“A Dagger Through the Skull and Nothing to the Wallet“

What causes the sense-of-security within a privately held monopoly of violence?  
- A case-study from the slums of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract

“A dagger through the skull and nothing to the wallet” is a common expression for the situation in the squatter societies of Rio de Janeiro. It is used equally amongst the residents of the slums or “favelas” as they are called, as well as used by the recently implemented pacifying police force that work there. In Rio de Janeiro there are 17 murders committed everyday. The majority of those murders occur in the favelas. Almost four years have passed since the efforts at pacification were initiated, but the implementation’s effectiveness is being disputed.

In this thesis I challenge and discuss the concept of social contract by describing the mechanisms behind the sense-of-security in a former privately held monopoly of violence. I find empirical evidence and theoretical support that the sense-of-security in a “pacified” favela is suppressed by inefficient government capacity.

The empirical material was gathered through qualitative interviews and participatory observation in one of the favelas. The research material is analyzed through Charles Tilly’s theory of state formation. The material is further developed with an in-depth investigation that relies upon Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations and Bo Rothstein’s theory of intrapersonal trust.

Key words: Social contract, Rio de Janeiro, squatter-society, civil-military relations, private monopoly of violence

Words: 9814
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1 Introduction

Before the purpose is stated the first chapter serves as a brief orientation of the general situation before the thesis goes into more depth.

1.1 Rio de Janeiro

The first appearance of squatter societies in Rio de Janeiro occurred after the slave abolition in 1888, which emptied the coffee plantations and caused a migration to the city. The term “favela” has its origin from the first low-income settlement named “Morro da Favela” situated in the city centre, which itself owed its name to a certain plant that spread along its hillsides (UCL, 2003; 3). At the start of the new century the city port was modernized and enlarged in order to keep up with the fast industrialization process. As a consequence it caused a vast urban expansion with a doubling of inhabitants in ten years. It was in the urban planning documents from the 1920’s the favelas were first documented as a phenomenon and their eradication was suggested. During the 1930’s, industry expanded in the suburban areas, which in turn became increasingly overcrowded. After the Second World War the industrialization process experienced a significant increase in growth causing problems for commuters when a vast number of people were forced to commute every day. The underdeveloped public transportation system encouraged a need for cars, which in turn crowded already congested streets. Land prices rose together with the height of the city and forced the spread of favelas into land areas that were seen as uninhabitable e.g. swamps, steep hillsides and polluted areas. In 1948 urban migration reached its peak at 38 per cent and between 1960-1970 Rio’s population increased by nearly 30 per cent (UNSP, 2003; 225-226).

The squatter societies or “favelas” (defined as highly consolidated invasions of public or private land), are self-built without planning and lack infrastructure (UNSP, 2005; 225). The most recent estimations claim a number of +1000 favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro area (Jones & Rodgers, 2011; 991).

The favelas are under control of drug traffickers, whom holds a private monopoly of violence. These drug trafficker domains have a hierarchical structure. At the top-of-the-chain is found the *dono* (owner) who is the authoritarian leader of both the traffickers as well as the residents of the favela (IDCP, 2010; 1). The *dono* is the leader of the gang that controls the favela and holds the responsibility for drug trade, weapons supply and bribes
to residents and police (ibid; 2). The favela residents are subjected to routine of violence and bear the brunt of illicit drug trade and regular gang violence. The murder rate in the state of Rio de Janeiro has been in excess of 40/100.000 and is much higher in certain favelas (Arias & Rodrigues, 2006; 53). The amount of weapons in circulation in Rio de Janeiro alone can only be estimated. In contrast, the number of seized weapons connected to drug trafficking in the city in 2003 was 5714. In the same year Colombia was in a declared armed conflict and seized 6919 in the entire country (IDCP, 2010; 4). This has led the police to regard favela interventions as military operations during war and has caused the civilian casualty rate to climb as high as 30 civilians per every police officer (ibid; 6).

The majority of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas are controlled by three major non-state actors and rivals: Comando Vermelho (CV), Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) and Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) (IDCP; 3).

These horrifying facts led the former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva to take action and deploy a strategy of “pacifying police units” in 2008 (Jones & Rodgers, 2011; 989).

1.2 Morro da Babilônia/Chapéu Mangueira

The favela of Morro da Babelônia/Chapéu Mangueira is situated in the south touristic zone of Rio de Janeiro on the hillside of Leme in the eastern part of Copacabana. The favela’s origin is from the 19th century, originally as a military century post that was built on top of the hill. Soldiers commanding the outpost built the first shanty houses and the neighbourhood first took form in the 1930’s as construction workers needed residence closer to the hotels that where being set up on Copacabana (Valladares, 2006; 16-17). The two names were originally two different favelas, but have now merged into one. The venue and dancehall in the middle of the favela is the most characteristic landmark separating the two.

The favela’s estimated population is 6-10.000 inhabitants and has been under control for decades by the TCP. On the 10th of June 2009 the UPP launched their occupation without firing a shot and today the UPP-force consists of 100 officers (TT; 2012).

1.3 Unidades de Polícia Pacifadora, UPP

The most recent governmental action has been by the principle of safe harbouring through the UPP, Unidades de Polícia Pacífadora-programme; this loosely translates as: Pacifying Police Units. It has drawn massive
international attention because of the upcoming World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016.
The initiative began in 2008 as an attempt to move from short-term interventions to a long-term police presence together with social services. The aim is to provide ‘the consolidation of territorial control and peace in the areas of intervention through the promotion of citizenship and development’ (Jones & Rodgers, 2011; 989). The strategy of the UPP consists of four basic steps: Invasion, Stabilisation, Occupation and Post-occupation.

The first step of invasion is conducted by BOPE1, or the special operations battalion, and is announced in advance by the government leaving the traffickers time to flee or go into hiding. The operation is highly effective, intelligence-based and uses special military forces capabilities.

The second step is stabilisation where BOPE remains and secures the territory from hostile threats until the UPP is ready to take over.

The third phase entails an occupation in which the UPP establishes posts and starts community policing.

The fourth and final step is initiation of socio-economical programmes together with the UPP’s interaction with the residents and the development of trust with the community (IDCP, 2010; 9-11). The UPP’s main objectives are:

- To regain State control of the community currently under the influence of criminal groups;
- To bring peace and public security in the favelas;
- To contribute to efforts to break the “logic of war” in Rio de Janeiro.

(IDCP, 2010; 9)

The close interconnectedness between the UPP and the US COIN (United States of America’s counterinsurgency strategies conducted in Afghanistan) is evidenced by police and military units primary focus on social and civil participation and the locals’ perception of the legitimacy of the state (Jones & Rodgers, 2011; 989). Hence, the challenge for the UPP is to convince the residents of the favela of the value in submitting to state authority by showing the virtues of: legitimate land ownership, access to education and importantly for this thesis: that a greater sense-of-security outweighs civil obedience, taxes and utility fees.

1Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais
Dated back since the beginning of the 80s BOPE was a response to the uprising of criminal violence in the favelas. The battalion is independent from other police or military branch to avoid corruption and categorized under the military police with certain jurisdiction. BOPE has the responsibility for high-risk operations in the poor areas in order to push out armed actors and is renown for it’s insignia and motto Faca na Caveira or “knife through the skull”. It has a reputation as an execution squad removing the dono or criminal leader of the favela in attempt to disrupt drug trade. BOPE is still used as a special police unit, but mostly as riot control and the first unit inside the favela as the UPP moves in. (IDPC, 2010; 4, Jones & Rodgers, 2011; 990)
The UPP initiative is financed through the private sector. This enables further socio-economic growth in the poor neighbourhoods as well as demonstrates that security is closely linked to development. Many of the social programmes are run by the NGO’s. This serves a secondary function as supervision of the UPP. The course of action during the reinstatement of governmental forces has been that a base is established at the heart of the favela, which in most cases has been the former headquarter of the ruling gang’s narco-trafficking. Thereafter, the police engage in daily foot patrols, workshops, youth clubs and school projects for the purpose of redirecting the youth from criminal activity. The grey-zone between police and social engagement has received critique as it could constitute an unrest as residents fear the creation of a quasi-police state, where the police is the only channel in which the residents can express their demands (ISN, 2011).

Secondly, the motives for which favelas the UPP enters has been questioned since the majority of UPP controlled favelas have been governed by the criminal fraction of Comando Vermelho, which is one of the three largest fractions, but still not the main actor in the south (touristic) zone where the UPP has concentrated their efforts. A critical hypothesis is that there are political motives within the government in favour of one fraction that would benefit for the loss of competition. Another is that “pacified favelas” serves as a publicity stunt as the UPP’s main focus has been in the touristic zone before the World Cup and Olympics (ibid).

The effects of the UPP programme have reported a decline of homicide rates in the UPP controlled favelas, although an increase in the surrounding favelas suggests that the fight of narco-trafficking has merely moved elsewhere. Scrutiny of police, in terms of their propensity to act as soldiers in a warzone instead of a regular policeman with the responsibility to protect, was made in the official report of the IDPC, International Drug Policy Consortium, overseeing the drug control in Rio de Janeiro (2010). On the other hand, governmental releases have showed improved living standards for the favela residents, but these reports have been widely criticized as far simpler than observations made “on the ground” (ISN, 2011). The IDCP report instead suggests in its analyse of conducted interviews that the transition of traffickers from one favela to the next or going into hiding causes a fear of retaliation among the residents of what would happened if the UPP occupation ceases (IDCP, 2010; 9). However, as the US COIN demonstrates, the expected effect is not immediate change. Instead, the UPP intervention is rather a long process of inclusion and not a ruling exclusion from Brazilian citizens (ibid).
Purpose

The purpose of this study is to cast a light over the mechanisms that underlay the sense-of-security within a privately held monopoly of violence. The case revolves around a former gang-controlled squatter society named Morro da Babilônia. The close relationship between security and development studies often referred to as the security-development nexus makes the study principally interesting. Additionally, the intra-state conflicts in the world are expanding in numbers and evolving into shapes the world has not seen before.

By conducting a qualitative case study my ambition is to empirically isolate certain empirical data from interviews, which help to explain the cause of the favela residents sense-of-security. The interviews were formed and interpreted by using the explanatory benefits of the human security theory. Further in-depth understanding is to be withheld by turning to civil-military relations theory, CMR. CMR theorists have stipulated that being considered professional by the civil society apprehends the legitimacy of an ideal military (Huntington, 1985). Furthermore this perception could be achieved through a close relationship with the civil society (Janowitz, 1964). In order to understand this relation of interpersonal trust I turn to Bo Rothstein (2000) and Julian B. Rotter (1971).

The recent developments in Rio de Janeiro with police intervention and re-seizure of land are currently under evaluation as to their effectiveness. To conduct a case study during this process is beneficial in two ways. I had a group of respondents that have lived both under a private monopoly of violence and are currently adapting to a state controlled civil society. Secondly, the reference point of the individual, between the UPP and the criminal power holders, makes the identification of the specific mechanisms that are most important easier both for me as a researcher as well as for my respondents.

Since the intervention, the UPP has transformed the institutional aspects of security providers in the area of interest profoundly. Secondly the process of in cooperation to regular civil society affects the security. In order to derive what affects this has meant for the residents of the favela I turn towards Charles Tilly’s theories of state formation. Lastly, since the new institutions are dependent on trust I make further use of Rothstein.

The research is focused solely on the independent variables of what is causing the dependent variable, that is the perceived sense-of-security, created by the privately held monopoly of violence. This is done in an effort to answer the question:
What causes the sense-of-security within a privately held monopoly of violence?

The study has high relevance within the discipline of political science as well as a broad scientific application by challenging the state monopoly of violence. In addition, this thesis contributes to studies made within the disciplines of peace & conflict, sociology and anthropology. Furthermore, the research embodies a puzzle that is yet relatively poorly examined from a political science point of view. The squatter societies in Rio de Janeiro possibly embody one of the most typical cases of privately held monopolies of violence in lower income squatter societies or slums. By conducting this case-study at a fairly low level of abstraction it could generate cumulative research with a higher grade of application possibilities.
2 Theoretical approach

During this chapter I first present the more abstract aspect of my theoretical framework. This embodies the main ideas and creates the foundation on which my operational theories will be derived. Thereafter I will proceed with my first main block of operational theory, namely Civil-Military Relations. Following the presentation of my operational theories I will also present my analytic scheme used for interpretation of the empirical material. To summarize I will discuss the basic critique of my choice in theory.

2.1 Social Contract, Trust and Security

In order to confront my main research question, I must first turn to political philosophy. The realist explanation of the abandonment process of the state of nature and entry of the social contract tackles the relationship between individuals and state. The theory dates back to the 17th century with scholars such as Thomas Hobbes, and are, according to many scholars, synonymous with international relations (Hough, 2008; 2-3). The rationalist’s conceptions of security as a matter of international military-security has undergone a journey were the pluralists have highlighted other matters, e.g. environmental threats, as a security issue (ibid; 3-4). From the rational individualist's point-of-view, the favela residents are in a state of nature were the social contract with the state has been damaged and they now constitute a criminal threat towards the state. In order to investigate this matter further than simply describing the favela residents as a group of criminals, I must call upon the rationalist thought. The rudimentary individualism presented by Hobbes in Leviathan (1961) is not applicable directly as it once was; hence the security concept needs to be deconstructed while maintaining the individualist perception. Furthermore, the stated problem addresses a state where the favela residents are interlocked between the state and their local community. Security as a concept therefor needs to be broadened and deepened in its definition to be able to explain the chosen intrastate phenomena.

Hobbes’ famous theory of social contract has been criticised, developed and interpreted by many scholars. There is a notion that the social contract could be broken when the residents’ security is challenged or undelivered by their own government. Hough argues that even rationalist governments may come to accept the emergence of new versions of the social contract, thus it is necessary to identify the best interest of a certain group of citizens (Hough,
2008; 259). Contemplating the ideas of Hobbes & Hughes I wonder what would happen to the citizen if the social contract were broken. For the individual citizen or resident this would imply that a substitute is needed to prevent anarchy.

Continuing in the individualist perspective, I turn towards human security theory, where the traditional scope is broadened from the single actor of a sovereign state to involve IGOs, NGOs and local communities. The theory claims that security as a concept has an origin that embodies more than just military security between states. Exploring this field even further it is vital that it is the individual who is affected by insecurity. In our context of a favela: the break of the social contract with the government.

The Human Development Report issued by the UNDP from 1994 stated the interpretation of human security as: “…the freedom from fear and the freedom from want…” (UNDP, 1994; 24). The narrow definition was later formulated simply as the freedom of fear (ibid). In the application of this narrow definition, which inhibits a broad empirical perspective, I am able to extract where the fear originates and what it consists of. Many scholars such as Charles Tilly (who shall be introduced more thoroughly further down) primarily place the concept of fear and security together with violence.

Since the beginning of the 20th century the trend has turned from inter-state acts of violence towards internal struggles with non-state actors (Jones & Rodgers, 2003, 985). The individual approach of human security subjects the more broad, value-based sense-of-fear and is not directly applicable on the analysis without complimentary theories. Instead it is beneficial to during the interviews of this study in order to extrapolate the mechanism behind the sense-of-security.

The application of this theoretical approach onto the favela communities imply that the favela residents as a group experience a common threat that also introduces a shared fear.

So far I have presented a broad theoretical point of entry were the social contract might have been broken and the choice is between a non-state actor and the government. The choice depends on who provides the residents a freedom of fear. The next step is to discuss what the fear consists of and how the favela residents might deal with the issue of sense-of-security.

The matter of choosing to (before the UPP entry) partake in an illegal system might be caused by a greater sense-of-trust towards the privately held monopoly of violence or a lacking of trust towards the official judiciary system (Arias & Rodrigues, 2006). Given the significance of trust in general and interpersonal trust in particular, it is important to clarify the concept fully. First, to define trust in a broader sense with Rotter’s words: “…an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon…” (Rotter, 1971; 444). The broad definition, which easily could be put into a political election context, has also been proven effective in examining more specific political or political trust issues similar of this study.
Moving closer to the main realist idea of social contract I turn to Bo Rothstein who discuss the social dilemma in rational choice theory and interpersonal trust towards institutions (Rothstein, 2000: 1). According to Rothstein the rationalistic way of benefit-cost calculation is true to some extent though it is also highly connected to the norms of the society (ibid; 485-486). Furthermore, societies are more or less dubious culturally towards institutions where Rothstein suggests that a society with low sense-of-trust culturally would apply the rational calculation model in a wider sense (ibid; 486).

The problems inherent with the construction of a model out of this theory are first, the question of if the favela residents are fully informed in their decision and secondly if the norms can be standardized. However, complete information about the UPP and the TCP (ruling gang) might not be possible. Instead, the information comes to the residents through vocal communication and the endogenously generated information of the past actions (Rothstein, 2000; 487). The last mentioned history or experience of other actors’ behaviour in-cooperates corruption, discrimination, professionalism and the expectancy of agent in keeping his/her word (ibid; 488).

In a social dilemma with a lack of trust, the relationship and information are apprehended by the means of communication. Information is affecting the actor and communication is the bridging key (Rothstein, 2000; 488, 495). To conclude Rothstein’s theory in the case of the favela I graphically show the trail of thought below.

2.2 Civil- Military Relations

The next step of my operational theory will be to see how the interpersonal trust and generated norms are constructed. My point of departure for this will be the school of civil-military relation, CMR. CMR theory is almost exclusively out of the realists’ point of view and in the context of liberal democracy. Since this thesis is challenging the realist ground of the state’s monopoly of violence, the exclusion of realist-derived theories would be inappropriate. However, my intent to study the favela residents’ of sense-of-security does not coincide with the realist theories since the civil society is considered as a solid group. The concept of objective civilian control coined by Samuel P. Huntington, who presented the theory, as
the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority. The key to objective civilian control is military professionalism, which leads to voluntary subordination. Without the view of professionalism it will become the anti-thesis of **subjective civilian control** (Feaver, 1996; 160, Huntington, 1985; 83). Applying the CMR perspective in my study creates a necessity of prerequisites:

- The local powerbrokers, TCP, and the UPP are to be considered as two military branches.
- The official structure is merely a **subjective civilian control**, which is subordinated the privately held monopoly of violence of the TCP.

For this case study I wish to focus on the concept of the professional soldier, which is a perception-based construct of trust since the notion of professionalism is normative. Huntington’s more open interpretation is closely linked to Thomas Hobbes’s thoughts about the military’s role as to protect the society from emerging threats. Applying the theory of Huntington is possible in arguing that the non-state actors within the favela are implementing or have built interpersonal trust by signalling professionalism as security providers.

Other CMR theorists like Morris Janowitz have adapted the importance of value-based professionalism, but in a less radical way than Huntington. Janowitz introduced and also stressed the importance of interconnectedness between the civil society and the military. By providing a sense of civic participation the military is more likely to achieve a notion of professionalism (Feaver, 1996; 165).

By applying these CMR theorists’ work it could more easily increase the understanding of how trust is implemented by the privately held monopoly of violence and why it might be lacking towards the official judiciary system.

### 2.3 Charles Tilly, Violence & Non-state Actors

Tilly’s understanding of the process of state formation shows that long periods of violence have often turned into cycles (Jones & Rodgers, 2003; 985). The resolution might take decades to achieve through a series of complex processes of social and political mediation, which fluctuates over time (ibid; 984). The emerge of Western Europe is a great example and had a violent period with 30-years of war and internal unrest during which numerous treaties were written, civil war was waged and revolutions took place, before the nations were consolidated and the dust had settled. For this case study I take state-making into respect in its narrow sense, that is the elimination or outmanoeuvre of local rivals who control a territory in the state (Tilly, 1985; 182).

On the topic of violence, Tilly emphasizes the importance of identifying which actor the violence serves and how it works (Jones & Rodgers, 2003;
Tilly adapts a limited definition of violence, differentiating through the context e.g. separating a brawl from a riot where the latter is a sign of underlying conditions and processes. In this way, adapting Tilly’s perception of violence, I make no difference between “legitimate” or “illegitimate” force since in its narrow sense subjecting damage to people and objects and in its broader a violation of people’s desires and interests (Tilly, 1985; 171). This serves as a beneficial approach for this study as the abstraction between violence in the matter of sense-of-security is irrelevant.

Staying on the subject of whom the force serves Tilly is suggesting that the government is choosing the side of the beneficiaries of intrastate inequalities as:

- Themselves as a ruling class are one of the beneficiaries.
- The beneficiaries have the best capabilities in organizing and influencing the government.
- Thirdly the flow of governmental resources would be disrupted if the inequality would be altered (Tilly, 2003; 10-11).

In terms of the favela this would imply that force is used for the sake of ordinary citizens and not the favela residents.

The authors of the World Development Report (WDR) (Jones & Rodgers, 2003) argue for the importance of a committed national leader who sets clear priorities in the enhancement of the integrity of people’s identification with the nation-state via a vision and purpose. In Brazil’s case, the former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and the sitting president Dilma Rousseff have done just that. On the other hand, the construction of national identity from strong leaders has a historically strong connection with violence and often tends to inhibit exclusion of specific minority groups (Jones & Rodgers, 2003; 986). The dynamics in- and between the fractions of identities varies in regions, economic and social development as well as the government capacities and allocates the power geometries (ibid).

As the level of democracy alters, the rate of violence might be a response of power brokers threatened by government or new actors entering an opening field. Nevertheless, the relationship is linear (Jones & Rodgers, 2003; 986). The process of democratization is dampening violence in the long term, but Tilly notes an interesting point where collective violence constituted by “non-state-actors” (guerrilla, gangs or militia groups) and the government initially is increased and then fluctuates over time (Tilly, 2003; 7). The end result is not guaranteed, but the government’s capacity and the level of implemented democracy determines it (Jones & Rodgers, 2003; 986).

This section connects the operational theory’s different aspects since Tilly is emphasizing how the violence is erupted; that it theoretically is most important for a minority group as the favela residents and thirdly that it is dependent on government capacity and democratization.
2.4 Analytic Scheme

The figure below is graphically describing my analytical scheme. In short: The social contract is broken since the favela residents have been living without citizenship and under criminal control without governmental interference. This creates an individual aspiration for a freedom of fear, which according to Tilly is a freedom of violence for a minority group subjected to such. The interpersonal trust and norms of that community are generated through communication and history, which determines where their trust will lay. The perceived professionalism of the military is determined by the closeness and information sharing between the military and civilians, as well as trust and historical norms. Government capacity and the democratization process determine how well this is performed and the level of uncertainty of the residents. Follow the arrows in one direction to conclude that if these prerogatives are met the social contract is broken. An important note is that the interconnectedness between the different arrows makes it possible to go either direction. For an example: a lack of capacity weakens the professionalism of the soldier that undermines trust and fuels the fear of the residents.

2.5 Theoretical Critique

The theoretical framework presented above represents the approach of post-structuralism and contains both beneficiary values as well as difficulties. The framework holds a greater depth of understanding security both in a
temporal and spatial sense. This approach is questioning what security actually is, what is being secured and who is responsible for the securitization?

Scholars have lifted critique towards the human security theory because of its departure from the individual- and not the state’s point-of-view. In practise human security theorist often addresses the state as the problem and not the solution. The narrow definition stated has also been criticised for being largely inconsistent with the normative concerns (Peoples et al, 2010; 127). The freedom from fear might be vague, but on the other hand, the favela dwellers are as a marginalized group of people experiencing a perceived threat from the government (Arias & Rodrigues, 2006). To be able to shelter from this fear the group has formed a privately held monopoly of violence when inclusion of the society was no longer considered an option.

The rational CMR theory might be considered an inappropriate use of this study’s post-structural theory. First because the civil-society is considered as a whole and second, because that the military by definition only can be state controlled. However, this would imply that the theory could be used in explaining the lack of trust towards the state’s military. Furthermore if the conception of professionalism is value-based this further implies that every individual or group might differ in his or her opinion, which strengthens the importance of conducting a descriptive case study. If a group considers that they are not a part of society and have their own military, it should be possible that the group also have an idea of the professionalism of that military.
3 Method

In this section I present the structure and methodological approach of this study by defining; case selection and method of empirical material collection through qualitative interviews and participatory observation.

3.1 Case-study Selection

Prior to this study I had made my own prerequisites in the selection of the specific case of private monopoly of violence. Looking over the different types of squatter societies with a private monopoly of violence e.g. in India, South Africa and Mexico it is immediately apparent the difficulty involved in identifying a homogenous structure within the same country or even city. By choosing to conduct a case study it is therefore intended to provide a foundation for most different design comparisons out of Harry Ecksteins definition (Esaiasson et al, 2007; 183). When the outcome or dependent variable varies immensely even within a small geographic area the interest is instead focused on what independent variables can be universal. With this conclusion one might find that one private monopoly of violence is as good as any other for a case-study. Nevertheless there is reason to believe that the phenomena in the Brazilian favelas are somewhat representative as a typical case because of their long-term existence and establishment as autonomous intrastate societies. Since I have prior personal experience of the life in a favela the choice of the specific favela, Morro da Babilônia, was made out of practicality in being able to conduct the study in a familiar setting.

3.2 Qualitative Interviews

The selection of respondents was made by the principle of “journalistic-selection” (Teorell & Svensson, 2007; 86). The advantage of this strategy was the forth coming of finding respondents that would match my preference of maximal variation in terms of sex and age. The respondents had to be persons that I had no personal relation toward and no subjective experts. I chose to conduct 5 interviews of two women and 3 men between the ages of 20-61 and the interviews length varied between 90 minutes to a little more than 2 hours. The subjective experts might be individuals who have personal relationship towards the power holders within the favela or towards the
government and fall under the tendency criterion (Teorell & Svensson, 2007; 106). This characteristic was hard to fulfil since it was in the person's interest not to mention their connections before the interview was conducted. The tendency criterion was dealt with during the informal initiation and courtesy part of the interviews where I tried to learn if such tendencies or ties could be determined and thereby used as a cut-off-point. This aim was difficult to fulfil since it was in the respondents’ interest to conceal this information from me as a scholar. My original aim was to conduct 6 interviews, but one was left out since I learned one of the female’s brothers was a member of TCP. The interference in my empirical material I consider to be fairly low since the aim was to apprehend the affections and perspective of the individual.

The scientific ethics were naturally carefully supervised especially in the matter of the confidentiality criteria, as the subjects of the survey were needed to be able to answer the questions truthfully thus providing valid data (Teorell & Svensson, 2007; 21). Furthermore, the tendency criterion was important in the choice of the journalistic-selection strategy, which without such a strategy, one could be led into finding a group that shares a common perception that differs from the majority e.g. families, associates and friends.

I made the choice to conduct qualitative conversation-based interviews. This decisions was based on the fact that I was examining a rather unexplored field and that I was focusing on the perceptions and affection of the favela inhabitants e.g. source of trust within the community, marginalization and the main topic being sense-of-security. The focus during the interviews was to make the respondent comfortable enough to explain to me how he/she personally and as a part of the favela experienced the society they lived in and their perceptions from everyday life. By semi-directing, meaning the respondent was mainly the one deciding the topics of the discussion, the interviews fulfils the purpose of bridging the information gaps from previous studies (that are mainly sociological or anthropological). In practice I would use open-ended questions were the respondents could freely express themselves. The secondary purpose of this strategy was that it allowed other independent variables to be revealed, which I had not anticipated (Esaiasson et al, 2007; 296-303).

Examples of questions:

- What are your fears concerning securing your household’s: economy, food, and health, environmental, personal, community and political security?
- Do you consider living outside the favela as a better or worse opportunity?
- Is it in- or outside the favela you are feeling the most afraid of crimes? – Why?
- In your opinion: Are the police and military (officials) protecting you and your family’s interest?
• In your opinion: Are the TCP in the favela protecting you and your family's interest?
• How was this trust/non-trust created?
• Can/Has it changed? – How?
• In your own words: What kind of unity/cohesion/relationship do the inhabitants of your favela have?

Two of the interviews were recorded (after given consent) and I completed my transcription together with the help of notes taken during the interview. The purpose for the capture of the whole conversation and to be able to focus on capturing the whole questionnaire was weighed against the loss of non-verbal communication. The notes were made in contracted manner where I made summary of what has being said (if the sentence was too long), without loosing the core of the statement (Esaiasson et al, 2007; 305). As the tone of voice as well as body language plays an important role during qualitative interviews I would add a + in the margin and additional notes that was of significance.

In order to reach reliable results the respondent and I sat in a closed room between four eyes and without distraction. I started off the interview with common questions of the everyday life, family and friends. It was also during this part of the interview that I was tried to determent if there were any the ties that could make the respondent tendentious e.g family ties to TCP or UPP.

The Brazilian Portuguese spoken in the favelas is heavily built on local expressions or slang, which differs immensely from European Portuguese or even to some extent Brazilian Portuguese. I speak and understand Portuguese through my knowledge of Spanish, which enabled me to conduct the interviews in portuñol, which is a mix of Spanish and Portuguese. In cases where expressions were unfamiliar to me I simply asked for further explanation. The linguistic barrier was not a problem.

The structure of the interview varied depending on the respondent’s own reasoning and the conversation’s progression. By using this highly free technique with open-ended questions during the interviews I was able to keep the conversation mostly one-sided, as I wanted the respondents to speak freely.

The statements chosen in chapter 4 are the ones representable to my material.

3.3 Participatory Observation

I was living with a friend in the Babilônian side of the favela across the road from the former TCP headquarters (today it is replaced by a kiosk). The purpose was to use direct observation as a complement to the interviews that form the core of my empirical material. Since I was living in the middle of the favela and also had friends living there I came in contact with many of the
subjects that was brought up during the interviews. The verbal aspect during the interviews was complimented through this method by observing the “naturalistic” behaviour of the residents in their home environment (Esaiasson et al, 2007; 344). Furthermore, the respondents might have left certain behaviour out of the interviews unintentionally just because it was obvious to them. Second, since the situation currently was fragile making their statements delicate I saw if they contradicted their statements with their actions. Thirdly the sense-of-security as an affection might have been hard to describe for the respondent or difficult to transfer to me in an accurate way. Therefore were the direct observations a valuable compliment for the empiric material in my thesis.

The character of my observation strategy was somewhat complex in classification since I had actively become a part of the community for a brief period of time with participation in celebrations and family gatherings, but the collection of observations was made passively. I did not express that I was taking notes on patterns and behaviours of my friends and neighbours, which would be covert observations. At the same time, the same people knew I was writing a thesis on the life of the favela residents. What I did not engage in was manipulation and environment construction (Esaiasson et al, 2007; 346-7).

The tool of my observation gathering was my notebook in which I took detailed descriptions of what behaviours could be connected or contradictory to the statements of the respondents. Since the last interview was conducted 4 days prior to my departure this collection method evolved during my time in the field. The material being qualitative meant that I had the ambition to capture the patterns of ordinary citizens and their interactions with others. For the sake of validity I would have preferred to have a co-observer with me, but during this study it was not possible. This was the main reason why I chose to only use my participatory observations as a complement to the interviews and only collect material connected to what was stated during the interviews.

3.4 Methodological Critique

Regarding my methodological choices to use interviews, I had to take the chance in unintentionally augmenting the product. The fact that I am a white, young male makes it plausible that my presence augmented the respondent’s statements (Esaiasson et al, 2007; 265-267).

However, it is my personal belief that this did not have any great affect on the respondents. This is partly explained by the amount of tourists living in the favela. Personally, the main challenge for me as a researcher was showing encouragement to keep on talking without giving consent of the statements made. This was new to me as not showing any affects easily could make the respondent uneasy.
The second method of choice, participatory observation often raises critiques as to its validity. On the contrary, of most observational data I do not think the main issue is being too distant to the material (Esaiasson et al, 2007; 347). The fact that I was using the method of theoretically organized data I might instead have been influenced by seeing patterns that could lead to a theoretical conclusion even though I was unaware of this fact.
4 Results

The following chapter will be divided in a theoretically thematic order for the purpose of being able to follow the analytic scheme through the empiric chapter and the analysis thereafter. The respondents preferred to be anonymous and therefore I have named the male respondents M1, M2 and M3 and the female respondents accordingly are named F1 and F2. Further profiling including the respondents age is under chapter 7.1. No emphasis is intended in the order of appearance of the respondents.

4.1 Freedom of Fear

M1 expressed that after the implementation of the UPP in 2009 his sense-of-security (I use fear of violence and security as expressions) has been affected negatively. The presence of the police has brought some improvements in infrastructure and the immediate, visible narcotics trade and the number of visible guns has declined. However the UPP presence has also dissolved the indirect control of violence which the traffickers provided opening the field for an increased threat of smaller crimes. According to the respondent it has limited his mobility in the favela and he claims that the number of assaults, rapes and murders has increased. As an example he mentions the favela parties aka “Baile Funke’s” where prior to the intervention was mostly peaceful but now has turned grim with further more brawls and the new appearance of stabbings. According to the respondents the Baile Funke’s that are permitted (My addition: The majority of these parties are now forbidden in the UPP controlled favelas) are heavily guarded by the police to ensure no guns are brought to the party. As a consequence, people bring concealed weapons such as knives or sharp objects, which easily can be used and thrown away making it impossible for the police to identify the assailant.

F1 expressed feeling more afraid walking in the favela during the dark hours after the UPP intervention. She mentions the taxis as a source of insecurity caused by the traffickers’ that uses taxi drivers, especially motorbike-couriers, in the distribution and transport of drugs. Some of the couriers are, according to the respondent, heavy users of the illicit drugs to stay awake while working night shift. The everyday situation has consequentially turned more anarchic than earlier. The traffickers have the same influence through illicit drug trafficking but just not in the open as before.
The interview with the elderly M2 started off with a narrative of the favelas development from "regular" low-income residence during the 60’s-70’s to the gradually gang controlled rule after the introduction of narcotic trafficking during the 80’s and especially the 90’s. The respondent expressed his positive view of the UPP intervention from the governmental side. He felt that the transcending development with the introduction of TCP-control as a personally experienced decline in sense-of-security with an increase of violence. He felt satisfied that an intervention was made since he remembers the days before “the guns and drugs flooded the streets”.

4.2 Trust & Norms

F1 underlined her sense-of-insecurity by mentioning a female friend being assaulted in a taxi returning from a party going up the hill and that it would not be possible if the TCP was in control. She was already agitated when I asked for further explanation. In her opinion, the weakening control of the street violence originates from the disappearance of the fear of reprisals from the controlling gang, TCP. The UPP’s control was described as control over the few corners where the police are stationed and the known routes that was patrolled in the favela. Since the routes and positioning of police officers is commonly known the violence just moves elsewhere. Places without the police’s presence are therefore more dangerous. In comparison to the gang-controlled period of the favela the respondent says she feels less safe now. During the gang-controlled era the gang would reattribute a crime since they knew everyone walking in and out of the favela and also where they were at the time of the crime. This “overseeing” eye would induce a fear of committing a crime, which would be discovered and also have severe consequences. On the other hand, the respondent also expressed that the presence of firearms had declined from the streets but that she did know that many people still had them in hiding. When I questioned if the over-watching gang members really punished every crime committed or if the gang-members themselves were immune to reprisals her answer was that: “If a gang-member would oppose the dono’s orders and commit a crime without his consent the gang-members were punished worse than if it was an ordinary citizen”. She frequently used the word “respect” during the interview describing why the situation has turned worse. She reasoned that it was caused by lack of respect towards the UPP by criminals as well as the UPP’s lack of respect towards the residents.

This statement of F1 is called by Arias & Rodrigues has been coined as “the myth of personal security” and has been used in UNDP, WDR, INS (Arias & Rodrigues, 2006).

M3 who recently moved from Babilônia started off with a comparison and observations from the respondent concerning the differences between the two favelas. In the respondent’s own words, the inhabitants in Vidigal were more easy-going and did not think much about the traffickers and more
about their neighbours. While in Babilônia, the small size invited even the poorest, whom even without informal power, aspire the throne of becoming the “donó”. My observations during the interview with M3 were that he showed a reluctance to speak about the pacifying police force and declared on me asking not speaking directly to them either. M3 showed more ease in speaking about the two rivalling gangs controlling the different favelas, the ADA of the Vidigal and TCP in Babilônia. The only difference in attitude mentioned from the respondent between the ADA and TCP was that according to the respondent the ADA had less visible influence over Vidigal.

I asked M2 who was positive towards the UPP intervention and if he talked with the police in the favela often. He answered firstly that he didn't talk to the UPP-officers everyday as he did not talk to every favela resident everyday. He added rapidly that he only knew one of the officers and then changed his mind saying that he probably talked with the police at least once a day. My observation during the interview was that this short period on the topic of the UPP officers working in the favela made the respondent feel a little bit uneasy for the first time. He expressed that he had to leave shortly thereafter.

My own observations regarding the norms in the favela was that after just been living for one week in the favela I already got included in the polite greetings walking up and down the hill from residents in the passing. As after the first two interviews had been conducted I noted that the residents seldom or never said “Hi!” to the officers standing at their posts, which was two on the way down from the house I lived in. I started to pay attention to this fact every time I passed by and during my stay I only saw residents speaking to the police or vice-versa two times. I walked up and down the hill to my residence at least 3 times a day and I could recognise the policemen and women standing at which post.

4.3 Professionalism

M1 stated one example of corrupt policemen who themselves provided drugs during the Baile Funke parties and did not interfere if there was a friend of theirs who was involved in illegal activities. His second example mentioned was that of the police officers who during one Baile Funke parties was smoking marijuana and drinking with the traffickers. The respondent knew one of the policemen as a resident of Rocinha (My addition: a larger close-by favela) and childhood friends with at least one of the traffickers. During the same night the traffickers could sell drugs and interfere and engage in a street brawl without the policemen moving from their posts.

Concerning the UPP M3 told me a story of when his friend broke his arm and received a big gash in his forehead falling down one of the many winding steps through the favela. He had to carry his friend to the nearest UPP post to see if the policemen could give him a ride to the hospital. This was (My addition: no health insurance) the only way to help his friends because of the amount of blood and also the fact that a public ambulance probably would take too long time if it would ever venture into the favela. The policeman
agreed and all three left Babilônia. The respondent tried to keep the injured friend awake since it was something he heard was imperative. The policeman asked while leaving the favela into the Copacabana strip, (Avenida Atlântica) where the hospital was situated. The respondent got aggravated and yelled back at the officer that he ought to know and that he was busy. The officer responded and they both got into a fuss, which culminated in the officer saying that he was the one doing the respondent a favour and the next time he saw him in Babilônia he would beat him to death and that he would remember his face. The equipage arrived after almost an hour to the hospital and his friend survived. But the threat of the policemen forced the respondent to choose alternative routes to and from work to avoid the UPP positioning where he knew the policeman used to work. M3 added at the end of the interview that this was also one of the contributing reasons why the respondent’s family later moved to Vidigal.

My observations during the 17 days I stayed there was that the police cars patrolling up and down the streets during night hours had their assault rifle’s barrels sticking out of the rolled down window making them swipe the pedestrians walking in the curb next to the road. I never had the chance to photograph it and decided not to make an attempt.

4.4 Government Capacity & Democracy

F1 started the interview in a positive manner listing new improvements of infrastructure and public buildings in the favela. The conversation then converged to the slow improvements and the inefficiency within the UPP in terms of the security.

M2 who was strongly positive about the UPP expressed his concern that the UPP force being understaffed. The timeframe of expansion and manning of the UPP force caused him disbelief about the prospects of the intervention’s success. M2’s feeling was that if the timeframe would be kept with new UPP interventions the number of policemen would be stretched thin. He continued that the work that had been done with integrating into the community with efforts during parties, activities for children and interacting with the residents have not been as successful as it could have been because of lacking staff. He continued by explaining the problems he saw in the Brazilian judiciary system. According to the respondent: if the highest in command of the traffickers would get sentenced he would not serve longer than the bodyguards protecting him. He also stated that corruption is making it possible for criminal leaders to operate as usual even from the prison. The respondent closes with his positive outlook on the future, that after five years (My addition: naming the Olympics which is in four years) the situation in the favela will have become better with further financing and staff.

When I asked M3 to elaborate the statement of Babilônia being more uncertain because of the opportunists who wanted to gain more power he was reluctant in his answer saying that “the dogs where feeding”. He continued by adding that the closeness between residents and traffickers in hiding made it more difficult to openly punish those who oppose the *dono*
and that the money pouring in was an inducement for many residents. As I asked the question if there was anything he found improving after the UPP intervention he laughed and said that it was less holes in the road.
5 Analysis

The empirical material of this study supports the hard evidence found in the official reports stating that the majority of favela victims are civilian. In the context of freedom of fear Tilly might suggest that the introduction of democracy and governmental institutions to the favela would “open the playfield” for new actors and in that void also affect the residents sense-of-security.

The respondents described a low sense-of-security and interpersonal trust towards governmental institutions in and outside the favela. Out of Charles Tilly’s idea of state forming and the hypothesis that the favela residents are an excluded minority from the society, the non-governmental inequality would affect the collective violence deeply. Tilly’s thesis of state formation suggests that collective violence is a cyclic process, which could serve as an explanation of the incoherence of reports of violence where governmental, and NGO reports are stating a decrease of violence and the respondents and local news reports an increase of violence. According to Tilly’s ideas it is mainly the effect of the turmoil caused by an increase of democracy and a shift of power brokers. Taking into account that the analysis of state forming is intended to be at a national level, but has also been used beneficially for an intra-state phenomenon. The governmental intervention is new to the favela residents in terms of the endeavours of inclusion.

The direct observations regarding the avoidance of contact with the UPP-officers in Babilônia is by my interpretation strange since the UPP had been present for 3 years and that the small number of UPP officers would imply a closer relationship to the favela residents. According to Tilly’s reasoning this could be connected to the introduction of democracy, which has lead to an insecurity of whom is really in power or the capacity of the UPP. I received an example of the former matter from M3 who referred to many small time criminals wanting to take over. The IDCP’s, UNDP’s and the WDR’s assessments that there is a ruling fear of retaliation attributed by the gang as well as an insecurity with cooperation between the favela residents and the UPP also emphasizes this pattern.

By narrowing down the analysis with the help of Huntington, the younger respondents perceived decline in sense-of-security that would be caused by the perceived objective control managed by the TCP. The respondents have described the rule of law during TCP control as an all-seeing eye where the fear of punishment ruled over direct punishment. As the key to success according to Huntington is value-based military professionalism, the mechanism causing this norm would be according to Janowitz the interconnectedness of the TCP militia and the civil society of the
favela. The civic participation in monitoring and information sharing with the militia would have integrated the military as a part of the favela as well as an implementation of professionalism. The professionalism is enforcing the residents socially built interpersonal trust towards the private monopoly of violence’s effectiveness in providing security, hence this drives an enhanced sense-of-security. The statement of M2 who had experienced the time prior to TCP could be explained through his personal experience of increased violence introduced by the TCP.

On the other hand, there is the UPP, which has yet not being able to integrate with the society. Hampered by the fear of the residents in addition to lack of capacity, a historically derived norm of being aggressor instead of protector and the cases of violation and corruption undermining the residents‘ trust further. However, since the statements made by M2 overall show a positive approach towards the UPP, it is plausible that there are other residents who share an improved freedom of fear and thereby a greater sense-of-security.

As the UPP intervention was initiated, keep in mind that it was done without a single-shot fired, the existing norm of the residents was that the TCP was the favelas security provider. In addition, the history of police interventions in the favela prior to the UPP has solely been connected to violence. As previous studies has shown by e.g. Arias & Rodrigues this has been used as a leverage by the traffickers in order to strengthen their position as a security provider and influence the residents into despising the police. In order to overthrow this process, Tilly’s theory of state formation implies a long term, even decades long process of adaption before consolidation. The CMR theorists would see this as a competition of professionalism as the UPP is hampered by prior norms yet forced to connect with the civil society of the favela. The outline, according to Tilly, is only a question of time and capacity of the government. As the empirical data suggests, the UPP’s social engagement has failed due to a lack of capacity, but not only within the favela and the UPP, but also on the legislative side.
6 Conclusion

In retrospect, returning to the basics of a descriptive case study.

*What was the favela Babilônia a case of?* – Babilônia has been a small geographic area completely without the influence of governmental control for a long period of time. Instead of a non-state actor, TCP, has managed a private monopoly of violence, which since 2009 has been revoked by a pacifying police unit. Today, TCP is present under the surface as the scale pends between the two power holders.

Answering my question:

*What causes the sense-of-security within a privately held monopoly of violence?*

My theory describes the suppressing variable being inefficient government capacity, which affects the communication and information sharing between the society and the UPP, which in turn affects the interpersonal trust in governmental institutions and the security provision, creating a norm, which assumes a low sense-of-security.

The governor of Rio’s proclaimed commitment of 25 years might be cutting it short since the “problem” of the favelas is deeply socially embedded. Which would need further studies in terms of consolidation and the legislative branch of the Brazilian government.

*What comes next?* – Since the US COIN influenced strategy has not been tested in marginalized communities such as a favela before, my evaluation and research will provide valuable information if it is used in similar settings. In addition, this thesis could aid our understanding of how interventions in cut-of cultures and societies might be in the future. The US COIN strategy has been used in Afghanistan and Iraq and new research is being produced that the cumulative possibilities are growing steadily. Nations across the globe struggle and shed blood with societies that share similarities with the case of this study.
7 References

7.1 Respondents

M1: Male. Age 30. Favela de Babilônia-resident for his whole life together with his family. He works as a sushi-chef in a restaurant outside the favela. Interview conducted: 2012-04-17


M3: Male. Age: 21. Former resident of favela de Babilônia since February 2012. Nowadays a resident of favela de Vidigal. The respondent’s family moved due to a couple of reasons. Changing working conditions, changes of the dynamic in Babilônia and also friendships in Vidigal. Interview conducted: 2012-04-22

F1: Female, Age: 36, Favela de Babilônia resident with children and grandchildren, resident of Favela de Babilônia since: 2000. Interview conducted: 2012-04-25

F2: Female, Age: 20, Favela de Babilônia resident with her family since birth, works at a laundry shop in Leme. Interview conducted: 2012-05-02

7.2 Articles


Qu, Sandy Q, Dumay, Jay, 2011,"The Qualitative Research Interview" - *Qualitative Research in Accounting &"
7.3 Media


The Economist, 2012. “Affirming a divide Black Brazilians are much worse off than they should be. But what is the best way to remedy that?” Internet: http://www.economist.com/node/21543494 (downloaded: 2012-02-03)


7.4 Databases


7.5 Literature


