Securitization in China and Pakistan’s Frontier Regions

A Comparative Account of Regional Security Discourses

Abstract

This thesis utilizes securitization theory in a comparative analysis of security discourses in both the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Peoples Republic of China by looking at how actors in both states frame and respond to security issues relating to the respective frontier regions of Khyber-pakhtun and Xinjiang. The purpose of which has been to produce a paper addressing the complexities that arise for peripheral regions that are expected to fit into large multi-ethnic states and how new security discourses are developing in Central Asia. Using securitization theory means this thesis also contributes to the growing understanding of how securitization theory can apply to regimes outside the liberal western model.

This thesis has found that Pakistan has a highly complex set of securitization characteristics something, which stems from the unique relationship that exists between the military and the government as well as its lack of economic development. This has lead to a peculiar fusion of the state, national and Islam in a way that promotes a highly volatile and contested security
discourse. In comparison to this this paper finds that the Chinese state is a more coherent actor to analyze with Securitization theory then first thought. The unitary nature of the Chinese state means that the central party and the military essentially act as one actor in securitization of the Uyghur Autonomous Region. Theoretically this paper successfully applied Copenhagen School methodology to the novel cases in a way that expands securitization studies as a research project.

Key words: Securitization, Copenhagen School, China, Pakistan, Frontier, Security, Xinjiang, Khyber-Pakhtun

Word count: 23453

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List of Abbreviations
AACP – Actions in Aid of Civil Power
ANP – Awami National Party
CAR – Central Asian Republics
CAU – Central Asian Union
CCP – Chinese Communist Party
CS – Copenhagen School
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas
IR – International Relations
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence
K-P – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (the former Northwest Frontier Province)
MQM – Muttahida Quami Movement
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC – National Security Council
PATA – Provincially Administered Areas (of Pakistan)
PML – Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PPP – Pakistan People’s Party
PLA – People’s Liberation Army
PRC – People’s Republic of China
RSC – Regional Security Complex
SCO – Shanghai Cooperation

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1 Introduction

Recent history has seen the rise of terrorism as a security discourse in both Pakistan and China. Globally, they both fit into a region heavily influenced by the “Global War on Terror”; and locally, both states have to account for issues of nationalism, Islamic revivalism, drug trafficking, economic development and integration. This paper seeks to explore the security discourses of two key regional actors in central Asia: The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), both of which have frontier regions in central Asia. I will seek to discover how the discursive security relationships have developed in both these states in relation to their central Asian frontier.

The central mode of analysis will be the application of securitization theory, also known as the Copenhagen School (CS). This will be applied in a comparative analysis of security discourses in both the Pakistan and PRC by looking at how actors in both states frame and respond to security issues pertaining to the respective frontier regions of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). By referencing how securitization is played out on international, domestic, regional and sub-regional/sub-national levels, we can hope to map security in a nuanced and (hopefully) enlightening way. The purpose of this is to produce a paper that addresses the security complexities that arise for peripheral regions that are expected to fit into large multi-ethnic states, how this relates to the International Relations of the region, and how we can better understand securitization theory and its application to regimes outside the liberal western model. The central argument of this thesis is that a more flexible adoption of the Copenhagen School can shed new light on the discursive security relations in China and Pakistan’s frontier regions. The starting point for this is the correct conceptualization of China and Pakistan’s political security institutions as this is a major point of difference from the western-liberal model that is so often utilized by the Copenhagen school.
The state/regime of Pakistan is fragmented and suffering from an crisis in its national discourse surround the role of the state, the nation and Islam which leads to an intensified and sporadic security discourse which fails to address the volatile reality on the ground in its frontier. In China, the centralized political system allows from far clearer process of securitization to emerge which translates into more coherent policies and rhetoric.

1.1 Problem Formulation

Securitization studies and the CS have been criticized for being applicable only to western liberal-democratic societies, mostly found in Europe and North America. Regardless, the CS provides researchers with a useful tool in IR for examining security relations and, as such, expanding it, as a research project can only add to our academic understanding. The first challenge of this thesis, therefore, will be analyzing the CS and recent theoretical developments pertaining to it, so that that we can construct a coherent framework for “road-testing” it in the case studies of Pakistan and the PRC. The first problem will therefore revolve around how we can effectively begin to apply securitization theories outside of its existing theoretical limitations. The second set of challenges are empirical focusing on the application of this analytical framework to the referent cases. In what way are tensions and instability translated into security objects via either a process of securitization or de-securitization? What features of security discourses are comparable between Pakistan and the PRC, and what elements are culturally/politically specific? Do these cases share any significant security discourses?

1.2 Roadmap

This thesis will be divided as follows.
First; I set out the theoretical foundation for the thesis. It will begin by describing the relevant tenants of securitization theory, starting with the Copenhagen School and how speech act theory operates as a research tool. It will discuss the limitations of CS theory and its bias toward liberal-democratic countries, and will discuss and analyze recent theoretical developments that can be incorporated to combat this.

Second; the methodological model will be explained and examined following the levels of analysis model as well as discourse analysis.

Third; this thesis will look at Pakistan and the People Republic of China and will detail the relevant nation/state characteristics. It will look to the relevant institutional dynamics of both states as a way of identifying who the dominant actors in securitization are likely to be.

Fourth; It will begin looking directly at the process of securitization relating to XUAR and K-P. It will take this analysis to the regional and sub-national level.

Last; it will conclude by examining comparability or incomparability of the cases analyzed, and will conclude with an analysis of stability of the region in the years to come.

1.3 Definitions

By referring to non-liberal democratic regimes I am essentially referring to non-western democracies that do not share the same liberal ‘rules’ or in other words ones that fail the normative criteria that western countries apply to non-western democracies. Pakistan would be the case of a non-liberal democratic regime as it a democracy but it would not have normatively ‘liberal’ characteristics in its civil society. The PRC is likewise clearly not a liberal democracy and as such does not share the same characteristics

2 Theoretical perspective
This chapter sets out the Copenhagen school and problematizes it in relation to its applicability outside of liberal-democratic cases. It looks at speech act theory and examines concepts that are transferable to this research. It introduces the concept of ‘strategic pragmatics’ as a way to adapt the CS more coherently in the cases of Pakistan and the PRC.

2.1 Securitization Theory

Securitization theory, also known as the “Copenhagen school” has developed into an effective and nuanced means of analyzing security discourses and their relationship to security practice. This thesis seeks to utilize developments in securitization theory in a comparative study of frontier security in both Pakistan and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The field of securitization studies is ideal for this subject of analysis because of its ability to engage both directly and in the context of broader ongoing debates in IR (Williams, 2003, 511), while also accommodating “actors and referent objects other than the state” (Wilkinson, 2007, 9). This moves security analysis beyond the traditional, the military-focused and state-centered readings of traditional strategic relations. This allows for the “expansion of the research agenda by new security sectors – economic, environmental, cultural – and new security referents – societies, non-state actors, individuals” (Guzzini & Jung, 2004, 1). This therefore makes CS suited to consider complex security relations in any locality. Theoretically, the two issues I will seek to address are: First, how is securitization theory applicable to non-liberal or non-democratic regimes, and how can it be applied without overly stretching its core concepts. Second, how can we utilize expanded securitization theory beyond its conventional linguistic procedures? To start with, I will summarize the CS securitization model and its core concepts and methodologies, while also highlight challenges that need addressing.

2.2 The Copenhagen School
Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, the core proponents of the Copenhagen School (CS), define securitization as:

“[A successful speech act] through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (2003, 491).

The study of securitization theory seeks to elevate discourse as an important aspect of security analysis. For the CS, analyzing this discourse is grounded in speech act philosophy and illocutionary strands of logic. In this way, securitization is premised on the central assumption that the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order wherein “normal politics” is bracketed. This is based on speech acts where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a specified referent object and declares an existential threat, implying a right to use extraordinary means to fence it off. Securitization of an issue precedes the existence of the referent issue as a security issue, a part of which is that “security” manifests when a relevant audience accepts this claim, they thus grants the actor a right to violate rules that otherwise would be binding (Wæver 2000: 251). For securitization to succeed, the claim is that there are three constitutive factors or “felicity conditions” defined as 1) the grammar or plot of security 2) the social capital of the enunciator, and 3) conditions related to the threat (Ibid, pp. 252-3). Under this basic framework, any actors involved in securitization must necessarily follow these rules, that is, the linguistic construction of an existential threat in relation to a referent object by particular persons and circumstances. Failure to follow these rules renders securitization incomplete.

There are two core issues that require highlighting and refinement in the CS. First is the issue of “normal politics” versus “special politics”. These categories represent the historical “democratic bias” of the CS, and therefore a potential limiting factor that needs considering. Second is the scope of the “felicity conditions” in the CS, namely, that this framework proposes too high a degree of formality for the discursive act of security. The criticism here is that this reliance on the defined parameters of “speech act” “lends itself too much to a distorted sense of
[securitization] as having a fixed, permanent, unchanging [code of practice]” (Balzacq, 2005, 172). This over reliance on speech acts reduces security to conventional procedure, whereby felicity conditions must be fulfilled in its entirety for the securitization act to succeed\(^1\). Both of these issues will be explored later on in this chapter.

2.3 Speech Act Theory

Speech act theory, as laid out by John L. Austin (1975 [1962]), and John Searle (1969) is the basis of the CS school of analysis. Securitizing language is considered generalizable when premised on the notion that a speech act can constitute a security issue. These mechanisms can be reduced to a set of functional ruse that should therefore be universally applicable to all societies. Rules govern language, and if reduced down to functional rules then it should be universally applicable regardless of case. Language use is therefore governed by rules, and all human languages share a set of constitutive rules that lie beneath conventional semantic structures. Language as an ability logically precedes a specific conventional manifestation of it. Human languages, when inter-translatable, are therefore regarded as “different conventional realizations of the same underlying rules” (Searle, 2969, pp. 36-37). When political language is categorized into speech acts it is held that some statements go further then only describing a given reality and as a result cannot be judged as merely true or false. These statements should be seen as “performative”, as opposed to “constraintive”

There are three categories to consider in speech act analysis. “1) The locutionary: the utterance of an expression that contains a given sense and reference” (Austin, 1975 [1962]). 2) The illocutionary: the act performed in articulating a locution (Ibid). This category “captures the explicit performative class of utterances, and as a matter of fact, the concept ‘speech act’ is

literally predicated on that sort of agency” (Balzacq, 2005, 175). Finally, 3) the perlocutionary: which are the “consequential effects that are directed at evoking feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions in the target audience” (Austin, 1975 [1962]). This trifecta of categories is summed up by Habermas as “to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying something” (1984, 289) [Emphasis added].

It is relevant to note that both illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are different in the consequences they initiate. Illocutionary acts is, according to the CS, are reliant on “felicity conditions” being meet:

1) a preparatory condition, determined by the existence of a “conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances” (Balzacq, 2005, 180):

2) An “an executive condition, to determine whether the procedure has been fully executed by all participants:

3) A sincerity condition, which “posits that participants in this ‘conventional procedure’” (Ibid) are required to act deliberately and “must intend so to conduct themselves” (Ibid);

4) A fulfillment condition, determined by whether participants “actually so conduct themselves subsequently” (Austin, 1975 [1962, pp. 14-15]).

The second, perlocution, is “specific to the circumstances of issuance, and is therefore not conventionally achieved just by uttering particular utterances, and includes all those effects, intended or unintended, often indeterminate, that some particular utterances in a particular situation may cause.” (Ibid). Thierry Balzacq claims here that the illocutionary (i.e. an act in saying something) has been conflated with the perlocutionary (i.e. an act by saying something) (2005, 178). This approach reduces securitization to the acts of the speaker leaving no room for the audience. In challenging the over-reliance on the role of the speaker Balzacq seeks to elevate the study of the audiences role in securitization. In acknowledging this aim we can begin to better apply securitization to novel audiences in a variety of non-western contexts.

2.4 Charting Speech Acts
Rolf Eckard (1990) has divided speech acts into five elementary types for categorization:

*Table 2*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Type</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Communicative purpose</th>
<th>Domain of relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assertive</td>
<td>What is the case?</td>
<td>That $H$ shall come to believe that $P$</td>
<td>Extra-linguistic reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissive</td>
<td>What does the speaker $S$ want to do</td>
<td>That $H$ shall be orientated as to a certain future behavior of $S$</td>
<td>Future behavior of the speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive</td>
<td>What shall the hearer do?</td>
<td>That $H$ shall do $R$</td>
<td>Future behavior of the hearer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declarative</td>
<td>What shall be the case institutionally?</td>
<td>That the institutional reality $W$ shall be maintained or changed into $W$</td>
<td>Institutional reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressive</td>
<td>What has to be done in view of a new social or personal reality?</td>
<td>That the (un)tranquillization connected with a certain personal or social fact shall be dissolved</td>
<td>Social and personal reality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no definitive definition of what can constitute a securitizing actor: not all securitizing speech acts are spoken by the powers that be, they do not have to have state powers. Actors
outside of “outside official authority can utilize securitization speech to achieve certain aims, provided they have sufficient social capital” (Bourdieu, 1991, 54).

Generally speaking securitizing speech acts follow a pattern, whereby a referent object is escalated to the point that extraordinary measures are justified. This escalation is as follows:

1. A referent object can see something as a existential threat and defend itself. The “The illocutionary point of claiming is assertive. Claiming has to do with taking a stand on something, in the case of securitization, on something being an existential threat to something. Most illocutionary acts can be successful and nondefective only if certain conditions apply.” (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985: 16–18), These conditions report a state of affairs and are known as ‘preparatory conditions’. When the claim is made the speaker has to have proof of its claim as it does not necessarily have to be obvious to the speaker or the audience that the audience knows the validity of the claim.

2. “Warning”: when it is claimed that the threat will be realized if nothing is done. This warning can either be directive or assertive and it constitutes the propositional content of the utterance. The speaker can warn that the “security referent is the case or warn someone to do something (or not to do something)” (Ibid,17).

3. The third act of this form of securitization can vary based on a number of factors. This depends on how the illocutionary point was reached, the “strength of its illocutionary point, and its propositional content conditions” (Ibid). The securitizing actor can “could recommend, suggest, request, deplore or insist that decision-makers take action” (Ibid, 20). The point of this state is to get someone do act, or to paraphrase the argument: “deal with this problem [with these measures] before it is too late and we will not be around to correct our mistake”” Searle and Vanderveken, 1985: 20).

2.5 Theoretical Problems

A number of key theoretical issues regarding the CS school need to be problematized when engaging in with the case studies of China and Pakistan. The key problems identified in this
thesis that need addressing are the charge of democratic bias’, the distinction between normal and special politics and the application of strategic pragmatics as a way to develop securitization theory further.

2.5.1 Democratic Bias

A specific theoretical issue with securitization is its general applicability to non-liberal or non-democratic regimes, an issue stemming from the historical “... Europeaness of the approach” (Vuvori, 2008, p. 65) or as Buzan and Little once called it: a tendency toward “a-historical and Eurocentric arrogance” (2001, p. 25). The argument is that this results in a democratic bias within securitization theory itself. The central notion of securitization is that in practice a securitizing act “is understood as a means of naturalizing politics, a means of moving certain issues beyond the democratic process of government” (Vuvori, 2008, p. 65). In this understanding, security issues are necessarily understood as a form of special politics, whereby special procedures are legitimized as a survival mechanism. Vuvori contends that this formulation contains an implicit ethical push towards democracy, with de-securitization being the imperative (Ibid). Therefore, if securitization studies are to become a wide reaching and relevant paradigm of security research, then it must actively seek to account for security speech and politics in any form of political system. A particular challenge with this is that securitization studies conducted outside a democratic-liberal case require a massive degree of cultural literacy for analysis to be effectively achieved. Adopting this mentality pushes IR into expanding fields of knowledge, something that is surely possible today due to the growing interconnectedness of universities. This pushes IR to be less reliant upon reductionist logics of realism and game theory; on the other hand, it makes creating a normative framework extremely difficult.

2.5.2 Normal vs. Special Politics
A core distinction in the CS is between normal politics and special (security/emergency) politics. According to the CS, “security” is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics, or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization (Buzan et al, 1998: 23). This set of concepts needs further discussion. “Special politics” has been defined to include 1) non-political issues, which are outside the purview of the state; 2) Political issues, which are on the agenda of “regular politics”; and 3) Security issues that are the arena of “special politics” (Buzan et al, 1998, 29). The latter of the three refers importantly to non-democratic decision-making that is made within the purview of being a necessity of survival. The problem at hand is that this formulation views special politics as something that has been moved beyond the democratic process. In a non-liberal democratic regime there is no need to move security issues into this particular conception of special politics because there is no democratic process to start with. This, however, is not always the case. The unifying condition here is maintaining legitimacy, as this is a prerequisite for the survival of any social institution, and any government must engage in acts of persuasion and coercion to survive (Vuvori, 2008, 67). This applies to both democratic and non-democratic systems, whether it is in Pakistan or the PRC. All societies have rules that must be followed, and even the most oppressive regimes have to legitimize their use of extraordinary measures (Holm, 2004, 219). This notion of “special politics” has to be understood contextually. We can say that societies all have rules that are the “products of historical and social contingencies, as are the referents objects and threats in security” (Vuvori, 2008, 69). If security logic is used to break these rules, then we can hold that there is an observable instance of securitization (Buzan et al, 1998, 24). If the constraints to be broken in a democratic society are democratic processes, then in a non-democratic society it is simply a matter of identifying the relevant constraints. The major issue, however, is distinguishing between “normal” and “special” politics. For example, in Pakistan, the Army and the intelligence-services intelligence (ISI) hold a large amount of power and influence, but remain highly secretive. Likewise, a similar problem persists when studying Chinese politics, as the political processes of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remain highly secretive. How we adapt methodology around these particular circumstances will dictate the success of this study.
2.5.3 Strategic Pragmatics

As noted, a core concept I seek to address is high degree of formality for felicity conditions in the CS, and how this struggles to sufficiently account for the audience in securitization. Highlighting the above dimension of the CS is not an attempt to relegate speech act theory, but rather, to better situate it as a “strategic action” (Balzacq, 2005). This differs in that the view security discourse moves to having levels of persuasion that use artifacts, such as metaphor, emotions, stereotypes, gestures or even silence in its goals the inclusion of which allows for more relative or context specific analysis (Ibid, 172). From this expansion of the theory comes a methodological challenge: how to retain a coherent and widely applicable framework that accounts for specificities and acts that are deeply specific to culture and context? To conceptualize this further, we can view the CS school as a universal pragmatic, with the overarching goal of creating a normative framework for security discourse analysis. This normative goal is a potentially limiting factor when considering regimes outside of the western model, which is to say that outside a liberal democracy – and the political and social conditions associated with it – major variations of major socio-political norms, such as those sure to come up in the cases of Pakistan and the PRC will likely result in felicity conditions rarely being fulfilled. However, this should not be taken to mean that securitization cannot take place. The strategic approach’s goal should be to utilize contextual clues in order to uncover how persuasion of a target audience operates. If this persuasion is used as a mandate for action to defeat or reduce the identified threat, then securitization has taken place. The measure of a speech act’s success should not be dependent on adherence to the conventional rules followed by the actors, but rather as “… a ‘discursive’ technique allowing the securitizing actor to induce or increase the [public] mind’s adherence to the thesis presented to its assent” (Ibid, 2005, pp. 172,173). By recognizing the potential limitation of normative constraints, particularly in relation to the cases being looked at in this study, we can look at an expanded notion of securitization study that approaches security discourse in a way that encompasses “social context, a field of power struggles in which securitizing actors align on a security issue to swing the audiences support toward a policy or course of action” (Ibid, 173). Where the CS places primacy on the power of
the speaker, some expanded theories of securitization seek to deepen the account of the status of the audience\(^3\). This means that external context has to be more readily accounted for by looking at security rhetoric that modifies the context, while also incorporating artifacts that exist independent of language. This approach does not intend to relegate the speakers role in an analysis – on the contrary, the assumption persists that the power of securitizing acts derives from the social position of the speaker. The added assumption is that language has an “… intrinsic force that rests with the audiences scrutiny of truth claims” (Balzacq, 2005, 173). Incorporating this involves the addition of a fourth felicity of: “conditions related to the audience of securitization” (Ibid, 175).

With these theoretical challenges in mind this thesis can approach the cases as a ‘road test’. This relies on being flexible with the empirical data collected and treating it within new contexts in a coherent and re-creatable manner.

3 Methodological approach

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This section deals with the general methodological model the is designed to guide the research and structure it in as clear and concise way as possible, something which is often a challenge in constructivist approaches. A good analytical model is contingent on three factors: 1) the descriptive accuracy of the phenomena being examined: 2) the explanatory value of the relationships between the phenomena being examined: and 3) the predictive conclusions expressed as a result. (Singer, 1961, pp. 78-80).

In this section, the level-of-analysis model will be adapted to fit the various descriptive and explanatory functions of the theory. The cases chosen will be justified and the comparative approach clarified. General guidelines for approaching empirical data will be laid out and the fundamentals of discourse analysis will be touched on.

3.1 Levels of Analysis

These levels are categorical locations, where both outcomes and sources can be viewed, should provide us with a coherent structure and useful framework for analysis. Kenneth Waltz first proposed this approach to research in the political sciences in his book *Man, the State and War* (1959) with his model being widely used in international relations studies. The five frequently used levels being (Ibid: pp. 5-6)

1. International system or systemic level – this is the highest level, which comprises of the largest social and political conglomerates of interacting or independent units at the highest level.
2. International sub-systems or regional level – referring to groups within the international system, which can be separated from the larger system by the nature of intensity of their interactions with or independently of each other. These can be territorially coherent units such as regions.
3. Units or state level – usually state actors but can also extend to other entities such as transnational companies
4. Sub-units – organized groups of individuals within unites that are able to affect the state. These can include lobby groups or state institutions
5. Individuals – most commonly state leaders or prominent members of any relevant actors
Waltz used three levels centered on the individual, the state and the international system to
explain conflict. David Singer revised these categories by listing the positives and negatives of
the widely used levels of the nation state and the international system, concluding that there was
no overriding imperative for any level and much relied on the needs of the research and the cases
selected (Singer.1961: p 90). The classical levels of analysis method as such will not be strictly
adopted and this allows us to depart from Waltz who tended to locate things exclusively within
the domestic, state, or international level (1959).

Rather the CS’s conception of levels-of-analysis is being adopted for this research, which
sees security complexes develop on the global, interregional, regional, or domestic level. If
securitization does not show up within these categories, then the claim by the CS is that “it ought
to show up, as international terrorism [is] now done” (Barry et al., 2003, pp. 461-468). A
classical formulation would be severely limiting, in that it makes transnational phenomena hard,
or in some cases impossible, to slot in. Rather, a regional approach proposed by the CS allows
for the inclusion of the “non-territorial subsystem” when mapping securitization (Buzan et al,
1998, pp. 163-191). The levels are “locations” where both sources and outcomes can be located,
providing us with a straightforward framework to categorize information used in this study.
(Ibid: 5). This level of analysis is useful as it allows us to plot causal relationships between one
level to another, for example from the top down or bottom up unit behavior from the individual
to the state.

In this way, we can start with this as a general mapping tool to look for non-territorial
security, which allows us to ask the important question of where security discourses are located,
whether it be at the transnational, global, sub-systemic, non-territorial, sub-state/ nation. The
strength of this approach is that it “will certainly pick up non-territorial securitizations” (Buzan
et al., 2003, 461). Utilizing more recent refinements of the CS level-of-analysis methodology,
this thesis will organize its analysis by applying concepts of Regional Security Complex (RSC)
Theory (Ibid). Buzan and Wæver define RSC as “a set of units whose major processes of
securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot
reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Ibid, 491). This approach
emphasizes the regional level in security analysis, while also pulling on the other levels of
global, interregional and local analysis. The RSC theory provides four levels of analysis to link
the study of internal conditions in states (domestic factors), relations among states of the region, relations among regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting powers (Ibid, 52).

This approach is reliant on the analyst being “prepared to evaluate the relative utility – conceptual and methodological – of the various alternatives open to him, and to appraise the manifold implications of the level of analysis finally selected” (Singer, 1961, 77). When analyzing an example of securitization, we have to take account of the levels that constitute the security constellation: the domestic, the regional, the sub-national and the global. In the case presented, this will involve reference to a number of actors who have interests, such as other central Asian Republics (CAR), the US or any relevant non-state actors. Because we are focusing our analysis on the regional and sub-regional levels, this means the global dimensions will be referenced, but not closely scrutinized.

For this thesis, the appropriate levels of analysis to focus on in Pakistan and the PRC are primarily state/regime (Nation-state), the Regional (Central Asia) and the sub-National (The Frontier zones). These are not definitive categories, as this would run counter to my assumption that not all security situations can be categorized along these normative lines. They are, in essence, an organizational tool intended to situate this analysis coherently, but they are not intended to be major theoretical tools outside of that. The three levels being referred to are therefore:

1) State/regime level: This level accounts for the internal dynamics of the state, such as the institutional dynamics, the political economy and the national ideology.

2) Regional Level: This refers to the regional environment of central Asia, comprising of Central Asian Republics (CARs) included in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Central Asian Union (CAU), Afghanistan, Pakistan as well as NATO and US presences.

3) Sub-National Level: This refers to the sub-state minority actors, such as the Taliban and militant groups present at the national and regional level. This category includes organizations that exist outside of normal state and security frameworks.
These three levels are shown in Figure 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/National</th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>Sub-National/Sub-state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan - (Internal characteristics)</td>
<td>Regional Dynamics</td>
<td>Transnational actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC – (Internal Characteristics)</td>
<td>Central Asian States</td>
<td>Militant groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Organizations</td>
<td>Ethnic groups</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2 Comparative Approach

Central to this thesis is the adoption of a comparative approach between Pakistan and the PRC. While it would be justifiable to produce a single case study of either Pakistan or the PRC, the adoption of a comparative approach provides “a sound basis for theoretical conclusions” (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster. 2000: 13). These conclusions rest on the application of both eliminative and analytic induction, which in principle is sufficient to identify relevant conditions underlying causal relationships (Ibid; 14) relevant to securitization studies.

Another factor that justifies a comparative approach is that this is a macro-political study relying on taking a broad range of actors into account. As the theory being tested is still novel outside of a western-liberal context it is important to be heuristic in my approach, which will enable me as a researcher to be hands on and creative. This is why a single case study would struggle to test securitization as a theoretical vehicle. The inclusion of two cases serves the purpose of identifying factors that could potentially be reduced to universal rules while also allowing for the discarding of obviously non-universal presuppositions that have accumulated within the theory, allowing for a form of Ockham's razor to be applied (Franklin, 2001: 241). Indeed, Eckstein notes that most heuristic “comparative studies in macro-politics make more sense as plausibility probes. (Eckstein in Gomm et al. 2000: 142) A comparative approach will be appropriate as it is noted that this is often a good way to test a the CS theory’s applicability within new contexts (Ibid; 147). The major practical
problem of this kind of comparative research involves the need for special knowledge of the cultures being examined. From this comes a major challenge: how can this thesis best retain a coherent and widely applicable framework that accounts for specificities and acts that are deeply specific to culture and context?

Ensuring this comes down to being familiar enough with the cases and flexible enough to reflect and revise any pre-suppositions that the researcher has about the cases.

3.3 Case Selection

A reader may ask: why are these cases comparable? It initially appears that both states and referent regions of study are different on a number of levels, such as political cultures and cohesion, ethnic makeup, and so forth. There are, however, key points that are appropriate for comparison. First, both the PRC and Pakistan are not usually counted as central Asian states, yet both counties have peripheral regions that extend into the Asiatic interior. The dominant security discourse and strategic alignments of both countries are focused towards other regional systems; for example Pakistan is more closely associated with South Asia and its neighbor India and China with East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Both states’ security apparatus have historically been focused elsewhere, and it is only in the aftermath of September 11 that they have been reluctantly pulled into central Asia through the auspice of the “global war on terror.”

The two cases chosen are also comparable in that both K-P and XUAR are ethnically distinct from the majority ethnicities of their host states, and have been recognized as so domestically, through the creation of special administrative zones. Semantically, both regions have been termed “frontier” zones, with K-P until April 2010 being officially called North-West Frontier Provence, and with Xinjiang translating to mean “new domain” (Starr, 2004, 102). Geopolitically, the cases are situated alongside less then stable central Asian states such as Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, which exposes both cases to a variety of regional forces emanating from a number of distinct actors. There are noted similarities in how Islam is utilized as a mobilization tool for militancy and separatism in both cases, and there are shared problems of international drug trafficking and economic development and integration to be accounted for.
How these factors play into security discourses in both regions, and the corresponding state reactions to this, is what is comparable. These similarities, together with the physical proximity of the cases being examined, form the rationale for this comparative approach. Due to the significant difference in stability of the two states being analyzed, it will be interesting to note how politics of securitization or de-securitization play out.

These initial observations need to be considered against the incomparable aspects of each case. The PRC is a very different political entity to Pakistan. Key to this is the nature unitary nature of the PRC compared to the de-centralized nature of the Pakistani state. This is difference is central to the research and will be thoroughly addressed.

3.4 Empirical material

The material collected for this thesis is a mixture of speeches, government documents and reports as well as print media. As a large component of this thesis is theoretical, a lot of academic material has also been collected and examined. While not strictly academic, some observation research has gone into the treatment of these cases which has come from my time researching and studying in both Pakistan and China, and while I was not directly working on this particular piece of research my time in both Xinjiang and K-P has informed my research. There is no specific time limit of primary sources but all data collected is recent and relevant to the post September 11 world. A focus will be placed on how to appropriately and methodically utilize material when found. Because of the theoretical challenges of this work it will not always be easy to find appropriate comparative resources as such I do not intend for this work to be an exhaustive review of all potential instances of securitizing language. For example, China has a large array of policy documents available from a centralized source pertaining to security while Pakistan does share the same coherency and as such this impacts the success of primary source collection. Sources as such will be varied and to address this I propose some criteria for asses sources as they emerge. These questions are designed to be general to “ensure their applicability across all cases in the study” (George and Bennett, 2005; 86) These questions also need to reflect the theoretical aims of the study and will pull on established rules within the CS and speech act
theory. The following list is not exhaustive but is intended to give some general direction for empirical studies:

- Does the source include a speech act that falls into the category of security? I.e. Something is identified as existential threat for a referent object that should continue to exist
- Who is the ‘speaker’ or who is the securitizing actor and who is the intended audience?
- Where does it fit within the existing discourse being studied? What, if any measures have resulted from this act?
- Who is the actor in terms of position; do they have legitimacy, proven influence within the context?

4 The Securitized State/Regimes of China and Pakistan
This chapter seeks to define what specifically needs to be taken account of in the PRC and Pakistan when conducting securitization studies. This starts with us first trying to understand the state/regime that characterizes each case. It is evident from the outset that these two cases are extremely different and, as such, it is difficult to keep the concepts and sections completely comparable. Thus, it is by design that I spend more time on certain differing characteristics of each case. The emphasis on different characteristics is intended to highlight the specific non-liberal-democratic factors of each case, so that we can account for both the PRC and Pakistan more concisely. The key argument I make in the case of Pakistan is that in the context of the armed forces position in Pakistani society that there has been an incomplete fusion of the state/regime with the nation and Islam, the result of which is a highly complex and volatile setting. The result of which is that the current state/regime is rendered incapable to addressing major security discourses in Pakistan in a straightforward way, which is to say that the state/regime is unable to successfully securitize major destabilizing forces in K-P while at the same time is unable to de-securitize them in a coordinated manner.

4.1 Pakistan

We start out by looking at Pakistan by looking at the particular make up of its state/regime and accounting for how this would affect a securitization study. This involves looking at its recent historical context and how the military has a dominant role in state/regime relations. When adapting securitization methodology outside of the western model, it is important to clearly define the relevant characteristics of the novel case being analyzed. Based on the level-of-analysis methodology, the starting point should be state/nation and its structural dynamics, as this gives us an initial impression of who the relevant actors are in a society and who the likely “speakers” will be. This is also done to identify the “rules” of a society that need to be broken in the process of securitization. This subsequently allows us to begin to identify the best way to view cases outside of the liberal-democratic model.

In the case of Pakistan this entails understanding the role that the military and the Inter-services intelligence (ISI) have come to play in Pakistani politics and society, and the
exceptionalism which both institutions enjoy because of it. An understanding of national ideology is another descriptive step, as whomever controls or challenges the idea of national identity is likely to have a key role to play in securitization. In Pakistan, this revolves around understanding major confluences imbedded in the idea of nationalism, state, regime, and Islam, and how these can translate into securitization.

4.2 Background: Pakistan’s Lost Decade

In order to contextualize Pakistan better, we need to acknowledge recent history circa 1989, around the time the Soviet Union began to break apart, a time that is relevant in both cases being studied, as we shall soon see. In the period of civil governance that preceded Pervez Musharraf’s term as president, between 1989 and 1999, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif alternated in office. This time of alternation better Bhutto and Sharif is often referred to as Pakistan’s “lost decade” where low economic growth in Pakistan led to a rise in urban and rural poverty levels. During the 1980s, GDP grew at an average rate of 6.5%, but during the 1990s, real GDP growth declined to 4.6% (Cohen, 2011, p. 10). This has left the poor and rural inhabitants of Pakistan with limited resources, and people clamoring for jobs and decent schools for their many children. Pakistan has been plagued by inflation, its people – quite literally – living in the dark due to electricity rationing. Pakistan’s ranking in the UNDP’s Human Development Index slipped from 120 in 1991, to 138 in 2002, and to 141 in 2009 – worse than the Congo (136) and Myanmar (138), and only just above Swaziland (142) and Angola (143), all countries with far weaker economies (UNDP, 2011).

Clearly, these factors could damage the state’s image as a distributor of economic welfare or social change. This economic decline has in turn influenced a deep distrust of the ideas of state, the functional state machinery (with the exception of the military), the civilian political processes and the political parties who inhabit it. With a lack of economic development, the legitimacy of the Pakistani nation-state as a provider of “security” (beyond its role of a defender against India) is questionable. During this period, Benazir and Sharif were largely unable to
govern without interference from the ISI and the military (Cohen, 2011, p. 11), whose political powers were greatly expanded during Pakistan’s preceding period of military rule under General Zia which ended in 1989. Despite moves to modernize the state and economy by Benazir and Sharif in the form of market liberalization, press reforms and education investment, neither were able to contain sectarianism within the country or get a handle of the growing Islamist movement, and neither were able to repair state apparatus’ that were weakened during Zia’s time in office (Ibid, 13). One reason that attempts by Benazir and Sharif to modernize Pakistan failed is that both the state and the military were unable to implement policies effectively (Ibid). From this period, we can see the rise of Madrassas (religious Islamic schools) as alternative educational institutions in Pakistan. The issue with Madrassas is unique in that it is claimed their proliferation through the 1990s until now has strengthened fundamentalist Islam in the region, while simultaneously supplanting the traditional role of the nation-state in education. This particular development was seen as threatening enough for President Musharraf to call for US aid in reforming the education system in Pakistan (Faruqui, 2002, p. 39). Despite Musharraf’s calls to clamp down of Madrassas, party links with the Taliban remain close (Fair & Jones, 2009, p. 21), this is a relevant factor because this highlights an instance the ambiguous relationships that exists between the government and non-state actors. The failure of Musharraf to address this issue points to a failed attempt to securitize the issue. Likewise, calling for US aid in reforming education is not likely to be acceptable to Pakistan’s population, which therefore means that the issue is not being seriously addressed or securitized as a major threat to the state/regime.

The state/regime in Pakistan has been shaken by the growing economic, social and educational crises, which have laid bare the fusion of the state and the particularistic interests of the guardian-parent regime type. The perception of Pakistani state/regime is evident with frustrations stemming from perceptions of “systematic corruption and governmental ineptitude” (Fair et al., 2010, p. 514). While this has lead to regular protests in Pakistan, these by themselves are not considered a threat to the state in the same way that they would be in a truly autocratic state. The general culture of political expression in Pakistan sees protests and political rallying as a common aspect of political life, and not by itself an existential challenge to the state/regime, something which comes in sharp contrast to the situation in China. If protests and dissatisfaction

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4 It is claimed that there are over 10,000 Madrassas that provide free social services such as education, food and board for poor children. Source: Islamonline News Site, “Pakistani Education.”
were deemed serious enough by the state/regime, then this could open the way for another coup, or for the military to return the state to civilian rule.

4.3 The Parent – Guardian Military

Since independence in 1947, Pakistan’s military “[have] governed the country outright three times and exerted strong political influence even when not in power” (Lieven, 2011, p. 52). Borrowing Ayesha Siddiqa framework, we can define this relationship as a “parent-guardian” type (2007)\(^6\), whereby the armed forces have, over a period of decades, sought to institutionalize their political power through a series of legal and constitutional provisions. This is characterized by a select group of top and middle ranking officials maintaining effective control of the state “in partnership with members of a larger military fraternity” (Ibid, p. 51); the entrenchment of the military in this manner has for Pakistan been a drawn out process. From 1947 to 1977, the military maintained its position as an “arbitrator type”, whereby it was known for taking periodic military control but shirking from prolonging its rule, then shifting to the “parent-guardian type” relationship that exists today (Ibid, pp. 47-51). The reason for this shift, according to Siddiqa, has been the growth of the military’s economic interests, which, in turn have seen a drive by the armed forces to institutionalize their political power in a way that secures their dominance as a member of the ruling elite. The institutionalization of the military’s role in politics has been contingent on the development of a civil/military partnership, where civil actors in government play a crucial role in endorsing the political role of the military through constitutional changes that expand military oversight in the affairs of governance, such as the 1985 constitutional amendment which empowered to the president both the parliament and the 2004 National Security Council (NSC). This has seen the Pakistan’s military become an “equal partner, sharing power, national resources with other members of the ruling elite” (Ibid, p. 51). This relationship has developed into a reciprocal one, where the existing political elite have become increasingly compelled to draw its power from the military. Pakistan’s military has subsequently become a

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permanent element of the state’s power politics and governance, the legitimacy of which is derived from the notion that “[since] the civil society and political actors cannot be trusted to protect the integrity of the state or ensure that the militaries interests are safeguarded, it is vital for the defense establishment to create permanent place for itself in political, with transcends all political dispensations” (Ibid, p. 51). The resulting dynamic is that the implicit demand is made upon Pakistani civil society to be aware of its “protector.”

It has become apparent that the military is reluctant to relinquish its influence, while equally unwilling or unable to take full control of the state. Often, the military’s civilian partners have been kept at the forefront of politics, forming a of patron-client relationship. The Pakistani military first sought an independent constitutional presence after 1977, where the regime of General Muhammad Zia ul Haq, who governed from 1977 to 1988, initiated the idea of the NSC, and while this was unsuccessful at the time, in April 2004, such a council was established by General Perves Musharraf (Paktribune, 2004). It is claimed by Siddiqa that this institutionalization of the military is a key strategy to protecting its interests, which in the case of Pakistan have been increasingly economic, in the sense that the military wants to retain direct control over industrial and agricultural production in Pakistan (, 2007). The armed forces assent to power has been a drawn out process, with civilian governments, such as Ali Bhuttis’g regime, seeking to relegate the military after a disastrous war with India (Lyon, 2008, 166). The military has, however, justified its institutionalization of power as a prerequisite for strengthening democracy, the result of which is the parent-guardian military type, which has become central to the process of redistribution of national resources. This arrangement has encouraged a form of crony-capitalism in Pakistan, whereby the “the combined political and economic influence of the armed forces has a huge socio-political and economic cost” (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 54). A notable characteristic of this is that the military’s influence cannot be reduced, because of the fragmentation of civil society, especially the weak political parties that inhabit electoral politics. The State/military relations in Pakistan exhibit the opposite of the ideal model civil/military relationship, and it is obvious that the army runs the state, rather than the other way around. This is not the result of a coup d’état, but something rather more discreet, by pulling strings and defining the borders of what is legitimate for the civilian politicians (Møller, 2007; Hale, 1994; Shafquat, 1997). In this way, the Pakistani military plays a unique role the securitization discourses being examined.
4.4 Military Exceptionalism

The armed forces in Pakistan have, as a result of this relationship, become the *exceptional institution* of the Pakistani state. Pakistan’s military has been the only “institution that works more or less as it is meant to, as measured against the generally accepted standards of a modern state institution” (Lieven, 2008, p. 53). This has established a perception within some sections of the Pakistani population that the efficiency and effectiveness displayed by the armed forces can be extended to the state as a whole, as a panacea for the dysfunction that permeates through Pakistani society. This belief is largely mistaken because the of the Pakistan state means that anyone who governs must necessarily resort to working through old elites in order to govern, relying on the same methods of patronage, corruption and exploitation of kinship ties (Ibid, 54).

The crucial reason that the military has been so effective is that it has exhibited a coherent national ideology, and as such, has retained a degree of legitimacy that other institutions have not. A major reason why this view is held is that the military has gone some way in answering the perennial question of the Pakistan nationhood: how can a nation exist with a society that is ethnically divided and structured along kinship lines? The divisions that inhabit regional politics have not affected the military in the same way. In the words of a senior officer of the ISI:

“Under the British, the military was kept in cantonments very separate from society. That was a good model, because in Pakistan, there is a permanent threat of politicization and corruption of the military. We fear this very deeply and try to keep ourselves separate… We have a great fear of the politicians interfering in military promotions and appointments. This could split the Army and if you split the army you destroy the country. Look at what happened under Nawaz Sharif’s last government. Karamat [general Jehangir Karamat, then chief of army staff] accepted a lot from Nawaz, but in the end the Army couldn’t take any more. Whenever a civilian government starts trying to interfere in this sector, we have to act in self defense” (Ibid, p. 54).
Here we have a justification for the parent-military type, that interfering with the armed forces could “destroy the country, this in its own right shows that the armed forces and the ISI, in a twisted way securitize the civilian sector of government. It is correct to claim that kinship and patronage have dominated to politics in Pakistan, something that is bound to with the extraction of patronage that permeates and corrupts the state” (Ibid, p. 55; Cohen, 2011, p. 32). The armed forces have gained space from this, and their effectiveness has contributed to the fact that they have been kept separate from society, and therefore independent of kinship loyalties. This kinship has been reflected by political parties, with the bulk of parties being identifiably dynastic; for example the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) has been dominated by the Bhutto family, The Pakistan Muslim league-Nawaz (PML-N) controlled by the Sharif family and The Awami National Party (ANP) by the Wali Khan family (Cohen, 2011, p. 38).

This privileged position afforded to the armed forces and the ISI give them a high degree of social status in mainstream Pakistani society. In other words, this ensures that the military acts as a dominant actor in the process of securitization in Pakistan. As opposed to liberal-democratic societies, the mainstream political parties are relegated to a sideline role. Strategic priorities, as defined by the armed forces, in this case define Pakistan’s security discourses.

4.5 Military Culture and Nationalism

The position of the Pakistani armed forces within society has developed to one of central importance to this securitization study. As such it is relevant to understand the culture of the armed forces and how it ties into their role in the Pakistani discourse of nationalism. Understand this link is important as it exposes what threats are most likely to be securitized in relation to the complex cultural interplay that exists between the military, nationalism and Islam.

The ethos provided to the military was one of Pakistani nationalism, something that the armed forces strive to be seen as the embodiment of. This has fed into the notion that the military is indispensible, the only true standard bearer of national loyalty, and as such the military has some form of superiority over other state institutions. In practice, the armed forces have discouraged split allegiances, and, with the exception of General Zia’s term in power, the
military has not openly allowed preaching (Lieven, 2011, p.64). This is relevant, as it exposes the conflicting notion of secularity at the heart of national ideology in Pakistan. The military has regularly treated Islam as a personal matter, as a feature of national identity, not a guiding ideology. With the military occupying such an important role in Pakistani society, how then is it able to engage with religion as a tool of securitization? The conflict here is that the military’s idea of nationalism has modernization principles at its core. It is a force perceived to be capable of beating down old customs and entrenched elites, and despite the rise of conservatism in the lower to middle class officer corps, some aspects of the military have retained a commitment to social modernization. We can see this ethos displayed in recent attempts of de-securitization by the military in parts of K-P and FATA. In the aftermath of the military’s campaign against Pashtun Taliban in the Swat valley, programs of nationalism and literacy were implemented (Lieven, 2011, p. 70). In doing this, the army has developed an idea of itself as representing some degree of social progress and modernity.

Nationalism on the other hand, especially among the military – is “structured around hostility to India” (Cohen, 2011, 65). The role of the military in this has been vital. Since its founding alongside the Pakistani state in 1947, it has been instrumental in constructing the narrative of national identity around this fusion of their place in the state/regime (i.e., the state/ regime) and their place in the nation. The military represents itself as the incarnation of the modern Pakistani state, whose very survival is guaranteed precisely because of the military’s efficiency. In this way, the Pakistani military is the state, a state which has been obsessed with founding the military as a strong state/ regime, with a purpose of preventing territorial collapse into ethno-linguistic units or from Indian invasion, both of which would result in the end of Pakistan as a nation-state and as an internationally recognized actor. Essentially, the military has established itself as the unifying force holding together the disparate ethnicities, clans and languages present within Pakistan.

4.6 Political Parties in Pakistan

For the purposes of this thesis I have chosen not to spend too much time on party politics in
Pakistan and while they are important they deserve their own study. Ultimately the party system in fractious and with so many suspensions to civil rule in Pakistan it seems logical to focus on the more constant institutions in Pakistan. They do need to be acknowledged however in relation to their relationship with security institutions. Cohen has done an excellent job of documenting their organizational strengths and shortcomings (Cohen, 2005). Most political parties in Pakistan, whether regional, Islamic or mainstream, are “vertically-integrated personality cults that aggregate highly localized interests” (Ibid, p. 182). The large parties of the PML-N and the PPP both have regional strongholds, with the formers being in rural Sind, the later’s in Punjab’s urban centers. Additionally, there are mainstream parties based on ethnic and provincial ties, an important one being the Awami National Party, which represents Pashtun interests in K-P and Karachi. Balochistan has a host of ethnically based parties with little appeal nationally. The only party resembling a secular movement is the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), which, interestingly, represents a political movement stemming from an organized criminal group (Cohen, 2011, 160). Additionally, there are several Islamist parties, which are not electorally influential, but have influence over the army which is disproportionate to their showing in elections (ibid). The fundamental problem with the political parties is that, with a few exceptions, they fail to aggregate national interest, and tend to instead pursue personal rather then collective agendas. Patronage networks are developed instead of strong party platforms. This patronage-driven politics can be seen with the failure of parties to pass sensible tax reform policies (Ibid, 140). More importantly, any meaningful efforts to normalize civil-military relations are perennially undermined by the simple truth that many politics benefit from the status quo, whereby they are enabled to use the army to undermine political opponents.

4.7 ‘Normal rules’

Pakistan’s experience of politics under the “normal rules” (as they are usually understood) has been limited to the periods of civil rule. Constitutionally, Pakistan has a mooring of parliamentary democracy, which allows for multi-party elections. The last time the constitution
was suspended in Pakistan was when Musharraf declared a state of emergency in November 2007, suspending the constitution and the Supreme Court judges (Cohen, 2011, p. 12). The most recent restoration of normal rules has allowed for civilian rule to re-establish itself.

The current constitution from 1973 remains the “lodestone of legitimacy” (Fair in Cohen, 2011, p. 171), but civilian and military regimes alike have constantly undermined it. One way of defining “normal rules” is to ask: “who actually adheres to constitutionalism?” While the military takes most of the blame for intervening in the state, the army always comes to power with the assistance of virtually every civilian and political institution (Siddiqa, 2007). The trajectory of military takeover usually follows the same path: “The process is predictable. The army chief steps in, suspends the constitution, disbands the parliament, promulgates various legal framework orders and requires the Supreme Court justices to not only validate the move, but also to take an oath to the new government” (Fair in Cohen, 2011, p. 185). The judiciary is compliant insofar as they follow their own self-interest when validating military take over. The interesting departure for Pakistan from other highly securitized Islamic states is that authoritarianism does not enjoy outright support. Instead, with the use of the ISI the new regime is able to forge what Fair calls a “kings party” (Ibid, p. 187), which relies on coercion of extant political parties. Flawed elections follow; as a result the “king’s party” comes to power both at a federal and provincial level (Ibid). This process usually involves the construction of opposition parties – which have often been a coalition of Islamist parties – which are used to offset challenges from Islamist quarters. The subsequently emerging parliament is a rubber stamp for the regime (bid, 189). This kind of regime consensus persists until the public becomes disillusioned with military rule, at which point the army moves against their president so as to preserve their standing amongst the people. The army then returns to its position as the “guardian-parent”, at which point the dysfunctional democracy of Pakistan emerges once again; until the public turns against the political class once again, opening the way for the army to come to power once again. The long arching result of this is that state institutions become less effective, and the separation of powers that are core to federal systems, such as the distinction between prime minister and president, or between the executive and the parliamentary branches, become tendentious. This process has played out perennially a total of four times: under Generals Ayoob Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf. In a broad sense, normal rules in Pakistan favor unilateral actions of the military, and as the military is by definition an institution that relies of
violence and force, it is not against the “rules” for it to act in any other nature. This does not mean that it is autocratic or unrestrained, but rather, that the military tends to define the rules (often retroactively). With power contained in the military, this essentially relegates civilian politics to a secondary position as a “speaker” of security.

4.8 Securitization of state/regime, Islam and the Nation

The increasing intensity of violence in Pakistan appears to be built into, and triggered by, a deep fusion of the state with the regime, and the nation together with the attendant “securitization” of this fusion. As outlined earlier, securitization theory operates with “security” being identified as a result of a speech act through which insecurity is identified, with an object of security being constructed around a threat. Security is only viewable when the securitizing actor makes a claim that the referent object (something or someone) is existentially threatened. To handle the exigencies of the threat “securitization” allowed for extreme responses to override the “normal” rules of politics. Securitization however is not simply achieved where the rules are broken or by the identification of an existential threat. It requires the acceptance of a relevant “audience” who are expected to accept violations of rules and political norms that would otherwise have to be observed (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 24–6).

Within the context of post September 11 Pakistan, there has been an exponential growth in Violence in K-P, both in the forms of violent insurgency by militant groups and counter-insurgency by the military. There exist many explanations as to why this violence persists, whether it be Islamists, the ineptitude of the state/regime or both. I argue that one of the reasons that violence persist is that both referent objects, Islam and the state/regime, have become “securitized” with the latter succumbing to an incomplete fusion of Islam, the nation and the state/regime and understanding this conceptual fusion is core to understanding Pakistan’s instability. While these three components are all defined in different ways, the fusion of the concepts remains the same. Therefore, the discursive struggle that fought at the state/nation level is based on who has the power to define and fuse these concepts. If an actor, state or otherwise,
contests this fusion it triggers fears that the existing construction of Islam, nation and state/ regime will disintegrate. This in turn can lead to the rapid “securitization” on behalf of the fusion, which legitimized the breaking of rules and the use of violence. Islam is a key variable in this equation, meaning that conflict is about how Islam relates to the nation and the state/ regime.

Pakistan as a state owes its existence to a historical compromise reached during the decolonization of South Asia. The conflicting raison d’être in its founding is establishment of an Islamic state with secular characteristics, a nation founded on a common adherence to Islam that was designed to supersede obvious ethnic divisions. The generally held wisdom is that the creation of a distinct Pakistani state was pursued out of a fear of being swallowed by India and its Hindu majority. Subsequently, Pakistan has emerged as a nation that exists in symbiosis with India. In terms of security literature, this relationship dominates. As Charles Tilly once remarked: “war makes states” (Tilly, 1984, p. 170); so too can we say that war and the threat of war has made the Pakistani state what it is today. We already know that the military in Pakistan plays a dominant role in the structure of Pakistan, but beyond that, what kind of state does this make Pakistan? Is it a successful post-colonial state modeled on British colonial institutions, or is it a failing one? In reality, it is neither of these; rather, it is a state, which is still in a process of state construction, that is, one “which signifies a conscious effort at creating an apparatus of control” (Martinez, 2000, p. 9). This process of state/nation construction is the established prerogative of the military. Cohen, observes the central conflict imbedded in the structure of Pakistan: that “There are armies who guard their nations borders, there are armies who are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are armies which defend a cause or an idea, summarizes the essential conflict here. The Pakistan Army does all three” (Cohen, 1983, p. 1). A central condition attributed to a successful state is the monopoly of legitimate violence, and this has been seriously challenged in Pakistan of late when considering the general rise of violence, militancy and US military incursions into Pakistani sovereign territory. In spite of this, the military, administrative and educational institutions continue to function, meaning that, despite its instability, Pakistan maintains institutional machinery that the state needs to survive. Until the events of September 11, and the subsequent invasion of

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7 The educational infrastructure of Pakistan is functional, but challenged by the rise of Madrassas as alternative institutions, something that will be picked up upon later. “Minister on U.S. Visit to Secularize Schooling,” http://www.islamonline.net/english/news/2002-03/10/article24.shtml (accessed January 2011)
Afghanistan by NATO forces, it looked as if the state was somewhat stable. Internationally, Pakistan appeared strong, in that its peers recognized it as a state and as an important regional player in South and Central Asia. Domestically, the state appeared strong (or at least stable) because General Pervez Musharraf had taken control in a bloodless coup and was leading a not unprecedented period of military rule. But the strength of a state neither depends on, nor correlates with, power (Buzan, 1983, p. 66). This means that a “strong state should not be recognized for deriving its strength from its military capacity, but for possessing a high level of political internal consensus centered around the idea of the state” (Holm in Guzzini & Jung, 2004, p. 218). Understanding the place of Islam in the state/regime of Pakistan is complex and contradictory. On one hand Islam and Islam-ization of a society are not, in themselves, securitized as threats to the state/regime. This could be the case if secularism were truly adopted into narratives of Pakistani statehood, but Pakistan is a state that was founded on being Muslim, and there is evidence that general public support the institutionalization Islam in the form of Sharia law (Fair et al, 2010). Recent data indicates that most Pakistanis view Pakistan as not being governed to any great extent by Islamic principles, and the vast majority of citizens (69 percent) indicated that Sharia should play either a “much larger role” or a “somewhat larger role” in the country (Ibid, p. 514). There have been attempts to further fuse Islam and the state into one object: Under the military rule of Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988), Islamization acquired the full backing of the state (Bajora, 2011). General Zia co-opted Pakistan religious parties and instigated a process of “Islam-ization” which included setting up national Sharia courts, establishing mandatory Islamic education in schools, setting up new Islamic laws and finally, promoting madrasses (religious schools) as a parallel educational system. He also took steps to Islamize the army by incorporating Islamic teachings into the military's training (Ibid).

How then, on a domestic level, can Islamic militancy be treated? Islamic militancy by itself has rarely been securitized by the state/regime. It only becomes an existential threat when it challenges the state/regime by directly challenging state/regime’s claim to Islamic-ness. This contradiction reflects what has been said for years: that the rise of militant Islam in Pakistan is directly linked to the support given to it and the Mullahs by the army (Swami, 2007, p. 32). In other words, the military and civilian leadership have relied on instrumentalizing Islam to manage Pakistan’s security and “to protect what has been called the ‘ideology of Pakistan’” (Cohen, 2005, p. 23). In this way, Islam has been securitized as a means protecting the strategic
interests of the Pakistani state, which are often played out on the regional level in central Asia Pakistan. For years, the armed forces’ “natural power projection throughout central and southwest Asia [was defined in] terms that relate to its Muslim-ness” (Swami, 2007, p. 45). This has led to the well-documented utilization of Islamist proxies to pursue issues of national important, a practice stretching back to Kashmir in 1947, and Afghanistan in the 1960s (Fair et al, 2010, pp. 495-496). This relationship between the regime and Islam is key to understanding the overarching security dynamics between Islamabad, its frontiers, and the central Asian region. Pakistan, conceived as home for South Asia’s Muslims, has never properly defined what role Islam plays within the state; there is no mainstream demand for a truly secular Pakistani nationalism, so legitimacy is not defined by separating these spheres of influence. This exposes Islam to competing definitions, a process that is increasingly superseding the state/regime’s definition. When Pakistan joined the “war on terror” it exposed itself to competing claims, by supporting a near universally despised “foreign actor.” It turned on militant groups that it had been morally and financially supporting. Support for the war on terror was unsuccessfully justified as an issue of national importance, because it was not immediately apparent that the Taliban represented an existential threat to Pakistan. Trying to make sense of this dynamic, Shah Aqil argues that her country’s “problematic and contested relationship with Islam” prevents the country from achieving a coherent national identity and stability as a nation-state. She finds that, this “perennial uncertainty” with Islam created a world “in trouble from the start” (2003, p. 78-88). Once again we see the fusion of Islam, the nation and the state regime. It is impossible to speak about the state/regime in Pakistan without making reference to Islam. But how then can we view them as linked in the various discourses. Islam is represented as an identity marker of the Pakistani nation in all discourses, however since there is a fusion of state/regime and Islam it is in turn also represented as being fused with the nation and the state/regime, therefore Islam is maintained and controlled by the state/regime. Pakistan’s constitution has always included reference to Islam, but as of the 1974 amendment, the constitutional relationship between Islam and the state shifted from Islam being the religion of the State to Islam being declared the “state religion” (Constitution of Pakistan, 1974, IX, 98). There is a difference here, in that Islam as a state religion “signifies that the state administers the religion, whereas Islam as ‘religion of the state’ indicates that Islam is either subordinated to the state or the state is subordinated to Islam” (Babadji, 2001, p. 56). In the former case, Islam puts its resources towards the legitimization of
the national political project. In the latter, the state acts in conformity with religious dogma. The state/regime is not subordinated to Islam in this arrangement; rather, Islam is subordinated because the state/regime instrumentalizes Islam for its political and strategic purposes. There is also an Islamist narrative, which sees Pakistan as the vanguard of an Islamic revolution that will spread from Pakistan to India and then to other lands where Muslims are oppressed (Henderson, 2009, Jamma’at-i-Islami). This particular narrative is relevant on the regional level of security because it typifies a link between the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic state with trans-national and regional security interests. The language is reminiscent of the Marxists of the 1970s, who saw Pakistan as a vanguard of an Islamic-socialist revolution. As Hasan Askari Rizvi notes:

“The Tariq Ali’s suggestion to reshape the Pakistani society from top to bottom is advocated by Islamic orthodox and neoconservatives, albeit, in an Islamic framework. They view militancy as an instrument for transforming the society, and warding-off the enemies of Islam and their local agents. They talk of the control of the state machinery to transform the state and the society on Islamic lines as articulated by them” (1970, pp. 243-244).

There have been historical references to Socialism in Pakistani politics, with several of the major parties, the PPP chief among them, espousing socialist rhetoric (Cohen, 2011, p. 21). But the agenda of socialism has all but disappeared from political life in Pakistan. One might argue here that the disappearance of political socialism, together with the fragile balance of “Islam as a religion of the state” and “Islam as the state religion” opens up a discursive space for the kind of political Islam represented by the Taliban. The disappearance of socialism has left references to egalitarianism orphaned. Political Islam here can present itself as an alternative to the military’s notion of nation, especially if the military has not lived up to its role as an Islamic institution. To manage both internal and external concerns, the state, under military and civilian leadership, has instrumentalized Islam in various ways, to varying degrees, and with a variety of outcomes. In short, Pakistanis continue to wrestle with foundational issues such as the role of Islam in the state, who is a Pakistani and who is not, what relationship should exist between the center and the provinces, where should the balance of power lie, and what kind of Islam should Pakistan embrace as a state.

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4.9 China

We can now look comparatively at China at the state/regime level. Securitization discourses in China, at least at the state level, are very different from those in Pakistan: The PRC’s state/regime level is more coherent for a variety of reasons and appeals more to ideas of (de) securitization. This coherence serves as a major contextualizing factor in this comparison.

4.10 Background: the opening up of China, Deng Xiaoping, and the possibility for (de) securitization

At roughly the same time as Pakistan’s “lost decade” (4.2), we can see massive economic liberalization and opening up in the middle kingdom. It is no secret that the past two decades have seen the PRC’s economy develop to become the world’s second largest economy, with corresponding rises in per capita GDP and increasing scores in human development (UNDP, 2012).

This development mirrors a profound shift in state/regime securitization discourses. After Deng Xiaoping’s political rehabilitation and power consolidation following the death of Mao Zedong, Deng was successfully able to reprioritize the state/regime in China. By 1979, Deng Xiaopong had put forward the “Four Modernizations” (modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense), which placed economic development as a priority of national interest, ahead of the even military (Forsyth, 2010, p. 58). From this, one could claim that Deng desecuritized the military and political spheres, while securitizing the economic sector. Harry Harding characterized Deng’s departure from Mao’s conceptualization by virtue of the change to the political, economic, and military content of the strategy that occurred along with Deng’s domestic reforms, initiated in 1979. In the political sphere, this lead
to a departure of class struggle rhetoric, which relied on Marxist divisions between “revolution” and “revisionism.” Economically, this also resulted in the departure of the Maoist development model. China launched into reforms that sought institutional domestic changes in tandem with its opening up to the outside world. This sparked unprecedented economic growth, which has become the foundations for China’s overall national strength (Harding, 1987). One assertion is that Deng successfully redefined China’s national security environment, from one that was focused on external threats to one that is based on internal growth and modernization (Tang, 2004, pp. 1-34). Deng’s ideas have proved successful, and Tang implies that China’s security definition was widened to achieve this. Tang also unequivocally states that China’s shift under Deng was clearly from offensive to defensive realism (Ibid, pp. 17-39). His analysis flows from certain observations. First, China no longer espouses revolutionary rhetoric, and no longer supports revolutionary insurgencies. Second, it is recognizing its role in the regional security dilemma, and seeks to mitigate the effects. Third, it is exercising greater self-restraint and willingness to be constrained by others (e.g., signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Declaration of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea). Fourth, it is enhancing its security via cooperation (e.g., the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). Tang definitely sees China as learning, and not merely adapting (Ibid). Starting in this period, Chinese security thinking changed substantially, with the economic sector becoming securitized and the political and perhaps even military sector becoming desecuritized. The environment was perceived as relatively less hostile than before (even beneficial), economic modernization topped the national security agenda, and the value of international cooperation to national strength, survival, and status was increasingly recognized. This stems from Deng worries regarding China’s backwardness, particularly its economic backwardness. Deng believed that the best way to preserve regime security was though improving the public welfare, not through political oppression. To this end, China promulgated the “Four Modernizations.”

To improve modernization, Beijing adopted a reform and open door policy. Overall, a change in focus engendered a broader view of and new approaches to, security. Revision of the domestic agenda necessitated a reassessment of the international setting. Deng did not think war was imminent, nor even inevitable. Heping Yu Fazhan (“Peace and Development”) was Deng’s central theme.9 Although Deng, like Mao, saw the international system as anarchic and believed

See generally, Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping), vol. 3.
security was achieved through competitive self-help, he departed from Mao on two key points: He viewed the international system as more of a source of opportunity than of danger, and he was more inclined toward cooperation than confrontations in pursuing national interests (Alagappa, 1998, p. 122). We can see this clearly in the 11th CCP Central Committee.

“After the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping made a new judgment with regard to war and peace, pointing out that the past tendency to always worry about having to fight a war now seems to have been excessive. Everything, he pointed out repeatedly, will be fine if the economy is developed, and it is necessary to be subordinate to this overall concern for it will be possible to modernize armaments for the armed forces only after the establishment of a good foundation for the national economy.”

Ruisheng also claims that China formed its new concept of security on the basis of serious reflection on its own historical experiences, and full adoption of such new concepts as comprehensive security (R, 1999, 6). Shambaugh believes that Deng reached the conclusion that, in order to pursue economic development, China needed a peaceful environment (1996). In asserting his theory, Deng had rejected previous Chinese assessments of the inevitability of world war and the unstable nature of the international order. A corollary to Deng’s thesis was that the leading hegemon, the United States, had entered a period of gradual decline (Ruisheng, 1999, p. 6).

While this shift may appear extremely optimistic, it does not necessarily apply to all state/regime security discourses. There remains in China a strongly negative, and sometimes exclusionary, security discourses. While this will be explored further in latter sections, it needs to be noted that, at least at the structural state/regime level, this is the dominant approach to regional and sub-regional security in China.

These are the two dominant modes of defining security that need to be kept in mind as we move to new levels of analysis. First is the traditional level of “national” security, which centers on territorial sovereignty. Second, there has been a more recent shift for the state/regime to phrase security in terms of economic development, specifically de-securitization, as seen in terms of economic development in XUAR.

4.11 China’s state/regime type
In stark contrast to Pakistan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a much less hegemonic role in the PRC state/regime. The relationship between the central government and the armed forces falls into the category of the “Authoritarian-Political-Military Partnership” (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 41). This means that the PLA is essentially an instrument of policy for the CCP, with political legitimacy lying primarily with the party. In this arrangement, the PLA is viewed as “Janus-faced. It is the guarantor of the civilian party regime and the protector of party harmony” (Ibid). The relationship, therefore, is more harmonious than the parent-guardian military type. Of significant note, Beijing removed the financial stakes held by its armed forces in order to professionalize a people’s army (Mulvenon, p. 2001)\textsuperscript{10}. For the purposes of this comparative analysis, the PLA and the PRC should not be seen as different actors with different security discourses; the underlying relationship is that the PLA represents the instruments of power, coercion and extraction. This is a symbiotic relationship between the authoritarian regime and the military and paramilitary elements of the state, which is often used for political suppression, securing continuity of regime and extracting resources. Another reason why the PLA cannot be treated as a unique actor is that literature on the workings of the PLA is difficult, if not impossible to obtain, meaning structure and interests can only be viewed via abstraction. It also does not appear to have clearly visible strategic or ideological goals beyond supporting the party, and it rarely acts as a “speaker” in its own right. As such, the state/regime type of the PRC is defined in terms of a unitary state that is highly centralized with Authoritarian-Political-Military Partnership.

4.12 Exceptionalism: The CCP is the State

\textsuperscript{10} The PLA has not been completely stripped of its economic interests: it still retains some manufacturing capacity, but in comparison to Pakistan, their share of means of production is completely different. See Ayesha Siddiqa (2007).
The Exceptional institute in China is therefore the CCP, as its monopoly over state affairs has never been challenged or fragmented to the extent that there is any major domestic competition for defining security objects. This frustrates securitization analysis, as it is hard to identify schisms between actors, and the unitary nature of the state means that China’s “normal rules,” in regards to constitutionalism and limits on power, are hard to define and even harder to break. When talking about national security policy, this means that sources are consolidated into government speech acts, often formulated as comprehensive statements. There are several sources for this: official White Papers; official statements and findings from the National Party and National Peoples Congresses, and speeches and statements from high-level leadership.

The PRC’s official national security strategy, as outlined by its semi-annual Defense White Papers, still perches territorial integrity and sovereignty as its top concerns, but is increasingly emphasizing economic and financial concerns as security threats. The vast bulk of these sources refer to more pressing issues of security – namely, the status of Taiwan and the South China Sea – but there are some direct references to central Asian security. One reference to central Asian security concerns comes from 2005’s Arms Control White paper, which addressed for the first time the concept of “nontraditional threats”

“The world is far from tranquil as traditional security issues persist, local wars and violent conflicts crop up time and again, and hot-spot issues keep emerging. Nontraditional security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), transnational crimes, and infectious diseases are on the rise. The intertwined traditional and nontraditional threats pose severe challenges to international security.”

Those controlling security discourses in China, much like Pakistan have been reluctant to categorize sub-regional security issues within the normal framework. In China, this means that traditional security issues and a preoccupation with Taiwan dominate the discourse. Nontraditional issues are scarcely mentioned at the state/nation level. The narrative of “stability” is the closest we can get to a position towards Xinjiang, stability in this case is a catch-all that

refers to the status quo of the CCP. If anything impacts this stability, it can therefore be treated as the existential threat that therefore provokes the violent response.

### 4.13 “Stability” as an Object of Security

Deng Xiaoping memorably observed, “in China the overriding need is for stability. Without a stable environment, we can accomplish nothing and may even lose what we have gained’ (Deng, 1993. Vol 3) Most speech acts that justify urgent responses are synonyms for “national security”; in the PRC’s case, the most commonly used synonym is “stability.” These concerns received the greatest amount of policy attention, both in terms of laws and regulations, and funding. Yet despite the securitization of non-military sectors, which is evidence of non-Realist thinking, the rationales for this securitization have roots in Realist worldviews. Therefore, the evidence points to a heavy preponderance of Realism still dominating PRC leadership outlook.

### 5 Securitization on the Regional Level and sub-national level

This next chapter will look at security at the regional and the sub-regional level. With the state/regime position in mind, we can begin to look at the dynamics of the respective frontier regions, in both how they fit into their respective nation-states and how they fit into their regional environment. In the case of Pakistan, this involves looking at security constructed in K–P, how this relates to the Pakistani state, and how it relates its immediate regional environment.
In China, this will involve looking at Xinjiang, how security is constructed there and how it has related to the larger central Asia region that it borders.

5.1 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region of Pakistan occupies what has been, up until 15 April 2010\textsuperscript{12}, historically known as the North West Frontier Province. K-P is the second smallest province of Pakistan in terms of population with an estimated 21 million people out of a total of 187 million\textsuperscript{13}, and as such does not carry much demographic weight when compared to Punjab and Sindh. Pashtun, sometimes known as Afghan form over two-thirds of the population\textsuperscript{14}. It has a high population of Afghan refugees, as well as other smaller ethnic groups of Tajiks and Hazaras.\textsuperscript{15} Economically, K-P represents 10\% of Pakistan’s GDP, roughly in line with its position of holding 11.9\% of the total Pakistani population. K-P’s industries are largely primary, focuses being on forestry, which takes up on average 61\% of the economy\textsuperscript{16}, followed by mining and agriculture. The region has the second lowest HDI out of Pakistan’s provinces, recoding a 0.60\textsuperscript{17}. Most inhabitants are adhere to Sunni Islam

Map 1: Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa and FATA

\textsuperscript{12} http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/123455.html Retrieved 1/06/2012
\textsuperscript{13} http://www.spdc.org.pk/pubs/rr/rr73.pdf
\textsuperscript{14} http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/419493/Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa#toc249136
\textsuperscript{15} http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e487016
\textsuperscript{16} http://www.spdc.org.pk/pubs/nps/nps5.pdf
\textsuperscript{17} http://www.spdc.org.pk/pubs/rr/rr73.pdf
My conceptualization of the Pakistani state/regime so far sees it as an ideologically dysfunctional state dominated by a military class. Islam has been instrumentalized in a way that has promoted Islamic militancy as a geo-political policy tool, the effect of which is a highly securitized frontier zone.

5.2 The Internationalization of Pakistan’s internal security

Crucial to understanding the Pakistani security equation is accounting for how security exists beyond the state/regimes definition of it. This involves adapting theory so that a link can be made between competing identifiers such as nationalism, ethnicity and religion. A rationale for including these more sociological categories stems from a desire to revise a “widespread feeling, popular and academic, that state interests and the imperatives of the system of states, economic
as well as political, furnish both the causes and the issues for most wars” (Smith, 1986, p.65). Relying too heavily on the state/regime “grossly underestimates the potency of certain kinds of identity and community and systematically [fails] to address the roots of successive ‘conflicts on the ground’” (Ibid, p. 86). A particular challenge for security studies is that is that ethnic conflicts assume a “chronic and bitter character,” whereby human beings are prepared to “sacrifice their lives and inflict violence on each other that seeks far from insignificant – or amenable to rational, peaceful solution” (Smith, 1986, p. 65). How, then, can we begin to view ethnicity and sub-state nationalism as a security issue in K–P? An important theoretical contribution from Alexis Heraclides sees states motives for involvement in ethnic conflict as bifurcated. Whether partisan or mediatory, states have instrumental and affective reasons to intervene. To examine first the state level, we look at elite decision-making, where one approach is to look at instrumental motives for involvement in ethnic conflicts. These can include “(1) International political considerations; (2) economic gains; (3) domestic or internal politics; and (4) military considerations” (Heraclides, 1990). When understanding the behavior of an ethnic group, such as Pashtuns in K-P, an instrumental approach would see an ethnic group’s behavior encompass the notion that ethnic identity is created or maintained “as a basis for collective action when there are clear competitive advantages attached to an ethnic identity” (Carment, 1993, p. 138). The parameters of ethnic identification are likewise dependent on the “situational constraints and the strategic utility attached to the identity” (Ibid, p. 139). Viewing ethnicity in a situational way sees it as being activated as a means to achieving specific goals. This logic of instrumentality entails that it carries with it a necessarily political nature, therefore shifting its categorization away from cultural, religious or linguistic considerations into “political and often territorial appeals for self-determination” (Ibid). Instrumental logic is largely amendable with how International Relations theory is often composed, which is to say that we can claim that the reduction of ethnicity to an instrumental political choice brings in common IR concepts such as the rational actor and the nation-state, which allows the application of state-centric logic to ethnic group behavior. However, any application of anthropologic or sociologic theory will demonstrate that an instrumental perspective will fall short in explaining the behavior of all actors. For example, there are politically less quantifiable qualities to ethnicity which are affective, such as desire for justice, humanitarian considerations, economic gains, domestic political motives and military gains (Heraclides, 1990, p. 371). In K-P, these include historical
injustices: a shared sense of injustices perpetuated by the state and interpretations of religion. These approaches do not need to be considered in isolation from one another, as it does not follow that instrumental or affective approaches are irreconcilable.

Another key question that presents itself when looking the regional/sub-regional level is whether insecurity is sub-nationally generated, then internationalized or vice-versa. Carment and James present several hypotheses for understanding the problem of internationalization. Firstly, “weakened state structures invite external predation and, in turn conflict escalation.” It is well documented that the Pakistani state/regime has not always maintained its presence in K–P and FATA, which stems from the armed forces unwillingness or inability to maintain a presence in the areas (Lieven, 2002). A lack of control logically creates space for outside groups to operate. On one hand there is al-Qaida, a truly international group working, freely with the trans-national yet Pashtun dominated Taliban. At the same time, NATO and the US are acting unilaterally in parts of K-P.

5.3 Relevant regional/sub-national actors and groups

There are a number of distinctive groups operating in and around K-P and FATA. Profiling these groupings is relevant because they operate at the regional and sub-national level:

5.3.1 Al-Qaida

Al-Qaida is often seen as the embodiment of an international Islamic terrorist organization, and they have had a highly publicized presence in Pakistan. However, al-Qaida is seen differently to how we see them in the west by the Pakistani public. It is a common belief that bin Laden was not behind the September 11 attacks. Even among those who concede that al-Qaida may exist,
most view the organization as “foreign,” either Arab, or Central Asian militants such as those who make up the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. (Fair, 2009, p. 164).

In 2004 there was a spate of arrests of so-called Pakistani al-Qaida, which began to alter beliefs among Pakistanis about al-Qaida and its composition (Ibid, p. 165). Since the onset of dedicated suicide attacks throughout Pakistan’s tribal areas in 2004, and later throughout important cities, more Pakistanis have come to believe that al-Qaida could be real and that it – along with its allied groups – pose a genuine threat to Pakistan itself (Ibid). Statements by Interior Minister Hamid Nawaz that the United States, India, and Afghanistan are behind the lawlessness and terrorism in Pakistan are a salient reminder that many Pakistanis do not blame Islamist militants for the violent killing of so many on Pakistani soil (Cohen, 2011, p. 130). The case of al-Qaida illustrates that al-Qaida has not been a particularly securitized actor in Pakistan, which is to say that evoking it does elicit the same response that it does in, for example, the United States of America. Its standing in Pakistan is such that al-Qaida is almost as foreign as the US or NATO. This “foreignness” has allowed al-Qaida, and militancy attached to it, to become packaged alongside the more traditional threats as an “outside influence.” As such, al-Qaida has developed of late into a greater threat to the state/regime then it previously was – not because it is a radical organization, but because it is a foreign one that can emotively be linked to actors such as the US or India.

5.3.2 The Taliban

A major group that has had a presence in K–P since September 11 is the Taliban. The Taliban in Pakistan represent a loose network of tribally based militants under the name Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan or the Pakistani Taliban (Cohen, 2011). The goals of this group are distinctly local, despite some evidence of professionalization amongst their Afghan counterparts and the long established connection with the transnational group al-Qaida. The main focus of the Afgan Taliban has been the expulsion of NATO forces from Afghanistan and the overthrow of the western support administration in Kabul. The Pakistani
Taliban, which emerged in 2004 and rose to prominence in 2007, is of interest in the Pashtun areas of Pakistan (Ibid). Their immediate goal is the expulsion of Pakistani armed forces from the Tribal Area (FATA). There have been sustained attacks on the Pakistani armed forces in both FATA and adjacent regions in K-P. Since 2006, there have been an increase of attacks against government targets, including civilian leadership, the most prominent attack being the December 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (Ibid). For years, Pakistan had supported the Taliban, a movement created by militant Afghans trained in Pakistan's Islamic schools (madrassas) that gained power by force in Afghanistan, and instituted strict Islamic law in the portions of the country it controlled. Additionally, Pakistan's influential military Inter-Service Intelligence agency (ISI) was suspected of having ties with Taliban fighters who may have been members of the al-Qaeda network, and in supporting the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir.

The Taliban are also not a monolithic group: there are tribal affiliations that have escalated into conflict; those who are Taliban affiliated target pro-government tribes resulting, in an ethnic conflict between those who support the government and those who disregard its legitimacy (Jones, 2007).

Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) has organized itself of late as a dominant organization in FATA and K-P. The TTP is comprise of several organizations which draw their personal from groups such as Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Jihadi-e-Islami (HUJI), among others (Fair, 2010). These groups have existed for some time, with LeJ and SSP forming in Punjab in the 1970s and 1980s. There are also ties between these militant organizations and some Islamist political parties. The parties are comprised of the various factions of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), organized around specific individuals such as Fazl-ur-Rehman of JUI-F and Sami ul Haq of JUI-S. The government of Pakistan acknowledges that part of the TTP is an enemy of the state, and has engaged in military operations to target TTP bases in much of FATA and KP. However, Pakistan’s ability to decisively eliminate these groups is limited by the fact that Pakistan still seeks to project groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Pakistani security managers believe that the group will re-orient against India and again become an ally one day, rather than remaining a potential foe of the state. Indeed, JeM’s leader, Masood Azhar, freely roams around Bahawalpur, where an entire Army Corps is stationed. The implications are clear: If Pakistan cannot abandon
Islamist militancy as a tool of external power projection, its ability to eliminate its internal threat will be very limited. Since the TTP shares overlapping networks with the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda, Pakistan will come under increasing pressure to act against the TTP, while preserving its interests in JeM. While it is popular to argue that only the military has espoused this policy of reliance upon militant proxies, the reality is quite different. Both the PPP and the PML-N have supported the jihadi groups operating in a variety of theatres. The purportedly secularly-inclined PPP has even allied with groups such as LeJ and SSP. Thus, a return of civilian-run government is not necessarily tantamount to a reversal of these potentially dangerous polices.

While Pakistan’s commitment to its external Islamist proxies diminishes Pakistan’s ability to act against its internal Islamist foes, Pakistan’s inability to promulgate effective governance and rule-of-law institutions further hinders its ability to manage its internal security issues. Arguably, the failure to provide good governance, to diminish corruption, to provide easy access to justice and to provide security is at the core of the security challenges in K-P and FATA. A relevant question to ask people affected by instability in Pakistan is why would anyone oppose the TTP if they offer access to services purportedly without corruption, access to some form of justice, provide services and can threaten violence when the state is not there to protect them from the same.

In April 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that the Pakistani Taliban was a “mortal threat” to the world. The Pakistani state/regime may not necessarily see them in the same light, but there have been trends towards referring to the Taliban in terms that increasingly securitize it. The Taliban themselves have threatened to step up their bloody campaign against the country's security forces unless the new government abandons its support for the US-led war on terror. A spokesman for Tehrik-e-Taliban has said recently: “We don't want political parties to repeat the mistake which Musharraf committed and follow a path dictated by the US” (Wilkinson, 2008). In support, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the head of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, strongly condemned "naked American interference in efforts to form a new government,” a reference to US statements urging the poll winners to work with Mr Musharraf (Ibid). A good exemplifier of how the Taliban securitize the state/regime is seen in top Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, based in Waziristan, who vowed back in 2008 to escalate clashes in Afghanistan while accepting a ceasefire with the Pakistan army: “Fighting between the Taliban and Pakistan is harming Islam and Pakistan,” he told journalists invited to his tribal
stronghold. “This fighting should come to an end immediately…. We and our cousins against the enemy…” (Toronto Star, 2008). Here, Islam is decoupled from Pakistan, and the Taliban are candidly competing with Pakistan regarding Islam. Clearly, the real security object here is Islam.

5.3.3 Pashtun

Pashtuns make up the major ethnic group associated with the Taliban and militancy in K-P. There is a historical grievance associated with the Durand line, a colonial artefact dating from the 1893 separation between British India and Afghanistan. This border divides the Pashtu speaking peoples who inhabit both K-P and southern Afghanistan. This boundary likewise remains a point of contention between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dupree, 1963). Since 1947 there has been a historical lack of support for the Pakistani movement (Wood, 2003). For Jinnah’s emerging state, the idea of Pashtunistan was simply subversion and an attempt to discredit Pakistan's claim to be the homeland for South Asian Muslims. In addition, Pashtunistan was an annoying distraction from Pakistan's real challenge, the hostile India wedged between Pakistan's east and west wings. While this is unlikely to endanger the state there is the potential for this form of ethno-linguistic nationalism to undermine the legitimacy of the state/regime. More likely is Pashtun nationalism being revived by the right through the use of rhetoric of the new Pakistani Taliban groups.

While these examples of ethno-linguistic nationalism seem unlikely to endanger the state, they could nonetheless undermine the legitimacy of the government and the army. Somewhat more likely is the possibility that Pashtun nationalism would be revived using the rhetoric and organization of new Pakistani Taliban groups. There is the potential for a potent combination of religion, long standing territorial claims forming in K-P. The Pakistani Taliban have emerged as a new vehicle for the expression of Pashtun grievance, but have been careful to portray themselves solely in terms of their Muslim-ness, which is unsurprising given the circumstances.
5.4 Policies Toward Militancy

Pakistan’s long standing policy of seeking an allied or client state in Afghanistan has never been primarily driven by affinity for the Taliban. Rather, “Pakistan’s chief motivation has been the fear of strategic encirclement by India” (Lieven. 2002, 108). This is because “An Indian-Afghan axis [leaves] Pakistan isolated in South Asia” (Jones, 2007, p. 17). General Zia-ul-Haq once remarked to the head of the ISI that “the water [in Afghanistan] must boil at the right temperature” (Jones, 2007, p. 17). In this way the ISI, which operates with near unaccountability in Pakistan, has always had a vested interest in “continuing to support some militant groups directed at the Afghanistan and Kashmir fronts” (Fair & Jones, 2010, p. 172). As such, militancy has been securitized slowly because the military has struggled in coming to grips with its balancing of responses to quite different threats. So far, the armed forces reaction to militancy has been to “see an Indian hand behind domestic terrorist and separatist groups, not an implausible reaction given Indian involvement in the East Pakistan movement and others” (Cohen, 2011, p. 120). The irony of the situation is that the military is now forced to control groups that it supported, in what can only be seen as blowback.

It is noteworthy that there is evidence of militancy being equated with foreign forces. But within the common rules of Pakistani security discourse, the threat must necessarily be linked to India to elicit a special response. As such, the armed forces have of late been conducting counter-insurgency operations in FATA (Cohen, 2009).

The armed forces have deliberately dismissed a large scale response, which is evidenced by the lack of securitizing language used by the armed forces. Instead there has been a focus on low intensity conflict. Only recently have the armed forces deemed it necessary to include a strong civilian component in their efforts at frontier counter insurgency (Ibid). Even more importantly the military has not addressed the issue of eliminating groups that target the state, such as the TTP in K-P. According to Cohen, there is evidence that the armed forces have avoided this on the basis that they are over-extended as it is. (Ibid, 140) The armed forces are not viewed favorably in parts of K-P with Cohen noting that the military are seen as invaders. They are not proud of the role, but, given the open challenge to the state in general, and to the army in particular, this has become a more immediate threat than India, and even some public opinion
polls have started to reflect this change of attitude in the army (Fair, 2011). Most security language still centers on external forces, never on internal ones, such as a statement by Interior Minister Hamid Nawaz that “the United States, India, and Afghanistan are behind the lawlessness and terrorism in Pakistan” (Daily Times, 2008). These are a salient reminder that many Pakistanis do not blame Islamist militants for the violence killing so many on Pakistani soil. While this is a matter of public opinion, there seems to be little to no effort by the state/regime to challenge this. To challenge this would be to securitize militancy and terrorism.

5.5 Attempts at de-securitization

There have been attempts to de-securitize K-P. In recent years, for example, many Pakistanis outside of the FATA have expressed considerable dismay at development funding for this region. They believe that Washington is interested in this border area only because of its relationship to the war in Afghanistan, and therefore do not accept this development assistance as anything other than a tool to advance the United States’ political agenda in the region (Fair, 2011, p. 514). Thus, not only is the impact of these programs in the FATA empirically unknown, but, given that the U.S. political agenda is deeply unpopular with Pakistanis, the programs may adversely affect Pakistani attitudes toward the United States outside of the FATA. Similarly, Pakistanis of many social strata resent U.S. efforts toward madrassa reform and curricula reform of public schools, as they believe these programs seek to “de-Islamize” Pakistan. This makes for a tricky situation when it comes to de-securitizing Pakistan, as it ultimately comes to down to de-securitizing Islam.

This is all largely because the education system has become bi-furcated. One on hand, there is the state education system. Normatively a modern education system, it would be seen as a modernizing influence on a country that would allow the state to clearly define the national identity. In Pakistan, it would therefore be a potentially de-securitizing factor to consider. The state education system has, however, added to national dysfunction. As noted by A. H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim, in a report for the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan, the educational system in Pakistan was designed “from the very beginning” to reinforce “one particular view of Pakistani nationalism and identity, namely that Pakistan is an
Islamic state rather than a country with a majority Muslim population.” Furthermore, the educational system needed to produce an image of a “singular homogeneous majoritarian Muslim identity that could be sharply differentiated from that of India, even though it meant suppressing the many different shades within Pakistan.” As the SDPI report notes, “the educational material in the government run schools do much more than madrassas. The textbooks tell lies, create hatred, inculcate militancy, and much more.”

Pakistan has also seen a dramatic rise of Madrassas (religious schools) that are claimed to have strengthened fundamentalist Islam in the region, while simultaneously supplanting the traditional role of the nation-state in education\textsuperscript{18}. This particular development is seen as threatening enough for President Musharraf to call for US aid in reforming the education system in Pakistan (Faruqui, 2008, p. 39). Despite Musharraf’s calls to clamp down of Madrassas, party links with the Taliban remain close (Jones, 2007, p. 21). This is because Pakistan has retained an instrumentalist approach to religion to the point that both education systems securitize Islam.

5.6 Alliance with the United States

One major problem in Pakistan is that, for many Pakistani civilians “US assistance [is] heretical” and therefore antithetical to Pakistan being an Islamic state (Fair & Jones, 2010, p. 177). This sentiment can, in turn, be utilized by Islamist groups to legitimize acts of domestic terrorism, for example: Maulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, chief patron of Gulshan-i-Uloom madrassa, said he would meet Pakistani or US operations with suicide bombs and remote-controlled bombs, noting US attacks “were carried out in the presence of the Pakistani Army; we cannot ignore our army’s cooperation with foreign forces in these actions that kill innocent people” (Fair & Jones, 2010, p. 177).

We can clearly see the ideological box that Pakistan has found itself in by looking at their relationship with the US. As America is easily defined as an “other” in Pakistani society, by

\textsuperscript{18} It is claimed that there are over 10,000 Madrassas that provide free social services such as education, food and board for poor children. Source: Islamonline News Site, “Pakistani Education Minister on U.S. Visit to Secularize Schooling,” http://www.islamonline.net/english/news/2002-03/10/article24.shtml (accessed January 2011)
extension Pakistan is left to balance its current alliance with the US with its historical policy of promoting militant Islam as a tool of foreign policy. This is obviously conflicting, and significantly diminishes the Pakistani states claim to legitimacy. Secessionist groups are consequently able to view “government efforts against al-Qaeda and other groups an ‘American war’” (Lieven, 2002, p. 172).

5.8 China

China is not plagued with the same level of instability as Pakistan, but it has increasingly viewed terrorism as synonymous with more its traditional security threats of stability and external interference. On the Regional and global level China has been an active participant in the ongoing security discourse on terrorism and on the sub-national level China has moved security towards de-securitization. For this section it is appropriate to give some immediate contextualizing factors in relation to frontier security then separate discourse between what is classically considered a securitizing speech act from what could be considered potentially de-securitizing acts.

Map 2: Xinjiang
5.9 Context

In the aftermath of the Soviet breakup China’s western frontier has found itself in a new geo-political environment, with several new Central Asian Republics (CARs) emerging directly adjacent the PRC and Xinjiang. This, together with borders with Pakistan, Russia and Mongolia meant that Xinjiang alone now had a total of seven neighboring states.

It is not surprise then that in this immediate period in the early 1990s, Xinjiang emerged as a central concern of frontier security, with the PRC reacting “with strong emphasis on the negative/reactionary elements in security”\(^{19}\). Deeper in China’s past the imperial China’s power has depended on whether external forces have seriously threatened it or not. External invasion from the frontiers has preoccupied historical efforts to protect China, the most famous example of which would be the threat posed in the north by the nomadic Mongols (Perdue, 2005, pp. 42-43). The Great Wall is the classic example of fears posed by external factors; we owe its

\(^{19}\) Shunji Cui and Jia Li (2011) ‘(de)securitizing frontier security in China: Beyond the positive and negative debate’ *Cooperation and Conflict* 2011 46: 144, p, 149
existence to China acting on traditional ideas about the nature of security (Shunji & Li, 2011, 148). This is the normative “us” vs. “them” relationship, which forms the basis of most explicit and easy to understand securitization discourses. With the fall of the Soviet Union the “East Turkistan” movement re-emerging its wake, initial policy to frontier security initially as reactionary. In April 1990 violent protests in Xinjiang lead the government to react according to this mentality, suppressing dissent as if it were an external army (Mackerras, 2009, 34). From this we can however see the emergence of the new discourse first articulated by Deng, that of “social stability and National Unity”\(^20\).

5.10 Securitization of the “three evils”

As noted in earlier, the notions of stability and unity are a core component of China’s post soviet securitization discourses. The global war on terrorism (GWoT) and the emerging discourse associated with it presented the PRC with the opportunity to articulate this on regionally acceptable terms.

The clearest set of speech acts to view this can be seen in the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Which defines threats to Frontier security in Xinjiang as being three forces, terrorism, separatism and extremism (SCO, 2012)\(^21\). The securitizing moment for this was when these three forces were defined was June 2001, when the SCO announced the “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.”(Ibid) In theoretical terms, the SCO was the securitizing actor and the Chinese government was the ‘audience’ and the annunciation of the three evils was the speech act. By claiming that ever member states stability and peace was threatened, SCO member states officially made a ‘securitizing move’. With China’s National People’s Congress’s ratification and adoption of the ‘Shanghai Convention’ the speech act was accepted. Other audience members, namely the CARs, likewise accepted the convention when they too ratified it.

\(^{20}\)See Deng’s official ideology at: http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/66739/4521326.html
\(^{21}\)Full content of the Convention can be accessed at: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show/asp?id=68
This had the added effective of bringing China in line with the global war on terror (Xinhunannet, 2003). This securitization process culminated in December 2003, when China issued a list of groups and individuals identified as “East Turkistan” terrorist groups and terrorists comprising of 4 groups and 11 individuals (Xinhuanet, 2003). In the aftermath of 9/11 this appears to bring China into line with the global war on terror therefore increasing any security practices legitimacy on the international and regional level. The consequence being that where China once received condemnation for its policies towards Xinjiang, in the wake of 9/11 it actually won approval from Washington by categorizing security in relation to terrorism. Where the international war on terror was designed by the US as a securitizing move to legitimize its invasions of Afghanistan, the PRC used it primarily to prevent intervention and subversive acts from other SCO member while at the same time avoiding international scrutiny of its acts hence forth. It seems odd however that the audience was the PRC itself. There is the unresolved question as to how much influence China had over the SCO. This is due to China’s dominant position in the SCO, a position that enabled it to successfully propose the three evils within terms acceptable to China, as such the other member states were likely to rubber stamp the threat as China articulated it (while not acting upon these threats domestically as though they were existentially threatening). The Chinese delegation becomes both the speaker and a major part of the audience in this instance, and while it is questionable whether that is possible within the strict CS rules, in this instance it is clear that China has securitized three core objects on the regional level by announcing what it perceives as threats that warrant extreme responses. This question of actor-audience relations is ambiguous within this context. As the other members at the time were the newly emergent CARs it is easy to suppose that China was a dominant player in the SCO. Within the theory, the audience is supposed to play a significant role in the securitization process by accepting the new threat as through a debating process. In the SCO it seems there was not real debate or discussion as there would be in a liberal-democratic system. This really seems to prove the point that in Asia “securitization is easier to achieve then in [the west]” (Acharya, 2006, 250)

5.11 Local/ sub-national level

While the three evils discourse is dominant aspect of securitization, China has expressed a desire to de-securitize the local and sub-national level. As noted earlier, economic development has become a major security paradigm in China. It therefore makes perfect sense that development would become the new mode of promote stability in Xinjiang. The Western Region Development Programme (WRDP) (Xibu da kaifa) is a central government program with sees development funds directed toward XUAR. The XUAR is a significant policy which according to the West Blue Book of 2009, Western Economic Development Report has seen in 10 years GDP in western region rises from 146.4738 billion in 1998 to 58.25658 billion in 2008 by 11.42% annually, well above the national average level 9.64%, which is the fastest growth seen in Xinjiang in the modern era. Ole Wæver, in his 1995 work ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’ defines security as a “speech act’, where security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. . . . By uttering ‘security’, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Wæver. 1995, 55) Desecuritization as a result is the opposite of this. In Jef Huysman’s work he provides an explicitly ethical-political approach to the issue of why to desecuritize. Drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt, Huysmans argues that securitization serves not only to demarcate the inside from the outside, but is also a technique of government that serves as an ordering principle, that is, “how a community defines its just and good way of life” (Huysman, 1995, 570) As Huysmans points out, securing ‘us’ against ‘them’ thereby raises a constitutive question about how the political community should be organized.

The little Chinese literature available of de-securitization practices points to XUAR being a key tool for security governance. The non-translated Chinese scholarship on the issue from Xinjiang Normal University (2012) sees the XUAR as having an obvious tendency towards desecuritization with its path covering policies about frontier economy development including

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23 Shunji Cui and Jia Li write a recent piece arguing for positive security practices in Frontier regions. This is affirmed by a 2012 article that is unpublished in English from the Journal of Xinjiang Normal University (Sciences) Col. 33, No. 1, Jan 2012.
science and technology, education, culture and citizen life quality. The article from Xinjiang Normal University claims that in searching and analyzing the discourses of China's leaders and national media sources in relation to Xinjiang, there is a strong trend of national leaders using ‘development’ in speech along side ‘security’. What are highly emphasized and repeatedly mentioned in policy agenda are development of the West Regions and Frontier. Even after the July 5 rioting, 2009, China's leadership, Hu Jintao, Xi jinping, Li Keqiang, Hui yuliang, Liu Yandong visited Xinjiang, and frequently used developing economy, preserve stability, support Xinjiang to explore and construct, promote to rely on science and education, talents and culture to rejuvenate the region. Therefore, it's easy to find that that is apparent desecuritization strategy. The strategy are effectively aiming to improve frontier region economic development, to lift people of the region living standard, employment and to increase education opportunities, and largely realize China's frontier stability and peace. This verifies the Copenhagen School assertive viewpoints that, as Waever claims, it is possible to improve security through lowering the close attention to security. This stands to reason, if an actor rhetorically treats a situation as a dangerous then escalation is more possible. The WRDP however by itself is not solely intended a de-securitization strategy which is to say that its intended effect is not to create a Galtung style notion of ‘positive peace’. (Galtung, 1985) Rather the idea logic is that this kind of program seeks to divert security concerns into other areas, namely economic development while “generating security as a side-effect” (Cui & Li. 2011, 156). This idea of security being a side-effect really shows a key divergence in how security is treated. The question of at the sub-national level in Xinjiang is does economic development change the nature of frontier security concerns by shifting the referent security object of the people there? Answering yes to this question would be clearly be over optimistic. The WRDP does not redefine security in Xinjiang but it broadens the avenues of discourse by identifying frontier security threats beyond the three evils. In this way Cui and Li argue that there is a shift away from the negative/ reactive side of security towards a more positive notion (Ibid, pp. 157-158) The issue here is that approaching de-securitization as a side effect of economic development runs the risk of being not immediately addressing some security concerns of minority groups. On issue is that if development is stratified towards the Han Chinese then de-securitization could act as an alienating force in Xinjiang and since this is the case, the shift to de-securitization does not bode well for the region. Lili Xu makes a clear point here when she
argues that effect frontier and national security in China is achievable with active protection and promotion of multi-ethnic cultures (2009).

Despite this, separatism is still treated as an existential threat that provokes a heavy-handed approach. This is reflected in PRC law with is yet to abandon the three evils (Xinjiang Normal University, 2012, 73) As Robert Starr notes: “The Chinese state, however, also appears to believe that development alone cannot destroy separatism; it must be accompanied by political control” (2004, 236) This does nothing to address the societal identity of the non-han population.

5.12 Speech acts

One illuminating set of speech acts is the PRC’s white papers on Xinjiang, prepared by Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. These serve as consolidated policy for any audience, whether domestic or international. As such the ‘audience’ the white papers is hard to define. This does not mean that felicity conditions cannot be met however. The Speaker of the white papers is the central government. The audience is therefore very hard to define. Potentially it is the general population of Xinjiang and China as a whole as it is a publically available document. Another audience would also be those who would question security policy, such as dissident groups and other actors. Gauging their acceptance of it is however not possible.

Here is a breakdown and analysis of the most recent white papers of frontier security. The following three sections relate to the securitization of “east turkistan”. They are acts of securitization that ‘legitimize future actions’. The speaker here is the central government and the audience is potentially any actor, both foreign and domestic, sub-national or otherwise. The complication with studying China is that because policy is so centralized there is no real issue of the speech act being rejected. It is therefore having a security discourse with a non-specific audience.

Here is an example of a white paper speech act in the PRC context:

**Figure 4: Speech act: Claim (see more in appendix)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositional Content</th>
<th>“East Turkistan” is a political struggle aiming for “independence of East Turkistan” (Claim).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Preparatory condition content | 1) The White Paper lists reasons and evidence as to the accuracy of Claim  
2) Old historical forces of separatism have revived a fabricated “ideological and theoretical system” to once again challenge national unity |
| Essential Content | Counts as understand the effect that “east Turkistan” is a political struggle |

This kind of speech act is important. The claim is the contextualization of the threat, situating within a continuum of things that automatically carry with it a certain response within the context of the PRC. By highlighting this securitizing act I have highlighted the duality of frontier security discourses. This highlights the persistence of separatism in security discourses, which is a classical example of securitization language as it clear demarcates the “us” and the “other” and articulates the existential threats in relations to the stability of the state. This is clearly securitizing language directed towards Xinjiang.

The PRC fits the CS model more then expected. The issue of the audience in China

### 6 Comparisons and Conclusions

Comparing and concluding on these two cases is challenging, as one key finding has been the radically different state/regime models of both cases. However there are some key conclusions
we can draw about the nature of securitization from these two case studies.

6.1 Differences in state/regime type

We can see from section 4 that both the PRC and Pakistan have different regime/state types to account for. For one, Pakistan’s state/regime dysfunction complicates securitization analysis. It lack of institutional cohesion means that securitization discourses play out on many levels simultaneously. We can see sub-state actors directly competing with the state regime over the contested notions of the state and its relationship to Islam and the Pakistani nation. It is clear the armed forces have a disproportionate amount of power and a position of exceptionalism in Pakistani society. They are largely unaccountable for their actions and as such can act in a unitary manner along their perceived self-interests. Because of the militaries role as protector of the nation and Islam it finds itself unable to fully engage with militancy in its frontiers. In other words its is unable to securitize actors and events which many would clearly see as existentially threatening to Pakistan. Its pre-occupation with India leaves it hamstrung and any attempt to re-direct rhetoric and resources to K-P would likely not be accepted in their entirety by the Pakistani people. This makes the CS applicable in Pakistan, but tricky to map out. The dysfunction of Pakistan when compared to the liberal-democratic model that it is historically based off means that a great deal of culturally specific knowledge is required in order to fully engage with security discourses in Pakistan that do not relate to India. The inability of the state/regime to securitize issues in K-P does not mean that there is security there. It seems counter-intuitive that securitization of issues in K-P is likely necessary in order for Pakistan to fully engage with the problems at hand. If the underlying discourse surrounding the state/regime, the nation and Islam remains unresolved then there is no foreseeable easement to tensions.

The PRC is substantially different in its regime/state type, which is highly relevant given that this was the first point of departure for this study. The centralized party system means that there is a unitary body directing everything with little competition. Essentially this means that speaker audience relations are altered on the domestic level as legitimacy is assumed in most PRC discourses, even more so when it is an issue of national sovereignty. With the absence of a liberal civil sphere, acceptance of the audience in securitization processes is not always relevant, something which undermines some core presuppositions of the CS. This however does not make
the CS school useless in the Chinese context. In its trans-national and international dealings the PRC is required to securitize objects and events within the audience of international actors. The coherence of security discourse in the PRC also means that de-securitization is possible. Despite some serious issues regarding ethnic relationships in China there are a number of key inroads into Xinjiang in regards to infrastructure and economic development.

3.2 Observability of Securitization

Initially I had expected Pakistan to be straightforward for analysis mainly because at least carries some liberal-democratic state traits as a result of its colonial history. However it became obvious when trying to source speech acts that there were not many. The armed forces rarely seek legitimacy for their security responses and the political parties cannot compel the armed forces to act easily. The categorization and analysis of the military as the chief securitizing actor in Pakistan is a key finding. Further sourcing of information, likely from a native Pakistani speaker would be necessarily to deepen this research project as it is apparently unclear where this can be easily accessed. A major issue is that the military does not feel compelled to justify its actions or clearly articulate its policies. Their engagement with terrorism in K-P as a security referent is weak and more often then not it is their ally the US that is seen as the easier threat to securitize. The pre-occupation with India means that issues in K-P are not likely to be phrased as existential threats to Pakistani society. A major emergent issue is that militant groups are one on hand historical proxies of the armed forces who have been mobilized around a conflation of religion and nationalism. This means that the state/regime in Pakistan has trouble securitizing the Taliban or other Pashtun affiliated groups in a way that would legitimate a serious response to the crisis. The armed forces as a consequence are stuck with only external actors to securitize, likely those who are seen as non-Islamic actors such as the US or India. This is a consequence of the unique ideological conflation in Pakistan that exists in the discursive relationship between the state, the nation and Islam. The ambiguous and unresolved relationship between these three important political dimensions opens space for competing actors to securitize one or more aspect of it, which more often then not is Islam. If the state/regime claims to be a protector of Islam
then if it is not actively representing it then its definition is open to competition. This competition is likely to be taken up in K-P by transnational groups such as al-Qaida and locally by the Pakistani Taliban.

In the PRC things are much more coherent for securitization analysis. It seems that the unitary nature of the PRC makes sourcing empirical data by comparison easier. There are consolidated policy documents and speeches, which while not exactly the same as liberal-democratic examples offer a good insight into securitization processes. The particular issue with the PRC however is defining who the audience is. It is not clear that securitization theory as it is classically understood can really be applied in the same way as it can in liberal-democratic cases. Even though Chinese politics are very secretive, and the ‘masses’ have not been allowed access to the processes that go on behind the great spectacles of Chinese politics, Chinese leaders have had the need and urge to appeal to the masses for support of this or that campaign. De-securitization should be viewed as a campaign as much as the Cultural Revolution in this sense. Even though the leadership is engaged in a dictatorship of the class enemy, they still have to appeal to the progressive masses. Argumentation is not only about intellectual acceptance, it is also about creating a basis for action people are truly convinced after they are willing to take action. Although authoritarian systems may not support genuine interaction, they do require people to participate in the ritual of conformity. A major difference between the PRC and Pakistan is that de-securitization, at least in economic terms is a generally pursuable goal. In Pakistan, it is not. Why is this? For one it comes down to the relative coherence of both states. With a centralized system de-securitization of the frontier can be pursued as a major objective. De-securitization can be the by-product of the PRC’s ability to coordinate regional economic development. In Pakistan it appears that de-securitization and development in K-P is impossible given deteriorating conditions. Economically the militaries control of industries means that liberalizing them in a way that would benefit the state peripheral zones is unlikely. Likewise aid and modernization have been tied to foreigners meaning that attempts both domestically and internationally to address root material problems could in turn be securitized by sub-national actors.

Below is a table comparing some key differences in the cases studied.
We see here that there is not much that is similar between the two cases. This was to be expected and this is by itself not a bad result. It is this incomparability that really illustrates the need to adapt securitization methodology to specific regime and societal types. Hopefully this analysis goes some way to exploring this. Likewise this paper illustrates that the trajectory of security discourses in both Pakistan and China illustrate the diametrically opposed situations that both are in. the PRC has the space to utilize economic development to de-securitize its frontier but this can only be effective with further recognition of minority culture and religion there. Pakistan on
the other hand is increasingly unstable with little chance of anything other than securitization from a multitude of actors possible.

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Appendix

Set A: East Turkistan as a political movement
### A. I. Speech act: Claim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositional Content</th>
<th>“East Turkistan” is a political struggle aiming for “independence of East Turkistan” (C).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Preparatory condition content | 1) The White Paper lists reasons and evidence as to the accuracy of C  
2) Old historical forces of separatism have revived a fabricated “ideological and theoretical system” to once again challenge national unity |
| Essential Content | Counts as understand the effect that “east Turkistan” is a political struggle |

This kind of speech act is important. The claim is the contextualization of the threat, situating within a continuum of things that automatically carry with it a certain response within the context of the PRC.

### A. II. Speech act: warn

| Propositional Content | Hostile forces in and outside China are contending with the party for popular support by openly challenging the Constitution and laws of China  
[if the party losses support of the people in Xinjiang then stability and unity will be lost] |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preparatory condition content</td>
<td>1) The hearer has a reason to believe that hostile forces could be contending with the party for the masses in Xinjiang, evidenced by hostile forces contending with the party before, resulting in a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
serious jeopardy for national unification

2) It is not obvious that low economic development should be attributed to subversive activity

**Essential Content**

Counts as undertaking the effect that unchecked, acts of subversion and the east Turkistan movement will economically deprive Xinjiang and *cause* further unrest

**A. III. speech act: require**

**Propositional content**

We shall protect and promote an environment that is conducive for economic development

**Preparatory condition content**

1) The audience is about to take concrete action
2) it is not obvious that the audience would take concrete action in the normal course of events on their own accord
3) There is a reason for taking concrete action: The east Turkistan movement is threatening national unity and the wellbeing of people under Chinese rule

**Essential content**

Counts as an undertaking to get the audience to take concrete action because social and political stability is threatened.

A notable strand of securitization has been the inclusion of “development” as a referent object.
Set B: Securitization of Development

This next set of speech acts deals with economic development in Xinjiang as a referent security issue.

B. I. Speech act: Claim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositional Content</th>
<th>East Turkistan is a threat to the the economic development of Xinjiang (C).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Preparatory condition content | 1) Xinjiang’s “environment for investment” is undermined by the East Turkistan movement  
2) Rioting, crimes of terror and violence are evidence of this bad environment |
| Essential Content | Counts stating that east Turkistan is responsible for lack of development opportunities |

B. II. Speech act: warn

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositional Content</th>
<th>Without the intervention of the Chinese government, the prospects for economic development in Xinjiang will continue to decline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Preparatory condition content | 1) The hearer that reason to believe that rioting and support of splitism will continue to deprive Xinjiang of development  
2) It is not obvious that stability and unity will be lost regardless |
| Essential Content | Counts as undertaking the effect that unchecked contending of the east |

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Turkistan movement will result in the loss of stability and unity, which is not in the hearer’s best interests
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| Essential Content | Counts as understand the effect that “east Turkistan” is a political struggle |

**A. II. Speech act: warn**

| Propositional Content | Hostile forces in and outside China are contending with the party for popular support by openly challenging the Constitution and laws of China |


| Preparatory condition content | 1) The hearer has a reason to believe that hostile forces could be contending with the party for the masses in Xinjiang, evidenced by hostile forces contending with the party before, resulting in a serious jeopardy for national unification 2) It is not obvious that low economic development should be attributed to subversive activity |
| Essential Content | Counts as undertaking the effect that unchecked, acts of subversion and the east Turkistan movement will economically deprive Xinjiang and cause further unrest |

A. III. speech act: require

| Propositional content | We shall protect and promote an environment that is conducive for economic development |
| Preparatory condition content | 1) The audience is about to take concrete action |
2) It is not obvious that the audience would take concrete action in the normal course of events on their own accord.

3) There is a reason for taking concrete action: The east Turkistan movement is threatening national unity and the wellbeing of people under Chinese rule.

**Essential content**

Counts as an undertaking to get the audience to take concrete action because social and political stability is threatened.

---

**Set B: Securitization of Development**

**B. I. Speech act: Claim**

**Propositional Content**

East Turkistan is a threat to the economic development of Xinjiang (C).

**Preparatory condition content**

1) Xinjiang’s “environment for investment” is undermined by the East Turkistan movement.

2) Rioting, crimes of terror and violence are evidence of this bad environment.

**Essential Content**

Counts stating that east Turkistan is
B. II. Speech act: warn

<table>
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2) It is not obvious that stability and unity will be lost regardless |
| Essential Content | Counts as undertaking the effect that unchecked contending of the east Turkistan movement will result in the loss of stability and unity, which is not in the hearer’s best interests |

Executive Summary

This thesis utilizes securitization theory in a comparative analysis of security discourses in both the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Peoples Republic of China by looking at how actors in both states frame and respond to security issues relating to the respective frontier regions of Khyber-pakhtun and Xinjiang. The purpose of which has been to produce a paper addressing the complexities that arise for peripheral
regions that are expected to fit into large multi-ethnic states and how new security discourses are developing in Central Asia. Using securitization theory means this thesis also contributes to the growing understanding of how securitization theory can apply to regimes outside the liberal western model. Securitization theory relies on gathering and analyzing security language in the form of official policy documents, political speeches and government communicates and using this information to deconstruct exactly how a security issues constructed and escalated. The value of this theoretical framework is that it allows for the expansion of security research by allowing for new sectors to be analyzed – such as economic, environmental, cultural – and new security referents – societies, non-state actors, individuals. A major challenge of this kind of theory is that it has developed almost exclusively within the study of western-democracies. This thesis addresses by researching what specific characteristics of Pakistani and Chinese states need to be understood for Securitization theory to be applicable. This thesis has found that Pakistan has a highly complex set of securitization characteristics something, which stems from the unique relationship that exists Uyghur Autonomous Region between the military and the government as well as its lack of economic development. The armed forces and intelligence services in Pakistan enjoy a privileged position and act as a guardian-parent to the civil government. This distorts how securitization is understood in western cases, as it is the military, not the civil government who acts as the chief actor in securitization. The armed forces in Pakistan actively attempt to define the ideology of the Pakistani state and society. This has lead to a complex situation where the armed forces have failed to properly define the role of Islam in the state and security policies. This has opened up space for other actors, such as the Taliban and militant groups, to contest the armed forces conception of Islam in a way that the military cannot effectively counter. This has come from the armed forces use of Islam and a tool of foreign policy to destabilize rivals in the area, such as India. The result of which is that Pakistan’s armed forces has securitized Islam in a way that it can no longer control thereby escalating its already complex security situation. In comparison to this this paper finds that the Chinese state is a more coherent actor to analyze with Securitization theory then first thought. The unitary nature of the Chinese state means that the central party and the military essentially act as one actor in securitization processes. While it was initially theorized that China would be hard to gather material for the opposite has been true. Political speeches and policy
documents have shown that security discourses in relation to Xinjiang have developed over the past 20 years. Where previously Chinese security discourse allowed for rapid escalation of frontier security along traditional threats of outside interference and social stability, new approaches to security has seen economic development take a prominent role. Economic development has become securitized in the Chinese context which militancy defied as much as a threat to economics as it is to national unity.

The conclusions and ramifications of this is that is the foreseeable future Pakistan will continue to see high levels of securitization from a multitude of competing actors. The Pakistani state is unable to de-securitize Islam as long as it seeks to instrumentalize religion as a tool of foreign policy. Its troubled alliance with the United States also mean that public opinion towards military policies aimed at de-securitizing and modernizing its frontier will be meet with resistance and therefore be counter-productive. At the same in, the elevation of economic development in China means that space has opened up for Xinjiang to become actively de-securitized through development projects. The issue for China still remains in how it allows for minority groups in Xinjiang to express their culture as economic development alone cannot fully satisfy this.