Haiti and the Horn: Crisis According to Whom?

A Qualitative Scrutiny of the Congressional Research Service’s Crisis Assessments

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Abstract

This paper is a qualitative scrutiny of two crisis evaluations conducted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The purpose is to investigate rhetoric used to analyse and assess the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa from a crisis management and disaster preparedness perspective. A modified grounded theory method is utilised. The qualitative method rests upon Quarantelli’s and ‘t Hart’s theories regarding differentiation of core principles and crisis-related political symbolism.

The Horn of Africa and Haiti experienced humanitarian episodes of immense scope. Efforts to alleviate suffering, build resilience for future disasters, and ultimately save lives during crises are divided into two key tools: crisis management and disaster preparedness. CRS, the research extension of the US Congress, has failed to conduct constructive and accurate crisis assessments due to inconsistent rhetoric and sporadic failure to recognise crisis management and disaster preparedness as unique but indivisible tools. Independent crisis management/disaster preparedness literature authenticates and accentuates appropriate and/or lacking crisis rhetoric. The consequent development of a potential political landscape within the realm of crisis management concludes the paper.

Keywords: Congressional Research Service; Crisis Management; Disaster Preparedness; Crisis Rhetoric; Haiti; Horn of Africa.
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Acronyms

AMISOM  African Union Mission in Somalia
CRS  Congressional Research Service
CRSR  UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
DART  Disaster Assistance Response Team
DHA  UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DINEPA  National Water and Sanitation Company
DRC  Disaster Research Centre
EU  European Union
FEWS NET  Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FY2012  Fiscal Year 2012
GT  Grounded Theory Method
ICG  International Crisis Group
IFRC  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM  International Organisation for Migration
MSF  Médecins Sans Frontières
NFI  Non-food Item
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA  UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
TFG  Transitional Federal Government
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
WASH  Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO  World Health Organisation
Part 1

1.1 Introduction

Post-quake Haiti and the aftermath of the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa provided the international community with two crises of immense scope. The prior disaster was immediate, unexpected and acute while the latter came as a result of poor rains and crop failure combined with mass displacement and political insecurity. Nonetheless, Haitians and peoples of East Africa required a substantial injection of organised humanitarian assistance. Media attention was thwarted to the two regions, governments and renowned NGO’s operated to alleviate the respective humanitarian disasters and the international community mobilised funding for aid. An aspect often overshadowed by practical management issues is the necessary step of evaluating crises for allocating financial support, logistical support and other humanitarian necessities; no state or organisational entity commits to humanitarian efforts without rational basis. This process is entitled crisis evaluation or assessment.

The Congressional Research Service, the public policy research extension for the United States Congress, constructed reports assessing the two crises in Haiti and the Horn region. “Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response” was published merely three days after the disaster hit. “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International Response” was issued six months after the crisis reached disaster declaratory status. The Haiti report focuses on the immediate crisis as a result of the natural disaster and the international response to date while the Horn report supposedly provides a framework for international and humanitarian response, and an analysis of operational challenges. The purpose of the reports is to provide US Congress with legal and policy recommendations by assessing the crises, which subsequently reflect decisions regarding allocation of funding, logistical support and ultimately US humanitarian assistance.

Analysis and subsequent rhetoric portrayed in CRS’s reports thus has considerable leverage in terms of releasing humanitarian assistance to crisis struck regions across the world. Difficulty arises however when evaluation of crises are lacking rudimentary recognition of core principles of crisis management and disaster preparedness. From this perspective, it is possible to highlight reluctance or keenness an entity has of appropriately evaluating a crisis. CRS has conducted crisis assessments for many years, and two of this century’s worst humanitarian disasters are no exceptions. It begs the question of whether CRS
complies with crisis management and disaster preparedness principles when assessing Haiti and the Horn of Africa.

1.2 Paper Objectives & Question Formulation

The objective is to scrutinise CRS’s evaluation of two recent crises, one being a slow onset humanitarian crisis and the other a natural disaster. This essay will investigate rhetoric used to present, analyse and assess the crises focusing on crisis management/disaster preparedness discrepancies. It will subsequently argue that CRS has failed its purpose of presenting a framework for the international and humanitarian response, and analysing the operational challenges for crisis management and disaster preparedness in the Horn drought of 2011; it will also present CRS’s successes in doing so for the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Lastly, the essay will accentuate the successes and failures of CRS’s assessments by evaluating the aforementioned reports in comparison to situation reports published by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and conflict prevention literature written by the International Crisis Group (ICG). The two major research questions circulating this study are the following:

Does CRS comply with crisis management and disaster preparedness principles?

How do CRS’s crisis evaluation reports concur with (humanitarian) strategic and tactical managerial literature?

In order to address these questions, the paper has been divided into different sections. Part 2 is limited to the first research question. Part 3 endeavours the latter whilst accentuating research findings from Part 2. The disposition of the paper is presented below.

1.3 Theory

Academic research on crisis management and disaster preparedness is vast and varied. While some scholars such as Brändström and Quarantelli focus on organisational and governmental decision-makers, others including ‘t Hart are more inclined towards power structures and symbolism crisis managerial actions entail. Researchers have in the past two decades conducted conceptual and empirical studies on the topic of large-scale crises, but scholars
agree that these studies lack psychological, socio-political and technological integration.\textsuperscript{1} The cross-disciplinary nature of organisational and governmental crises has particularly contributed to this lack of integration – Pearson and Clair elaborate upon this relationship, suggesting that the embracement of multidisciplinary approach has resulted to discussions regarding crisis management in “many different languages to different issues and audiences”.\textsuperscript{2} Discrepancies are inevitable when researchers utilise stipulative definitions for crisis, management and preparedness whilst creating frameworks for successful crisis management. Consistency is much needed.

In light of this, I found language and portrayed rhetoric the most important tool to clarify when discussing the Congressional Research Service’s reports. Consensus regarding imperative communication flow and organisational structures in crisis situations is widespread. However, I found that literature depicting successful or ineffective crisis management and disaster preparedness has a tendency of focusing on the exercise of authority and decision-making without reasonably acknowledging the dimension of symbolism and power. There is a need for a broader perspective on the nature of politics of crisis management. This is an intrinsically delicate relationship, where much needed rigorous definitions of crisis management and disaster preparedness, and the apparent necessity of a broader spectrum of crisis management discourse need to complement each other respectively. Therefore, I found the proposals put forward by Quarantelli and ’t Hart useful as they combine and complement the much needed correlation between defining the phenomena and acknowledging wider social, economic and political factors. Enrico Quarantelli is a professor of sociology and founder of Disaster Research Centre at the University of Delaware. Paul ‘t Hart is a professor of public administration at the Utrecht School of Governance whose area of expertise include crisis management and policy evaluation.

Quarantelli focuses on formal organisations as the social entity attempting to cope with crises. CRS, OCHA and ICG all acknowledge that the occurrences in Haiti and the Horn are in fact humanitarian crises. Quarantelli does not deal with crisis type situations like wars, terrorist attacks, civil disturbances etc; nor does he put non-community kinds of disaster crises such as transport accidents which do not affect the functioning of a community into


account in his definitions. The relevant premise is Quarantelli’s observation of partial correlation between the undertaking of preparedness planning and successful management of community disasters, i.e. the corresponding relationship between crisis management and disaster preparedness. He identifies two reasons for this: one is that planning is poor in the first place. This could depend on specific rather than generic planning, too segmented or segregated rather than involving all relevant social factors, or if planning demands artificial or far-from-everyday activities. Implementation will naturally be poor in actual disaster situations – poor planning can only encourage poor management activities.

Given this, the other reason (which I find of great interest and relevance for the study) is the failure to recognise that the principles of crisis management differ from the principles of disaster preparedness. Quarantelli draws a parallel between crisis management/disaster preparedness and the military distinction between tactics and strategy:

Strategy, in general, has reference to the overall approach to a problem or objective. But there are always situational factors or other contingencies which require particular adjustments to attain a specific goal if the overall objective is to be attained. This is the area of tactics. In somewhat parallel terms, good disaster preparedness planning involves the general strategies to be followed in readying for sudden community emergencies. In good crisis management, particular tactics are used to handle the specific situational contingencies which are present or which arise during the course of an emergency.

I found the clear distinction between the two unique but indivisible concepts to be pertinent for discussing the Congressional Research Service’s evaluation of the crises as focus is put on rhetoric discrepancies and inconsistency.

Quarantelli’s summary of research findings provides an institutional perspective of great importance. Crises are interlinked however to social, economic and political conditions, and a full understanding of these factors is essential to understanding crisis management. Much of crisis management literature tends to be strongly oriented to managerial issues of planning, response and communication. This managerialist orientation has a tendency of being interpreted rather exclusively in functionalist-technocratic terms;

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analysis angled for policy and organisational practice. Quarantelli focuses on this central dimension of crisis management and disaster preparedness. This element however does not itself contribute to a deeper understanding of crisis management rhetoric – socioeconomic and political factors are not put into account, and conflicts of interest are not sufficiently highlighted. The instrumental orientation dominating the field rests upon certain normative assumptions which ‘t Hart summarises in terms of a “functionalist paradigm emphasising control”. Decision makers themselves may be ambivalent in their interpretation of events, making the battle between different groups for dominant definitions of the situation all the more considerable.

“Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management” introduces a more power-critical approach to the analysis of crisis management and draws attention to opportunity spaces crises entail for crisis actors. Paul ‘t Hart provides critical intersectional tools for comprehending the important role of political interests and the symbolic power of labelling; by whom, how and why an event is perceived as a crisis is a key empirical issue for crisis analysts. Although there is widespread consensus over the fact that the events presented below are in fact crises, rhetoric used to analyse the disasters differ respectively. In this context, I found the arguments of ‘t Hart useful. He identifies language as the most important instrument of crisis management and those who are able to define the crisis are most likely hold the key to defining the appropriate strategies for resolution. The earthquake in Haiti is considered a crisis due to its immediate nature and colossal scope, but language used to depict the drought crisis suggests customariness, despite the millions affected. This power-critical approach is crucial for scrutinising the language used in reports published by the Congressional Research Service.

Quarantelli and ‘t Hart thus provide a functionalistic orientation perspective for policy and organisational practise with a power-critical approach focusing on language. The Congressional Research Service itself is not a legislative body, but its recommendations are

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key instruments for legislative and, to some extent, executive bodies in the US. The need to scrutinise evocative language used in CRS’s reports will thus be highlighted using multidisciplinary crisis management literature.

1.4 Methodology

A considerable fraction of literature on crises and emergencies stands out with its strong orientation to managerial issues of organisation, planning and response. Given the fact that I intended to investigate CRS’s compliance with crisis management and disaster preparedness principles, the appropriate methodological base of this study was a qualitative approach. This was crucial in uncovering meanings and contents of crisis assessments, rather than accumulating data concerning management chronology during and after the respective crisis. A stipulative version of grounded theory method (GT) was thusly selected in order to generate a hypothesis regarding crisis management/disaster preparedness acquiescence. Traditional GT is a research method which operates in a reverse fashion: rather than beginning with a hypothesis, the first step of GT is data collection. Subsequent collection of codes, concepts and finally categories are extracted, which form the basis for the construction of a theory.¹⁰

I chose ten crisis assessments discussing Haiti and the Horn published by CRS. Subsequently, I identified anchors including but not limited to crisis, preparedness, management and political instability. This allowed the key points of the data to be gathered i.e. crisis management and disaster preparedness principles as defined by Quarantelli. Ten CRS reports discussing Haiti and the Horn were ventilated, exhausted and later limited to two primary sources, an issue which is elaborated upon below. Data collected from these two sources were grouped into collections of codes of similar content.¹¹ It is at this particular point in which the method deviates from classic GT. I found the theories of ’t Hart and Quarantelli to be extremely fitting in the collection of codes with similar content. Therefore, their theories were used to generate and simultaneously confirm clear categorisation between the two reports in an abductive manner, highlighting the practical dichotomy with theoretical

¹⁰ Alvesson, Mats; Sköldberg, Kaj, Tolkning och reflection: vetenskapsfilosofi och kvalitativ metod, Denmark, Narayana Press, 2008, p. 141-150.

¹¹ Alvesson, Mats; Sköldberg, Kaj, Tolkning och reflection: vetenskapsfilosofi och kvalitativ metod, Denmark, Narayana Press, 2008, p. 157-159.
support. Literature from ICG and OCHA acted as contextually verifying components for the analysed and synthesised data gathered from CRS’s crisis assessments.

Crisis management and disaster preparedness are central terms in this study. There are a variety of definitions and I chose to provide definitions for the idioms in Part 2. Although it is a subject worth critical analysis, this study did not discuss the problematic (and somewhat contradictory) nature of crisis management/disaster preparedness principles.

Difficulties and problematic factors with modified GT are based on the method’s prerequisite of objectivity. It is impossible to claim that I had no presumption when I undertook the study. As Thomas and James suggest, it is impossible to liberate oneself of preconditions in the collection and analysis of data in the way that GT advocates say is necessary. CRS’s compliance with crisis principles was (and is still) not an absolute phenomenon, but information accumulated from popular media and literature regarding US Foreign Policy has given one a resilient picture of the organisation’s expected rhetoric. Ultimately, I attempted to relinquish conjectures by presenting the crises as described by CRS. This itself is not without flaw – hence the contextual and comparing importance of ICG and OCHA literature.

I chose my primary sources as a result of identified anchors and collection of key points (as described above). CRS’s report on Haiti was published just days after the earthquake while the Horn report was published in January 2012, six months after a disaster declaration was issued. The former crisis was one of immediate proportion while the latter came as a result of deteriorating climate conditions compounded by other factors. Therefore, I compiled the immediate disaster with a reactionary report and the slow onset crisis with a report ordained for short-term and long-term framework purposes. Nevertheless CRS literature used, regardless of type, was complemented with OCHA’s reactionary crisis management literature and ICG’s disaster preparedness (and to some extent crisis management) analysis.


1.5 Disposition

Part 2 is divided into four subchapters. Definitions and Background provide readers with definitions of crisis management and disaster preparedness. Also, the Congressional Research Service is briefly presented along with a historical contextualisation of the two regions of interest. The second subchapter discusses the Haitian crisis by presenting CRS’s crisis overview and outlook, with a subsequent independent analysis of crisis management and disaster preparedness rhetoric. The author attempts to emphasise the correlation between crisis definition and subsequent management rhetoric. The third subchapter has an identical disposition, but discusses the Horn. The last subchapter intertwines the analysis from the two prior subchapters of crisis management and disaster rhetoric in order to highlight the stark differences between the portrayed rhetoric. Part 2 attempts to frame CRS’s compliance with crisis management and disaster preparedness principles.

Part 3 introduces ICG and OCHA and contextualises their relevance in this paper. Haiti is presented first; relevant OCHA Situation Reports and ICG’s Latin America/Caribbean Report are compared and contrasted to CRS’s crisis evaluation report. The Horn is examined in an identical manner, utilising OCHA Situation Reports and a policy briefing published by ICG. The author attempts to highlight crisis management/disaster preparedness successes and failures. Part 3 analyses CRS’s concurrence with strategic and tactical managerial literature. Part 4 concludes the findings and provides a short reflection on the correspondence between crisis assessment and development of political landscapes.
2.1 Definitions and Background

2.1.1 Crisis Management and Disaster Preparedness

Crisis management is an inherently complex and politically controversial phenomenon. It can only be defined and analysed to the fullest extent if managerial, functionalist decision making is complemented by a power-critical perspective. Paul ‘t Hart elaborates on this relationship. He suggests that a useful set of tools lending themselves to a power-critical analysis of the dynamics of crises and of prevalent crisis management practices can be found in theory and research on the symbolic dimensions of politics and administration.\(^{14}\) In other words, symbolism within the realm of crisis management complements political agendas and administrative willingness upon the face of crises, making rhetoric a key instrument to fully grasp prevalent crisis management.

As this study will focus on CRS’s reports on two humanitarian emergencies, crisis management in this context is defined as the process by which an organisation or political entity understands and handles major events. Crisis management is characterised by tactical measures used to comprehend and act upon urgent threats to the well-being of people, and the dearth of time to act on the situation.\(^{15}\) Disaster preparedness on the other hand is strategic management processes employed by organisations or governments to protect and prepare the people from future disasters, and ensure the resilience of the organisational or political structure.\(^{16}\) This study will focus on the rhetoric the two reports convey. Crises are linked to social, economic and political conditions and tensions - as many scholars of crisis phenomena have emphasised, a “full understanding of these factors is essential to understanding crisis management”.\(^{17}\) However, a clear distinction between the two concepts is vital in order to avoid definition discrepancies and to righteously scrutinise the Congressional Research Service.


2.1.2 Congressional Research Service

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a public policy research extension of the US Congress. Almost a century old, CRS provides policy and legal analysis to committees and members of the House of Representatives and Senate, regardless of political affiliation. CRS experts support Congress at every stage of legislative processes – from early considerations and proposals to oversight of enacted laws and agency activities. CRS does not however make legislative or other policy recommendations to Congress. Nevertheless, its recommendations regarding public policy are vital because Congress, the bicameral legislature of the federal government of the US, relies on CRS to “marshal interdisciplinary resources, encourage critical thinking and create innovative frameworks to help legislators form sound policies and reach decisions on a host of difficult issues”. Hence, it is an influential and important organisational entity in Congress.

2.1.3 Background: The Horn of Africa & Haiti

The Horn of Africa is a peninsula located in the easternmost protrusion of the African continent. It is inhabited by roughly 100 million, most of which live in Ethiopia. The Horn of Africa denotes the region including the countries Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. However, given the reach of the drought crisis, Kenya has been included and considered part of the Horn of Africa region for the purposes of the forthcoming review.

Drought is a predictable event in the region’s arid climate. Major famines have taken place, ranging from the famine in Tigray (1958) to the Somali famine caused by drought and civil war in the early 1990’s. 8 major famines have taken place in some or all regions of the Horn since 1984. As expressed by the UN News Centre, “a famine can be declared only when certain measures of mortality, malnutrition and hunger are met. They are:

at least 20 per cent of households in an area face extreme food shortages with a limited ability to cope; acute malnutrition rates exceed 30 per cent; and the death rate exceeds two persons per day per 10,000 persons”. Moreover, the Horn of Africa’s inhabitants are no strangers to political instability and armed conflicts, ranging from civil war in Somalia to prolonged hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. All countries in the region (with the exception of Somalia) have been categorised using Human Development Index (2011) by the UNDP as states with Low Human Development. Democracy Index (2010, 2011), compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit and endorsed by the Swedish International Development Agency, rank Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea in 103rd, 121st, 147th and 154th place respectively. Somalia’s last inclusion in the HDI ranking was in the 1996 report. Political fundamentalism, lack of freedom of press and unemployment are terms used extensively to portray the political status quo of the African peninsula.

Haiti is a small Caribbean country which borders the Dominican Republic. With a population of roughly 10 million (half of which are under the age of 20), the relatively homogenous populace is concentrated in Haitian towns and cities: Port au Prince, the capital, has 1.25 million inhabitants.

Political instability and severe weather predicaments also characterise Haiti’s contemporary history. The hereditary dictatorship of the Duvalier family lasted for almost 30 years, only to be succeeded by a military regime in 1986. Democratic rule was dominant in the 1990’s but was nevertheless vacillating. A coup in 2004 led to great uncertainty between the Haitian government and the United States, their major international ally. Moreover, Haiti has a history of major flooding and tropical storms since the new millennia, creating social unrest due to soaring food and fuel prices in 2004 and 2008. Haiti is in 114th place in the Democracy Index (2011) and in ranked 145th in the Human Development Index (2010). Given the fact that in its 200 year history, Haiti has suffered 32 coups, the Caribbean state is also

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typified by political instability, albeit dissimilar, and of lesser severity and political complexity than that of its East African counterpart.

2.2 Haiti

2.2.1 Crisis Overview and Outlook

On the 12\textsuperscript{th} January 2010, the largest earthquake ever recorded in Haiti devastated parts of the country, including the capital. The epicentre, 25 kilometres (15 miles) southwest of Port-au-Prince, had a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale, subsequently affecting a third of Haiti’s population. A disaster declaration was immediately issued. Search and rescue operations for survivors were made the country’s top priority, along with electricity generation capability and provision of mobile medical units.

It comes as no surprise that the Congressional Research Service was not able to outline detailed priorities of the Haitian and international humanitarian response. “Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response” was published three days after the deadliest natural disaster in the Western Hemisphere struck Haiti as a reactionary report focusing on the immediate crisis and the (then) response to date (15\textsuperscript{th} January 2010). The contents clearly outline a linear disposition where status of the crisis is followed a “response” subheading or “relief operation outline”. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, key priorities were quickly identified. Imminent threat to Haitians lives due to collapsed infrastructure was of major concern. Loss of crucial personnel, including Haitian government officials and UN civilian staff and peacekeepers further complicated the mass adversity. No initial figures regarding casualties are given in the report, but it mentions that estimates may “reach into the hundreds of thousands”.\textsuperscript{23} The unyielding basis is that little is yet known: the severity of the earthquake and the fundamental need for a quick humanitarian relief operation can only be obtained after a full determined assessment of the disaster on the ground.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24} Taft-Morales et al, p. 3.
2.2.2 Crisis Management and Disaster Preparedness: Haiti

Congressional Research Service’s report on Haiti focuses “on the immediate crisis [...] as a result of the earthquake and the US and international response”.\textsuperscript{25} It comes as no surprise that casualty figures and other details are not presented (as stated above), but the report outlines the situation considerably well. Haitian government response is initially presented, stressing their top priorities. The World Bank and other actors “were working with the Haitian government to incorporate disaster risk management into Haiti’s overall development strategy and to develop its capacity for disaster response”.\textsuperscript{26} Although the focus of its risk management efforts targeted hurricanes (the most common cause of natural disasters on the island), there is a firm differentiation between incorporating risk management into the country’s development strategy and developing disaster response. The false perception that the presence of disaster preparedness planning will only require implementation of prior planning in the event of a crisis is discarded at an early stage; the immediate tactical means of crisis management are mapped as priorities while the strategic means of recovery and reconstruction, parallel to the relief efforts, would begin as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{27}

Kenneth H. Merten, Ambassador to Haiti, issued a disaster declaration on the 13\textsuperscript{th} January.\textsuperscript{28} The US response is divided into humanitarian assistance and domestic legislation. The latter is embodied in temporary halting the deportation of Haitians, facilitating the evacuation of US citizens and issuing a travel warning.\textsuperscript{29} Humanitarian assistance from the US focuses on search and rescue, logistics and infrastructure support, provision of assistance where possible, and conducting needs assessments.\textsuperscript{30} USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). Other smaller teams were sent to assist DART, including the Response Management Team and the Fairfax Urban Search and Rescue Team to assess humanitarian needs and to assist with coordination at the US Embassy. The US response is closely linked to the priority of search and rescue, but also crisis assessment.

Relevant humanitarian relief sectors, called clusters, are usually established during humanitarian crises in order to coordinate partners, facilitate planning and prioritise

\textsuperscript{25} Taft-Morales et al., summary.
\textsuperscript{26} Taft-Morales et al., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{27} Taft-Morales et al., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{28} Taft-Morales et al., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{29} Taft-Morales et al., p. 6, 14.
\textsuperscript{30} Taft-Morales et al., p. 6.
resources. Emergency shelter, food assistance, health, logistics and water/sanitation were organised by various agencies (including IOM and WFP). A variety of other NGO’s already operating in Haiti work in partnership with relevant organised clusters, but the head of each cluster reports to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, the senior-most UN official in a country experiencing a humanitarian emergency. The earthquake was a crisis which needed “immediate provision of emergency supplies and personnel”,\(^\text{31}\) and organisations such as the IFRC contributed with medical assistance and tracing missing people.

Ultimately, crisis management in its tactical means are highlighted and depicted as the priority from a US foreign political perspective. There is no discrepancy regarding crisis management and disaster preparedness; instead the report clearly indicates the difficulty of fully determining the humanitarian needs before conducting in-depth assessments for a more detailed understanding of the circumstances on the ground.\(^\text{32}\) Prior efforts to strategically use the “window of opportunity to enable the consolidation of stability and the undertaking of a process of sustainable development” are by no means undermined by unimaginable conditions following the earthquake.\(^\text{33}\) As Quarantelli concludes, although such coordination remains relative at best and is seldom achieved, good prior disaster planning may reduce effectively the convergence of nullifying organisations and thus allow a relative degree of coordination.\(^\text{34}\) The later reality does not correspond with the idealistic premise (as discussed later), but it is vital to appreciate CRS’s rhetoric as it differentiates the two unique but indivisible managerial tools.

2.3 The Horn of Africa

2.3.1 Crisis Overview

Mark Bowden, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, issued a famine declaration on the 20\(^{th}\) July for two regions of southern Somalia. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) elevated the status of the Horn drought crisis to a major, large-scaled emergency on the same day. At that particular period, it was

\(^\text{31}\) Taft-Morales et al, p. 12.
\(^\text{32}\) Taft-Morales et al, p. 3.
\(^\text{33}\) Taft-Morales et al, p. 2.
believed that 750’000 people were in the brink of starvation. When the report was published (6th January 2012), an estimate of 13.3 million people were believed to be affected by the humanitarian crisis, 250’000 of whom needed food assistance “in the near term to avoid death”.

Rains between October and December 2011 brought some relief to the arid drought-affected areas in the region. Although the shift in severity was most likely due to increased provision of assistance by the international community, the effectiveness impacted relief efforts negatively, causing logistical barriers for the delivery of assistance. Flooding and displacement affected an already vulnerable demographic group, initiating fears of higher rates of water-borne respiratory diseases and malaria. Furthermore, deterioration of security conditions due to increasing restriction on humanitarian access in Somalia by the insurgent fundamentalist group Al-Shabaab combined with security incidents within the Dadaab refugee camp complex in Kenya complicated the logistical and distributive means in which organisations operated within. To summarise, the arid plains of East Africa, devastated by a slow onset and critical drought, and subsequently a famine, has been subjected to what is suggested to be a humanitarian impasse by the Congressional Research Service. Massive displacement and political insurgency complicates what is described as “the worst humanitarian crisis in the world”.

While the United States remains the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to the Horn, the report clearly implies (prior to the framework for humanitarian response and its analysis of operational challenges) the near impossibility of managing the crisis by accentuating the development of the slow onset crisis proportions, and failing to recognise that the principles of disaster preparedness planning are different from those of crisis management. CRS’s outline of the humanitarian crisis and international response mentions that previous droughts have been responded to by “establishing early warning systems and ‘safety nets’ to mitigate the types of impact poor climate conditions are having on the region” and that without these mechanisms in place, “the current crisis would have

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36 Margesson et al, p. 3.

been worse.” However, as presented later and argued throughout the essay, the failure to appropriately distinguish the principles of crisis management and disaster preparedness as two separate entities in the Horn of Africa has led to ambivalent and sporadically inconsistent rhetoric in the report prepared for members and committees of the US Congress.

2.3.2 Current Outlook

The Congressional Research Service identifies three major issues of concern regarding the (then) current outlook on the humanitarian crisis: 1) soaring food prices and dearth of crops/loss of livelihoods; 2) security impasse created by insurgent political groups and strains within overpopulated refugee camps (most notably Dadaab in north-eastern Kenya, close to the Somali border); and 3) displacement and vulnerable populations. The third predicament is portrayed as a result of the former two as population movements often occur in crises resulting from natural disasters or conflict. Life-saving assistance is clearly the priority, as emphasised in the report. Soaring food prices due to crop failures and perished livestock resulted in raises of staple food prices, ranging from 51% in Kenya to 240% in Somalia between June 2010 and June 2011. FEWS NET analysed and concluded that while Ethiopia’s food needs would decline in 2012, food assistance need in Somalia would remain far above typical levels.

Internally Displaced Person’s (IDP’s) and refugees fall under the category “vulnerable and displaced populations”. Although the acuteness of their malnourishment is recognised (and indeed highlighted), preventing secondary causes of death and illness related to malnutrition “including communicable diseases such as measles, cholera, and respiratory infections, and vector-borne diseases such as malaria” is seen as critical. Poor sanitation

38 Margesson et al, p. 4.
40 Margesson et al, p. 7.
41 Margesson et al, p. 9.
42 Refugees are protected under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). A refugee is defined as a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. IDP’s on the other hand are still within their country’s border and is thusly not covered by the Refugee Convention. See United Nations report Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and CRSR (1951).
43 Margesson et al, p. 9.
conditions, over-crowded living conditions and limited safe drinking waters have led to a rise of fatality rate among children. With the onset of the rainy season combined with the large influx of IDP’s and refugees, the risk of spread of measles and acute watery diarrhoea has dramatically increased.44

The number of displaced Somalis continues to change: Ethiopia witnessed a radical drop of refugee influx towards the end of 2011 while Kenya continues to receive over 1’100 refugees per day.45 Along with the aforementioned health constraints, the lack of security poses an imminent threat to the well-being of refugees. A “suspension of all but emergency relief efforts at the Dadaab camps” was caused by rising insecurity and a series of kidnappings close to the Kenya-Somalia border.46 Relocation of some refugees living in overcrowded areas of the camp was suspended because of rising insecurity. Al-Shabaab imposed restriction of access to the World Food Programme, which intensifies security concerns and increases the possibility of IDP’s and refugees, who have received humanitarian assistance in the past to return to famine.

2.3.3 Crisis Management and Disaster Preparedness: the Horn

The Congressional Research Service’s report “Horn of Africa Region: the Humanitarian Crisis and International Response” is supposed to provide an overview of the current status of the crisis, summary background on the region, a framework for the international and humanitarian response, and an analysis of some of the operational challenges in East Africa.47 It presents as shown above a crisis overview and the current outlook of the humanitarian circumstances. As this section will argue, however, the omission of certain terminology in CRS’s report and the reluctance to separate crisis management and disaster preparedness when describing and analysing the framework for international and humanitarian response characterise the failure of drafting a suitable crisis evaluation.

The Congressional Research Service quickly identifies three major causes of concern. The food situation is perhaps the most tangible and acute of the three, with an

44 Margesson et al, p. 9.
45 Margesson et al, p.10.
46 Margesson et al, p. 11.
47 Margesson et al, summary.
estimate of 13 million people in the Horn who are in need of food and other humanitarian assistance according to WFP. 9.6 million of the drought affected population are in need for near-term food assistance.\textsuperscript{48} A separate humanitarian cluster, or sector focusing on specific relief activities, lead food dispersion in Somalia and Ethiopia, embodied by WFP. They are feeding 7.4 million people in the Horn countries, with other agencies taking the responsibility for delivering food in areas of southern Somalia.

As humanitarian assistance in Kenya is led by their government, WFP assist in developing programmes to “transition from short-term interventions to recovery activities such as food-for-assets [...] through which WFP, working with the Kenyan Government, is helping communities to improve their ability to manage and recover from drought through investments in community and agricultural infrastructure”.\textsuperscript{49} Kenya is thus assisted through strategic supplements in which recovering mechanisms are highlighted: WFP estimates that the programme will reach 500’000 people in 2012.\textsuperscript{50} Kenya’s central highlands are among Africa’s most productive agricultural areas, but the arid north is exposed to similar agricultural farming conditions as southern Somalia. The vital factor in Kenya’s recovery resides in the relatively ensured security and political stability. No other country’s future in the region is constructively presented and analysed in the terms of crisis management and disaster preparedness as Kenya; the appeal for humanitarian response, according to CRS, focuses on two parallel tracks – one to respond to acute humanitarian needs including the refugee crisis and urban challenges, and the other on rebuilding resilience to emergencies within communities.\textsuperscript{51}

Challenges Somalia is facing regarding humanitarian assistance are almost exclusively connected to access and delivery due to security concerns. The United States considers Somalia too dangerous to maintain a diplomatic presence, and the TFG’s capacity to coordinate relief efforts is righteously undermined.\textsuperscript{52} Al Shabaab’s decision to drive many international aid groups out of southern Somalia due to their inconsideration for farmers and hidden agendas in 2009 sparked the complex nature of the insecurity and infrastructure predicament. Coordination and aid oversight is also a challenge; the absence of a functioning

\textsuperscript{48} Margesson et al, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{49} Margesson et al, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{50} Margesson et al, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{51} Margesson et al, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{52} Margesson et al, p. 15.
central authority has made extortion and ad hoc taxation possible by militia groups and road checkpoints. Al Shabaab also announced that it has banned 16 UN agencies and other international NGO’s for advocating secularism and demonstrating a lack of neutrality.\textsuperscript{53}

However, with this in mind, WFP has scaled up assistance in Somalia via airdrops and new routes by land. Other relief organisations have been able to continue operations, including the ICRC and multiple Islamic organisations.

The US State Department has expressed that they would focus on the response to address short-term needs and save lives, but also “build capacity to reduce the cycles of famine and failure that occur repeatedly in the Horn region”.\textsuperscript{54} USAID estimates that nearly $220 million would go to humanitarian assistance in the Horn, of which $194 million will be for food aid in FY2012.\textsuperscript{55} The State Department emphasise the strengthened assistance and increased funding for early warning systems in its DART offices in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. Safety net programmes and developing agricultural sectors are also mapped as critical contributions by US humanitarian efforts. These measures are undoubtedly long-term strategic instruments for development and disaster preparedness. Albeit necessary, it is worth consideration and scrutiny that the efforts are only applicable to Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti: Somalia and Eritrea are not included.\textsuperscript{56}

It is worth noting that CRS’s report on the Horn appreciates the inadequate resources provided for the humanitarian response. Funding in the near term has improved, but concerns remain about sustaining support throughout the crisis which is expected to last well into 2012.\textsuperscript{57} Although restrictions imposed by Al Shabaab pose a great obstacle, inadequate funding and donor government regulations restricting operation and access remains, according to CRS, the greatest impediment to humanitarian assistance in Somalia.\textsuperscript{58}

Rhetoric consistent in CRS’s depiction and analysis of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is the omission of crisis management in one hand and the emphasis on the “recovering factor” and the security “impasse”. As stated above, disaster preparedness policies drafted by the State Department are not applicable for Somalia. CRS’s report

\textsuperscript{53} Margesson et al, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{54} Margesson et al, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{55} Margesson et al, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{56} Margesson et al, p. 19-20.
\textsuperscript{57} Margesson et al, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{58} Margesson et al, p. 18.
concludes that no one can state with any certainty when the drought-driven factors of the crisis will end, and sustaining the humanitarian effort through to the end of the crisis remains a huge concern.\textsuperscript{59} It acknowledges that the drought has triggered the worst international humanitarian crisis in the world, but fails to respect an essential principle of a crisis: finite time for response.\textsuperscript{60} Assistance efforts in 2012, according to CRS’s report, “will focus on providing life-saving assistance [...] and prevent further displacement by assisting people where they live [...] [by] providing a minimum package of services and strengthening the protection of vulnerable populations”.\textsuperscript{61} The ambiguity of institutional actors and reluctance to provide geographic referees stands in direct contrast to the presentation of difficulties of providing assistance in Somalia. Here, the challenges are presented in practical detail, ranging from the restriction on US aid and UN sanctions to refugee influx to hosting neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{62} With political will considered, it is still possible to recognise the omission of “crisis management” in the entire report, which is wretchedly extraordinary in a report examining the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Particular tactical rhetoric is not used to handle the specific situational contingencies which are present during the course of the emergency in Somalia. In other words, disaster preparedness in the form of relief projects overshadows and subsequently invalidates the need for crisis management in a country facing its worst drought in 60 years.

2.4 Crisis Rhetoric in the Horn of Africa and Haiti

The two crises are very different from one another in several dimensions. Political contextualisation of the crises gives one a firm understanding of taken precautions and resulting humanitarian assistance. It is neither shocking nor controversial that the US assisted Haiti in its immediate crisis to save as many lives as possible, but also to prohibit mass migration of Haitians towards North America. It comes as no surprise that the Congressional Research Service acknowledges the difficulty of providing aid services in Somalia, a country with weak central authority and an active fundamentalist insurgent terrorist group. The crises stand in stark contrast to one another, one being a massive earthquake shaking the foundation

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{59} Margesson et al, p. 25.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Margesson et al, p. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Margesson et al, p. 11, 15-6, 20-1.
\end{itemize}
of everyday life in a fragile democracy, the other a slow onset drought in a border-crossing region complicated by political insurgency and lacking infrastructure.

There is, however, a common misconception about crises. The epochs of profound uncertainty and urgent challenges may have their own distinct physical characteristics and level of escalation, but they are not unique. If one goes beyond the specifics of time, place, method and scale, or looks beyond physical events and examines challenges to communities and policy-makers, crises lose their unique essence.  

Humanitarian relief efforts and other NGO activities operate in both cases, regardless of disaster. To a certain extent, the reports provided by the Congressional Research Service are extensions of US foreign policy and act as recommendations. Whether this justifies the omission of crisis management when describing and analysing the worst humanitarian crisis in the world for Congress is doubtful. CRS’s report on Haiti on the other hand, albeit urgently written, acknowledges the urgency of the earthquake and the importance of prior significant progress in the country’s development strategies. It begs the question of whether the immediate severity decides the subsequent quality of crisis management rhetoric in US foreign policy.

At a rhetorical level, evocative language is used to generate or reflect popular or elite anxieties; the very act of labelling a particular set of conditions a “crisis” is itself a rhetorical act. It is impossible to deny the extent of the two crises presented. However, the decision to omit crisis management in CRS’s report on the Horn conveys a certain assessment of the situation as opposed to CRS’ report on Haiti in terms of seriousness and the eventual allocation of responsibility for the crisis situation. The complex set of challenges in terms of poor infrastructure and insecurity are justifiably presented but excessively accentuated in episodes concerning access and aid delivery, IDP’s and vulnerable populations, and crisis overview in CRS’s report on the Horn. Such language acts as an important function to de-

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64 Taft-Morales et al, p. 2.

politicise the crisis event and employing a “non-partisan” channel for defining the situation and assessing success and failure.\textsuperscript{66}

CRS addresses Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti in little detail. Kenya’s challenges and appeals however are assessed as collective to the international community, most likely because they are aligned with US interests, ranging from concerns regarding security and demographic implications of refugees crossing to Kenya, to focus on providing life-saving assistance to IDP’s and refugees where they live.\textsuperscript{67} Kenya is an important regional ally to the United States, and with the presence of a relatively stable government compared to its neighbours, CRS presents the humanitarian appeal thoroughly, thereby employing a “non-partisan” channel defining the situation and linking the crisis in Kenya to social, economic and political conditions determining the US ally’s success and failures.

Diplomatic presence in Somalia is non-negotiable due to political and security reasons, and given the historical context where US military presence in the 1990’s caused mass unpopularity with the American people after 19 soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in 1993, it comes as no surprise that CRS refrains from labelling US efforts as crisis management. This strategy is quite effective as it realigns different and mutually contradictory definitions of the situation – it remains the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Nevertheless, pessimists (in this case CRS) are less sanguine about policy-makers’ ability and their willingness to critically assess their past performances during intensely political episodes. They are motivated to exaggerate their success and thus “over learn” from them in the future. Hence, their failures are obfuscated and “explained away”, thereby “under-learning” from them.\textsuperscript{68}

Crisis language in CRS’s report on Haiti however is unequivocal, consistent and constructive. The thoroughgoing theme evident in CRS’s “Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response” is the consistent differentiation: crisis management is exemplified in tactical means by outlined priorities drafted by the Haitian government, USAID and other international actors. Disaster preparedness planning on the other hand is embodied in structural

\textsuperscript{67} Margesson et al, p. 5, 10-11.
programmes present prior to the disaster, ranging from Haiti’s capacity for disaster response to poverty reduction strategy. The reference to overall approaches to certain objectives (poverty reduction, disaster response), though weak, is complemented by the severe situational factor which required particular adjustments and specific goals. They do not collide. This is the true essence of the indivisible but unique nature of crisis management and disaster preparedness. As ‘t Hart stresses, the structure of political institutions and the way they operate reflect elaborate set of interaction rules enabling, yet also selectively impairing, the articulation of demands, the settlement of conflict and the formulation and implementation of public policies. CRS manages to embody all these traits when formulating their pressing report on the immediate crisis in Haiti published just days after the earthquake.

Part 3

3.1 OCHA and ICG

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (henceforth OCHA) is the Secretariat “responsible of bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies”.

In December 1991, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 46/182, designed to strengthen the United Nations' response to both complex emergencies and natural disasters. It also aimed at improving the overall effectiveness of the UN's humanitarian operations in the field. The resolution created the high level position of Emergency Relief Coordinator, whose function would combine tasks carried out by representatives of the Secretary-General for major emergencies into a single UN focal point. As part of the Secretary-General’s programme reform in 1998, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was reorganised into OCHA, expanding its mandate to include the coordination of humanitarian response, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. Participants include all humanitarian partners, from UN agencies, funds and programmes to the Red Cross Movement and NGO’s.

The International Crisis Group (henceforth ICG) is an independent NGO working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve conflicts around the world. Their approach is grounded in field research; based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations to key decision makers. Founded in 1995, ICG’s five key roles in preventing and resolving conflict are: early warning coverage through its long-term presence, producing independent field-based analysis and advice, providing detailed actor mapping,

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offering new strategic thinking on intractable conflicts and crises, and focusing international attention on “forgotten” peace-building processes.  

These two organisational sources will be used to fortify the above analysis of CRS’s crisis assessments. OCHA has an emergency related role customary to relief discourse, and ICG is regarded as an independent body working for conflict prevention and resolution. These perspectives, one being a short-term relief-based (crisis management) and the other short to long-term constructive conflict evasion (crisis management and disaster preparedness), will highlight CRS’s successes and failures in addressing post-disaster Haiti and constructively assessing the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa.

3.2 Haiti

3.2.1 OCHA

OCHA’s situation reports considered in the following comparison were published two and ten days after the earthquake hit. The disposition for these reports is as following: key priorities are presented, followed by a situation overview. Humanitarian needs and response is subsequently presented, with subcategories discussing logistics, food, health, WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene), shelter/Non-food Items (NFI’s), nutrition, protection and agriculture. Coordination, funding and contacts conclude the reports. The reports systematically identify strains related to post-quake Haiti and the consequentially required tactical measures. This part of the essay will present crisis management in post-quake Haiti using a source focusing on the assessment of immediately needed provisions. This narrative will highlight the (to some extent) corresponding rhetoric with CRS and confirm both sources correlation with ‘t Hart’s and Quaranelli’s theories regarding symbolism and clear distinction.

Situation Report #3 was published one day before CRS’s “Crisis and Response”. The loss of water supply, electricity and communications are regarded as problematic incentives for looting and other crimes. Major hospital collapses and prison escapees pose as obstacles for quick recovery and security. Top priority is given to search and rescue assistance parallel to the critical concern regarding food, clean water and sanitation. These issues are

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quickly followed by the humanitarian response in constructive detail. For example, under WASH, a cargo worth $500’000 with oral rehydration salts, water purification tablets and tents for temporary housing for 10’000 arrived in Haiti on the day of publication, with another cargo due to arrive on the same day.⁷⁴

By the time Situation Report #11 was published, the top priority of search and rescue was declared over by the Haitian government.⁷⁵ As of the day of publication (22⁷⁸th January 2010), the government accounted for 111’481 deaths and over 600’000 people without shelter in the capital. Situation Report #11 is less reactionary than its third counterpart (which stemmed from the immediate assessment need), and this is understood from the concerns discussed: focus is put on potential health issues and migration from Port-au-Prince to already vulnerable communities. For example, WHO notes no reported outbreaks of communicable disease including cholera, measles and rubella despite strained conditions. WHO recognises however the immediate need of Haiti’s immunisation programme, which was not functioning, creating the immediate concern of tetanus.⁷⁶ WFP, who handled the food cluster, was only able to reach 27’000 people by 21⁷⁶th January due to warehouse constraints and prioritising hospitals and orphanages.⁷⁷

Situation Report #3 is thus an evaluative record of implemented and necessary humanitarian interventions in post-disaster Haiti. Situation Report #11 on the other hand acts as a follow-up to prior post-quake humanitarian interventions, further elaborating on short-term needs. Both reports aim to mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with the Haitian government and international actors. These reports discuss humanitarian crisis management in its purest form: communication processes, information flow and the exercise of authority are concentrated in the cluster arrangement working with the Haitian government. For example, WFP heads food assistance, WHO leads the health cluster and UNICEF organises the WASH cluster, all whom which report to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator. The last vitality when crisis management is discussed (development of coordination and loosening command structure) is difficult to evaluate in situation reports as this issue’s success cannot be derived at such an early stage of the disaster (ICG criticises the humanitarian intervention in Haiti regarding this point, see below).

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⁷⁶ UNOCHA, Haiti Earthquake Situation Report No. 11, 22nd January 2010, p. 3.
CRS employed a near identical rhetoric in “Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response”. Each organisational entity managing a humanitarian cluster is presented and humanitarian needs and response in CRS’s report has an uncanny resemblance to the OCHA reports – logistics, food, health, water and sanitation, emergency shelter and infrastructure support are all focal points in CRS’s crisis management assessment. A natural consequence perhaps, but as ‘t Hart emphasises, the field of symbolic action evolves around central themes of political processes as constructed realities; the role of symbols as instruments of such social construction is consequently the crucial manipulative function of language. The mere decision to construct a report of legitimate replica is itself a political action regardless of the reason behind it. CRS clearly distinguishes the tactical needed measures, and the striking similarity between its assessment and the two OCHA situation reports poses itself a remarkable symbolic positioning.

3.2.2 ICG

As opposed to CRS’s report on Haiti, ICG published its “Haiti: Stabilisation and Reconstruction after the Quake” on the 31st March 2010, eleven weeks after the earthquake. The report’s disposition is as following: an executive summary and recommendations for the Haitian Government, its political leaders, donors, police and Security Council preludes the report, followed by an introduction to the unprecedented disaster and emergency response. Part II of the report is relevant in terms of conflict prevention and resolution as it outlines in detail the uncertain political landscape, socio-economic setbacks and the priorities for restoring security. Part III focuses on international cooperation and effective reconstruction, followed by a general conclusion. This episode of the essay will analyse crisis management and disaster preparedness in post-quake Haiti using a source focusing on conflict prevention and resolution. This will illustrate the corresponding rhetoric with CRS and highlight the success CRS had in consistently evaluating the situation in such short notice in accordance to Quarantelli’s and ‘t Hart’s respective theories.

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78 Taft-Morales et al, p. 5-6.
International Crisis Group’s depiction of the situation is concise and relevant. The organisation introduces the natural disaster as a compounding component to a country with “a long history of corrupt and inefficient governments, centralised political power [and] extremely inequitable income distribution”. The characteristics of the earthquake (high magnitude and shallow depth) combined with Haiti’s deeply rooted social problems of poverty, weak institutions and an overcrowded capital produced a disaster of enormous scope. However, the government nonetheless made fuel available only days after the earthquake. Electricity service was restored in several areas within a month after two of the four electrical plants damaged were repaired (it is worth consideration that CRS identified the priorities of electricity generation capability). Water supply was considered a priority by the Haitian government and the national water authority (DINEPA) managed to stabilise water supply. Sufficient cash was available just one week after the disaster struck as cooperation with banks was coordinated smoothly. The legislative and executive branches of government worked together to declare a state of emergency on the 18th January. Over 170,000 bodies were buried in a week to prevent spread of disease (though ICG notes the importance of keeping adequate burial records).

Tactical management measures taken by the Haitian government were thus to some extent (according to ICG) efficient despite the usual consensus that effective response to major post-disaster situations depends on strong central authority. The mere symbolism of President Préval’s characteristic silence met mass criticism from the majority of Haitians, but the structure of political institutions and their elaborate interactions conveyed an important imagery; behind the broad catchwords laid a diverse mixture of ideas and priorities that actually reflected crisis managerial realities in Haiti. The international response operation

82 Taft-Morales et al, p. 2.
saved numerous lives and averted escalation of the crisis. Haiti witnessed a quick and substantial emergency response from abroad, totalling $2.2 billion by the end of March.\textsuperscript{86}

Nevertheless, ICG are quick to criticise the lack of good prior disaster planning in a country with known seismic risks. 70\% of Haiti’s national budget is funded by foreign aid and over 50\% of its population live in abject poverty, thus making disaster monitoring and education a lesser priority.\textsuperscript{87} Tropical Storm Jeanne, which killed 3’000 people in 2004 and caused damages totalling 15\% of Haiti’s GDP, compelled the authorities to give disaster preparedness some precedence.\textsuperscript{88} However, specific rather than generic disaster planning, and disaster preparedness measures too segregated rather than involving relevant social factors such as civic awareness education will ultimately facilitate a decisive impasse; poor planning can only encourage poor managerial activities.\textsuperscript{89} CRS’s report mentions the incorporation of disaster risk management into Haiti’s overall development strategy in order to develop its capacity for disaster response, mostly targeted at hurricanes.\textsuperscript{90} However, as ICG remarks, citizens lacked guidelines on how to react in the event of an earthquake as the improved early warning systems targeted hurricane awareness. This ultimately caused serious deficiencies in government, community and citizen preparedness and response networks.\textsuperscript{91} Disaster preparedness in Haiti was in fact very limited, and criticism may be directed to CRS’s unrealistic reliance on the incorporated development strategy.\textsuperscript{92} However, it is important to appreciate CRS’s rationale of recognising the principles of crisis management and disaster preparedness respectively as two separate entities. This trait is reflected in ICG’s criticisms to the situation before and after the earthquake, making CRS’s evaluation in its abrupt report commendable and constructively cautionary.
Moreover, ICG expresses disappointment with relief efforts due to the many clusters operating within the affected areas: “inadequate management [...] has led to an uneven response and undermined confidence in the UN. Relief organisations achieved better results in areas where there were fewer entities to coordinate”.\(^{93}\) In terms of crisis management interpretation, CRS cannot be held accountable to its appraisal for operating relief organisations as CRS’s report was published days after the overwhelming disaster – at the time of publishing there simply was a desperate need for a massive “immediate provision of emergency supply and personnel”.\(^{94}\) Quarantelli asserts that the partial to low correlation between disaster preparedness and crisis management resides in poor planning in the first place and the failure to recognise the two tools as separate entities.\(^{95}\) The overlapping and duplicating humanitarian clusters combined with the rigid UN approach for emergency situations highlighted by ICG ascertain criticisms directed towards relief efforts.\(^{96}\) CRS was exemplary in preliminarily assessing needed relief efforts and thus crisis managerial measures, even if the later reality revealed issues related to undefined police jurisdiction, struggling international relief coordination, and redundantly complex integration of foreign and domestic response efforts.\(^{97}\)

### 3.3 Horn of Africa

#### 3.3.1 OCHA

The two situation reports below were published in two separate occasions: one during the epidemic stage of the drought and the other was published roughly the same time as CRS’s evaluation. The disposition is virtually identical to the situation reports on Haiti; the only difference is that each country in the Horn (Eritrea being the only exception) is fully described and analysed separately, with humanitarian cluster subheadings. The below passage will

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94 Taft-Morales et al., p. 12.


briefly present some of the findings by OCHA’s report. It will then contrast these to CRS’s descriptive and analytic episodes focusing on operational challenges and the alleged framework for international and humanitarian response. Unlike the above presentation of situation reports on Haiti, the coming presentation of OCHA’s depiction of the crisis will interlink Situation Report #9 and #31 to illustrate identical rhetoric, and emphasise symbolic importance in the two considerably similar reports published by OCHA.

As stated above, all countries in the Horn are dealt with in detail apart from Eritrea. Instead of listing mere clusters for a considerably large region, the countries constituting the Horn of Africa are divided, with separate clusters per country. Take Djibouti for example - work on the Holl-Holl site, expected to ease congestion at the Ali Addeh camp currently hosting over 20’000 refugees, continues. Possible ground water resources are being explored at both sites in order to increase the quantity of safe drinking water for refugees and local populations surrounding the refugee camps. Djibouti’s reception of diarrhoea kits enables the government to sufficiently treat 200 severely dehydrated patients and over 500 somewhat dehydrated cases. Ethiopia’s suspected case of Acute Flaccid Paralysis in the Somali Region has encouraged a joint investigation by the government, WHO and other NGO partners. The education cluster in Kenya undertook data collection exercises. It also continues to monitor school attendance and opening hours as security precautions for children as a result of fear of attacks. Logistical successes and obstacles are highlighted when OCHA encounters Somalia’s then current situation.98

These vital issues are either dealt with inadequately in CRS’s report or are not discussed at all. Djibouti for example is given a short historic introduction for context, with emphasis put on the country’s important geopolitical position.99 Over 200’000 are in need of assistance and 18’000 are displaced in Djibouti. Yet the country is only examined as a peripheral supplement to aid efforts in the other countries in the region (usually Somalia). Appeals for emergency efforts are presented as collective and uniform.100 From a power-critical perspective, the political and organisational symbolism is uncanny - the general depiction and subsequent analytic homogeneity put forward by the Congressional Research Service has resulted in an inadequate assessment. There are no clusters in Djibouti as CRS

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98 UNOCHA, Horn of Africa Drought Crisis Situation Report No. 31, 27th January 2012, p. 3-5.

99 Margesson et al, p. 5-6.

100 Margesson et al, p. 17.
correctly notes – instead a humanitarian focal point was assigned by the UN Development Programme (UNDP).\textsuperscript{101} However, this does not relieve the severity of the humanitarian crisis in Djibouti, regardless of the challenges in southern Somalia and northern Kenya. The absence of a humanitarian cluster does not justify CRS’s ineptitude and unwillingness to complete the framework for international response in Djibouti.

With this in mind, the incongruity lies in the accentuation of the security impasse in the Horn. Crisis management rhetoric in CRS’s report is typified by emphasis on the security concern. Displacement is regarded a crucial priority, and the objective with the assessment is to provide a framework for humanitarian and international response. Yet CRS fails to depict issues of migration in constructive detail. Appeal to avoid pull factor migration across borders, the importance of assisting people where they live and strengthening the protection of vulnerable population is noted with indistinct institutional backing.\textsuperscript{102} Homogeneity and ambiguity are fitting terms for CRS’s crisis management rhetoric as tactical means are merely suggested. OCHA on the other hand manages to identify responsible actors, their contributions and migration challenges, ranging from the Kenyan Government suspended registration of new arrivals in Dadaab to UNHCR’s process of establishing a parallel estimate of new arrivals in all sites.\textsuperscript{103} The security issue is obviously decisive for US humanitarian intervention. Displacement being a direct consequence of insecurity, the reluctance to identify significant institutional actors and taken measures to comprehend displacement in CRS’s report poses a frank testimony of its failed purpose of presenting a framework for the international and humanitarian response.

Moreover, the analysis of operational challenges for crisis management and disaster preparedness in the Horn has retreated to the security impasse. The language of the complex set of challenges in the terms of insecurity conveys different assessment of the situation in terms of seriousness but foremost the allocation of responsibility for the crisis.\textsuperscript{104} In other words, consensus is present when discussing insecurity in Somalia, as is the reluctance to recognise responsible institutional actors for dealing with the top priority. OCHA scrutinises and cooperates with relevant actors, including the Ethiopian and Kenyan

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Margesson et al, p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Margesson et al, p. 10-11.
\item \textsuperscript{103} UNOCHA, Horn of Africa Drought Crisis Situation Report No. 31, 27th January 2012, p. 5.
\end{itemize}
governments who are even suspected of deporting Somalis back. CRS conversely recognises them as mere allies, thereby successfully misconstruing the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.

### 3.3.2 ICG

The chosen literature from ICG is a policy briefing focusing on what CRS regards as a core challenge for aid and development in the region: insecurity. “Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed” specifically analyses Somalia’s political future, while key regional and international players act as important peripheral supplements to the reconstruction of the Horn. This source was chosen because of CRS’s constant accentuation of the security impasse; it would be neither relevant nor constructive to utilise a general crisis perspective when it is evident that CRS’s report refers to security relapse. The analysis of operational challenges conducted in “Horn of Africa Region: The Humanitarian Crisis and International Response” roots from the lack of security and the impossibility of maintaining diplomatic presence. It is unequivocal that these concerns stem from Al-Shabaab and similar militant insurgent elements. The policy briefing has the following disposition: a situation overview is followed by the renewed international attention. Focus is then put on avoiding TFG mandates, and challenges facing the recovered areas. Corruption and international cooperation concludes the briefing. In order to righteously highlight CRS’s failure to present and construct neither crisis managerial tactics nor long-term political strategy, the concluding episode of Part 3 will present ICG’s Policy Briefing on Somalia, focusing on the security concern and political landscape of the country’s future. The comparison will equip a justified conclusion to CRS’s rhetoric in its report.

Renewed international attention came as a result of the 2011 famine in the region and the subsequent necessary security awareness for providing 3.2 million people life-saving assistance. Moreover, the military advances by AMISOM pushing Al-Shabaab on the defensive combined with the culminating TFG mandate further added to initiatives, including the UK proposal of hosting the international conference on Somalia in London on the 23rd

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105 UNOCHA, Horn of Africa Drought Crisis Situation Report No. 31, 27th January 2012, p. 4-6.
February 2012. Given the fact that the policy briefing was published before the London conference, ICG provides recommendations regarding the consensus prior to the congregation: no further extension of TFG, improved international cooperation, building a mechanism for dealing with corruption and addressing the challenges of areas recovered from Al-Shabaab.

A fundamental problem of the TFG is the Transitional Federal Charter’s “failure to properly demarcate the powers of the president and the prime minister”. Rancorous power splits and the incapability of the president, prime minister and speaker to cooperate within parliament are to a great extent the cause behind the stagnating political progress. ICG therefore promotes the promising development of the Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference, which includes an “ambitious timeline to complete the final draft of the constitution no later than 20th April”. ICG mobilises regional participation and international cooperation; ICG even suggests, albeit carefully, negotiation with Al-Shabaab elements. CRS’s report is not intended for elaborative analysis of the political structures in Somalia. Some operational challenges are in fact discussed; efforts are focused on providing life-saving assistance to reduce mortality and prevent further displacement by assisting people where they live by strengthening the protection of vulnerable populations. However, CRS places insurgent elements as the core cause of instability without scrutinising the legitimacy of the TFG. TFG are instead victimised as targets of guerrilla-style and suicide bombings. This itself is true, but lacks relevant analytical utility when discussing the protection of vulnerable populations. ICG on the other hand addresses clan and diaspora leaders, and the

112 Margesson et al, p. 10.
113 Margesson et al, p. 15.
need of a quasi-national governmental framework in the troubled south. The symbolic narrative of absent functioning central authority to enforce the rule of law is depicted as absolute by CRS, both in the terms of “managerialist” orientation and symbolic articulation of demands, thereby authenticating the security impasse status quo.

Disaster preparedness is defined as strategic management processes employed by a government to protect and prepare the people from future disasters, and ensure the resilience of the political structure. ICG manages to embody and include relevant actors needed for disaster preparedness, and identify the danger of the predatory environment that supervenes with power vacuums. CRS’s crisis management rhetoric is, as discussed above, restricted and cautious. What is strikingly disturbing however is its inability to assess the crisis from a disaster preparedness perspective neither. The “increasingly difficult security situation”, the complication of Islamic insurgency and the general instability in Somalia are not elaborated upon. Instead, funding is highlighted as the sole tactical measure (the US is the largest bilateral donor) in alleviating poverty, and strategic processes are typified by military offences aimed at controlling and diverting migration to neighbouring countries. An improved political structure, as ICG stress, is required to overcome the security gridlock. This is a bold suggestion, far too audacious to be recommended by a non-legislative US governmental source; it would confine Somalia’s sovereign integrity. CRS can be held accountable however for displacing crisis perceptions onto other domains. The security issue in Somalia is not perceived as a crisis itself because labels and “explanations” have been attached to them, portraying them as natural and inevitable. As mentioned above, insecurity is a term used extensively to describe the political climate, but the selective labelling amounts to a masking of the critical nature of the concern. The political landscape has been deemed inconceivable and politically sensitive whilst emphasis is put on successful dramaturgy, in

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117 Margesson et al, p. 10, 16.
118 Margesson et al, p. 19.
119 Margesson et al, p. 11-12.
this particular case the drought.\textsuperscript{121} South-central Somalia is de facto considered a hostile environment at the time of publication, and militant insurgency poses a great obstacle for challenges of access and aid delivery to Somalia. Nevertheless conflicting, “positive” rhetoric in ICG’s Policy Briefing confirms the displacement of crisis perception onto a “natural” domain of political gridlock. Hence, from a disaster preparedness perspective, CRS has failed to suitably analyse operational challenges in the Horn due to its masking of an “intrinsically” complex crisis.

Part 4

4.1 Conclusions and Reflection

The humanitarian crises discussed above were caused by diverse incontrollable factors, and up-to-date results are linked to social, economic and political conditions and tensions. Haiti experienced its history’s deadliest natural disaster recorded. It led to infrastructural pandemonium, loss of livelihood and bankruptcy of strategic programmes built to prepare and secure citizens in the face of an emergency. The immediate threat mobilised the international community to assist the Haitian government in the aftermath of the immense earthquake responsible for the death of over 100’000 people. The Horn conversely experienced a devastating drought further complicated by soaring food prices, massive displacement and political instability. Over 13 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in a region typified by poverty, militant insurgency and absence of democracy. The slow onset disaster reached its apex in the latter half of 2011 and was acknowledged as the worst humanitarian disaster on earth. Millions of people in both regions were affected by displacement, loss of livelihood and insecurity. Innumerable individuals lost their lives.

Congressional Research Service attempted to create a framework for the international and humanitarian response for the Horn and an outlined response for the immediate crisis that followed the earthquake in Haiti. It constructed a commendable evaluation for post-quake Haiti, following the model used by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The principles of crisis management and practical tactical measures are not presented synonymously to the principles of disaster preparedness and developing strategic safety net programmes. From a rhetorical crisis management perspective, the instantaneous differentiation is the pillar of legitimacy which CRS rests upon when focusing on the immediate crisis in Haiti.

Discrepant is the term best suited for CRS’s rhetoric when assessing its operational framework and analysis for the Horn. The region is politically diverse, which is righteously depicted. Nevertheless, operational difficulties rest upon political instability. Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea are discussed in little detail, and Kenya’s operational challenges are handled by its government, thereby relinquishing some of the responsibility from the international community. Somalia and migration from Somalia to neighbouring countries is the main premise for CRS’s assessment. This sends a clear message comprehensible from a
power-critical perspective. CRS has, for reasons speculated below, indeed failed to evaluate the humanitarian crisis in the Horn due to these evolutionary points: 1) by masking the critical nature of concern and naturalising the political landscape in the region (particularly Somalia), CRS has managed to emphasise 2) security impasse rhetoric, which ultimately resulted in 3) the failure to separate crisis management and disaster preparedness.

The scope of the humanitarian crisis is indeed recognised, but overshadowed by CRS’s angled rhetoric: all countries in the Horn are presented, as are the successes of humanitarian intervention, regardless of organisation or actor. Drought in Somalia is depicted as a major issue domestically and regionally, leading to mass displacement, poverty and insecurity to the entire region. Insecurity is a term used extensively to describe the political climate, but the selective labelling amounts to a masking of the critical nature of the concern. The political landscape has been deemed inconceivable and politically sensitive whilst emphasis is put on successful dramaturgy, in this particular case the drought and mass migration.\textsuperscript{122} This has made it possible for CRS to emphasise security impasse rhetoric in Somalia. Such language acts as an important function to de-politicise the crisis event and employing a “non-partisan” channel for defining the situation and assessing failures. It is therefore impossible for CRS’s channel for definition to separate crisis management tactics and disaster preparedness strategy – there is an un concealed reluctance to abandon security impasse rhetoric. Recognition of responsible actors and institutions for crisis management and disaster preparedness is crucial. Congressional Research Service, a respectable organ utilised by the US Congress for deep political analysis, has frankly chosen to omit these, resting on the security impasse caused by an “inherent” political landscape.

The emerging political context in terms of crisis management focuses on the decision making function, an evident trait worth further discussion. This “might easily lead analysts to turn a blind eye to the broader significance of crises”.\textsuperscript{123} Social, economic and political contextualisation is imperative to fully grasp crisis management. If one chooses however to go beyond the specifics of time, place, method and scale as Brändström et al accentuate, and look at the challenges facing communities and policy-maker, crises are left


without a sense of uniqueness.\textsuperscript{124} This sheds a light on the power-critical dimension to crisis management – the decision making function is interdependent to social, economic and political conditions and tensions at the face of crises. Evaluation of crisis management rhetoric is therefore suitably understood through the fusion of two dynamic dimensions: 1) contextualisation of the definer of the crises, introducing a broader power-critical approach and 2) appositely rigid differentiation of crisis management and disaster preparedness.

By scrutinising CRS’s reports with a power-critical approach, CRS’s disinclining rhetoric in its Horn Report has become evident – it is impossible to conduct fair evaluations of crises without applying rigid differentiation. Another problem which deserves further discussion lies within the realm of power criticism. Crisis management literature is aimed at policy-makers, organisations and states. Narrative frequently targets accomplishment and failures in the face of crises and scholars agree that communication is central. These findings mean little however if entities such as CRS and other analytical bodies assessing crises are politically biased and unwilling to employ more flexible power-critical approach. Focus on relief factors instead of crisis management measures in Somalia due to diplomatic strains highlights the realistic and dangerous capacity of crisis management rhetoric. OCHA and ICG constructed applausive literature aimed for the wellbeing of peoples in both discussed regions. Political discourse could have immense effect on the outcome surrounding crises. To what extent CRS has contributed or thwarted crisis management rhetoric can only be speculated upon. Judging from two of its crisis assessments, one can only anticipate uncertainty in the next coming catastrophe.

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