Master Thesis:

“Populists are actually Democrats!”

- A Content Analysis of Interviews and Speeches Given by Nigel Farage Against the Backdrop of Populism and Euroscepticism

21st of August 2012
Submitted by:

Nora Hädicke
norahaedicke@yahoo.de

Supervisor: Eleonora Narvselius
Abstract

With Europe and the EU facing a time of constant political changes and financial crisis in to the Eurozone, the rise of phenomena like Euroscepticism and Populism are more topical than ever. Through the use of populist rhetoric, Eurosceptic parties, such as the British UK Independence Party (UKIP), are gaining support across Europe and have proven their influence on the European political stage. Claiming to speak in the name of the ‘common’ people, UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage regards himself as their representative in a quest to defend democracy, the peoples’ and the British nation states’ interests against the ‘dangerous’ supranational institution and political elite. Farage and UKIP argue against the regulations coming from ‘unelected bureaucrats’ in Brussels and proclaim their main political agenda, favouring the UK’s eventual withdrawal from the EU. The use of well-chosen, cunning populist rhetoric along with the targeting of EU’s supranational institutions and Mr. Barroso and Mr. van Rompuy as ‘Bully-boys’ has proven successful for Farage and UKIP.

An examination of speeches and interviews by Farage lays open his implemented populist rhetoric tools and sheds light on the main targets of his criticism, the EU’s institutions and the European political elite. The aim of this thesis is to meticulously single those out and interpret how and why he criticises them. By applying an encompassing quantitative as well as qualitative method of content analysis, twenty-nine of Farage’s speeches and interviews are scrutinised against the backdrop of populism, populist rhetoric and Euroscepticism. Through frequent simplifications of complex issues and a reoccurring lack of substantial arguments, however, his credibility occasionally happens to be negatively affected. Farage does not provide a fundamentally solid plan for the UK’s and UKIP’s future, in case of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU.
# Table of Contents

1. Introductory Chapter................................................................................................................. 1  
   1.1. Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1  
   1.2. Outline............................................................................................................................. 2  
   1.3. Who is Nigel Farage?....................................................................................................... 4  
2. Methodology............................................................................................................................... 6  
   2.1. Content Analysis............................................................................................................... 6  
   2.2. The Opportunities and Limitations of CA........................................................................ 9  
3. Theoretical Framework............................................................................................................... 10  
   3.1. Populism – An Attempt to Define.................................................................................... 10  
      3.1.1. Populist Parties......................................................................................................... 13  
      3.1.2. Right-wing Populism ............................................................................................. 14  
   3.2. Populism as Rhetorical Strategy....................................................................................... 16  
   3.3. Euroscepticism and its Many Faces.................................................................................. 18  
      3.3.1. General Euroscepticism........................................................................................... 18  
      3.3.2. Patterns of Euroscepticism...................................................................................... 21  
   3.4. British Euroscepticism...................................................................................................... 22  
      3.4.1. Political Euroscepticism........................................................................................... 22  
      3.4.2. Economic Euroscepticism....................................................................................... 23  
      3.4.3. Cultural & Immigrational Euroscepticism............................................................... 24  
      3.4.4. British Euroscepticism and the News....................................................................... 25  
   3.5. UKIP - Euroscepticism as a Strategy................................................................................. 26  
4. Analysis........................................................................................................................................ 28  
   4.1. Farage’s Language.............................................................................................................. 29  
      4.1.1. Key Words & Repetitions.......................................................................................... 29  
      4.1.2. Metaphors & Illustrations......................................................................................... 32  
      4.1.3. Colloquialisms & Offences....................................................................................... 35  
      4.1.4. The Usage of Pronouns............................................................................................ 37  
      4.1.5. Patterns of Identification & Solidarity....................................................................... 39  
   4.2. Lee’s Four Populist Strategies Applied to Farage............................................................. 40  
   4.3. Farage As a Populist Leader – Brief Evaluation of His Qualities.................................. 42  
   4.4. In General – Against the EU as a Political Union........................................................... 43  
   4.5. Against the Political Elite.................................................................................................. 47  
   4.6. Targeting Barroso and Van Rompuy............................................................................... 48  
   4.7. UKIP’s Stances – Farage As The Populist Mouthpiece for UKIP?................................. 50  
5. Conclusion..................................................................................................................................... 52
List of Abbreviations

CA – Content Analysis
CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis
DA – Discourse Analysis
EC – European Council
ECB – European Central Bank
ECJ – European Court of Justice
ECM – European Commission
EEC – European Economic Community
EP – European Parliament
EU – European Union
LibDems – Liberal Democrats
MEP – Member of the European Parliament
MP – Member of Parliament (British)
OW – Official Website
QCA – Quantitative Content Analysis
QLCA – Qualitative Content Analysis
RWPPs – Right-wing populist parties
UK – United Kingdom
UKIP – UK Independence Party
WWII – World War Two
Tables

Table 1.
Numbers of: Key Words & Repetitions

Table 2.
Numbers of: Metaphors & Illustrations, Colloquialisms & Offences, The Usage of Pronouns, Patterns of Identification & Solidarity
1. Introductory Chapter

1.1. Introduction

If there were only one truth, you couldn’t paint a hundred canvases on the same theme.
--Pablo Picasso, 1966

When applying this quote to the British politician Nigel Farage, one finds myriad ways of presenting ‘the political truth’. In terms of Europe, the European Union (EU) and all its attachments, the United Kingdom (UK) has frequently proved to be a rather ‘gate-keeping’ state, seeking to retain its domestic political sphere as untouched from Brussels as possible. It can be argued that Britain’s fairly glorious role in the Second World War (WWII) is part of the reason for Eurosceptic tendencies (cf. Grant, 2008: 2). By having the uncontested role of a postcolonial power even after the dissolution of their empire after 1945, the UK has retained its isolated island character. It is not in vain that, after its discussion to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s, their referendum on membership in 1975, Thatcher’s firm and adverse attitude about it in the 1980s and the domestic public debates about Maastricht in the 1990s, Britain has been labelled “an awkward partner in the European Community” (cf. Daddow, 2006: 66 and George, 1990: Title). The founding states of the EU, especially France and Germany, have always been regarded as the driving forces of European integration, whereas the UK is widely and well-known as Eurosceptic nation and its people as rather more inimical than in other countries (cf. Grant, 2008: 1). However, the contrary could be argued as more likely, where a Germany-France dominated Europe bears reason for the British dislike (cf. Grant, 2008: 7). A frequently criticised issue on EU level from the side of the British is the argument that the Council of Europe was initially founded to prevent exactly that, a Franco-German dominated Europe (cf. Nigel Farage, 2011: Video 2).

Within the last five years since the crisis, topics like populism and Euroscepticism have been brought back on the European political table and ask for active public debate rather than being put on the backburner. Especially now in times of the Euro crisis, instability and occasional ‘upheavals’, the developments and movements within Europe in that respect are omnipresent and more topical than ever. Doubts about the European project are raised, nationalism and Eurosceptic voices are re-emerging,
calling for a ‘worthy’ end of this European construction and a regain of supremacy of the European nation states. Farage’s way of dealing with and discussing these issues in the European Parliament (EP) and with the news is highly controversial, partly amusing, but in any case attention-grapping.

Farage can be seen not only as a representative, but also as the epitome of British Euroscepticism. He polarises his audience with provocative statements about an ‘undemocratic’ EU and its ruling class, especially José Barroso and Herman van Rompuy, who are sitting ducks to his reproaches, since they have not been directly voted for by the European people. Farage serves as an interesting individual to examination, since he represents a sceptical antipole to Europhile politics, thus, can be seen as a stimulus within the EP. What came to my mind when listening to his speeches was a wondering how Farage manages to convince people with his populist tirades, who and what his main targets are and how he sells his arguments through, often impudent, remarks. Especially negative sentiments about the EU are seized by him and implemented into his string of Eurosceptic and populist arguments. So far, no examination of Farage’s interviews, speeches and rhetoric tools has been done, especially against the backdrop of Euroscepticism and populism. Resulting from these reflections, I have established the following research questions.

**Which populist rhetoric tools does he avail himself of in order to bring his Eurosceptic message across? Why is he using them?**

**Who are (the people) and what are (the institutions) his main targets of Eurosceptic criticism?**

**1.2. Outline**

**Structure**

The paper starts off with a general introduction to the thesis, lay open the motivation and limitation of it, as well as presenting the ‘protagonist’, Nigel Farage. The choice of method, quantitative and qualitative content analysis, is explained and justified against the backdrop of the theoretical framework of populism, populist rhetoric and
Euroscepticism, which are presented in the following chapters. Furthermore, the encompassing analysis follows suit, before a concluding chapter rounds this thesis off.

**Limitation**

The phenomena of Euroscepticism and populism have been subject to numerous research projects and academic scrutiny. There are vast amounts of angles and perspectives from which they can be examined, offering highly intriguing approaches to the topics. Since it is impossible to shed sufficient light on the whole range of Euroscepticism and populism when looking at Farage’s speeches within this thesis, the relevant aspects of both are included only. The conspicuousness of his presence, his political speeches and his Eurosceptic standpoints offer a range of perspectives to be examined. A purely linguistic analysis of his language, his usage of words and concepts would be a highly intriguing topic in terms of Eurosceptic right-wing populism at work. Simultaneously, his qualities as a charismatic populist leader of the allegedly single-issue party UKIP would offer enough material to write another thesis as well. Lastly, looking at Farage and his standpoints from perspectives other than political science would be an interesting approach. Yet, I decided to examine a combination of his populist linguistic tools and an interpretation of his ‘verbal actions’ against his political enemies as the most suitable approach to answer my research questions. Herein, I shed light on his rhetoric tools and provide an interpretation of them and his messages only, as a unilateral means of communication. An examination about the impact of these tools on his audience, as a bilateral cause-and-effect study would also be highly intriguing. Additionally, what could have been interesting to consider is an autobiographical book with the title “Fighting Bull”, which has been published by Farage, laying out his political life and the early stages of UKIP. It would have offered substantial insights into his strategies of ‘constructing’ a populist message by taking his side of the story, as well as his background and his own depictions into account. He explains his reasoning for entering politics “as an extension of my own annoyance and resentment at having inherited freedoms infringed by power-crazed idiots spouting gibberish” (Farage, 2010: Description: BD). However, for objectivity reasons, this thesis will not include it as a source.
Source Description

The chosen videos are primary sources and were chosen according to their relevance to the topic of the thesis, Farage’s speeches in the EP and some of his interviews. It should be pointed out that it is ‘merely’ Farage’s verbal production, in form of speeches and interviews on textual level, which are being examined. The tone of his voice, his gestures, the surrounding and anything visual in these videos is not taken into consideration. The videos are from a time-span of about two years, 2010-2012, in order to achieve more recent and up-to-date results. The only exception is one video, dating from 2008, which was included for logical and argumentative reasons. The video-‘uploads’ are from official sources such as the EP or UKIP and are checked by them before their publication various times for representational reasons. Thus, the ‘uploaders’ of these videos are reliable sources, since they publish original speeches of Farage given in the EP or sequences of interviews with various news-channels, such as Russia Today or Sky News. All twenty-nine videos are available from the aforementioned sources, but due to an improved sound quality, for reasons of additional replies from politicians/ interviewers and an encompassing context understanding, some versions are preferred from other ‘uploaders’. Consequently, they are all treated as primary sources. The length of all videos varies between two and twenty minutes.

The secondary sources are mainly articles published in political journals and a few books dealing with the topics Euroscepticism and Populism laid open in the theoretical frameworks and were chosen according to their relevance. My intention here was to include the most well-known sources, the fairly recent ones and a decent variety of them.

1.3. Who is Nigel Farage?

Nigel Farage is a 46-year-old British politician, leader of the UKIP and a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for the South East of England. He is a former member of the Tories, the British Conservative Party, which he left in 1992 after they had signed the Maastricht Treaty and then went on to co-found the UKIP in September 1993. Having not been overly politically successful on domestic soil,
Farage gained a seat in the EP Election in 1999, for which he got re-elected twice. Shortly after the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 and also in 2009, just before the Treaty of Lisbon became effective later that year. Farage became the leader of the UKIP in September 2006, which culminated in a great success for the party during the 2009 EP Elections. UKIP could count the second highest share of votes for the European elections for themselves in Britain, ‘abandoning’ Gordon Brown’s Labour Party and Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats by outnumbering them by over 2 million votes (cf. Video 14, 2012). He stepped down as the party’s leader in late 2009 in order to pursue a career as a Member of Parliament (MP) in Westminster, only to re-emerge as their conspicuous head again in November 2010. Farage is also one of the twelve-UKIP members in the EP and the co-president/ co-chair of the Eurosceptic group *Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD Group)*, which was formed after the EP elections in 2009. Beside nine Italian *Lega Nord* representatives, ten of his fellow-UKIP MEPs are also members, making them the largest political party in this group (cf. UKIP, 2012).

With an adherence to populist right-wing politics, Farage has been described as “born to rant” and with a variety of verbal offences against several of his political enemies, he has found ways to be noticed (Farndale: 2010). Farage has created himself a notorious reputation for criticising European Council (EC) President Herman van Rompuys, carping about his ‘overly exaggerated’ salary as being more than U.S. president Obama’s and he pejoratively compared him to ‘a damp rag’ and a ‘low-class bank clerk’ (cf. Farndale 2010 and Video 3). Also, the EU Commission’s (ECM) President, José Barroso, has been subject to Farage’s rants quite a few times. Interestingly enough, however, he has been harshly criticised himself when it was revealed that “Farage {…} used EU allowances to finance his eurosceptic message” (Helm, 2009). This allowance had a worth of £2m of taxpayers’ money on top of his annual £64,000 MEP salary and he pumped it into the promotion of UKIP’s message that the UK should leave the EU (cf. Helm, 2009).

According to his ‘humble self’, Farage is “a firm believer in Independence for the United Kingdom” and also “a proponent of free speech” for what he has faced “considerable hostilities from his political opponents for speaking out in favour of free and fair referendums on the transfer of power from elected politicians to the EU”
(Farage, 2012). He states that “they {Barroso and van Rompuy} are trying to deal with me but only in terms of rhetoric, but not in substance” (Video 25&26, 2012). Farage seeks to battle bureaucracy in Europe and raises doubts against the Brussels authority, “such people presume to grant us rights where we can manage perfectly well with innate freedoms” (Farage, 2010: BD). The British politician sees himself as “a fascinating and controversial character” and, in the political sphere, as “a fun-loving iconoclast whose motto is to work hard and play harder” (Farage, 2010: BD). His speeches can be described as arousing attention, populist and highly straightforward, which not always follow the rules of diplomacy and respect. His audience ranges not only from the EP, to the ECM and other institutions, but also includes the electoral public, the media and the press.

### 2. Methodology

#### 2.1. Content Analysis

In order to gain understanding of the actual meaning and implementation of content analysis (CA) as a method for this thesis, it is advisable to accumulate and compare a wealth of definitions of it. Firstly mentioned in the 1940’s, this method has been termed according to the Webster dictionary as an “analysis of the manifest and latent content of a body of communicated material (as a book or film) through classification, tabulation, and evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning and probably effect” (Webster dictionary in Krippendorff, 2004: xvii). Naturally, throughout the decades, various new media have emerged, expanding the means or body of communicated material, such as internet, or platforms like youtube, twitter etc., that can be subject to examination, but the application of the method remains the same or at least alike. Krippendorff rightly suggests that “the phrase ‘or other meaningful matter’ is included in parentheses to indicate that in content analysis works of art, images, maps, sounds, signs, symbols {…} as data- that is, may be considered as texts – provided they speak to someone about phenomena outside of what can be sensed or observed” (Krippendorff, 2004: 19). In this respect, the wider definition of CA is important as it states that all forms of media can be involved and taken into consideration when analysing their contents. Thus, the examination of uploaded youtube videos, including interviews and speeches in a verbal form is clearly a part of content analysis. According to Neuendorf,
Content analysis is a summarising, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity, intersubjectivity, reliability, validity, generalisability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented. (2002: 10)

Herewith, it is essential to emphasise the unlimited types of variables and contexts that can be chosen and submitted to examination within CA. CA is regarded as research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative portrayal of the content of communication (cf. Berelson, 1952: 18 in Neuendorf, 2002: 10). When taking this definition into account, it is inevitable to scrutinise the exact meanings of objective, systematic and quantitative descriptions when used in CA (speeches, videos and interviews) and emphasise why exactly it is so important. General rules of any research method include that “techniques are expected to be reliable” and “scientific research must also yield valid results” in order to withstand careful independent analysis (Krippendorff, 2004: 18). The stating of ‘objective’ and ‘systematic’ is subordinated to the dual requirements of replicability and validity that need to be ensured by following pre-determined and -established explicit rules that are equally applied to all subjects of examination (cf. Krippendorff, 2004: 19).

Both, Berelson as well as Neuendorf describe CA to be a quantitative research method. However, a combination of both, quantitative analysis (QCA) and qualitative content analysis (QLCA), appears to be an adequate choice of method for this thesis, since it considers the overall picture in its entirety. The traditional QCA allows for classifying my primary sources by establishing specific categories that provide numerical results, whereas QLCA enables to go beyond linguistic approaches of “merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts to examine meanings” (Zhang&Wildemuth, 2009: 1). It offers me to conduct a content interpretation through a systematic categorisation process, which helps me identify certain themes or patterns (cf. Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1278). In this manner, QLCA serves as an expansion of the traditional QCA by incorporating the identification of categories as well as their interpretation according to significant themes (cf. Zhang&Wildemuth, 2009: 11). Thus, the choice of method eventuates in a combination of both.
The term scepticism itself means ‘doubting knowledge’ and the famous philosopher Montaigne “{…} believed that there is no general truth about which certainty is possible and concluded that we can claim certainty about nothing” (Toulmin, 1990: 42). This means that his philosophy would deny universal truth in any field. Moreover, it aims at justifying scepticism as something natural and limitless, since even general facts, theories and policies cannot be treated as real. So a healthy amount of scepticism towards ‘facts’ is adequate when using CA as a method.

It is important to acknowledge “the contribution that analysts make to what counts as content” (Krippendorff, 2004: 21). As a CA analyst, I should not only understand, but be aware of my own social conditioning that plays into the matter as well. It is inevitable to mention that certainly my background, education, perceptions and knowledge form a basis from which the interpretational analysis is done and influenced. This means that a certain amount of subjectivity cannot be avoided. Just as Krippendorff depicts in one chapter, “a problem-driven analysis derives from epistemic questions, from a desire to know something currently inaccessible” and the content analysts’ strong conviction that the strategic examination of potentially significant texts/videos could provide answers (Krippendorff, 2004: 342-343).

Five different categories have been established according to which the videos are examined. This corresponds to the aforementioned definitions of QCA and serves as a solid basis for the following QLCA and the interpretation of the findings according to the predefined theoretical framework of Euroscepticism and Populism / populist tools. The categories are:

1. Key words & their Repetitions
2. Metaphors & Illustrations
3. Colloquialisms & Offences
4. Usage of Pronouns
5. Patterns of Identification & Solidarity

For the quantitative analysis, Farage’s tendency of using certain rhetorical tools in the analysed material, supports and justifies the choice of the aforementioned categories. Furthermore, the theoretical framework on populism shows all these categories to be typical or common for populist rhetoric. In all categories, a counting method was applied, whose results are presented in the first part of the analysis chapter. Exact numeral listing for every video can be found in the annex.
For the first category, I decided upon seven key words that Farage re-uses throughout both, speeches and interviews. Since Farage speaks in a highly vivid and figurative language, which has myriad effects, the second category of metaphors and illustrations has been chosen. This ‘tactics’ is described shortly and their effect is interpreted. Furthermore, his speeches and interviews are riddled with numerous colloquialisms and often even offences towards his political opponents, justifying the establishment of the third category. Additionally, his tremendous use of personal pronouns is remarkable and offers vast amounts of possible interpretation from various angles. Lastly, his frequent attempts to identify himself with and to show solidarity for ‘the common people’ of Europe are striking and fairly common for populist leaders. Thus, the fifth category was established and can be compared to the four attributes of populist reasoning, finding traces of a “victimisation and redemption” in which ‘the people’ are presented as the unjustly scapegoats bearing the consequences of the political elite’s false decisions (Lee, 2006: 363). This will be done in the second half of the first analysis chapter.

2.2. The Opportunities and Limitations of CA

There is a range of advantages and disadvantages when having to choose and apply a research method and finding the allegedly most suitable one can be a challenge.

Opportunities

One of the most important advantages is that it examines the information straight from the horse’s mouth and allows for quantitative as well as qualitative approaches. When analysing Farage’s speeches, this seems to be a suitable combination, since investigating the frequency of his usage of certain words and linguistic tools is as crucial as their later interpretation. Furthermore, through the opportunity of CA to create arbitrary categories, allows scrutinising a matter from various perspectives, in this case from a partly linguistic, partly political science one. The possibility to examine written or spoken interactions by means of interpretations also offers to include the usage of language. A mixture of a quantitative and qualitative CA, based on ‘hard facts’ over discourse analysis (DA) as a potential method of choice for this thesis, seems more adequate, since “discourse analysts do not view analysis in terms
of or as equivalent to categorization” and they are fairly sceptical towards a preliminary categorization of the source, without knowing if the use of this category is justified (cf. Palmquist, 1980; Wood & Kroger, 2000: 32; cf. Schegloff, 1993). The option of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) for this thesis was also considered as an option since it “aims to provide accounts of the production, internal structure, and overall organization of texts” by having an “overtly political agenda” and by bringing in highly critical dimensions (Kress, 1990). However, since aforementioned categories are deemed as crucial, this mixture of CA was chosen over that of CDA.

**Limitations**

The most obvious disadvantage is that it is immensely time-consuming to count myriad words in twenty-nine videos. When a relational analysis is done to achieve a higher level of interpretation, it is also prone to lose its exactness by attempting too freely to extract significant inferences from the source. Another risk of this method is to choose categories too subjectively. In other words, there is an existing ‘danger’ that the inferences drawn from Farage’s speeches are too liberally and slightly inaccurately done in the analysis. However, the awareness of these risks shall omit the chance of committing grave errors and the distortion of results.

**3. Theoretical Framework**

In order to establish a clear theoretical framework of populism, populist parties, right-wing populism, its application and its rhetoric tools, a versatile range of definitions is given. Herewith, the main aim is to lay the first half of a fundamental theoretical foundation for the later following analysis of Farage’s speeches. The general populist and right-wing populist characteristics are outlined here and UKIP’s specific traits of them, for structural reasons will be examined within the Euroscepticism chapter.

**3.1. Populism – An Attempt to Define**

Populism in Western Europe is by no means a new phenomenon and has existed for as long as there has been politics. The term itself can be defined from different standpoints, which means that populism “has precise meanings in a number of specialist discourses, but attempts at a general theory have been problematic”
(Canovan, 1999: 3). Bearing this in mind, there is agreement on the fact that populism as a term “lacks consensus on core definitions and ideological characteristics” (Rydgren, 2007: 242). ‘General populism’ and its ideology embody the idea of objecting the remarkable gap between the ‘common people’ and ‘the elites’ and seek to prevent an increased class-divided society and the social, political and economic exclusion of particular marginalized ‘outsider groups’. Essentially, populism describes a political concept applied by ‘the common people’ or their political representatives that implements the population’s emotions, fears, and prejudices as a tool to pursue their own aims (cf. Bauer, 2011: 6). Thereby, political discussions, issues and problems are presented on a simplified, ‘down-to-earth’ platter making the complex relations seem not only ‘black & white’, but also surprisingly easy (cf. Bauer, 2011: 6f). Canovan describes populism as the following phenomenon:

Populism, understood as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values, should not be dismissed as a pathological form of politics of no interest to the political theorist, for its democratic pretentions raise important issues (1999: 2).

She warns of running the risk of merely dismissing populism as an anti-political, peripheral matter and indicates its strong democratic ambitions to put emphasis on contemporary political nuisances. Also, Laclau remarks that “populism is the royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political as such”, meaning that the comprehension of populism phenomenon leads to a better understanding of political operations per se (2005: 67). According to him, “the political operation par excellence is always going to be the construction of a ‘people’”, so in a way all politics is populist to some extent, obviously, some more than others (2005: 153ff.). Mudde encapsulates his definition of populism in reference to the ‘people’ and its antagonistic ‘other’, which offers an interesting, but also limited insight:

“Populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” (2004: 543)

Moreover, The Social Science Dictionary has defined populism as a political movement that seeks the “redistribution of political power, economic dominance and cultural leadership {…} in favor of empowering ‘the common people’” because they
are described to lead a simpler and more honourable life which is founded on traditional values and customs (SSD, 2008). Correspondingly, Fenneman notes that “‘the common man is basically good and his opinions are always sound’” and M.H. Williams agrees with that by saying that the “populist strategy pays attention to the demands of the public because elites of government prove incapable of responding to them” (Fennema, 2005 cited in Williams, 2010: 115). Williams emphasises that “Fennema largely concurs, characterizing populism as a political strategy whereby the state and its governmental elites are considered ‘technically incompetent and morally corrupt’” (Williams, 2010: 115). Populists regard the policy-making as being done almost merely according to the ‘elitist theory of politics’ and strongly object it as being entirely illegitimate (cf. SSD; 2008). Additionally, Canovan states that a wide range of populists favour ‘direct democracy’, which incorporates “political decision making by referendum and popular initiative” (1999: 2). Krouwel & Abts are linking political discontent with populism and argue that populism is not merely a response to decreasing political trust, but that populists mobilise, generate and generalise sentiments of political discontent (cf. 2007: 253).

Lastly, an essential feature of populism and populist parties is the existence of a charismatic leader. Ideally, it is an individual with the abilities for a stringent leadership, with a capturing, charismatic ‘aura’, who personifies the interests of the nation and “embodies the popular will in his or her persona” (cf. Canovan, 1999: 5; Hellström, 2012: 9). According to Hellström, populism as style refers to the personalization of politics, an emphasis on charismatic leadership and also the medialization of mainstream politics (cf. 2012: 9). Another argument is that populism substitutes the trust that was formerly put in the system with now personal trust in the charismatic populist leader instead (cf. Offe, 1999: 3; cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 253). Deiwiks states that “if political institutions like parties can be portrayed as impediments to direct, popular sovereignty, it is tempting to charismatic, populist leaders to try to exploit the purported gap between the ‘people’ and the mainstream political establishment” (2009: 5). Striking is the fact that it is often ‘only’ a single person who serves as a driving force of a populist movement, “due to the leader’s direct appeal to voters”, especially in right-wing populism (Deiwiks, 2009: 5). The leader’s clear positioning on the side of the ‘people’ and away from the ‘elites’ helps strengthening the ‘bonds’ between him and them, thus, avoiding to being perceived as
a “self-serving racket perpetuated by professional politicians” (Canovan, 1999: 6). One reason why populism is often labelled with a negative connotation is that complex political concerns such as (un-) employment, health or economic prosperity are not likely to have simple solutions and populists tend to oversimplify problems (cf. Deiwik, 2009: 5).

3.1.1. Populist Parties

The re-emergence of European populism can be regarded as a “symptom of problems as it is a problem itself” and may well be taken as an indicator to reflect the upcoming negative sentiment on the contemporary European political stage (Jones, 2007: 44). Various scholars have attempted to categorise and define European populist parties throughout the years, but naturally, there are no common categories that unconditionally apply to all parties (cf. Williams, 2010: 112). Undoubtedly, several populist parties across Europe share the aforementioned common features, characteristics and beliefs, regardless if left- or right-wing, however, one cannot possibly colour all of them with the same brush. Yet, Jones’s argues that his findings about populism reveal that “what European populists have in common is a rejection of the cartel-like power of entrenched political elites” (2007: 38). A party’s opposition to immigration has often been associated with a populist position since public apprehensions concerning immigration have been prevalent on the Western European political stage and mainstream parties have not brought forward a satisfying solution (cf. Williams, 2010: 122). Claiming to speak in the name of democracy, populists and populist parties regard themselves as the only authentic carriers and representatives of democracy that bring forward ‘the real people’s’ interests, wishes and ideas – “their professed aim is to cash in democracy’s promise of power to the people” (Canovan, 1999: 2). Another clear description of populist parties contains the parties’ generally oppositional trait and their notion of themselves as stemming from its objection of mainstream governments as well as institutional players and highlights their ability to consequently modify their political stances on a regular basis (cf. Williams, 2010: 115). In this respect, an interesting discussion can be triggered by examining suitable examples, where a populist party, or parties, have amended their message, stance and agenda over time in order to preserve this oppositional character. Deriving from there, Williams gauges that “populism is reactionary and
instrumentalist in nature” and that it respectively and almost automatically adjusts to its current context (2010: 116). The populists in established democracies assert to be voicing the will of the “silent majority of ordinary people whose interests and opinions are regularly overridden by arrogant elites, corrupt politicians and strident minorities” and often ‘verbally assail’ them for their dominating position in governance (Canovan, 1999: 5).

Noteworthy is the fact that the credibility of populist parties often impairs when in government, yet, maintain a decent position in minority governments – ‘power without responsibility’ (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19). However, one might also take Jones’s suggestion into account that it is not parties, which are populist, but people and that European populism is rather opportunistic than ideological (cf. 2007, 37). Ideally, this refers not only to the typical populist-charismatic party leader embodying a ‘peacock presence’, but also to the versatility of populist parties to easily adjust to the current political circumstances rather than following ideological principals.

3.1.2. Right-wing Populism

When looking at right-wing populism and their political strategies more specifically, one notices that it upholds this ‘vertical elite dichotomy’, however, avails itself to an additional scope of actions. It can be described as ‘nourishing’ an almost antidemocratic ideology that derives its legitimisation on the basic principle of social inequalities due to racial and ethnical differences (cf. Boettcher, 2011: 2). Zaslove argues that right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) commonly assert that “they are saving democracy from the elite and corrupt politicians” and, thus, going from there, “attract voters who are disenchanted with the bureaucratic state, the welfare state, parliamentary democracy, and the catch-all political party” (2004: 64). On the horizontal level, right-wing populism facilitates the objection of certain marginalised groups in society, whereas radical right-wing populism is more extreme and enforces their exclusion (cf. Bauer, 2010: 9f). In terms of telling the difference, RWPPs can be easily differentiated from established parties as well as right-wing extremist parties by their essential assent of the existing system and, above all, right-wing populism proclaims its doubts about a coalescing Europe (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19). RWPPs back up the slogan ‘Europe yes – EU no!’ and frequently use prevalent notions within the
population against a Europe that is allegedly dominated by the EU at the expense of one’s own national identity (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19-20). RWPPs frequently avail themselves of arguments stating that “the integration project has been described as (and criticized for being) an elite project” and that it has actually become obvious in the past years that the gap between the citizens and EU governance is wider than expected and cannot be ignored (cf. Hooghe, 2003 in de Vreese, 2007: 281). They caution the ‘common people’ against a severe loss of national sovereignty to the supranational institutions in Brussels that are allegedly deprived of any form of vicinage to the citizens and democratic legitimisation (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19-20).

Amongst others, the opposed issues of both, radical and ‘mere’ right-wing populism, comprise immigration, foreign influences and values and supranational institutions, which endanger and threaten domestic politics. According to Williams, Farage’s UKIP party, for instance, has presented an agenda, which states to carry a nonracist and anti-immigrant message (cf. 2010: 113).

On a European scale, RWPPs object the European supranational institutions and with them the ‘un-elected bureaucrats’ in Brussels, who are often seen as the ‘bogey-man’ that pose a threat to domestic politics and European nation states (cf. Boettcher, 2011: 4). According to some ideas of right-wing populism, individualism should be neglected in favour of a collectively and ethnically homogenous community that flourishes under a totalitarian nation state (cf. Boettcher, 2011: 2 & cf. Bauer, 2010: 5). With the EU opening its borders for free movement and welcoming increased mobility of labour forces, along with a promotion of the EU’s motto ‘United in Diversity’, right-wing populist parties sharply criticise this behaviour and monger the fear of the national masses respectively towards a loss of national traditions, indigenous culture and identity. Taking this into consideration, Betz brands these RWPPs as being indeed populist due to their “unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment” and additionally because of “their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense” (1994: 3-4). The aims and ideas of RWPPs are based on the belief that the ‘genuine civil society’ has to unshackle itself from the bureaucratic state, the ‘incursion’ of immigrants and the establishment of a multicultural society (cf. Zaslove, 2004: 64).
There is an observable tendency among people to identify themselves through a distinction from others, often implementing nationalistic, xenophobic or racist notions (cf. Dülffer, 2007). Both, left- and right-wing populists share the characteristic of offering easy solutions to highly complex problems through a simplification of the matter (cf. Dülffer: 2007). Moreover, what is further criticised by European RWPPs is the feared loss of national sovereignty and values. They sense a severe threat to their national and nation state interests from the interdependence of European countries through economically integrated markets and political integration through the EU institutions (cf. Jones, 2007: 43). Due to this tight interdependence, they fear, no EU country is invulnerable from eruptions emanating from the others (cf. Jones, 2007: 43).

3.2. Populism as Rhetorical Strategy

Understanding populism as a rhetorical strategy is ideally done thematically instead of politically, i.e. depending on the context rather than the political positioning. Populism, often related to advanced left politics, is a strategy without a specific partisan affiliation, proving a argumentative basis for the whole political range, so it cannot merely be assigned to left-wing politics (cf. Jackson, 2011: 2). Hence, populist rhetoric is known by ‘the pattern of arguments’ rather than its political content, so it is regarded as an exemplary reply towards situations that are scarred by crisis (cf. Rohler, 1999: 316). Interestingly enough, Jackson gauges this proposal and states that “populist rhetorics use populist reasoning”, meaning that they tend to apply some of the abovementioned typical populist characteristics (2011: 3). According to Lee, there are four attributes of populist reasoning that Jackson describes: “Populist rhetoric

1) invokes a virtuous people ‘portrayed as heroic defenders’ of time-honored values (358);
2) identifies this rhetorically constituted people against a rhetorically constituted enemy ‘hoarding power’ (359);
3) further compounds the enemy rhetoric by claiming to work against a ‘system’ (like government or the economy) once virtuous but now ‘sullied’ (360); and
4) expresses an ‘apocalyptic confrontation’ or a ‘mythic battle’ set in a political order on the verge of collapse (362).

Applying these four strategies to a European, right-wing populist political context, can be called a “narrative of victimization and redemption” in which the ‘common’ people are presented as the unjustly scapegoats who are bearing the consequences of the political elite’s false decisions (Lee, 2006: 363). To sum up, these attributes of populist reasoning can be illustrated as demonising oppositional and antagonistic positions to their populist notions - anything bucking their political stances.

However, Jackson also remarks that populism and populist rhetoric have lately been “articulating more a mood than a specific political ideology” (2011: 3). This phenomenon can be explained with the abovementioned argument of Williams that populist parties are reactionary and strongly tend to disagree with mainstream ones - thus, they trim their sails to the wind and adjust their ‘mood’ to the current political context respectively (cf. Williams, 2010: 116). While being applied and practiced, one needs to consider the option that “populist rhetoric merely enables while pretending to empower” populist parties and ‘common people’ (The Economist Blog, 2008). It also looms large that strategic news about politics presented in form of populist rhetoric might fuel the public’s distrust in politicians and cynicism about politics in general and eventuates in a decrease of civil involvement and electoral participation (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 274). When analysing content, it has been shown that “with a higher level of strategic news reporting, news media exposure contributed to cynicism, while in the context of less strategic reporting, news media exposure yielded to a decrease in political cynicism” (de Vreese, 2007: 278). Deriving from the assumption that a politician in fact pursues to evoke exactly this cynicism in a specified audience against political enemies (such as rival parties or, on a European scale, the EU and its elites), this ‘method’ of populist rhetoric might prove to be invaluable. Naturally, the successful effect of this applied method and strategic news framing on Eurocynicism depends on their pervasiveness and political sophistication, so that particularly politically less-sophisticated people are swayed by populist rhetoric (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 274).

These rhetorics embrace a style that distinguishes itself by a rather black and white language. It dramatises the prevalent political circumstances by making distinctions in an exaggerated form, such as us vs. them, winning and losing, good and bad and does so by emphasising its universal absoluteness (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 274). The often
used dramatisation of content and the repetition of phrases being used in populist rhetoric further sells ideas as being ultimate truths and should be taken into consideration during analysis (cf. Jones, 1999: 39).

3.3. Euroscepticism and Its Many Faces

The following chapters have the purpose of defining Euroscepticism and then narrowing it down to its relevant subgroups. An encompassing approach towards Euroscepticism is of great importance, so it is looked at from various perspectives and forms the second half of the theoretical framework of this thesis.

3.3.1. General Euroscepticism

The phenomenon of Euroscepticism is by no means a new one and it is not surprising to learn that “its origins lie in traditionally Eurosceptical Great Britain, where it entered into political and journalistic jargon in the middle of the 1980’s” (Hartleb, 2011: 10). Generally, Eurosceptics criticise the EU as an endangerment of the nation state’s sovereignty and fear the substitution of their national laws by supranational ones. Its occurrence can be observed not only in the economic and political arena, but also in the cultural and environmental field, so Euroscepticism is a multilayered phenomenon. Euroscepticism respectively evolves out of a general, adverse attitude towards a neoliberal economic system, a supranational institution that weakens the scope of action of the individual nation states, the homogenisation of the European cultural diversity and the EU as a slowdown when it comes to the implementation of sustainable environmental reforms. Although the EU’s motto is “United in Diversity” and several policies aim at preserving the variety of cultures and traditions in Europe, Eurosceptics indicate a distinct loss of exactly this diversity and predict an inevitable homogenisation among the European cultures.

During the late 1990’s, Taggart depicts the term Euroscepticism as expressing “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”, ensuing from the side of Eurosceptic parties (1997: 4). In the last two decades, the term Euroscepticism has been typified as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ in Western European party systems by the Paul Taggart and de Vreese also confirms a rise in support for Eurosceptic parties
across Europe (cf. Taggart, 1998; cf. de Vreese, 2007: 271). Looking at the political European landscape, Euroscepticism has been found to mostly emerge from the fringes of party systems and from a variety of parties (cf. Taggart, 1997: 3). Leconte proposes that political Euroscepticism should be seen a fundamental objection or defiance against the establishment of a supranational institutional system, the following devolution of powers to these institutions beyond a certain amount of policies (single-market, competition policy) and the idea of unifying sovereignties (cf. 2010: 50). Lubbers and Scheele argue that only few countries have offered referenda over the exact policies that should be settled on European level – so most likely the legitimization of the EU eventually stands or falls according to the number of support from the European populace regarding decision-making on a supranational scale (cf. 2005: 225).

In the field of politics, the movement of Euroscepticism has emerged and made an appearance in almost all European countries. Trenz & de Wilde are providing a working definition of “Euroscepticism as a discursive practice of political opposition to the EU-polity”, which criticises the competencies, the institutional and almost constitutional character of the EU polity (2009: 3-4). Political actors, who reactively object the validity of the EU polity and who reject any increase in their power and responsibility in the political sphere of influence, apply this discursive practice (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 4). Additionally, Euroscepticism can defy the ‘absolute’ integrity of political actors and institutions by impeaching the behaviour of European elites and even demanding their substitutions (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 5). Criticism of or conflicts with single politicians should by no means be regarded as polity contestation, yet, a critique of a complete political elite should be indeed, though (cf. Hurrelmann et al. 2009 in Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 5). With the help of Euroscepticism and populist rhetoric, political actors manage to seize events, for instance a referendum, as so-called ‘windows of hope’ to come to the fore with long-known problems and their potential solutions (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 7).

In order to secure the successful public attention, “mediatisation and dramatization need to be understood as an essential element of Euroscepticism” and the performer’s Eurosceptic narratives dramatically emphasise the ‘danger’ of specific European nuisances (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11). Applying the commonly tried and tested
strategies of Said’s 1978 book “Orientalism”, namely ‘the other’ and ‘us vs. them’, “these narratives are typically constructed around the distinction between enemy and foe, between true friends and false friends, between assumed perpetrators and real perpetrators that dramatize the stories, make them publicly salient and provoke societal resonance” (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11). Definitions also include a distinction between Euroscepticism as a general mood and as an element of a particular political and ideological presentation given by certain parties (Hartleb, 2011: 7).

Euroscepticism and Political Discontent
Krouwel & Abts argue that the common label if Euroscepticism contains doubting, cynical and rejecting attitudes and that Eurosceptics may greatly vary in their exact arguments for opposing Europe (cf. 2007, 255-256). As so-called targets of political discontent, European authorities, the regime and the community have been mentioned (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 256). The first mentioned source of discontent is the European authorities, the ones that are ‘calling the shots’. The term refers to various politicians as part of the political class and the performance of certain leaders within the EU and their respective integrity, legitimisation and driving forces (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 256). These ‘virtues’ and whether their commitment and motivation is driven by public interest are meticulously scrutinised from the side of Eurosceptics. Emerging questions such as

“Are actors reliable in terms of keeping their promise?
Are they predictable and consistent in their behaviour?”

are not rarely asked, especially in the EP (Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). For instance, van Rompuy as the EC president and Barroso as the ECM president are occasionally subject to sharp criticism concerning their accountability from Euroseptic actors and parties. When discussing the competences of political actors, their support is dependent on their capabilities of being efficient, transparent and reliable in delivering the policies and regulations expected by the citizens (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). The second target is the political regime, which encompasses the EU institutions. Herein, the citizens’ and Eurosceptic parties’ political discontent may derive from a pilloried lack of fairness and equity in the institutions and their disability to be responsive to their needs (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). The institutions’ responsiveness towards citizens’ needs and interests is of utmost
importance for a successfully functioning EU, since a lack or even failure of it seems to only play into the hands of Eurosceptic populist parties and their leaders, claiming to represent the ‘common people’. However, whether the European citizen’s needs can be generalised at all, is a different question.

**Hard and Soft Euroscepticism**

When further specifying Euroscepticism, it is of prime importance to differentiate the term between what Taggart and Szczerbiak have coined as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. “Hard Euroscepticism” illustrates the firm and categorical rejection of a country’s membership in the EU as well as the objection of the EU in its sheer existence as a supranational institution. “Soft Euroscepticism” bolsters the EU’s existence in its current shape as a political institutions and favours the country’s membership, however, strongly disagrees with certain EU policies, fearing situations when national interests are conflictive with them (2002: 7). Thus, UKIP is a hard Eurosceptic party.

**3.3.2. Patterns of Euroscepticism**

In the attempt to specify right-wing Euroscepticism, it is crucial not to pigeonhole it automatically as a general right-wing attitude. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that characteristically right-wing extremist or new right-wing populist amalgamations will lean towards Euroscepticism, arguing for a ‘preservation of the nation state (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 10). It is crucial to carve out that Euroscepticism is a highly far-reaching term, encompassing the whole range of positions when it comes to political meaning, and, thus, cannot be assigned to merely a left- or right wing political camp. When looking at right-wing Eurosceptic parties and their ideology, one finds that instead of mitigating the political objection towards merely one ‘scapegoat’, they tend to “project their nationalism and their anti-immigration stance on to the EU” (Leconte, 2010: 109). Additionally, the new sphere of party politics is often seen in the future of emerging populist right parties, who successfully take up the worries of the ‘losers’ to accelerate the current alteration of the Western European party systems, when understanding Euroscepticism as an ideology (cf. Stratham, 2008: 11; cf. Kriesi, 2005: 5). The rise of Euroscepticism in Europe can also be ascribed to an overall increased general discontent that is expressed by right-wing
populist entrepreneurs, claiming to speak in the name of the ‘common people’ (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 253).

3.4. British Euroscepticism

3.4.1. Political Euroscepticism:

In the case of the UK, Euroscepticism is born out of an objective position towards a supranational institution that neglects and thus, weakens the scope of action of the country as a nation state. Here, justified apprehension about the undermining of the power of national parliaments and less legitimate critique of the unelected EU institutions (ECM and European Central Bank (ECB)) is proclaimed and the Eurosceptic jargon is riddled with words like ‘unelected bureaucracy’, ‘European super-state’ and ‘Brussels dictatorship’ (cf. Teubert 2001; cf. Leconte, 2010: 55). The idea of an existing ‘democratic deficit’ on a European level has been coined by a pro-European British author called Marquand in 1979, who worried about an emerging ‘democratic deficit’ originating from a lack of accountability in EU decision-making (cf. Leconte, 2010: 54).

Ever since then, the word ‘democratic deficit’ has found its way not only onto the British political stage, but also into the usage of European Eurosceptic parties and their policies. The alleged lack of this ‘democratic deficit’ is upheld by not only by European, but particularly by British Eurosceptics when arguing “against the widening and deepening of the EU in terms of level and scope” and, above all, “against the powers of supranational institutions and/ or against a further transfer of sovereignty” (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 3).

From a Eurosceptic party perspective, the UK’s membership in the EU is frequently compared to other international organizations (such as the Commonwealth, NATO etc.). Eurosceptics put emphasis on the claim that with its reduction to merely “a province of a European superstate”, the EU would “doom the UK to a parochialism alien to British tradition” (Teubert, 2001: 73 & Leconte, 2010: 89). The type of Euroscepticism prevalent in the UK can also be called “instrumental Euroscepticism”,

Democratic Deficit: “The idea behind the notion of a ‘democratic deficit’ is that decisions in the EU are in some ways insufficiently representative of, or accountable to, the nations and peoples of Europe” (Lord, 2001: 165).
meaning that people are doubting the direct benefits, deriving from the EU, on their domestic soil (Lubber & Schepers, 2005: 227). Moreover, it has been mentioned that the more citizens disagree with their national governments and domestic institutions, the more they tend to be reluctant to support EU integration (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 253 & cf. McLaren, 2002, 2005).

Furthermore, as commonly known, Britain has not joined the Euro and the Schengen Agreement and avoided the expansion of qualified majority voting concerning areas like tax, foreign policy and defence and their prevalent national attitude towards these issues is not likely to change (cf. Grant, 2008: 1). De Vreese rightly argues that in Britain Euroscepticism is nurtured by a general decline of trust in authorities and institutions used by political Eurosceptic entrepreneurs to further deliver their message (cf. Nye et al., 1997; cf. Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004; cf. Koruwel & Abts, 2007 in de Vreese, 2007: 272).

3.4.2. Economic Euroscepticism

After the entrance into the European Community (EC) in 1973, the era of the iron lady Margaret Thatcher and her conservative government began. She strongly objected Brussels’ supranational ‘top-down’ influence as well as Britain’s membership in the European Monetary System and would have liked to see the UK’s political relations with Europe limited to free trade and efficient competition. Also, the UK’s national decision not to join the Eurozone in 2002 under former Premier Gordon Brown, fits into the picture of Eurosceptic Britain. Therefore, their refusal to join the Eurozone and their reluctance of accepting a top-down monetary union on EU level has been noticeable in the 1980’s as it is today.

During the recent Euro crisis and the heated debates about potential changes in the Lisbon Treaty in December 2011 to save the Eurozone, the UK’s objective position towards the tax and budget pact in order to combat this European debt crisis became most evident, as it opted out as the only one of twenty-seven Member States. The respective changes would not allow ‘the City’\(^2\) to give the newly introduced

\(^2\) The City: The term ‘the City’ is a short-form for the financial district of London. Definition Free Merriam- Webster Dictionary.
amendments on financial services a miss and, thus, would not reflect Britain’s interests (cf. BBC: 2011). Since the UK has been hit enormously by the crisis, its main national aim is to protect ‘the City’s’ processes to run smoothly through domestic politics without any regulations or limitations from Brussels for the ‘mere’ sake of saving the EU’s Eurozone. Farage has mentioned numerous times that the most suitable option for the UK would be leaving the EU and only taking part in economic trade relations. Nowadays, a tad more than half of the UK’s merchandise trade is done with the EU, but that does not seem to impress the Britons as they are convinced that would succeed and flourish globally anyway, independently from EU rules or regulations (cf. Grant, 2008: 2).

Due to open borders and an increased and flexible mobility within EU-Member States, the labour markets have become highly competitive on the European stage. Especially in the UK, employees personally experience the consequences in form of shrinking real wages and intensely increased labour forces from other European states (cf. Video 5, 2011). Yet, what does distinguish the British one from other EU countries’ economies “is not only the size of its financial sector, but also its openness to foreign investment, including takeovers by foreign firms” (Grant, 2008: 6). Here, one could question the allegedly justifiable criticism about floods of immigration into the country, if there is no national regulation to avoid domestic job losses through foreign firm takeovers.

3.4.3. Cultural & Immigrational Euroscepticism

Potential reasons for Euroscepticism, observable in the British public, can be traced back to various roots. De Vreese mentions a wide range of reasons, such as fear of immigration and an animosity towards other cultures, but also fearing the loss of national identity (cf. 2007: 272). Particularly, when considering Eurosceptic notions and feelings of the ‘common people’, Kriesi pigeon-holes the potential way to success in the cultural and identity field by saying that “I expect the cultural aspects of the opening up of the borders to be more important for the mobilization of the ‘losers’ than the defence of their economic interests” (2005: 5). Here, the labelling ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ refers to those people either benefiting or suffering from the consequences of globalisation and de-nationalisation in politics (cf. Statham, 2008:...
11). Grant describes these ‘losers’ as tending to be from poorer backgrounds, obtained less education, fear an unknown future and generally travel less (cf. 2008: 5). In order to successfully criticise and denounce European-wide rather than national migration policies and the EU’s four freedoms as a threat not only to British citizens, but also to the preservation of their national traditions, the aforementioned mediatisation and dramatisation of political issues has frequently proven to be worthwhile (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11). The exaggeration of potential cultural and immigational threats looming from the EU to the UK, the fear-mongering among the national citizens against alleged floods of immigrants and the ‘good old’ scapegoating tactics to blame the EU and their elites are seized by and high up on the agenda of the British Eurosceptic party UKIP (cf. Video 5, 2011). It is suggested that the UK citizens’ anti-EU attitude derives from their strong desire to preserve national identity and deter threats to their cultural identity by promoting anti-immigrant sentiments (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 253). Since most of the British so-called “principle source of unskilled labour” derives from the newly-2004 and former communist EU-countries like Poland or Romania, their influx to Britain could possibly only be controlled by taking a new approach towards the European project in general (cf. Ford, 2012).

3.4.4. British Euroscepticism and the News

It is not in vain that the British media has been labelled one of the most ruthless ones in Europe since it “has a uniquely powerful and eurosceptic popular press” (Grant, 2008: 3). Particularly, when it comes to reporting about EU-related issues, it has made a name for itself by being overly critical towards anything coming or deriving from Brussels, regardless of the political stance. About thirty million people in the UK are said to read a daily newspaper, however, three quarters of these papers are drawn towards rather anti-EU standpoints (cf. Grant, 2008: 3). Interestingly enough, it has been found that frequently “exposure to strategically framed news about EU politics fuels Euro-cynicism”, so news reporting specifically tailored to the masses or targeted audiences will most likely show the desired effect (de Vreese, 2007: 274). Deriving from these facts, Grant is convinced that the British media’s and public’s dislike of Europe might actually trigger opposition from British ministers towards EU decisions, simply out of fearing their reaction (cf. 2008: 2).
According to the Flash Eurobarometer (FEB) 2011 analysis, measuring the attitudes towards the EU in the UK issued by the European Commission, about 82 per cent of the questioned participants stated they only “knew very little or almost nothing about the EU” (2011: 5). Above all, “respondents felt that EU reports on television, radio and, particularly, in the written press were too negative” and even “almost half (48%) perceived a negative bias in press reports” (FEB, 2011: 5). Public doubts, opposition and skepticism are nourished by frequently falsely presented facts about the EU and its processes and it does not really help that EU-reporting by serious journalists is tendentiously or even simply wrong (cf. Grant, 2008: 4). Conclusively, one can infer that the British media has the potential of fuelling and reducing Eurosceptic sentiments within the country (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 280).

### 3.5. UKIP - Euroscepticism as a Strategy

Rob Ford has outlined the existence of populist right-wing parties, their Eurosceptic core concerns and ideas as they are occurring in Britain as an agenda of four main points (cf. 2012).

1. “Ethnic nationalism” to protect national identity from ‘alien influences’.
2. “Authoritarianism to maintain social order and support the rule of established means of authority.
3. “Xenophobia” as emotional feeling of fear, triggered by the different or the unknown.
4. A form of “Populism” that turns away from mainstream politics and towards the ‘real’ interest of the common man.

According to him, Eurosceptic populists in Britain particularly emphasise the public’s frustration over repeated denials from both parties, Labour and the Conservatives, to offer a national referendum on Europe to the British citizens and their reluctance to take a severe revision of the relationship with the EU into mere consideration (cf. 2012). They argue against the British government parties and EU politics as an “elite-clique maintaining self-serving links” with “notorious spending and accounting habits” and describe Europe and particularly the EU as the root of all evil (Ford, 2012). British jobs and their cultural identity are described as being threatened by EU immigration, other faulted arguments include that EU’s judicial regulations are jeopardising British citizens’ safety by protecting the ‘enemy’, aka terrorists and
criminals and Britain’s sovereignty as being sacrificed for the sake of a ‘United States of Europe’ (cf. Ford, 2012).

When looking at British Euroscepticism in numbers, UKIP’s electoral success with 16.5 per cent in the 2009 EP elections is proof of it (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 37). The populist party seeks the UK’s exit from the EU and Taggart describes the UKIP as being “on the fringes of the party system” in Britain, having an agenda that is solely conditioned towards EU issues (1997: 8). UKIP has often been labelled a ‘single-issue’ party, which designates its raison d’être mostly from its opposition towards the EU. Their ‘style’ has been described as “populist politics of grievance”, with the aim of evoking the citizen’s suspicion of the EU and whose style surfs on the wave of general British fatigue towards the European project (cf. Mycock, 2012). As their leader, Farage has criticised the entire domestic political class (Conservatives, Labour and LibDems) as never having been more out of touch, by cutting domestic spending in favour of an increased EU-related one (cf. Barnett, 2010). In UKIP’s notion, Europe represents a foreign power that seeks to disregard the will of domestic voters and imposes alien values instead of fostering traditional ones (cf. Ford, 2012).

In this regard, Leconte’s finding that “parties of government tend to be Europhile, while protest-based parties tend to be Eurosceptic” should be taken into account (2010: 107). Arguably, Farage’s party can be seen as an epitome of a protest-based party on the national British as well as on the EU level. Since it has started off as this single-issue party favouring only the aim of Britain’s final withdrawal from the EU, it has furthered its agenda in order to be taken seriously on the political stage in Britain. Moreover, ‘contemporary’ UKIP calls for “allowing the relief of business from crushing regulation and the less well off from the burden of taxes, shutting off the flood of immigrants and freeing enterprise”, whereby the party clearly unites almost stereotypical Eurosceptic arguments in their ‘manifesto’ (UKIP – Official Website, 2011). The reasoning behind UKIP’s Eurosceptic standpoints, could be explained by considering Leconte’s idea that two broad types can be put forward to account for parties’ attitudes towards European integration: their strategies in relation to government, and their general ideology. Whereas the first type of factor explains party-based Euroscepticism as a result of strategic calculations, the second type of factor relates Euroscepticism to a party’s identity and Weltanschauung. (2010: 106).
Leconte’s insights into party-based Euroscepticism loom large when looking at UKIP. Here, it is inevitable to look at Euroscepticism as a strategy when it comes to government participation and political representation in this respect. She rightly states the assumption that “government participation is barely compatible with anti-EU positions or even strong Euroscepticism” (Leconte, 2010: 106ff.). So far, UKIP has never had a single seat in the House of Commons and, thus, has never played an active and crucial role in British national politics. However, the party has been represented in the European parliament for more than a decade (since 1999) and currently has 12 MEPs (cf. UKIP – Official Website, 2012). Seeing themselves as a protest-based party, favouring Britain’s withdrawal in order to “regain our self-governing democracy”, UKIP has no intention, let alone ‘obligation’ to moderate its Eurosceptic views (UKIP – OW, 2011). The term ‘democratic deficit’ coined by Marquand has nested itself in the official UKIP manifesto in form of arguments like restoring self government and democracy, abolishing unelected commissioners who dictate 75 per cent of British laws and finally providing the British people with a long-desired referendum on the EU membership (cf. UKIP – Official Website, 2011). As Leconte is arguing, for protest-based populist parties like UKIP, an anti-system approach towards the European project helps collecting those votes that generally oppose the domestic political mainstream establishment and therefore have to oppose the EU as well (cf. 2011: 107). Whether Euroscepticism as a strategy will actually be the key to success for UKIP in the long run, remains to be seen.

4. Analysis

First Part: Quantitative Results and Their Analysis

Farage’s Rhetoric Strategies

The initial part of the first analysis chapter deals with Farage’s form of rhetoric strategy in his language and carves out its most distinct Eurosceptic and populist features. His language has been ‘broken up’ into five categories established me in order to classify these features into comprehensive components. For the analysis of only one video, a qualitative approach would have been suitable and sufficient. However, in order to be able to draw representational conclusions, allowing meto make generalisations about Farage’s rhetoric tools, a quantitative examination of a
variety of videos is necessary. In other words, a quantitative analysis of the five established categories is inevitable to receive generally valid results and shows that Farage’s usage of them is not random, but indeed well intended and thought through as a systematic use of rhetorical figures in his speeches contributes to supporting his cause. The quantitative numbers serve as a justification for the established categories, examining Farage’s rhetorical tools.

Table – Categories

*Numbers in all twenty-nine videos:*

**Table 1.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Referendum</th>
<th>Bully-boys</th>
<th>Unlected</th>
<th>Economic prison</th>
<th>EU-Titanic</th>
<th>European Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaphors &amp; Illustrations</th>
<th>Colloquialisms &amp; Offences</th>
<th>Usage of Pronouns</th>
<th>Patterns of Identification &amp; Solidarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1. Farage’s Language

4.1.1. Key Words & Repetitions

Through a repetition of his virtually most crucial terms in a political context, Farage manages the successful implementation of the theory that “repeating certain phrases \{and words N.H.\} contributes towards making the ideas contained in them seem ‘common’ sense” (Jones & Wareing, 1999: 39). By emphasising these key words repeatedly, his speeches are equipped with a polemical ‘touch’, which serves the purpose of bolstering his political arguments. It could also well be called psychological political warfare.

---

3 For a detailed overview over the respective numbers in every video, please see attachments.
4 Democracy as the first key word should be understood as an umbrella term, as the counting of the word in the videos also encompasses the usage of its variations, such as democrat, democratic, undemocratic and anti-democratic.
Democracy:
Throughout the twenty-nine videos, the term democracy and its variations are mentioned seventy-seven times, which makes it the most frequently used one of the key words. In particular, Farage strongly argues for a ‘correct’ implementation of the concept of national democracy. According to him, this involves an adequate consideration of the EU nation states, their respective national democracies and referenda for all European citizens, giving them the chance to voice their opinion on supranational EU policy decisions (Video 29, 2011). In populist manner, Farage claims to speak in the name of democracy and attempts to “cash in democracy’s promise of power to the people” (Canovan, 1999: 2). Furthermore, by emphasising the importance and lack of democracy on EU level in his arguments, he presents himself as “saving democracy from the elite and corrupt politicians” (Zaslove, 2004: 64).

Referendum:
The word referendum is mentioned seventeen times and has an important role in Farage’s chain of arguments. By calling for popular referenda about all EU policies in the affected respective Member States, Farage mainly asks for the implementation of democracy by asking the people. Not only does he demand referenda about the EU membership in Britain, but also emphasises that the Irish said no to the Lisbon Treaty and that the Greek should be given a referendum on the question of the Eurozone membership (cf. Video 8, 2012, cf. Video 4, 2008; cf. Video 6, 2012). Therefore, he also fulfils Canovan’s argument that populists tend to favour ‘direct democracy’ that incorporates “political decision-making by referendum and popular initiative“ when he appeals for a consideration of the Irish, French, Greek, Dutch and British referendum for the sake of democracy (Canovan, 1999: 2; cf. Video 4, 2008; cf. Video 6, 2012). By constantly demanding referenda as a ‘window of hope’ out of the supranational EU and the lasting Eurozone crisis, the politician displays his form of Euroscepticism (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 7).

Bully-boys:
Although the exact phrase ‘Bully-boys’ is only used twice in all videos, similar expressions occur various times. This term is a derogatory description of the European elite ‘guys’ (Barroso and van Rompuy in particular) calling the shots in
Brussels by stigmatising them as merely ‘boys’, who are unreliable and do not keep their promises of growth and jobs for the EU (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257; cf. Video 16, 2012). Herewith, he spawns distrust in the political elite among the people by weakening their position and reputation, showing that he does not take them seriously. Through labelling Barroso and van Rompuy as “Bully-boys”, Farage regards them and their policy-making as a dominating “elitist theory of politics” and strongly objects it as entirely neglecting the ‘common’ European people (SSD, 2008). This, in turn, is considered a populist strategy (cf. Williams, 2010: 15).

Unelected:
The evoking of distrust and cynicism among the people, is also ignited by his usage of and emphasis on the word ‘unelected’ for eighteen times throughout the videos. By pointing out the EU’s and the political class’ lack of accountability and legitimacy, he piques the audiences’ feeling of wanting a saying in this European issue by appealing to their rights to do so (cf. Video 3, 2010; cf. Video 13, 2010; cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). Stigmatising the European elite as “unelected non-entities, Farage expresses his consideration of them as “technically incompetent and morally corrupt” – this is also characteristic for populist strategies (Video 17, 2011; cf. Fennema, 2005 cited in Williams, 2010: 115; Williams, 2010: 115).

Economic prison:
The highly illustrative metaphor of the Euro as an ‘economic prison’ is used seven times and serves to describe the Eurozone as an economic trap with high ‘regulative steel bars’ and a vanishing low chance of ‘escape’ for its Member States. By dramatising the political situation with disproportionate metaphors, Farage’s own arguments with the usage of fear-mongering against it might fall on sympathetic ears among his audience (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11).

EU-Titanic:
Similarly, the metaphor Euro-Titanic, used only thrice, also takes the same line as economic prison. With the mentioning of this word, history is being help up and the pointing towards the well-known end of the Titanic, the inevitable ending of the Eurozone towards ‘economic iceberg’, is being foreshadowed.
European project:
The phrase ‘European project’ is mentioned eighteen times and mainly used to describe the EU and its various policies, such as economic or political ones, and relates it to the pro-European political elite. Farage implements the phrase to depict the EU as their product, particularly that of Barroso and van Rompuy. He laments the fact that in order to preserve ‘their European project’, any controversial political decision in the name of pursuing the plan towards a ‘United States of Europe’ is justified.

4.1.2. Metaphors & Illustrations

With the counting of 103 metaphors throughout the videos, Farage’s language in his speeches and interviews is riddled with a high number of metaphors and illustrations. A selection of those is chosen to exemplify this chapter. Presenting political issues in an immensely vivid and lively language not only captures the audiences’ attention, but also curbs their imagination and helps depicting these often highly abstract and complex processes. With the help of metaphors as strategic populist rhetoric, Farage is able to ‘serve’ abstract political procedures in a simplified and comprehensive – not necessarily correct - manner particularly to “politically less-sophisticated individuals” (de Vreese, 2007: 274). The usage of metaphors arguably signifies a certain amount of creativity that he places within his language to make it more appealing. In Farage’s case the questions of persuasiveness and beguilement could be raised and whether in a political context a metaphorical language is more or less successful than literal one. What it certainly does, however, is evoking attention and stir agitation among his audience as is observable especially in Video 3 when he is comparing van Rompuy to a “damp rag” (2010). The politician colours his Eurosceptic political arguments with comparative metaphors of the EU being a big ship out in the “open Atlantic in a huge storm with massive waves” and its member countries falsely believing that being “all on the ship together, hoping to be somehow safer”, are awfully misled (Video 7, 2011). In Farage’s reality “the EU Titanic has now hit the iceberg” and has evolved into “an EU with the economic prison of the Euro” (Video 24, 2012). By using the metaphor of the EU-Titanic, he ignites the collective memory of the European peoples, as he puts the word onto the ‘table’ and leaves it to the audience to finish the thought about the well-known tragic ending of it. With the term ‘economic prison’,
Farage suggests that without breaking up the Eurozone or letting the weak Member States leave, the economic, political and human disaster in countries like Greece or Spain is inevitable (cf. Video 20, 2012).

Other comparative metaphors are used to harshly criticise the EU’s and van Rompuys’ claim that the Euro stands for a strategy and a “remedy to create growth and jobs and yet it is actively destroying both of those things”, so the “medicine is killing the patient” (Video 16, 2012). Farage calls the Eurozone an “economic prison” and, in his eyes, maintaining it and its instable currency would be “increasing the dosage” and thus be “madness” and “economic suicide for an entire continent” (Video 11, 2011; Video 16, 2012). By stigmatising the Euro as the actual ‘poison’ instead of the intentioned ‘medicine’, Farage predicts the ‘economic death’ for the patient Europe and its people. Also, with this metaphor, the Eurozone issue is illustrated and emphasises his oppositional attitude towards the Euro. Additionally, he compares a European commissioner’s staff, which was sent to Greece to monitor the financial processes as a condition to the bailout money, to a “Gauleiter”\(^5\) (Video 20, 2012). After being criticised for it, Farage justifies his metaphorical choice of word by saying that it was indeed “the UK’s biggest Sunday selling newspaper used that word”, which proves not only his Eurosceptic attitude, but also the British media’s strategically-framed Eurocynical and Eurosceptic news reporting (Video 28, 2012; cf. Grant, 2008: 3). Not only serve metaphors and illustrations like these the colouration of his arguments, but they also contribute to a linguistic-rhetoric dramatisation of the prevalent political circumstances. Farage’s picturesque dramatisation needs to be understood as what Trenz & de Wilde called “an essential element of Euroscepticism”, so the performer’s Eurosceptic narratives dramatically depict the danger of certain European nuisances (2009, 11). Especially the current political and economic precarious situations in Europe scarred by crisis, particularly with regard to the Euro, provide an excellent futile soil for his populist-metaphorical arguments. Dramatisations such as the Brit’s argument that by remaining within the Eurozone, “the country of Greece and its people are being put to the sword” and even “sacrificed at the European altar, all in the name of preserving the European project” successfully

---

\(^5\) Gauleiter: a) a district leader in Nazi Germany who served as a provincial governor; b) a subordinate official resembling a Nazi gauleiter in function or in autocratic manner. Definition: Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary.
tap into various niches at the same time (Video 6, 2012). First of all, it is a biblical / religious comparative metaphor, which evokes mixed feelings about people being tortured and sacrificed for potentially dubious reasons. Secondly, a highly complex and economically challenging situation is presented in an immensely simplified manner, which does not matter-of-factly do justice to or reflect the actual circumstances. Thirdly, the intentionally vivid exaggeration of these circumstances appeals to the audience’s feeling of collective responsibility and guilt towards the country and its people. Thus, Farage seeks to ‘awaken’ the audience and to arouse their urge for action by reminding his audience of the course of the latest European history. He states that “sixty years ago an iron curtain came down on Europe, but now with this commission there is an economic fist” (Video 18, 2010).

Lastly, Farage illustratively argues that he thought, “not even the EU could not sink to those depths” of demanding “diplomacy at gunpoint” from Greece and spreading “chaos, fear and anger” among the people (Video 20, 2012; Video 1, 2012). Yet, he is constantly stating that “the Euro is doomed” and “the sky will not fall in if Greece leaves the Eurozone” (Video 9, 2012; Video 16, 2012). Herewith, on the one hand his metaphorical language is used as fear-mongering, prudently anticipating the European peoples’ worries of a similar treatment (Video 1, 2012). On the other hand, he is de-escalating a potential Greece-Eurozone-withdrawal-situation by saying that there will be “a boom in tourism and investment” for this country (Video 16, 2012). In the long run, these dramatising metaphors and illustrations he uses may serve to prove and foster his point about the end of the Eurozone not meaning the end of the ‘Europe world’.

Interestingly enough, his metaphors are rather ‘technical’ instead of ‘nature-related’, which could be associated with Britain as the origin of industrialisation. What can be said conclusively about Farage’s usage of metaphors is that he seeks to demonstrate political processes descriptively and pique the ravages of time, the awareness of history and the lessons it taught among the audience.
4.1.3. Colloquialisms & Offences

Throughout his speeches and interviews, Farage’s language is characterised by 304 colloquialisms and offences towards political ‘enemies’ and antagonists. An informal and relatively simple choice of language ensures that not only the academic and politically versed people can understand, but also those with a less sophisticated background and political knowledge. This can be seen as a diffuser of his political content and message among the whole broad range of electoral audiences. With strategically framed news about political circumstances in form of populist rhetoric and informal expressions, he manages to fuel existing anti-sentiments and public distrust about the EU institutions and the political elites among his audience (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 274). By attempting to evoke cynicism and anger among his audience, he himself is rather cynical when throwing his offences on the EP table. His direct verbal attacks include colloquialisms and substantial offences against his self-announced political enemies, which serves the purpose of channelling his actual message into a rather sarcastic and mocking direction, mainly doubting the competence of the political ruling class and figures (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). Furthermore, it serves the purpose of positioning himself on the side of the ‘common’ European people by speaking ‘their language’ rather than teaming up with the ‘out of touch’ political European ‘elite’. The side effect, however, is that the choice of informal language can also mean less credibility and seriousness.

A remarkable portion of cynicism can be found in comments like “well, you’re back Mr. van Rompuy, no doubt a reward for your great success” and “we have seen these old scare tactics” whereas remarks such as “Mr. Sarkozy, worst of all is the sheer arrogance of saying that you know best when it comes to the European project” and “Mr. Barroso, {...}, these comments look ridiculous” are clear and unequivocal verbal offences against individual politicians (Video 10, 2012; Video 7, 2011; Video 4, 2008; Video 9, 2012). The most notorious one is probably his offence against Rompuy insulting him as having “the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a low-grade bank clerk” (Video 3, 2010). Frequently used colloquialisms include verbal attacks in order to topple Brussels’ “unelected puppets” and denigrate them by claiming that “these guys treat democracy with absolute contempt” (Video 25&26, 2011). Consequently, Farage states that it is high time for Britain to “make the great
escape” while “you lot head for disaster” – all these are comments, which are mainly aimed at Europhile politicians, parties and the elite (Video 2, 2011; Video 26&27, 2011; Video 17, 2011). In Eurosceptic manner, Farage informally points out that long-known problems, like the ‘unelected puppets’’ lack of accountability, but merely names ‘Britain’s great escape’ from the EU as only potential solution (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 7).

It has been argued before that exposure to strategic news contributes to cynicism among the audience and Farage presents political issues on an informal platter by downgrading his political enemies (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 274; cf. Dülffer, 2007). This tactic often proves to be effective and successful when he is touching the soft spot of political dissatisfaction not only among fellow politicians, but also among the electoral public. By attempting to score points with people being disappointed with mainstream-politics, politically apathetic ones and the ‘common’ people, Farage’s strategy of an informal and offensive language to gain support might indeed be highly efficient. This also mirrors typical right-wing populism features, using a disparaging language when declaring his “skepticism towards a coalescing Europe” (Hartleb, 2011: 19). Especially offences towards single politicians, the political elite and his political enemies reflect a populist party leader’s conspicuous nature and are regarded as a linguistic tool to enforce his opposition to mostly Europhile mainstream parties and the ‘ruling European elite’. An informally- and derogatorily- given description of the EU institutions and their leaders helps Farage to emphasise and point out the “purported gap between the ‘people’ and the mainstream political establishment” (Deiwik, 2009: 5). Herewith, one can see his qualities as a successful, populist leader since it allows him to clearly position himself on the side of the people.

Additionally, the usage of myriad colloquialisms and offences serves the purpose of simplifying matters and offering simple solutions for highly complex political problems, which has been described as a typically populist strategy (cf. Dülffer, 2007). Farage’s simplifications, especially concerning the Eurocrisis, such as “why don’t we let them go” out of the Eurozone and “why can’t we do things as mature democracies” are not treating profound political issues adequately. Therefore, it leads to a populist, but obviously distorted presentation of problems and thus, causes populism to be associated with often negative connotations, since complex political
issues are unlikely to have simple solutions (cf. Deiwik, 2009: 5). In Farage’s case, this occasionally results in him not being taken seriously by his audience and political counterparts. However, what does contribute to an effective populist success is his usage of pronouns in this respect, which is examined in the next chapter.

4.1.4. The Usage of Pronouns

The usage of in total 1601 pronouns in twenty-nine videos in Farage’s language has a variety of purposes and effects. Firstly, their frequent utilisation contributes to emphasising the gap between the political elite and the ‘common’ people, by establishing virtually binary oppositions. These oppositions are presented in a ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ form that praises the good ‘us’ as the saviours of Europe and stigmatises the antagonistic bad ‘them’ as the allegedly dangerous and menacing ‘other’. Herewith, Farage manages to portray the gap between the elite and the ‘people’ as an ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ constellation, which also helps him as a populist leader to position himself on the side of the ‘people’. With a prudent use of these pronouns, Farage defines himself and his kind through differentiation from others, in this case the European ‘ruling class’ (cf. Dülffer, 2007). While he is blaming the political elite for many faulty procedures within the EU by saying that “they make an absolute mess of it” and “you are determined, but delusional in this attempt to keep the Euro propped up”, Eurosceptic Farage clearly delineates himself from Europhile politicians and parties stating that “they want to impose a United States of Europe on the people” (Video 7, 2011; Video 10, 2012; Video 12, 2010). Shared interests and agreement between him and the ‘common’ people are highlighted with appeals such as “we’ve got to give {the Greek N.H.} people hope because out there now is absolute despair” and “why don’t we decide ourselves” (Video 16, 2012; Video 4, 2008). Interestingly enough, his solidarity with the Greek and Italian people through an increased usage of “I” and “we” shows that he does speak on behalf of the European people instead of only of the British ones (cf. Video 16, 2012; cf. Video 7, 2011). Furthermore, it contradicts Ford’s argument that British Euroscepticism and populist right-wing parties are labelled through xenophobia (cf. 2012). In these discussions, it becomes obvious that it hardly is the ‘foreigners’ he stigmatises as the ‘other’, but indeed the EU and its political elite.
Deriving from the argument that “by taking away from people their ability to govern themselves and transferring that power to the ECM, we're headed for a Europe of rebellion and violence, let's take the democratic route”, Farage seeks to align his personal interest to the collective ones of the European people (Video 29, 2011). His frequent usage of ‘I, we, us, our, you, they, them and their’ serves not only the purpose of moving the responsibility of a precarious political situation away from him and his kind (‘us’) towards ‘them’, his pre-defined ‘usual suspect’-scapegoats, namely the EU and its political elite. It also allows him to feather his nest among the ‘common’ people as potential future voters for him as MEP and his UKIP party. Farage’s position as an MEP provides him with the chance to blame ‘them’ and simultaneously allows him to present UKIP’s agenda in the EP. Despite not being in the domestic British government and constituting ‘merely’ a minority party compared to the ‘mainstream parties’ Tories and Labour in Britain, Farage and UKIP have what Hartleb calls alleged “power without responsibility” (2011, 19). It allows Farage’s and UKIP’s populist attitude to be reactionary towards the government parties without having their amount of political responsibility (cf. Canovan, 1999: 5). In addition, by speaking about “we were told that when we had a president, we’d see a giant global political figure” and “I’m afraid what we got was you”, Farage speaks on the self-announced behalf of and from within the ‘people’ and, thus, generalises the entire multitude of European people as being one homogenous group (Video 2, 2011). He asserts to be voicing the will of the European “silent majority of ordinary people whose interests and opinions are regularly overridden by arrogant elites” (Canovan, 1999: 5). A suitable example is his comment declaring that “public opinion is saying they want a European cooperation, yes of course, I agree with that. What they do not want is this Europe run by unelected bureaucrats like Mr Barroso.” (Video 29, 2011).

Secondly, the use of ‘I’ in many speeches and interviews helps Farage to maintain his position and to secure attention. By saying ‘I’, the popular will is embodied in his persona and by simply personalising political affairs in his appearance, the essential features of a charismatic leader are given. The politician proclaims that the elites can not be trusted (‘they’) and the ‘Bully-boys’ of Brussels would be dangerous men in Europe, so he intends to weaken the public’s trust in the governing class and strengthening his own position as a single-person representative and charismatic leader of the ‘common’ people, i.e. in fact as one of them. Comments such as “laws
are proposed by unelected Eurocrats like you, Mr. Barroso, I know the European Parliament voted for you, but you were the only candidate offered to us” and “I can say with confidence that I can speak on behalf of the majority of the British people” mirror this (Video 23, 2011; Video 3, 2010).

Thirdly, however, the reasoning behind his immense usage of pronouns should be questioned. It is obvious that it ensures a substantial amount of his successful populist strategy and contributes to his provocative appearance. Yet, one could get the impression that Farage’s choice of pronouns is done in order to conceal unverifiable claims to avoid in-depth discussions or to cover up a lack of substantial political arguments from his side. His pronoun-bristled language often appears flippant and provocative to mask unprovable allegations, but one has to take into consideration that this might exactly be his refined, ‘well-tailored’ and intentioned strategy. Farage’s remarks such as “you blabber on about democracy” and “your Eurozone is a despicable pact” are not intrinsically constructive and comprehensive arguments (Video 20, 2012). Therefore, the main aim of these pronouns is to delineate himself and his kind from the European political leaders and to expressly underline his vehement opposition towards their policies.

Conclusively, the usage of pronouns helps Farage dealing with the issue of political responsibility by allowing him to either actively push responsibility aside when disagreeing or to collectively immerse in and appeal for it, if it is for the sake of the ‘common’ people. The issue of identification and solidarity is touched upon as well and the next chapter will briefly outline the main details of it.

**4.1.5. Patterns of Identification & Solidarity**

When looking at patterns of identification and solidarity in Farage’s language, one finds the same reasoning as above. By standing ‘on the side of democracy’, he argues that “democracy is actually deliberately and wilfully being destroyed by people who will do anything to prop up their failed European project” and that “we, the people and citizens of European nation states need to wake up” (Video 7, Video 25 & 26, 2011). He intends to evoke collective solidarity with “we need to recognise that a terrible mistake has been made” and appeals to a shared responsibility between the
European leaders and nation states on a European level when demanding “we’ve got to restore democracy and human dignity” in Greece (Video 16, 2012). Yet, while speaking for identification and solidarity on a European level before, some true colours of nationalism are shining through when he proclaims the same on a domestic or national level. He strongly argues for the preservation of British interests, such as “we need to protect our country” and “we go on paying you 50 million pounds a day”, so his personal identification and solidarity is individually adapted and respectively amended according to the current situation and political debate (Video 5, 2011; Video 17, 2011). Acting accordingly to populist strategies and what Fennema calls “the common man is basically good and his opinions are always sound”, Farage assumes that the reason and the values of the common European people are righteous and should not be questioned, therefore he solidarises with them and positions himself on their side (2005, cited in Williams, 2010: 115).

What Farage also pursues is a victimisation of the European and the British national citizens. By saying that “we’ve seen Greece reduced to nothing more than a protectorate”, “we {the UK, N.H.} find ourselves without friend in the room” and “I’ve been certain from the start that Greece and Portugal should be set free” from their economic prison, he portrays the submission of these countries by the EU and actively seeks their political redemption from it (Video 3, 2010; Video 17, 2011; Video 7, 2011). This also reflects what Hellström calls “populism as style”, meaning a personalisation of politics by displaying solidarity, which works especially well when presented by a charismatic leader, like Farage (2012: 9).

4.2. Lee’s Four Populist Strategies Applied to Farage

1) invokes a virtuous people ‘portrayed as heroic defenders’ of time-honored values (358);
2) identifies this rhetorically constituted people against a rhetorically constituted enemy ‘hoarding power’ (359);
3) further compounds the enemy rhetoric by claiming to work against a ‘system’ (like government or the economy) once virtuous but now ‘sullied’ (360); and
4) expresses an ‘apocalyptic confrontation’ or a ‘mythic battle’ set in a political order on the verge of collapse (362).
The first of Lee’s four populist strategies can easily be applied to the chosen range of Farage’s speeches in the EP and his interviews with TV channels. Herein, Farage describes virtuous European peoples, who are heroically defending a number of valuable and ‘time-honoured’ national and European values. What can be counted as these values is his emphasis on the significance to have a “Europe of sovereign nation states” rather than a “United States of Europe” and also include Eurosceptic ideas (Video 11, 2011). He advocates a fostering of the nation states’ unfettered ability to “run their own affairs” and calls for an empowerment of the ‘common people’ (Video 27, 2011). The politician tends to presents himself and his kind as the brave, reasonable and righteous defenders of these values, stating that “we need to protect our country” and its national interests (Video 5, 2011). By elevating the European peoples with their respective representatives to heroic defenders, Farage stigmatises them as the last saviours before “the EU heads off on the Titanic towards an economic and democratic disaster” (Video 17, 2011). The applied rhetoric reflect his preference in terms of a redistribution of political power in favour of empowering the ‘common people’, assuming that their reason and common sense is right and reliable (cf. SSD, 2008; cf. Fennema, 2005).

Also the second populist strategy can well be applied to Farage. On the one hand, his constituted people encompass the entire peoples of Europe against the ‘elitist’ “bully-boys in Brussels”, Barroso and van Rompuy in particular, and the European political ruling class as the proclaimed ‘hoarding power’ (Video 7, 2011). On the other hand, it also encompasses the national British people against the enemy EU as “supporting the destruction of nation states” (Video 29, 2011).

The third strategy works particularly well for Farage to further develop his quest against the EU-enemy and omnipresent Brussels machinery. By saying that “post 1945, there were some very sensible ideas put together, namely the Council of Europe” and that “a Europe where we sit down together, where we have a free trade agreement, where we agree minimum standards on work, on the environment” is the desirable choice of Europe and argues for a European cooperation “without the ECM, without a EP and without a European Court of Justice (ECJ)” (Video 29, 2011). So Farage claims that the once virtuous ideas from having the Council of Europe have now evolved into and changed to a sullied and remote contemporary EU that is out-
of-touch with the people. He faults that “the EC has failed us over the last couple of years” and emphasises that he forcefully opposes its current existence (Video 7, 2011). Criticising a once virtuous, but now sullied idea, his applied populist strategy also pays attention to the public demands, combating the risk that elites of government might prove “incapable of responding to them” (Williams, 2010: 115).

Lastly, Farage expresses his relentless battle against the European political elite in order to secure and defend the sovereignty of European nation states. His confrontational populist quest aims at avoiding Europe’s succumb to the ‘dominant’ European ruling class and, thus finally, a “United States of Europe” (Video 16, 2011). By describing the Eurozone as a quagmire and “economic prison”, he claims that the EU in its current form is heading for “a Europe of rebellion and violence” and merely proposes “the democratic route” as “a positive way forward” (Video 29, 2011). This is done in a highly cynical manner by saying that “nobody in these countries actually is having the courage to stand up for national democracy” to fuel Euroscepticism and public distrust about European politics and politicians (Video 11, 2011). It also draws attention to the urgent necessity of his battle against them as the EU aka “you lot head for disaster” (Video 17, 2011).

4.3. Farage As a Populist Leader – Brief Evaluation of His Qualities

When looking at his strategic rhetoric, Farage fulfils all the essential aforementioned features and skills of a successful, populist charismatic leader. Due to his verbal ‘peacock’ aura and rumbustious choice of language, he can be sure to capture the attention of is audience and his political ‘fellow players’ by showing rigorous quality in leadership. By dividing the European political stage into two adversarial camps, the ‘unelected Brussels’ elite’ and the European peoples and by clearly positioning himself on the side of ‘the people’, Farage intends to personify the interests and opinions of the ‘common’ people. He manages to seize the existing gap between the elite and people to his benefits and, thus, strengthens his position as leader and representative of the ‘common’ people. Simultaneously, he stigmatises the EU institutions and its leaders as being incompetent to cater for the enforcement of the European’s public interests and as a severe impediment to democracy and national sovereignty. Therefore, Farage portrays himself as the required brave ‘saviour’ of the
people and their time-honoured values from the ‘dire’ elitist political class. With a combination of all his qualities, the politician ensures that his UKIP party receives sufficient and in the long-run also successful attention and votes.

Second Part: Qualitative Analysis - Farage Out on the Limb Against the EU

4.4. In General – Against the EU as a Political Union

When looking at Farage’s quest against the EU ‘dictatorship’, one needs to distinguish his opposition into two parts. Not only does he ‘bravely fight’ against the EU as a political union and its sheer existence, but also against the European political elite. Firstly, this chapter looks at his opposition towards the EU itself, whereas the second one is dedicated to his campaign against the European elite and the ‘unelected’ men on top of the EU institutions.

The British politician’s first target is the EU as a political union, which encompasses institutions such as the ECM, the EP and the ECJ. By illustrating the obvious, undeniable differences between the various European countries along with their individual economic and political ‘crosses to bear’, he argues that “we should not be forced together in the same political union” (Video 7, 2011). In order to prove his point, the politician reverts to drastic comparative arguments by contrasting the EU and its Member States to the Balkan war in the 1990’s when Yugoslavia was split up. By evoking mixed feelings about the commemorable events of this war, Farage reminds his audience of the potential repercussion when “countries are being artificially forced together” (Video 7, 2011). This proceeding aims at inducing feelings of guilt, unperceived responsibility and of a bad conscience among his audience for favouring a supranational political project, which might eventually endanger national democracy, freedom and stability. In order to prove his point and express his substantial criticism, the politician resorts to an illustrative ‘European history’-speech, proclaiming that “in generations to come, children will be told a story” (Video 18, 2010). Herein, according to Farage, it will become obvious that ‘back in the days’, the ECM’s “plan was flawed and their fanciful monetary scheme collapsed” and by denying the European people a ‘genuine’ saying in the form of referendums concerning the matter of having a political union, the story is likely to
finish with “in the end, those people had to resort to violence to get back their nation states and their democracy” (Video 18, 2010). Herein, the Eurosceptic parties’ and the European citizens’ political discontent and repudiation with the supranational body derives from a pilloried lack of fairness and equity in the institutions and their disability to tailor policies to national needs (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). The institutions’ responsiveness towards citizens’ needs and interests is of utmost importance for a successfully functioning EU, since a lack or even failure of it would only play into the hands of Eurosceptic populist parties and their leaders, claiming to represent the actual ‘common people’.

One form of Euroscepticism has been described as “incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” and to supranational institutions (Taggart, 1997: 4). Farage’s strong defiance towards an existence of a supranational institution, i.e. the EU, and an elevation of powers from a national towards a supranational European level is highly visible in many of his speeches. He does make his point when stating that “I want to live in a Europe, of democratic nation states that trade together, not a Europe where Germany calls the shots and face these bureaucrats taking over our democracies” (Video 15, 2012). In this respect, Farage not only portrays his opposition towards these supranational institutions, but also his resistance towards a political union in which certain countries are dominant.

Frequently addressed topics of British Eurosceptics encompass the categorical opposition to an elevation of powers to supranational institutions and warnings against a further transfer of national sovereignty and powers towards the EU (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 3). As a Brit and as leader of a Eurosceptic party, Farage represents these Eurosceptic features, which are reflecting a general, in Britain decreasing trust in governments and political institutions. With sentences like “the EU does not know what to do” and claims that “law-making in the EU should be reduced to national laws” and “we need self-determined borders in the UK”, clearly mirrors his stance in which the EU is regarded as an endangerment of the nation state and in which he fears the substitution of national laws by ‘public-remote’ supranational ones (Video 5, 2011). Farage is agitating against the supranational institution in reproaching them that “over 75 per cent of our national laws in Britain are made by
the EU” and, thus, proclaiming the need for a British “independent judiciary” (Video 1, 2012).

His call for self-determined borders is rooted in his claim that “the UK is the most overcrowded country in the EU”, being entirely flowed with immigrants since “the total free movement of people since 2004” (Video 1, 2012). Herein, Farage’s victimisation of the British people and a pigeon-holing of them into so called ‘winners and losers’ of European immigration regulations is clearly visible. In order to avoid “cultural threats to the nation state as well as anti-immigrant sentiments” among the population, the populist politician proposes the ‘only way out’ of this migration by calling for a change in the British relationship with Europe (Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 253; cf. Video, 17, 2011). Yet, as a British Eurosceptic populist, he seems to be mobilising or igniting hostility towards immigration, due to the four European freedoms, in the British public. That is done by stating that it often brings “ghettoisation in cities and towns” and that from “the 1st of May, our social security system will give people from Poland the same rights to unemployment benefits as we have” (Video 5, 2011; cf. Brown, 2012). But, when shedding a clearer light on this issue, it is not the foreigners he blames for the “mass migration to the UK”, but in fact Britain’s membership in the EU (cf. Video 5, 2011). Farage predicts that “Britain is going to make the great escape, we are going to get out of this union, we’ll be the first European country to get our freedom back” and argues that “what we’ll have is our democracy back, our liberty back and we’ll have influence in the world as you lot head for disaster” (Video 1, 2012; Video 17, 2011). With these claims, Farage confirms Grant’s argument that he himself and many Brits are convinced that their country would thrive as a global hub for trade and investment around the world, unaffected by rules and regulations from Brussels (cf. 2008: 2).

Concerning the Euro, the Eurozone and its crisis, the politician has clear standpoints as to what he regards as the most reasonable option for its future. He points out that “the economics of this are doomed anyway because the Euro was never going to work” and consequently draws the conclusions by remarking that “this is serious, we need to break the Euro up, we need countries to get their own currencies back” (Video 15, 2012). According to him, by ignoring the need for action when it comes to the future of the Euro, “democracy is actually deliberately and wilfully being destroyed
by people who will do anything to prop up their failed and failing Europe” (Video 7, 2011). Farage is blaming them to only “prop up something that should be allowed to die” only because they are “the people with the jobs, they are the people with the big salaries and the best pensions payable anywhere in the world” (Video 9, 2012; Video 15, 2012). Keeping the Euro propped up is “an enforcement of failure” and the Spanish call for bailout only shows that already “another bites the dust”, Farage warns that Europe is facing a “looming impending disaster” (Video 19, 2012; Video 21, 2011). What he does here can be described as an illustrative description of and a simplification of highly complex economic and political matters by providing trivial reasoning for the proceedings in this respect. Also, the usual scapegoating helps pointing the finger at the ‘political culprits’ by shuffling away the responsibility.

When it comes to the role of the UK within the Eurozone, although they did not join the Euro, Farage deplores the top-down politics from the EU, saying that “the City⁶ is being damaged hugely by bureaucratic regulations coming out of Brussels” (Video 15, 2012). As the only way out of the ‘European misery’, Farage advocates the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and proposes trade relations and agreements that go beyond the European single –market, for the sake of the British traditions and economy (cf. Video 17, 2011). Being limited and subdued to the European financial regulations, the EU, what Leconte describes, “doom{s} the UK to a parochialism alien to British tradition” and reduces it to a mere “province of a European superstate”, so Farage suggests that “we leave the EU, we go on doing business with French and German companies, but more importantly, we enable ourselves to open up fresh trading links, and I think the Commonwealth would be a very good place to start” (2010: 89; Video 15, 2012). In his view, in order to stimulate UK’s economy and financial situation, “we’ve got to refocus Britain towards being part of a global economy and not just towards Europe” (Video 19, 2012). It is undeniable that Farage is dissatisfied and sceptical about the benefits of the EU for the UK and thus, can be called an instrumental Eurosceptic (cf. Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005: 227).

Furthermore, Farage describes the European political elite and their European project called Eurozone as pursuing a goal that has failed long ago. For the sake of preserving

---

⁶ The City: The term ‘the City’ is a short-form for the financial district of London. Definition Free Merriam- Webster Dictionary.
their very own project, this is done at the sacrifice of democracy and the peoples of Europe. His reoccurring argument of a lack of democracy is paired with a dire outlook on the future, that countries like Greece are imprisoned inside the Eurozone “we are going to spark a revolution”, if the EU will continue to be run by “unelected bureaucrats” (Video 8, 2012; Video 21, 2011). According to him, “Greece is bust and that’s the reality”, “the prime minister of Greece has been removed and replaced by a puppet”, so the country needs to regain its democracy (Video 8, 2012). For instance, Farage claims that the EU intends “to force upon them austerity measures”, which will eventually cause Greece to go bankrupt (Video 8, 2012). As a Eurosceptic, Farage intends to avoid giving more decision-making power to ‘the unelected bureaucrats’ and their institutions and impeaches the behaviour of the European elites and demands their substitution (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 5). His main criticism here is the attempted establishment of a “European federalism”, characterised by a lack of democracy, referenda and the accountability of its institutions (Video 8, 2012; cf. Video 3, 2010, cf. Video 6, 2012).

Eventually, for the long run and in the future, the politician is proposing the following: “Let's have a Europe where we sit down together, where we have a free trade agreement, where we agree minimum standards on work, on the environment - we can do all these things, without a ECM, without a EP and without a ECJ” (Video 29, 2011). As aforementioned, the only option would then be UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

4.5. Against the Political Elite

Going hand in hand with the aforementioned time-honoured procedures of RWPPs, Farage avails himself of drastic words influencing his general choice of language, such as calling the political EU ‘elite’ a “dislocated society”, which is “hopelessly out of touch” (Video 5, 2011). Hereby, a blunt presentation of the in fact existing and hardly concealable gap between the European citizens and the EU, mentioned by Hooghe, is given and Farage almost bitter-cheerfully rubs the proverbial salt into a continuous and frequently criticised wound of the EU institutions (cf. 2003 in de Vreese, 2007: 281). A shown in the theoretical section of the thesis, this tactic is commonly applied by RWPPs and Farage indeed encapsulates existing negative
sentiments among the peoples of Europe against Brussels’ supranational institutions by pointing to their alleged lack of vicinage to the citizens and democratic legitimisation (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19-20).

By repeatedly picking up long-term nuisances of the EU, the relationship between the European peoples and the political leaders is never moved on the backburner (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11). The issue of the existing gap, on the all-time-‘to combat’-list of the ECM, offers the opportunity for him as a populist politician to point out and argue meticulously against the long-known problem, done on the self-announced behalf of the ‘common people’. This is done by stating that “we live in an age when the gap between ordinary voters and the European political class grows wider by the day” (Video 29, 2011).

4.6. Targetting Barroso and Van Rompuy

In an attempt to find the responsible ‘architects’ of the European crisis, Farage has long ago singled out a whole hoard of, in his eyes, responsible ‘black sheep’. This hoard constitutes the leading European political actors, who are ‘falsely’ favouring a furthering of the European integration. Mostly, it is van Rompuy and Barroso whom he makes his scapegoats and calls them “very bad and very dangerous people”, whereby he is appealing to their reason that “the peoples of Europe do not want deeper integration” (Video 26 & 27, 2012; Video 4, 2008). He ‘teaches’ Barroso a lesson by informing him that “populists are actually democrats” (Video 22, 2011).

Another one of his designations names them as “these ghastly, non-descript people running the lives of 500 million people”, who are merely “pursuing their political dream of a United States of Europe” (Video 16, 2012; Video 7, 2011). Strategy-wise, the straight pointing and raising the moral finger to the personified guilty ones work out fairly well in terms of populist success. He is labelling Barroso and van Rompuy specifically as “unelected non-entities” and blaming them for the Eurocrisis by promulgating “you are causing the misery in these countries” (Video: 17, 2011; Video 20, 2012). Fearing that “they’re prepared to commit economic suicide for an entire continent”, Farage is actively and publicly calling for their resignation, loudly proclaiming “I want you all fired!” (Video 16, 2012; Video 29, 2011; cf. Trenz & de
Wilde, 2009: 5). His applied tactics can virtually be associated with a prompt for a public and political *coup d’état* in order to overthrow the opposed European elite – an invocation for a grassroots revolution so to speak (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 5). This is essentially important when looking at it as populist strategy. Farage is paying attention to the demands of the European public because his ‘constituted hoarding power’ is merely following their elitist ideas of a United States of Europe, regardless of all the ‘casualties’ along the way. According to him, van Rompuy and Barroso only want to further their own idea of the European project, regardless of the consequences and costs (cf. Williams, 2010: 115). He positions himself on the side of the people and thus, attempts to evade the reputation of being a ‘corrupt’ and ‘greedy’ politician as well (cf. Canovan, 1999: 6).

In populist manner, Farage adjusts his speeches in relation to the issue and the current political context. The aforementioned questions, whether political actors are reliable in keeping their promise and whether they are predictable and consistent in their behaviour are intriguing ones in terms of Euroscepticism (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). Their accountability is criticised by Farage as being non-existent and their behaviour in terms of the Eurozone-break up as undiscerning and obstinate, describing Barroso and van Rompuy as “merely kicking the can down the road”, so they are not reliable and consistent in bringing “jobs and growth to Europe” (Video 25 & 26, 2011; Video 16, 2012). This is going as far as Farage offending van Rompuy with cynically saying that “you should perhaps be the pin-up boy of the Eurosceptic movement”, portraying him as a personification of everything Euroscepticism opposes (Video 1, 2012). It looms large that Farage as a right-wing populist party leader takes stance for the peoples of Europe who are exposed to and subjugated to the “quiet assassin of European democracy and of the European nation states (Video 1, 2010). He constantly emphasises that “you {van Rompuy} have not been elected, you are not accountable, there is no mechanism for the peoples of Europe to remove you, it was Zeus of course that kidnapped Europa, my fear is that you are kidnapping our democracy” (Video 13, 2010).
4.7. UKIP’s Stances – Farage As The Populist Mouthpiece for UKIP?

According to Farage, the peoples of Europe and of “the twenty-seven Member States have different interests and do not want to be dominated by unelected bureaucrats in the ECM”, so he takes the stance and ‘solidarity’ with them and asserts that UKIP will save democracy from the political elites including illegitimate leaders of the European institutions (Video 7, 2011). He claims that “my party will go on campaigning that the UK will be free”, but also clarifies that “my party is not anti-European in any way at all, we want a Europe in which we trade together, cooperate together and be good next door neighbours” – however, rejecting a “United States of Europe” (Video 7, 2011; Video 16, 2012). By pointing out economical, political, cultural and linguistic differences between the European countries, UKIP calls for a ‘friendly co-operation’ rather than an involuntary fusion into a supranational institution (cf. Video 7, 2011).

In terms of the immigration debate, Farage states that “four years ago, Cameron accused me and my party of closet-racism for talking about the immigration-issue, I’m pleased to see that politically he has matured” (Video 5, 2011). Farage and UKIP seek to bring the issue of immigration law back into the exclusive hands of domestic politics by suggesting “why don’t we in Britain decide ourselves how many people are coming in” instead of being subdued to EU laws which allows the total free movement of people (Video 5, 2011). The main emphasis is their clear delineation from any kind of racism or comparison to the extreme right British National Party and explains that the British interests are simply the first priority (cf. UKIP OW, 2011). UKIP seconds what Ford describes as the following: “Europe is seen as a foreign power, frustrating the will of the British voters and politicians in order to impose alien values” (2010). In their agenda, UKIP states two of their main goals as “shutting off the flood of immigrants and freeing enterprise” (UKIP, 2011). By saying that “goodness me, we have an extra three million people that have settled in this overcrowded country of ours since 1997” and “we’ve had a huge number of immigrants for these countries” after the Eastern Enlargement of 2004, Farage and UKIP confirm a strong argument made by Leconte. With this example, one can see that UKIP with their mouthpiece Farage as a Eurosceptic right wing party tends to
indeed “project their nationalism and their anti-immigration stance on to the EU” (Leconte, 2010: 109). Here, it is noteworthy that it is the EU, who is made the scapegoat and thus, according to Farage and UKIP, the responsible one for the ‘mass-migration’ into the UK, rather than the immigrants themselves. This proves and backs up their claimed delineation from extreme right-wing parties and “closet racism” (Video 5, 2011).

Farage’s and UKIP’s criticism of mainstream parties is not restricted to domestic governing parties, but also and mainly present on EU level. Particularly, fearing the threat of a loss of British jobs, UKIP as a typical protest-based party criticises the mainstream national government cutting down expenses for Britain, but at the same time increasing the money spent on the EU (cf. Barnett, 2010). As the chosen videos have shown, Farage, on behalf of UKIP, is constantly denouncing and degrading the current domestic and European political mainstream stage, who are allegedly ignoring the interests of the British people (cf. Video 7, 2011). Since he is constantly demanding a British referendum concerning the EU membership, the question of his potential intentions inevitably emerges. UKIP argues that the EU is merely “a symptom, not the cause” and simply “undemocratic, expensive, bossy – and we still haven’t been asked whether we want to be in it” (UKIP OW, 2011). The idea immediately suggests itself that he speculates on the theory that the more citizens disagree with their national governments and domestic institutions, the more they tend to be reluctant to support EU integration (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 253 & cf. McLaren, 2002, 2005). So he and UKIP must be convinced that, were the British public given a referendum, they would vote against a EU membership. This is an emerging question, which unfortunately, for space reason, cannot be examined in this thesis. It would be worth scrutinising why Farage is so convinced about a -for him- positive outcome from a British referendum and whether this is related to the ECM Eurobarometer results from the UK. Herein, it has been found that “56 per cent of UK citizens said they did not understand how the EU worked” and “64 per cent of the poll said they did not trust the EU” (ECM: Eurobarometer, 2010: 3; 6). It would be intriguing to see if Farage speculates on the citizen’s insecurities, deriving from a lack of substantial EU knowledge and trust, which would result in a vote against their country’s membership. Would this favour UKIP’s agenda of the British withdrawal?
If this was actually true, his populist tactics of denouncing the domestic governing parties as well as the whole range of EU institutions in order to achieve Britain’s EU withdrawal could prove successful. However, the question remains if the EU as the black sheep is actually justified or whether it is merely being used to find a trigger to express political discontent within the own country. UKIP blames the EU for being “the biggest symptom of the real problem” – and contends with now well-known arguments that the people need to combat “the theft of our democracy by a powerful, remote political ‘elite’ which has forgotten that it’s here to serve the people” (UKIP OW, 2011).

It has been found that in terms of success, “his remarks have had the desired effect” (Spiegel, 2012). Farage can be sure to evoke not only attention among his audience, but also potentially new supportive voters for UKIP. On domestic soil, the UKIP did well in recent local elections in England and prominent Tories have defected to his party. In the polls, UKIP is just behind the Liberal Democrats who are part of Britain's coalition government. As a result, Farage is becoming an increasing problem for Prime Minister David Cameron's Conservatives (cf. Spiegel, 2012). The politician aims at advancing “liberty, freedom and democracy” and heralds that “we’ve got to fight back against these people who seem to want to entrap us in a formal global government” (Video 8, 2012). On a more negative scale though, he is described as a “politician, who is resorting to cheap populism in order to rack up domestic political points” for his party (Spiegel, 2012).

5. Conclusion

With the results of the word counting in all videos, a justification for my choice of categories has been given, substantiating the validity to draw generalisations from them. After examining these five categories in detail, they have been proven to be in fact populist rhetoric tools and serve their purpose well, of bringing Farage’s Eurosceptic message across. The use of these populist rhetoric tools helps him making his Euroseptic voice heard, not only in the EP, but also in the UK and across Europe. As his main targets of criticism, the EU institutions, along with the ‘Bully-boys’ Barroso and van Rompuy have been singled out as the lone representatives of the threat to British national sovereignty. Linking contextually quite relevant issues to
mere superficial solutions like ‘firing’ representatives of the EP or simply leaving the Union, undermine his credibility in terms of offering valid solutions. The analysis has shown that UKIP’s agenda of preserving British interests can very well be justified, however, it is barely laid out in detail how it is supposed to happen. Farage’s string of arguments gives the impression that certain worldly occurrences, such as globalisation and the world’s political developments, are unswayable and mostly out of our control. Yet, a decision about the EU and a membership in it, is something that is indeed in our hands and thus, susceptible to change, triggering the desire of Farage and UKIP to aim for it.

With his populist strategy and reckless provocative populist rhetoric, Farage is said to actually be badmouthing and dramatising the current situation and “thereby worsening the crisis” (Spiegel, 2012). Given the assumption that his political goal, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, was to happen one day, what would be the consequence? He would lose his job as an MEP and his UKIP their main agenda. It would be interesting to see the influence on the number of UKIP votes on national level, resulting in an uncertain future for the party, whose sustainability would be doubtful anyway, once the blame has to be found on national soil. It is surprising enough that I could not find any journalist in all twenty-nine videos that would actually ask questions about UKIP’s future, after their current agenda would have been fulfilled.

When furthering the study of Farage, there is a great variety of aspects that would be highly intriguing and worth taking a look at. For instance, an examination of the tone of his voice, the irony and cynicism that colours his speeches and influences his tone, would be extremely worthwhile. Furthermore, adopting a research angle other than a political one, could offer insightful perspectives into the matter. His role as a charismatic, populist leader in particular, would allow for some enlightening findings, for instance from the perspective of English Romanticism. Additionally, a comparison and juxtaposition of various European populist right-wing politicians, along with their differences and similarities in rhetoric and topics discussed, would be late-breaking and highly relevant. All in all, these considerations of Farage as a politician and his populist rhetoric tools could be particularly significant when attempting to evaluate and measure his political success, in the last decades as well as in the future.
Moreover, one could argue that the withdrawal from the EU and the reduction of the UK’s relation to merely trade agreements, would be seizing EU’s advantages without taking responsibility. In turn, this reminds of the times of British colonialism, in which the UK was profiting from the Commonwealth countries, but was not showing solidarity when it came to their wealth and rights.
Bibliography

Primary Sources: Videos

1.) UKIP Nigel Farage on Michael Coren, Canadian TV - Jan 2012. Published by ukipmedia 26th of January 2012. 9:03 min.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fLSIRWLpmn0&index=1

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_sYcpSLxWI&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=2

3.) Nigel Farage destroys the EU president (swe/fin/eng subs). Published by RiktigPolitik. 28th of February 2010. 5:14 min.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ViPm0GUxw-M&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=3

4.) Nigel Farage exposes Sarkozy. Published by europarl. 10th of July 2008. 5:12min.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXmidPjQaE8

5.) Nigel Farage: Mass migrants to spill over open borders while UK in EU. Published by Russia Today. 14th of April 2011. 5:24 min.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=56aT47Igwao&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=5

6.) UKIP Nigel Farage Russia today - EU turning the screws on Greece - Feb 2012. Published by ukipmedia. 15th of February 2012. 4:59 min.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qZT-0_54Oa0&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=6

7.) Nigel Farage: This is How Dictatorship Begins. Published by UKIPmeps 27th of November 2011. 15:52 min.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HanScOYhyuE&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=7

8.) Farage: We've got to fight back against entrapment of global government. Published by europarl. 1st of March 2012. 14:50 min.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIIFR5ICOV4&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lIDYLb7Holk&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=9
10.) Eurocrats Carry On Up The Khyber, Determined and Delusional, says Farage. Published by europarl. 14th of March 2012. 3:18 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tivRCQqBFGA&feature=iv&annotation_id=annotation_210098

11.) Nigel Farage, exposing Eurocrat annoying nonsense and propaganda. (Interview SkyNews). Published by KnowMoreNoWarNoHate. 7th of December 2011. 8:27 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5zQT6jLarE&feature=related

12.) QT: Euro fascists attack Nigel Farage over sinking Europe (25Nov10). Published by liarpoliticians2. 27th of November 2010. 9:11 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5LxWwfHyY&feature=related

13.) UKIP Nigel Farage April 2010 – ‘ZEUS-like’ van Rompuy kidnapping our democracy. Published by ukipmedia. 7th of April 2010. 2:45 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Blb_YOjCMQY

14.) UKIP Nigel Farage on UKIP progress in local elections – BBC Sunday politics 6th of May 2012. Published by ukipmedia. 6th of May 2012. 5:18 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LQb8_YydInk&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=14&feature=plpp_video

15.) UKIP Nigel Farage on ABC Australia – May 2012. Published by ukipmedia. 2nd of May 2012. 6:10 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oE_SMD3_nDE&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=15&feature=plpp_video

16.) Farage: Break up the euro and restore human dignity. Published by europarl. 22nd of May 2012. 4:44 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RQ9uHUDkTq4&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=16&feature=plpp_video

17.) Britain’s only option: The Great Escape – (video collage). Published by europarl. (Date 13th of December 2011). 18th of December 2012. 14:49 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5m01uxhpyl8&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=17&feature=plpp_video

18.) An Iron Fist has come down on Europe – Nigel Farage. Published by UKIPmeps. 9th of February 2010. 3:35 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyNnlyIVjhU

19.) UKIP Nigel Farage & Red Ken Livingstone on collapsing Eurozone Sky News 10 Jun 2012. Published by ukipmedia. 10th of June 2012. 7:24 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oxgw1-0Sozg&list=PLBE8BE89FB4C5F31B&index=19&feature=plpp_video

20.) Nigel Farage: Whatever happened to the veto? Published by europarl. 1st of February 2012. 2:34 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x4eLJEWZ7Kk&feature=b-vrec
21.) Nigel Farage: Bombings, bailouts—what on earth are we doing? Published by Russia Today. 25th of March 2011. 9:57 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AqKdDNM7jpQ&feature=relmfu

22.) Nigel Farage: So-called ‘populists’ are actually democrats. Published by UKIPmeps. 11th of May 2011. 2:29 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XaYd-e6SK2s

23.) Nigel Farage EU buying its own debt will mean ECB debt crisis. Published by politicalpunditsuk. 20th of May 2011. 6:39.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=atrjvWCyrm&feature=endscreen

24.) Nigel Farage At It Again. Published by kpickney 9th of May 2012. 3:03 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ca_E6pf-AfU

   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Uv2ZAEZF7s&feature=g-user-u

26.) Nigel farage on collapsing Eurozone, part2/2 (28Jun12). Published by liarpoliticians. 30th of June 2012. 7:28min
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uh7zeU4n6Lw&feature=related

27.) Nigel Farage: United States of Europe insane politics. Published by RussiaToday. 12th of October 2011. 5:51 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugX8NDYkqC0

28.) Schulz’s Law: First confrontation between Farage and Schulz. Published by europarl. 1st of February 2012. 2:52 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYHUR1E7xaI&feature=iv&annotation_id=annotation_979421

29.) Nigel Farage: I want you all fired! Published by UKIPmeps. 6th of July 2011. 4:09 min.
   http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XoAtCs7wXHY

Secondary Sources:

Books


**Chapter in books**


**Articles and Working Papers**


unpublished paper:


Kriesi, H. “How national political parties mobilize the political potentials linked to European Integration”. Manuscript, University of Zürich: 2005. 1-37.


Online Sources


European Commission:


Express: UK News

Brown, Martyn: “All migrants to get a British pension”. 7th of May 2012. http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/318555/All-migrants-to-get-a-British-pension


Note 1:  
All online sources have been checked and last accessed 20\textsuperscript{th} of August 2012.

Note 2:  
Due to a repetition of Lee’s populist strategies in the analysis part (to facilitate better reading), the tables and the footnotes, the word count exceeds the 20.000 limit.
## Exact Listing of Numerical Results in Every Video – Quantitative Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Referendum</th>
<th>Bully-Boys</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Prison</th>
<th>Euro-Titanic</th>
<th>European-Project</th>
<th>Colloquiums &amp; Offences</th>
<th>The-Usoage-Of-Pronouns</th>
<th>Patterns</th>
<th>Of-Identification &amp; Solidarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Video</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>