The cartographic authorship of the state

Developing a theoretical position regarding states and maps

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with establishing a theoretical position regarding the state as a cartographic author. Critical cartography provides an understanding of the profound connection between the state and the map. I am adopting a classical state-as-actor IR-perspective in order to ascribe the state agency, and I situate this perspective in the ontological debate of structure contra agency. The cartographic authorship of the state-agent is established.

The phenomena of the map is problematized, and the perspective arrived at is that of maps as territorial arguments. From an understanding of the state as a territorially defined entity, the map is ascribed a prominent role as a tool for the territorialisation of space. The discussion is informed by the study of Israeli mapping practices, and hypotheses are suggested for a theoretical framework.

The study of Israeli mapping practices implies the importance of state ideology; we must clearly define the relationship between the concepts of “nation” and “state”. Furthermore, I argue that the theoretical positioning elaborated can be useful when looking at cartography in the era of globalisation. The struggle over the map reflects the changing role of the state in an increasingly globalised world.

Key words: state, map, authorship, agency, Israel
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Useful concepts

In order to facilitate the reading of this thesis, and to secure the cohesion of the arguments, some essential concepts will be explained and defined in this paragraph.

*Cartography* is “the science or art of making maps” (Merriam-Webster). This definition can be plenty problematized. For example, in a Foucaultian understanding one could argue the epistemological formation of the “science” of cartography to be an extension of power through the construction of “knowledge”. Cartography can furthermore be understood as a territorial argumentation (Wood 1992, 2010), or as a means of territorial production (Elden 2010). This thesis recognises that several different approaches can be equally relevant, but mainly focus on the territorial argument.

*Critical cartography* is, according to Crampton & Krygier (2006), constituted of two critical movements. These are: 1) The theories, arguably political in their scope, that are looking to reveal the underlying power structures of cartography, and 2) the “set of imaginative mapping practices” (2006:12) that challenge the elite’s monopoly of cartography.

*State* is “a politically organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory; especially : one that is sovereign” (Merriam-Webster); or “a political organization whose rule is territorially ordered and which is able to mobilize the means of violence to sustain that rule” (Giddens 1985:20). Or even

> “a differentiated set of institutions and personell embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outward to cover a territorially demarcated area, over which it claims a monopoly of binding and permanent rule making, backed up by violence” (Mann 1986:37 as cited in Strandsbjerg 2010:10).

Even though these definitions do not harbour all contemporary states, I will stick to Giddens (1985) and Mann (1986) for simplicity rather than diving in to further discussion about dysfunctional states, etcetera.

*Nation-state* is “a form of political organization under which a relatively homogeneous people inhabits a sovereign state; especially : a state containing one as opposed to several nationalities” (Merriam-Webster). Following this definition, the “nation” of the nation-state correlates to ethnicity. I consider the concept of “ethnicity” to be a social construct, as do most with me (White 2004). It is, however, a construct that serves effectively, even though often destructively, as the ideological base of some states.

“Nationality” does not have to rely solely on “ethnicity”, and can be more or less restricted. In the case of Israel, we will see that the ethno-nationalism of the Zionist project is everything but inclusive. This can be compared to, for example, the Swedish form of nationality, that arguably is (in its ideal form) inclusive and without any mythological focus on ethnicity. For example historian Hedva Ben-Israel argues that the meaning of “nation-state” largely has shifted away from the romantic 19th century understanding (2011).
*Territory* is “a geographic area belonging to or under the jurisdiction of a governmental authority” (Merriam-Webster).

*Toponymy* is “the place-names of a region or language or especially the etymological study of them” (Merriam-Webster).
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1 Introduction

1.1 States and maps

When I google the phrase “Israeli maps”, the site Eye on Israel (www.eyeonisrael.com) is the first hit that shows. It is a tourist information-site from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism, with headings such as “Attractions”, “Wildlife of Israel”, and “Accommodations”. Visually, the focus of the site is a map, simply labelled Map of Israel. On a first glance, the map seems perfectly fine. The Mediterranean, the Dead Sea, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem all are where I would expect them to be. But how come the Gaza Strip shows as a part of Israel? And what about the occupied Golan Heights?

The nation-states of today are spatially defined through their borders. These borders are presented to us via maps. A fair inference might be that the borders must be in place before the maps, since the latter are supposed to display the formers’ factual whereabouts. With this view, maps are understood as representations of reality; they can be seen as right or wrong, but this is then only a question of accuracy. But what if the map comes first? According to political philosopher Mark Neocleous, the borders of the state’s territory come into existence on the map first, and only second in the spatial reality the map are supposed to represent (2003:418). Following this argumentation, the map can be said to produce reality, rather than the other way around.

A telling set of examples, often brought up by scholars (Harley 1988[a], Said 1993, Driver 2001, Butlin 2009), is how the colonial powers violently implemented their spatial divisions on their subjects, “inscribing lines of antagonism and identity across the face of the earth” (Neocleous 2003:419). In this sense, maps are powerful tools. It is no wonder that nation states historically have been concerned about monopolizing cartography (Harley 1989, King 1996, Corner 1999, Neocleous 2003, Pickles 2004, Jacob 2006, Wood 2010, Elden 2010).

In the 1980s, cartographer¹ Brian Harley pioneered the study of maps by applying the methods of philosophers Michael Foucault and Jacques Derrida. Since then, much has been written about the power of maps. Maps have long been in abundance in our culture – maybe even defining it, as is pointed out by critical cartographer Denis Wood in The Power of Maps (1992).

¹ Harley “had come to the study of old maps as an historical geographer” (Edney 2005:718).
However, even since Wood’s book came out in the early 1990s, a lot has happened concerning how we relate to information. Indeed it seems like the nation states of today have to consider the non-state actors, such as the search-engine giant Google (Strandsbjerg 2010). The struggle stands not only between states and huge corporations. Political geographers Crampton & Krygier argue that cartography has slipped out of the hands of elites in general; “the great map houses of the west, the state, and to a lesser extent academics” have lost ground due to 1) the technological transition that allows everyone to be a cartographer, and 2) the “social theoretic critique” which sees through the business of mapping and uncovers the underlying power-structures (2006:12). I am concerned with the second point, the social theoretic critique.

The struggle over mapping, and the mentioned historical state-monopoly of cartography, implies authorship of maps. However, critical cartography has as a discipline to a large extent its starting point in Foucault’s works. This makes the question of authorship complicated. Foucault is known to have posed the question *What is an Author?* (1969), and to have postulated the discourse as the only author around (Belyea 1992, Crampton 2001, Kitchin & Dodge 2007). For example, human geographer Nigel Thrift accuses Foucault of having a blind spot when it comes to the subject, and furthermore to have nourished a “poststructuralist anti-humanism” (Thrift in Crampton & Elden 2007:53). The internal discussion in critical cartography has often circled around how one should interpret Foucault with regards to authorship.

I argue that the state’s unique relationship with cartography makes it a strong candidate as to who authors the map. To proclaim the state a cartographic author, however, is to ascribe the state agency. This is a theoretical position that is not entirely obvious. The problem of discourse contra author thus calls for a positioning with regards to the more general problem of structure contra agency. What is the state’s relation to the map? Can the state have authorship, or to generalise that concept, agency? Can the state be an actor? Through questions such as these, I strive to contribute to political scientists’ appreciation for critical cartography, and to critical cartographers’ confidence in their own ontological positioning.

When I googled the phrase “Israeli maps”, I was intrigued by what I found. To judge by my imperfect knowledge of the region, the Map of Israel originating from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism is faulty. The insights from critical cartography do however help me to problematize that concept. “Right” and “wrong”, in a naively objectivist understanding, might not always be applicable in cartographic discussions.

I will make an attempt at development of theory. I aim to reach a positioning regarding the relationship between on the one side the political entity of the state, and on the other side the phenomena of the map. Such a positioning demands 1) a discussion of the underlying ontological question of whether one could fruitfully ascribe states agency (i.e., the structure contra agency problem, or IR theory’s

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2 The 2010 sequel, *Rethinking the Power of Maps*, is therefore called for.
state-as-actor problem); 2) an understanding of the discipline of cartography; and 3) an understanding of the political entity of the state. For empirical substance, I will turn to the case of Israeli mapping practices. Learning from theoretical discussions and empirical facts, I will suggest a theoretical standpoint. This standpoint should ideally hold criteria for falsification, so that it potentially can be tested.

1.2 Purpose and problem

I aim to develop a useful and potentially falsifiable theoretical position regarding states’ relationship to maps. I argue that this approach can bring new perspectives to the political scientist’s take on the structure-agency-problem, since the state’s cartographic authorship arguably is an aspect of this problem. The empirical part of this thesis, the study of Israeli mapping practices, will serve to inform the theory-developing discussion.

I will argue that the state per definition is a spatial construct, or territorial as so far that “territory” is defined as a space that is claimed and controlled. Seeing the state as a political entity with an essential spatial/territorial element (Giddens 1985, Escolar 1997, Biggs 1999, Brenner 1999, van Schendel 2005), I will furthermore argue that the state is inescapably intertwined with cartography and the map. This argument stands on two legs; 1) the historical emergence of modern cartography in the context of the development of the state and corresponding science paradigms (Harley 1989, Neocleous 2003, Wood 2010, Elden 2010), and 2) the theoretical understanding of the map as a geopolitical argument and tool of territorialisation (King 1996, Corner 1999, Pickles 2004, Jacob 2006, Strandsbjerg 2008, 2010, Elden 2010).

The relationship between the state and cartography will be analysed with help from the post-modern continuation of cartography, namely critical cartography. (The distinction between critical and uncritical cartography should be duly noted.) The discipline’s fundamental concern with authorship, often approach through the writings of Foucault, is here understood as one of many faces of the structure-agency-problem (addressed as discourse contra individual, or supra-individual, authorship). The theoretical discussion will be approached from the understanding of the state as a first-rate “map-fiend”, and with the textual (in the meaning of “discourse-artefact”) qualities of map increasing the tangibility of the structure-agency-problem. This is in line with political scientist Colin Wight’s appeal to put ontology at the forefront of analysis (2006:290), and also follow fellow political scientist Jeppe Strandsbjerg’s assertion that “we cannot understand the relationship of space, modern territory, and the state without grasping the significance of cartography” (2008:336). The study of Israeli mapping practices

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3 I do, however, humbly acknowledge that “the agent-structure problem is a problem with no overarching and definitive solution” (Wight 2006:4).
will further inform my theoretical discussion, and ideally help provide concrete tools for an embryonic theory of state cartographic authorship.

In short, I will discuss the following questions:

• How can we understand the relationship between state and map?
• Is it fruitful to ascribe the state cartographic authorship?
• How could a theoretical positioning regarding states’ cartographic authorship look?

1.3 Delimitation and perspective

The main focus will be that of political science, in that the state’s role and ontological status will be examined, and the political concept of territory will serve as a tool for delimitation and focus. The importance of space, and the focus on maps, will skew the thesis somewhat towards cultural/human geography, more specifically political geography. A global perspective will be ever present, as that is the scale of the state and its activities.

Even though several scholars have argued that the importance of the nation-state is declining (Ohmae 1995, Barber 1995, Strange 1996, Habermas 2001, Abrahamsen & Williams 2009), most would probably agree on its continued relevance as a political entity (Brenner 1999, Bartelson 2001, van Schendel 2005, Wight 2006, Strandsbjerg 2008, 2010). To a political scientist, the state remains an immensely interesting object of study.

When it comes to the discipline of cartography and critical cartography, I will avoid technical aspects, GIS, and similar offshoots. The perspective will be theoretical, in opposition to practical, and in a political sense to that. Crampton & Krygier (2006) describes critical geography as a “one-two punch”. In that terminology, this thesis is delimitated to the uppercut of critical theorising, leaving the jab of “imaginative mapping practices” (2006:12) for another fight.

The attack on the structure-agency-problem will take me into sociology, but the aim of the discussion is to extrapolate the sociologists’ wisdoms into the field of political science. In that sense, the theoretical influences will come from two directions; 1) sociologists, who have been the most industrious discussant of structure-agency, 2) critical cartographers, who have taken the related but more specific question of authorship very seriously. Also, to a less degree, I will glance towards international relations (IR), a field that has had good reasons to

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4 van Schendel aims to shake off “the ‘iron grip’ of the nation-state” (2005:4), but still argues for a reterritorialisation to be more relevant than a deterritorialisation. In a way he takes the middle ground in the globalisation versus the nation-state debate, when claiming that we should be “neither state-obsessed nor globe-entranced” (ibid:8).

5 If nothing else, those who argue against a state perspective are simultaneously acknowledging that very perspective; why would they otherwise have to exert themselves to deny it?
contemplate the status of the state. The Strandsbjergian (2008) call to understand cartography, in order to understand the state, is something I bear in mind. Since readings of Foucault informs critical cartography’s as well as sociology’s discussions on structure-agency, the philosopher will serve the purpose of bridging the gaps between the different approaches. In this way, the theoretical parts are intimately connected and very much coherent.

Empirically, my delimitation is the study of Israeli cartographic practices.

1.4 Method

My method is mainly literature studies. This goes for the theoretical as well as the empirical parts. For the latter, I will however glance at first hand material in the form of official state maps. Since my concerns are with theory development, and my aim is to reach a theoretical position, I will bring together the theoretical and empirical content in a concluding discussion where I will lay out my suggestions for an embryonic theory. The main criterion for this theoretic positioning is the aspect of falsifiability, however in a less than perfectly strict sense. Even Karl Popper “recognized that falsifiability is not a dichotomous matter (either/or) but rather a matter of degrees” (Gerring 2012:31).

The theoretical discussions will unavoidably inform the empirical study. Theory is arguably necessary when interpreting empirical evidence. Conversely, the application of an arrived at theoretical perspective can function as to evaluate it. As mentioned above, it is not necessarily a strict matter of confirmation or falsification, but rather a testing of the positioning’s relevance. It is neither a matter of “proving” a theoretical position: “Proof – at least in an absolute sense – is a theoretical ideal, available in geometry class but not in real life” (Oreskes 2004:379-380). However, I intend my embryonic theory to generate predictions that can potentially be falsified by further inquiries.

A purely theoretical discussion will always benefit from an exchange with the phenomena it is intended to clarify. Case studies are suitable in theoretical development. They are often the method of choice to identify causal mechanisms and complexities. A case study is arguably the appropriate way to approach the hows and the whys, without being too limited by the presumptive understanding. Even though I do not endeavour to pursue a downright case study, but rather an empirically informed theoretical discussion, I do look at the case of Israeli mapping practices in order to learn from it. Since I do not intend to make any excessive generalisations from this unique instance, the concept of analytical generalizability comes in handy here; similar circumstances is likely to produce similar results (Merriam 1994, Lindgren 2008).

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6 “As Karl Popper showed in the 1930s, there is no ‘final proof’ that a theory is correct” (Beinhocker 2006:58).
My argument will mainly rely on theoretical material, as the issues at hand are predominantly theoretical. For this exploration, relevant literature in the form of books and peer-reviewed articles will suffice. Regarding the Israeli mapping practices, I similarly will rely on mainly secondary sources, although some first hand material in the form of maps will be brought into the discussion.

1.5 Structure and reading directions

The chapter at hand has laid out the premise, the purpose, and the problem. The following tree chapters (chapters 2-4) are discussing theory. This is the most extensive part of the thesis, and it includes the structure-agency problem, critical cartography’s understanding of maps and the state-map-connection, the problem of discourse contra individual authorship, the state as actor from an IR-perspective, the nation-state as a concept, and the state as a cartographic author.

The fifth chapter consists of the empirical study of Israeli mapping practices. The section includes examples of official state maps, the Zionist movement, the colonial legacy, the birth of the state, the national project, contemporary maps, and examples of non-Israeli maps.

The sixth and final chapter consists of a concluding discussion. The section provides a summary of the deliberations presented throughout the thesis, as well as a more prospective discussion. Here is also where I formulate my attempt at developing an embryonic theory.
2 Structure contra agency

In this chapter, I will discuss the problem of structure contra agency. The position I deem most reasonable is that of causal realism, as laid out by Brante (2001). I argue that causal realism’s irreductive ontology allows for a state-as-actor perspective, without eliminating the possibility for a state-as-structure perspective. The concept of stratified reality is at the forefront of this discussion. Furthermore, I argue that the reading of Foucault as anti-agency is erroneous. That is a point that later on will have implications on the discussion of cartographic authorship.

2.1 The problem

It has been referred to as the problem of fate contra agency, event causation contra agency causation (Betts 1986), structure contra agent (Wendt 1987), determinism contra intentionalism (Hay & Wincott 1998), sufferer contra doer (Allen 2002), object contra subject, society contra individual, structure contra action, collectivism contra individualism, holism contra atomism, macro contra micro (Smart 1982), Karl Marx contra Max Weber (Callinicos 2004), or Émile Durkheim contra Max Weber (Wight 2006), but perhaps most commonly as structure contra agency (Smart 1982, Hay & Wincott 1998, Sibeon 1999, Brante 2001, Lewis 2002, Wight 2006, King 2009). The underlying ontological question is the same, however, and it is essential to all social sciences (Archer 1982, Hay & Wincott 1998, Sibeon 1999, Wight 2006).

So, what is the question then? It is the very fundamental question about how we should understand reality. Is the structure all-explanatory, or does the individual have agency? Can we study emergent social high-level phenomena, attribute them with causal power, and still leave room for “free will”? Does different strata of reality have different ontological status? The problem is thus an ontological one, but it can be extrapolated into many other fields. The theory of

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7 Admittedly, not all scholars would lump these problems together. Wight separates the micro-macro problem from the level-of-analysis problem, suggesting the former is a “unit-of-analysis issue” where as the latter is a “level-of-explanation” issue (2006:105).


9 Or, conversely, “whilst the agent-structure problem is not simply an ontological matter, the ontological aspects of the problem take priority” (Wight 2006:88).
science one adopts might for example have implications on one’s political views.\footnote{The mother of objectivism, Ayn Rand, is perhaps the ultimate personification of this. Her ontology implies an individualism that has been immensely influential through fictional works such as \textit{The Fountainhead} (1943) and \textit{Atlas Shrugged} (1957), the latter often seen as a bible of the neo-liberal paradigm. As if to illustrate this point, “non-profit” organisation The Ayn Rand Center present itself as follows: “The Center’s mission is to advance individual rights […] as the moral basis for a fully free, laissez-faire capitalist society” (The Ayn Rand Center’s homepage). Republican vice president candidate Paul Ryan once gave \textit{Atlas Shrugged} as a Christmas present to all his co-workers (Mayer 2012).}

Agency can be defined as an “actors’ capacity to act upon situations” (Sibeon 1999:139), and actor can be defined as “an entity that, in principle, has the means of formulating and acting upon decisions” (ibid:141), not necessarily an individual. Structure can be defined as “the pattern of system of beliefs, relationships, institutions […] in a social group or society” (Merriam-Webster), and the question at hand can be posed as whether the causal power of the structure extinguishes the agency of the actor.\footnote{A classical work advocating such a reductive view is political scientist Kenneth Waltz’ \textit{Man, the State, and War: A theoretical analysis} (1959). Waltz’ structural realism includes three levels of analysis; the individual, the state, and the systemic level. Waltz argues that the third and “highest” level is the exclusively pertinent one. In my view, Waltz is thus losing the cake while eating it. Wight is of another opinion, claiming that the view of Waltz as reductionist is faulty. According to Wight, Waltz’ is a “methodological” rather than “ontological” structuralism (Wight 2006:75).}

\section*{2.2 Ontological dualism}

Several positions regarding the structure-agency-problem have been proposed. Ontological dualism is one such position. Following this line of thought, individuals’ agency is recognised, and seen as producing higher-level social phenomena (King 2009). Prominent scholars of this tradition include Pierre Bourdieu, who has introduced the concept of habitus, which is a structuring structure that provides the frames for social action. The practices dictated by this meta-structure are simultaneously reproducing the structures themselves (Bourdieu 1984). Similarly, Anthony Giddens suggests a theory of structuration, where the production of social action reproduces the system (Giddens 1995). Bourdieu’s and Giddens’ respective takes can be seen as roughly equivalent (Schatzki 1987).

It can be argued that ontological dualism does not solve anything, but rather eludes the real question (Brante 1989, 2001); that its recognition of the unconscious further circumscribes the individual’s agency (Smart 1982); that it oscillates between voluntarism and determinism (Archer 1982); that the rules of its meta-structures are not limited enough to be meaningful determinants (King 2009); or even that the epistemological configurations of human sciences does not allow the detachment of the structure-agency dualism (Smart 1982).
2.3 Power and subject

If ontological dualism emphasise how the structure is “both the medium and the outcome” of reproduced practices (Smart 1982:134, Callinicos 2004:94), then Foucault’s understanding of power can be interpreted as Giddens’ inverse. To Foucault, power is a condition for the subject. It is the structure that defines certain bodies as individuals. Foucault is thus not necessarily denying the existence of agency (Allen 2002), even though “a young Foucault” can be read that way (Brante 2001:177). Philosopher Amy Allen reads Foucault, as well as Hannah Arendt, as advocates for power (i.e., structure) as potentially facilitating agency, and in any case being necessary for the emergence of subjectivity (2002).

Ontological dualism arguably becomes unreasonable with this view, since Giddens and Bourdieu hold that the subject must be in place to reproduce the structures. Also, Foucault’s alleged “killing of the subject” (ibid) can be countered through the application of the philosopher’s notion of “resistance”. In fact, similarly to how power is a condition for the subject, Foucault argued power to produce resistance, the act of opposing the structure (Smart 1982). Following this argument, it becomes quite intuitive that agency can come into existence in conflict with structure. One could even argue that the distinction between subject and system becomes tangible first when they strive for different goals.

Foucault claimed to not “analyze the phenomena of power”, but “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (1982:777). Still, as far as the societal relations can be understood as the workings of power, the concepts seem unavoidably connected. In relation to the state, the subjectification is seen as intertwined with the pastoral European state’s formation: “The state’s power […] is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power” (ibid:782). Foucault does not provide any unambiguous definition of the “subject”. Yet it is there, as a pattern in the substrate of power.

2.4 Critical realism

One further ramification of ontological dualism is critical realism. The key elements are the avoidance of a reductive ontology and the search for a middle

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12 "It is not man himself who thinks but he is thought by the thought system he happens to be caught in, he does not speak but is spoken by the language he is born into, he does not act but is acted by the social, economic, political systems he belongs to” (Foucault in Lindung 1968:203, as cited in Brante 2001:177).

13 Arendt is usually read as an advocate of agency over structure: “Arendt does not look at man first and foremost as a passive object, subjected to social effect. She is an active being and through her vita activa a common and meaningful world, that sets the limits to our actions, emerges” (Israel in Arendt 1988, my translation).

14 Human geographer Nigel Thrift labels Foucault’s treatment of the subject a “blindspot” (Thrift in Crampton & Elden 2007:54).
ground between objectivism and relativism. In critical realism, the individual’s production of the social structure is still central. Sociologist Margaret Archer argues for an infinite cycle where actions, shaped by structure, precede structural elaborations (1982). Philosopher Roy Bhaskar argues that individuals knowingly follow social rules to gain meaning, and thus reproduce the social structures (1991). The social forms precede the subject’s actions in that it governs them, and “the reason why garbage is collected is [not] necessarily the garbage collector’s reasons for collecting it” (Bhaskar 1998:39). Furthermore, societal formations gain their ontological status through their causal effectiveness towards the material reality. The intermediary is “intentional human agency” (ibid:88).

2.5 Causal realism

The most productive view, in my opinion, is the close relative to critical realism, namely causal realism (Brante 2001). The core concepts are causality, mechanism, and stratified reality (ibid:171-172). Political scientist Charles Tilly defines mechanisms as “a delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (2001:25-26). This definition of the concept allows for assertions about causal connections, an understanding widely agreed on in political science (Gerring 2008, Falleti & Lynch 2009). Furthermore, causal realism’s take on causality opens the door for Karl Popper (1990), in emphasising probabilities before a simplistic binary “if A, then B”-view of causality. Thus, a less rigid, more dynamic and more viable view of causality becomes available.

This view of mechanisms and causality becomes very relevant when applied to the causal power of the structure, as discussed by for example Bhaskar (1998). To assign different levels of causal power to the structure is of course another way to phrase the debate. A more smoothened understanding of causality allows for naming the structure as a determinant, without falling into determinism.

The concept of stratified reality is yet another blow to a reductionist view. The structure-agency problem is a problem of the layers of reality, and their respective ontological status. Stratified reality provides an irreductive ontology, where every level of explanation can coexist peacefully. The psychologist, the rational-choice theorist, and the Marxist sociologist can all hypothetically be right at the same time, in that they are concerned with different stratum of reality. Even though their respective analyses might seem irreconcilable, the causal realist understands it as simply being an issue of ontological levels (Brante 2001). This tolerant and

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15 Who, by the way, can be compared to Bourdieu in how he understood cultural systems as practice-based (Emirbayer 2010).

16 The typical analogy from natural science is how we understand temperature. On one level, it is a question of the individual movements of atoms. On a macro-level, however, the statistical tendency will reveal itself as warmth or coolness. Temperature is an emergent high level phenomenon, as real as anything else, but fully and
multifaceted theory of science corresponds to political scientist Colin Wight’s understanding of the different “solutions” to the structure-agency-problem as “competing visions of what the social world is” (2006:4).

2.6 Concluding remarks on structure-agency

I argue that the structure-agency-problem can be approached from the theory of science-standpoint of Brante’s (2001) causal realism. The irreductive ontology gives that individual agency and structure can be equally explanatory and equally worthy of analysis; there is no opposition, only a matter of changing focus from low-level to high-level phenomena. Moreover, one can dynamically ascribe causal power of a varying degree, rather than stating that any one actor or structure possesses all, or total, causal power.

The readings of Foucault (Smart 1982, Allen 2002) give a deeper understanding of the multidirectional relation between constituent and constituted in the structure-agency discussion. Where ontological dualism emphasises how the subject produce the structure (Bourdieu 1984, Giddens 1995), Foucault conversely stresses how the structure defines the subject, and how power breeds agency as resistance. Furthermore, the structure also facilitates the subject’s agency; it is not exclusively oppressive.

As we will see, the structure-agency problem is reoccurring in critical cartography. Strandsbjerg writes: “As states consolidated and centralised, there was a general push to acquire authorship of map-making” (2008:337, my italics). At the same time, several critical geographers question the possibility of unitary authorship, drawing on their reading of Foucault (Crampton 2001, Kitchin & Dodge 2007). Strandsbjerg is “tracing the agency of the map-making” (2008:342), an agency that is irrelevant with an orthodox reading of the philosopher.

Brian Harley, who took help from discourse analysis and deconstruction-theory when moving away from the empiricist cartographic paradigm, have often been criticised for misreading (or miss reading) Foucault (Belyea 1992, Hubbard et al 2004:178). As has already been hinted towards, the denial of agency is not necessarily the only possible interpretation of Foucault’s works. This realisation will be useful when finding a position with regards to the structure-agency-problem as understood through the mapping-practices of the state.

The causal realist’s view paves the way for my argument that the meso-level dwelling entity of the state (i.e., Waltz’ [1959] middle level) can hold cartographic authorship (Strandsbjerg 2008), and that this authorship is of the highest relevance for political science. In this respect, this thesis holds a classical

only constituted of the average of the behaviour of smaller particles. (One epoch-making piece of literature that has to be mentioned when discussing the multiple stratum of reality is professor of cognitive science Douglas Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid [1979].)

17 “The question is not whether to be a realist, but of what kind” (Wight 2006:26).
IR-perspective, emphasising the state actor, but without abiding to a reductive ontology. With a similar approach, Wight divides the IR-discourse’s ontology into the international system versus the nation state vs bureaucracy vs individual, in a falling scale from high- to low-level. This formulation

“forces/allows the relocation of agency at every move up or down the levels, so that what appears as a structure on one level becomes an agent on another” (2006:107).
3 Cartography

My aim is for this section to give a brief historical background on cartography, and to give a basic understanding of the theorising on maps and mapping, especially in relation to the historical emergence of the state. Understanding cartography is essential to understanding the state (Strandsbjerg 2008). And, as political geographers Crampton & Krygier write: “[critical cartography] can only be understood in the historical context of the development of the cartographic discipline more generally” (2006:11).

It is important to avoid confusion regarding the terms “cartography” and “critical cartography”. Critical cartography can be seen as a natural continuation from cartography. In a sense the “critical” side of it denotes when the cartographic discipline became self-aware.

The section at hand is divided with consideration to chronology. It starts off with discussing the meanings of Medieval-, Renaissance-, Enlightenment-, and Modernist cartography. The resolution of the exposition increases when we enter the empiricist, or “Robinsonian”, paradigm. The epoch-making shift to critical cartography is the next step, after which the text will travel along the different paths of theorising within the discipline, with special consideration to the problem of discourse contra authorship.

3.1 From art to science?18

The major insight in modern cartography is that maps are not objective representations of reality. The idea that they are, however, is neither very old. Cartography was long seen as equal parts art and science, and aesthetics is known to have trumped the idea about accuracy. Religious celestial “maps” are instances when priorities look remarkable through our 21st century glasses.

However, old maps differ substantially from modern ones even when “accuracy” is a priority. They might for example be foremost concerned about signifying the time it takes to travel between different locations on horseback. On old maps, this is sometimes illustrated by dots whose interspace represents a time-

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18 This brief historical background is shamelessly Eurocentric. For a broader perspective, see for example the many volumes of The History of Cartography (founding editors Harley & Woodward).
unit. Even on a map such as Olaus Magnus’ *Carta marina*\(^{19}\), which is considered “cartographically […] a step forward” (Frängsmyr 2004:59, my translation), the artistic perspective is prominent. Actually, it partly constitutes the informative content of the map, in that the many imaginative illustrations tell a vivid story about the northern periphery of Europe.

Oftentimes, maps have been very specific in a way we are not used to today. For example, Pellervo Kokkonen describes a 16\(^{th}\) century Dutch commercial map of the Baltic Sea, which selectively maps a few commercially relevant routs, complete with linear textual descriptions of how to go about one’s journey, and even suggestions of what to trade (1998:58). In fact, medieval “maps” were often purely textual (Strandsbjerg 2010).

The talk about “old maps” can in fact be seen as a misconception. Sociologist Michael Biggs writes that “medieval Christendom […] essentially [was] a mapless world” (1999:376). Biggs argues that we often impose the notion of “map” on different pictures, even though that class of visual representations did not become linguistically specific until the 16\(^{th}\) century. The constituents of modern cartography were joined together during the Renaissance; before that, the discipline and its products were essentially different from that of today (ibid). Wood argues that what we understand as maps is a less than 600 years old phenomenon (2010).

Even if we choose to interpret the medieval visual representations as equivalent to our concept of maps, the production and use of maps still increased drastically during the transformation from a feudal pre-modern society. Map-making, as it was, was largely a privilege of the elites even before this, but when states began to emerge and the concept of borders and well-defined territory became increasingly important, map-making became almost exclusively a state-business (Neocleous 2003). Wood writes that maps came about “in the needs of nascent states to take on form and organize their many interests” (2010:8).

The view of maps as purely scientific products, in a positivist sense, goes hand in hand with the development of cartography during the Enlightenment. Throughout this period and forwards, the scientific ideals came to take a hold of geographic representations, and “art’ was […] purged from maps” (Edney 1999:193).\(^{20}\) The development was emphasised during the 19\(^{th}\) century, when the ideas of modernity reshaped the role of the map in the same pace that the understanding of science changed. The Enlightenment’s representation of choice,

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\(^{19}\) *Carta marina*, the famous map of Scandinavia by Olaus Magnus, was printed in 1539 in Venice (Frängsmyr 2004:58-59). The map can be seen at the following URL: [http://xyz.malmo.se/historiska_kartor/pdf/481M1_3.pdf](http://xyz.malmo.se/historiska_kartor/pdf/481M1_3.pdf) (accessed 14/8-2012). One should be aware that even though the Renaissance took place in Italy in the 14\(^{th}\) century, it did not reach northern Europe until much later. This chronology reveals *Carta marina* as a typical product of the Renaissance.

\(^{20}\) As Edney’s quotation marks around “art” indicate, the problematic aspect of the art-science-dichotomy should be noted. Cartographer John Krygier argues that the distinction is an argument of the positivist/empiricist paradigm, and that separating “progressive science” from “a-progressive art” only serves to position modern, “accurate” mapping as something essentially different from earlier cartography. The same separation applied to a single map will convey the idea that the “scientific elements” are infallible, while the “artistic elements” are not. Krygier does not acknowledge that the “art/science dualism […] stand up under close scrutiny” (1995:3).
the terrestrial globe, was simultaneously replaced by maps, or as cartographer Matthew Edney puts it: “The Enlightenment’s global fetish was torn down and replaced by Modernity’s reductionist conviction that its knowledge of the world is detailed, particular, and exact” (1999:192). It was this “empiricist” understanding of maps that largely reigned during the 20th century.

What a map is has changed throughout history. Different ideologies and ideals have generated different priorities. The medieval “maps” were few, and those of world scale had a purely metaphysical/religious narrative. The Renaissance (14th-17th century) brought new elements into cartography, artistically as well as methodologically. During the Enlightenment (18th century), cartography turned into a “science”, a development that was emphasised during late modernism. The associated positivist paradigm made maps out to be potentially objective representations of the world, with accuracy as the main goal.

Interchangeably with the development of theory of science and aesthetics, the state developed as the hegemonic political entity (Escolar 1997, Biggs 1999, Wood 2010). The state’s emphasis on territory and sovereignty gave cartography an essential role (Strandsbjerg 2008, 2010). During colonialism, cartography became a powerful tool of oppression and domination (Harley 1988[a], Said 1993, Driver 2001, Butlin 2009). When the state began to support itself on the notion of the nation, the map found a place in the morass of ethnicity and identity-politics (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006, Wallach 2011). Consequently, states have had a strong grasp on cartography (Harley 1989, Neocleous 2003, Elden 2010). The grasp loosened, however, at the end of the 20th century (Crampton & Krygier 2006), and today’s development of cartography is towards becoming “increasingly ‘democratized’ and privatized” (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010:834), leaving the nation-state-monopoly behind. However, states are still obviously concerned with cartography in the endeavour to territorialise space.

To contemplate these intertwined historical threads is to contemplate the evolution of cartography. This is much in the spirit of the person who in the 1980s arguably took the next step in the understanding of maps: Brian Harley. Before turning to Harley, however, we will take a closer look at the cartographic paradigm that raised him.

### 3.2 The empiricist paradigm and its critics

The empiricist paradigm was built around the idea that quality of map content is the only parameter worth contemplating. In other words, accuracy was the guiding

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21 Wood & Krygier (2009) name cartography-scholars Wood, Fels, Harley, Woodward, Rundstrom and Pickles as the key critics who challenged the empiricist “Robinsonian” paradigm, “shifting attention from the ‘form’ of the map […] to its ‘meaning for behavior’” (Wood & Krygier 2009:342). They emphasise, however, that this view is narrow, and that “criticism more broadly understood has been an aspect of mapmaking from its earliest days” (ibid:344).
principle. The goal was to accomplish objective representations of reality (Edney 2007).

Arthur H. Robinson’s *The Look of Maps: An Examination of Cartographic Design* (1952) argued that cartography, and not only geography, should be fully recognised as a discipline. Robinson saw cartographic practice as split between engineers and academics, of which the latter was overtaken and needed a boost. The “Robinsonian” cartography was allegedly “a-political, empirical and [...] segregated from context” (Crampton & Krygier 2006:25), and for this naivety it was critiqued already by contemporaries (ibid). Arthur H. Robinson’s influence has named the empiricist paradigm “Robinsonian”. Robinson relied on information theory, and advocated a model that treated maps as mere communication devices (Dodge *et al* 2011).

R. A. Skelton’s *Looking at an Early Map* (1965) pointed out the imperfections and different fallibilities of older maps. Skelton mentioned a few historical cases, in order to illustrate the problems associated with studies of “early maps”, a term connoting “any map which, through immaturity of knowledge, judgment or expression, is not to be read as a strict record of geographical facts” (1965:27). I have of course included this quote because of how it epitomizes the core values of the empiricist paradigm.²²

Barbara Petchenik’s *Cognition in Cartography* (1975) quoted art-theorist and perceptual psychologist Rudolf Arnheim: “All perceiving is also thinking, all reasoning is also intuition, all observation is also invention” (Petchenik 1975:183). Petchenik extrapolated findings in psychology to the field of cartography, and contemplated the implications of the shift from behaviourism, when posing the question: “How [...] does one read a map?” (ibid:184). As some mapping practices were pointed out to be arbitrary, and not possible to “be interpreted in any way other than by the rules of the mapping game” (ibid:191), Petchenik put her finger on the receiver’s part in the creation of the cartographic experience. The view of the map as a text within the discourse, shaped by what the power/knowledge-system dictates to the writer as well as to the reader, was hereby foreboded.

Robinson-student David Woodward did, on his end, father the discipline of the History of Cartography, beginning with *The Study of the History of Cartography: A Suggested Framework* (1974). The article “provides a simple definition of the field” and “introduces a matrix” meant to clarify the relevant concepts (Woodward 1974:101). Through separating production and product, Woodward could distinguish between “the study of the making of the map and the study of the map itself” (Woodward 1974, as cited in Edney 2005:719). Woodward furthermore influenced Brian Harley to move his emphasis from “cartography” to “history” when studying the history of cartography. This shifted the understanding

²² It is immensely fascinating to see how Skelton routinely dismisses all cases of “early maps”, without ever questioning his contemporaries. There is an ingredient of nonchalance in how he consider all other historical cartographical starting points to be fallible, but not that of his own time. With this said, the exposition carried out is highly educative and interesting.
of cartography into seeing it as a humanistic discipline, which in its turn implicitly recognised cartography as anchored in respective historical context. This eventually pushed Harley into “linguistics, iconography, the sociology of knowledge, and poststructuralism” (Edney 2005:720).

Even though Harley later arguably pioneered cartography, he was active in the empiricist paradigm up to that. Harley’s The Evaluation of Early Maps: Towards a Methodology (1968) tried to establish a formalised methodology for the study of “early maps”. Harley’s later questioning of the empiricist paradigm is seemingly emerging already in 1968. When describing why historical maps are such deceptive objects of study, Harly wrote: “almost every map involves a certain amount of generalization, selective emphasis and conventionalization” (1968:74, Harley’s italics). Edney (2007:14) mentions The Map User in the Revolution (Harley 1978) as a case of when Harley’s empirical findings prove his theoretical framework insufficient, thus paving the way for later intellectual innovations.23

Jacques Bertin’s Semiology of Graphics: Diagrams, Networks, Maps (1983, originally in French 1967) carried out a semiotic analysis, which became increasingly important when the communications model collapsed. Dodge et al argue that this semiotic tradition blended with cognitive approaches in the 1990s,24 and became a “new representational orthodoxy” with regards to GIScience25 and GeoVisualisation26 (2011:4). They also direct attention to the fact that such models of communication still pose the old positivist truth-claim of the empiricist paradigm, all in a dazzling smoke of scientific rationality (ibid). However, Brian Harley’s Deconstructing the Map (1989) put a fan to the smokescreen.

3.3 Questioning the objectivity of maps


Harley’s vantage point is on the relativist side of the playing field. He explicitly sets out to remove the positivist veil that still is the garment of choice

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23 Historian of cartography Richard Oliver (2007) claims that Edney overstates Harley’s earlier intellectual concern to understand maps. According to Oliver, “there was no one ‘Harley line’: his theoretical basis shifted from paper to paper” (2007:6).

24 Notable for this “blend” is Alan M. MacEachren’s How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design (1995), that “sought to reestablish map design studies on scientific grounds” (Edney 2007:18).

25 GIScience is the theory behind GIS, i.e. Geographic Information Systems.

26 Geographic Visualisation is the analysing of spatial data through interactive visualisation.
for many cartographers. In *Concepts in the History of Cartography: A Review and Perspective* (Blakemore & Harley 1980), the authors present a trailblazing critique of cartography. In *Deconstructing the Map* (1989), Harley rejects the idea of the map as an objective representation of reality, and escorts cartography into the post-modern era.

Harley argues that “the notion of a progressive science is a myth partly created by cartographers in the course of their own professional development” (1989:2), and that historically, cartography has been considered as much an art as a science. Consequently, maps are more norms and values than sheer equations. Political geographer Jeremy Crampton writes about Harley’s work: “By positioning maps within their societal power relations, a richer account of their purpose could be provided” (Crampton 2001:242). This goes for the scientific paradigm, as well as for the project of colonialism. Even more importantly, Harley emphasises the importance of the Foucaultian notion of discourse when posing the question: “What types of rules have governed the development of cartography?” (1989:3).

In *Maps, knowledge, and power* (1988[a]), Harley writes that “the history of the map is inextricably linked to the rise of the nation state in the modern world” (ibid:283). “The state became – and has remained – a principal patron of cartography” (ibid:284).

Harley goes on discussing how knowledge of cartography, historically, has been a privilege in order to “monopolise knowledge” (ibid). From a knowledge-power-perspective, this becomes even more intuitive when one considers the military aspect of the nation-state project. From a military viewpoint, geographic knowledge is quite literally power, which means that a monopolisation of cartography serves the states interests in consolidating its military advantage and monopoly of violence.\(^{27}\)

Thus, according to Harley, the discourse perhaps most relevant for the understanding of maps and cartography is the emergence of the modern nation-state. Not only, however, the military side, but also the disciplinary aspect. Harley writes that “maps impinged invisibly on the daily lives of ordinary people. Just as the clock […] brought ‘time discipline’ into the rhythms of industrial workers, so too the lines on maps, dictators of a new agrarian topography, introduced a dimension of ‘space discipline’” (ibid:285). Harley exemplifies with the dividing of former commons, and the mapping of “the ‘wilderness’ of former Indian lands” (ibid).

Another point made by Harley is that of “deliberate distortion of map content”. Examples are manipulations of scale, the use of emotive colours, the changing of topography, etcetera (ibid:287). One interesting aspect of this is how US world maps during certain periods have showed the globe in two halves, thus

\(^{27}\) In *Questions on Geography*, an interview with Foucault, the etymology of several geographic notions is discussed. The philosopher makes the immediate connection to military terminology, and recognises the connection between geography and nation-state militarism: “It seems to me that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analysed […] in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organizations of domains” (Foucault in Gordon 1980:182).
mediating the idea of the United States’ own hemisphere. Through such visual modes, maps can be said to codify, legitimate, and promote certain worldviews in a quite obvious manner (Harley 1989).

Less evident, however, are the unconscious distortions, which are the result of the values of the map-producing society. Mechanisms of this are, according to Harley, map geometry, “silence” of map content, and hierarchical tendencies (Harley 1988[a]:289).

Relating to the first category, Harley mentions the “omphalos syndrome”28, i.e., that map-producing cultures tend to position themselves in the centre of the universe. Another often-mentioned distortion is the ethnocentrism of world-map projections; for example the famous Mercator-projection exaggerates the sheer size of Europe enormously, “reinforcing the Europeans’ view of their own world hegemony” (ibid:290) relating to the colonial project.29 Landscape architect James Corner mentions the north on top-convention, that can be said to psychologically put the northern hemisphere in a superior position (Corner 1999:218).

When it comes to the silence of maps, the point is what is not there. The historical examples brought up by Harley cover the exclusion of unwanted settlements in rural Ireland as well as the discrimination of native peoples in colonial mapping (Harley 1988[a]:292). When it comes to hierarchical distortions, one telling example is how religious and/or political importance often have trumped actual size and population when depicting cities (ibid:294).

To conclude, Harley pioneered the cartographic discipline by promoting the textuality of maps; they can be read and analysed at levels beyond the evident, and beyond the supposedly objective representation of reality. In a Foucaultian spirit, Harley defined the cartographic discourse as related to the emergence of the nation-state, its knowledge/power-striving, and its territorial aspirations. Through his intellectual innovations, Harley has brought maps out of the empiricist/positivist paradigm.

3.4 Beyond Brian Harley

Harley was soon followed by Denis Wood (1992) and John Pickles (1992), who understand maps through linguistics and semiotics respectively hermeneutics. The “inherently political” nature of maps is emphasised by both scholars (Dodge et al 2011). Furthermore, in The Fine Line between Mapping and Mapmaking (1993)

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28 “Omphalos” means “navel” in Greek, and refers to the centre of the world, Gaia’s navel.
29 Earth is a sphere, but maps are usually flat. Hence, the globe must be severely distorted, in one way or another, in order to be made into a map. The Mercator projection is one very famous take on this problem: “The Mercator map stretches the surface of the globe without excision onto a flat surface, oriented ‘upwards’ to the north. The compass directions are made parallel, leading to gross distortions of land area and shape, especially as one moves towards the poles. The northern hemisphere dominates, with Greenland more than twice the size of Australia, even though the southern island is in fact greater than three times the land area of the northern” (Corner 1999:217).
Wood criticise Harley for not riding the postmodern train to the end-station. Barbara Belyea’s *Images of Power: Derrida, Foucault, Harley* (1992) also criticise Harley, now for having an incomplete understanding of Foucault and Derrida.

Some thinkers have pointed to the self-evident nature of some Harleyan arguments. Wood even argues that the focus on obvious distortions and manipulations are misleading:

“By parading egregious instances of map bias, the vast corpus that underwrites our daily living is allowed to evade inspection. [...] Our attention is turned to ‘propaganda maps’ whereby the innocence of other maps is protected by blinding us to all but a small corpus of maps in which everyone can see – and happily acknowledge – the social construction of the image. Or, a big deal is made about the failure of maps in the past to reflect the ‘real world’” (Wood 1992:20).

Wood carries out an almost anthropological exposition throughout our map-making culture, and claims that maps are best to be seen as arguments rather than representations (1992). The arguments are often about ownership, which makes Wood’s highly constructivist perspective very relevant to the view on mapping as a territorialisation of space carried out by the nation-state. In the later work *Rethinking the Power of Maps* (2010), Wood dwells on this perspective, and underlines that the map’s power lies not in that it is a representation, but conversely in that it is a proposition about what might be. This was actually what made it such a valuable tool to the state (Wood 2010).

Linguist Emanuela Casti similarly argues that “the message conveyed by the map can actually replace reality” (2005:11). By applying semiotics to cartography, she identifies maps as agents, capable of presenting themselves as maps through self-reference. In combination with the “iconization” of them, this gives maps the power to take precedence over more “direct” perceptions of reality. Hence, maps have an interpretive prerogative (ibid). This makes them incredibly powerful, and able to shape reality through their users when these strive to fulfil the maps’ implicit truth claims.

Political geographer Jeremy Crampton points to the fact that Harley’s deconstruction is far more successful in “reveal[ing] what the map was not (i.e., innocent, scientific, optimal)”, than in explaining what it is (2001:241). Furthermore, Crampton argues that Harley sometimes misunderstood Foucault and Derrida, partly in that Harley suggested unitary authorship of maps. Here, Crampton underlines that Foucault denied the possibility of a unitary author (ibid:242); the discourse is the author. Geographers Collins-Kreiner *et al* put it quite neatly: A map is yet another text which is part of the discourse. It is not necessarily any specific actors’ conscious attempt to manipulate (even though I would argue that maps often are just that). A map is, however, made according to

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30 This resembles the Greek 6th century prophecies mentioned by Foucault in *Diskursens Ording* (L’ordre du discours): “In prophesies about the future did [the discourse] not only proclaim what was going to occur, but it was simultaneously complicit in making it happen” (1993:11, my translation).
knowledge and norms produced by the discourse in which the cartographer acts (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006:382).

Human geographers Kitchin & Dodge (2007) draw from Wood and Crampton when criticising Harley. According to their criticism, Harley never abandoned the view of maps as possibly objective representations, had one removed the ill agendas of the author:

"Harley's strategy was to identify the politics of representation in order to circumnavigate them [...] not fully appreciating, as with Foucault's observations, that there is no escaping the entangling of power/knowledge" (Kitchin & Dodge 2007:332).

Kitchin & Dodge argue that maps have no ontological security at all, but rather are “ontogenetic in nature” (2007:335), by which they mean that maps are always remade every time they are used; “Maps are of the moment, brought into being through practices [...] always remade every time they are engaged with” (ibid:335).

The consequence of this ontology is that the discourse constantly shapes the reading of the map. The textuality of maps is hereby underlined, in that the reader is acknowledged as an indispensable part of the map’s creation. In my understanding, this step takes us from a relativist epistemology into relativist ontology, with regards to the map. “Mapping works because its set of practices has been learnt by people” (ibid:341). The sung “maps” of the aboriginal people (i.e., the song lines) are instances where this becomes quite clear; the very specific competence to interpret is essential.

3.5 Harley and Foucault

The discussion on Harley’s understanding of maps has come to circle around matters of structure contra agency. Some have argued that Harley misinterpreted Foucault when suggesting a unitary author (Belyea 1992, Crampton 2001, Kitchin & Dodge 2007). I partly disagree, in that I see Harley’s discussion on unconscious distortions of map content as the workings of the discourse. In a sense, the map can be said to lie on two fundamental levels; 1) through the unconscious workings of the discourse (norms, values, language, traditions, etcetera), and 2) through the deliberate manipulations of the individual author with the agenda.

The discussion is thus shifted to whether anyone can have any agency whatsoever within the almighty discourse. “There is no escaping the entangling of

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31 I find it slightly contradictory that Crampton (2001) argues against unitary authorship, when Crampton & Krygier (2006) define critical geography as partly being the spread of authorship through the demise of the elites’ map-monopoly.

32 The ontogenetic nature of maps gives that the discourse rules through the receiver’s perception, not only through the cartographers practices.
power/knowledge”, to again quote Kitchin & Dodge (2007:332), and as we have seen, Foucault have indeed made that argument at times (Foucault in Lindung 1968:203).33

This overly structuralist and reductive view, that the structure is the only author, could need some smoothening out. Through applying the concept of stratified reality, one can acknowledge the “total” authorship of the discourse, without renouncing the authorship of the individual; they are active at different levels of analysis, different layers of reality. Perhaps the older version of Foucault would agree, as he can be said to have moved from structuralism to poststructuralism over the course of his intellectual path.34 The poststructuralist view can be said to acknowledge the individual’s agency to a slightly higher degree, trapped within the structure but still relevant. Foucault’s The Subject and Power (1982) is concerned with the individual’s subjectification of herself; her self-formation. The work arguably marks “an important new direction in Foucault’s work” (Rabinow 1984:11).

Interestingly enough, a Hérodete editorial, intended as a response to Foucault’s questions on geography,35 indicates a position similar to a causal realist’s ontology:

"Understanding the problem of power by systematically distinguishing between different spatial scales and different levels of analysis enables us to avoid conflating very different, but nonetheless mutually articulating, structures of power into a fluid whole and even a ubiquitous presence” (Hérodete editorial [1977], in Crampton & Elden 2007:23).

The Hérodete editorial furthermore criticise Foucault for not distinguishing between the conscious and the unconscious; the very same distinction that Harley makes regarding distortions of map content.

As have already been argued with regards to the general phrasing of the structure-agency-problem, Foucault is not necessarily “con” agency. In fact, his notion of power as a condition for the formation of the subject; as a potential facilitator and not only repressor of agency; and as a breeder of resistance (Smart 1982, Allen 2002), gives that Foucault can be read as far less ontologically reductive than is sometimes the case. Still, Foucault’s understanding of authorship as arbitrarily assigned to different texts undermines the importance of the individual subject (1969). The Harleayan positioning of the map within the process of state-formation, and the consequential view of the state as the author (Strandsbjerg 2008, 2010), is thus a relevant shift between levels of agency. The

33 Nigel Thrift, who heavily criticise Foucault’s excessive structuralism, in passing sacrifices a footnote to admit that “in his later works it becomes clear that Foucault’s position was more complicated than this” (Thrift in Crampton & Elden 2007:54). Also, as human geographer Matthew Hannah points out, Foucault rather saw his own work as a set of tools for anyone to utilise or discard, “not a catalogue of theoretical ideas implying some conceptual unity” (Hannah in Crampton & Elden 2007:83).

34 Even though Foucault himself probably would not fancy the labels.

35 The “questions on geography” referred to are questions that Foucault directed to the French geographical journal Hérodete, after being interviewed by them (see Gordon 1980).
authorship is, with this approach, a strategy of power applied by the state, as a strong formation informing and affecting the discourse in the broader sense. “Who has power?” (Foucault in Crampton & Elden 2007:19). The state, that’s who, and winning the struggle over authorship of maps has been one way for the state to acquire this power.

Planner Margo Huxley approaches the understanding of governmentality and geography in a Foucaultian way. She considers the proper understanding and extrapolation of Foucault to be that “spatial techniques” are inevitable objects of study. Foucault never took the discussion of space/power relations to its fullest, but Huxley argues that

“where space has been examined as a rationality of government, it is often taken as the technology of a disciplinary order of visuality, surveillance and control. However, if power and government are seen not only as forms of control, but also as productive of political subjectivities and self-forming subjects; and space is taken as integral to the exercise of power and the conduct of conducts; then spatial and environmental causality can be examined as central elements in the thought of government” (Huxley in Crampton & Elden 2007:199).

This understanding of Foucault further emphasise the understanding of power/structure as a potentially agency-facilitating formation. (Also, the spatiality of government, and by association statehood, is implicated.)

The term propaganda maps implies an actor’s deliberate manipulations, and therefore its agency. Geographers Collins-Kreiner et al write that “maps are the most explicitly spatial form of propaganda”, and argue that “maps are an important part of political socialization” (2006:383). Mark Monmonier defines the propagandist cartographer as one with diplomatic and military goals (1996:87). As we have seen above, Harley distinguished between conscious and unconscious distortions of map content. In propaganda maps, these distinguished distortions blend with each other; the lower level agency is obvious, even though the structure provides the framework, facilitating and/or repressing. In the context of states and contested territory, maps are often very bluntly biased. Following Wood’s warning (Wood 1992:20), this thesis refutes “the innocence” of any map. Still, the agency-level is often relevant, and geopolitical agendas often visible, as in the cases of propaganda maps. With an IR-perspective, the agency of the state-actor is classically acknowledged (Wight 2006), and the supposedly Harleyan understanding of the unitary authorship is therefore constructive. I have argued that Foucault would not mind this understanding.
4 The state as the author

The tools of causal realism and the reinterpretations of Foucault have helped in writing the author back in. At this point, an ontologically irreductive theoretical position regarding the problem of structure-agency, or discourse-author, has been argued for. By that I mean that authorship, or agency, can exist on several layers of reality. But who is our author, then? As the contextualisation of the rise of the map suggests, the state must take precedence as an answer to this. I.e., the perspective will be a classical IR state-as-actor view.

This section aims to take the discussion further into the sphere of the concepts “state” and “territory”. Cartography’s development in relation to the emergence of the state has already been described, but its relevance to the state’s territoriailty should be further accounted for.

4.1 The state

The state is a political entity that is defined in terms of territory (Giddens 1985, Escolar 1997, van Schendel 2005, Strandsbjerg 2010). It is arguably the dominating form of political organisation (Finnemore 1996).

“Looking at any wall map or atlas, we see a world composed of states. The earth's surface is divided into distinct state territories. Each is demarcated by a linear boundary, an edge dividing one sovereignty from the next. The division is accentuated when each territory is blocked out in a separate color from neighboring states, implying that its interior is a homogeneous space, traversed evenly by state sovereignty. Our world is a jigsaw of territorial states, and we take this picture for granted” (Biggs 1999:374).

This perspective is relatively young; people of medieval Europe did not at all view the political entities as well-defined territories in this sense. Sociologist Michael Biggs argues that the modern state qualitatively differs from earlier “realms”, in that it is defined through “delimited territory”. Thus, “the formation of the modern state [...] was constituted in part through cartography” (ibid:374).

Geographer Jeremy Crampton reads Foucault as labelling cartography and geography as techniques of the state: “Foucault occasionally explicitly links mapping and government” (Crampton in Crampton & Elden 2007:224).36 This is,
as we have seen, not a controversial view among contemporary scholars (for example Strandsbjerg 2008, 2010, Wood 2010, Elden 2010).

The full scope of the symbiosis of state-hood and maps becomes clear once the realisation is made that the state is quite unique as a political entity, in that it is so strictly defined in space. One does not have to turn to history and compare with earlier “realms” to see this. Other political entities, such as religious communions or commercial corporations, usually intersect states’ borders and exercise their power with little regard to spatial delimitations. The Catholic Church might have its Vatican State, but its activity is by no means restricted to those 0.44 square kilometres. Exxon Mobile’s headquarters might be located to Irving, Texas in the United States, but the company’s business is worldwide.

In fact, when the argument is about threats to the state, the dissolution of contemporary geopolitical divisions is usually brought into the limelight, often in terms of the process of globalisation. The world economics’ disregard of states and their borders is one side of this (Ohmae 1995, Strange 1996); the privatisation of the monopoly of violence is another (Abrahamsen & Williams 2009). Only when separatist movements are the threat (Barber 1995), can the state as a phenomenon be safe; the goal of such movements is often a state of their own.

Philosopher Jürgen Habermas lump together “the territorial state, the nation, and a popular economy constituted within national borders” (2001:61), and argues that this cluster is past its hey-days due to the pressure of globalisation. Habermas depict the state’s territoriality as its Achilles heel in an increasingly interdependent world, and yet sees the infringement on states’ territorial sovereignty as their defeat (ibid:70). This underlines that the element of spatial exclusivity is essential to the state-concept. Other sovereignties can overlap, but as far as the state is concerned, an overlap is per definition a conflict. As borders dissolve, the stateliness of the state leaks out.

Now on to another piece of the Habermas-cluster: the nation.

### 4.2 The nation

 Territory is, as we have seen, a defining constituent of the state (Giddens 1985, Biggs 1999, Strandsbjerg 2010). The state’s legitimacy largely depends on its

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37 Strandsbjerg still prefers to look back, when comparing the state to earlier political formations such as “city states, the Hanseatic League, the Teutonic knights and the Church” (2010:148). Finnemore writes: “The modern bureaucratic state has become the sole legitimate form of political organization in the world; virtually all others have been eliminated. Empires, colonies, feudal arrangements, and a variety of other forms have become extinct and, perhaps more important, unimaginable in contemporary politics” (1996:332).

38 Van Schendel’s discussion on reterritorialisation contra deterritorialisation is perhaps a more well-balanced take on the state’s role (2005).

39 Habermas holds this combination to be the vehicle of the welfare state and of democracy; that, however, is far outside of the scope of this thesis.

40 For example political geographers Rosière & Jones argue that the main trend today is the “hardening” of borders, rather than the dissolution (2012).
ability to control said territory. The concept of the nation-state can be understood as an ideological construction that connects the nation to the territorial state. A state can hardly lack territory. A nation without territory, however, is often seen as “homeless”, and usually entertains territorial claims; it strives to be a nation-state (Finnemore 1996:332). The nation, in this sense, is often interpreted as equivalent to the notoriously slippery concept of ethnicity (White 2004).

Thus, a nation-state is when the state and the nation coincide. Collins-Kreiner et al write:

"As territory plays a key part in nationalism, national identity cannot be separated from links to a specific territory, which provides the only tangible basis for the national myth [...] Maps are ideally suited to further the cause of nationalist movements" (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006:382).

Interestingly enough, Crampton’s reading of Foucault show that “race” has often and eagerly been mapped. In fact, even though “today it is common to assert that geography and identity cannot be equated”, the opposite seem to have been the case (Crampton in Crampton & Elden 2007:224). In this sense, the mapping of race is also the mapping of nationality. Through cartographic practices, the otherness to the nation-state can be established (ibid).

Nationalism, the state’s own ideology throughout the 19th and 20th century, is usually viewed as a younger phenomenon than the state (Biggs 1999:391). The concept of the national carries several unflattering connotations, partly because of its destructive role in history, and partly because of its elusive nature. A nation, however, is not necessarily equal to an ethnicity, and a difference should be made between ethno-nationalism and more inclusive social constructions. One argument holds that “the romantic ideology of nationalism of the early nineteenth century” in many cases have changed to include “equal citizenship for all and extensive recognition of the cultural rights of minorities” (Ben-Israel 2011:65). Regardless of ones feelings towards the concept of the “national”, its formulation and function admittedly look very different in different settings.

Habermas argues that the symbolism of the nation is a necessary construction for the state. The perceived commonality “of descent, language, and history” that constitutes “the people”, i.e. the nation, generates a perception of “collective belonging” that makes the abstract unity of state-hood more tangible (2001:64-65).

Thus, the “nation” can be interpreted as the constructed identity of the citizens of a state. In a less likeable vintage, the notion can be understood as grounded in ethnicity. If the nation-state equates when the state and the nation coincide, one could test whether the nation at hand is of the out-dated, “romantic” kind by pulling the territorial state away from under its feet like a rug. If the nation persists without a state, I would argue that the construction has survived its
purpose, and walks the earth like a Frankenstein’s monster. If the nation evaporates, however, it was just as firm a construction necessary to serve as the uniting element of the territorial unit.

Of course, as Strandsbjerg suggests, “collective identities do not necessarily correspond with the abstract spatial framework given by state territory” (2010:153), and the same can be said about the concept of the “nation”. However, the “nation” is a far more fluent concept (van Schendel 2002), and other identities can sometimes share the traits of certain definitions of the “nation”. This is not the place to dive deeper into the discussions about nationhood, ethnicity, citizenship, and such. It will suffice to say that the nation is yet another concept with a nearly tautological relationship to the concept of territory.

4.3 The territory

The notion of territory, “the link between space and politics” (Gottman 1975:29 cited in Neocleous 2003:411), was in fact brought into the discussion by Foucault in an interview; “territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it’s first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power” (Gordon 1980:176). Etymologically, the word “territory” is usually seen as a derivation from \textit{terra}, i.e. “earth, land”. Online Etymology Dictionary states that it means “’land under the jurisdiction of a town, state, etc.,’ probably from L\textit{\[Latin\]} territorium ‘land around a town, domain, district’” (Online Etymology Dictionary).

This understanding points to the concept’s spatial connotations, but also to its political meaning in that it seems to have evolved from simply “earth” into “earth in relation to a human settlement”. Since “politics” simultaneously connotes “a struggle for power” and “the craft of running the state”, “territory” is an inherently political concept as it relates both to power and state. The etymological derivation supports that territory should be understood as the space that a political entity controls, i.e. has power over. If one is following Strandsbjerg’s notion of space as a social construct (2008, 2010), then the same holds even truer for territory. Territory is indeed constructed out of space. This construction, this territorialisation, is an act of inducing power.

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41 This is just a model of thought to distinguish between different typologies of the national. The discussion barely scratches the surface, and the statement is not intended to say anything about stateless groups or diaspora populations.

42 Online Etymology Dictionary also gives an alternative theory. According to this version, the word “territory” would be related to Latin’s \textit{terrere}, i.e. “to frighten”. Political geographer Stuart Elden argues that this interpretation enriches the concept “territory”, as it “has an association with fear and violence”, and that “creating a bounded space is already a violent act” (2010:807). I would advice Elden to stick to one out of two etymological theories, and out of these two, the \textit{terra}-derivation seems more likely to me.
on space; taking space into control. Elden is emphasising the difference between space and territory. An actor is needed to territorialise a space. Thus, “territory needs to be understood through representation, appropriation and control, broadly understood as the workings of power” (Elden 2010:804). This means that space becomes territory through ownership, and that the notion of territorialisation is the process when an actor induces its power on a certain space. The non-overlapping nature of the state is also significant in this discussion; territory can be said to link to sovereignty (Strandsbjerg 2010).

4.4 The territorialisation of space

"If your grand duchy or tribal area seems tired, run-down, and frayed at the edges, simply take a sheet of paper, plot some cities, roads, and physical features, draw a heavy, distinct boundary around as much territory as you dare claim, color it in, add a name – perhaps reinforce with the impressive prefix 'Republic of' – and presto: you are now the leader of a new sovereign, autonomous country. Should anyone doubt it, merely point to the map. Not only is your new state on paper, it's on a map, so it must be real" (Monmonier 1996:88).

Territory seems to be best understood as a political concept; as a controlled space; as a space that an actor exercises power over. As have been argued above, cartography can be a territorial argument, i.e., an argument about power over space (Wood 1992, 2010). Elden again: “Cartography does not just represent the territory, but is actively complicit in its production” (2010:809). Strandsbjerg holds that space is real because it is a social construct; the representation of space is also the construction of space (2008:340-341). Following this line of thought, territory can be seen as the product of cartography.

We have established the territorial aspect of the state, and consequently its claim to exclusive control over a defined space. The historical backdrop is not to be forgotten:

"As territory became more and more obviously central to the state and the multiple sovereignties of the feudal era were replaced by the unitary sovereign state, cartography – as a means of identifying the boundaries of the sovereign state's territories as well as its core features, a means of asserting ownership, sovereignty and legitimacy – emerged as a political discourse concerned with the acquisition and maintenance of state power" (Neocleous 2003:417).

The importance of mapping from a state’s perspective is unveiling itself. The Foucaultian notion of power/knowledge has already been discussed, and indeed the monopolisation of cartography can be argued to reflect the state’s consolidation of power. On the one side, when we simply understand maps as useful for military and administrative purposes, the monopoly of cartography is the monopoly of its practical applications. On the other side, the sole rights to maps can be seen as a way of dominating the discourse and securing legitimacy (Escolar 1997). Similarly, in a response to Foucault Jean-Michel Brabant argues that the discipline of geography was made into a science in its shift from merely
strategic knowledge to an ideological weapon (Brabant in Crampton & Elden 2007:26).

The state’s argument is an argument about power over space; hence, an argument about territory. Through mapping, and other forms of “violence”, a state comes into existence, manifests itself through territorialisation of space. In today’s world, where the understanding is that space should correspond to one or other sovereign entity, i.e. state, political space must be mapped into territories. The division of the world into states is not, however, a perfect fit. States do argue over territory, and again the map as an argument becomes essential. Geographer Mark Monmonier writes:

“Nowhere is the map more a national symbol and an intellectual weapon than in disputes over territory. When nation A and nation B both claim territory C, they usually are at war cartographically as well” (1996:90).

4.5 Can the state be one author?

With regards to state actorship, one should remember Escolar’s distinction between “the Kings state” and the later “arenas for the public” in the development of European states (1997:69). The state can be understood as more or less monolithic depending on form of government. Sibeon does not acknowledge states as actors, due to their lack of “identifiable means of taking decisions, let alone acting on them” (1999:141). Following this definition, the argument could be put in terms of centrality of decision-making, where a more totalitarian regime would reasonably read as more concentrated in that regard. With this said, I am by no means alone in treating the state as an actor/author (Wendt 1987, Wight 2006) in the particular context of cartographic practices (Escolar 1997, Strandsbjerg 2008, 2010).

Even when acknowledging the state as a diverse entity, on a certain level it still serves as the relevant aggregate; the emergent phenomenon of its building blocks. “Governments are supposed to reflect the collective will of their citizens” (Feld & Grofman 1990:430), but if one would disagree with that presumption, even in the case of well-functioning democracies, this would not refute the unity of the state-actor.\(^{43}\) Whatever informs and controls the state (may it be elites, technocrats, or democratic processes) still allows for treating the state as one actor

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\(^{43}\) Feld & Grofman argue that with a basis of “diffuse agreement”, collective consistency will occur (1990). I.e., the more homogenous the group (in terms of ideals, opinions, “culture”), the better suited it is for collective decision-making. This informs my argument in that it puts the actorship of a democratic collective in terms of functional or dysfunctional regarding decision-making. Thus, even a diverse collective can be considered an actor, although lacking efficiency. However, states rarely make decisions in a direct-democratic manner comparable to this view, especially not on short-term basis (Allison & Zelikow 1999).
on the output-side. The same could be argued from a decision-perspective, regardless of what perspective one chooses.44

Political scientist Martha Finnemore argues that (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism are reductive views in understanding the international society, since they assume several aspects of the state without any prior explanation; “these approaches begin with the assumption that states are actors having certain presupposed and unproblematic characteristics” (1996:337). Even though I could feel stung by this critique, I argue that my only major assumption about state actors is their territorial element. Also, my perspective of state actor/authorship is pursued because of its relevance in relation to cartography; the point of the perspective of causal realism’s stratified reality is the possibility to adjust theoretical foci depending on what the situation calls for.45

Since I equate authorship of maps with agency of state actors, Foucault’s What is an Author? (1969) must be mentioned.46 “It has not always been the same types of texts that have required attribution to an author”, Foucault writes, and the cartographic practices have indeed transformed from individually “authored” texts (for example Olaus Magnus’ Carta Marina [1539]), to discursive artefacts assigned to no one individual. The demise of the individual map-author is arguably connected to the idea of the objective representation; one could compare with Donna Haraway’s “God trick” (1988), i.e., the hiding away of the subject. Foucault again:

"A switch takes place in the seventeenth or eighteenth century. Scientific discourse began to be received for themselves, in the anonymity of an established or always redenomstrable truth; their membership in a systematic ensemble, and not the reference to the individual who produced them, stood as their guarantee. The author function faded away, and the inventor's name served only to christen a theorem [...]
And if a text should be discovered in a state of anonymity [...] the game becomes one of rediscovering the author" (1969).

The state has attained authorship under a veil of “objective” science, and can thus qualify as the answer to Foucault’s question: “Who has power?” (Foucault in Crampton & Elden 2007:19). The epistemic formation of cartography has arguably to a large degree removed the individual author. However, even when an individual’s name is associated with a map, the power/knowledge-structure induce state authorship. The spatial argument that is the map is historically and logically associated with the spatially defined entity of the state. Hence, with regards to cartography and authorship, Waltz’ (1959) mid-level of analysis, the state level, seems most relevant (however without adhering to any hierarchy of levels,

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44 For three such perspectives, see Allison & Zelikow (1999).
45 If anything, Finnemore’s view is the reductive one: her "institutionalist arguments emphasize structure at the expense of agency” (1996:342). This is, in my view, a suboptimal take on the structure-agency-problem.
46 Even though the text to a large extent concerns itself with literary authorship exclusively; Foucault admits to “have unjustifiably limited [his] subject” up to a certain point in the text; “certainly the author function in painting, music, and other arts should have been discussed” (Foucault 1969).
regarding interpretative prerogative). This brings us close to the classical IR-perspective, emphasising the state actor.

Political scientist Alexander Wendt argues that the state can be understood “both as an agent and as a structure” (1987:339). Wendt chooses, however, to see the state as an agent;

"a move which can be justified in part because the organizing principles of the state system constitute states as individual choice-making units which are responsible for their actions” (ibid).

This view is symptomatic for IR. In fact, treating the state as an agent is a main premise for International Relations, thus making “the ‘state-as-agent’” out to be “the first step for IR theory” (Wight 2006:177). Wight refutes the treating of the state as a black box; rather, “each state structure […] is composed out of the dynamic interplay of the structural logics of the planes of social activity” (ibid:299). Still, the state-as-actor is an often entertained and doubtlessly analytically useful conceptualisation in IR (ibid). And as Foucault argues, we can hardly disregard the state:

"It is certain that in contemporary societies the state is not simply one of the forms or specific situations of the exercise of power – even if it is the most important – but that in a certain way all other forms of power relation must refer to it” (1982:793).
5 Israeli mapping practices

This part of the thesis will look at Israeli mapping. I will draw from the theoretical exploration in that I pay attention to state ideology, state interference in academia, and state strategies for territorialisation of space. Furthermore, I will briefly consider non-Israeli mapping practices in order to provide a comparison, in order to examine the view of maps as arguments.

5.1 “Come find the Israel in you” 47

The Gaza Strip was occupied by Israel until 2005, when all Israeli troops left the area as of Israel’s unilateral disengagement plan (2004).

“Today Israel is poised to disengage from the Gaza Strip […], an initiative that will be the first practical test of the possibility for peaceful coexistence with the Palestinian Authority […] Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip and will redeploy outside the Strip” (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005).

Still the “Map of Israel”, from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism’s Eye on Israel-site (www.eyeonisrael.com), displays Gaza as just another region of Israel. Admittedly, the colouring is a tad darker; the same goes for Judea and Samaria (i.e., the West Bank). These areas are also clearly presented as parts of Israel, only slightly shaded, like ill-boding stains on an X-ray plate.

The Golan Heights, internationally recognised as Syrian, are not even shaded. Nothing on the map suggests that Golan would be any less Israeli than, for example, the adjacent region of Galilee. At the same time, the UN General Assembly are “deeply concerned that the Syrian Golan, occupied since 1967, has been under continued Israeli military occupation” (United Nations General Assembly 2010, their italics). The message seems not to have got to the Israeli Ministry of Tourism. Under the heading “the Regions of Israel” they write: “The Golan Heights is one of the most beautiful and most travelled parts of the country” (Israeli Ministry of Tourism Homepage[a]).

The Ministry of Tourism’s Eye On Israel map is discussed because of its status as an official Israeli map, and because of its prominent position on the website. There are numerous other examples that are much less subtle. For example, The Israel Science and Technology Homepage include maps with names

47 This is the slogan of the Israeli Ministry of Tourism. I might seem ironic when directed at for example Syria, in the light of the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights.
such as “Arab countries versus Israel” (Figure 1). That particular map shows Israel as a small, red dot, completely surrounded by an ocean of pan-Arabian green spanning between Mauritania, Somalia, Syria, and Oman. To make sure that no one misses the point, the map text reads: “Note that Israel is like a tiny island in a sea of Arab countries” (Israel Science and Technology Homepage[a]). The page is created by former “Science Adviser to the Prime Minister Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu”, Israel Hanukoglu (Israel Science and Technology Homepage[b]). Worth noting is that a nearly identical map, only with different colouring and excluding Somalia and Mauretania (although including instead Iran and Western Sahara), occurs in Israel’s Story in Maps (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006:28), an official state document (Figure 2).

Another map of Israel, simply labelled “Israel” (Figure 3), that is available through the Israeli Ministry of Tourism’s own webpage, does not indicate the West Bank even with shading. Of all contested areas, only the Gaza (or “Azza”) Strip is indicated as less than fully Israeli. Samaria and Judea, or “Shomron” and “Yehuda” (i.e., the West Bank), does not stand out even slightly. Neither do the Golan Heights (Israeli Ministry of Tourism Homepage[b]). Still the map is simply labelled “Israel”, not for example “Israel including disputed territories”.

5.2 Zionism and cartography

In 1897, the Zionist Organisation was founded in order to reach the goal of a Jewish state.48 In the words of the Israeli founding father David Ben-Gurion and fellow members of the People’s Council:

“in the year 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodore Herzl, the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country” (Ben-Gurion et al 1948).

In 1919, the Zionist Movement suggested the area for the state of Palestine (the Jewish version, Eretz-Israel) to be within a line drawn from (approximately) El-Arish to Taba, and from there to Sidon, in a curved line well outside of today’s border and into Jordan. The line was never accepted, but is often understood as the ultimate goal of the Zionist movement (Biger 2008).

The Zionist project aimed to create a Jewish homeland out of the altneuland of Palestine. A mythology was created around the “new industrious Jew”, and the hardships of the first settlers were romanticised (Azaryahu & Golan 2004, Meyerson 2005). The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (1948) bears clear traces of this mythology:

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48 For a handy overview of the history of Zionism, see Meyerson (2005:10-12).
“Impelled by [...] historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, defiant returnees, and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessing of progress to all the country's inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood” (Ben-Gurion et al 1948).

The modernist visions of Zionism contrasted somewhat to the old Jewish traditions. This contrast was manifested in tensions between the cities of Jerusalem (the religious centre) and Tel Aviv (the secular centre). The Zionist rhetoric often brought forward the claims for the Jewish state in secular terms (Azaryahu & Golan 2004, Meyerson 2005).

The Zionist project can be described as a colonial one, but with political rather than economical overtones. Strong ethno-romantic conceptions have shaped the approach to the state-project of Israel. Even though the Zionist movement has been diverse, the majority have understood the territory of the former British Mandate of Palestine as mystically and religiously connected to the Jewish people. The understanding has been that the land cannot thrive without the Israelites. The Zionist nationalism is an ethno-national one, and its territoriality a spatial one, in that the land and the people are considered connected as if it were by blood (Schnell 2001).

These conceptions have had several implications. The ethnic emphasis has made the state of Israel an exclusionary one; indeed a nation state, were belonging to the nation (in an ethno-romantic sense) has trumped inclusionary and universalist versions of the term “citizenship”.49 According to this brand of Zionism, arguably the dominating one, Arab inhabitants became anomalies to the land and state of Israel. Furthermore, the mystical connection between land and people led many Zionists to see the settling of the land by Jews as a necessity. A mere political control of the territory was insufficient; there had to be a physical presence of “real” Israelis (ibid).

“Maps of the land became the visual language for staking claims on territory” for the Zionist movement (Leuenberg & Schnell 2010:808). One example is the Jewish National Fund’s50 Blue Box, a collection box from 1901, meant for donations to purchase land for the Zionist project. The collection boxes were spread across the world, and present in Jewish communities everywhere, usually placed in classrooms. On the box, there was a map of the area referred to as “Greater Israel”, extending over both sides of the Jordan River. When in the 1920s the British government forced the Zionist movement to formally abandon

49 Schnell (2001) makes this argument convincingly. However, it is fair to mention the following passage from The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel: “We appeal – in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months – to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions” (Ben-Gurion et al 1948). Israeli passports show both citizenship and ethnicity, thus implicitly dividing citizens into an A and a B-team. Arab Israelis are not allowed to serve in the military (Meyerson 2005).
50 The Jewish National fund is “a pivotal Zionist agency”, according to Azaryahu & Golan (2004).
the demands for the areas east of the Jordan, the Blue Box-map of Greater Israel still implied the legitimacy of the original claims (ibid). The map on the box did not, however, depict any precise borders, which can be argued to reflect on the one hand “pragmatism”, in that it left the door open for territorial negotiations, and on the other hand “the expansionary impulse” of the Zionist movement (Wallach 2011:362).

5.3 The colonial legacy

During the First World War, Great Britain became the colonial master of the area. The British tried to establish “a Jewish national homeland”, in accordance with the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Furthermore, the British established the borders with Egypt, Lebanon and Syria; along with the administrative division between Sinai, Jerusalem, and Hejaz; and the division between east and west Palestine. They also created the eastern border through the setting up of Trans-Jordan, east of the Jordan River. In 1937, Britain tried to divide Palestine into two states, a Jewish and an Arab one. The division was never implemented, but was the historical embryo to the two-state solution that many advocate as the only possible solution to the conflict today (Meyerson 2005, Biger 2008).

Political geographer Gideon Biger argues that the lines of the British mandate of Palestine still are very strong. Several times, actors have crossed the line, but always withdrawn as of the respective peace treaties. The exception is the Golan Heights, that Israel still holds, but this might be because the Syrians have not lived up to the Israeli Land for Peace-policy (Biger 2008).

In the 1940s, the British colonial administration “provided an authoritative map of the Holy Land” (Azaryahu & Golan 2001:183). The map mostly relied on Arabic and Christian names. However, the Zionist movement viewed a Hebrew toponymy as historically accurate, drawing from religious and historical sources. Even though few Hebrew names could be derived from this method, the movement passionately tackled the quest of (re)discovering the historical geography of the area. The incentive was a “Zionist-purist attitude towards the language of the landscape” (ibid:184), and a desire to create possibilities of identification for Jewish settlers. Thus, the process to create a Hebrew toponymy took hold even before Israel came into existence (ibid).

51 The Balfour Declaration was a letter from the UK Foreign Secretary to the Jewish community-leader Baron Rothschild. The letter, which was meant to be forwarded to the Zionist Federation, expressed the wish to accommodate “the Jewish people” with a “national home” (Meyerson 2005).
52 This principle is derived from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which states that Israel must withdraw “armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”, and calls for “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State” (United Nations Security Council 1967). Syria is officially at war with Israel (Meyerson 2005).
Due to the extraordinary and horrific circumstances of the 2nd World War, the Zionists eventually accepted the split Arab-Jewish state of the British Royal Commission’s suggestion and the United Nation decision (Meyerson 2005, Biger 2008). Again, *The declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*:

"The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people – the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe – was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State" (Ben-Gurion et al 1948).

Also, the strong presence of Arab Palestinians already residing in Palestine surprised many Zionists, and that gave rise to a debate within the movement. The Zionist movement gave priority to “a substantial Jewish majority”, over keeping the full extent of the territory (Schnell 2001:225).

5.4 The birth of Israel

In 1948, the state of Israel was established. The Israeli demand of strong defensive borders have been the guiding star ever since. Another compass arrow has pointed towards the idea that the Israelis have a historical right to certain areas, and that “the plow will determine the future boundary line” (Biger 2008:78). These notions have led to the establishment of Jewish settlements in Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and at the West Bank; settlements that indeed have given birth to conflict, even though they might not have determined the boundaries of the Israeli state (ibid). The process of refining the Promised Land simultaneously eradicated Arab populations, particularly in connection to the founding of the state and the subsequent war. The transformation have “result[ed] in the disappearance of the traditional Arab landscape”, which was certainly intentional (Azaryahu & Golan 2004:500).

A civil conflict arose between Yishuv and Arab forces due to the United Nation decision on a split state in 1947. An Arab coalition intervened, which turned the conflict into a full-scale war. Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, with backing from Saudi Arabia and North Yemen, invaded former British Palestine only a few hours after Israel was declared established. This conflict is known as the 1948 War (Greenberg 2004, Azaryahu & Golan 2004, Meyerson 2005).

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53 The settlements on the Gaza Strip were evicted as of the 2005 disengagement.

54 “Yishuv” was what the Jewish residents of Palestine were called before Israel was established.

55 Thus not adhering to the People Council’s pleadings in *The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*: “We extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land” (Ben-Gurion et al 1948).
The war ended in 1949. The armistice agreement established the so-called “Green Line”, an armistice line between Israel and its neighbours. Due to the war and the following agreement, Israel enlarged its territory appreciably. The West Bank was occupied by Jordan, and the Gaza strip by Egypt. Jordan’s annexation went against the international community, but the area was not transferred to the PLO until 1988. The Green Line stood until 1967 (Bregman 2002, Greenberg 2004, Meyerson 2005). According to again Biger, the Green Line holds a similar legitimacy as do the Mandate line, if not as strong (2008).

When the state of Israel was established in 1948, the Israeli government set out to “hebraicise” the map of Israel. The “Governmental Names Commission” created a map where most Arabic and Christian names were changed to Hebrew ones. The map was spread all over Israel, and was in place in every classroom. “Everything from mountains, valleys, springs, and roads were renamed” (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010:810).

Ben-Gurion, then prime minister, nominated the naming-commission in 1949. He considered the hebraicisation a necessity for Israeli sovereignty. The Negev, i.e. the south half of Israel, was the commission’s primary task. This was partly because the British tried to separate the area from new-born state, which made the Israelis anxious to consolidate their presence. The resulting map was by the commission described as “purified from foreign names” (as cited in Azaryahu & Golan 2001:186).

After the work was done on the Negev, the commission extended its efforts to the north of Israel. During the period 1950-1951, the commission came up with 170 new names. It should be stressed that, as was also the case with the Negev-naming, only a few of these new suggestions had historical justifications. Most were simply translations of Arab names, in the cases were those described the landscape or connoted for example a plant or an animal. Others were arbitrarily named after Jewish historical figures. In 1960, approximately 5000 Hebrew names had been determined. In order to change the population’s habits, state institutions and road signs, as well as the educational system, took the new toponyms into use. As new maps were printed, Arabic names were gradually replaced concurrently with the commission’s progress (ibid).

Several Arab settlements and Bedouin spaces were erased from the map due to the hebraicisation. Furthermore, the borders with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Jordanian- respectively Egyptian-controlled, were only showed “as temporary ceasefire lines”. Arab territories showed as sparsely populated, “consisting of empty spaces and wilderness that contrast starkly with Israel as a small, vulnerable, densely populated, and civilized territory”. The colouring contrasted Israel to the rest of the region (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010:812).

5.5 Nation building

The hebraicisation of maps was a part of a larger national project. One can consider “the reading of landscapes and of maps as a social practice and a
semitic procedure”, and the place names as “the language of nationalism” (Azaryahu & Golan 2001:181). In this view, naming places is a process of appropriation, which can be ascribed to the 19th and 20th century “systematic construction of ‘national’ toponymies” to the “nation-building and state-formation” (ibid).

The Zionist movement perceived the discipline of geography as a means of “assist[ing] children’s emotional absorption in the country” of Israel (Bar-Gal & Bar-Gal 2008:44). Thus, the Zionist movement appreciated the importance of the geographic discipline to the nation-building project. One leading character in this process was David Amiran (1910-2003) (Schnell 2004). In the 1950s, Amiran became the head of the Negev Studies Institute, of the Scientific Council, and of the Governmental Names Committee. In this position, Amiran was elementary to the hebraicisation-process (University of Haifa homepage[a]). He was also the editor behind two editions of the national atlas. His successor Avshalom Shmueli, who continued Amiran’s atlas project, was inspired by the 1967 war to include “the newly occupied territories of Judea and Samaria, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai” as if each one of them was simply any other Israeli region (Schnell 2004:562).

Geographer Yehoshua Ben-Arieh was the leading voice of the historical geography of Zionism. This is a branch of geography “focusing primarily on the heroic stories of particular settlements” (ibid:562). A critical geo/cartographical standpoint emerged very late in this context, where the Zionist movement long played the role of the main patron of the geographic discipline. When the seal was eventually broken in the 1980s, this led to “a discussion on the very nature of Israeli national identity” (ibid).

Israel’s history is characterised by conflict. The Suez War of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967, the War of Attrition of 1967-1970, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the First Lebanon War of 1982-1985, and the Second Lebanon War of 2006 are examples that have had impact on Israel’s extension. In particular the Israeli blitz-triumph of 1967, the Six Day War56, led to a huge increase of Israeli territory. During this war, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, and cease-fire lines were established (Owen 2001, Oren 2002, Bregman 2002, Greenberg 2004, Meyerson 2005).

After the 1967 war, post which Israel “more than tripled the territory under its control” (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010:815), official Israeli maps did no longer show any demarcations vis-à-vis occupied areas such as the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. Furthermore, “the newly acquired Israeli controlled territories were also Hebraicized” (ibid:815). The areas were however still debated due to Israeli human rights organisations, Palestinians who kept their old naming of the geography, and the controversy of international law deeming the occupations illegal (ibid).

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56 Yitzhak Rabin chose the name of the Six Day War, allegedly as a reference to the religious notion of the six days of creation (Oren 2002).
Because of these inconsistencies, a debate accompanied the publication of the Atlas of Israel, in which a critical text pointed to the non-geographical considerations of Jewish settlements. The publication was stopped, and a page was excluded. When Israeli geographers refused to adhere to the political demands regarding the issue, the Housing Minister acquired what was needed from “a non-academic source […] which legitimized the settlements” (ibid:816), and the Atlas was published with an insert. Another debate arose when the Minister of Education banned a school Atlas from schools, due to its demarcations towards the West Bank, which implied that this area was separate from the Israeli state (ibid).

The Six Day War broke the hegemony of the labour-branch of Zionism. The military successes were a breakthrough for a new generation of Israeli leaders. The Yom Kippur War, on the other hand, exposed poor military preparedness, which in combination with corruption scandals and a declining economy resulted in a huge defeat for the labour coalition in the 1977 election. Instead, the revisionist branch of Zionism became increasingly represented in politics. Hence also it’s strong ideological emphasis on expansionist policies, as promoted by the new Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (Meyerson 2005).

The new establishment strove to incorporate the West Bank through aggressive settlement-policies, contrary to the mentioned Camp David Accord. This led to increased conflict in the region. In the same expansionist spirit, the Golan Heights was incorporated into Israeli jurisdiction through new legislation (ibid).

5.6 Contemporary maps

The cartographic project of the Zionist movement and the Israeli state has, as we have seen, carried territorial claims, expansionary ideals, and ethno-national narratives of land-people connections. Contemporary commercial maps for everyday use are not necessarily any subtler.

One example is how a road map, published by the settler’s lobby organisation “The Yesha Council”, show the West Bank and Gaza “as direct continuations of the state of Israel” (Leuenberger & Schnell 2010:820). The map does not show the Green Line. Rather, it shows the West Bank as just another region within Israeli national territory. Furthermore, the status of Palestinian territories are diminished in that their road systems seem continuous with Israel’s. Israeli and Palestinian territories are left inseparable with regards to colouring, use of symbols, and level of detail. This “unifies the national spaces, while the heading claims the territories as part of Israel” (ibid:820). Similarly, several maps produced by the so-called secular expansionist camp stress the vulnerability of Israel, “supporting the need to expand Israeli territories for security and defence purposes” (ibid:827).

Not all Israeli maps make the same argument. Some maps originate from the “Peace Camp” in the Israeli debate. This group includes NGOs such as human rights-organisation B’Tselem and settlement-opposed organisation PN. Such
actors tend to publish maps that adhere to the conventions of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and international law. Thus, there are Israeli maps depicting a more modest vision, territorially speaking (ibid).

Collins-Kreiner et al (2006) have studied 101 Israeli maps. Applying a semiotic methodology, they consider “the depiction of borders and frontiers” of Israel to be the primary “signs” (2006:386). Through reading the maps as cultural texts, Collin-Kreiner et al identify two main narratives: Greater Israel and Smaller Israel. No map in the study has included any kind of temporarily agreed upon borders towards Palestinian controlled areas, a choice of depiction that violates the “Palestinian autonomy of the Gaza Strip” (ibid:388). Lacking is also the A-, B- and C-zones on the West Bank, which further violates Palestinian sovereignty. The maps identified by Collins-Kreiner et al as Greater Israel-maps omit the Green Line, i.e. the pre-1967 border towards Jordan. This border is simultaneously the wished-for delimitation of the hypothetical Palestinian state. The contrasting norm for map publishers outside Israel is to present the Israeli borders in their pre-67-form. That depiction leaves the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank out of the picture (ibid).

Governmental maps usually adhere to the Greater Israel-narrative. The earlier mentioned map labelled “Israel”, from the Israeli Ministry of tourism, is one. The Golan Heights and the West Bank are not the least depicted as detached from Israel. Hebrew toponymy has precedence; Azza for Gaza, Samaria or Shomron and Judea or Yehuda for the West Bank. The road-net shows as continuous (Israeli Ministry of Tourism Homepage[b]). Thus the map is delegitimising the Palestinian Authority, to again follow the argument of Leuenberger & Schnell (2010). This narrative permeates official documents in general, and the list of examples can be made very long. One is how the document The Land (2010), from The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, repeatedly includes a stylized map of Israel that includes Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, without the slightest recognition of the problematic status of these areas (Figure 5).

The second narrative, what Collins-Kreiner et al call Smaller Israel, depict the border with Lebanon in the north, the border with Jordan and the ‘Green Line’ as the border in the east with a “Palestinian land”, the border with Egypt, a border with the Gaza Strip, and the pre-1967 Syrian border along the river Jordan. Even though the maps under study are all depicting Israel, many do not exclusively have the state’s name in the title. Interestingly enough, the Greater Israel maps are often simply labelled “Israel”. The maps mediating the narrative of Smaller Israel, however, usually have names that underline that fact. “Israel – Within Boundaries and Cease-Fire Lines”, is an example of a title that carries different connotations than just “Israel” (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006).

One can interpret the variety of maps in various ways. Maps depicting old and new borders simultaneously can be said to emphasise the expansive nature of

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57 These zones are from the Oslo Accords (i.e., the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements), the 1993 agreement to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The West Bank and Gaza Strip were divided into the three areas A, B and C, with varying degrees of Palestinian respectively Israeli control.
Israel; focus or not on cease-fire lines, and similar signs with military connotations, can project an image of a war-zone respectively of stability and safety. Depicting Israel’s borders as less far reaching than the de facto controlled areas, show Israel as a colonial power. How the maps are drawn tells a lot about the politics and agenda of the authors. Only 14 of the 101 maps in the Collins-Kreiner et al study show the Green Line, i.e., the pre-1967 borders that emerged after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The presence of this line is a watershed between the Great and Small Israel narratives. Names are also important; the West Bank are usually labelled Judea and Samaria, names dating back to biblical times. Of all the studied maps produced in Israel, not a single one show Jerusalem as divided. Outside maps, however, normally show the east-west split of the pre-1967 agreements (ibid).

5.7 Non-Israeli maps

In order to nuance the description of cartographic practices, and to understand how another cartographic perspective can be constructed, examples of non-Israeli maps will be briefly discussed in this paragraph. As far as Palestinian maps go, these can be divided in those showing the Greater respectively Smaller Palestine, were the former exclude the state of Israel all together, and the latter the areas under the Palestine National Authority as a Palestine state. This mirrors the Israeli narratives of Greater respectively Smaller Israel (ibid).

In the context of the Palestinian civil rights movement, “a commemorative spatial map” has been created to show “the destroyed Arab settlements and the places of importance in the history of Islam in Israel” (Schnell 2001:231). Even though marginalised Israeli Arabs might identify as Palestinian in terms of ethnicity, they have incentives to downplay the ethno-nationalism of the state’s policies in favour for a pluralistic citizenship (ibid).

The nationalist iconic maps of “Greater Israel” and of “historical Palestine” are virtually identical in shape, the only difference being that the Israeli version includes the Golan Heights. The maps in question are stylised versions of Palestine, as it was delimited during the years of the British Mandate (1922-1948). Even though this picture is a historical fantasy, it is reproduced in different contexts; as weather maps as well as icons for respective nationalist project. Middle East-expert Yair Wallach calls these maps “mirror-maps” or “mirror-images”, in that the overlapping ambitions of the two nations, regarding the one territory, mirror each other (Wallach 2011).

The map of historical Palestine is routinely used “to write nationalism onto everyday surroundings” (ibid:365), and is reproduced on necklaces, t-shirts, on walls as graffiti, on posters, etcetera. PLO chairman and PNA58 president Yasser

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58 Palestinian National Authority.
Arafat (1929-2004) used to carry his keffiyeh, i.e. traditional headdress, arranged as a triangle emulating the map of historical Palestine (ibid). In these contexts, the map undoubtedly serves as a national symbol.

Another example of non-Israeli mapping of Palestine is the *Subjective Atlas of Palestine* (2007), edited by graphic designer Annelys de Vet. de Vet invites Palestinian “artists, photographers and designers to map their country as they see it” (www.annelysdevet.nl). Wood describes the project as “bubbl[ing] up out of the rich interior life of Palestinians without caring about what most people think an atlas should be and with supreme disregard for Israeli maps” (Wood 2011). Even though it largely moves beyond our everyday perception of an atlas or a map, Wood puts it in a tradition of atlases with focus on content other than traditional maps (ibid).

One interesting aspect of the mapping of the Palestinian “nation” that can be found in the *Subjective Atlas of Palestine* is Awatef Rumiyah’s mapping of the Palestinian diaspora (de Vet 2007:120-121) (Figure 4). This map is partly emancipating itself from the focus on territory, in that it illustrates in what proportions Palestinian refugees are scattered over the world. At the same time, however, the world map that constitutes the backdrop is classically divided into states, thus emphasising this political unit and the need to divide space in the manner of non-overlapping sovereignties. Furthermore, the map recognises areas such as the “occupied Gaza Strip”, the “occupied Palestinian Territories”, and the “occupied West Bank” (ibid). Even though this might seem completely relevant, it certainly differs from standard Israeli mapping practices were occupied areas often are included as any other region of Israel. Most apparently, the Gaza Strip is officially disengaged from by Israel, which means that the mentioning of the Gaza Strip as “occupied” goes against the official Israeli view.59

Even though the *Subjective Atlas of Palestine* (2007) can be described, in loving terms, as “not anti-Israel but bracingly and embracingly … for Palestine” (Wood 2011, his punctuation), it still diverts from official Israeli mapping. This is of course largely the point, and partly what makes it an interesting atlas.

Tourism maps for Christian pilgrims usually carries a purely biblical narrative. They are prone to project safety and exclude signs of conflict. These maps are less obvious when it comes to political projections, even though they are inevitably forced to decide on their take on the border-issues. Collins-Kreiner et al argue that “unintentional biases stem from the socio-cultural context” (2006:404) in these maps, which more ties to Foucault’s conception of the discourse as the author, and to Harley’s class of unintentional “distortions”, than to the notion of propaganda maps.

The tourism maps intention to “blur[… ] problematic political facts” (ibid:405) is an interestingly apolitical turn of events. Rather than promoting any geo-political argument, these maps strive to play down the conflict. Furthermore,

59 This view, however, is severely contested, since Israel controls the area’s borders, and thus the influx of supplies.
they implement a Christian toponymy to a large degree, thus violating the Arabic naming customs and counteracting the hebraicisation at the same time.

5.8 Concluding Israeli mapping practices

When looking at the conflict-ravaged region of Israel/Palestine, it becomes clear that maps are far from simply objective representations of reality. Rather the cartographic practices, of the past as well as the present, reflect how actors compete for territory. In this context, maps are fruitfully understood as territorial arguments, in line with Wood (1992, 2010). Mapping practices such as hebraicisation reflect how maps are used to territorialise space, which supports the argument conveyed by for example Biggs (1999), Strandsbjerg (2008, 2010), and Elden (2010).

There are several instances where cartographic practices that suit the view of maps as territorial arguments have originated directly from the Israeli state. The Israeli Ministry of Tourism and the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs are two state-level institutions that illustrate this. (Organisations with an ambiguous status, such as Israel Science and Technology Directory, also tie to the state’s map-propaganda.) These are cases where the “state-as-author”-position is relatively unproblematic, and the “state-as-actor”-level seems most appropriate.

Furthermore, the Israeli state has obviously intervened directly in the authoring of cartographic publications, and very explicitly shaped the agendas of the academic sphere. The project of hebraicisation was largely initiated by founding father David Ben-Gurion, and the Governmental Names Commission have had an absolute say regarding the toponymy of Israel. Influential cartographers and geographers have had ties to the state; David Amiran and Avshalom Shmueli are two prominent examples. When academics have refused to adhere to the state’s cartographic course, the government has overruled them. Thus, the state’s cartographic agenda has evidently been imposed on academia. “Science” has again served to conceal the state author, and to promote the objectivity of cartographic representations, all in compliance with Foucault (1969). This echoes of the state’s strive for a cartographic monopoly, as it has been described by scholars such as Harley (1989), Neocleous (2003), and Pickles (2004).

Interestingly enough however, the very same mapping practices occur in abundance in non-state mapping. As have been showed by for example Collin-

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60 To recapitulate: Amiran participated in building up the Hebrew University’s Geography Department, he sat on the Governmental Names Committee, he was the head of the Scientific Council in the Prime Minister’s office, he edited the national atlas, he “raised generations of students”, and “his life work may be seen in the evolution of the Geography department” (University of Haifa homepage[a]). Shmueli, who also had a career in the military and as a settler (University of Haifa homepage[b]), similarly edited the national atlas, and was responsible for its depiction of the West Bank and the Golan Heights as normal Israeli regions (Schnell 2004).
Kreiner et al (2006; also Leuenberg & Schnell 2010, Wallach 2011), commercial maps printed in Israel have a very strong tendency to adhere to the same narratives as the official state maps. Contested areas are almost always depicted as Israeli, expansionary ideals are mediated, adjacent states are depicted as hostile, and Arab populations are marginalised. When this is not the case, the discrepant narrative is underlined as if to emphasise the divergence from normalcy. The discursive starting point is thus the Greater Israel-narrative, and deviants have to relate to this. Does the state function as a structure, dictating the rules of cartographic practices to non-state actors? Or are state- and non-state actors both informed by an additional determinant? One suggestion that finds some support in this case study is the shared ideological construction of Zionism.

The ethno-nationalist elements of the Israeli nationalism are clearly relevant. Crampton’s reading of Foucault, regarding the mapping of race, functions as an effective tool to understand the implications on mapping practices (Crampton in Crampton & Elden 2007). The connection of land and people corresponds to the ethno-nationalist understanding, as do the construction of the “others”. The hebraicisation is thus best to be seen as a racist mapping practice, ethnically cleansing the toponymy and consolidate the land-people connection. In this sense, following Ben-Israel’s exposition through the variations of the “national” (2011), the Israeli nationalism has been an old-fashioned one; a romantic nationalism, if anything better suited for the 19th century.

The case study has had to acknowledge the incontrovertible importance of the Zionist movement and ideology. Its impact on the state formation, as well as on the formation of academic disciplines, is clear. Obviously, the state’s cartographic arguments stem from the Zionist project, as did academia’s into at least the 1970s (Schnell 2004, Bar-Gal & Bar-Gal 2008). As the blue box shows, the geopolitical aspirations of Zionism predate the state formation considerably (Leuenberg & Schnell 2010, Wallach 2011). In fact, to historically separate the state of Israel from the ethno-nationalism of Zionism is a fool’s labour, when even the founding document names the Zionist movement’s originator as the state’s “spiritual father” (Ben-Gurion et al 1948). To split the concept of the “nation-state” into “nation” and “state” becomes less meaningful when the state-project from before it’s beginning can be put in terms of a nationalist project. In the case of Israel, the state did not create the nationalism. It was the other way around.
6 Discussion

This chapter will bring together the insights from the previous sections, and formulate a number of hypotheses as part of a theory of state cartographic authorship. Aspects of the proposed position’s relevance will be discussed, and a few generalities and analytical categories will be suggested.

6.1 Conclusions

Maps are not objective representations of reality. Analysing the underlying power structures can be helpful to our understanding of maps and mapping practices. I find it constructive to follow the perspective, advocated by among others Wood (1992, 2010), that maps are arguments. We do not leave Foucault behind; to make an effective argument, preferably camouflaged by the positivist understanding of science and objectivity, can be seen as the discourse’s way of flowing through the cartographer’s pencil. The eroding of the modernist understanding of cartography is, in this sense, a breach in the power/knowledge-realm of the (nation) state; its arguments are suddenly contested on a fundamental level. This is in fact what is so “critical” about critical geography (Crampton & Krygier 2006).

With all due deference to structure and discourse, there is more to it. From the ontologically irreductive position of causal realism, the mapmaker’s agency can be acknowledged. At the same time, it seems clear that the state has attained the authorship of the map. Seeing how cartography emerged hand in hand with the state, and how the state as a territorial unit necessarily is associated with the map as the primary form of territorial argument, the agency of the state actor is deemed highly relevant. Thus, the theoretical position most relevant in this context is the classical IR-perspective of the state actor, comparable with Waltz’ (1959) mid-level of analysis.

The theoretical positioning elaborated in this thesis is that we can ascribe agency to the state. A more specific form of this argument is that the state can hold cartographic authorship. By this operation, I argue to have abated the ambivalence that has existed within critical cartography with regards to authorship; in other words, to have eased the tension between Harley and his critics (Belyea 1992, Crampton 2001, Hubbard et al 2004:178, Kitchin & Dodge 2007). I do not, however, pursue this positioning just because causal realism (Brante 2001) and IR-theory (Wight 2006) allow me to do it. The state-as-actor-perspective is relevant only if it adds to our understanding of the world.

The state’s roll can and should be discussed, as globalisation theorists often do (Ohmae 1995, Barber 1995, Strange 1996, Habermas 2001, van Schendel 2005,
Abraham & Williams 2009, Rosière & Jones 2012). It seems clear that the political entity of the state is quite a unique construction, when looked at from a historical perspective (Biggs 1999, Neocleous 2003). I seems equally clear that the territorial component of the state compels it to obtain the authorship of the map, and that this enterprise is an integral part in the state’s coming into being (Pickles 2004, Strandsbjerg 2008, 2010, Elden 2010).

As if this was a legal process, we have now established a “motive” for the state to “steal” the cartographic authorship. The ontology provided by our theory of science, causal realism, makes it possible to treat the state as a “juridical person” in this analogy; i.e., to ascribe agency to the state. As the case of Israeli mapping practices has illustrated, this position is analytically relevant. Let us therefore, to conclude this legal metaphor, think of this case as a precedent.

6.2 Cartography in the era of globalisation

Social science is to a large extent about interpretations. With the tools of analysis established here, we can interpret the world in a theoretically well-grounded manner. The course of events that is sometimes thought of as the process of globalisation is one aspect of reality that is essential to interpret. The insights of critical cartography, and a nuanced theory of science with regards to the structure-agency-problem, give perspective on the state’s role in this discussion. Let me turn to a couple of examples.

In 2010, Nicaragua invaded and occupied a small part of Costa Rica. The justification was that on Google Maps, the area was shown as a part of Nicaragua. In this case, the map became an argument utilised, but not authored, by a state (Alini 2010). Is this best seen as a reflection of the state’s declining role in an increasingly globalised world? When states are slipping from the privileged position of the cartographic monopoly, they will perhaps increasingly learn how to exploit other actors’ production.

The web services company Baidu, a “Chinese Google”, is known to comply with regime regulations and apply censorship like there was no tomorrow (Qiang 2009, Stempel 2011). When Google moved their servers to Hong Kong, due to questions of censorship and state meddling, Baidu’s grip on the Chinese market tightened substantially (Muncaster 2012). In this context, the Google Maps counterpart Baidu Maps can be interpreted as a tool for bringing back cartography into the hands of the state. The struggle for the map can be the struggle over space, and a state is arguably not much of a state without its territory.

These examples hint at what discussions can potentially emerge from the perspective I advocate. The tools that work so well to explain the birth of the territorial state can thus be shifted to interpret the doings and developments of states in the contemporary world. How the discipline of cartography developed, and by which agency, similarly shed light on cartographic practices of today.
6.3 State ideology

The case of the Israeli mapping practices show that the state-as-author-perspective has relevance in that it generates a meaningful and plausible description. However, the case also illustrates the complexities that threaten to shatter my theoretical lens. The constituents of the state struggle to crackle the flawed perception of the state monolith from the inside. The variable nature of the state, especially the democratic one, makes its agency struggle over time.

The concept of the nation-state is, as have been argued, even more problematic. In the words of historian Willem van Schendel:

“In the new literature, the connections among nation, state, territory, sovereignty, history, and identity are all problematized. Nations are seen as being socially constructed in many different ways [...] Nations are now conceived as more fluid, malleable, and unpredictable than ever before” (2002:115).

Zionism’s role in the case of Israeli mapping practices is obviously important to consider. Thus the state can be seen either as an actor informed by the more high-level structure/discourse of nationalism, or as a structure carrying and mediating this ideology. Both perspectives can be seen as circumnavigating the agency/authorship of the state, each in their own way. This argument indicates that simply claiming an irreductive ontology is not necessarily enough to avoid reductionism. Even if, according to the causal realist, all three viewpoint are potentially equally true, what you choose to adhere to will in a sense still exclude the others. To treat the state as an actor does in fact leave out the perspective of the state as a structure. To again quote Wight: “The agent–structure problem cannot be solved in the sense of a puzzle with an answer, but rather represents competing visions of what the social world is and what it might become” (2006:4, my italics). This gives that the allegedly irreducible ontology of causal realism perhaps should be renamed an elusive ontology, simply camouflaging the act of reduction that is inescappably taking place. However, following these logics, any delimitation can be seen as an act of reduction. Reducing becomes simply an aspect of understanding.

As I have argued, I do not find it overly worthwhile to try to separate the Israeli state from its nationalism. In this particular case, the state ideology seem inseparable from the state as a territorial political entity, thus adhering to Habermas’ trinity of state-nation-economy (2001), only with a ethno-romantic form of nationality.

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61 I do not want to dive into a discussion about definitions of “democracy” when discussing the case of Israel. Rather, I am content with Freedom House’s labelling “Free” (2012), the CIA World Factbook’s labelling “parliamentary democracy” (2012), and the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index’ scoring of 7.53 (compared to North Korea’s score of 1.08 and Norway’s score of 9.80), placing Israel in the category “flawed democracy” (2011:4). The reason why I discern democratic states specifically is that their political composition alters frequently, while many authoritarian regimes (unfortunately) seem politically very stable.
6.4 The power of tradition

A perhaps more serious objection to the state-as-author perspective is the colonial cartographic relics.62 A strict adherence to the cartographic traditions of colonial legacy could be argued to make the contemporary state’s autonomy less manifest; it would make the state simply a slave to discourse. The prime example in the Israeli case is how the British Mandate Line still holds strong legitimacy (Biger 2008). Still, not all colonially implemented borders enjoy that kind of respect. As of the British decolonialisation, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict was a fact, and the territory divided between Israel and neighbouring states. When the dust of the 1948 War settled, the second half of the split-state approach had evaporated (Greenberg 2004, Meyerson 2005). Of course arguments, even cartographic ones, can be grounded in something, and history seem to be the go-to pretext. More problematic historical factoids, such as the Jewish people’s right of inheritance to the Holy Land, serve to highlight the arbitrary nature of such arguments.

Of course, according to Brante (2001) and Wight (2006), the state can be both a “slave to discourse” and an agent simultaneously. Since the point of an irreductive ontology is to acknowledge that certain concepts hold relevance only on certain levels of reality, and do not contradict seemingly opposing concepts located at other levels, the state can be both structure and agency depending on what ontological stratum we are talking about. And as Foucault’s argument – that power is a necessity for subjectification – emphasises; an all-encompassing discourse does not kill the subject. The persistent tendency to put “slave to discourse” in opposition to agency does however illustrate the difficulty to incorporate this view in one’s reasoning. I believe that this difficulty stem from the concept of irreductive ontology actually being self-evident. For example, we seem to be able to treat states as actors as well as structures interchangeably, depending on context, irrespective of whether we explicitly make the philosophical argument supporting this view or not.

6.5 State interference in Academia

Drawing on the theory, the inquiry of Israeli mapping practices focused on certain aspects intimately connected with the state’s cartographic authorship. The territorialisation of space, as a part of state formation and consolidation, is one such aspect, exemplified by the project of hebraicisation. State ideology, i.e. the

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62 When discussing the Indo-Banlga-border, van Schendel makes reference to Edward Said as he describes “partition as a ‘parting gift of Empire,’ a legacy of imperialism” (2005:26). He also makes comparison with “other late-imperial partitions such as in Ireland or Palestine/Israel” (ibid:32).
collective identity of the national, is reflected in the Zionist movement. Most important, however, is perhaps the connection between state and science.

The symbiotic relationship between state and academia is strong in the case of Israel. Zionism is, as we have seen, the common denominator: “Israeli geography has shown a strong tendency to conform [...] to narratives that allow the appraisal of the Zionist project” (Schnell 2004:571). Not until the 1980s did a critical geographical tendency emerge (ibid). Even today, geography education aim “to tie the cords between the people and its land” (Bar-Gal & Bar-Gal 2008:61). The ties between academia and the state have been historically strong, as the Governmental Naming Commission exemplifies, and state officials have intervened directly in the production cartographical publications. This corresponds to the theoretical segment on the state’s knowledge/power-consolidation. As a modernist (yet also romantic) movement, Zionism perfectly fits the bill of a nationalist ideology, adhering to a science-paradigm effectively hiding away the subject. The state’s agenda is thus promoted through academic discourse, camouflaged by the claim of objectivity. The “science” of cartography becomes a tool for the territorialisation of space, and therefore of state formation.

6.6 The map-reader

The view of maps as territorial arguments has proven useful to understand Israeli mapping practices. The interesting instance of Christian pilgrimage tourism maps does however add a diverging perspective. These maps seem to primarily focus on hiding away conflict, portraying the “Holy Land” as a peaceful and anachronistic destination. Such mapping practices adhere to a commercial logic, promoting Israel as a nice place to visit and catering to a non-Israeli audience. These maps show the limitations of the maps-as-territorial-arguments perspective. However, they can still be seen as arguments; to spend your holiday budget on a trip to Israel.

It becomes obvious that different actors have different cartographic agendas. The territorial argument is one expected to be made by the state, because of its territorial composition. However, the receivers of maps are equally important, as the Christian pilgrimage tourism maps shows. This raises a question that has been partly overlooked thus far: who is the intended map-reader, from the state actors perspective? That the map is created in the reading as well as the authoring is something that has been acknowledged, but not further pursued.

In the case of the state author, the receiver can be either those participating or not participating in the particular state-project: residing or non-residing citizens, or residing or non-residing non-citizens. These four categories of potential map-readers have different expected levels of identification, loyalty, knowledge, and antagonism with regards to the particular state. In light of the importance of state ideology, it could be argued that the territorial argument often are directed towards readers already sympathetic to the state’s cause. School atlases and maps intended for the education system are apparently reaching the state’s own
population. Thus, the mapping practices can be interpreted as constantly creating, recreating, and implementing nationalism as a collective identity of the population. The argumentative side becomes less straight-forwards, since the propaganda function is not necessarily intended to convince non-believers. The map is in this function not intended for a debate, as much as it is intended for indoctrination.

When it comes to non-citizen residents, the mapping practices can be argued to act as an excluding mechanism, alienating divergent perspectives. It is perhaps not very likely that a politically conscious Israeli-residing Palestinian will be convinced by a map, and change his or her mind concerning the status of the Gaza Strip. However, by stressing a certain perspective, a hegemonic view can be established, marginalising deviants rather than allowing multiple perspectives in an open discussion.

Non-residing non-citizens is perhaps the class of receivers that are most likely to be “convinced” by maps. As have been argued, maps communicate their own objectivity through their connotations, and are therefore not always viewed as subjective arguments. This does of course make them even more effective as such. A map-reader with a lack of knowledge or well formulated opinion might very well read such a map as a mere “truth”, without further questioning. With this receiver in mind, the agenda of the state map-author can arguably be to convince the map-reader, and to promote the preferred discourse of the state.

As far as the fourth category of map-readers go, the non-residing citizens, this group is particularly relevant in the case of Israel, if one adopts an extended notion of citizen. The Law of Return 5710 (1950) states that “every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh”, slightly tautological as “oleh” means “a Jew immigrating, into Israel” (Knesset Homepage). It seems likely that a considerable share of this group agree with the arguments of the Israeli state. The group is not, however, exposed to the Israeli educational system. The map as a nationalist symbol, as a symbol of diaspora identification, is one probable function maps can have for this class of receivers.

6.7 Suggesting a theoretical framework

Many different actors can produce maps. The state, however, is a map-author in a more profound way than other actors. Cartography has namely emerged hand in hand with the state, and is therefore custom-made to serve its purposes. In this understanding, one state makes maps, but the state made the map.

Through theoretically and empirically grounded discussion, I have sought a reasonable position regarding states and maps. As the state-as-author and state-as-actor perspectives reciprocally inform each other, I have discussed what seems to be an adequate ontology from the premises of this context. I have furthermore emphasised critical cartography’s importance to political science.
Once the fairness of the state-author perspective have been argued, I would like to move further and suggest a few points for a theoretical framework of state mapping in general. These hypotheses also add a very concrete element of falsifiability to my framework. This is what I argue that we can expect of state mapping in the context of territorial struggle:

1) **Standardising of toponymy.** As the project of hebraicisation exemplifies, the state ideology of nationalism is imposed through the renaming of the landscape. This practice can be put in terms of ethnic homogenisation, or as a tool for territorialisation of space.

2) **Imposing on academia.** In order to make an effective argument, the state wants to pull the God-trick. In order to do so, it needs to control the cartographic discipline and its output. The educational system is also a valuable tool for indoctrination. This is an aspect of the state’s cartographic monopoly, both in the sense of controlling how maps are authored, and in the sense of controlling how maps are received.

3) **“Generous” drawing of borders.** As Figure 3 and Figure 5 exemplifies, a state can simply include disputed areas in the depiction of its territory. Israel’s inclusion of the Golan Heights does not, as we have seen, correspond to the view of the international community. The inclusion of the West Bank does not correspond to the view of the Palestinian Authority. The inclusion of the Gaza Strip does not even correspond to Israel’s own official view.

4) **Secrecy of mapping.** This is a point that I have not elaborated on, but that I wish to include for future discussions. It regards the important phenomena of cartographic monopoly, and is therefore worthy of inquiry.

These are aspects that I consider to be characteristics of state cartographic practices. They can be falsified or occasionally confirmed by looking at other cases; do any of these practices occur in, say, the case of Morocco’s mapping of West Sahara? Do they have any bearing on, say, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute? I have also underlined the importance of creating classifications of the map-author’s intended receiver. These aspects all need further discussion.

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63 When researching the Indo-Bangla borderlands, van Schendel writes: “The strategies of territoriality employed by these states are remarkable for relying on measures of blocking information” (2005:12). In the same context, political philosopher Ranabir Samaddar writes that “maps are a barred subject” (as cited in van Schendel 2005:13), which van Schendel claim derives from “an unbroken tradition of secrecy about maps” (ibid:13). Secrecy of mapping occurs in Harley (1988[b]), where a separation is made between strategic and commercial secrecy. For the purpose of a theory on state mapping, the strategic secrecy is arguably more relevant. Neocleous writes: ”Maps are [...] a means of both physical colonization and conceptual control [...] As a form of knowledge, maps have therefore been brought under the veil of secrecy which shrouds the modern state. Maps were historically regarded as privileged knowledge, with access given only to those close to the core of state power; map secrecy, like other forms of secrecy, came to be regarded as a prudent policy of good government” (2003:419-420). However, as Harley points out, not all states have historically insisted on secrecy. Due to obscurities such as this, the point of secrecy of mapping in particular calls for further scrutiny.
development, testing, and elaboration. Some of the points are mainly derived from the study of Israel, and perhaps irrelevant in other context. The point on toponymy might for example only be applicable when different national identities compete for territory.

To return to the questions laid out in the introduction: “How can we understand the relationship between state and map?” Maps can be seen as tool developed to suit a territorially defined political entity, and as the optimal form of territorial arguments. The state maps its claims; the map states its claims. “Is it fruitful to ascribe the state cartographic authorship?” In light of the intertwined histories of these phenomena, I argue that it is very much so. “How could a theoretical positioning regarding states’ cartographic authorship look?” As I have made an effort to show, such a theory should rest on an ontological position where the authorship of the state is allowed. Also, such a theory can include classifications with regards to concrete mapping practices, derived from processes such as territorialisation and identity building. It can also include typologies regarding the author’s particular purpose, and the intended receiver.
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8 List of figures

Figure 1. Map depicting Israel and surrounding states. Source: Israel Science and Technology Homepage(a). Used with permission from Mr Israel Hanukoglu, editor at the Israel Science and Technology Homepage.

Figure 2. Map depicting Israel and surrounding states. Source: Photo by the author of document from the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006).
Figure 3. Cut-out of map from Israeli Ministry of Tourism. Source: Israeli Ministry of Tourism Homepage(b). Used with permission from Mr Göran Nilervall at the Israel Government Tourist office for the Nordic and the Baltic countries.

Figure 5. Formalised map of Israel, including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Source: Photo by the author of document from The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010).