For God and Ulster
Unionist Securitisations and Desecuritisations during the Peace Process in Northern Ireland

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Abstract

The Troubles in Northern Ireland have played a prominent part in modern European history. Despite the success of the Peace Process in the 1990s and subsequent stabilisation of the conflict through the introduction of power-sharing and paramilitary decommissioning of weapons, tensions still dominate the province. This thesis uses the Copenhagen School of Security Studies to investigate processes of securitisation and desecuritisation that have taken place in Northern Ireland during the years of the Peace Process, in order to achieve a broader understanding of how key actors can help shape the prospects for lasting peace and stability. Through an analysis of speech acts performed by political and religious leader Ian Paisley between 1993 and 2007, two main securitisations are identified: the institutionalised securitisation of sectarian violence and the securitisation of unionist Ulster. Subsequently, an analysis of social practice identifies the introduction of power-sharing and de-escalation of violence as successful desecuritisations. The information gained through the analysis is further used to discuss whether, in order to be applicable to a wider range of cases, the Copenhagen School must increase its focus on facilitating conditions. Finally, focus is placed on the reconstruction of identities and othering, and how this might mitigate historical animosities and facilitate lasting peace and stability.

Key Words: Copenhagen School, securitisation, desecuritisation, Northern Ireland, ethnonational conflict

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List of Abbreviations

**CAIN** - Conflict Archive on the Internet

**CDA** - Critical Discourse Analysis

**DUP** - Ulster Democratic Unionist Party

**IICD** - Independent International Commission on Decommissioning

**IRA** - Irish Republican Army

**NIWC** - Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition

**PSNI** - Police Service of Northern Ireland

**PUP** - Progressive Unionist Party

**RUC** - Royal Ulster Constabulary

**SDLP** - Social Democratic Labour Party

**UDP** - Ulster Democratic Party

**UK** - United Kingdom

**UUC** - Ulster Unionist Council

**UUP** - Ulster Unionist Party

**UVF** - Ulster Volunteer Force
1. Introduction

Throughout history, Europe has been rife with conflicts caused by perceptions of nation, ethnicity and religion. One such conflict that has been ongoing in different forms for centuries is the one in Northern Ireland, widely known as the Troubles. Outside the British Isles, the conflict is often regarded as being between Protestants and Catholics. The situation is, however, vastly more complex in that the Northern Irish conflict is not a fight for provincial independence, as is often the case in similar conflicts. Rather, it is “ethnonational, a systematic quarrel between the political organisations of two communities who want their state to be ruled by their nation, or who want what they perceive as ‘their’ state to protect their nation”\(^1\). In short, the conflict is about whether Northern Ireland should be a province within the United Kingdom or become a part of the Republic of Ireland.

At the time of writing, the conflict in Northern Ireland has been stagnant for a number of years after a decade-long peace process resulted in agreements for political power-sharing and decommissioning of weapons by the paramilitary groupings. Recent riots have, however, demonstrated that historical tensions are not easily quelled, but nevertheless, there is a growing consensus from both sides that peace and stability cannot be achieved through violence.

An interesting theory to apply to any case where security issues are prevalent, is the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. As a security theory, the Copenhagen School is known as widening\(^2\), since it adheres to an understanding of security as broader than just military, and poststructuralist, in that focuses on the intersubjective construction of security and threats through speech acts. Given this background, I seek to explore how threats have been articulated and perceived during the Peace Process and how this has been both facilitating and hindering to achieving lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

1.1. Definitions of Concepts

There is a number of key concepts involved in this thesis that require initial elaboration. Firstly, I refer to the Troubles as the, now concluded, violent conflict that took place between the end of the 1960s and 2007 in Northern Ireland, with spillover violence being perpetrated in both the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain.


Contrarily, I define the Northern Ireland Conflict as ongoing, due to the unresolved political situation as well as the tensions that still mar the province.

I identify the conflict to be between two sides: the unionists who would like to retain the union with Britain and the nationalists, who prefer Northern Ireland to join the Republic. These terms will be used when speaking of the non-violent political entities. Violent groups, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) or Irish Republican Army (IRA), will be referred to as loyalist and republican. The terms are somewhat interchangeable with unionist/nationalist, but are generally accepted to refer to the more extreme fractions. Where religious affiliation is relevant, Protestants and Catholics will also be used interchangeably with unionists and nationalists.

I refer to the province of Northern Ireland as Northern Ireland, the Province or the North. When adapting unionist rhetoric, the term Ulster will used instead. I understand Northern Ireland to be a part of the United Kingdom (UK), whereas Great Britain only refers to the island comprising England, Scotland and Wales. I will, however, use the term Britain in its everyday meaning to refer to the entire United Kingdom. The Republic of Ireland will be referred to as the Republic or the South. The name Ireland will only be used when referring to the entire isle.

1.2. The Northern Ireland Conflict

1.2.1 Historical Summary

The relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland has been marred by strife for almost a millennium. By the 16th century, the entire island of Ireland was under the control of the English Tudor dynasty, and English culture, language and law had been imposed. In the 17th century, Protestant, and mostly Scottish, planters settled in Northern Ireland on lands confiscated from Irish chieftains, as part of a planned colonisation initiated by the British Crown. Despite this attempted Anglicisation of the island, and strict penal laws imposed on the Catholic majority, several rebellions took place throughout the following centuries, culminating in

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3 Nationalist is here not to be confused with the term nationalism, which is used in its general meaning and can apply both to nationalists and unionists.

4 The province of Ulster consists of nine counties, three of which are located in the Republic of Ireland. Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone belong to Northern Ireland whereas Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan are in the Republic. Consequently, the use of the term Ulster to refer to Northern Ireland is regarded as political given that the province does not encompass the entirety of Ulster (see Appendix 1).

the Easter Rising in Dublin 1916. The violent rebellion was put down by British forces in such a manner that public opinion, which had not been supportive of the rebels at first, was swayed. The Irish War of Independence followed and consequently, in 1921, the Irish Republic was given Commonwealth Dominion status and granted Home Rule through an agreement of partition in the Anglo-Irish Treaty\(^6\). This meant that the six counties in the North-East with a predominantly Protestant population remained under British rule, whereas the predominantly Catholic South became the Irish Free State. A civil war followed in the new Free State, between those who supported the status that Ireland was granted in the treaty and those who opposed partition and wanted full independence, with the former emerging as victors. Nevertheless, Ireland was granted full independence in 1937 and therethrough became the Republic of Ireland. The constitutional status of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK, however, remained unchanged\(^7\).

In the 1960s, following several decades of relative peace, violence flared up in Northern Ireland, parallel to a civil rights movement that protested against the discrimination of the large minority group of Catholics. In continuation of this, the Troubles became an infected conflict between those wishing to stay a part of the UK and those wishing to become a part of the Republic. Battles were fought politically and militarily between parties and paramilitary groups of loyalists and republicans. Republicans were mostly organised within the IRA, a paramilitary organisation with ties to the political party Sinn Féin. Loyalist insurgency, on the other hand, was somewhat more dispersed, with the UVF as the largest organisation.

In 1969, the British Army was called in to protect and support the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and became an additional actor in the violent conflict\(^8\). A peace process was initiated in the 1980s, but despite this, the Troubles continued with a high level of sectarian violence up through the 1990s, until and even after the Belfast Agreement\(^9\) was signed in 1998. Republicans and loyalists decommissioned their weapons in the early 2000s, but not until 2007 did the last British troops leave; which signalled the definite end of the Troubles. Despite the downscaling of sectarian violence, historic animosities and recent atrocities remain

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\(^9\) The Belfast Agreement is also known as the Good Friday Agreement.
fresh in the minds of the population. Also, acts of sectarian violence do still occur, which further emphasises an unresolved atmosphere of distrust\textsuperscript{10}.

1.2.2. The Reverend Dr. Ian Paisley

Ian Paisley was born in 1926 and grew up in County Antrim in Northern Ireland. At an early age, he received a religious vocation and consequently received his first congregation at the age of nineteen\textsuperscript{11}. In 1951, he founded the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster, an evangelical denomination adhering to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. As the Troubles started and violence erupted through the 1960s, he organised counter-demonstrations against the Catholic civil rights marches and took part in riots\textsuperscript{12}. In 1971, he was one of the founding members of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which was established out of a perceived need to defend Protestantism\textsuperscript{13}. The party claims to represent traditional unionism, and has been controlled by individuals with “strongly conservative religious beliefs”\textsuperscript{14} from the very beginning. Paisley remained the party leader until 2008 and stepped down from religious ministry in 2012.

My reason for focusing on Ian Paisley is primarily due to his unique status of being both an influential religious leader as well as an influential political leader\textsuperscript{15}. Because of this dual role he has been one of the most controversial figures in Northern Ireland during the past five decades and is known for his flamboyant rhetoric\textsuperscript{16}. He is thus in the required position of authority to be able to facilitate a successful securitisation\textsuperscript{17}. Although he has now stepped down from his official duties, Paisley’s ideas continue to exert considerable influence on the political and religious situation in Northern Ireland\textsuperscript{18} and the DUP is today the largest party in Northern Ireland with their current leader, Peter Robinson, in the position of First Minister.

\textsuperscript{15} Bruce, 2007:1
\textsuperscript{16} Weitzer, 1987:288
\textsuperscript{18} Jordan, 2011:63
1.3. Relation to Previous Research

Traditionally, research within security studies has focused on military threats. However, in the 1980s, with the theoretical advancement of constructivism, security came to be regarded as a term which gained its meaning through social context19. On this background, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, who are often credited as the main initiators of the Copenhagen School, developed a framework for analysing the intersubjective construction of threats through speech acts. The concepts of desecuritisation and, in particular, securitisation have been applied to a myriad of issues ranging from migration20 to HIV21 to conflicts and revolutions22.

In regard to security studies and the case of Northern Ireland, academic focus has primarily been on issues such as counter-terrorism23, statebuilding and power-sharing in divided societies24 and the relation between violence, peace and conflict transformation25. Whilst DUP discourses in relation to the Peace Process have been analysed by Ganiel26, little, if any, research has been published using the Copenhagen School framework to analyse the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation during the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. It is therefore an explicit aim of this thesis to explore the applicability of the Copenhagen School framework of securitisation and desecuritisation to the articulation and performance of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland.

1.4. Delimitations

There are a number of delimitations to take note of in this thesis. Firstly, the focus is on one key actor, Ian Paisley, and his rhetoric. I neither analyse the Northern Ireland conflict nor the Peace Process and its consequences per se. I am aware that

19 Sheehan, 2005:43
25 Mitchell, 2011
A large number of actors played a significant role in the process and continue to do so, but it is beyond my scope to elaborate in detail upon their role. Secondly, it should also be noted that, whilst I do attempt to identify all Paisley’s articulated securitising moves, the empirical material is limited, and therefore cannot represent the totality of Paisley’s opinions. Owing to the performative nature of desecuritisation, it is beyond the theoretical and empirical scope to identify all possible desecuritisations. A third delimitation is the subjective nature of the conducted research, owing to my social constructivist paradigm. Whilst I do not determine whether the security problems are objective, I do define whether securitisations have taken place and thus, the study is a reflection of an intersubjectively constructed reality.

A general limitation of case studies is the weak capability of estimating the causal effects between variables. My aim in this thesis is not to uncover a causality. It would be impossible to prove that the changed rhetoric of Ian Paisley was the only reason for the stabilisation of the conflict, or contrarily that the de-escalation of violence altered Paisley’s rhetoric. Additionally, there are several factors that may not be taken into in-depth consideration, such as the practical difference between being a governing party and being in opposition. Consequently, I will argue that there are parallels and connections between levels of violence, election results and speech acts, but cannot claim a final causality or correlation.

1.5. Research Question
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation that have taken place in Northern Ireland during the years of the Peace Process and therefrom achieve an understanding of how speech and performative acts by key actors can shape a political process and prospects for lasting peace and stability. As such, my research question is:

How have processes of securitisation and desecuritisation, as expressed by Ian Paisley between 1993 and 2007, reflected and/or contributed to the changes in the political and societal situation in Northern Ireland and facilitated peace and stability?

I work with two hypotheses regarding the success of the securitising moves and desecuritisation attempts. Firstly, that Ian Paisley was successful in securitising

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27 Buzan et al., 1998:34
the Belfast Agreement as a threat to Ulster’s existence since, in the aftermath of the treaty, the DUP became the largest party in Northern Ireland. Secondly, that the conflict between unionists and nationalists has been desecuritised and thus moved from being a security issue to a political issue, through performative acts such as power-sharing and decommissioning.

1.6. Structure of Thesis
This study commences with a discussion of the ontological and epistemological foundations of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and proceeds to present its most important elements; explaining the concepts of securitisation, desecuritisation and sector analysis. Further, my methodology is presented. On the basis of Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis, I explain its relevance to this study and describe my method of analysis in detail. I continue with an analysis of Paisley’s speech acts during the past fourteen years, and present my identified securitising moves. In addition, I situate his speeches in the temporal context of the conflict and thus identify an institutionalised securitisation as well as desecuritisations. Finally, I discuss the implications of my results for the Copenhagen School, in particular in regard to defining the moment of when a securitisation becomes successful. I also elaborate on how the concept of othering can be explicated in the theory and how this can be used to, in practice, facilitate a lasting and stable peace in the province.
2. Theory

This thesis will primarily build upon the theoretical framework of securitisation and desecuritisation as proposed by the Copenhagen School and its critics and developers. The theory is especially relevant to apply to the case of Northern Ireland since it allows for an investigation of elements that may contribute to the escalation and de-escalation of a conflict, and the role played by key actors in defining the situation.

2.1. Ontology and Epistemology

In line with the Copenhagen School, I adhere to a social constructivist understanding of security. The school denies an objectivist understanding of security. Thus, in the debate between traditionalists, who claim the content of security to be fixed: “military security against the military security of other states”\(^\text{29}\), and wideners, who see security as a broader concept, capable of encompassing several levels of analysis and different ontological understandings of threats, it positions itself amongst the wideners. The Copenhagen School can be defined as reflexivist, as opposed to positivist, and is characterised by its constructivist, and therefore anti-essentialist nature. Hence, reality may exist, but is not accessible to be analysed objectively and therefore, we cannot scientifically determine the reality of a threat\(^\text{30}\). This is not to say that security is a purely subjective construction. Instead, threats, and thus securitisation, are constructed intersubjectively in language and actions between actors\(^\text{31}\). For the analyst, it is neither a possibility nor task to step outside the social reality to determine the existence of an ‘objective’ reality or threat\(^\text{32}\). It is therefore important to acknowledge that the results of this study will not comprise an objective truth, but that it should be regarded as an unavoidably subjectivist interpretation of the dialectism between speech acts, discursive and social practices.

Through this focus on how meaning is created in interaction, knowledge is gained epistemologically. Meaning is thus created through the social, which serves as the basis of knowledge\(^\text{33}\). The most important form of interaction is understood to be language, as demonstrated through the focus on speech acts. In so-

\(^{29}\) Sheehan, 2005:2

\(^{30}\) Taureck, Rita (2006). “Securitisation theory - The Story so far: Theoretical inheritance and what it means to be a post-structural realist” 4th annual CEEISA convention, University of Tartu, 25-27, pp.3

\(^{31}\) Buzan et. al., 1998:30

\(^{32}\) ibid.:33

cial constructivism however, norms, identities and values also constitute important forms of interaction through which meaning is created\textsuperscript{34}. The contingency of these reality-shaping factors further establishes the theory’s anti-essentialist nature.

2.2. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies

The Copenhagen School of Security Studies consists of three main elements: security sectors, securitisation and the theory of regional security complexes. The latter is not relevant to the subject matter of this thesis, and will thus not be further elaborated upon. Whereas securitisation is the main process adhered to by the school, much academic debate has taken place regarding the process of desecuritisation, which is mentioned but not fully conceptualised by the school’s creators\textsuperscript{35}. For the purpose of this thesis, I will apply Lene Hansen’s conceptualisations of four ideal type desecuritisations: change through stabilisation, replacement, rearticulation, and silencing to my analysis of Ian Paisley’s speech acts.

2.2.1. Securitisation

At the core of the inner logic of security is the concept of survival\textsuperscript{36}. Thus, the logic of survival in the face of threats drives securitisation. Securitisation occurs when a securitising actor performs a speech act in which they articulate an object or a phenomenon as an existential threat toward a referent object, in an attempt to move an issue from a communicative political sphere to one where measures can be taken to eliminate the threat. In order for the securitisation to be successful, it must be accepted as such by an audience who thereby legitimises the use of extraordinary measures. The Copenhagen School is somewhat unclear regarding exactly what securitisation refers to; whether it is the referent object or the threat itself that is securitised. I define securitisation as referring to the actual process and consequently, both the threat and referent object can be perceived to be securitised. The process of securitisation is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

The concept of audience accept is especially important, for without it an issue cannot be claimed to be successfully securitised; instead a securitising move has taken place. One should also note that extraordinary measures do not necessarily have to be adopted for a securitisation to be successful; audience accept is suffi-


\textsuperscript{36} Buzan et. al., 1998:27
The concept of audience does, however, provide a problem for the school, in that there is an unclarity in regard to which audience is the most relevant and when the audience is persuaded to accept a securitising move. This, however, also mirrors the reflexivist epistemology of the school, wherein the analyst is in a position to define when a securitisation has taken place.

The securitising move takes place through a linguistic articulation, known as a speech act. In order for a speech act to work, a certain number of facilitating conditions must be met. These fall into two categories: “the internal linguistic-grammatical - to follow the rules of an act” and “the external, contextual and social - to hold a position from which the act can be made”. Internally, the speech act must be articulated in a way that can be understood linguistically by an audience using a language of security. Externally, the actor must first possess authority, or social capital in order to be accepted as a securitising actor. Secondly, the threat itself can be articulated as existential if references can be made to objects that are generally perceived to be threatening. Other factors, such as norms and

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37 Buzan et. al., 1998:25
40 Buzan et. al., 1998:33
identities based upon historical enmities do not necessarily contribute to the speech act, but also act as external facilitating conditions, wherein the chance of successful securitisation occurring is increased. The inclusion of facilitating conditions has, however, also been subject to criticism. There are claims that context has been downplayed within the Copenhagen School, in particular because facilitating conditions do not encompass an inherent part of the framework, where the focus is “on the performative role of the speech act rather than the conditions in which securitization itself becomes possible.” Hence, an increased focus on facilitating conditions and context as an integral part of successful securitisation could improve its applicability to cases where other elements of securitisation are not as evident.

It is important to distinguish between the units involved in a security analysis. Firstly, the referent object is what is “seen to be existentially threatened and that [has] a legitimate claim to survival.” Secondly, the securitising actor securitises a particular issue by claiming that the referent object is existentially threatened. The distinction between referent object and security actor can sometimes seem unclear as actors often speak as representatives of the referent object they aim to securitise. Yet, due to the socially constructed nature of any referent object, these can only exist intersubjectively and thus have no essence allowing them to ‘speak’ for themselves. Theoretically, it could be possible for any actor to securitise any referent object. However, constraints created by facilitating conditions do limit the amount of successful securitisations.

It is also possible for securitisations to become institutionalised. Institutionalised securitisations often rely on a social practice of violence and conflict but could also be the product of “repeated audience acceptances atrophying into a set of institutionalised practices.” Consequently, a successful securitisation can be accomplished by invoking words that are intricately tied to such institutionalised issues, without having to elaborate on why they constitute a security issue. Thus, if an issue such as IRA terrorism is already accepted as a major security issue, linkage of other issues to this concept will immediately result in them being accepted as security issues, regardless of their nature.

41 Buzan et. al., 1998:60
42 McDonald, 2008:572
43 Buzan et. al., 1998:36
44 Hansen, 2012:532
The defining moment of *when* a securitisation is successful can also be contested. There is an inherent paradox in that a successful securitisation does not require extraordinary measures to be implemented, only accepted by an audience, owing to difficulties in defining when such an audience accept occurs. In addition, focusing on the specific moment when implementation of extraordinary measures is legitimised does not add to our understanding of *why* implementation becomes possible in that particular moment. This brings us back to the discussion of context and facilitating conditions that will be given added importance in my analysis in order to achieve a greater understanding of why the expected processes of securitisation and desecuritisation have taken place.

### 2.2.2. Desecuritisation

Desecuritisation is the process wherein an issue loses its status as securitised and moves toward the politicised, or in rare cases even non-politicised. Desecuritisation is performative, and does not necessarily occur through speech acts. Whilst securitisation has been extensively theorised, the process of desecuritisation is comparatively underdeveloped. However, Wæver himself does assert that there are three methods to desecuritise an issue: either one can *not* speak of it, not use extraordinary measures for an issue that has already been securitised or move issues back to the sphere of normal politics. Several other authors have also contributed to the debate with various methods and strategies of desecuritisation, in particular in regard to minority rights and migration.

In continuation of these debates, Hansen has argued that there are four different methods of desecuritisation that encompass most empirical cases:

1. **Change through stabilisation**: a move out of an explicit security discourse to a less violent form of politics.

2. **Replacement**: one issue moves out of security whilst another is simultaneously securitised.

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46 McDonald, 2008:576
47 Hansen, 2012:526
50 Hansen, 2012:538f
3. **Rearticulation**: a security issue is resolved through an active political solution.

4. **Silencing**: an issue is non-politicised and fails to register or disappears completely from both the political and security agenda.

It is important to note that these are ideal types and are hence not mutually exclusive. Consequently, one could recognise several different modes of desecuritisation within one empirical case.

### 2.2.3. Security Sectors

In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde identify five sectors of security: the military, economic, environmental, societal and political. Each of these sectors differ in regard to their referent objects, actors and logics of existential threat. Since neither the environmental nor economic sectors have much relevance to this perspective on the Northern Irish conflict, I will not elaborate further on them. Recently, there has been much debate on the inclusion of a religious sector, in order to encompass elements that cannot be accommodated within the societal or military sectors, where religious conflicts are often identified to belong. Owing to the ethnic/religious nature of the Northern Irish conflict, I will therefore argue to include religion as a sector in its own right.

**The Military Sector**

The military sector is the closest to traditional notions of what security entails. The referent object here is typically the state, which is securitised by its government or other military authority. Existential threats are understood as military in nature, often involving violence. The referent object can, however, also consist of a non-state unit. In the case of Northern Ireland, which is not a state per se, the presence of British soldiers and the violence perpetrated by loyalist paramilitaries were perceived as a threat by Catholic/nationalist communities, whereas the violence by IRA and other republican paramilitaries were perceived as military threats by and to Protestant/unionist communities. In such cases, the referent objects are not states, but the perceived threat is still military.

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The Societal Sector
The referent object in the societal sector is widely understood to be the somewhat vague concept of identity, often conceptualised as an imagined community. Such communities are constituted through identities, norms and customs and can vary in size between the individual and the global. Common issues perceived as threats to identity are migration, horizontal competition - when a community's culture is threatened by external cultural and linguistic influences - and vertical competition - where an integrating project pulls people towards an either wider or narrower identity. The concept of identity as a referent object has been criticised since it essentialises identity in a way that contradicts the social constructivist ontology of the school, thus ignoring that identity is a constant negotiation. One could, however, also argue that whereas the fluidity of identity is a valid claim, identities are often sedimented as discourses, and can thus function as referent objects for security.

The Political Sector
Within the political sector, the referent object is typically state sovereignty, or in the Northern Irish case, the possibility to independently choose affiliation. Thus, “political security is about the organisational stability of the social order(s)” and the perceived threats are non-military in nature. This can be illustrated by how many unionists perceived Ulster to be threatened by the Republic’s constitution from 1937, which claimed that the six counties of the North were a part of the Republic of Ireland rather than the UK. Also, the referent object of state sovereignty can be perceived as threatened by external power-sharing agreements, where foreign states are given access to the political system of a state.

The Religious Sector
The religious sector is not (yet) an inherent part of the Copenhagen School. Religion as a referent object is often treated as an identity, and as such, placed within the societal sector. When it is regarded as a threat, as is the case of religious terrorism, it is instead placed within the military sector. However, there are elements of religion that cannot be explained by the secular; namely the referent object of

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53 Buzan et. al., 1998:121
56 Buzan et. al., 1998:141
57 Walker, 2012:146
faith. Faith is distinguished from other nodes of identity in that it cannot be explained by referring to discourses of rationality, since it is subject to belief despite doubt. It is related to the metaphysical conflict between good and evil\textsuperscript{58}. The very concept of \textit{being} is what is at stake: “the true faith, our possibility to worship the right gods the right way and - in some religions - thereby have the chance of salvation”\textsuperscript{59}. It is this perception of the sacred, which constitutes the very essence of existence, that can result in the securitisation of religion\textsuperscript{60}. Also, whereas religion does to some extent constitute an identity, it is a part of the identity that is deeply engrained and unchangeable, and can therefore be differentiated from other forms of identity\textsuperscript{61}.

The sectors should not be treated as closed systems, as there are a large number of cross-linkages between them\textsuperscript{62}. Actual security actors do not necessarily securitise consciously within one sector: rather, sector analysis is a framework for identifying and analysing elements that result in a successful or failed securitisation. States as referent objects appear in several sectors, as do various other referent objects such as nations and other imagined communities, despite seeming clearly rooted within one. Consequently, sectors are interrelated in the securitisation process and should not be regarded as separate\textsuperscript{63}.

\textsuperscript{59} Laustsen & Wæver, 2000:709
\textsuperscript{60} ibid.:719
\textsuperscript{61} Sheikh, 2012:376
\textsuperscript{62} Buzan et. al., 1998:167
\textsuperscript{63} ibid.:175
3. Methodology

This section describes and explains the methodology and methods I will apply to this study. Firstly, I will present the theoretical foundation and inspiration for my research method, namely Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as developed by Norman Fairclough. Secondly, I will discuss the methodology of the single-case study, and its implications for the contributions that this thesis can make, as well as motivations for my choice of empirical sources. Finally, I will describe the specific methods used to analyse the presented empirical material.

3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

Since the Copenhagen School understands the defining criterion of security to be textual, discourse analysis is an obvious method to use in uncovering how something is established as a security threat\textsuperscript{64}. This discourse analysis will follow along the lines of the method presented by Buzan et. al. where discourse is studied “as a subject in its own right, not as an indicator of anything else” without the use of any “sophisticated linguistic or quantitative techniques”\textsuperscript{65}. In addition, my analysis will be inspired by the premises of CDA as introduced by Norman Fairclough. CDA can contribute to the theorising of the method of identifying securitising speech acts in that discursive practices are seen as inherent to social practice and contribute to the construction of the social world\textsuperscript{66}. Its aim is consequently to shed light on the linguistic-discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena and processes of change\textsuperscript{67}.

According to Fairclough, discourse is shaped in language and both constitutes and is constituted by social reality\textsuperscript{68}. Thus, language both shapes the construction of an external social world, but is also shaped by it. In terms of action, language can be seen as a social activity used to create meaning as well as a mode of action that can be acted upon\textsuperscript{69}. This is in keeping with discourse being in a dialectical relationship with social practice\textsuperscript{70}. The dialectical relationship is especially important in my motivations for applying CDA to the Copenhagen School since it al-

\textsuperscript{64} Buzan et al., 1998:176
\textsuperscript{65} ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} ibid.;74
allows for a study of the consequences of language use and acknowledges a social world that is not necessarily discursively constructed, but, instead, socially constructed and thus adheres to the same ontology.

Discursive practice is manifested in its linguistic form, through written or spoken texts\textsuperscript{71}. These are always placed within a particular social practice, which does not constitute part of the discourse. It is important to note that the text in itself does not equal discursive practice, but rather, that discursive practice acts as a mediator between texts and social practice. Thus, texts shape and are shaped by social practice \textit{through} discursive practice\textsuperscript{72}. This means that Paisley’s speeches in themselves do not constitute a discursive practice, but that it is through discursive practice that their textual meaning can be analysed. Parallel to my theoretical securitisation framework, I claim that the securitising moves, articulated through the linguistic content of Paisley's speeches, constitute the discursive practices in this study. The social practice, on the other hand, is constituted by institutional practices and norms\textsuperscript{73}. This also conforms directly with the Copenhagen School's understanding of historical, social and political contexts as facilitating conditions for the success of a securitising speech act. Ergo, discourse depends on the “nature of the social practice and conjuncture of social practices it is placed within, and on how it figures within them”\textsuperscript{74}.

The element of power plays an important role within CDA inasmuch that discourse is constituted through power and becomes a controlling force that can enforce particular subject positions on individuals and groups\textsuperscript{75}. It is also in this understanding of power and hegemony that the \textit{critical} element of CDA becomes apparent. In essence, analysts try to understand which “structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction”\textsuperscript{76}. In exploring the reproduction of power relationships, the analyst can also challenge dominance. Methodologically, this involves a top-down approach, similar to that of the Copenhagen School, where

\textsuperscript{71} Fairclough, 1992:71
\textsuperscript{72} Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999:81f
\textsuperscript{73} ibid.:98
\textsuperscript{75} Jørgensen & Phillips, 1999:87f
the “symbolic power”\textsuperscript{77} of elites allow them special access to discourse, therein affording actors in positions of power the opportunity to define security\textsuperscript{78}.

The reflexivist nature of CDA also raises issues regarding the position of the analyst. CDA is a subjective method, where the interpretation of speech acts is done by the analyst, who, according to social constructivist epistemological definition, does not have access to an objective reality independent of thought and experience. Thus, the interpretation of my analytical results does run a risk of being biased due to my personal experiences and opinions regarding the Northern Irish conflict and Peace Process. However, this does not necessarily have problematic implications, since experience of circumstances may help to provide an understanding of context and social practice\textsuperscript{79}. In fact, Fairclough’s CDA is inherently normative in that it, taking inspiration from Marxism, asserts that it is important for analysts not to automatically or unconsciously reproduce the ruling political climate. Rather, there should be a normative political commitment from the analyst\textsuperscript{80}. Despite discussions and critique to the contrary\textsuperscript{81}, the Copenhagen School also allows for an amount of reflexive normativity from the side of the analyst because, whilst it is not up to the analyst to determine the reality of a security threat, the analyst does determine whether securitisation has actually taken place\textsuperscript{82}.

3.2. The Single-Case Study

For the purpose of this thesis, I will apply a qualitative single-case study approach. The great advantage of a case study is that it offers an opportunity for intensive in-depth analysis even when the resources for research are limited\textsuperscript{83}. Depending on the purpose of one’s study, there are a number of established methods for choosing cases to study. It is often argued that cases should be chosen through

\textsuperscript{78} Van Dijk, 2001:303; Buzan et al., 1998:31
\textsuperscript{79} Fairclough, 1992:36
\textsuperscript{82} Buzan et. al., 1998:33f
\textsuperscript{83} Lijphart, Arend (1971). “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, \textit{The American Political Science Review}, 65(3), 682-693, pp. 691
their ability to stand for a population, and that generalisation is, or should be, the aim of case-study research\textsuperscript{84}. This claim has, however, been contested.

Flyvbjerg argues that it is possible to generalise on the basis of a single-case study, but also that “formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas ‘the force of example’ is underestimated”\textsuperscript{85}. In addition, case studies can be especially useful if aspiring to explore standards for judging whether some generalisations are more applicable than others\textsuperscript{86}. According to Flyvbjerg, cases can either be chosen because they present an interesting case in themselves, or because one has an ambition to generalise the results.

My case has been chosen primarily due to its interesting character as it is a case that has filled the debates and had severe human consequences for several generations of British, Irish and Northern Irish. I would argue that the case of the Northern Irish conflict contains unique elements in that it is partly ethnic, partly nationalist, partly religious, as well as being primarily about which entity of nation-state to belong to, rather than a nation seeking independence\textsuperscript{87}.

These elements of uniqueness bring into question whether the conclusions of my analysis could be applicable to other cases, and if so, which elements might consequently be used as a basis for further investigation. It is an explicit aim of this thesis to contribute to the debates surrounding the Copenhagen School in regard to what constitutes successful securitisations and desecuritisations. Indeed, single-case studies can often be useful in theory development\textsuperscript{88}. Paisley's rhetoric through the past one and a half decades when the Peace Process in Northern Ireland has been ongoing, does not present an easy case for securitisation theory\textsuperscript{89}. Above all, the required element of emergency measures is rarely articulated, thus leading up to a post-analysis discussion of whether this element is indeed crucial to the theory. In addition, the parallel processes of desecuritisation as defined by Lene Hansen that I aim to explore have not been extensively tested. Thus, despite the uniqueness of the totality of the case, I believe that there are also several ele-

\textsuperscript{84} Seawright, Jason & John Gerring (2008). “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options” \textit{Political Research Quarterly} 61(2), 294-308.
\textsuperscript{86} George & Bennet, 2005:19
\textsuperscript{87} There are arguments that the Northern Irish case is not as unique in character as often claimed and that the claim of uniqueness has resulted in an unnecessary prolongation of the conflict due to a failure to learn from elsewhere (see Walker 2012:183). Religion has, e.g. historically served as justification for conflicts and violence in many conflicts, including Western European.
\textsuperscript{88} George & Bennett, 2005:18
\textsuperscript{89} Flyvbjerg, 2006
ments within it that could provide useful and generalisable results in regard to these specific processes in other conflicts.

3.2.3. Empirical Sources

In order to analyse speech acts, the chosen texts must have been spoken or expressed at some point, since it is the act of speech itself, and not hidden intentions, that constitutes the social reality of the threats. I have chosen to analyse speeches given by Ian Paisley between 1993 and 2007 because they temporally cover the two main peace treaties that resulted in the stabilisation of the Northern Irish conflict and the end of the Troubles. Ian Paisley and the DUP were not positively inclined towards these agreements at the time, yet today express pride regarding the stabilisation that has been achieved and the pluralism of Northern Irish society.

The texts have been chosen through a search of transcribed speeches given by Ian Paisley, available at the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)\textsuperscript{90}. The particular speeches given by Paisley to the DUP at the annual conferences were chosen mainly for two reasons; firstly there was an uninterrupted range of speeches from 1993 to 2001, and then further from 2004 and 2006. This allows for added consistency, since the audience remains the same. Thus the expected change in speech acts that takes place over time cannot be attributed to a change of audience. Secondly, the speeches are made at a party conference and are therefore reported medially, thus introducing the statements to the public sphere. Thirdly, the primary context is political and not religious, giving room for an analysis of how religious language is used to emphasise political aims. Whilst it would be in keeping with the orthodoxy of the Copenhagen School to explore the process of securitisation using no more than one speech, the reason for this large number is above all to explore how securitising moves and desecuritisations can change over time and the influence that this can have on the social reality lived by those in the midst of the conflict.

In order to fully include the period of the last decade, where the Peace Process has resulted in a new political constellation, a small number of other speeches given in other settings have been included\textsuperscript{91}. Additionally, given that the historical and cultural contexts are significant in a securitisation analysis, I will also make

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} These include two speeches given at Independent Orange Demonstrations in 2004 and 2006, statements made regarding the British Government's plans for security normalisation in 2005, a statement on the recalling of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2006 and finally two speeches made in relation to the resumption of devolved government in 2007.
\end{itemize}
use of secondary sources in order to explore and discuss discourses of politics, culture, history, and identity of Northern Ireland.

3.3. Methods of Analysis

3.3.1. Methods of Speech Act Analysis
Methodologically, CDA entails performing a concrete linguistic textual analysis on the semantics of social interaction. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to perform a thorough linguistic analysis and coding of the entire content of the speeches. Instead, each speech will be read keeping in mind a search for security arguments that adhere to the aforementioned security logic of the Copenhagen School. These findings are subsequently investigated in regard to the referent object(s), the articulated threat(s) and their connection to security sectors, as well as the social, historical and political context at the time of the speech. In sum, my method is simple: to read and look for arguments that take “the rhetorical and logical form defined here as security”\(^{92}\). The analysis will be guided by a search for the specific articulations demonstrated in Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Question(s)</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referent Object</td>
<td>What is being threatened?</td>
<td>State sovereignty, a community/nation, a religion, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whose survival is at stake?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential Threat</td>
<td>What does the threat entail?</td>
<td>Bodily harm, inability to practice religion, loss of freedoms and/or independ-ence, centralisation of government, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Who is exerting the threat?</td>
<td>A different state’s military, terrorists, religion, external legislation, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience</td>
<td>Who is the intended audience of the speech act with the power to legitimise extraordinary measures?</td>
<td>The general public, legislators, community members, the military, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraordinary Measures</td>
<td>Which measures are suggested in order to curb the threat?</td>
<td>Military action, personal defence, state of exception, removal of democratic rights, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1.

\(^{92}\) Buzan et. al., 1997:176ff
The rhetorical imagery of the speeches will also help situate them within specific sectors. Hence, the religious language that is prevalent in Ian Paisley's rhetoric throughout his entire career will be analysed as part of a sector analysis, rather than as religious speech per se.

3.3.2. Methods of Context Analysis
The above outlined method will be used to investigate whether a securitising move is taking place within the speeches. In order to analyse whether the securitising move is successful, the reaction of the audience must be studied, thus moving beyond semantically constituted discourse into social practice. The definition of audience will depend on the speech in question, but it is befitting to surmise that the majority of the speeches were given with supporters of DUP in mind, regardless of whether they attended the annual conferences. Media reporting would also have made them widely accessible. Therefore, public support for the DUP conceptualised as results in referendums and elections will serve as a basis for determining the success of securitising moves. Often, the success of a securitising move cannot be determined before a period of time has passed\textsuperscript{93}. It seems highly likely that this particular case will also adhere to that assumption.

As previously mentioned, the act of desecuritisation does not necessarily occur through speech acts. On grounds of said performativity, desecuritisation is a part of the social, rather than discursive practice. I will identify these performative actions through an analysis of the social practice of the time; specifically operationalised as the status of the Peace Process, constitution of Northern Irish parliament and levels of violence. The number of deaths will be used as an indicator of the level of violence, using the extensive and detailed Sutton Index of Deaths\textsuperscript{94} available at the CAIN website.

\textsuperscript{93} Roe, 2004:281f; McDonald, 2008:575ff
4. Analysis

This chapter will present my analysis of Paisley’s securitising moves, institutionalised securitisations and desecuritisations. These have been identified through an analysis of Paisley’s speeches in combination with a reading of secondary literature in order to understand the facilitating condition of context, which is especially crucial in regard to institutionalised securitisation and desecuritisation.

As discussed earlier, the concept of *audience* and *audience accept* is crucial to successful securitisation since it results in the legitimisation of extraordinary measures. Consequently, the audience of the speeches must be defined. The majority of the speeches were made at DUP Annual Conferences whilst the remainder were made at Independent Orange Marches or released as public statements. I define the initial audience as those being present when the speech was made; DUP delegates or members of Independent Orange Orders. Since the speeches were also made in public settings with media reporting, I understand the broader audience to be anyone sympathetic to the views of Paisley, in particular the DUP electorate. Albeit Paisley does claim to speak for “traditional unionism”\(^95\), one should note that his speech acts are performed whilst in the role as founder and leader of the DUP, a party which does not represent all unionists. Therefore, I define the potential DUP electorate as the intended audience of Paisley’s speeches. By defining the electorate as the main audience, Paisley’s successful elections from 2003 and onward can function as a conceptualisation of *audience accept*, which, as will be further discussed, could enable his attempted securitising moves to become successful securitisations.

4.1. Securitising Ulster Unionism

This part of this analysis will focus on the securitising moves made by Ian Paisley in the analysed speeches. There are three main securitising moves apparent here. The first refers to the threat against Ulster as a sovereign political entity, the sec-

ond, the imagined community of Ulster unionists, and the third, the Protestant religion. I will subsequently discuss the intermingling of these three securitising moves and how this relates to the theoretical sector division as well as enabling a fuller understanding of the case.

4.1.1. Threats to Ulster & the Union

Of all the threats articulated by Paisley, the threat towards Ulster as a sovereign political entity in a union with the UK stands out as being the most consistent and frequently called upon. I identify this securitising move as taking place within the political sector given that the threat is not military in nature but instead political. It can be briefly summarised as a fear that Ulster as part of the union is at risk because the Irish Government either lays claim to, or is given, a level of influence upon matters in the North. The British connection is articulated as “an essential safeguard for the practice of religion and the freedom to pursue [our] way of life.” Thus, the existence of Ulster as part of a union becomes of vital importance to the Ulster people, who can only retain these liberties if Ulster and the union survive.

Despite this threat being constantly articulated throughout the period of analysis, the nature of how the threat is exerted differs over the fourteen years of speech acts. The shifting nature of the articulated threat runs parallel to the social practice in which the articulation is situated. Before the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, the existential threat towards Ulster is perpetrated through the Joint Declaration. Whilst the British government had already in 1990 claimed “no selfish strategic economic interest in Northern Ireland,” the Joint Declaration issued in December 1993 affirmed that the people of Ireland had the right to self-determination, that the situation in Northern Ireland should be solved between North and South with mutual consent, and that Northern Ireland's affiliation should be determined by the people of Northern Ireland. In addition, paramilitarily linked groups would be permitted to participate in peace talks on the condition that they abandoned violence. The declaration did, however, incite fears among...

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96 Buzan et. al., 1998:141, Sheehan, 2005:47
99 Bruce, 2007:113
100 Coogan, 1996:80, 367ff

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unionists that the union would be weakened, resulting in a united Ireland\textsuperscript{101}. Given this background, Paisley articulates Ulster as threatened by the Republic of Ireland and Irish dominance\textsuperscript{102}, as well as the British Government and its Prime Minister\textsuperscript{103} since the document aims to “bring about the sole and sovereign authority of a Dublin Government over us”\textsuperscript{104}.

The threat against the union is articulated somewhat differently after the signing of the Belfast Agreement, which is mainly concerned with civil and cultural rights, justice and policing and the decommissioning of weapons by paramilitaries. It also serves as a basis for Northern Ireland's current constitutional stature as a part of the UK, introducing the devolved system of government\textsuperscript{105}. It was signed by both the governments of the UK and Republic of Ireland and eight Northern Irish political parties\textsuperscript{106}. The DUP was the only major party in Northern Ireland to oppose the Agreement, which also resulted in a constitutional change in the Republic of Ireland where Articles 2 and 3, which laid claim to the six Northern Irish counties, were amended\textsuperscript{107}.

In continuation of this, Paisley’s patterns of articulating threats evolve. Though they are still mentioned, the main enemies are no longer the governments of the UK and Republic of Ireland. Instead, it is the then largest political party in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and its leader, David Trimble who have “destroyed Ulster's foundation” by signing the Belfast Agreement\textsuperscript{108}. This rhetoric does not abate with time. In 1999, at a referendum at the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC)\textsuperscript{109} on endorsing Trimble’s leadership, Paisley states that “every

\textsuperscript{101} Walker, 2012:144


\textsuperscript{104} Paisley, 1994


\textsuperscript{106} LUP (Ulster Unionist Party), SDLP (Social Democratic & Labour Party), Sinn Féin, the Alliance Party, PUP (Progressive Unionist Party), NIWC (Northern Ireland Women's Coalition), UDP (Ulster Democratic Party) and the Labour Group


\textsuperscript{108} ibid.

\textsuperscript{109} The Ulster Unionist Council is an umbrella organisation for Unionist political groups in Northern Ireland.
hand that is raised for Trimble today and for his prophecy is a hand just as much
the enemy of Ulster as a hand of the IRA\textsuperscript{110}. In later years, the Belfast Agreement
and its advocates are articulated as a threat to democracy\textsuperscript{111}, whereas David Trim-
ble and the UUP are traitors\textsuperscript{112}. Thus, it is clear that the biggest threat to the politi-
cal sovereignty of Ulster post-Belfast Agreement comes from unionists who do
not stay true to their ideals\textsuperscript{113}.

4.1.2. Threats to the Ordinary Ulsterman

The second referent object that is articulated by Paisley is that of the imagined
community of ordinary Ulstermen\textsuperscript{114}. By speaking of the “unionist family”\textsuperscript{115}, and
“traditional Ulster principles”\textsuperscript{116}, the people of Ulster are presented as possessing
a shared identity through norms, culture, and history that encompasses both their
unionism and Protestantism\textsuperscript{117}. The survival of the Ulster unionist collective iden-
tity is at stake, and consequently the threat is placed within the societal sector\textsuperscript{118}.

Like the threat against the union, the threat to Ulster identity is also exerted
through the political context. Thus, the Joint Declaration and the Belfast Agree-
ment’s consequences of Dublin influence over Northern Irish politics is regarded

\textsuperscript{110} Paisley, Ian (1999). Text of extracts of a speech by Ian Paisley, then Leader of the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), to the DUP’s Annual Conference, in 1999. Belfast: Democratic Unionist

\textsuperscript{111} Paisley, Ian (2000). Text of a speech by Ian Paisley, then Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP), to the DUP’s Annual Conference, in 2000. Belfast: Democratic Unionist Party. Available

\textsuperscript{112} Paisley, 2004a; Paisley, 2006a; Paisley, Ian (2001). Text of extracts of a speech by Ian Paisley,
then Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), to the DUP’s Annual Conference, 2001. Bel-
(2004b). Speech by Ian Paisley, then Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), to the Inde-
pendent Orange Demonstration in Rasharkin, County Antrim, (12 July 2004). Belfast: Democratic

\textsuperscript{113} Paisley, 2000; Paisley, 2001; Paisley, 2004a; Paisley, 2004b

\textsuperscript{114} Paisley, 1993

\textsuperscript{115} Paisley, 1995; Paisley, 1996

\textsuperscript{116} Paisley, 2001

\textsuperscript{117} Fahey et al., 2006:76

\textsuperscript{118} Sheehan, 2005:84
as embarking on a road to the inevitable end of partition\textsuperscript{119}. This will result in the dissolving of Ulster identity through vertical competition, where integration with an Irish nationalist identity could dilute its uniqueness\textsuperscript{120}. This perceived threat draws upon experiences in the post-partition Republic, when the unionists remaining in the South rapidly internalised an Irish identity, thus resulting in a decline of the previously distinct British/Irish identity in the Republic of Ireland\textsuperscript{121}. There is also a fear that “unionists [will] always [be] in a minority in matters relating to Northern Ireland”\textsuperscript{122} and that “Gaelic civilisation, a civilisation viewed by Ulster and the rest of the United Kingdom as backward and negative” will be restored at the expense of the “Protestant North”\textsuperscript{123}.

According to Paisley, this societal threat has already been seen in the removal of Orangemen's civil liberties by forbidding them to march along traditional routes through predominantly nationalist/Catholic areas\textsuperscript{124}. Identity is likewise threatened when vital symbols such as “the national flag is insulted” and “the Queen is reduced to the same level as the President of the Irish Republic”\textsuperscript{125}.

These fears do, however, have historical connotations. The post-partition decline of British and Protestant identities in the Republic of Ireland can be interpreted as a warning example of what could be in store for Ulster unionists if Ireland is united, and thus serves as a historical facilitating condition in Paisley's securitising move. Additionally, the tradition of marching is a highly symbolic act that is of great importance to the demonstration of Protestant unionism in Northern Ireland. A threat to this right is therefore also a threat to the ability to retain a national identity. It is interesting to note that it is in the articulation of threat to


\textsuperscript{120} Buzan et. al., 1998:121

\textsuperscript{121} Walker, 2012:83

\textsuperscript{122} Paisley, 1997

\textsuperscript{123} ibid.

\textsuperscript{124} On the 12\textsuperscript{th} of July, marches are held all over Northern Ireland by fraternities known as Orange Orders. This is done in order to commemorate the Battle of the Boyne wherein Protestants, supporting Protestant King William of Orange, fought Catholics, supporting Catholic King James, in 1690 and won. The marches have often been controversial, in particular since many traditional marching routes pass through Catholic neighbourhoods, which is regarded as both insensitive and instigating conflict.

\textsuperscript{125} Paisley, 1998
ward identity, and marching in particular, that Paisley for the only time justifies violence as an extraordinary measure. He refers to rioting that took place in Drumcree after the RUC attempted to reroute an Orange Parade as how the “recent bursting into flame in Drumcree should be a warning to the Government and those who hound them on to neuter the Union that the last word will not be spoken by the Whitehall Government but by the men and women of Ulster themselves”126.

4.1.3. Threats against Protestantism

The third articulated referent object is that of the Protestant faith. Due to the intermingling of religion and nationalism in Paisley’s rhetoric, it can be difficult to distinguish from threats against collective identity, since a faith community also represents an identity. In this case however, I argue that Paisley’s role as Presbyterian minister, as well as his history within the evangelical movement, separates these notions of identity. Thus, I define the articulated threat where Protestantism is mentioned to take place within a religious sector. This securitising move is more or less constant during the period of analysis but does become less apparent in later years, when the DUP have won elections and agreed to power-sharing with Sinn Féin.

Protestantism as a truth-bearing faith is presented as threatened by the Roman Catholic Church127. The threat that the Roman Catholic Church exerts as a spiritual entity also entails a physical threat against the practitioners of ‘true Christianity’. Referring to the large decline in the Protestant population in the Republic of Ireland post-partition, Paisley articulates how “they have seen 80% of the Protestant population eliminated in the Irish Republic and they are well aware the same fate awaits them if they allow themselves to be cajoled into a country which refused to enter the 20th century even although that century is about to end”128. Historical discourses of violence and warfare are drawn upon by referring to the “torture of our Protestant forefathers for no other crime than that they were Protestants and would not bow the knee to the Papal Antichrist at the Vatican”129. The articulation of the Pope as Antichrist is notable here, since it specifically pinpoints the Catholic faith as being fallacious, thereby preventing eternal salvation for those who might otherwise have achieved it.

126 Paisley, 1995
127 Paisley, 1994; Paisley, 1997; Paisley, 2004a
128 Paisley, 1993
129 Paisley, 1994
Consequently, the threat against Protestantism could be understood as twofold. Firstly, faith in itself, and thereby the chance of salvation, is under threat. Secondly, the community of Protestants is threatened by the monolith of Catholicism. One should, nevertheless, note that only a minority of Northern Ireland's identifying Protestants adhere to Paisley's interpretation of faith and scripture. Also, when Paisley refers to true Christianity, he is referring to the evangelical, born-again Christian movement that he represents, in particular the fundamentalist Free Presbyterian Church.

As will be discussed later, Paisley's articulation of faith as a referent object is intricately tied to the concepts of the political nature of Ulster and the unionist identity. Yet, religion does play an important role in how these articulations are made, in that his speeches frequently draw upon biblical quotations, referring to the truth of the scripture, and the “Almighty God of justice”. In addition, his symbolic power as both a political and religious leader serves as a facilitating condition. I thereby assert that religion cannot be delimited solely to an expression of social identity.

4.1.4. Synthesising Sectors

Whilst the sector division demonstrated above is useful as an analytical tool, sectors are not closed systems, and ought therefore not to be regarded as separate. This is extremely relevant to this analysis where the political entity of Ulster, the social identity of unionists and the Protestant faith are intermingled in such a way that they cannot be separated if one is to achieve a deeper understanding of Paisley's securitising moves. The articulated threats and enemies do not differ remarkably between sectors. Hence, the Roman Catholic Church poses a threat both to the Protestant faith and the Protestant unionist identity as well as the survival of Ulster, the Irish constitution is a threat both to the union and the unionist identi-

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131 Fahey 2006 et al., 2006:36
132 Bruce, 2007:92
133 Paisley, 1994
134 ibid.
135 Buzan et al., 1998:167ff
136 Paisley, 1994; Paisley, 1997; Paisley, 2004a; Paisley, 2004b
and the Belfast Agreement is a threat to Protestantism, the union, and Ulster traditions and culture.

I understand this intermingling of referent objects as an expression of what Brewer and Higgins refer to as anti-Catholicism. The term encompasses three different typologies: the secular, based on a defence of the union whilst attacking the political ideology of republicanism; the theological where Catholicism is Christianity in error; and finally the covenantal, where Ulster is regarded as the land promised to Protestants by God, who has also endorsed its constitutional union with Britain. It thus becomes a divine mission for Protestants to save Ulster from the Catholic Church. One could consequently argue that Paisley, as the Troubles started, became convinced that he had been “commissioned by God to defend Irish Protestantism - that he was, in effect, God’s man in Ulster.”

In the covenantal mode of anti-Catholicism, identity, politics and religion cannot be separated. This also means that one referent object cannot exist without the other. When Paisley refers to the “right-thinking people of Northern Ireland”, he equates them with the “Ulster unionists” and their “Protestant birthright.” Ulster only gains sovereignty through its union with Britain, unionist identity can only exist if Ulster prevails, and the Protestant faith requires the union in order not to dissolve. Yet, despite existential threats, the religious aspect helps assert that Ulster will prevail, if it is God’s will. Thus, even if “Ulster Protestants have been slandered throughout the world, [...] they have kept on their way resolved to do and die for the cause of God and Ulster.”

On the background of this synthesis, I will regard the analysed securitising moves as one single securitisation that takes place within the political, societal and religious sectors. The lack of articulated emergency measures does make it

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137 Paisley, 1993; Paisley, 1994; Paisley, 1995; Paisley, 1997
140 ibid.:243
141 Juergensmeyer, 2000:40
142 Jordan, 2011:50f
143 Paisley, 1994; Paisley, 1995; Paisley, 1996
144 Paisley, 1997
145 Paisley, 1993
146 Bruce, 2007:241f
147 Paisley, 1993
somewhat problematic to define Paisley’s securitisations as successful. The theoretical implications of this will be discussed in detail further on, but for now I will define Paisley's attempts at securitising Ulster unionism as successful, due to both the use of security speak, clearly articulated referent objects and threats and audience accept through successful elections in the 2000s.

4.2. The Securitisation of Sectarian Violence

The securitising move that refers to the safety of the Northern Irish population, and therethrough also to the physical survival of the state, is located within the military sector. It is important to note that the acts of violence referred to here are not necessarily objective threats. Rather, they are perceived through “historical and material facilitating conditions [that] affect the processes of securitization and desecuritization in a fairly systematic way”\textsuperscript{148}. According to Paisley, the existential threat of violence toward the referent object of the state of Ulster is perpetrated by the IRA and their political counterpart, Sinn Féin. The securitising move occurs frequently throughout the period of analysis, but is especially prevalent in the early 2000s, when the discussion regarding IRA decommissioning is at its peak. While the overarching referent object in this securitising move is the state of Ulster, Paisley also articulates the people of Northern Ireland\textsuperscript{149}, the “security of the Province”\textsuperscript{150}, “free citizens of Britannia”\textsuperscript{151} and even “the right to live”\textsuperscript{152} as referent objects threatened by “the dark pit of bloodthirsty republican terrorism”\textsuperscript{153}.

Depending on the context, the articulated threat entails different consequences. During the Peace Process in the 1990s, the IRA and Sinn Féin pose a threat through their inclusion in the negotiations, which is seen as a compromise with terrorists\textsuperscript{154}. The negotiations thus send a message that “bullets are more influential than votes”\textsuperscript{155}. Subsequently, the acceptance of IRA in political circles becomes a threat to the stability, peace, and existence of Ulster. IRA violence continues to be a threat however, amongst other reasons because the Belfast Agreement includes a section regarding prisoner release where “the worst murdering

\textsuperscript{148} Buzan et. al., 1998:57
\textsuperscript{149} Paisley, 1994; Paisley, 1995; Paisley, 2001; Paisley, 2004a
\textsuperscript{150} Paisley, 2000
\textsuperscript{151} Paisley, 2004a
\textsuperscript{152} ibid.
\textsuperscript{153} Paisley, 2006a
\textsuperscript{154} Paisley, 1994; Paisley, 1995; Paisley, 1996; Paisley, 1997; Paisley, 1998
\textsuperscript{155} Paisley, 1995
scoundrels ever put behind bars are being set free”\textsuperscript{156}. This statement might indeed also refer to the loyalist counterparts of republican terrorists, and can hence be interpreted as an articulation of sectarian violence per se posing a threat, and not solely violence perpetrated by republicans\textsuperscript{157}.

In 2001, the IRA agreed to decommission its weapons following conditions of the Belfast Agreement. The process was completed in September 2005. In 2000, Paisley articulates “illegal armies and equipment”\textsuperscript{158}, coupled with a weak and demoralised police force\textsuperscript{159} as a threat to Ulster. He subsequently refers to how the “IRA/Sinn Féin murder squads and other terrorists hold on to their weapons”\textsuperscript{160}. IRA criminality and violence continue to be articulated as a threat\textsuperscript{161}. Decommissioning is questioned and articulated as a “blatant lie” that has been pushed “down the throats of the Ulster people”\textsuperscript{162}. By drawing upon a collective understanding of the violent IRA threat, Paisley aims to convince his audience that the IRA have not decommissioned and therefore still exert a threat against the people of Ulster, both through the violence and criminality as well as the political influence that they might gain access to.

This reliance on a collective understanding of the threat posed by an enemy can be understood as an institutionalised securitisation. Consequently, calling the IRA ‘terrorists’ automatically connects them to the bombings and shootings that they have perpetrated, both against the British army and against civilians in Northern Ireland and Britain\textsuperscript{163}, and thus, few more words are needed in order to articulate the organisation as a threat. Therefore, whilst the IRA and Sinn Féin may often be spoken of in the same sentence as “blackmail, murder or terrorism”\textsuperscript{164}, they are also articulated as a threat several times in Paisley's speeches, where further explanation of how and why they exert this threat is not elaborated upon\textsuperscript{165}.

\textsuperscript{156} Paisley, 1998
\textsuperscript{157} One should however, keep in mind that, historically, loyalist violence has rarely been condemned by the DUP “since it is viewed simply as a reaction to Republican provocation.” (Weitzer 1987:289).
\textsuperscript{158} Paisley, 2000
\textsuperscript{159} Paisley, 2000; Paisley, 2001
\textsuperscript{160} Paisley, 2001
\textsuperscript{161} Paisley, 2006a; Paisley, 2006b
\textsuperscript{162} Paisley, 2006a
\textsuperscript{163} see Sutton Index of Deaths
\textsuperscript{164} Paisley, 2001
Based on this idea of institutionalised securitisation, I conclude republican violence to have been successfully securitised by Ian Paisley, since no further elaboration is needed on his part to invoke audience accept for his securitising move, as demonstrated through the DUP’s electoral success. On the background of this and the mentioned facilitating conditions, the issue can then be moved into the sphere of security.

4.3. Desecuritisation

The concept of desecuritisation is integral to this study, given how the conflict in Northern Ireland has changed significantly in the past decade. In general, the removal of an issue from the security sphere to a communicative sphere of normal politics through desecuritisation is regarded as normatively positive, as well as being better for democracy. This section aims to analyse which desecuritisations have brought about the relatively stable current situation in Northern Ireland - if any - and how these relate to Paisley's securitisations, using the typology of change through stabilisation, replacement, rearticulation and silencing developed by Hansen.

4.3.1. Executive Power-Sharing

The reintroduction of devolved government in Northern Ireland, through the Northern Ireland Assembly, was one of the main features of the Belfast Agreement. In practice, it entails that Northern Ireland has an independent legislative body, devolved from the British parliament in Westminster. The Assembly is based on power-sharing between ethnic groups, where both nationalists and unionists are in practice guaranteed places in both the parliamentary body of the Assembly and the governing body of the Executive Committee. This means that major parties cannot be excluded from legislature, which, considering the cleavage between nationalists and unionists apparent today, guarantees representation for both sides.

When Paisley in 1998 spoke of Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness as coming from the “filthy nest of murderous Irish nationalism”, few could have fathomed that they would be governing together barely a decade later. Considering the rhetoric used to articulate the Peace Process as a threat to unionism and Protes-

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167 Hansen, 2012:539ff
168 Kerr, 2006
169 Paisley, 1998
tants, it is remarkable that the successful power-sharing Executive Committee could come about in this relatively short period of time. Regardless of his rhetoric, Paisley performed a desecuritising act by accepting both his own and McGuinness' new positions as representatives of the largest parties in Northern Ireland after the elections in 2007. Seen from the perspective of his constituency, this change of heart could be viewed with suspicion. Yet, as Ganiel asserts, Paisley could justify the DUP's participation in the structures set up by the Belfast Agreement by referring to how he never did support it, but instead called for a renegotiation, something that succeeded somewhat with the St. Andrew's Agreement.

In 2007, Paisley asserts that he no longer deems the union to be threatened. He speaks of how republicans have ended their terror campaign and accepted partition and simultaneously claims that the union with Britain has been strengthened. This mode of desecuritisation can be identified as a change through stabilisation, wherein the conflicting parties have ended up recognising each other as legitimate. This might not mean that the conflict has been resolved, but instead that the issue has been moved to the background. However, since neither party of the conflict has fully won, there is still a risk that the conflict could flare up again.

One could also call it a demonstration of rearticulation; an active political solution has been offered and the securitisation has been resolved. As such, a power-sharing Executive Committee may indeed be a demonstration of decreased animosity, in that is has moved security issues into the political sphere to be handled by democratic means. Yet, a question does remain as to whether a conflict can ever truly be resolved. Though there is some evidence that changes in identity are indeed taking place, in particular in regard to strength of religious affiliation, the cleavages within Northern Irish society are still apparent, regardless of the current political structure. There is no guarantee that a political solution such as this will result in a desecuritisation of the religious or societal aspect of the securitisation. The identity of unionists is still intricately tied to the British symbols of banal nationalism that are used to construct and reproduce imagined communi-

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170 Ganiel, 2007:311; Paisley, 1998; Paisley, 2000; Paisley 2001
172 Hansen, 2012:539
173 ibid.:542f
174 Fahey et al., 2006:37ff; Walker, 2012:149f
ties in order to create ties to geopolitical entities\textsuperscript{175}. This was demonstrated when a decision by the Belfast City Council to fly the Union Jack 18 days a year instead of every day sparked nationwide riots in the summer of 2012. The sectarian violence continued well into 2013 and is still somewhat ongoing. Thus, despite a perceived political solution to the conflict, the animosity and tensions between the unionist and nationalist communities remain unresolved and consequently, the desecuritisation that power-sharing entails may refer mostly, if not exclusively, to the political entity of Ulster, therethrough separating the sector synthesis. Despite threats to identity and religion being closely intertwined with the idea of the state of Ulster, they are also dependent on ideas of othering that are not necessarily altered through performative political action.

I do, however, assert that a desecuritisation through rearticulation has taken place in regard to the securitisation of the political entity of Ulster, through the establishment of power-sharing. I also claim that while a minor desecuritisation has taken place in regard to the imagined community of Ulster, the issue has not been resolved, and could thus be defined as change through stabilisation given that the tensions are mostly dormant, but seem viable to flare up when threats relating to cultural identity and heritage are perceived. On a theoretical level, there may also be an ontological contradiction in claiming the finality that a rearticulation entails, since finality is inherently impossible given how dichotomies cannot cease to exist altogether\textsuperscript{176}. Yet, the process of politicisation does not necessarily require a dichotomy to cease altogether. The issue of how to govern the Province is political in nature, and the division of communities as well as the relationship to the Republic of Ireland and the British Government are an inherent part of the communicative political sphere. For these issues to be depoliticised they would need to be silenced completely, and given the nature and history of the situation in Northern Ireland, this seems extremely unlikely.

4.3.2. De-escalation of Sectarian Violence

Another performance of desecuritisation can be connected to the institutionalised securitisation of sectarian violence. In this regard, several performative actions within social practice have taken place. The issue of performance is especially important here, since it is inherent to the nature of desecuritisation that it is not necessarily performed and reproduced in speech. However, it is important to keep in mind that institutionalised securitisations are notoriously difficult to desecuri-

\textsuperscript{176} Hansen, 2012:544
tise\textsuperscript{177}. In continuation of this, a question can certainly be raised as to whether violence in itself can ever be desecuritised, or whether the institutionalisation is so hegemonic that little convincing will ever be necessary on the part of the securitis- ing actor in order to articulate it as a threat.

Yet, several performative actions have occurred since the Belfast Agreement was implemented and violence has de-escalated significantly, as has militarisation\textsuperscript{178}. Firstly, the estimated number of deaths related to sectarian violence has decreased considerably. In 1998, the total number of deaths was 55, whereas in 2012, two victims were recorded. During the past decade, sectarian deaths have been at less than 10 victims per year, and are often associated with dissident republican groups. Many of the murders have been committed by the same organisation that the victim was a member of, and drugs are suspected to be related to a number of the cases\textsuperscript{179}. Secondly, both the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries have decommissioned their weapons. As previously discussed, the 2005 decommissioning of weapons by the IRA was regarded with suspicion from Paisley, yet it was generally accepted by the Irish and British governments as well as the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), the independent organisation monitoring the decommissioning, that the weapons were destroyed\textsuperscript{180}. Lastly, Operation Banner came to an end in 2007. The operation was the longest-running British military operation in history: the first British troops were deployed to protect Catholic civilians at the beginning of the Troubles in 1969. The withdrawal of troops was welcomed by nationalists, whilst the UUP and DUP regarded it as premature; Paisley articulating security normalisation as a surrender to the IRA that every unionist should condemn\textsuperscript{181}.

While these indicators do point to a de-escalation of violence and demilitarisation of Northern Ireland they do not, however, prove that sectarian violence in general and republican violence in particular has necessarily been completely desecuritised. There are, however, indicators that it may be both articulated as, and perceived as less of a threat\textsuperscript{182}. Yet, violence, criminality and terrorism continue to be mentioned in conjunction with Sinn Féin and the IRA both during and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{177} ibid.:532
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Mitchell, 2011
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Sutton Index of Deaths
  \item \textsuperscript{181} Paisley, 1995
  \item \textsuperscript{182} Paisley, 2007b
\end{itemize}
after decommissioning. This pulls the normative aspect of desecuritisation into question and affirms that one cannot claim that securitisation is universally bad and desecuritisation is universally good given that “no ‘universalism’ can exist without spatial or temporal exceptions.” Hence, a desecuritisation of sectarian violence, be it republican or loyalist, may indeed not be normatively desirable since this could result in it being regarded as legitimate political action. By remaining institutionally securitised, sectarian violence can be accepted as a threat to the people of Northern Ireland and can consequently be dealt with accordingly.

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184 Hansen, 2012:535f
5. Discussion

This chapter involves a discussion of the results of my analysis. Firstly, I discuss Paisley's securitising moves and whether these can be regarded as successful, given the lack of articulated emergency measures. Secondly, the concept of othering is elaborated upon, along with how friend/enemy distinctions constitute an understanding of both security and the political within the Copenhagen School. I discuss this in relation to how Paisley articulates the Other as a threat, thus constituting an identity for himself and his supporters, and how a reconstruction of the Other could contribute to peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

5.1. Defining Successful Securitisation

According to the Copenhagen School, a securitisation needs to fulfil a number of criteria in order to be successful. An existential threat toward the referent object must be articulated in conjunction with a justification for extraordinary measures that are not ordinarily accessible. The audience subsequently needs to accept the use of extraordinary measures. The exact moment of when a successful securitisation occurs can be difficult to pinpoint, since extraordinary measures do not need to be implemented in order for a securitisation to be successful. Also, this narrow definition of success ignores how institutionalised securitisations can come about over time, without a specific moment of intervention.

Since audience accept for emergency measures is, nevertheless, deemed crucial for successful securitisation, it must be defined. In this study, the audience for Paisley's speech acts has been defined as his electorate. Therefore, I assert that audience accept for any articulated emergency measures is displayed through the democratic practices of election, or supporting his standpoint in a referendum. The referendum on the Belfast Agreement took place in 1999, and led to the ratification of the agreement by the populations of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Despite overall support for the agreement, only 57% of Northern Irish Protestants voted in favour compared to 99% of Catholics. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to prove that the lack of support in the Protestant community was due to Paisley's securitising moves during and after the Peace Process. One can, however, not deny that the DUP was the only political party in

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185 Buzan et al., 1998:26
186 McDonald, 2008:576
187 In the Republic the reaction was overwhelmingly positive, with 94% voting in favour. In Northern Ireland the result ended in 71% in favour.
188 Fahey et al., 2006:97
Northern Ireland which did not support the Agreement. The first post-Agreement election took place in June 1998 and resulted in a small decrease for the DUP. It was therefore not before the DUP victory in 2003 that Paisley could demonstrate what he had claimed to be doing all along: that he represented the majority of Ulster\textsuperscript{189}. Considering how he had continued to criticise the Belfast Agreement in the years following its signing, this vote of confidence must be considered an acknowledgement that points to a certain level of success for Paisley in establishing his securitising moves as crucial to the survival of Ulster.

On this background, it is particularly noteworthy how there is a lack of articulated emergency measures in Paisley's speeches. Only once, in regard to the Drumcree riots in 1995, does he justify the use of violence. While he does refer to how Ulster unionists must “come together to defend their hard-won rights and liberties"\textsuperscript{190}, how Ulster will not surrender\textsuperscript{191} and evokes images of war and fighting\textsuperscript{192}, Paisley neither instigates nor justifies the use of violence\textsuperscript{193}. On the contrary, he speaks of democracy and the ballot box, and the “freely expressed democratic will of the people of the Province"\textsuperscript{194}. Thus, an element that the Copenhagen School defines as crucial to securitisation is not apparent here, which raises the issue of whether securitisation has truly been successful and if so, how to define emergency measures.

One way of stretching the theory could be to understand the election of Paisley in 2003 (and 2007) as an emergency measure in itself. In 2001, he does claim that Ulster's only hope of survival lies in supporting him, a statement that could be conceived as somewhat hyperbolic. Yet, albeit the success of a candidate that would previously have been seen as impossible giving his antagonistic nature might seem extraordinary, it still takes place within the open, political sphere. The extraordinary measures of securitisation are called such because they do not take place within this communicative sphere. They are exceptions that might not otherwise be legitimised within a democratic forum. That is not to say, however, that there is not something paradoxical in the way Paisley calls for open and democratic elections and articulates himself as a democrat\textsuperscript{195}, yet simultaneously re-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Bruce, 2007:266
\item Paisley, 1994
\item Paisley, 1995; Paisley, 1996; Paisley, 1997; Paisley, 2004b; Paisley, 2006a; Paisley, 2006c
\item Paisley, 1994; Paisley, 1995; Paisley, 1996; Paisley, 2000; Paisley, 2004a; Paisley, 2006c
\item Bruce, 2007:209
\item Paisley, 1994
\item Paisley, 1999
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
fuses to acknowledge votes for Trimble\textsuperscript{196} or Sinn Féin\textsuperscript{197} as legitimate; but even this does not necessarily make Paisley’s election success extraordinary.

It could also be tempting to define Paisley’s securitising moves as successful politicisations, where the issues are established firmly on the political agenda. Yet, in his speech acts there is no doubt that he does articulate threats and speak security, whilst gaining accord politically. Thus, the dichotomy between security and politics, and lack of graduation therein, poses a problem in regard to where the line between politics and security is drawn\textsuperscript{198}. Based on stringent Copenhagen School theory, the securitisations have not been successful due to the lack of articulated extraordinary measures, yet, they are certainly articulations of security speak. Paisley draws upon substantial religious and historic discourses in order to further emphasise the threat that is posed to Ulster. Yet, if the theory is widened in order to allow for the declining importance of extraordinary measures, the purpose of the theory is also put into question since it aims to understand how the securitisation of an issue makes it possible to fulfil and legitimise extraordinary measures outside the democratic sphere. Despite this, I do assert that an increased focus on facilitating conditions and context as an integral part of successful securitisation could improve its applicability to cases where other elements of successful securitisation are not evident.

5.2. Rearticulating Identities: Prospects for Peace

An important theoretical concept that serves as a basis for the reasoning within Paisley’s securitisations, it that of the Other. The concept of othering has been explored extensively by known scholars such as Edward Said\textsuperscript{199}, Michel Foucault\textsuperscript{200}, Judith Butler\textsuperscript{201} and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe\textsuperscript{202}, and outlines how the identity of the self is constructed in relation to a constitutive Other. Through his speeches, Paisley constructs a threatening enemy Other, whether it be David Trimble, the Irish Government, Sinn Féin or the Pope, who is in a dichotomous relationship with the righteous and truth-bearing community that he represents.

\textsuperscript{196} Paisley, 2001
\textsuperscript{197} Paisley, 1998; Paisley, 1999; Paisley, 2001; Paisley, 2004b
\textsuperscript{198} McDonald, 2008:576
\textsuperscript{200} Foucault, Michel [1976] (1990) \textit{The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge} London: Penguin
This animosity provides the justification for the articulated threats and, when applicable, the legitimisation of emergency measures.

A focus on the friend/enemy distinction constitutes part of the Copenhagen School's understanding of politics and security. The unavoidability of such a dichotomy implies a return to a logic of politics as derived by Carl Schmitt, where this distinction encompasses the very notion of what politics is. That is not to say that the Copenhagen School solely understands politics as Schmittian; its understanding of the political as a communicative sphere of deliberation is decidedly inspired by Hannah Arendt. Despite this, by drawing upon the above-mentioned postmodern scholars, one can surmise that the dichotomy of othering may indeed be unavoidable, considering that the very construction of identity is dependent on an Other.

As my analysis has highlighted, successful securitisation is dependent on the articulation of a threat and enemy in relation to a referent object: the dichotomy between the threatening and the threatened. Whilst the process of desecuritisation does seem to result in a change in how this dichotomy is understood and acted upon, it does not necessarily entail its cessation. As Behnke has argued in continuation of Schmitt, political communities can only exist through distinguishing themselves from the enemy. As such, the desecuritising ideal type of rearticulation, wherein a securitisation is completely resolved, may present a logical paradox, given the inherence of dichotomous enmity to politics. Therefore, a replacement due to a process of change in identities, or change through stabilisation may present a more accurate description of desecuritisations in the case of Northern Ireland. Despite these claims, I do nonetheless assert that desecuritisation through rearticulation could be a theoretical possibility. The friend/enemy distinction that is inherent to politics could certainly be understood as othering which, while adhering to Behnke’s unavoidable dichotomous relationship, does not necessarily demand that the relationship to be one of hostile animosity. As such, there is no innate contradiction in combining the self/other dichotomy with the understanding of politics as communicative. I would claim that this has been demonstrated through the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation articulated and per-

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203 Hansen, 2012:530ff
formed by Ian Paisley. The change in rhetoric demonstrates a change in the will to work toward a compromise, in contrast to the previous hard line stance.

The ideal type of replacement does, nevertheless, deserve further elaboration. By accepting the poststructural premise that othering is unavoidable, it becomes necessary to look for other securitisations. In the case of Northern Ireland, the past could function as one such Other. Thus, by articulating past animosities and violent conflict as a security threat to the referent object of the current stable situation, a general consensus in regard to avoiding repeating patterns of the past could be achieved. Another, more orthodox, way of replacement would be through the replacement of one type of threat or enemy with another. Here, the role of religion could play an important part. Both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are notably religious compared to the majority of Europe, whereas Britain is one of the most secular countries of the continent. Therefore, an ecumenical common defence of faith could provide a high level of identity reconstruction, as the religions shift from opposition to juxtaposition. A final, and perhaps most viable replacement, could be an othering reconstruction of ‘violent extremists’ as opposed to ‘common, peaceful Northern Irish citizens’ - regardless of religious affiliation. Indeed, the construction of such a dichotomy is even somewhat attempted by Paisley in his condemnation of sectarian violence.

The ontological and normative understanding of politics and security in the Copenhagen School is essential to how processes of desecuritisation can be understood. As such, one important issue to discuss when speaking of desecuritisation is the normative implications of desecuritising an issue, and whether a move from a securitised to depoliticised sphere could ever be beneficial. A depoliticised issue is moved out of the communicative sphere of politics, and is, as such, not recognised as an issue worthy of the political agenda. In general, the Copenhagen School prefers politicisation to non-politicisation, since it allows an issue to be

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205 From a policy of No Surrender and refusal to entertain the thought of Sinn Féin in government, Paisley agreed to a power-sharing Executive Committee in 2006 and subsequently acted as First Minister with former IRA leader Martin McGuinness as his deputy before retiring a year later. As early 2003, Paisley's speech acts began to change and he stated that the DUP would be willing to govern with Sinn Féin on condition that the IRA decommission its weapons.

206 Hansen, 2012:542

207 Fahey et al., 2006:45

208 Despite secularisation having surpassed the isle of Ireland somewhat, the role of religion in civil society is starting to be downplayed in both North and South. While Paisley is certainly in theological opposition to Catholicism (for a detailed discussion, see Bruce (2007) Chapter 1, and Elliot (2009), Chapter 3), the fact that his fundamental Presbyterianism has a similar stance on so-called moral issues such as homosexuality and abortion as the Catholic Church, should not be ignored. Given the fundamental differences of faith and interpretation of scripture, however, such ecumenism does not seem likely to occur in the nearest future.

209 Paisley, 1995; Paisley, 1998; Paisley, 2001; Paisley, 2004a; Paisley, 2006a
present on the political agenda\textsuperscript{210}. However, there are possible exceptions to this. A deeply securitised issue might, in fact, be better off being depoliticised to avoid being resecuritised\textsuperscript{211}.

Recent flare-ups of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland have proven that collective identity, in particular, still runs inherent risks of being securitised. Considering the ethno-religious connotations of this conflict, I therefore assert that a complete depoliticisation of religion and national identity where these affiliations become subordinate to other basic political issues such as economy, education and foreign policy, might be advantageous in creating new, less infected, cleavages in Northern Irish society. It therefore seems plausible that such an act of depoliticisation in itself may involve a change in identity and the self/other animosity interest\textsuperscript{212}. On a theoretical level, this involves understanding Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction as a process of othering, thus enabling \textit{rearticulation}, and thereby allowing a stable and lasting peace in Northern Ireland to become a possibility. By actively rearticulating the Other in a less antagonistic fashion, actors such as Paisley could exert an important influence and create a prospect for changes in identity which could eventually lead to a complete rearticulation of all hostile elements that facilitate the Northern Irish conflict and consequently result in lasting peace.

\textsuperscript{210} Wæver, 1993:76
\textsuperscript{211} Hansen, 2012:535
\textsuperscript{212} ibid.:533
6. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to shed light on the conflict in Northern Ireland: an undeniable part of a shared European history that is known because of its violence, but where the underlying reasons are not generally discussed outside the British Isles. Through an application of CDA through the Copenhagen School of Security Studies to speeches by Ian Paisley, I sought to investigate processes of securitisation and desecuritisation and their connection to changes in the Northern Irish conflict. Two discourses of securitisation were unearthed through my analysis: one relating to the referent object of the unionist Ulster, and the other relating to sectarian violence. Further, I moved beyond the speech acts to explore the social practice wherein the processes were situated, and identified performances of desecuritisation that were evident through the introduction of power-sharing and a de-escalation of violence. Lastly, I discussed the theoretical implications of a lack of articulated extraordinary measures for successful securitisation as defined by the Copenhagen School, and how the concept of othering could be actively used in desecuritisation to facilitate peace and stability in Northern Ireland.

In concluding this analysis and considering the prospect for a final solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the current personal role of Ian Paisley ought to be mentioned. He is now 87 years old and has stepped down both as leader of the DUP and Free Presbyterian Church. There is a new generation on the rise that did not experience the extreme violence of the 1970s and thus seem less likely to resort to ancient animosities. However, it is important to note that a generational shift alone will not solve the tensions between communities. Because of the length and death-toll of the conflict, few if any families have been left unaffected, and experiences do trickle down to new generations. On the other hand, religious affiliation is currently in decline in both the North and South, and consequently the religious nationalism that is articulated by Paisley and his followers also seems likely to decline somewhat. I surmise that if the religious content in religious nationalism is taken out, a softer and less dogmatic form of nationalism is likely to emerge. A similar conclusion could be drawn from the recent rise of a specific Northern Irish identification as separate from an Irish or British identification213, which also seems to imply a less conflicted future.

Although this thesis has focused exclusively on the conflict in Northern Ireland, I believe there are several conclusions that could be applied on a broader scale. Firstly, regardless of the background to a conflict, a lasting and stable solu-

213 Walker, 2012:135
tion cannot be facilitated by the moderate actors of a conflict since they, per se, will not have the support of the more extreme parties. In order for a conflict to be desecuritised, the most extreme parties must therefore recognise each other as legitimate, and perform these desecuritising acts in conjunction. Secondly, in today’s globalised world, no conflict can be regarded as completely isolated. Events such as 9/11 changed the world security discourse and, arguably, facilitated the decommissioning of weapons in Northern Ireland. Therefore, on the theoretical level, the role of facilitating conditions within the Copenhagen School need to be regarded as inherent to securitisation. This would help broaden the approach, since security as a speech act is always spoken in a social context. Finally, regardless of wherein the points of issue in any conflict lies, I claim that a reconstruction of identities could play a pivotal role in the quest for peace and stability, in that the Other can be recognised, not as an enemy, but as a fellow, if different, human being.

7. Bibliography


Appendix

Appendix 1: Map of Ireland

Map available at: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ireland_regions.svg
Appendix 2: Glossary of Key Terms and Actors

**Anglo-Irish Agreement:** Agreement signed in 1985 by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Irish Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald. It aimed to bring about an end to the Troubles by confirming Northern Ireland’s constitutional role as a part of the UK but also, for the first time, giving the Irish government an advisory role in the governing of Northern Ireland.

**Anglo-Irish Treaty:** 1921 treaty between what was then the Government of the UK and Ireland and representatives of the Irish Republic. It concluded the War of Independence by giving the new Irish Free State Commonwealth Dominion status, but also allowed Northern Ireland to opt out of the Free State.

**Belfast Agreement:** Also known as the Good Friday Agreement, the agreement was signed between the British and Irish governments and all major political parties in Northern Ireland, bar the DUP, on Good Friday 1998 and signified the first major step towards stabilisation.

**Bertie Ahern:** Taoiseach in the Republic of Ireland from 1996 to 2011 and leader of Fianna Fáil. As such, played a pivotal role in the negotiations of the Belfast Agreement in 1998.

**David Trimble:** Leader of the UUP from 1995 to 2005, he also served as First Minister of Northern Ireland from 1998 to 2002. Trimble held a key role in the negotiations leading up to the Belfast Agreement, and was the joint recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize with John Hume in 1998. After the UUP was defeated by the DUP in the 2005 general elections to British parliament, Trimble stepped down as party leader, and subsequently joined the Conservative Party.

**Decommissioning:** The act of disarming by reducing and destroying weaponry by the various paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland. Decommissioning was a key part of the Belfast Agreement.

**Democratic Ulster Party (DUP):** The largest unionist party in the Northern Ireland Assembly. The DUP is generally regarded as a socially conservative right-wing party. It was founded by Ian Paisley in 1971 and is currently led by Peter Robinson. The party has strong links to evangelicalism and Protestant churches, in particular the Free Presbyterian Church and adheres to the slogan “For God and Ulster.” The DUP was the only major political party in Northern Ireland to oppose the Belfast Agreement in 1998.

**First Minister:** The First Minister and Deputy First Minister are responsible for running the Northern Irish Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The two ministers have equal power and are nominated by the largest parties in the Assembly. Current First Minister is Peter Robinson of the DUP, with Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister.

**Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster:** A denomination founded by Rev. Ian Paisley in 1951. The church is evangelical and adheres to fundamentalist and Calvinist
Protestant doctrines and has approximately 12,000 members, around 1% of the Northern Irish population. It is especially known for its opposition to Roman Catholicism. Ian Paisley retired from religious ministry in 2012.

**Gerry Adams:** Leader of Sinn Féin since 1983, he played an instrumental role in the facilitation of the Peace Process from the late 1980s and onwards. Despite allegations of ties to the IRA, Adams has denied ever being affiliated with the organisation.

**Independent Orange Institution:** An offshoot of the Orange Order that attempts to be somewhat less political than the traditional Orange Order, focusing on guarding the principles of Reformation Protestantism. The Independent Orange Institution is thus not politically affiliated, but Ian Paisley (who is not a member) has been a frequent speaker at rallies and marches.

**Irish Republican Army (IRA):** The Irish Republican Army as referred to here is an abbreviation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which formed after a split with the Official IRA over differences of ideology in 1969. Identified as a terrorist organisation, the majority of its victims during the Troubles were members of the security forces, but a large number of civilians were also killed. The IRA decommissioned its weapons in 2005, but is still alleged to have ties to organised crime. The organisation is also claimed to have close ties to the political party Sinn Féin.

**John Hume:** A founding member of the SDLP, he was the second leader between 1979 and 2001. He is credited with being one of the architects of the Peace Process and Belfast Agreement and received the Nobel Peace Prize together with David Trimble in 1998.

**Joint Declaration:** Also known as the Downing Street Declaration, this declaration was issued in December 1993 by British Prime Minister John Major and Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.

**Martin McGuinness:** Sinn Féin politician and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland since 2007. In the 1970s, McGuinness was involved in the Provisional IRA and held the position of second-in-command in Derry at the time of Bloody Sunday in 1972. He left the organisation in 1974 and subsequently became prominent within Sinn Féin.

**Northern Ireland Executive Committee:** The administrative branch of the Northern Ireland General Assembly to which it answers. The Executive consists of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister as well as various individual ministers.

**Northern Ireland General Assembly:** The devolved legislature of Northern Ireland, acting as a parliament, that has power of legislation in a wide range of areas that are not reserved for the Parliament of the UK. It also appoints the Northern Ireland Executive. The Assembly was established as a consequence of the Belfast Agreement and sits at Stormont in Belfast.
**Operation Banner:** The name of the British force’s armed campaign in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 2007. Initially, troops were deployed to aid the RUC in protecting Catholic civilians from loyalist violence. However, especially after the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972, where 14 civilian Catholic demonstrators were killed by British paratroopers, they lost legitimacy amongst the nationalist minority. Many IRA campaigns were mounted against their presence, and a total of 763 members of the British armed forces were killed during the Troubles, whilst they allegedly killed 305 people, whereof 156 were civilians.

**Orange Order:** A fraternal organisation that is strongly linked to unionism and requires that members be Protestant. The order has lodges in most Northern Irish towns. A large part of the activities of the organisation are parades of which several are held annually, especially leading up to the commemoration of the Battle of the Boyne on the 12th of July. Marches typically move from the Orange Hall to the local church and have been seen as controversial expressions of sectarianism, in particular when traditional routes have passed through Catholic neighbourhoods. During the Troubles, Orange marches often resulted in rioting.

**Peter Robinson:** First Minister of Northern Ireland and leader of the DUP since 2008. Also one of the founding members of the DUP.

**Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC):** The police force in Northern Ireland between 1922 and 2000. Due to its pro-unionist stance and almost exclusively Protestant membership, the RUC was controversial, and not accepted as legitimate by Northern Irish nationalists during the Troubles. In 2001, it was replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).

**Seamus Mallon:** Deputy Leader of the SDLP from 1979 to 2001 and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland from 1998 to 2001.

**Sinn Féin:** Meaning “We Ourselves” in Irish, is the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland. They are currently the second-largest party in the Northern Ireland Assembly and hold the position of Deputy First Minister. Sinn Féin has traditionally held close ties with the IRA, being described as its political branch, and many of its top leaders have been accused of affiliation with the organisation.

**Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP):** A nationalist and social democratic party in Northern Ireland. The party supports a united Irish Republic and was the most popular nationalist party in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. In contrast to Sinn Féin, they strongly rejected violence and held no ties to republican organisations. The SDLP held the position of Deputy First Minister in the Executive until 2001, however, after the Belfast Agreement and IRA ceasefire, they lost ground to Sinn Féin.

**St. Andrew’s Agreement:** Agreement signed in 2006 by British and Irish governments as well as the main political parties. Its main components involve Sinn Féin acceptance of the newly instated Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and a DUP commitment to power-sharing between unionists and nationalists, resulting in the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive.
Stormont: The Northern Irish parliament buildings in Belfast.

Taoiseach: The Prime Minister and Head of Government in the Republic of Ireland. As of 2011, the Irish Taoiseach is Enda Kenny.

Ulster Unionist Council (UUC): The Ulster Unionist Council is an umbrella organisation for Unionist political groups in Northern Ireland.

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP): The UUP is a unionist, conservative political party in Northern Ireland. It was the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles. Its leader, David Trimble, was pivotal to the Peace Process, which resulted in the Belfast Agreement. After the agreement, the party held the position of First Minister until 2001 but has since lost ground to the DUP which has taken over as the largest unionist party in the North.

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF): A loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, founded in the mid-1960s. The UVF was founded to combat republican violence and protect the Northern Irish constitutional status. A majority of its victims during the Troubles were Catholic civilians and attacks were carried out in both the North and South. In the UK, the UVF is defined as a terrorist organisation. The UVF called a ceasefire in 1994 and, despite several breaches, decommissioned its weapons in 2009.

Westminster: The Parliament of the United Kingdom as often referred to by parties in Northern Ireland.
Appendix 3: Timeline of Important Events

Pre-Troubles
1916  Easter Rising in Dublin acts as a starting point for a popular movement to liberate Ireland from Westminster rule.

1919-1921  Irish War of Independence.

1921  Irish Free State established and Home Rule introduced to the 26 counties in the South. The island is partitioned as the remaining six counties in the North-East remain under direct British rule.

1921-1922  Irish Civil War.

1937  Republic of Ireland established.

The Troubles
1966  Loyalist paramilitary organisation, the UVF founded.

June 1968  Civil Rights Movement established.

August 1969  After extensive rioting in Northern Ireland, Operation Banner commences. British Forces are deployed to Northern Ireland to protect the Catholic population after rioting in Derry and Belfast results in several deaths and a large number of the Catholic population being forced to flee their homes.

December 1969  Ideological disagreements within the IRA result in a split into the Official IRA and Provisional IRA (IRA).

September 1971  Ulster Defence Association (UDA) is formed. It quickly becomes the largest loyalist association in Northern Ireland. Few weeks later, the radically unionist DUP is formed by leaders of the Protestant Unionist Party, with Ian Paisley at the helm.

January 1972  Bloody Sunday in Derry. Several unarmed civilians shot by British paratroopers during a civil rights march. The British embassy in Dublin is subsequently burned to the ground by protestors in the Republic.

May 1972  The Official IRA announces a ceasefire. This marks the end of their military campaign during the Troubles.

May 1974  Dublin and Monaghan bombings by the UVF leave 33 people dead and more than 300 injured.

Autumn 1974  Guildford and Birmingham pub bombings by the IRA in England. A total of 22 British civilians and 4 soldiers killed.
July 1976 British ambassador to the Republic of Ireland, Christopher Ewart Biggs assassinated by the IRA in Dublin.

August 1976 Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan become leaders of the Peace People, where Protestants and Catholics rally for peace together for the first time, after an IRA volunteer is shot dead by the British Army whilst driving, causing his car to spin out of control and kill three children. They are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977.

1981 Hunger Strikes in the Maze Prison by republican prisoners. A total of 10 of the hunger strikers die as a result, including 26-year-old MP Bobby Sands.

October 1984 Brighton Hotel Bombing. Five people killed by an IRA bombing at the hotel where the Conservatives are holding their annual conference. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher escapes without injury.

November 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement signed by British PM Margaret Thatcher and Irish Taoiseach Garrett Fitzgerald. A month later, all the 15 unionist MPs at Westminster resign in protest.


December 1993 Joint Declaration signed by Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and British Prime Minister John Major.

July 1994 The IRA announces complete ceasefire. The Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC), which represents all the loyalist paramilitaries, follows suit in October.

December 1995 David Trimble elected as the leader of the UUP.

February 1996 The IRA ends their ceasefire with London Docklands Bombing. In June, they destroy large parts of Manchester’s city centre in the Manchester Bombing.

April 1998 The Belfast Agreement is signed on Good Friday at Stormont, the Northern Irish Parliament buildings. Referendums held in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland a month later result in the Republic voting 94.4% in favour, whereas the North votes 71.2% in favour.

June 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly elections held. The UUP's David Trimble elected First Minister. SDLP’s Seamus Mallon elected Deputy First Minister.

August 1998 Omagh bombing by a dissident group calling themselves the Real IRA kills 29 in the deadliest attack on civilians in Northern Ireland during the Troubles.
December 1999  Direct rule from Westminster ends. Power handed over to the Northern Irish Assembly.

October 2001  The IRA starts decommissioning its weaponry. Four years later, in 2005, they issue a statement that their armed campaign has ended.

October 2002  Northern Ireland Assembly suspended over an alleged IRA espionage ring at Stormont. Direct rule from Westminster reintroduced.

2003  DUP wins majority of Ulster votes, thus becoming the largest political party in Northern Ireland for the first time. Sinn Féin becomes the biggest nationalist party with the UUP decreasing to become the second-largest unionist party, and the SDLP the second nationalist party. Since the DUP refuses to go into government with Sinn Féin, the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive remains suspended.

March 2007  Following the 2006 St. Andrew’s Agreement where the DUP agree to enter into a power-sharing devolved government in Northern Ireland, elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly take place, which further increases the votes for both the DUP and Sinn Féin, compared to 2003. Subsequently, Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams meet face-to-face for the first time. Two months later, the new Northern Ireland Assembly meet and the Northern Ireland Executive is formed with Ian Paisley as First Minister and Sinn Féin leader Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Leader.


Post-Troubles

August 2012  Decisions to only fly the Union Jack on designated days on the Belfast City Hall sparks loyalist riots and the worst sectarian violence in 15 years throughout the Province.