

Civil military relations: The Role of Military in the Politics of Pakistan

Author: Aslam Khan
Supervisor: Ted Svensson



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Introduction:

Democracy is apparently an attractive concept for the masses and the scholars of political studies. Democracy is a political system whereby the citizenry can hold governments accountable for their policies and prevent an abuse of power. Democracy can promote economic growth, human rights and protect people from the cruelties of an autocratic regime and from the effects of social and economic disasters. Democracy encourages the governments to be alert to the needs of their citizens and to promote, therefore, the health, education, and overall well-being of the population, which enriches the life of the people by promoting peace, both between states and within them. Moreover, it helps the people in the developing societies to learn from one another through public discussion, thereby facilitating the definition of needs, priorities, and duties, and enrich the lives of citizens by recognizing their dignity as human beings. This brand of democracy can be found in the most developed democratic societies. Developing democracies like Pakistan suffered a lot due to the continuous interference of undemocratic forces in the political process. Civil and Military bureaucracy as well as some political parties disrupted the democratic process time and again for personal gains.

Pakistan unfortunately was deprived of its founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the man responsible for the creation of the state, soon after independence. The next line of leadership was not prepared yet to take the responsibility to keep Pakistan on the democratic path. They were not well prepared to accomplish the task of formulating a functional constitution for the newly independent state for the next nine years after independence. The formulation of constitution did not guarantee the respect for law and it always remained open to amendments, even if the latter were opposed to democratic rule.

Moreover, the landed aristocracy along with the British trained civil and military bureaucracy further helped to disrupt the democratic process in Pakistan. These factors further strengthened the aristocratic colonial structures of the military institutions in Pakistan. The military jealously guarded its institutional hierarchy against political process. Furthermore, the political leaders could not manage to divide the centralized command system of the Punjabi dominated military. Therefore, Pakistan experienced intermittent phases of military rule and democracy after almost every decade.

Despite the adoption of the constitution in Pakistan, the military continued to intervene in the political process of the country. Within two years of the introduction and adoption of the first constitution by the constituent assembly, Martial Law was imposed in the country by Field Marshal Ayub Khan in 1958. He handed over the government to General Yahya Khan from 1970 to 1971. After the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, democracy returned to Pakistan for a short while under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which was once again overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Zia ruled the country for more than a decade.

Democracy did return to Pakistan after Zia's death in a plane crash in 1988 but could not function smoothly during the 1990s due to ever-present military involvement in Pakistani politics. During 1990s, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto ruled the country alternatively but no one completed their full term in office for five years, while the political process was hampered time and again. In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf took over the government in a coup d'état against Nawaz Sharif and thus derailed the democratic process in Pakistan for the next nine years. After the 2008 general elections, democracy has again returned to the country but still defense and foreign policies are controlled by the armed forces.

Within this context, the thesis attempts to respond to some central questions: Why did Pakistani military participate in politics? What has been the contribution of Pakistan's civil institutions in countries political process and military coups? What is the military's perspective about its role in the democratic system? And what are the international factors involved in the facilitation of military coups?

To answer these questions and to gain in-depth understanding of the military's complex role in Pakistan's politics this thesis is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the historical experiences of Muslims in combined India, before and after British colonization. The second part discusses the role of Pakistan's civil institutions in the country's political process. The third part explains the military's perceptions about its role in the country's politics. The fourth part discusses the role of international community in Pakistani politics. In order to respond to the above queries, it would be useful to discuss the theoretical parameters of the thesis.

Theoretical Framework:

Many scholars have worked on topics related to the civil military relations in different countries but only a few of them worked exclusively to find out the reasons behind the military coups in Pakistan. This study is focused on the history of Pakistani military's direct and indirect role in politics. This study will combine historical legacies, internal political problems, military external influence and other variables that are responsible for the military's interventions in Pakistani politics.

A brief literature overview regarding the theoretical framework would be very helpful to provide a theoretical structure to support this study. Two approaches are used for the analysis of reasons behind the military coups in Pakistan; one describes the 'structural'¹ reasons and the other describes the 'triggers'². The structural reasons call for a historical analysis of the political trends, systems and practices of the Muslims living in Indian sub-continent because these are the deep rooted reasons which are normally ignored. Through the study of history, the purpose is to locate the factors of high coup risks in the system, which leads to coup d'états if triggers are present.

The study conceptualizes the coup risk as a function of deep, structural attributes which include society, political culture and state-society relations, whereas triggers are short-term crises that precipitate a coup³. In the absence of structural causes, triggers alone cannot lead to a coup. Instead, they can be regarded as factors that may determine the exact timing of

¹ Zinkin, Taya., "India and Military Dictatorship," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXII (March 1959); Johnson, John J. "The Latin American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society," in Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, 1962), pp. 93 – 104, and *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, 1964), pp. 13-90; Eric R. Wolfe and Hansen, E.C. "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IX (January 1967); Glubb, John B. "The Conflict between Tradition and Modernism in the Role of Muslim Armies"; Leiden, Carl ed., *The Conflict of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East* (Austin, 1966), and "The Role of the Army in the Traditional Arab State," in Jack H. Thompson and Robert D. Reischauer, eds. *Modernization of the Arab World* (Princeton, 1966); Be'eri, Eliezer "Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society" (New York, 1970), pp. 275-92; Gutteridge, William "Military Institutions and Power in the new States" (London, 1964), pp. 15-23; Emerson, Rupert. "From Empire to Nation" (Boston, 1960), pp.272-92.; Khadduri, Majid. "The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics," *American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (June 1953).

² Thompson, W.R. "The Grievances of Military Coup Makers" (Beverly Hills Sage, 1973); Nordlinger, E.A. *Soldiers in Politics* (N.H. Prentice Hall 1977), Janowitz, M. "The Military in the Political Development of New Nations", (Chicago: University Press, 1964).

³ Belkin, Aaron. "Evan Schofer, "Towards a structural Understanding of Coup Risk", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47:5 (Oct., 2003), p.598

a coup in countries where coup risk is high. Both structural and triggering causes of coups are factors that are so linked that both are necessary for a successful coup.⁴

The structural and triggering causes are different and can be distinguished. Structural causes of coups are deep rooted in the political system and tend to change slowly. On the other hand, triggering causes are not deeply embedded and can be fickle.⁵ For example, the personal grievances of officers can be categorized as triggering causes because they can change quite suddenly. These grievances are not structural and so cannot lead to a coup.⁶ It can only lead to a coup, if the system is already vulnerable to coup. This means that it is basically both institutional and structural vulnerability in the first place which leads to coups.

There are three dominant perspectives, which explain triggers as the reasons for military coups: domestic/societal perspective⁷, military perspective⁸ and foreign influence⁹, which is common, both in societal and military perspectives. Both societal and foreign influences are partially structural and partially triggers. Research has shown that at times they show up as structural problems and at times they act as triggers.

⁴ Belkin, Aaron. 3003: 598

⁵ Belkin, Aaron. 3003: 589


⁶ Belkin, Aaron. 3003: 599

⁷ Zakria, Fareed "The Rise of illiberal Democracy" *Foreign Affairs* 76:6 (Nov/Dec 1997); pp. 22-43; Finer, S.E. "Comparative government" (London: Allen Lane 1970 and "The Man on Harseback: The Role of the Military in Politics" Boulder, (CO: Westview 1988); Linz, J.J. "The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, breakdown and reequilibration". (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1978); D. Sutter, "Legitimacy and military intervention in a democracy: Civilian government as a Public Good," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 58:129, 1999, p. 43; C.E. Welch, Jr., *Civilian control of the military: Theory and cases from developing countries*. (Albany: State University of New York Press 1976).

⁸ Stepan, Alfred "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan [ed], *Authoritarian Brazil, Origins, Policies, and Future*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) pp. 47 – 65; *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

⁹ Maniruzzaman, Talukder. "Arms Transfer, Military Coup and Military Rule in Developing States", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 36, No. 4, December 1992.

Figure: 1
Activity of Coup d'Etat



Source: Alan Wells, "The Coup d'Etat in Theory and Practice: Independent Black Africa in the 1960s", American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Jan., 1974), p. 885

Figure 1 shows the activity of coup d'etats. According to Allen Wells¹⁰, this model best explains the activity of coup d'etat, showing how all triggers work together to make a military coup possible. It demonstrates how internal and external influences act on the socio-economic and political factors as well as on the military elite to cause coup d'etats.

¹⁰ Wells, Alan "The Coup d'etat in Theory and Practice: Independent Black Africa in the 1960s", *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 79, No. 4, January 1974.

From societal perspective, militaries do not operate in a vacuum; there is always a ‘pull factor’¹¹, which pulls military into politics. There are three sub-dimensions of societal perspective, which explain the political breakdown, and the phenomenon of the pull factor. First, social dimension deals with the pre-conditions of democracy such as poverty, literacy, economy, social disorder, ethnicity, mobility of masses etc. Second factor is institutional dimension, which deals with rule of law, constitution, institutional strength etc. Third, political dimension deals with the nature of political government.

The military perspective discusses the reasons, which lie inside the institution of the military itself, and leads military out of barracks to the civil offices. They can be nominated as push factors.¹² The military perspective presents three factors. First, military role belief¹³, which deals with the custodian nature of the military¹⁴, high self esteem in society, and sometimes perceived, sometimes actual, internal or external security threat to the country¹⁵. Second, officer’s personal grievances, which deal with the professionalism of the military, threat to the institutional integrity¹⁶ and corporate/economic interests of the officers.¹⁷ Third dimension deals with the role of civil bureaucracy, sections of civil society and opposition political leaders who themselves collaborate with the military officials to stage

¹¹ Linz, J.J and stephan, A. “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1996); S.P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay”, XVII, April 1965; Political order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); D.A. Hibbs, Mass Political Violence: A Cross national Causal Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973); E Luttwak, coup D’etat (London: Penguin 1968).

¹² Zimmermann, Ekkrt. “*Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions: Theories and Research*” (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co. 1983).

¹³ Nunn, Frederick. “*Yesterday Soldiers: European military professionalism in South America: 1890-1940*” (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); *The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1961); Martin Needler, “The Latin American Military: Predatory Reactionaries or Modernizing Patriots? *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, April 1969.

¹⁴ Berlin, David P. “Democratic Breakdown in Paraguay and Venezuela; the Shape of Things to come for Latin America?” *Armed Forces and Society* 30:1 (Fall 2003); Jose Nun, “The Middle Class Military Coup,” in Claudio Veliz, ed. *The Politics of Conforming in Latin America* (London, 1967); *Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup* (Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, Politics of Modernization Series, No. 7, 1969).

¹⁵ Stepan, Alfred “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion”, In Alfred Stepan, et al., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner [eds]. *Civil Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996).

¹⁶ Fitch, John Samuel. “*The Military coup d’etat as a political process: Ecuador, 1948 – 1966*” (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics; op.cit.*

¹⁷ Named as Milbus in Aysha Saddiqa, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press 2007); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977); Huntington, S.P. “*The Soldiers and the State*”, (Cambridge; Massachusetts, The Belknap Press, 1995).

a coup.¹⁸ Foreign influence works in both spheres of societal and military perspectives. It deals with the contagious effects of foreign influence on militaries.¹⁹ Military or economic alliances²⁰ with super powers help always contributed to the political turmoil in Pakistan. Similarly the strategic importance of the countries²¹ for international community also effects the democratization of a country.

Literature Review:

The thesis offers a deep analysis of the factors responsible for the military's participation in the politics in Pakistan. A wide range of literature is available on the civil military relations and coup d'états related issues. The first category of literature deals with the historical context in general and more particularly with the studies that trace the political thinking of Pakistan from the political attitudes of the Muslim communities who lived side by side with Hindus in Hindu dominated British India. K.B. Sayyed's²² "*Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948*" deals with the differences in the political attitudes of the Hindu and Muslim communities in British India from the war of independence in 1857 until the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947. The author highlights the anti-western as well as pro-monarchical tendencies of the Muslims of India. Ayesha Jalal and Sujata Bose's *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy*²³ paints a similar picture when the authors emphasize the divergent political attitudes of the two communities (Hindus and Muslims) inhabiting United India. C.E. Welch's *Civilian Control of the Military; Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*²⁴ explains the military influence in the developing countries.

The second category of literature explores the complex relationship between Islam and authoritarianism. It argues that Islam per se is opposed to the idea of western liberal democracy and maintains its argument on the basis of Muslims' sympathetic attitude towards

¹⁸ Acuna, Carlos. "Political Struggle and Business Peak Associations; Theoretical reflections on the Argentina Case", en Francisco Durand and Eduardo Silva (Camps.), *Organized Business, Economic Change, and Democracy in Latin America*, (North South Center-Lynn Reiner, 1998)

¹⁹ Bell, M.J.V. "The Military in the New States of Africa," *Armed Forces and Society; Sociological Essays*, ed., Jacques Van Doom (The Hague: Mouton, 1958).

²⁰ Hienen, H. "*The Military Intervenes*" (New York: Russel Sage Foundations, 1968); Luttwak, E. "*Coup D'états; A Practical Handbook*", (Greenwich, Conn.; Fawcett. 1969)

²¹ Cohen, Stephen, P. "*The Idea of Pakistan*" (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2006); Guy, J. Pauker, 'South East Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade', *World Politics*, Vol. XI, April 1959.

²² Sayeed, K.B. "*Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857 – 1948*" (London: Oxford University Press, Second Ed, 1968), p. 177.

²³ Jalal, Ayesha and Boss, Sujata. "*Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy*". Routledge, New York, 1998.

²⁴ C.E. Welch, Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries*, Albany: State University of New York Press 1976.

monarchical and authoritarian structures. Within this context, Fouad Ajami's 'The Arab Inheritance'²⁵, Samuel, P. Huntington's 'after Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave'²⁶, Elie Kedourie's *Democracy and Arab Political Culture*²⁷, Sanford Lakoff's 'The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism'²⁸, Bernard Lewis' 'Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview'²⁹, Daniel Pipes' *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*³⁰ make remarkable readings. Such studies can be interpreted to mean that Pakistan, by virtue of being a majority Muslim state, is unable to maintain democracy as its permanent political system. However, such an interpretation would be highly biased because it would ignore the main reason behind the primacy of military in Pakistan – the nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Given its significance in explaining Pakistan military's participation in the country's politics, the literature centers on the nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan. Diamond's *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*³¹, Rizvi's *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*³², Haqqani's *Pakistan: between Mosque and Military*³³ and McGrath's *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*³⁴ summarize this category of literature well. The existing literature focuses more on the subject of democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia, the functioning of military regimes in Pakistan, their roots and ramifications. Unlike these studies, the present work attempts to uncover the reasons for divergent political experiences of Pakistan at a time when Pakistan is experiencing yet another democratic transformation after nearly nine-year military rule under General Musharraf. Within this context, the thesis attempts to valuable understanding of the reasons accountable for frequent military coups in Pakistan.

²⁵ Ajami, Fouad 'The Arab Inheritance', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, issue 5, 1997.

²⁶ Huntington, Samuel, P. 'After twenty years; The Future of the Third Wave' *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1997

²⁷ Kedourie, Elie. "*Democracy and Arab Political Culture*" (London; Frank Cass, 1994)

²⁸ Lakoff, Sanford 'The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2004

²⁹ Lewis, Bernard 'Islam and Liberal Democracy. A Historical Overview,' *Journal of Democracy*, No. 2, 1996

³⁰ Pipes, Daniel. "*In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power*" (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

³¹ Diamond, Larry. and Marc F. Plattner [eds], *Civil – Military Relations and Democracy*, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

³² Rizvi, Hassan A. "*The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997*", 2nd ed., Sange Meel, 2000.

³³ Haqqani, Hussain. *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Washington, D.C.; Carnegie Endowment, 2005.

³⁴ McGrath, Allen. *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Research Methodology:

The thesis has utilized both descriptive and analytical approaches to describe the dynamics of the Pakistani politics—the failure of democracy and military's participation in the politics of the country. The data collection has centered on the historical, domestic, regional and international factors contributed in the military's coups in Pakistan. The qualitative approach, especially document analysis, is used to find the answers of the questions. In order to gain an in depth understanding of the subject the problem needs to be studied from various lenses i.e. historical, domestic, regional and international.

Within this context, the thesis is based on document analysis using both primary and secondary sources. The primary documents, which form the backbone of qualitative analysis, include speeches and statements of decision makers, Pakistani Constitution, the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly and others. The secondary sources include books from the discipline of International Relations in general, and on the politics and civil-military relations of Pakistan in particular. The sources also include articles in international journals of International Relations such as *World Politics*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Armed Forces and Society* and *The Journal of Conflict Resolutions*. Working papers and reports published by various think tanks have also been helpful for this study. The thesis is also based on articles, editorials and news reports from US newspapers such as *Washington Post* and *New York Times*. Pakistani newspapers include *Dawn*, *News* and *The Daily Times*, while Indian newspapers such as *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India* have been utilized.

Format of the Thesis:

The thesis is divided into four chapters to discuss four different aspects of political participation of military in Pakistan. Chapter one, *Political Participation of Military in Pakistan: Historical Context* discusses the historical context of the political participation of Muslims in the Indian Sub-continent. It argues that the patterns for Pakistan military's participation in the political process were developed during the pre-colonial era and British colonial era.

Chapter two, *Civil Institutions and Political Participation of Military in Pakistan* discusses the inter-relationship between the civil institutions and political

participation of the military in India and Pakistan. It argues that the weak civil institutions in Pakistan led to the political participation of the military in the country.

Chapter three, *Political Participation of Military in Pakistan: Military Perspective* discusses the perception of Pakistani military regarding its roles in the political process. It argues that Pakistani military participated in politics because it believed that it was the custodian of the state. As a custodian of the state it has the right to participate in politics. The military had a centralized control and command structure, which led the army to guard the institution against the politicians.

Chapter four, 'Democracy and coup d'états in South Asia: The Global Factor' discusses the role of the major powers, especially the United States in promoting democracy or coup d'états in South Asia. It will argue that the major powers played a strong role in the supporting and strengthening military authoritarianism in Pakistan.

Chapter One

Political Participation of Military in Pakistan: Historical Context

This chapter discusses the historical context of the political participation of military in Pakistan. It argues that the patterns for Pakistan military's participation in the political process were developed during the pre-colonial and British colonial eras. Military's engagement in politics in Pakistan was due to the Indian subcontinent Muslim's pre-colonial cultural heritage, the backwardness of Muslims during British colonialism and the absence of strong leaders.

In order to understand the structural reasons behind the military coups in Pakistan it is essential to understand the history of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, including that of before and during the colonial era. Historical legacies play a very important role in any society's cultural and political developments. They explain the structural reasons behind a given problem in a particular society. Consequently, the chapter is divided into following three sections: 1) pre-colonial heritage of the Muslims in India; 2) British colonial experience of the Muslims in India; and 3) the nature of Muslim League and the incompetency of its Leadership.

Pre-Colonial Heritage of the Muslims in India

The nature of socio-cultural heritage suggests that Pakistan's military frequently take over power due to the country's Islamic heritage, which is deeply embedded in its culture. Being an Islamic state it is very traditional for Pakistani society to look towards its military chief to protect the society from any internal or external, perceived or actual threat. It would not be wrong therefore to suggest that the military's role as a custodian is deeply woven with in the fabric of society³⁵ and it is the very part of society's historical culture. The values, attitudes and symbols of a culture define, not only the nation's view of its military's role, but also the military's own view of that role.³⁶ A significant point in the historical and cultural context is the fact that military is regarded very highly in the Pakistani society. This importance of military resulted from the study of role of military in the Islamic history, which generally focuses unquestionably on the rise and fall of heroic warriors and conquerors without explaining the nature of the relationship between society and the military.

The idea of religion vs. democracy argues that there are certain cultures where

³⁵ Schiff, Rebecca L. "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces and Society* Vol.22, No. 1, Fall 1995, p11.

³⁶ Schiff, Rebecca L. 1995: 11

the very idea of democratization of society and polity is considered a completely strange thing and therefore cannot be applied there. In the comparative study of democracy in the West and Islamic countries the question of democracy is usually put forth in the context of Islamic religious tradition vs. democracy in the Islamic countries. Some scholars conclude that Islam and democracy are incompatible, maintaining that there are intrinsic qualities about Islam that conflict with democracy.³⁷ Lewis captures this view in his words, “The interaction between Islamic Tradition of a state based on faith and western notion of separation between religion and government seems likely to continue”.³⁸ It is peculiar that Lewis not only considers Islamic tradition as not conducive to democracy, but also dismisses any future hope for democracy, since state and faith, in his opinion, will continue to be joined. So it means democracy will flourish only when religion is separated from politics, which is an unlikely case for the Islamic countries.³⁹

History of Mughal rule in India states that Mughal kings were great warriors. They did not only have diffuse authorities of civilian government and military but they did establish the Mughal Empire through military conquest. They, most of the time, relied on cavalry in making their conquests, although artillery was also used in an innovative way for selective purposes.⁴⁰ Babar, the first Mughal emperor of India, was descended from Timor (the great Turkish Empire builder in Central Asia) on his father’s side and from Genghis Khan (the great Mongol war-leader) on his mother’s side.⁴¹ The military strength was always very essential for every Mughal ruler. Baber defeated Ibrahim Lodhi in 1562, in the first battle of Panipat and took over the rule.⁴² After Babar, his son Humayun did not prove himself to be a very strong ruler militarily and an Afghan challenge led by Sher Shah Suri forced Humayun to flee the country and take refuge in the court of Safavid Iran.⁴³

Heritage signifies the Islamic tradition of diffusion of institution of military and the head of state. It is evident from Islamic history that since the beginning of the Islamic state

³⁷ Ajami, Fouad. “The Arab Inheritance,” *Foreign Affairs*, volume 76, issue 5, 1997; Huntington, Samuel P. “After twenty years: The Future of the Third Wave” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. *, No. 4, 1997; Elie Kedourie, *Democracy and Arab political culture* (London: Frank Cass, 1994); Sanford Lakoff “The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2004; Bernard Lewis, “Islam and liberal Democracy. A Historical Overview,” *Journal of Democracy*, No. 2, 1996; Daniel Pipes. *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

³⁸ Bernard, Lewis. “Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East.” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 3, 2005.

³⁹ Bernard, Lewis. 5005 *ibid*

⁴⁰ Jalal and Boss, 1998:28

⁴¹ Jalal and Boss, 1998:28

⁴² Jalal and Boss, 1998:28

⁴³ Jalal and Boss, 1998:29

in Medina, and in all Muslim empires the King used to be the head of the military called Sipahsallar-e-Azam, meaning the supreme commander. Initial Muslim states had the centralized command system of political and military institutions under one head known as Ameer-ul-momeneen. European civilizations showed a high degree of military separation from society, ancient Indian and Islamic (pre-colonial civilizations) showed a lower degree of military separation from civilian affairs.⁴⁴ So, the civilian supremacy can be achieved only if the military remains separate from civil society, which appears invalid in the case of Pakistan. This assumed separation and superiority of civil society encourages confrontation with the military, instead of coordination and harmony in the Pakistani context.

The British colonization of India changed the whole life of its citizens. The Muslims community, which was ruling the country, now became subjects of the British raj. The British rulers were also considering them their enemies because the Muslims were angry and were planning to get back their lost prestige. On the other hand, for Hindus it was only a change of rulers from Mughals to English. Soon Hindus started the western education and became the privileged class. The colonial experiences of Indian Muslims and its effects on their mind and thoughts, which also effected the civil military relations in Pakistan, are discussed in the following part.

British Colonial Experience of the Muslims in united India:

In the immediate aftermath of the revolt, of 1857, the entire brunt of mutiny was thrown on the Muslims. Due to which they were deprived from government jobs and any sort of progress as they were not trusted. British officials exaggerated the religious factor when they singled out the Muslims as the main rebels and explained the rebellion as an insidious plot by Muslim fanatics.⁴⁵ Shah Waliullah's letters depict the state of the Hindus and the Muslims at that time. They show that even at that time Hindus were well versed in the art of polity and economy while the Muslims were ignorant. Muslim community was in a pitiable condition. Control of the machinery of the government was in the hands of the Hindus because they were the only people because they were more near to the British rulers. Wealth

⁴⁴ Rosen, Stephen Peter. *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). P.xi.

⁴⁵ Jalal and Boss, 1998:93

and prosperity were concentrated in their hands, while the share of Muslims was nothing but poverty and misery.⁴⁶

British introduced English language as the language of state instead of Persian. During the Mughals rule of India, Hindus had learned political tactics well to get closer to the rulers. Within this context Hindus immediately learned English and became eligible for the government jobs. However, Muslims did not accept it and they drifted towards ignorance and away from the art of statecraft. The immediate response to the change of official language by Hindu literate castes was to switch from Persian to English in order to find continued service in government. It was largely at Indian initiative that the Hindu College, the first English language higher educational institution, was established in 1818.⁴⁷ The universities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were established in 1857. Although a few Muslims educated at Delhi College and Calcutta Madrassa also took to English and entered into colonial service, the vast majority of Muslims remained aloof from the new western education institutions.⁴⁸

In 1857, Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan established the Aligarh Anglo-Muhammadian Oriental College, which attracted the sons of Muslim landlords of northern India and drew British patronage.⁴⁹ But even Sir Syed's efforts could not develop an educated political environment for the Muslim community. One man's efforts were nothing equal to the Hindu's whom the British supported. This lack of educated political culture is still becoming a hurdle in the political stability of Pakistan. The political environment for the Hindus, which was provided by the British during the 20th century, helped them to develop democratic values in India.

An objective study of the origins of Pakistan and a willingness to face facts will reveal that many of the weaknesses and tensions that Pakistan has been encountering recently existed in their embryonic form during the period of Pakistan's gestation.⁵⁰ After the fall of Mughal Empire Indian Muslims were busy in their mourning for the lost empire. They did not understand the winds of change. They have not been subject to a foreign power since centuries. And they did not know the art of survival in the modern political culture. The

⁴⁶ Khaliq Ahmed Nizami (ed.), *Shah Waliullah Ke siyase Maktubat* (Political Letters of Shah Waliullah) (Aligarh: 1951), p.106.

⁴⁷ Jalal and Boss, 1998:81

⁴⁸ Jalal and Boss, 1998: 85

⁴⁹ Jalal and Boss, 1998:113.

⁵⁰ Sayeed, K.B. "*The Political System of Pakistan*" (Karachi: Civil and Military Press, 1987) p.1

creation of a separate homeland was not on the agenda. They thought India was their homeland because of which the Muslims joined the Congress.

The Muslim League was formed in 1906, by the Muslim aristocrats for personal benefits. The persons who engineered the Muslim deputation to the Viceroy were the land owning Muslim aristocrats of Bengal and the United Provinces and other holding high administrative ranks in the state of Hyderabad. It was not a vibrant organization. As late as 1927, the total membership of the Muslim League was 1330⁵¹. During the year 1931-3 its expenditure did not exceed Rs.3000⁵². In the 1930 Allahabad session, when Sir Muhammad Iqbal presented his historic address demanding the establishment of a North-Western Muslim state in India, the League meeting did not even have its quorum of 75 members. The annual session of 1931, held at Delhi, was described as ‘a languid and attenuated House of scarcely 120 people in all’⁵³. The Muslim League’s claim that it was the sole spokesman of the Muslims was first challenged in the United Provinces.⁵⁴

In 1930 at Allahabad, Iqbal presented the idea of a separate homeland but no one at political level noticed it. In 1939, Chaudhary Rahmet Ali suggested the name for a new country but these things were being used only as political tactics to bring the Congress and the British at own terms. Muslim leaders were neither thinking on those lines, nor working for this until the failure of cabinet mission plan. Jinnah reached the same conclusion of separate state reluctantly and much later than Iqbal.⁵⁵

From 1940 to 1947, Jinnah played his hand with consummate skill. He exploited every opportunity that presented itself and capitalized fully on the weaknesses and tactical mistakes made by the Congress.⁵⁶ From 1940 to 1945, a series of negotiations and proposals were ship wrecked on the rock of Hindu-Muslim differences. With each failure, however, Jinnah’s prestige soared. The Muslims started blaming the Hindu Congress and displaying increasing zeal to struggle for Pakistan under Jinnah’s leadership.⁵⁷

⁵¹ Dutt, R.Palme. “India Today and Tomorrow” (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955), p.234

⁵² Annual Report of the All India Muslim League for the years 1932 and 1933, Delhi:n.d., p10.

⁵³ The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 30 December 1931.

⁵⁴ Sayeed, K.B. 1987:35

⁵⁵ Burki, Shahid Jave “Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood” (Lahore: Maktaba Jadeed Press, Vangaurd 1999), p.1

⁵⁶ Sayeed, K.B. 1987: 41

⁵⁷ Sayeed, K.B. 1987: 42

Nehru was impressed by the argument that it would be better to hand over a few small strips of territory in the northwest and in the east to Muslims than to endanger Indian unity and strength by trying to work with Muslim league.⁵⁸ It was an eleventh hour creation.⁵⁹ Jinnah and the Muslim League campaigned very hard but not very long for the establishment of Pakistan as an independent state for the Muslims of British India.⁶⁰

Only seventeen years before the actual independence of Pakistan, the idea emerged of a separate grouping of provinces encompassing the north-west section of British India with a predominantly Muslim Population.⁶¹ Actual work on the idea started only eight years before. People were gathered on the idea to achieve an Islamic state. Eight year long struggle is not enough to develop a political consciousness in people when no one even thought about the structures and systems to run the newborn. Demand for Pakistan was a tactical move; blueprints were not made, as the separation was not expected. It has been reported that Jinnah himself never expected to see Pakistan in his lifetime.⁶²

With the arrival of independence, Jinnah himself appeared to be in a state of shock. Negotiating over the years to achieve Pakistan, when it came into being he realized that he had never expected to reach that goal in his lifetime and was vague about Pakistan would be run as a country. Once he had won his Pakistan, he left it for others to make use of it and set new goals for it.⁶³

Jinnah has been reported to say, "I have done my job. When the Field Marshal leads his army into victory, it is for civil authority to take over".⁶⁴ This shows that he did not have any idea how to run the state. This lack of experience, prior preparation and vagueness led Pakistan to the problems of stability, which the country constantly faced from its inception until today.

The leaders who led the movement for independence were members of the westernized class of professionals and intellectuals who identified closely with the parliamentary form of government. They were persons like Jinnah, who were not concerned

⁵⁸ Azad, Abul Kalam. "India wins Freedom" (Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1959) pp.185-187.

⁵⁹ McGrath, Allen. "The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy" (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.1

⁶⁰ Burki, Shahid Jave 1999. Op.cit.

⁶¹ McGrath, Allen Op.cit.

⁶² Bolitho, Hector. "Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan" (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 195.

⁶³ Allen McGrath, Op.cit.

⁶⁴ Coupland, R. "The Indian Problem" (New York: Oxford University Press), Vol. III, p.92.

with religious matters. They were ‘Islamic’ in that they identified themselves as members of the faith, were willing at times to express themselves by referring to religion in dealing with both social and political issues, but were reluctant to introduce Islamic ideology into politics.⁶⁵

Thus, a number of young idealists and socialists among the lower echelons of the Muslim League leadership soon became disenchanted with the League after the formation of Pakistan. They were disillusioned when the important leaders ignored their demands for economic and social reforms. The disappointment of the Ulema (Islamic scholars) and other orthodox element was equally acute, for the failure of ruling class to make Pakistan an Islamic state.⁶⁶ Ulema established their own political parties in Pakistan and started struggle for Islamic system in the country. The Islamic parties always supported the army’s influence in politics; especially during Zia’s dictatorship, Jamaat-i-Islami (a prominent religious Party) had very close relation with the army.⁶⁷

The Nature of Muslim League Leadership after Jinnah

The nature of leadership during the in the initial years of independence determined the political paths of both Pakistan and India. Jinnah was a charismatic leader for the Muslims of Indian subcontinent. It was a rare phenomenon even in the long history of India that a westernized cold blooded logician and lawyer, who did not speak any of the languages of his community fluently, at the age of sixty four (in 1940) had captured the imagination of a highly religious people like the Muslims.⁶⁸ Unfortunately Pakistan could not cherish it for long and lost its founding father. He died soon after Pakistan was formed and the groups that had been hastily strung together fell apart.⁶⁹ He did not get time to leave a line of worthy leaders who could manage Pakistan after him. The Muslim League would have remained a viable organization if it had inherited from Jinnah a group of strong provincial leaders and a clear program.

The structure of the leadership in the League however was weak, comprising the supreme leader, Jinnah and under him sub-leaders who were supported by their own tribes.

⁶⁵ Sayeed, K.B. 1987: 8

⁶⁶ Sayeed, K.B. 1987: 54

⁶⁷ Haqqani, Husain. (2005) “Pakistan between Mosque and Military” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, P. 201-202

⁶⁸ Sayeed, K.B. 1987:42

⁶⁹ Sayeed, K.B. 1987: 59

Any minister in the parliamentary system has to display two kinds of political skills. First, he should know how to keep his party together behind his party program. Secondly, he should provide leadership and control over the civil servants in the matter of policy formulation and the management of his department.⁷⁰ In the case of Pakistan, Muslim League had a party agenda that was 'Partition' of India and the achievement of Pakistan. After achieving that goal, Jinnah did not give any agenda to party workers, which could address the political issues of Pakistan. Therefore, soon after Jinnah's death Muslim League was divided in different sections on petty issues. The popularity of the Muslim League was short lived, because it neither had a strong party organization nor a concrete program.⁷¹

On the contrary, India was lucky to have Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru until 1961. For Nehru was not only a leading light of the nationalist struggle, but he became the first Prime Minister of independent India, guiding the destiny of his country for a little less than two decades.⁷² It was a sufficient time to strengthen the roots of democracy in the newly independent country. Nehru played a strong role in introducing planned economy, initiating the process of industrialization, developing science and technology, trying to rear an apparatus of political democracy and endeavoring to foster a secular spirit.⁷³ Tharoor finds that Nehru's imprint on India rests on four tenets, namely "democratic institution-building, staunch pan-Indian secularism, socialist economics at home, and a foreign policy of non-alignment."⁷⁴ Nehru deserves the credit for legitimizing the status of Congress leadership in post-colonial India by trying to create 'the development state'.⁷⁵

In the case of Pakistan, there was only one leader who could not stay alive long enough to put Pakistan on the right path. Before Jinnah, Muslim League did not have support at the grass root level. Some even go as far as to comment that had Jinnah died earlier, there would not have been Pakistan.⁷⁶ Jinnah used every means, even religion to gather support from illiterate masses. Unfortunately he could not get enough time to continue and to implement any political agenda or any national ideology, which could bring people together to work for the cause of Pakistan.

⁷⁰ Sayeed, K.B. 1987:57

⁷¹ Sayeed, K.B. 1987: 59

⁷² Das, Suranjan "The Nehru Years in Indian Politics", Edinburgh Papers In South Asian Studies Number 16 (2001).

⁷³ Tharoor, Shashi. "*Nehru the Invention of India*" (New York: Arcade Publishing Inc., 2003) p.34

⁷⁴ Tharoor, Shashi, 2003: 34

⁷⁵ Chatterjee, P. "Introduction" in P.Chatterjee (ed.) *State and Politics in India* (Delhi): 1998) p.12

⁷⁶ Brecher, Michael *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Political Biography* (London: Oxford University Press. 1959).

Islamic history demonstrates the diffusion of civil and military institutions. The ideology of Pakistan was totally based on the Islamic notion and its military is still considered as an Islamic military. It became more evident in 1998, when Pakistani nuclear weapons were called “Islamic Bombs”. So, Pakistani military also considers it legitimate to have its say in the national and international politics. It requires long struggle from the political parties to handle this issue. Pakistani political parties need strong leadership like Jinnah, who was determined and faithful to his cause.

The lack of visionary political leadership, after Jinnah, was the biggest problem for Pakistan. The political leadership failed to formulate a constitution and the country was running without a constitution for almost a decade. This also strengthened the military elite to interfere in the government matters. The failure of the political leadership in the initial years of independence gave courage to military to take power in 1958.

Chapter Two

Civil Institutions and Political Participation of Military in Pakistan

In the previous chapter the historical legacies of the Muslims in a combined India are discussed. This chapter discusses the inter-relationship between the civil institutions and their role in the different democratic and military regimes. India and Pakistan got independence at the same time and both inherited the British parliamentary democratic system. Today India is considered as the largest⁷⁷ democracy in the world, while on the other hand, Pakistan have a long history of military coups and dictatorial regimes. There are always domestic societal factors, which lead military into politics. Weak and non-viable political institutions and processes characterize the political system of Pakistan. Civil and military, bureaucratic elites have always influenced the policies and decisions of the political government. As Rizvi narrates:

Most rulers, civilian and military, pursued personalization of power and authoritarian style of governance, assigning a high premium to personal loyalty and uncritical acceptance of what the ruler or the party chief decides. This was coupled with partisan use of state apparatus and resources, and an elitist and exploitative socio-economic system.⁷⁸

A comprehensive examination of the Pakistani political and bureaucratic institutions reveals a pattern of undemocratic values, which are present in every sector of the society. To argue thus, this chapter is divided in the following three sections: 1) institutional prerequisites for democracy; 2) institutional problems in Pakistan 3) feudal aristocracy and political legitimacy.

Institutional Pre-requisites for Democracy:

The absence of pre-conditions of democracy hampers the consolidation of democracy in Pakistan. As long as the preconditions of democracy are absent from Pakistani society, democracy cannot succeed in Pakistan and military will be pulled to fill the vacuum. The first Indian prime minister Nehru was of the opinion that, 'it is not the inordinate

⁷⁷ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12557384>

⁷⁸ Rizvi, Hassan. A. "Democracy in Pakistan," Paper prepared for the Project on State of Democracy in South Asia as part of the Qualitative Assessment of Democracy. Lokinti Center for the study of developing societies Delhi. <http://www.democracy-asia.org/qa/pakistan/Hasan%20Askari.pdf>

ambition or a special taste for the politics but the failure of the political classes to govern effectively that the military intervention takes place in Pakistan.⁷⁹

Carother analyses that certain preconditions should be in place before a society democratizes.⁸⁰ It is the absence of these preconditions, which precipitate into weak democratic politics, or in other words, a nation should be prepared for democracy before it democratizes. A certain average income level, an independent middle class or urban bourgeoisie and a certain level of literacy and education are also important for the democratization of a country.⁸¹

The prerequisites for democracy may be different for different societies. In democratizing countries, the democratic political forces have failed to gain any public sympathy in the long run. In the case of Pakistan, dictatorial rule was even welcomed by the masses.⁸² Shin and Lee suggest that democracy should be examined from the perspective of those masses who have suffered political oppression and injustice. Democracy represents opportunities and resources for a better quality of life.⁸³ Democratic political parties in Pakistan failed to provide justice and a good quality of life due to which dictators gained support in the country. “Democracy as a political method or institutional arrangement has been separated from democratization, a social and political process”.⁸⁴ So, when a democratic government fails to deliver to the masses what they expect from democracy, all differences between political concepts become blurred.

Increased levels of literacy and income are strong motivators for the increase in popular public support of democratic government.⁸⁵ Masses do not support the democracy in a country where “social indicators like infant mortality and female primary and secondary enrollment are among the worst in the world”.⁸⁶ And where education, health, societal

⁷⁹ Rudolph, Lloyd J. and Rudolph, Susanne H. “Generals and Politicians in India,” *Pacific affairs*, spring 1964.

⁸⁰ Carothers, Thomas. “How Democracies Emerge,” *Journal of Democracy* 18, No. 1:12-27, 2007, p.13

⁸¹ Schmitter, P.C. and Brouwer, I. *Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection*, EUI Working Paper SPS No. 99/9. European University Institute, Florence, 1999, p.5.

⁸² Rashid, A. “Pakistan’s Coup: Planting the Seeds of Democracy?” *Current History*, 98, no. 632: 1999, p 409

⁸³ Shin, Doh C. and J. Lee. “Comparing Democratization in the East and the West”, *Asia Pacific Perspective* 1, no. 3:40-49, 2003, p. 40.

⁸⁴ Khan, Mohammad, M. “Problems of Democracy: Administrative Reform and Corruption,” *BISS Journal*, 22 (1):1-24, 2001, p. 35.

⁸⁵ Knack, Stephen “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?”, *International Studies Quarterly* 48: 251– 266, P 257

⁸⁶ Easterly, William, “The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan”, *Paper for the Analytical Narratives of Growth Project*, Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, 2001, p.2.

livelihood are lagging far behind from other countries. In this context a developing or underdeveloped society would perceive democracy to better its standards of education, health, livelihood and law and order among many others. The failure of democracy to bring about such a social transition thus can have irreversible repercussions.

In Pakistan the masses remain more interested in their economic development that would raise the standards of their livelihood rather than following democracy as a political system with the exception of it.⁸⁷ Since 1970, the authoritarian countries have experienced better economic indicators than democratic countries.⁸⁸ Consequently “in societies, where a gap between the elites and representatives of the people on professed principles of democracy and their actual conduct widens, people begin to lose faith in democracy”.⁸⁹ For instance, the current democratic government in Pakistan failed to lift the standard of living in the country. The economic indicators in the Musharraf’s dictatorial regime were better than today’s democratic government. Thus, the nostalgic population of Pakistani wants to get rid of the Zardari government and want a change.

Institutional problems in Pakistan

The respect for the democratic institutions of the state is necessary to develop a democratic system. The disrespect for the institutions, the constitutional issues, judicial issues and doctrine of necessity are major reasons for democratic instability, which provide a gateway for the military to intervene in Pakistan. Pakistan took nine years to formulate the constitution⁹⁰ and supreme law can be easily amended, nullified or disregarded in Pakistan.

Academic discourse further suggests that institutional imbalance, lack of political consensus building, weak political parties and leadership, extensive ethnic and sectarian cleavage and subservience of judiciary to political institutions⁹¹ share the responsibility for the failure of democracy in Pakistan. Such arguments place the responsibility on the political elite, who are understood not to have fulfilled their politic social responsibilities and thus weakening

⁸⁷ *ibid*

⁸⁸ Haber, Stephen (2006)“Authoritarian Government”, in Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, Oxford University Press: New York, p. 693

⁸⁹ Saeed, Shafqat. “Democracy in Pakistan: Value Change and Challenges of Institution Building,” *The Pakistan Development Review* 37, no.4, 11: 281-298, 1998, p. 283.

⁹⁰ Haq, Noor ul. “Governance and democracy in Pakistan: weaknesses, strengths and prospects” *IPRI Journal X*, no.1 (Winter 2010), P. 07

⁹¹ Hassan. A. Rizvi, “Democracy in Pakistan,” *OpCit*; Saeed. Shafqat, “Democracy in Pakistan: Value Change and challenges of institution Building,” *OpCit*; Vanhanen, Tatu.. “Problems of Democracy in Ethnically Divided South Asian Countries” Panel 32: Problems of Democracy in south Asia, in Lund, Sweden, 6-9 July 2004.

the foundations of democracy in the country. The political elite is said to have accentuated the gap between procedural democracy and the social perceptions of democracy.⁹² Though these arguments are justified in their candor, at best, they explain the failure of democracy in Pakistan at a micro level.

Pakistan inherited institutional imbalance at the time of independence in August 1947. The state apparatus, the bureaucracy and the military, was more organized and developed than the political and democratic institutions. Further, the first interim Constitution of 1947 also strengthened the bureaucracy and authoritarian governance.⁹³ The process of political decay and degeneration was set in motion soon after independence. The Muslim League was composed of feudal and semi-feudal leaders, who were motivated by personal ambitions⁹⁴ rather than a strong objective of nation building. Other political parties also did not have strong organizational setup and suffered from similar problems of internal disturbances, indiscipline and a lack of direction. As a consequence, they were unable to offer a viable alternative to the Muslim League and failed to articulate and aggregate interests within a participatory national political framework. They also failed to create viable political institutions or processes capable of pursuing meaningful socio-economic policies.⁹⁵

Pakistan coped with initial problems and was trying to develop democratic values but Jinnah's death in September 1948 set in motion the political trends that undermined the already weak political institutions and fragmented the political process.⁹⁶ Most of the political leadership after Jinnah had regional and local stature and did not have a nationwide appeal. By the time the first constitution was introduced (March 23, 1956) a strong tradition of violation of parliamentary norms had been established, the political parties were divided and the National Assembly was unable to assert its primacy.⁹⁷ The violation of democratic norms by the political parties jeopardized the democratic system and just after two years of the introduction of first constitution General Ayub Khan imposed Pakistan's first martial law.

⁹² Saeed, Shafqat. 1998: 283

⁹³ Rizvi, Hasan Askari "Pakistan: Civil-military Relations in a Praetorian State", in *The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific* edited by May, R. J. (ANU E press) Page 7

⁹⁴ Briefing Manual on Current Affairs (2001 Islamabad), Institute Of War And Peace Reporting http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/pakistan_current_affairs_briefing_manual.pdf

⁹⁵ Rizvi, Hassan. A. "Democracy in Pakistan" op.cit

⁹⁶ Rizvi, Hassan A. (1991) "The military and politics in Pakistan" *Asian and African Studies*, Vol 26, Numbers 1-2, P 33

⁹⁷ Hassan, A. Rizvi, "Democracy in Pakistan" op.cit

Pakistani politics was the real case of defiance of supreme law as Guillermo O'Donnell says, 'One cannot stop a coup d'état by an article in the constitution'⁹⁸. Deviation from the professed virtues of democracy is evident in the form of weak law and order situation, concentration of power amongst bureaucratic and military elite, and military dictatorial interference in civil rule.

Diamond relates democratic instability with three main crises of government which were 'dramatically manifested in Pakistan' as its democracy reeled towards a collapse in the 1990s.⁹⁹ First, there has been lack of accountability¹⁰⁰ (weak rule of law that permits endemic corruption, smuggling, and abuse of human rights). The powerful elite have been violating the state law for last 65 years. Second, Pakistan failed to manage regional and ethnic divisions peacefully and give all the citizens an inclusive stake in the political system.¹⁰¹ Third, Pakistan has faced economic crisis, stagnation, or instability.¹⁰² The political instability compelled the international community to withdraw its investment from Pakistan and invest in other developing countries.

In a nutshell, institutional breakdown in Pakistan hampered the consolidation of democracy in Pakistan. The institutions are controlled by individuals and the lack of strong institutions empowers these individual to affect the national policies. Most of the Muslim League leadership had feudal or semi-feudal background and they were motivated by personal power ambitions. They were not entrusted in such a system which could disturb their feudal status.

Feudal Aristocracy and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan:

The presence of feudal elite in the political process hampered the democratization of Pakistan in its embryonic state. India had a different experience in that phase, while struggling for independence. Congress in India reached to an agreement with the dominant feudal groups and diminished the feudal culture, but Muslim League failed to do so. The multi-religious Unionist party, failed to put down democratic roots in Punjab after independence because it was dependent on the support of the landlords.¹⁰³ In the 1946

⁹⁸ Przeworski, Adam. 2004. "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition* 39(2): 527-540. P. 529

⁹⁹ Diamond, Larry. "The global state of democracy", *Current History*, Issue FINAL Dec. 2000, p. 414

¹⁰⁰ Diamond, Larry. 2000: 414

¹⁰¹ Diamond, Larry. 2000:415

¹⁰² Diamond, Larry. 2000:415

¹⁰³ Talbot, I. (1998) 'Pakistan: *A Modern History*', London: Hurst and Company, p.68.

election, these landlords switched their allegiance to the Muslim League¹⁰⁴ because of its mass mobilization in urban areas. There was no democratic pact between the landlords and the elite of the Muslim League in Pakistan¹⁰⁵ but still it was dependent on the landlords. This dependence hampered the ability of the Muslim League to articulate a cohesive political program and soon it divided into factions. Military took the advantage of the situation; General Ayub Khan dismissed the constitution and imposed Martial Law.

The democratic regimes in Pakistan have been known to be ripe with “political instability, social divisions, continued fragmentation of society on sectarian lines, constant strife from within and security threats from without Pakistan”.¹⁰⁶ Pakistan’s socio-economic division and maintaining equilibrium with the army have created numerous problems for the democratic governments. The political governments failed to evolve a coherent political order that could address the national issues.¹⁰⁷ The land based elitist oligarchic culture, dominating the political arena, has created an environment of personalized politics in the country.

Despite a little increase in the representatives of various classes, feudal leaders still continue to be the dominant the politics.¹⁰⁸ Politics has become a game for the rich and this is a result of the power and influence. It is almost impossible for a middle-class individual to consider standing in elections.¹⁰⁹ Such negative developments only reinforce the position of the elite by concentrating and even widening its influence over other areas of social responsibility.

¹⁰⁴ Waseem, M. “*Politics and the State in Pakistan*”, Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research (1994), p. 113

¹⁰⁵ Adeney, Katharine and Wyatt, Andrew (2004) *Democracy in South Asia: Getting beyond the Structure-Agency Dichotomy*. Political Studies, 52 (1), p. 12

¹⁰⁶ Maluka, Zulfikar K. “Reconstructing the Constitution for a COAS President: Pakistan, 1999 to 2002” *Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics and Society*. Ed. Craig Baxter, Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 2005, p.53.

¹⁰⁷ Cohen, Stephen P. 2006: 131-132.

¹⁰⁸ Saeed, Shafqat, “Democracy in Pakistan: Value Change and Challenges of Institution Building,” *The Pakistan Development Review* 37, no.4, 11: 281-298, 1998,

¹⁰⁹ Haqqani, Irshad, A. “The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan?” *The Muslim World*, 96:2, 2006, pp. 223-224.

Table 1
Social Class Backgrounds of National Assembly Members

| | 1985 | 1988 | 1990 | 1993 | 1997 |
|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Landlords/Tribal leaders | 157 | 156 | 106 | 129 | 126 |
| Businessmen/Industrialists | 54 | 20 | 38 | 37 | 39 |
| Urban Professionals | 18 | 9 | 46 | 26 | 32 |
| Religious Leaders | 6 | 15 | 11 | 8 | 3 |
| Retired Military Officers | - | 7 | 3 | 5 | 2 |
| | 207 | 207 | 207 | 207 | 207 |

Source: (Shafqat 1998, 291)

Table 1 demonstrates a pattern of feudal influence on the democratic process. Thus, to exercise power and control and to perpetuate their existence, it is imperative for these feudal elites to control development, and even contribute in the underdevelopment of their subservient communities,¹¹⁰ so that potential candidates to power may be systematically eliminated.

It can be asserted, that democracy cannot be achieved with a feudalistic social structure in place. The two are mutually exclusive. Since the change to the established feudal culture cannot come from within a democratic government, the land reforms are necessary and the political participation of the masses in popular elections is encouraged. The Indian government did it in the very initial years and eliminated all the Rajas, and demolished princely powers and feudal system.

The society divided between large deprived masses and small superior elite would result either in oligarchy or in tyranny.¹¹¹ Cohen suggests that a revolution ensuing from within the rural population, which comprises approximately 60 percent of the nation's population, might be the only viable option left to remove feudal autocracy from its dominant position.¹¹² This revolution may not be a far cry considering the changing social perceptions of democracy among the masses in the country.

¹¹⁰ Easterly, William. 2001:P 22

¹¹¹ Lipset, S.M. "Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy," American Political Science Review, 53:1. 1959. P 75

¹¹² Cohen, Stephen P. 2006: 285

In essence, democratic reality cannot be realized without mass support, and the absence of this support would often times turn the masses to other regimes, even military, for their social uplift, questioning the legitimacy of the elected government. The absence of this support, for democratic regimes, is accentuated by the democratic regimes ineptness to control law and order, provide for basic necessities, and in a gist, due to the democratic regimes' lack of commitment to realize the social perception of democracy or, in other words, to move towards substantive democracy.

The support often shown by the masses for democracy needs to be evaluated and analyzed under the value change that has ensued. The masses remain interested to solve their personal problems instead of considering democracy as a political concept. Thus masses are involved in a barter trade with the feudal elite. Masses provide power, in the form of vote, to elite in exchange for personal favors.¹¹³ It demonstrates that masses are interested in their own practical ends rather than political ideologies.¹¹⁴ Thus, when political elites fail to satisfy their constituencies, a value change occurs and the government begins to lose its legitimacy. The masses quit their support for democracy and look beyond democracy for other viable options and, hence, enter dictatorship. Same thing happened in Pakistan, in 1999, when General Musharraf took the power after a coup and arrested the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The masses in Pakistan supported the takeover and some of them were distributing sweets.¹¹⁵

The personalized policies of the feudalistic political elite resulted in the form of weak and vulnerable state institutions in Pakistan. Weak political institutions generating weak policies play a negative role in the state building. In such situations the armed forces use the apology to resist such detrimental conditions. As a weak polity, often represented by a weak political system, is considered hazardous, resulting in internal insecurity, the army deems it a responsibility to rectify the situation, by deposing such a political system.

¹¹³ Saeed. Shafqat, Op.cit.

¹¹⁴ Monshipouri, Mahmood and Samuel, Amjad "Development and Democracy in Pakistan: Tenuous or Plausible Nexus?" *Asian Survey* 35:11, 1995, p. 988.

¹¹⁵ Malik, Iftikhar H. "Pakistan in 2000: Starting A new or Stalemate?" *Asian Survey*; 41:1, 2001, p. 108.

Chapter Three

Political Participation of Military in Pakistan: Military Perspective

Pakistani military participate in politics because it believes that it is the custodian of the state. The military has a centralized control and command structure, which led them to guard their institution against the politician. The relations between military and religious and pro-military political parties also contributed to the military's involvement in politics¹¹⁶. The role of these political parties from Ayub Khan (first military dictator) till Musharraf (last military dictator) shows that it was not only the military but also the politicians, who were involved in the disruption of democratic process in Pakistan.

Militaries are not supposed to judge between right and wrong. But in Pakistan the defense and foreign polities cannot be made without the approval of the military elite. These undemocratic norms, of military's involvement, which affect the whole democratic process in Pakistan, are discussed in this chapter. These norms are undemocratic from the perspective of pro-democratic segments of the society but not from the military perspective. Military officers consider it legitimate to influence every policy making institution of the state.

This chapter is divided into: 1) the military's belief about its role in society; 2) officers' personal grievances, coup d'états and democracy; and 3) disengagement/engagement of military with civil society.

The Military's belief about its role in society:

The custodian nature of the military and its high self esteem in society leads the military to act as a guardian of the society against sometimes perceived, sometimes actual, internal or external security threats to the country. The self-conceived savior status of the army compelled the General Ayub Khan to overthrow the civilian government and abrogated the constitution in order to establish the institutions that, according to him, suited the "genius of Pakistani people".¹¹⁷

Trading with the concept of military role belief scholars confer that 'ineffective' regimes are overthrown by groups who consider themselves more competent and more aware of the problems of the state.¹¹⁸ Pakistan's military, consider civilian governments to be

¹¹⁶ Haqqani, Hussain. 2005: 199-200

¹¹⁷ Khan, Ayub. "Friends not Masters" (London: Oxford university Press, 1967)

¹¹⁸ Fossum, Egil "Factors influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d'Etat in Latin America,

incompetent and ineffective. Military has ruled the country for more than half of Pakistan's existence. Even when the country is ruled by civilian government, army and Inter services intelligence (which is also controlled by army) play the 'guardian role' behind the scene.¹¹⁹ The structural imbalances and economic travails that have contributed to the country's continued political instability have generated growing pessimism. However others were more explicit in how they saw the eve of the Musharraf's coup in October 1999. As Rashid expresses that "the bloodless coup met with overwhelming public support. Leaders across the political spectrum hailed the army for "saving" Pakistan."¹²⁰

Musharraf, like his predecessors, came into government to "clean up the mess"¹²¹ created by civilian politicians. He highlighted, on the eve of takeover, "my singular concern has been the wellbeing of our country alone...the armed forces have moved in as a last resort to prevent any further destabilization".¹²² Musharraf's allegation is supported by others who explain that due to extreme mismanagement, the economy had plunged to a precarious state.¹²³ Media reports exposed massive corruption, sectarian violence involving Sunnis and Shias and political crises in Sindh. Nawaz Sharif's personalized and whimsical political management, however, had alienated major political forces in the country.¹²⁴

The main motivation which led General Zia to overthrow the Bhutto government is considered as Zia's concern for army's prestige and image in the society¹²⁵. He mentioned this fact in his first address, July 5, 1977, saying, "The Armed Forces were subject to criticism and ridicules"¹²⁶ for its support to the unpopular regime of Bhutto. Thus in Zia's perspective, under the public pressure, the armed forces were supposed to overthrow the Bhutto government.

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1967) p.233

¹¹⁹ Haqqani, Irshad A. 2006: 223-224

¹²⁰ Rashid, A. 1999: 411

¹²¹ Fathers, Michael "I want a True Democracy" (interview with General Musharraf), TimeAsia , 6 December 1999. www.time.com/time/asia/magzaine/99/1206/pakistan.musharraf.html (also present on <http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/04/06/time-asia-i-want-true-democracy-musharraf/>)

¹²² General Musharraf, televised address to the nation, 13 October 1999.

¹²³ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, (1999) "Pakistan in 1998: The Polity under Pressure", Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 1, p.181

¹²⁴ Ansari, Zafar A. Ansari and Moten, A. Rashid. "From Crisis to Crisis: Musharraf's Personal Rule and the 2002 Elections in Pakistan," *The Muslim World*, vol 93, July/October 2003. P 375

¹²⁵ Amin, Tahir. "1977 Coup D'etat in Pakistan" in *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture* Vol.XXVI111 no2 (July-Dec.2007) pp. 46-47

¹²⁶ The Pakistan times, July 6, 1977. (in Amin, Tahir. "1977 Coup D'etat in Pakistan" p.47)

Pakistan's military is considered to be responsible for the deteriorating condition of democracy in Pakistan. Indeed, most discourse on the issue suggests that repeated military interventions constitute a major reason for the failure of democracy to take roots in the country.¹²⁷ Domestic political instability, the existential threats from the India¹²⁸ and the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan¹²⁹ are the motivating factors behind the military's intervention in politics in Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistan Army, assuming its role as the guardian of the physical and ideological frontiers, moves to counter both internal and external security threats.

Internal security threats comprise the threats emerging from within the state, which encompass the inability of the democratic governments to maintain peace and law and order situations intact. This shows that the malfunctioning of the political class transports the military into politics. It is said that "democracies should have fewer civil wars than non-democratic states"¹³⁰ but statements like this are faced with a number of empirical problems in Pakistan. The experience of most South Asian countries demonstrates that the democratic institutions per se are not sufficient to prevent violent conflicts.¹³¹

A powerful section of the Pakistan army considers the army as 'the guardian of the nation'¹³² and therefore has the right to intervene in politics whenever there are any political crises. In each of the three occasions (1958, 1977 and 1999) when the Pakistan Army intervened into politics, there was a real crisis in the country.¹³³ External security threats (especially from India) are the core justification for the military's involvement in politics. "Democratization is less likely to occur when a country is under threat, because the armed forces are more powerful and the ruling elite's are less likely to risk the uncertainty of a transition during a period of conflict"¹³⁴. Thus, Jalal argues that the perceived threat that India

¹²⁷ Shah, Aqil. "A Transition to 'Guided' Democracy," in *Jim Rolfe (ed) Asia Pacific: A region In Transition*. Asia Pacific Center for security Studies 2004, p.207

¹²⁸ "Pakistan considers India an existential threat; US wants positive relations with Pak: US Intelligence Chief", *The Nation*, February 01, 2012 (<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/01-Feb-2012/pakistan-considers-india-an-existential-threat-us-wants-positive-relations-with-pak-us-intelligence-chief>)

¹²⁹ Kapila, Subhash (2009) "Afghanistan And Pakistan: Comparative analysis Of geo-strategic and geo-political significance" South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 3139

¹³⁰ Oneal, John, R. and Russett Bruce (2001), "Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations", New York/London, P.70

¹³¹ Wagner, Christian. "Democracy and State in South Asia: Between Fragmentation and Consolidation" *Asian Survey*, 39;6 (November/December 1999), pp. 908-925.

¹³² Khan, Fazal Muqueen *The Story of the Pakistan Army*; Karachi 1963, p.63

¹³³ Chaudhury, G.W. "Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule", S.A.A Printers Karachi 1988, p.27

¹³⁴ Aziz, Mazhar (2008) "Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State" Routledge: London, P.56

posed to Pakistan strengthened the anti-democratic elements in the state.¹³⁵ The defense expenditure is increasing every year and the other sectors of the society are left undeveloped.

India and Pakistan have fought three wars and still all of the security issues are not resolved. India blames Pakistan for supporting terrorists in Kashmir and India. This blame game sometime leads to serious conflicts. For instance, the Mumbai blasts of July 2011, provoked an all out blame game by India against Pakistan, and once again reinforced the perceptions on which the military builds its strategic preponderance.¹³⁶ It affected the whole peace process and highlighted the military's strategic vision for survival. The rhetoric of peaceful reconciliation has exposed the inability of the intellectuals, on both sides of the borders, to understand the full dimension of the Pakistan-India conflict. The normalization of the India-Pakistan relations is necessary but it is an insufficient condition for Pakistan's re-democratization.¹³⁷

Officer's Personal Grievances, Coup D'états and Democracy:

This section deals with the professionalism of the military and how it relates to the exercise of Coup d'états and democracy in Pakistan. It involves the military's reaction to any threat to the institutional integrity posed by civilian authority and corporate/economic interests of the officers. Militaries are rival institutions and their officers always compare their institution with foreign ones. They have greater awareness of the international standards and a greater sensitivity to weakness in their own society.¹³⁸ From the very initial years of independence, when the whole society was chaotic and turbulent, the military establishment was the only cohesive and disciplined national institution in Pakistan. The military's role in Pakistani politics was further enhanced in 1950s when Pakistan served as the CIA's main base for covert operations.¹³⁹ This alliance between United States and Pakistan facilitated the transfer of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan and its military obtained training by Americans.

Military power and autonomous influence over the Pakistani polity has varied over time. However, by the 1990s, the military had "shaped itself into the most formidable

¹³⁵ Jalal, Ayesha. "Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1995) p.60

¹³⁶ Cohen, Stephen P. 2006: 278-279

¹³⁷ Cohen, Stephen P. 2006: 278-279

¹³⁸ Pye, Lucien W. "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization", John J. Johnson (ed) *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped countries*. (Princeton N.J. Princeton University Press 1962) p.87

¹³⁹ Coll, Steve "Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden", (New York: Penguin, 2004).

and autonomous political actor capable of influencing the nature and direction of political change.”¹⁴⁰ During its long years of direct rule military have penetrated every major sector of state and society. Government, semi-government and private sector, all are so much influenced by military that it can exercise sufficient clout even when not in power.¹⁴¹ In fact, expansive military influence over the polity had created in its wake what one analyst has called a “lingering crisis of dyarchy”¹⁴² where the relationship between politicians and the permanent state apparatus is inherently unstable and political leaders have limited policy choices.

Institutional integrity is a matter of deep concern for the military elite. Whenever the civilian governments cross their limit and threaten the military domain the military establishments retaliate in the form of invasion. Of particular interest in this context is the question of whether military elites retain “reserved domains” or “prerogatives”¹⁴³. Reserved domains pertain to areas of policy that are excluded from the purview of elected government officials. Militaries have no electoral accountability but have privileged access to crucial elements of state power to destabilize or overthrow the elected governments.¹⁴⁴ Democratic civilian control of the military, which is a necessary condition for democracy, is undermined due to these reserved domains.

Popularly elected governments in Pakistan periodically tried to establish the civilian authority over the national security affairs. This was manifest in parliamentary debates over defense expenditures, the activism of the parliamentary public accounts committee and attempted reforms of arms acquisitions procedures and intelligence agencies. The civilian governments tried to reorder the civil-military relations on democratic principles, however, the military sought to resist this trend. Discretionary removal from office through the exercise of presidential powers was used to tame erring civilians as a last resort. In August 1990, for instance, President Ishaq Khan dismissed the Bhutto government after barely 18

¹⁴⁰ Rizvi, Hasan Askari. “*The Emperor’s New-Look Clothes*,” Outlook India, 23rd July 2001 (<http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?212674>)

¹⁴¹ Rizvi, Hasan Askari. “Military, State and Society in Pakistan” (Lahore: Sange Meel Publications, 2003).p189

¹⁴² Waseem, Mohammad. “Pakistan’s Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy,” Asian Survey, 32:7 (July, 1992), p634

¹⁴³ Stepan (1988:93) defines military prerogatives as areas “where, whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over internal governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between state and political or civil society.

¹⁴⁴ Valenzuela, J. Samuel (1990) Democratic consolidation in post-transitional settings: notion, process, and facilitating conditions, *Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame*, p.10 (<http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/150.pdf>)

months in office on charges of corruption with the approval of the Army chief of staff Aslam Beg.¹⁴⁵ While the allegations of corruption had eroded her government's legitimacy, the dismissal was triggered by Bhutto's provocative attempt to overhaul the intelligence apparatus and her growing assertion over military appointments.¹⁴⁶ The Bhutto government's involvement into what the military perceive as its internal affairs increased the contempt of the army Generals for the Prime Minister.¹⁴⁷

The next Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) government lead by Nawaz Sharif (1990-93) also developed serious differences with the military over external and internal security affairs. Sharif was dismissed by the president with military approval when he tried to influence senior military appointments and made his intentions to repeal article 58(2) B (which empowers the president to dismiss the elected government) of the Pakistan's constitution.¹⁴⁸ After assuming power for the second time in 1997, with a clear mandate to restructure state power, Sharif repealed 58(2) B and restored the control of Prime Minister over appointments of military chiefs. Sharif's subsequent dismissal of the army chief General Jahangir Karamat and the elected government's peace overtures to India strained the outer limits of military tolerance of civilian authority.¹⁴⁹ In May 1999 Pakistan military entered into the northern Kargil sector of Kashmir, and the Kargil conflict started, which destroyed the peace dialogue with India.¹⁵⁰ Sharif tried to replace Musharraf to prevent a coup but now it was too late. In October 1999, when Sharif attempted to replace Musharraf, the military seized power and the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was sent to jail.

According to Haqqani, a senior former advisor to two prime ministers in the 1990s, the support of Pakistan military for the elected civilian leader depends on how much they support the military's internal and external missions.¹⁵¹ Similarly, military officers have their economic corporate interests and the civilian governments are not allowed to interfere in

¹⁴⁵ Rizvi, Hassan A. "The Military and Politics in Pakistan; 1947-1997". 2nd edition (Sange Meel, 2000); Kamran Khan, "Bhutto out as premier in Pakistan" Washington Post, November 7, 1996 (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/27/AR2007122701023.html>)

¹⁴⁶ Haqqani, Hussain. 2005: 82

¹⁴⁷ Shah, Aqil. 2004: 210

¹⁴⁸ Rizvi, Hasan Askari. *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, Op.cit.

¹⁴⁹ Haq, Ihtashamul. "Karamat Retired, Muhaffaf Takes Over as COAS," *Dawn* (Karachi), 10 October 1998.

¹⁵⁰ Lodhi, Maleeha "The Karcil Crisis: Anatomy of a Debacle," *Newsline* (Karachi), July 1999), pp. 1-28; Haqqani, Hussain. 2005: *Pakistan between Mosque and Military*, Op.cit.; Nasr, Sayyed Vali "The Rise of 'Muslim' Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 16 16,2 (April 2005), pp. 13-27.

¹⁵¹ Haqqani, Hussain. 2005: *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*: op.cit.

the financial issues. If the government tries to reduce the defense budget, it has to face the consequences of the military elite's displeasure.

In all the states that have seen the ascendancy of military to power, military has become a ladder to get lucrative jobs. In General Zia's regime the military became much more powerful than all other military regimes in Pakistan. Zia failed to civilianize his regime and continued to lean heavily on the military. To keep the army loyal to him he distributed the rewards of power in the military in a consistent and extensive manner. The higher echelons of the military have thus emerged as the most privileged class in Pakistan.¹⁵² The military officers were appointed to the top civilian jobs, leading to what Finer describes as the "military colonization of other institutions" whereby "the military acts as a reservoir or the core of personnel for the sensitive institutions of the state."¹⁵³ Pakistani military controls business assets worth about \$20 billion, a third of all heavy manufacturing in the country and up to 70% of Pakistan's private assets.¹⁵⁴

The military is a very powerful element of every nation state and is responsible for the protection of state and masses. The military is not a neutral force moving mechanically into the political arena, but a powerful political force with interests and stakes of its own.¹⁵⁵ In Pakistan the military has a prominent role in the politics, business and commercial activities in both government and semi-government sectors, especially in the fields of industry, transport, health care, education, and real estate development. It is not so easy for the civil political government to alienate the military from politics and send them back to barracks.

Disengagement/Engagement of Military with Civil Society:

It has not been military leaders alone who have helped to create this state of affairs. The senior civil service assisted them in rolling back the frontiers of democracy soon after independence. The defining role of the military-bureaucratic elite in the state's formation has been to begin and perpetuate an endless cycle of manipulated politics. Bureaucracy and the military maintained their professional disposition marked by hierarchy, discipline, and

¹⁵² Rizvi, Hasan Askari "The paradox of military rule in Pakistan", *Asian Survey*, 24:5 (May, 1984), pp. 534 – 555

¹⁵³ Finer, S.E. "The Military and Politics in the Third World," S. Scott Thompson (ed.), *The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy*, (San Francisco: Institute of contemporary studies, 1978), p.20.

¹⁵⁴ Islam, Shada "Building democracy and fighting extremism in Pakistan: a role for the EU," *Policy Brief* European Policy Centre April 2008.

¹⁵⁵ Ansari and Moten. 2002: 373

esprit de corps.¹⁵⁶ These elites have installed themselves in the highest seats of power since independence.

The bureaucratic elites have far greater staying power than one is willing to concede. It is this “staying power” that sustains continuity and enhances the enduring capacity of the bureaucracy.¹⁵⁷ Like other democratic systems it is expected in Pakistan that bureaucracy should ensure continuity of policies, promote law and order and work for the economic development. These traditional functions have been forcefully defended by the proponents of bureaucracy.¹⁵⁸

Taking the historical view into account, the elucidation of the importance that the military has gained in political matters of the state becomes obvious. The civil and military bureaucracies were always concerned with the security problems. So, right from the start, external and internal matters were mixed, giving the army a key role in the state-building.¹⁵⁹ The military has played both direct and indirect role in the policy making and especially defense policies have always been controlled by the military.

The politicians in Pakistan, instead of serving the cause of democracy, have chosen to get favors from the military elite. The corruption has destroyed their reputation and gave rise to increasing public disenchantment with politics and the political process.¹⁶⁰ Military regimes in Pakistan are always supported by some political parties and antigovernment elements of society. In some cases the political leaders invited the military to overthrow the elected governments. In 1977, Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan, a prominent leader of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), invited the army through a letter to take over the country. In his letter “he called on the officers to distinguish between the ‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’ commands and not to support the ‘illegal’ government of the day”.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Rizvi, Hassan. A. “Democracy in Pakistan,” Paper prepared for the Project on State of Democracy in South Asia as part of the Qualitative Assessment of Democracy. Lokinti Center for the study of Developing societies Delhi. <http://www.democracy-asia.org/qa/pakistan/Hasan%20Askari.pdf>

¹⁵⁷ Drucker, Peter “In Defence of Japan’s Bureaucracy”, *Foreign Affairs* 77:5 (1998), pp. 250-253.

¹⁵⁸ Bureaucracy politicized, Daily Dawn, 5th Feb 2012 (see <http://dawn.com/2012/02/05/bureaucracy-politicised/>)

¹⁵⁹ Boris, Wilke “State-Formation and the Military in Pakistan: Reflections on the Armed Forces, their State and some of their Competitors,” *Working Paper* No. 2 Research Unit of Wars. Armament and Development: University of Hamburg, 2001, p. 32

¹⁶⁰ Haqqani, Irshad A. “The Failure of Democracy in Pakistan”, *Opcit.*

¹⁶¹ Amin, Tahir. 2007: 46

There are several factors which enhance the military's lust and capability to overthrow the civilian governments. Pakistan military participated in politics because it believed that it was the custodian of the state. The military's self-conceived status of savior of nation has always overshadowed the democratic norms in the country. The military had a centralized control and command structure, which led them to guard their institution against the politician. The civil bureaucracy and corrupt politicians have supported the military cause for their personal benefits. The opposition parties requested the army to overthrow the governments. This kind of undemocratic attitudes along with security threats from India converted Pakistan into a security state. After Musharraf's resignation as the president of the state, the Prime Minister Gillani's government is also accused of corruption, and masses are nostalgic about the Musharraf regime.

Chapter Four

Democracy and coup D'états in Pakistan: Global factor

Like the internal factors discussed in the previous chapters, international developments also affect the democratization process in developing countries. The occurrence of the coup in one country can stimulate those in other countries.¹⁶² Similarly, the interests of the superpowers in the region, and their support for the autocratic regimes also contribute in promoting dictatorships. The strategic partnership between United States and Pakistan strengthened the armed forces in Pakistan. The US interests in the region compelled the Americans to support the military dictators in Pakistan.

To argue thus, this chapter is divided in the following two sections: 1) the role of alliances with major power in democracy and coup d'états 2) Geo-strategic significance of Pakistan and coup d'états

The role of alliances with major powers in democracy and coup D'états:

Since its inception, Pakistan has been a close ally of the United States because Pakistan required the economic support from the US to develop its institutions. The US interests in Pakistan were purely strategic because Americans needed allies in the region against the Communist block. The political governments in Pakistan could not fulfill the US interests in the region because of their limitations. Therefore the US governments supported the military's interference and helped the armed forces to take power.¹⁶³ Pakistan's perceived threat vis-à-vis India compelled Pakistan to join the Cold War alliance. The American extraordinary defense aid and training as well as the immature nature of the political institutions and civil society empowered the military bureaucratic elite to start interference in politics.¹⁶⁴

The strength that the military so often boasts of is not entirely a creation of domestic economic subsistence but has largely been realized by the 'Cold War'.¹⁶⁵ As a newborn and weak state, Pakistan chose to side with the US during the Cold War era. Within this context Pakistan entered into the western alliance system signing South East Asian Treaty

¹⁶² Wells Alan, "The Coup d'Etat in Theory and Practice: Independent Black Africa in the 1960s" *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 79, No. 4 (Jan., 1974) p.874

¹⁶³ Amin, Tahir. 2007: 47

¹⁶⁴ Jalal, Ayesha. 1995: 127

¹⁶⁵ Haqqani, Irshad A. 2006: 224

Organization (SENTO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1950s.¹⁶⁶ Being a member of these alliances had a strong impact on whether Pakistan would remain democratic or face coup d'états in the coming decades.

Pakistan was catapulted into the front line of the Cold War in 1979 when Pakistani trained and US-funded Mujahideen or freedom fighters drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan.¹⁶⁷ CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) worked together to improve Pakistan's intelligence services.¹⁶⁸ This strategic partnership between US and Zia's dictatorial government got improved, throughout the Afghan war Pakistani military was getting weapons from the US and financial aid from both the US and the Saudi government to fight against the Soviets.

The country's regional and global significance increased even further after September 11 2001, when General Musharraf agreed to join the US-led 'war on terror'.¹⁶⁹ Musharraf took a U-turn on Islamabad's Afghan policy against the will of Pakistan people, because he needed American help to prolong his rule.

Both the Cold War and the 9/11 incidents not only increased Pakistan's global importance but gave legitimacy to authoritarian regimes. Western powers, who are the great proponents of democracy, helped Pakistan more during the military regimes than democratic ones. This gave an impression that foreign players promote authoritarian regimes in Pakistan to further their own interests and Pakistani people are against the US policies in the region¹⁷⁰ and want Pakistan to disengage itself from the Afghan war.

US supported the dictators in Pakistan because the civilian leaders do not have the power to fulfill their interests and feel easy to deal with unelected dictator than elected government.¹⁷¹ The US supported all the military rulers in Pakistan but the successive civilian rulers were never favored so much. For example, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a democratic leader, did not get America's support and the Zia (who is regarded is the killer of Z.I. Bhutto and the worst dictator), was getting all kinds of support. Similarly the civilian governments of Benazir

¹⁶⁶ Ibid

¹⁶⁷ Haqqani, Husain, 2005: 178

¹⁶⁸ Ibid

¹⁶⁹ Islam, Shada Opcit.

¹⁷⁰ Islam, Shada "Building democracy and fighting extremism in Pakistan; a role for the EU" *Policy Brief*, European Policy Centre, April 2008.

¹⁷¹ Haqqani, Irshad A. 2006: 225

and Nawaz Sharif from late 1980s to late 1990s were under the crushing sanctions imposed by US.¹⁷²

The philanthropic foundations were also promoting the CIA's interests. The Ford Foundation was one of the leading during the Cold War. Ford Foundation was converted into a national and international foundation. The CIA has long operated through a number of philanthropic foundations. In James Petras' words, the Ford-CIA connection "was a deliberate, conscious joint effort to strengthen US imperial cultural hegemony and to undermine left-wing political and cultural influence."¹⁷³ Frances Stonor Saunders, in a recent work on the period, states that "at times, it seemed as if the Ford Foundation was simply an extension of government in the area of international cultural propaganda. The Foundation had a record of closely with Marshall Plan and CIA officials on specific projects."¹⁷⁴

The geo-political significance that Pakistan has exhibited and the strategically significant situations it has often been caught in have allied the military with the western powers in an indispensable manner, such that democracy promotion was relegated to a secondary position.¹⁷⁵ The 65 years history of Pakistan is marked by two kinds of US-sponsored policies, first anti-communist and then anti-al-Qaida. The aid was connected with US interests in the region and democratization has never been the issue of interest.

Geo-strategic interests and coup d'états:

Pakistan is geo-strategically located at an importance place in the region and has gained more importance due to its status as a nuclear state. The geo-strategic location of Pakistan is significant for super powers, and has played an important role in the Afghan wars.

The US patronized General Ayub Khan because US wanted to have an ally in the region. India was trying to develop cooperation with the Soviets and didn't want to play an anti-Soviet role in the Cold war. The US wanted to check the spread of communism, of which Soviet Russia and China were the two main protagonists.¹⁷⁶ Then the US fully backed General Zia-ul-Haq with respect to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan's support

¹⁷² ibid

¹⁷³ Petras, James "The Ford Foundation and the CIA; A documented case of philanthropic collaboration with the secret police", December 2001 (see at <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/FordFandCIA.html>)

¹⁷⁴ Petras "The Ford Foundation..." *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*, 2000, p. 139.

¹⁷⁵ Shah, Aqil. 2004; Haqqani, Irshad A. 2006: 219-232

¹⁷⁶ Haqqani, Irshad A. 2006: 224

to the Afghan resistance.¹⁷⁷ After Soviet disintegration US-Pak relations were changed and Pakistan was left with one hostile neighbor in its east and a destroyed Afghan nation in the west.

It is of great importance to note that the US favored the military regime in Pakistan against communism, while the US gave aid to India to save it from communism. The US had a similar strategy until the end of the Musharraf era. General Musharraf did not enjoy any favor from US before 9/11. After declaring war against terror on Afghanistan in 2001, the US enlisted General Pervez Musharraf's support as a "close ally" in this war.¹⁷⁸ Many scholars¹⁷⁹ have argued that the IMF and the World Bank predominantly responded to the interests of the US administration in terms of both aid allocation and aid conditionality.

The disenfranchisement of democracy by the western powers in pursuance of their strategic interests thus empowered the military in Pakistan. It often happened that the commercial, strategic and political motives of the donors distort the actual objectives of the foreign aid. If the donor's interests are best served, there is indeed no reason for foreign aid to be effective in promoting the development of the recipients.¹⁸⁰ If aid is used to support the authoritarian regimes who are not interested in the broader national development, then the relation between aid and development will be minimal.¹⁸¹ The western support for military regimes fulfilled western strategic interests but did not produce democratic culture in Pakistan.

Donors seek to take advantage of the strategic and commercial gains they can derive from aid and hence allocate aid to pursue their own self-interests. From the late 1960s, a number of scholars¹⁸² have argued that aid is used to promote donor's own economic and foreign policy interests and to exercise their political power. Riddell holds that the developed

¹⁷⁷ *ibid*

¹⁷⁸ *ibid*

¹⁷⁹ Thacker, S.C. "The High Politics of IMF Lending". *World Politics*, 52:1, 1999, pp. 38-75; Barro, R.J. and Jong-Wha Lee 'IMF Programs: Who is Chosen and What are the Effects'. *Paper Presented at Second IMF Research Conference*, Washington DC, IMF 2001; Frey, B. and Schneider, F. 'Competing Models International Lending Activity', *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 20, (1986), pp. 225-245.

¹⁸⁰ Berthelmy, J. and Tichit, A. 'Bilateral Donor's Aid Allocation Decision', *World Institute for Development Economic Research (WIDER)* Discussion Paper, No. 123, Nations University (2002).

¹⁸¹ Harrigan, Jane and Wang, Chengang "A New Approach to the Allocation of Aid among Developing Countries: Is the USA more Selfish than the Rest?" *School of Economic Studies*, University of Manchester, Manchester.

¹⁸² Jalee, P. "*The Pillage of the Third World*", (Monthly Review Press, New York 1968); Hayter, T. "*Aid as Imperialism*", (Penguin Books, New York 1971); *The Creation of World Poverty; an Alternative View to the Brandt Report*, (Pluto, London 1981); Hensman, C.R. "*Rich Against Poor; the Reality of Aid*". (Allen lane, London 1971).

countries can exercise their financial muscles directly via their bilateral agencies as well as indirectly through multilateral organizations and international financial institutions.¹⁸³ Hence, the ultimate purpose for giving aid is to help spread donor values and ideas, such as capitalization or more recently globalization, and to perform the express functions of stabilizing pro-Western governments.¹⁸⁴ In the case of Pakistan America always allocated aid to ensure Pakistan as an ally against communism from the 1950s-1980s or against terrorism after September 11. The 9/11 basically provided legitimacy to the Musharraf regime from western powers. The US sacrificed Pakistan's political stability for the US strategic interest.

Many scholars have discussed that development in Pakistan and the administration's allegedly tepid response is evidence that President Bush's so-called Freedom Agenda was applied selectively and without principle.¹⁸⁵ During a November 2007 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Pakistan, several members of the committee called for suspending some forms of aid to Pakistan until Musharraf reverses the imposition of emergency (second marshal law) in the country. The Bush Administration called Musharraf "an indispensable ally in the global war on terrorism".¹⁸⁶ The imposition of emergency in Pakistan was an undemocratic act and the whole civil society was against but the US government was not ready to say anything against Musharraf.

Due to geopolitical reasons, the flow of economic assistance has wavered to an extent that the increased flow of assistance to Pakistan during dictatorship regimes has reinforced the perception that the US views the military authoritarian regime to be its only unconditional ally. All the dictatorial regimes have been caught in a geopolitical environment, in which the US had to provide economic assistance to further its geopolitical interests,¹⁸⁷ argues Barry. It implies that Pakistan's significant geo-strategic location was an important factor in the US calculations of encouraging military dictators in Pakistan.

¹⁸³ Riddell, R. *Foreign Aid Reconsidered*, (James Curry, London, 1987).

¹⁸⁴ Harrigan, Jane and Wang, Chengang, *Op.cit.*

¹⁸⁵ LaFranchi, Howard. "Why U.S. Sticks by Musharraf," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 6, 2007; Mazzetti, Mark. "Bush Urges Musharraf to Reverse Course But Signals No Penalty If He Doesn't," *New York Times*, November 6, 2007; "Working with a Dictator" (editorial), *Washington Post*, Nov. 6, 2007; Bennett, Brian "Can the US Pressure Musharraf?" *Times* (online), Nov. 5, 2007; Milbank, Dana "Hitting the Mute Button on the Freedom Agenda," *Washington Post*, November 6, 2007

¹⁸⁶ House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on "Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Terrorism in Contemporary Pakistan," November 7, 2007

¹⁸⁷ Barry, T. 'U.S. Isn't "Stingy," It's Strategic' *IRC Policy Report*, January 7, 2005.

The international community overlooked Pakistan's instability just to serve its strategic interest. The 1999 coup by General Musharraf "triggered automatic penalties under Section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act, which bans non-humanitarian U.S. assistance to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by a military coup".¹⁸⁸ These sanctions can only be reversed when democracy is restored in the aid recipient country. The Bush administration waived coup-related sanctions on Pakistan after September 11.¹⁸⁹ The waiver helped the undemocratic forces to strengthen and to prolong their rule in Pakistan. Both General Zia and General Musharraf gained western backing and prolonged their rule due to the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan in the US sponsored wars, in Afghanistan. During the democratic era between the Zia and Musharraf regimes (1988-1998) US aid was almost negligible. After 1999's military coup, the amount of aid gradually increased.¹⁹⁰

The Bush Administration generally had not ranked democracy at the top of its list of priorities for Pakistan. The December 2007 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Pakistan, one senior analyst offered that, "Overall U.S. policy toward Pakistan until very recently gave no serious attention to encouraging democracy in Pakistan."¹⁹¹ President Bush strongly defended Musharraf by saying that he "hasn't crossed the line" and "truly is somebody who believes in democracy".¹⁹² The use of word 'democratic' for a military dictator by the US president shows how much they were interested in the democratization of Pakistan. The dictators like Musharraf always get patronage from superpowers to prolong their rule which ultimately destroy the whole democratic setup.

Conclusion:

This thesis has discussed the political participation of the military in Pakistan from 1947 to present. The central argument of the thesis is that there are three major reasons behind the political participation of the military in Pakistan. First, the British colonial experiences of Muslims in the United India, from the 19th century up to the independence of Pakistan in 1947, have great impact on the undemocratic behavior of Pakistani people.

¹⁸⁸ Kronstadt, K. Alan "Pakistan's Political Crises" *CRS report for Congress*, Order Code RL34240, Page. 23

¹⁸⁹ *ibid*

¹⁹⁰ Anwar, Mumtaz and Michaelow, Katharina 'The Political Economy of US Aid to Pakistan', *Review of Development Economics* 10(2): 195-209, Oxford: Blackwell (2006).

¹⁹¹ Ambassador Teresita Schaffer, statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee December 6, 2007.

¹⁹² Abramowitz, Michael and Wright, Robin. "Bush Gives Stronger Backing to Musharraf," *Washington Post*, November 20, 2007.

Second, the constant fragility of the political institutions in Pakistan from 1947 to 2009, led frequently to coup d'états in Pakistan. Third, the perception of the Pakistan military about its role in the country also affected the political system of the state. Pakistan's military participated in politics because it believed itself to be the savior of the state and the military had a centralized structure which allowed it to guard the military's interests sometimes at the expense of the political institutions. Finally, the major powers played a strong role in encouraging and supporting the military's role in the politics of Pakistan.

The persistent trend of the failure of democracy has, time and again, contributed to disillusioning the people from the ideal of the state which the founding leaders of the country envisaged. Its inherent socio-economic structural weaknesses coupled with an ominous geopolitical presence and its ever strong military have contributed largely to its failure as a democratic state. This is not because of the causal nature of these imperfections, but rather because they are intertwined and woven in the fabric of the society. These anomalies are inherent to the very nature of the political system of Pakistan.

It is important that an out of the box effort is made in order to accomplish the objectives of becoming a successful polity. Furthermore, the goal of the political system should be formulated in order to enhance the quality of life of the general masses, the provision of socio-economic amenities and security to them. Such steps would strengthen the democratic culture within Pakistani society. However, in order to accomplish such a task, it is important to abolish the hierarchical structure surrounding feudalism.

Most importantly, in order to alienate the military from the political process of Pakistan, the threat emanating from India needs to be reduced. Within this context Pakistan should initiate a peaceful dialogue with India on unresolved issues to prevent Pakistan army from intervening in the politics of the country. The role of international community is essential here to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

External influences emanating from the country's geopolitical vulnerability should be neutralized. In the past, the major powers especially the US have supported the Pakistani military's participation in the country's politics for the military's willingness to pursue pro-US policies. The current situation of Afghanistan has once again involved Pakistan in a proxy war. The Presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan is affecting the civil-military

relations. Musharraf's policies are still intact and US-Pak relations are dependent on the will of Armed forces which is an alarming situation for the democracy in Pakistan.

In order to reduce military intervention in domestic politics, it is imperative to deprive the military of the excuses it uses in justifying its rhetorical stance as the guardian of the state. The possibility of Pakistan's move forward to realizing the ideals of true democracy are held in abeyance unless the political leadership of Pakistan takes serious measures to strengthen the institutions of the country and abolish the colonial structures. These are the very steps which India took enabling it to practice sustained democracy without facing any threat from military intervention in its political process.