politically binding instruments can sometimes be as effective at producing change as legal instruments”; (Adler, 1997:274).

There are no legally binding processes that commit Nordic states to cooperate with each other, but shared conceptualization of security and favoring of a common Nordic identity binds states’ cooperation through politically created commitments.

There is an interesting paradigm uniting Nordic diplomats in political commitments – the assumption that people have similar historical tradition, harmonious relationship and a feeling of solidarity, similar language, respect for international law and support of the UN, the feeling that the Nordic area is a special area with limited military presence, an area from where one can export peace and stability and modern ideas about society, model of life and gender perspective. These factors are instruments used in a process binding Nordic states together and making them
very like-minded. It is more a question of this like-mindedness as a characteristic of a Nordic profile, rather than the issue of formal groupings and actions.

The Nordicity aspect on the international arena may be called the like-minded aspect. This paper makes an attempt to put a framework around this like-mindedness paradigm by disclosing what socially constructed factors can be used to characterize its possible institutionalization.

Previous EU ambassador for the OSCE delegation, Swedish Lars-Erik Lundin, highlighted an interesting point. He had never experienced any ethical problems being a Swede and a representative of the EU. He felt he was representing the same interests (Interview 1). Therefore there is no need for an obvious Nordic grouping in the OSCE as one can align with the EU position and act as like-minded. Common conceptualization of security between Norden and the EU is one of the main factors that explains why there is no clearly defined Nordic profile in the OSCE, because of similarities on security agenda in general there is no need for Nordic states to create their own official community, where they cooperate just fine through their informal alliance. On the other hand a Nordic profile exists in specialized Nordic areas or areas where Norden has issue-specific interests.

The need of legitimation of certain commitments is an important theme to discuss because it can affect how both the public and officials understand and pursue Nordic cooperation and may indicate which objectives are in need of more justification than others. Signing of the Solidarity Declaration in 2011 was one of these objectives. Comments such as “Now it's all for one, one for all in the Nordic Region” (Kristensen, 2011) and “to share an identity with people is to feel solidarity with them” (Hollinger, 2006:23) illustrate the impact and importance of legitimizing certain issues. The Solidarity declaration has also become an important symbol for prioritizing Nordic cooperation in a new decade (see Skrivelse 90, 2012; St.melding 5, 2012). The symbolism and the like-mindedness aspects are the main factors in the processes of legitimation of actions by Nordic countries, while the confidentiality and sensitivity of certain policies make it harder for states to talk openly about these. Nordic states’ transparency score the highest on different rankings, so the latter factors are not seen as particularly problematic for Norden,
but rather a thing to keep in mind when “there is more to it than is officially known” (Interview 1). Cooperation between Nordic member states in the OSCE is far more coordinated and active than one gets the impression of by reading official documents.

5.2 Additional indicators

Two additional indicators were identified during the collection of the empirical data, these were collective responsibility and personal social ability, and both indicators are specifically fitting my research and are not borrowed from any particular theory.

5.2.1 Collective responsibility

“Nordic countries must assume collective responsibility for their own security“ (Stoltenberg, 2009). This type of collective responsibility is of great importance today and was highly visible during the Cold War when a lot of Nordic consultations on security and creation of a Nordic balance took place. NATO had prepositioned material based in Norway in case of war and because of this the Soviet Union expanded security cooperation with Finland. This situation showed the need for Nordic collective responsibility to keep the situation under control as well as promote the stable peace to their geo strategic neighbors.

Collective responsibility is a feeling of being responsible for the Nordic region as a whole as well as for the norms and values it tries to promote. One can see this as a responsibility in relations between the Nordic states and relations towards other neighboring states, as well as the promotion of issue areas important for the region.

In the framework of the OSCE the main Nordic responsibility is about promotion of human rights, democratic norms and environmental protection as the main characteristics of Norden (see St. melding 30, 1998). Since Norden is not in a position to play a greater role in terms of a military and financial collective block
(neither is this a goal for Norden as such), “the humanitarian dimension of the OSCE is the one most important for Nordic countries” (Interview 2) and it is often in this dimension that the LMG goes further than the EU. As the previous EU ambassador to the OSCE Lars-Erik Lundin puts it “Norway is very strong on human rights and said some of the things that I wanted the EU to say” (Interview 1). This shows commitment to certain issues as well as the like-mindedness between Norden and the EU.

A norm entrepreneur is an actor that mobilizes support for particular standards of appropriateness and persuades other states to adopt such new norms (Finnemore&Sikkink, 1998:901). Norden can therefore be identified as a norm entrepreneur in the specific area of human dimension in the framework of the OSCE. Being a norm entrepreneur means having a certain amount of power and good reputation on what a country or a group of countries have the ability to achieve. Nordic standards are considered as a model and an agenda-setter for many OSCE topics (see 4.1 on relations between the OSCE and Norden). The importance of Nordic identity has given the group social power in fields where countries’ diplomatic skills, mutual trust and situational relevance are the most importance factors. In this area Norden has secured its space in the spotlight.

To sum up this sub-section, Nordic states feel great responsibility on two specific matters: a geopolitical matter concerning close neighboring countries to the Nordic area and the responsibility to be a norm entrepreneur – helping other countries pursue human rights and democracy. These two responsibilities can be concluded to be the main priorities for the N5 in collective performance.

5.2.2 Personal social ability

Both interviewees cherish their coordination and working relationship to each other and describe it as excellent (Interview 1 & 2). This made me think that the personal social skills and code of conduct of the Nordic officials dealing with Nordic cooperation must be of highest importance both in the OSCE and elsewhere. In terms of getting things done in the Nordic group “off-set” (outside the official
meeting in the OSCE), personal social skills and abilities were and are key factors for good coordination.

It is important to keep in mind that diplomatic communities in Norden are relatively small and the group of people specializing in the security policy is even smaller. This diplomatic community can be seen as small families, where through regular consultations and informal interactions Nordic representatives get even closer together. People speak some kind of mixed Scandinavian language and can talk with their colleagues as friends on a very informal level (Interview 1).

Great personal ability among Nordic officials in terms of defending their position as norm entrepreneurs will be given here in two examples. During the OSCE Astana Summit in 2010, the EU had at the maximum nearly 46 countries (out of 56 countries in the OSCE in total!) supporting their position. The main issue at Astana was the reaffirmation of all commitments, with two very sensitive commitments to the East. The first was the so-called Moscow mechanism, which is the statement that human rights are not an internal matter for participating states, meaning that other participating states have a legitimate right to look into other countries’ situation; the second was the problem of one-site inspections, which Russians felt was against their military interests. The Norwegian delegation was a frontliner on this reaffirmation issue and was also one of the strongest in their criticism against the Russians on this scenario (Interview 1), where they succeeded in their good force of persuasion. This issue was definitely of a common Nordic importance where personal ability to pursue and negotiate played an important role in the process.

Sometimes Nordic governments would ask all embassies to write a report on a specific phenomenon, to compare results and create common analysis. This type of initiative was taken into practice when writing the Stoltenberg report, where all the embassies and foreign policy stations were instructed to express their ideas on how Nordic cooperation could be further developed in the future. “This is one of the areas Stoltenberg advocated in his report, which I found to be an excellent idea” (Interview 2).
Cooperation on the administrative area saves time and money for Nordic countries, where there is something to be gained from sharing reports and sometimes also sending one’s colleague’s reports instead of writing one’s own. Practically and pragmatically this is an area where much has been and more can be accomplished.

It is difficult to create personal skills or social abilities, but a good starting point is investment in the research and diplomacy as well as employing strong and well-educated officials that understand and promote Nordic values.

5.3 The results of the analysis

When looking deeper into the Nordic cooperation one can identify clear pragmatic characteristics that rule the Nordic states’ behavior. Countries choose to cooperate in a Nordic network when they can gain from it, as for example finding pragmatic solutions for saving work load and achieve stronger positions internationally.

The analysis of separate indicators creates a further typology of what the Nordic cooperation is, how it evolves, what it includes and if it is relevant and fixed enough to be referred to as a common Nordic profile in the OSCE; where any assessment of Nordic profile will depend on how one defines this profile in the first place.

My interpretation of a Nordic profile is a phenomenon built upon a wide range of social factors; these factors do not include economic factors and power relations but are exclusively built upon constructed structures, processes, identities, initiatives and objectives created by the Norden as a group. This was also a choice clearly made in the beginning of this paper, due to different limitations and own preferences. This socially constructed side of the Nordic profile presents only one of many sides connected to the phenomenon, but which I believe is the most interesting one because it builds upon a long tradition of trust, commitment and human interaction which can be difficult to trace officially.
All themes and indicators above fit my case and create a common result or answer to my research question, which went as following:

*Are there any patterns of existence of a common Nordic profile to be identified in the framework of the OSCE and how can socially constructed factors affect the position of this profile embedded in organization’s and countries’ institutions?*

To start off with the first part of this question, on the patterns of a certain Nordic profile, I will conclude that there are many formal and informal clarifications that support this statement. There are both fixed and flexible alliances that surround the Nordic group of states, but these are always seen to have a common position or approach in the OSCE, despite different groupings. The like-mindedness between the EU and the Nordic group wipes out the group affiliations which leads to the statement of “different groups – different profiles” relatively weak and where beside the formality there is no clear distinction between the Nordic states.

The Nordic states are often proactive in their statements and actions and stand out as an influential group on certain issue areas. Norden has common approaches and positions towards the human dimension of international security politics, where they use to combine their diplomatic skills, strategic coalitions and close communication to achieve interests of Nordic importance.

An informal but real Nordic grouping has been created in the OSCE; this group builds upon common Nordic identity and is highly prioritized by Nordic officials, which also see it as best for the group to continue with an informal character, framing international social reality around it.

With this being said I conclude that there are definitely patterns of a Nordic profile in the OSCE but there is no official profile in the organization, the circumstances has made Norden split in international organizations due to its different security solutions, but Nordic countries are not giving up their ambition to hold on to their Nordic roots. As was concluded in the small states theory the actual state of political affairs should be the matter. The degree of institutionalization of the Nordic profile is not high, due to all communications and interactions that take
place on the *informal* level. But the main practices as development of common objectives and common analysis are not to be underestimated.

When looking at different socially constructed factors that are of importance and are affecting the role of a Nordic profile explicitly or implicitly, there are several that stand out in the case of Norden. The role of the Nordic profile can be especially identified during Nordic Presidencies or Chairmanships; other relevant factors are cooperation for a common “good”, expression of a diplomatic dialogue and active interaction, representation with well-organized and well-prepared positions and the symbolic value of Nordic commitments, common conceptualization of security and pioneering in favor of human security.
6 Conclusion

This study turned out to be an explorative project suggesting different socially constructed factors as the creative force behind an informally existing Nordic profile in the OSCE.

Several things that were thought to be a matter of course when starting off writing this paper became the opposite and gained therefore more interest than first thought and intended. The reason for choosing the OSCE as my case was set on a test when I discovered that not only are Nordic countries organized in two different groups (The EU and The like-minded group), neither do Nordic countries (beside Norway, which is the only outspoken state) speak in the OSCE on behalf of themselves or their Nordic interests. The second test was when I learned how the machinery within the OSCE works, where there are no voting rules or sanctions towards other member states, leading to problems such as lack of patterns or behavior to analyze. Lack of these basic factors made me think differently, namely to attack the problem from within rather than from the outside. The most valuable sources were the two interviews conducted with the OSCE officials as well as the written communications on Nordic cooperation from Norway and Sweden. These created my empirical base and therefore made this research possible.

It should be mentioned that there are subjective and objective ways of defining a common profile - subjective logically relates to the way states view themselves, while the objective way relates to how other states or actors within the same framework view this group of states. An interview with a diplomat from a country outside Norden and even the EU would be the perfect addition for this study, putting the emphasis also on the outside environment and how countries outside the Nordic group or countries like-minded with Norden perceive group’s importance and role in the OSCE. Unfortunately, it was quite difficult to get hold of OSCE diplomats or officials from other countries (mostly Russia and Ukraine) and to get
them interested in participating in an interview on security and relations to Norden. I still believe that this kind of information would have enriched my analysis even greater, but for now it can be concluded as the suggestion for future research.

Also a broader conclusion can be drawn upon the findings in this paper, factors affecting Nordic cooperation in the OSCE can also be effective in other international forums; Nordic social power to influence stakeholders in promoting international rule of law, human rights and democratic values is possible because of the relevance and commitments that are placed into the Nordic cooperation by Nordic countries. Relevance of knowledge exchange with commitment to form coalitions in return is a practice that can affect all types of cooperation – transparency and openness between states create mutual trust, as a precondition for possible cooperation. Relating this back to the theoretical level, and specifically to the model of foreign policy, the interests of actors are evolving with the environment surrounding them, where the power and capability of actors will be put to a test to see how they can react and prevent new security threats. The situation in Norden today can be closely related to this abstract theoretical model, where due to changes in society and environment surrounding Norden in the last 15 years it has developed new interests and capabilities to achieve them – through an informal institutionalization of a Nordic profile, building on the identity and social relations, actors have created a common political will expressed through formal and informal alliances.

There are both strengths and weaknesses in using my four chosen theories; where the strength is that all theories identify a specific area of the existence of a common profile among states and represent one or several aspects of the Keukeleire and MacNaughtan foreign policy model (2.1) and can therefore be used for measuring of other regional groupings; the weakness of using four different theories is connected to the collection of analytical indicators that arise from them - by collecting some indicators one have to leave out some. This can be seen as a problem of objective thinking from the author, using theories and indicators that oneself believe fit this case study the best. But since I only use socially constructed indicators the range of choices for the theories is therefore limited, where this
weakness can rather be called for a self-made limitation.

This paper showed a way to study the existence of a common profile in an international organization by using a set of socially constructed factors, where I believe I have succeeded in presenting instruments of interaction in both formality and reality.
7 References

Ashworth, Blake & Gibbs, Barrie (1990): The double-edge of organizational legitimation, Organizational Science, Vol. 1, Issue 2
http://philosophy.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1153/socialconstruction.pdf
Browning, Christopher 2007, Branding Nordicity. Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism, Keele University, Contribution to the Special Issue of Cooperation and Conflict
Burney, Aquil (2008): Inductive & Deductive research method, Department of Computer science, University of Karachi. PPT presentation form May 6th 2008:
http://www.drburney.net/INDUCTIVE%20&%20DEDUCTIVE%20RESEARCH%20APPROACH%202006032008.pdf


Gruber, Thomas (1993): A translation approach to portable ontologies, Knowledge Acquisition, Number 5(2), 199-220


Hanf, Kenneth & Soettendorp, Ben (1998): Adapting to European Integration, Small states and the European Union, Addison Wesley Longman Limited, United Kingdom

Helsinki final act (1975): http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html


65
Korhonen, Kajsa (2011): The state of Nordic affairs, chapter 1 in Norden - making a difference?, The Norden 2020 project report, FIIA

Kristensen, Henrik D. (2011): All for one, one for all, Norden website 2011:


Manners, Ian & Whitman, Richard (2000): The foreign policies of European Union member states, Manchester University press, UK


Neumann Iver B. & Gstöhl Sieglinde (2006): Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?
Chapter 1 in Small States in international relations edited by Ingebritsen et al, University of Washington Press

Neumann, Iver B. (2012): “Nordic identity and its relevance for the Baltic region”, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, Speech at a conference 22-23 March
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dsLJrrBrbZs

NUPI website, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt,
http://www.nupi.no/content/search?SearchText=The+EU’s+Performance+within+NATO

OSCE website 1, http://www.osce.org/secretariat/35775
OSCE website 2, http://www.osce.org/pc/43251


Rieker, Pernille (2003): Europenisation of Nordic security, the EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic states, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo

Solidarity Declaration (2011): The Nordic Declaration on Solidarity, Helsinki

http://www.mfa.is/media/Frettatilkynning/Nordic_report.pdf


The Canadian encyclopaedia website:
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/nordicity


Interviews

Interview 1, Lars-Erik Lundin, the EUs delegation OSCE ambassador, 02.05.2012, Stockholm
Interview 2, Guttorm Vik, Norwegian delegation OSCE ambassador, 04.05.2012, Oslo

Written communications

Norwegian archives


St. melding 30 (1998-1999) approved 17.09.1999 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 30 (1999-2000), approved 22.09.2000 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 56 (2000-2001), approved 31.08.2001 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 50 (2002-2003), approved 26.09.2003 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 5 (2002-2003), approved 04.10.2003 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 48 (2003-2004), approved 24.09.2004 by Norwegian Stortinget
St.melding 43 (2004-2005), approved 02.09.2005 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 26 (2005-2006), approved 29.09.2006 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 41 (2006-2007), approved 28.09.2007 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 36 (2007-2008), approved 26.09.2008 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 23 (2009-2010) approved 24.08.2010 by Norwegian Stortinget

St.melding 6 (2009-2010) approved 02.10.2010 by Norwegian Stortinget


Swedish archives

Skrivelse 147 (1996-1997), approved 01.01.1997 by Swedish Riksdagen

Skrivelse 73 (1997/1998), approved 01.01.1998 by Swedish Riksdagen

Skrivelse 67 (1998-1999), approved 01.01.1999 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (1999-2000), approved 01.01.2000 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2000-2001), approved 14.03.2001 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2001-2002), approved 13.03.2002 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2002-2003), approved 14.03.2003 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2003-2004), approved 17.03.2004 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2004-2005), approved 14.03.2005 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2005-2006), approved 22.03.2006 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2006-2007), approved 22.03.2007 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2007-2008), approved 12.03.2008 by Swedish Riksdagen
Skrivelse 90 (2009-2010), approved 19.03.2010 by Swedish Riksdagen

Skrivelse 90 (2010-2011), approved 27.04.2011 by Swedish Riksdagen
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Forslag/Propositioner-och-skrivelser/Nordiskt-samarbete-2010_GY0390/?text=true
Skrivelse 90 (2011-2012), approved 16.03.2012 by Swedish Riksdagen
Executive summary

This study is an examination of the security cooperation between the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) in the OSCE; as well as examinations of the existence of a Nordic profile in the organization and how different socially constructed factors affect the position of this profile internationally.

The Nordic countries have a long tradition of policy coordination, where formalized cooperation on socio-political and economic aspects go all the way back to the early 50s. Security and foreign affairs cooperation has been an outsider in the regional dynamics, despite close interaction between Nordic officials. After the end of the Cold war Norden went for different political solutions, where Sweden and Finland joined the EU, while Norway and Iceland decided to stay outside. Despite these decisions the countries continued their cooperation and developed new coordination mechanisms to gain the most from the current situation. Evolving a concept of security also change these countries’ perceptions and priorities. And since Nordic countries are so close to each other it is logical to believe that they cooperate together in international forums, also on security measures. My main research objective in this thesis is to find out if there is a common Nordic profile within the biggest regional security organization (OSCE) by looking at patterns of social arrangements and institutionalizations involving Norden. My research question is: “Are there any patterns of the existence of a common Nordic profile to be identified in the framework of the OSCE and how can socially constructed factors affect the position of this profile embedded in the organization’s and member countries’ institutions?”

I decided to carry out this research in a constructivist manner, with the identification of the frame of possible socially constructed factors affecting the existence of a Nordic profile in the OSCE as my starting point. Nordic profiling in a
security organization can be described as a puzzle of a bigger picture – the model of foreign policy in the IR. This model was the basis for what theories to choose that could best serve my case, and my choice fell on four separate theories, which together create a solid base for studying patterns of Nordicity. The first theory is the small state theory and relates to the social organization of a state or group of states. The small state theory is an actor-based theory focusing on shared normative framework. The second theory is the imagined security communities’ theory and represents the status and identity of states that cooperate together. Imagined communities can be identified through examination of informal, non-institutional cooperation and communication patterns between actors. The third theory is the institutional performance theory, which measures effectiveness and relevance of actors’ achievements and goals internally and internationally. The fourth and last theory is the identity activation theory and is identifying what structures and processes are being promoted and if actors favor certain policy areas above others, where legitimation of these policies is a sign that indicates more commitment. To be able to work with these theories in practice I needed to identify themes arising from them as my future indicators. I identified four themes directly from the theories and added two additional themes after collecting my empirical data, resulting in total with six indicators to analyze. The original indicators were: social organization, informal, non-institutional cooperation, systematization of common objectives and legitimation of commitments, and the two additional indicators were: collective responsibility and personal social ability.

My first methodological choice fell on using a single case approach as my study technique, where I chose to study patterns of Nordicity in the OSCE in the period 1995-2012 as my case. My second important choice was the decision on the research objective, where I went for the “building block” study approach, which means that this study can both serve as an independent analysis but also be a component part of a bigger phenomenon. Since I am only studying the socially constructed factors as my indicators for Nordic profile, another building block could study the economic or historical factors as the main indicators for the analysis. The final methodological decision was the matter of the data collection, where I decided to go for a two-folded approach: firstly, a document analysis of
written communications from Norwegian and Swedish governments on the issue of Nordic cooperation in general and in the framework of the OSCE; and secondly conduct informal interviews with two experts on the area of Nordic security cooperation – heads of Norwegian and the EU delegations to the OSCE.

The data collection showed that the Nordic states are divided into two groups, the EU group (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and the Like-minded group (Norway and Iceland) in the framework of the OSCE, meaning that there is no independent Nordic group in the organization. This division has lead to a lot of informal cooperation between states for exchange of notes and creation of common analysis and positions. The situation in the EU group do not allow countries within the group to put forward independent statements in the OSCE, where the EU speaks with one voice and is an extremely central actor in the OSCE negotiations; the situation in the Like-minded group is different, where countries can express themselves independently from the group but are also invited to affiliate with the EU positions, which they do quite often. The Like-minded group is a forum for consultation, which speaks on the matter of principle and is seen to defend typically Nordic values in its statements. Both the EU and the Like-minded group are often supporting the same issues, but despite formal group differentiation the Nordic countries are in practice still informally united.

When analyzing my previously chosen indicators one by one I could discover how a geostrategic region of small states can be seen as a model for others to follow. Commitment to the human dimension of security gives Nordic countries issue-specific power on topics of shared Nordic value, where Nordic countries have weekly informal meetings to organize these common positions. This institutionalization of informal coordination is easier due to a couple of reasons: common language makes communication between states much smoother; a common Nordic identity, as a feeling of a certain “we-ness” and a wish to work together for a common “Nordic good” is a pre-condition for the presence of a Nordic profile. Without common objectives and believes it would be impossible.
When discussing systematization of common objectives in Norden, there is a problem of non-existing common Nordic security institutions or a common Nordic formal grouping in the OSCE that would account for goals achievements in Norden. Therefore the next best thing to do was to identify the Nordic states’ priorities for wanted performance as a group, where I examined Norwegian and Swedish governmental archives on the issue of Nordic cooperation from 1995 and until today. Nordic security has become an important issue in the Nordic Council and has been especially in focus in the last years. This development has something to do with the creation of the Stoltenberg Report from 2009 and later the Declaration on Nordic Solidarity in 2011, which both put emphasize on closer Nordic security cooperation.

Also, in the period when a Nordic country is holding the EU Presidency or the OSCE Chairmanship, other Nordic states expect to be consulted and be more visible on the international arena as a group. Norden feels a certain collective responsibility, both in relation to Nordic neighbors and in terms of promotion of the issues important for the region. In this aspect Norden is seen as a norm entrepreneur mobilizing support for particular standards and using its diplomatic skills and good reputation to persuade other states. These diplomatic skills can be seen as personal social abilities owned by certain Nordic officials, where investment in research and diplomacy in Nordic countries has been the pre-condition for this development.

Conclusions from this thesis suggest that all indicators mentioned above play an important role in the conduction of a Nordic profile in the OSCE, which is under constant change. Social factors do matter in Nordic cooperation, and this study identified a subjective Nordic profile that relates to the way states view themselves and their cooperation and prioritizations. Similar case studies could be carried out by identifying other factors that could lead to other ways of describing and measuring patterns of Nordicity; this study is an explorative project and measures only one side of the Nordic profile – the socially constructed side.