Yooda & Rashii
Pragmatic motivations and the perception of information

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Bachelor’s thesis
Japanese Studies
Spring semester 2013

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ABSTRACT

The Japanese evidentials *yooda* and *rashii* both express inference, but it is difficult to articulate their difference. This paper presents a new theory that can explain the practical use of said evidentials, including cases that are problematic for previous research. A secondary use where they adjectivize a noun or predicate has also been taken into consideration, to avoid cross-contamination between the two different uses. Examples of the practical use of *yooda* and *rashii* and counter-examples to previous theories have been analyzed and discussed with a native Japanese speaker. The findings indicate that Japanese is very listener sensitive, and that *yooda* and *rashii* reflect this. The distinction between them depends on how the speaker perceives the information in an utterance from not only his own, but also the listener’s perspective. Pragmatic strategies are also employed to manipulate how information is perceived in discourse. It is concluded that *yooda* is used to present information euphemistically, and *rashii* is used to distance the speaker from the information to avoid emotional conflict etc. As such, politeness seems to take precedence over their evidentiality.

**Keywords:** Evidentiality, Japanese, politeness, pragmatics, *rashii*, territory of information, *yooda*
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank, in no particular order: Axel Svahn, Eric Ahl, Lars Larm, Manami Koyanagi and Simon Engwall. Without your insightful advice and comments, not to mention your help and encouragement, this paper would not have been possible.
CONVENTIONS
Glossing conforms to the Leipzig Glossing Rules. Glosses and any translations lacking citation are added by the author. Romanized Japanese from other sources has at times been altered for consistency.

ABBREVIATIONS
ACC accusative
CONC concessive
CONF confirmation
COP copula
GEN genitive
GER gerund
NEG negative
NPAST nonpast
PAST past
POL polite
PROG progressive
TOP topic
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC

The purpose of this paper is to explain the difference between the Japanese auxiliaries *yooda* and *rashii*, which tend to be indiscriminately translated into English as “seems”. But as Nevara & Tanimori (2003:593) explain, they both “hold their own particular nuance, having delicate shades of difference that are difficult to translate into English”. While they are ambiguously taken to have the same meaning in English, in Japanese, there are cases where using one over the other would sound unnatural or even ungrammatical (Nevara & Tanimori 2003:598). Trent asserts that learning to use sentence final auxiliaries such as these correctly is one of the biggest challenges for non-native learners of Japanese, and difficult even for native language teachers to systematically describe (1997:77).

Frequently referred to as evidential, these auxiliaries are described as requiring some previously obtained information, or source, as a basis for making an inference. Evidentiality, according to Aikhenvald (2004), is not concerned with the truth of a statement. It simply marks the information as originating from a specific source, such as what the speaker saw, or what he heard from someone else. Whether the information is factual or not is unimportant – evidentiality can be said to be a question of accuracy rather than fidelity.

Aikhenvald also asserts that evidentiality is grammatically obligatory, and that only languages where an omitted evidential marking is ungrammatical can be considered “truly” evidential. This puts the evidential status of *yooda* and *rashii* in jeopardy as there are clear cases where they can be omitted or replaced without it being ungrammatical (Trent 1997, McCready & Nogata 2007b). However, McCready and Nogata argue that the notion of evidentiality being grammatically obligatory is a fallacy, and that while languages where they are strongly preferred exist, there are in fact no languages where they are truly obligatory (2007b:152). Rather than being grammatically obligatory, Trent instead implies that they are a pragmatic requirement for socially acceptable discourse (1997:342). Although the evidential status of *yooda* and *rashii* is outside the scope of this paper, some allusions as to their evidentiality may be made because of the very nature of the investigation.

One might think that supplying the source for a claim has to do with certainty, but *yooda* and *rashii* seem to actually indicate uncertainty. For instance, they only co-occur with adverbs that denote uncertainty, and are infelicitous if the evidence for a proposition is too strong (McCready & Nogata 2007b:181). Since they function to make an inference based on
uncertainty, they are also considered to encode an element of epistemic modality (McCready & Nogata 2007b, Narrog 2009). Narrog explains that epistemic modality has to do with the degree of commitment on the part of the speaker, expressing a judgment on the likelihood of a proposition being factual based on the speaker’s knowledge of the world (2009:10).

As such, *yooda* and *rashii* are thought to be both evidential and epistemic modals. The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality is still a matter of debate, with evidentiality sometimes being classified as a sub-category of epistemic modality (Narrog 2009:10). But Aikhenvald (2004) expressly states that this is not the case. While evidentiality and epistemic modality has no direct relation, she consents to the fact that they are not mutually exclusive and thus overlap can be seen.

There is a further usage of *yooda* and *rashii* that in this paper is judged to be completely separate from the evidential use of the two. This distinction is by no means new, but they are seldom treated completely separately, and as a result some theories become muddled as they try to treat them together – sometimes even going as far as leading to false conclusions.

McCready & Nogata (2007a) correctly identify the need for a more strict separation between the two. In the non-evidential use of *yooda* and *rashii* they act as suffixes, attaching to nouns and effectively *adjectivizing* them. Hence this use is dubbed the *adjectival* use, as opposed to the *evidential* use. We will continue using these two opposing designations in this paper. However, this paper argues that McCready & Nogata fail to identify all of the syntactic uses of the *adjectival yooda*; namely that it not only works in conjunction with nouns, but also with adjectives and verbs in full-fledged propositions.

As for the *evidential* use, countless attempts have been made to discern the difference between *yooda* and *rashii*; or as Narrog puts it: “Given their commonalities, much ink has been spent on the issue” (2009:118). But despite this, there are still inconsistencies between the different theories and no consensus seems to be in sight. In this paper some of the most noteworthy theories from the last 30 or so years will be cross-examined with the intent of explaining the usage of *yooda* and *rashii*, but the findings indicate that the current theories are insufficient to account for all practical uses of the two. Therefore, a new theory that is based heavily on the pragmatic intents of the speaker is proposed. Borrowing from the ‘Theory of Territory of Information’ by Kamio (1994, 1995), and the revisions to it proposed by Trent (1997), the theory in this paper is in line with many of the findings of previous research while still being able to account for atypical uses of *yooda* and *rashii*. In addition, it is my aim to debunk some of the misconceptions that are still present regarding *yooda* and *rashii* along the
way, since even recent research is sometimes based on the unsupported claims of previous theories.

1.2. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY

This paper is organized by starting with the grammatical properties of *yooda* and *rashii*, followed by a closer look at their different uses, and finally the proposed theory of how they are distinguished. This structure is meant to promote understanding by moving from the most basic and widely recognized aspects of the two forms to progressively easing into a more abstract analysis and new and uncharted territories.

The next part of the paper, chapter 2, provides a closer look at the form and function of *yooda* and *rashii*. Chapter 2.1 deals with their morphology and syntax, and defines the boundaries of the topic of research more closely. Chapter 2.2 elaborates on the *adjectival* use, as it is important to grasp the difference between the *adjectival* and *evidential* use of *yooda* and *rashii* in order to avoid misconceptions and false conclusions when analyzing their function. In chapter 2.3, previous research regarding the *evidential* use is discussed. This chapter demonstrates not only how the theories proposed by current research vary widely, but also provides examples of how they are insufficient to account for the practical use of *yooda* and *rashii*. The proposed theory for differentiating between the *evidential* *yooda* and *rashii* is presented in chapter 3. Finally, chapter 4 summarizes and discusses the findings.

The method utilized in this paper is mainly the analysis of examples of *yooda* and *rashii* being used practically. Although examples lifted from previous research often work within the framework proposed by said research, counter-examples such as the ones presented here show that they cannot account for all practical uses of *yooda* and *rashii*. This paper also purposefully includes atypical and challenging examples found by the author, mostly from modern literature but also from other sources such as Japanese *dorama*,¹ to ensure that the proposed method can properly account for all instances of *yooda* and *rashii*, and not just prototypical examples. In order to avoid the arbitrary and misconceived interpretations that can sometimes be seen regarding *yooda* and *rashii*, the examples have been cross-examined and discussed with a native Japanese informant.

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¹ Japanese television drama.
2. YOODA AND RASHII

2.1. MORPHOLOGY AND SYNTAX

Although *yooda* and *rashii* may be similar in meaning, they differ morphologically. Whereas *rashii* is an adjective, *yooda* is a nominal adjective,\(^2\) and accordingly, they inflect as one would expect. Typically, in the *evidential* usage method, they appear as sentence final auxiliaries, following verbs or adjectives in their plain nonpast or past form. The predicate preceding the auxiliaries can be negated, but the auxiliaries themselves generally reject negation.

1. Kare wa hontoo no koto o shira-na-i rashi-i
   
   He TOP truth GEN matter ACC know-NEG-NPAST RASHII-NPAST
   
   It seems [rashii] he doesn’t know the truth.

2. Kare wa hontoo no koto o shit-tei-ta rashi-i
   
   He TOP truth GEN matter ACC know-PROG-PAST RASHII-NPAST
   
   It seems he [rashii] knew the truth.

3. Kanojo wa saifu o wasure-te shimat-ta yoo-da
   
   She TOP wallet ACC forget-GER completely-PAST YOO-COP.NPAST
   
   It seems [yooda] she forgot her wallet.

4. Kanojo wa tsukare-tei-ru yoo-da
   
   She TOP tired-PROG-NPAST YOO-COP.NPAST
   
   She seems [yooda] tired.

*Rashii* and *yooda* can also be used *adjectively*, attaching as a suffix to a noun and seemingly turning it into an adjective or nominal adjective, respectively. Unlike the *evidential* auxiliaries, these can be negated freely.

5. Sakura wa haru rashi-i desu ne
   
   Cherry blossoms TOP spring RASHII-NPAST POL CONF
   
   Cherry blossoms are spring-like [rashii], aren’t they?

6. Kare wa shinshi rashiku-na-i
   
   He TOP gentleman RASHII-NEG-NPAST
   
   He is ungentlemanly [rashii].

7. Ano hito wa marude honmono no santa-san no yoo-da
   
   That person TOP just like genuine GEN Santa Claus GEN YOO-COP.NPAST
   
   That person is the spitting image of [yooda] Santa Claus.

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\(^2\) In Japanese there are two types of adjectives that inflect differently: adjectives and so-called nominal adjectives. For more, see Shibatani (1990:215-16) for example.
8. Kare wa meeku o shi-tei-temo zenzen onna no yoo-dewa-na-i
He TOP makeup ACC wear-PROG-CONC not at all woman GEN YOO-COP-NEG-NPAST
Even if he wears makeup he doesn’t look like [yooda] a woman at all.

When used in this way, they behave differently from their evidential counterparts, and it can be regarded as being a separate use altogether (McCready & Nogata 2007a). This will be referred to as their adjectival use. However, it is possible for rashii and yooda to be used as suffixes while still retaining their evidential use, depending on the context. The reverse is also possible, at least for yooda. That is, yooda can follow a verb or adjective while having the adjectival meaning. A more detailed look at this adjectival use will be given in the next chapter.

When not in the sentence final position, yooda can also be inflected into its attributive form yooni or adverbial form yooni. The attributive form is used when preceding a noun and the adverbial is used when preceding a verb, adjective or nominal adjective. These forms typically denote the adjectival use of yooda. Especially yooni seems to be used exclusively in the adjectival usage method. However, as Tanomura mentions (1991:73), yooni is often used in conjunction with verbs like mieru [to look; to seem; to appear], forming expressions such as “~yooni mieru” [~looks like; ~seems; ~appears] and “~yooni omou” [think of ~ like; ~feels like]. Accordingly, the meaning becomes practically the same as the evidential use of yooda. But since the sort of meaning expressed by these is already encoded in yooda when used normally, they seem to be merely lexical approximations of yooda, and are therefore not considered to be relevant to the purpose of this paper. Moreover, yooni has other uses as well which are unrelated to both the evidential and adjectival yooda.

Rashii also has a literary attributive form, rashiki, which is hardly seen in spoken Japanese, but is still used in literature (Martin, 1988:989). This form is considered to indicate the evidential use (Iwasaki 2011, Tanomura, 1991:67).

On the subject of yooda, there is also a more colloquial auxiliary called mitai which is often referred to as being identical to yooda (Makino & Tsutsui 1986). However, this is not strictly the case. While they do seem similar, the morphology varies between the two. For instance, although they are both nominal adjectives, mitai – unlike yooda – requires neither to be appended with the copula, nor preceded by the particle no or na when following a noun or nominal adjective, respectively. Furthermore, they appear to behave slightly differently on the

3 For further information regarding these see Martin (1988:731) for example.
syntactic level (McCready & Nogata 2007b). It has been pointed out that mitai cannot be used 
anonymously in its attributive form like yooda (Adachi et al. 2003), but not everyone seems to 
share this opinion (McCready & Nogata 2007a, Makino & Tsutsui 1986). In favor of clarity, 
and to avoid misrepresentations, only yooda and rashii will be considered in this paper.

2.2. ADJECTIVAL USE

That yooda and rashii have several uses is hardly a new notion. What we here refer to as the 
adjectival use has for instance previously been called comparison (Adachi et al. 2003) or 
metaphor (Tanomura 1991) in the case of yooda, and appropriate (Teramura 1984) or 
featuring (Kusumoto 2008) in the case of rashii. There is also the naming convention of using 
suffix versus auxiliary to distinguish between the two uses (Tanomura 1991, Iwasaki 2011). 
However, in this paper I have chosen to use evidential and adjectival to distinguish between 
the two uses, following McCready & Nogata (2007a).

One reason is to keep the number of different terms to a minimum, as adjectival can be 
used to refer to both yooda and rashii. Secondly, the classification suffix versus auxiliary has 
syntactical connotations, and while this would be correct in the majority of cases, one of the 
aims of this paper is to show that this adjectival use can occur even outside the position of 
being a suffix, at least in the case of yooda, and vice versa.

So, what then is the adjectival use, and how does it differ between yooda and rashii? 
Unlike in their evidential use, there seems to be much more of a consensus regarding the 
meaning and usage of the adjectival yooda and rashii. This may be because the differences 
between the two are much more evident when used in this way, and there does not seem to be 
any room for overlap in meaning.

2.2.1. Rashii

When used adjectively, rashii attaches to a noun as a suffix, and expresses the archetypical 
qualities of that noun as if it were an adjective. According to Kusumoto (2008), the special 
characteristics of that noun, and what is generally thought about it, is strongly expressed 
without regard as to whether that content is good or bad. Take this example for instance:

   Mr. Oki is manly [rashii].
   (Makino & Tsutsui 1986:375)

This example can be translated as “manly”. In other words, what are generally thought to be 
the stereotypical qualities of a man (strong, masculine, brave etc.) are expressed. Take note,
however, that this use is only possible with nouns that have a tangible meaning that can be expressed in this way. In other words, numerals, expletive nouns and nouns that serve grammatical functions and so forth are not usable with the *adjectival rashii* (Kusumoto 2008:294).

Unlike the example “otoko rashii” [manly] above, the meaning is not always that easy to translate, let alone decipher precisely, as it is based on the speaker’s abstract notion or cultural context of how he thinks something should normally be. Consider the example “Kyooto rashii”. As McCready & Nogata (2007a) explain: “Kyoto is generally thought to have certain properties, e.g. being of historical interest, being beautiful, being elegant, etc.” In the case of “Kyooto rashii”, it would indicate that whatever the speaker is referring to conforms to his image of “typical Kyoto”. They go on:

Imagine that there are two restaurants, both in Kyoto. One, Restaurant A, is located in an ancient temple with an extremely Kyoto-like atmosphere; but they serve only hamburgers. The second, Restaurant B, is on the first floor of an office block, and is relatively atmosphere-free; but the food is classical Kyoto cuisine, and further is excellent. Which is more Kyoto Adj [rashii – added by author]? The answer is completely unclear.

Since there is no concrete, inherent meaning to the word ‘Kyoto’, trying to decide which meaning is most suitable is inane as it depends on the speaker’s perception, and can both include and make reference to various different aspects of the stereotypical image he has in mind. McCready & Nogata (2007a) also bring up the example “ano onna wa onna rashikunai” [that woman is un-womanly]; meaning that the woman in question lacks the properties ordinarily associated with women. However, as they point out, she cannot lack all womanly characteristics, or she would not be a woman at all. Consequently, the characteristics expressed by rashii are peripheral to the most basic intrinsic properties of the noun in question.

Another way you often see the *adjectival rashii* used is in constructs like “watashi rashii” [me rashii] or as a suffix to someone’s name, possibly translating to “in a way typical of that person”, requiring the speaker to have personal experience of the person in question – not just generally thought or culturally accepted notions.

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4 *Kyooto, or Kyoto, is a former capital of Japan which is regarded as a mecca for traditional culture.*
After thinking about it for a moment, I reached the conclusion that it was more logical to assume that I was going to die in a little over twenty-two hours. Thinking about it like the transition to the immortal world and such reminded me of “The Teachings of Don Juan”. How embarrassing. I conveniently thought to myself that “I am going to die”. That way was much more typical [rashii] me.

Also, there are certain limitations concerning what nouns can be used in conjunction with the adjectivized noun. As we saw in the example “ano onna wa onna rashikunai” above, the basic intrinsic properties of the adjectivized noun still hold true. Hence “onna rashikunai” [un-womanly] still refers to a woman. It is therefore not possible to say for instance “*onna rashikunai otoko” [un-womanly man]. Similarly, even an expression like “*onna no otoko rashikunai taido” [the un-manly manner of a woman] is infelicitous (Tanomura, 1991:66). Kusumoto (2008) believes that this has to do with the cognitive process associated with rashii, which will be explained further in the next chapter. But putting it simply, the noun that is adjectivized by rashii and the noun that is modified are tangibly the same, making any mutually exclusive content, such as man and woman, impossible.

In practice however, this does not seem to strictly be the case, as my informant informs me that it is not completely impossible to use the adjectival rashii with mutually exclusive content. In informal situations it may be possible depending on the context. For instance, this example sounds perfectly fine to my informant:

11. Kare wa meeku o shiteitemo zenzen onna rashikunai.
   He is completely un-womanly [rashii] despite wearing makeup.

As McCready & Nogata (2007a, 2007b) point out, individual speaker judgment seems to vary, so certain speakers may find it entirely possibly while it is clearly infelicitous to others. Different social and dialectal factors probably play a role. As for my informant, she is a female college student from the Tokyo area. But consider the following example:

12. Ringo wa chanto usagi-san rashii.
   (Kanagawa-ken Kawasaki-shi Shinmaruko no Neginikutame [The leek and meat stir-fry of Shinmaruko in Kawasaki, Kanagawa Prefecture] 2013)
   The apple is properly rabbit-like [rashii].

Commenting on a piece of apple that has been deliberately cut to look like a rabbit, the speaker in this example is from a very different social group from my informant, being a businessman in his forties. Clearly, a piece of apple and a rabbit are not fundamentally the same, yet rashii is chosen over youda. It is possible to consider that when referring to an
attempt to deliberately mimic something, rather than a mere coincidental likeness, some speakers find it possible to use rashii. Although it is outside of the scope of this paper, this is an area where I would like to see more research.

Since the adjectival rashii always attaches to a noun as a suffix, it might seem to be easily distinguishable from the evidential rashii. However, it is possible for the evidential rashii to follow a noun directly as well. Consider the following sentences:

13. Moyari no chikatetsueki ni oriru to shibaikenbutsu rashii hito no name ga kokuritsubunrakugenjoo no hoo ni tsuzuiteiru. (Miyake 2006, as cited in Iwasaki 2011:141)
   (i) When I got off at the nearest subway station, a wave of theatergoing-like [rashii] people led in the direction of the National Bunraku Theatre.
   (ii) When I got off at the nearest subway station, a wave of people that seemed [rashii] to be theatergoers led in the direction of the National Bunraku Theater.

14. Wakai gakusei to issho ni, kauntaa de kooji o nomu kyooju rashii roojin o mita. (Tanaka 1986, as cited in Iwasaki 2011:141)
   (i) I saw a professor-like [rashii] elderly person that is drinking coffee by the counter together with a young student.
   (ii) I saw an elderly person that seemed [rashii] to be a professor drinking coffee by the counter together with a young student.

In cases like these, the interpretation of rashii becomes ambiguous, and the perceived meaning will vary depending on how it is interpreted on the receiving end.

Although ambiguous cases are not completely avoidable, there are ways to discern the adjectival rashii from the evidential. The first and most clear-cut case is when the adjectivized noun modifies an instance of the very same noun, as in “otoko rashii otoko” [manly man]. In cases like this it is obvious that the noun that is referred to is, in fact, a man. An evidential interpretation, as in “a man that seems to be a man”, would simply be redundant. Hence the formula [N1 rashii N1] can always be taken to mean the adjectival use (Tanomura 1991).

Another telltale sign of the adjectival use is whether or not rashii itself is negated, as in the earlier example of “onna rashikunai” [un-womanly]. According to Teramura (1984), the evidential rashii cannot be negated, and therefore it must be adjectival if negated. However, Martin (1988:986) claims that even the evidential rashii can be negated. Personally, I have not been able to find any conclusive examples of the evidential use being negated, but it is plausible that some speakers find it possible as individual judgment seems to vary in these regards (McCready & Nogata 2007b).

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5 Japanese puppet theater.
The next means of differentiation is rashii’s literary attributive form, rashiki. Although not as prevalent, and definitely not representative of interpersonal conversation, it is still used in writing, and indicates the evidential use (Tanomura 1991, Iwasaki 2011):

(Tanaka 1986, as cited in Iwasaki 2011:140)
The beach was an open expanse of mud. Huge timber logs were piled up here and there. At the heart of it all was a building that seemed to be [rashii] an auto repair shop, with countless tractors carelessly left behind.

Finally, there is a phonological difference between the evidential and adjectival rashii (Martin 1988:988; McCready & Nogata 2007a:45, Tanomura 1991:67). If the word preceding rashii ends in a low accent mora, it denotes the evidential use, as the adjectival rashii will always override the low accent of the final mora, as if changing the accent pattern of the two words to a single word. However, if the preceding word ends in a high accent mora, the difference is not as clear, as there seems to be a difference in opinion regarding the phonological properties of rashii itself. While Tanomura seems to indicate that the adjectival rashii starts with a high accent and the evidential rashii starts with a low accent, Martin states that while the adjectival rashii always starts with a high accent the evidential rashii can be either high or low.

McCready & Nogata on the other hand make no allusion to the change in accent in rashii, only mentioning the change to high accent in the preceding word. However, even with these differences in mind, a low accent preceding rashii will always be taken to mean the evidential use. Here is an example of the difference according to McCready & Nogata:

This is a ghost house, according to rumor [rashii].

House that is like [rashii] a haunted house according to rumor.
(McCready & Nogata 2007a:45)

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6 In Japanese each distinct phonetic unit is referred to as a mora, and each one of these can have a distinct pitch accent of either high (H) or low (L). For more on the accentual patterns of Japanese see for example Tsujimura (2001).
7 Since the accents of particles are modified by the words they come into contact with hyphens are used to show this relation in this and the following example.
It is also worth noting, that besides these methods of distinguishing between the *evidential* and *adjectival rashii*, perhaps the most obvious is the context itself. Language seldom exists in a vacuum devoid of further context, and likely, put into a larger context or judging from the situation itself the intended usage is made clear.

As a final addendum, I would like to make a brief mention of words such as *bakarashii* [absurd] that have become fully freestanding words in their own right, with a distinct meaning of their own, and not nouns with *rashii* as a suffix. On that cautionary note, we are finished with describing the *adjectival* use of *rashii*.

### 2.2.2. Yooda

The use of the *adjectival yooda* does not adhere to a strict set of rules as closely as the *adjectival rashii*. Unlike the *adjectival rashii* that only co-occurs with nouns, the *adjectival yooda* can co-occur with nouns, verbs and adjectives, and still retain the *adjectival* meaning. In this sense, the *adjectival* labeling is not as clear as in the case of *rashii*. But if it is thought of as a nominal adjective presenting the preceding predicate or noun adjectively, the distinction will hopefully be clear. As a nominal adjective, it is also often seen inflected into its attributive form *yoona*, or its adverbial form *yooni*, which seems to be used exclusively for the *adjectival* meaning. Often referred to as *comparison* (Teramura 1984, Adachi et al. 2003) or *metaphor* (Tanomura 1991), this *yooda* is used to describe an impression or semblance that clashes with reality (Tanomura 1991):

17. Kimura-san wa marude sake o nonda yooda.
   Mr. Kimura looks as if [yooda] he had just drunk sake.
   (Makino & Tsutsui 1986:549)

The situation described by this sentence is not actually true, but is rather just a simile. Teramura (1984:243) describes it as knowing something is not true, but that it has an aspect that resembles reality. In a similar vein, Kusumoto (2008) states that it expresses things that are close but not the same as a metaphor:

18. Shoogakusei no shuugakuryokoo de, shanai wa tsubame no mure ga saezuru yoodatta.
    During a field trip for elementary school students, it was like [yooda] a flock of swallows were chirping in the train car.

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8 Although it also has other uses that are unrelated to the *yooda* described in this paper. For more info see for example Martin (1988:731).
Unlike the *evidential yooda*, Tanomura (1991:71) explains that the *adjectival yooda* can also be used to describe impressions that have two mutually contradicting aspects:

   
   When the arrangements were finished, it felt as if my life so far had ended. It seemed like *yooda* a long experience, but when it ended, it also seemed like *yooda* an awfully short time.

He also points out that expressions like “*wakaru yoona wakaranai yoona kao*” [a face that looks like it (both) understands (and) doesn’t understand], and other variations of the formula *X yoona Y nai* (negative) *yoona* are often seen.

Opposite what we saw with the *adjectival rashii*, a noun with *yooda* attached as a suffix cannot modify a noun that is essentially the same, or as McCready & Nogata (2007a:39) put it, *yooda* actually requires whatever it modifies to lack the property denoted by its complement.

In other words, in an example such as “*ano hito ha otoko no yooda*” [that person looks like a man], “*ano hito*” [that person] cannot be a man. Of course, that means that expressions like “*otoko no yoona otoko*” [a man that looks like a man] are also infelicitous (Kusumoto 2008).

As the *adjectival* for the most part behaves the same as the *evidential yooda* syntactically, there are cases where the distinguishing between the two becomes ambiguous:

   
   (i) The deliciousness of quickly gulped down cold beer seemed to make *yooda* living in the jungle for close to two months and the fatigue since San Quentin almost completely fade away.
   
   (ii) The deliciousness of quickly gulped down cold beer made it seem like *yooda* living in the jungle for close to two months and the fatigue since San Quentin almost completely faded away (but it didn’t).

Of course, as in the case of *rashii*, the difference is often made clear through context. Certain adverbs such as *marude* [as if; as though; like] and *atakamo* [as if; as it were; as though] only co-occur with the *adjectival* use, and conversely, use of the adverbs *dooyara* [it seems like; it appears that] and *doomo* [somehow] clearly mark the *evidential* use (Teramura 1984, Tanomura 1991, Adachi et al. 2003). Additionally, use of the question particle *ka* after the predicate preceding *yooda* marks the *adjectival* use (Tanomura 1991, Adachi et al. 2003).

Martin states that such a construction can be taken to mean that the previous proposition seems ‘as if it were true’ (1988:732).
21. Ano hito no kuchiburi wa, marude jibun dake ga tashii ka no yooda.
(Adachi et al. 2003:168)
The way that person speaks, it is as if [yooda] only (s)he is correct.

Also, when used attributively, yooda can typically be taken to be *adjectival* rather than *evidential*. Kusumoto (2008:292) goes so far as to say that yooda in the attributive form must always be taken to mean the *adjectival* use. However, let’s examine this counter-example:

22. Genba no oyakata no yoona hito wa toomawashi ni kojiba ni onna nanka ireru mono dewanai, to iu yoona koto o itta ga, watashi wa kikoenai furi o shiteita.
The man who looked like [yooda] the boss at the site said that they should not let a woman step in the site, but I pretended I didn’t hear it.
(Sono 1995, as cited in Sugi Riggs 2006:253)

In this example the attributive form *yoona* is used to describe someone who looks like the boss at a construction site, with the implication that he in fact is the boss. As explained earlier, the *adjectival* yooda implies that what you are describing is evocative of something, but cannot be the very same thing. But judging from the context in this example, it would become rather absurd if interpreted in the following way: “The man that looked as if he were the boss (but wasn’t) at the site said that they should not let a woman step in the site, but I pretended I didn’t hear it.” Therefore it follows that the attributive *yoona* can also be used *evidentially*, although it is usually used *adjectively*.

Finally, similarly to how it was with rashii, there appears to be some discrepancy between the *adjectival* and *evidential* when it comes to the negation of yooda itself. According to Teramura (1984:246) the *evidential* yooda cannot be negated, but the *adjectival* can. But this seems to be an oversimplification, as the *evidential* yooda can be negated in denial to a preceding statement, such as in response to a question (Larm 2006:157). Furthermore, McCready and Nogata speculate that it may be possible to negate the *evidential* form if it is presented as expressing someone else’s evidence (2007b:170). But, suffice it to say, the *evidential* yooda resists being negated (Larm 2006:158). The *adjectival* yooda however is susceptible to negation:

23. Sakki no tokoro yori wa sukoshi chikazuita node, kao ga moo sukoshi hakkiri miete kita keredo, yappari mito koto no nai kao de koojikankeisha no yoodewanai yoodatta.
(Shiina 1994)
Since he was closer than a moment ago, I could see his face a little bit more clearly, but as I thought I had not seen him before and he didn’t appear [yooda] to be a construction worker, it seems [yooda].
This example exemplifies why it is important to consider the evidential and adjectival use separately. If both were taken to be evidential the previous sentence would be very paradoxical indeed, as it is would translate roughly to “it did not seem to seem”. In summary, I hope that not only in the previous sentence, but in the chapter as a whole, the difference between the adjectival yooda and rashii has been made clear, as well as the difference between the adjectival and evidential.

2.3. EVIDENTIAL USE

2.3.1. Theories of dyadic opposition

As we saw in the previous chapter, the difference between the adjectival rashii and yooda is quite apparent, since the difference between them is distinct enough to not allow for overlap. However, this is not the case for the evidential yooda and rashii. Much has been written on the topic of how they differ from one another, but no consensus has been reached and as such there is a myriad of different theories. More often than not their relationship is presented in terms of dyadic opposition. As one of the earliest theories to be presented in English, Aoki’s (1986) dichotomy of direct versus indirect evidence has been very influential. According to Aoki, yooda is used “when the speaker has some visible, tangible or audible evidence collected through his own senses to make an inference”. Rashii on the other hand, is used “when the evidence is circumstantial or gathered through sources other than one’s own senses” (1986:231).

Differentiation based on source of information can be seen in many other theories as well. McCready & Nogata (2007b) assert that the fundamental difference between yooda and rashii are the types of evidential sources they encode. In their findings, yooda can be used with tactile, visual, auditory, internal sensory (such as pain and feeling sick, perceivable only to the speaker himself) and unknown sources, but is questionable with regards to hearsay information. Rashii on the other hand, is incompatible with tactile and visual evidence, but works exceptionally well with hearsay evidence. The problem with these theories is that they are inconsistent with the actual usage of yooda and rashii. Consider the following sentences:

24. Kinoo obaa-chan no tokoro ni ikimashita. De, hochooki da kedo, jitsu wa moo motteiru rashii. (Misete moratta, kasutamu meido no mono deshita)
I went to Grandma’s house yesterday. As for the hearing aids that we discussed [though we assumed otherwise] in reality she already owns [rashii] a pair. (She showed it to me, and it was a custom-made thing.)
(E-mail message, as cited in Sugi Riggs 2006:241)
25. Doobutsu ya nyoo no shuuki ga hana o tsuita. Iki o koraete Mitsuko wa kensoo ga tsutawatteiru kookoo no oku ni nita kono uramichi o susunda. Ashi ni nanika furete omowazu koe o dashita.
“Doo shimashita.”
“Nanika funda rashii no.”
(Endoo 1986:172, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:157-158)
The alley smelled of animals and urine. Holding her breath, Mitsuko walked along the back street, which reminded her of the inside of a mouth, while the sounds of revelry continued to echo from behind.
Something brushed against her leg, and she yelped. “What is it?”
“I THINK [rashii] I stepped on something.”
(Trans. Van C. Gessel, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:157-158)

26. Shinbun ni yoru to sensoo ga hajimaru yooda.
According to the newspaper, it seems [yooda] that a war will begin.
(McCreedy & Nogata 2007b:189)

In the first example, rashii is used even though the evidential source is direct and visual – the hearing aid is seen personally. In the second example, something directly touches her leg – direct tactile evidence – and yet rashii is used. In the final example, from McCreedy and Nogata (2007b) themselves, yooda is used to report hearsay from a newspaper. Hence, the distinction of direct versus indirect evidence, or rashii and yooda only being compatible with certain evidential sources, cannot properly explain the actual use of yooda and rashii.

Asano-Cavanagh (2010) has a slightly different approach to differentiating them. Using what is known as the ‘Natural Semantic Metalanguage Theory’, she uses ‘semantic primes’ to try to extrapolate the individual semantic meaning of yooda and rashii. ‘Semantic primes’ refer to basic lexical items that have been identified as universal and culture-independent, and are thought to be fundamental to human thought. These are then used to try to paraphrase the meaning of yooda and rashii. The results are as follows:

rashii
(a) I think this about X
(b) I think like this because I know something else about X
(c) I don’t say I know

yooda
(a) I think I can say something like this about X
(b) I think like this because I know something about X
(c) I don’t say I know

(Asano-Cavanagh 2010:175)

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9 See Goddard & Wierzbicka (2002) for more information.
Except for alternative (b) for both, the definitions are very vague. Especially (c), which is the same for both, suggests that they can be interchangeably used to express uncertainty, namely that the speaker does not know it as a fact. But what governs the selection of one form over the other, let alone other expressions of uncertainty such as *kamoshirenai* [may; might; maybe; perhaps]? This definition does not accommodate the fact that *yooda* and *rashii* point to having some sort of basis for the inference – or their evidentiality if you will – either. The definitions in (a) suffer the same inadequacies; ‘I think this about X’ is too simplistic and can easily be used to describe other expressions. However, according to Asano-Cavanagh, the difference between *yooda* and *rashii* here is that while *rashii* states a simple thought, *yooda* involves the speaker’s comparative judgment. But I believe that this distinction is also a misconception, which will be discussed in further detail later.

The last category, (b), is more compelling. While Asano-Cavanagh states that she does not believe in overly simplistic explanations such as direct versus indirect evidence, this category presents a strikingly similar interpretation to Aoki, who states that *rashii* is “used when the evidence is circumstantial or gathered through sources other than one’s own senses” (1986:231). While Asano-Cavanagh rejects the claim that *rashii* cannot be used with evidence gathered through one’s own senses, she strictly adheres to the notion of the evidence being circumstantial. In turn, the difference between *yooda* and *rashii* becomes a dichotomy of circumstantial versus non-circumstantial evidence. Consider the following sentence:

27. Sono toki, matamo doa ni nokku no oto ga shita.
Namino wa sore o kikitsuke, hiniku o itta.
“Oi, dareka kita yooda yo. Sumaatona seinen demo yatte kita n janai no ka.”
(Hoshi 1972:132, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh, 2010:164)
Then, again, there was a knock at the door.
Namino heard it and said sarcastically, “Hey, LOOKS LIKE [*yooda*] someone’s come. It isn’t some fancy young man, is it?”
(Trans. Stanleigh H. Jones, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh, 2010:164)

According to Asano-Cavanagh, *yooda* is used here because of the non-circumstantial evidence of a knock on the door. However, couldn’t this also be taken to be circumstantial evidence? If as in this scenario, the ‘X’ for ‘I think like this because I know something about X’ is ‘a visitor has come’, then you would have to know something about the fact that ‘a visitor has come’. But in this case, the evidence is circumstantial – you heard a knock on the door. The knock could certainly be caused by means other than a visitor, and therefore the evidence can be interpreted as circumstantial. Likewise, in example 25 above, Asano-Cavanagh argues that *rashii* is used because of the circumstantial nature of the evidence, but I
would argue that the evidence of directly feeling something touch your foot is not circumstantial; it is in fact one of the least circumstantial ways I can think of in that scenario. As such, this method becomes very open to interpretation. Of course, there are plenty of other examples as well that contradict this method of differentiation, not least example 24 where the hearing aid is seen directly – hardly circumstantial evidence – yet rashii is used.

If the source of evidence is not the differentiating factor then, what is? According to Teramura (1984) it’s a matter of how large a role the speaker’s own reasoning plays. When using rashii, the speaker’s own inference is low and therefore rashii is more objective. But when using yooda, the speaker’s own inference is more important, and it is therefore more subjective. But again, it is not difficult to find contradictory examples:

28. Watashi wa Hokuriku Tonneru ga mada tsukurikake no toki ni sono koojigenba o mita koto ga aru… Genba no oyakata no yoona hito wa toomawashi ni kojiba ni onna nanka ireru mono dewanai, to iu yoona koto o itta ga, watashi wa kikoenai furi o shiteita. Genba ni onna ga hairu to engi ga warui to iu iken kara rashii ga, genba ni ookina jiko mo nakute kansei shita yooda.

I had an opportunity to visit the construction site of Hokuriku Tunnel when it was still under construction… The man who looked like [yooda] the boss at the site said that they should not let a woman step in the site, but I pretended I didn’t hear. It seems [rashii] that there is a jinx that if a woman gets in the construction site, it brings bad luck to the construction…; in reality, the tunnel seemed [yooda] to be completed accomplished without any significant incident.

(Sono 1995, as cited in Sugi Riggs 2006:253)

29. Shiai wa sude ni hajimatteita. 19:00 kara to ryokoosh o ni kaite uta ga, panfu o mite miru to 18:00 kara hajimatteita – yooda.

The game had already started. According to a guidebook for tourists, it was supposed to start at 19:00. Yet in reality, it seems [yooda] that the game started at 18:00 as the pamphlet stated.

(Excerpt from a weblog, as cited in Sugi Riggs 2004:55)

In the first example, the writer uses yooda to describe that the tunnel seemed to have been completed without incident. This sort of matter-of-fact statement can hardly be interpreted as subjective. In the second example, the information written in a pamphlet is stated using yooda. Again, this is not at all subjective information. Regarding the objective nature of rashii, consider these examples:


Chittomo hanashi no tsuzuki janai node, watashi wa bikkuri shite Yuichi o mita.

“Boku datte, Eriko-san mitai ni omoitsu de ikiteru tte kimi wa omoitteiru rashii kedo, kimi o ie ni yobu no wa, chanto kangaete kimeta koto do kara…”

(Yoshimoto 1988:58, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:166)


“To continue what we were talking about,” said Yuichi. “Are you planning to move out from our place, too? Don’t.”
I looked at him, puzzled. It wasn’t a continuation of anything we had been talking about.
“You SEEM [rashii] to think that I live on impulse, like Eriko, but inviting you was something I thought over very carefully…”
(Trans. Megan Backus, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:166)

31. Watashi wa honsho o kakioeta toki, dooshite kono mono o daroo to jimon shita. Omoo ni dooyara watashi wa, konnichi no genjitsu, toku ni mata nihon oyobi nihonjin no mondai ni tsuite, watashi nari no vijon o teikyoo shitakatta rashii.
After I finished writing I asked myself why I wrote such a thing. It seems [rashii] that I wanted to provide my own opinion about present reality, specifically, about problems in Japanese society and Japanese people.
(Doi 1991, as cited in Sugi Riggs 2004:54)

In example 30, the speaker’s inference that her conversational partner seems to think that she lives only on impulse is highly subjective, since it is impossible for the speaker to actually know what another person thinks. Similarly, example 31 also expresses subjective reasoning, as it would be implausible for someone to be able to articulate his own internal motivations objectively. Again, this theory is based on the hypothesis of yooda and rashii having oppositional meanings, but cannot always correctly account for their use.

2.3.2. Theory of fundamental difference
Based on the above, I do not believe there is a binary opposition between yooda and rashii. Instead, there must be some other cause that governs their use. A theory proposed by Tanomura (1991) states that, rather than an oppositional relationship between the two, the very meaning they encode is different on a fundamental level. Rashii is used to make an inference from a pre-established basis, and yooda expresses an impression obtained either from the speaker’s senses or thinking, or a combination thereof. Unlike rashii, yooda does not have some factual piece of information as a basis for inference. However, Tanomura goes on to say that the closeness that can be observed between yooda and rashii is caused when the cognitional aspect of yooda is given priority and the expressed assumption is based on a previously obtained piece of information, making yooda overlap into rashii’s territory (1991:69). He stresses however, that despite this it does not go beyond the fundamental workings of yooda that expresses an appearance or impression.

Basing his theory on the same principles as Tanomura, Kusumoto (2008) states that the difference between yooda and rashii can be gauged by the speaker’s mental processing. The so-called anaphoricity of rashii is not something separate from the speaker. Rather, the pre-established basis of rashii is merely a judgment inside the speaker’s head. Kusumoto calls it
the comparison between knowledge and mental image, which results in the speaker’s a priori cognition. Knowledge refers to the speaker’s knowledge of the world, and mental image is the intended propositional content. These are then compared to one another by a cognitive process.

In the case of *rashii*, this is a binary process that results in the proposition being accepted in the case the two matching, or rejected if they do not match. Furthermore, there is no margin for the speaker’s own consideration to enter into the process.

As for *yooda*, instead of a binary process that looks for a match, the comparison between the speaker’s knowledge and intended proposition gauges whether or not they resemble each other, and as such there is an intervention of the speaker’s own thinking. But when this resemblance is measured as being a complete match, the use becomes very close to that of *rashii*, which is why they are perceived as similar. The difference is that even in this scenario, *yooda* permits the speaker’s own reasoning while *rashii* does not. This is why *rashii* supposedly has more of a ring of truth to it than *yooda* (Kusumoto 2008:288).

However, there is a big flaw in this theory. Much like Teramura’s (1984) theory, the fact that *rashii* does not allow for the speaker’s own reasoning at all means that it is perceived as being completely objective, while *yooda* states the speaker’s subjective impressions. As was shown above, *rashii* can indeed be subjective and contain the speaker’s own reasoning. Furthermore, it will later be demonstrated that *rashii* can be used as a pragmatic strategy, which is also incongruous with disallowing the speaker’s own reasoning. Worth noting perhaps, this theory seems to be consistent with the adjectival use, but starts to fall apart upon further inspection of the evidential usage. Even though I find the cognitional aspect of the theory implausible, like many of the theories above it does bring up some valid findings, although the reasoning behind them may be flawed. These findings will be presented together with the proposed theory in the next chapter in order to be easier to absorb.

### 2.3.3. Theory of speaker judgment

In what seems to be at odds with the other theories up to this point, Sugi Riggs (2004, 2006) suggests a more pragmatically driven theory where the speaker plays a more active role. According to this theory, “the speaker’s choice of *yooda* versus *rashii* is based on a desire to convey specific information. The type of information source that underlies a speaker’s conclusions does not influence this decision” (Sugi Riggs 2004:56). The proposed dichotomy states that *rashii* is used to emphasize the speaker’s judgment and *yooda* is used to deemphasize the speaker’s judgment.
So, what factors would cause a speaker to purposefully emphasize or deemphasize his inferential judgment? This theory states that *rashii* is used when the information is unexpected to both the speaker and listener:

32. Katei no shufu wa amari hon o yomanai rashii. Soo iu choosa kekka ga aru... Okusangata wa hon o yondeiru no dewanai ka to yosoo shiteita dakeni, kono suuji wa yaya igai deatta. Housewives seem [*rashii*] to seldom read books. There are statistics that indicate this... Since I had presumed that housewives spend more time reading, the statistical number referring to them is a little bit unexpected. (Toyama 1981, as cited in Sugi Riggs 2006:251)

In this example, Sugi Riggs argues that the author, who is a male professor, makes a revelatory statement about a social group that he himself, and the anticipated target audience of Japanese businessmen, are unfamiliar with. The ‘high focus’ *rashii* is used to augment his surprise and draw attention to his new findings. The following sentence is taken from the same book:

33. Kangaete miru to (kangaete minakutemo hakkiri shiteiru ga) wareware wa sukoshi koohii o nomisugiru yooda. When I think it over – it’s obvious even if I don’t think about it too seriously – we seem [*yooda*] to drink too much coffee. (Toyama 1981, as cited in Sugi Riggs 2006:252)

Here, the author makes an observation about his own social group, and presumably his audience based on the use of the pronoun wareware [*we*]. Since the revelation is not considered surprising, he uses the ‘low focus’ *yooda*. In this theory, *yooda* is used when the speaker is not certain about a judgment, when it validates pre-existing expectations, or when the information is thought to already be expected by the listener. Or as Emanuel Schegloff puts it: “Ordinarily, *speakers should not tell recipients what they suppose (or ought to suppose) the recipient already knows*” (quoted in Sugi Riggs 2004:58).

While this theory claims to be able to account for the usage of *yooda* and *rashii* in all cases, it is solely driven by the speaker’s pragmatic motivations, and it sometimes becomes necessary to jump to subjective conclusions about the speaker’s intended meaning. Thus, some interpretations become arbitrary. Moreover, the position that *rashii* is always used to emphasize one’s own statement is not strictly true, as the opposite is demonstrated in the proposed theory. It also offhandedly dismisses many of the findings from other theories, which in my opinion have too much supporting data to just overlook. In certain cases, these findings account for the usage better than only Sugi Riggs’ method alone, such as in the case for hearsay and speaking euphemistically. More on this can be seen in the following chapter.
3. PROPOSED THEORY

3.1 EVIDENTIAL USE AND TERRITORY OF INFORMATION

The theory presented in this paper continues the line of thought presented in Shirota (1998), which states that *yooda* expresses the speaker’s opinion, or an inference that exhibits something akin to the speaker’s approval or concern. As such, *yooda* is said to express information inside of the speaker’s territory. Conversely, *rashii* suggests that the speaker is relying on someone else’s authority regarding the basis for an inference, or that it is based on something external that the speaker is unable to influence himself. It is therefore said to express information outside of the speaker’s territory. The following example exemplifies this well:

34. Kanojo wa hyoojoo o isshun kagetta yooda. Nanika iyana koto o omoidashita rashii.
   (Shirota 1998:351)
   Her expression seemed to [yooda] darken for an instant. It seems [rashii] she recalled something unpleasant.

Since the inference that her expression changed is based on the speaker’s perception, it falls into the speaker’s territory and *yooda* is used. The inference that she recalled something unpleasant, however, is something that only she herself can know, and it therefore falls outside of the speaker’s territory and *rashii* is used.

However, this dichotomy of inside versus outside the speaker’s territory is too simplistic to always properly account for all the uses of *yooda* and *rashii*. Sugi Riggs also criticizes this distinction, claiming that defining which territory information falls into can be problematic. She uses the following sentence as an example:

35. Um, moji wa onna no yooda na.
   (Natsuki 1980, as cited in Sugi Riggs, 2006:242)
   Um, it looks like [yooda] a woman’s writing.

In this example two detectives are examining an anonymous letter, and one detective makes an inferential judgment based on the handwriting. Sugi Riggs questions the fact that the information can be considered to fall into one detective’s territory over the other’s when they both have access to the same information simultaneously. Furthermore, *yooda* is followed by the particle *na*,\(^{10}\) which indicates that the speaker is soliciting agreement from the listener (Sugi Riggs 2006:243). For these reasons, I believe that simply differentiating between *yooda*

\(^{10}\) The particle *ne* is also used to solicit agreement.
and rashii as inside versus outside the speaker’s territory is insufficient to explain their practical use, and that a more comprehensive theory is required.

Kamio’s ‘Theory of Territory of Information’ (1994, 1995) offers a more exhaustive look at the workings of information territories, giving a more detailed definition of how to determine what territory information falls into. According to Kamio, yooda and rashii are used when information is either outside of both the speaker’s and listener’s respective territories, or when it is inside the listener’s territory but outside the speaker’s. No allusion is made to the difference between yooda and rashii, let alone other similar expressions. Ultimately, this theory is too broad and does not accommodate the different uses of yooda and rashii.

However, elaborating on Kamio’s ‘Theory of Territory of Information’, Trent (1997) makes some modifications that, while not strictly pertaining to yooda and rashii, suggest that the speaker’s pragmatic motivations can be seen as an underlying factor for choosing between the two. Trent suggests that the Japanese evidential system is in fact quite hearer-sensitive, and that the speaker’s awareness of the listener’s knowledge is also taken into account. Because of this, the speaker can choose to make the listener’s territory appear to be larger than it actually is, so that it includes the speaker’s own territory. Reversely, the speaker can also make his own territory appear smaller than it actually is, so that the topic at hand appears to be outside of his territory. When applied to yooda and rashii, this conclusion makes sense of many of their atypical uses. In a sense, this theory is very much in line with what Sugi Riggs’ theory describes in that the speaker plays an active role, and chooses between yooda and rashii based on pragmatic motivations.

What then, first of all, does an individual’s information territory entail? For example, internal sensations such as pain or other abstract feelings, information regarding professional expertise, and facts that are historically and socially qualified as truth et cetera. In other words, information that an external party should be incapable of refuting. Taken from Sugi Riggs, information that validates pre-established expectations are also considered part of one’s information territory. Information that is completely inside a speaker’s territory typically does not require an evidential marker. Information that is outside of one’s information territory is unexpected information, hearsay information and so forth. Information that is thought to be known or anticipated by the listener naturally falls into the listener’s territory. It is worth noting that this is not something that has to do with type of information or

\[ {\text{For a more detail see Kamio (1994, 1995) and Trent (1997).}} \]
information source per se, but is rather a subjective perception made by the speaker. The territories are merely abstract representations that serve to more easily illustrate the speaker’s motivations for choosing between *yooda* and *rashii*.

Now that we have established what an information territory is, how does this correlate to *yooda* and *rashii*? The proposed theory is not as straightforward as outside versus inside, but also takes the speaker’s pragmatic strategies into consideration. Let’s start with *yooda*, which is used when the information is judged to be inside the speaker’s territory, such as when validating some previously held expectation by the speaker. But what’s more, I argue that it is also used when information is judged to be inside the listener’s territory, such as when making reference to the listener’s internal sensations. Furthermore, it is also used when the information falls into both the speaker’s and listener’s territory, which is what is happening in example 35 above. Lastly, *yooda* is also used pragmatically when the information falls into the speaker’s territory, but the speaker makes it appear as though the listener is included. As in example 35, this is supported by the fact that *yooda* is often seen with the particles *ne* and *na*, which are used to solicit agreement from the listener. A search of the online corpus ‘Kotonoha’ for instance reveals 1050 instances of “*yoo desu ne*” compared to only 252 instances of “*rashii desu ne*”. A quick search of Google Books reveals even more overwhelming support of this fact. Hence *yooda* can be seen as having a very strong sense of inclusion and euphemism.

*Rashii* on the other hand is used when the information is judged to be outside of both the speaker’s and listener’s territory. This is why *rashii* is frequently identified as having a hearsay function for instance. But *rashii* can also be used pragmatically, when the speaker makes information in his own territory appear to be outside of it and in turn making it seem more objective or uncertain. Sugi Riggs also identifies *rashii* as being used more often in sentences involving the speaker’s reasoning, based on the inclusion of the word “*kara*” [because] (2006:249). This also points to the information being presented as unexpected as it would usually be redundant to state the reason for something that the listener already knows.

One of the advantages of this theory is that it successfully accounts for the typical uses of *yooda* and *rashii* identified by other theories as well as atypical cases. For instance, Kusumoto (2008) identifies a set of situations in which supposedly only *rashii* and not *yooda* can occur and vice versa. Let’s look at these with our proposed theory as a basis.
3.1.1. Hearsay

Although hearsay can be expressed with *yooda* as well, as we showed earlier, it is predominantly used with *rashii*. While Sugi Riggs (2004:59) argues that the use of hearsay with *rashii* is incidental, and merely suggests that the info is highlighted as noteworthy by the speaker, I find that it is too frequent to be incidental. Instead, the reason that *rashii* often co-occurs with hearsay is because hearsay information by its very nature is information outside of the speaker’s territory. But this theory also accounts for why *yooda* can be used for hearsay. Consider the following example:

   “Sono nijuushin wa soo iu noirooze mitaina jootai de nai toki wa okinai no desu ka.”
   “Demo nai yoodesu ne. Bunken ni yoru to lwate-ken no shoogakkoo no onnakyoooshi ga soo iu jikakushoojoo ga nai nimokakawarazu nijuushin o okoshiteimasu. Kanojo wa sono tame ni gakkoo o san do mo menshoku ni natta soodesu.”
   (Endoo 1986, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:157)
   “Ah, I see.” Tono showed no suspicion. “If it's for a novel, I seem to remember that Dostoevsky wrote about something like this.”
   “Does this doppelgänger condition occur other than in instances of neurosis?”
   “It SEEMS [yooda] to. According to the documentation, a woman who taught at elementary school in lwate prefecture had the doppelgänger experience without any of the other subjective symptoms. She was discharged from the school on three different occasions because of it.”
   (Trans. Van C. Gessel, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:157)

In this example where *yooda* is used to report hearsay, the speaker prefaces the report by saying that he seems to remember reading about it. Furthermore, the actual report is an affirmation of the listener’s question, which means the information is not unexpected by neither speaker nor listener. As such, *yooda* is more suitable than *rashii*. Adachi et al. (2003:169) state that when *yooda* is used to report hearsay, a stronger nuance of how the speaker perceives the information is felt compared to *rashii*. My informant remarks that the fact that the speaker in this example is a psychologist is important, as this presupposes that he should have prior knowledge regarding the subject of the report. This is also in line with the assumption of professional knowledge falling in the speaker’s territory, even in the case of hearsay, while *rashii* is used with information outside of the speaker’s territory.

This example with using *rashii* also illustrates an important point:

37. Ninja wa na, asa tte iu ki o mainichi tobikoete, sono ki ga dondon okiku natte, sugee takasa made toberu yoo ni naru rashii zo.
   (My Tree 2011)
Ninjas, you see, would jump over so called hemp trees every day, and as those trees grew they would become able to jump to incredible heights, it seems [rashii].

In this example, an adult is telling a story to a six-year-old about how ninjas would jump over the same tree every day, from when it was planted until it became full-grown, and thus became able to jump incredibly high. Of course, he fully realizes that this is a complete fabrication, and naturally uses rashii, making the information appear outside of his own territory. My informant agrees, saying that this is a common use for rashii. This goes against Sugi Riggs’ (2004, 2006) assumption that rashii emphasizes the speaker’s judgment, as it in this case has the opposite effect – the speaker uses rashii to deemphasize his own judgment since he knows that the proposition isn’t true. The same phenomenon can be seen in the next example as well.

3.1.2. Avoidance of responsibility

Rashii is frequently identified as having an air of avoidance of responsibility (Kusumoto 2008, Adachi et al. 2003, Shirota 1998). Kusumoto points out that a doctor using rashii to make a statement about a patient’s condition would sound as if he is resigning his professional judgment (2008:291). This is also in accordance with the information being outside of the speaker’s territory. However, this is not necessarily a bad thing, as the following example shows:

Daughter-in-law: “Demo, amari atsugi o saseru to ase o kaitari ugokinikukattari de kaete yokunai rashii desu yo.”
(Hayatsu 1988, as cited in Kusumoto 2008:291)
Mother-in-law: “Don’t you feel cold in such light clothes, you poor thing? Please put on something more.”
Daughter-in-law: “But since I’d start sweating and it would be hard to move around if I put on more clothes, it doesn’t seem like [rashii] a good idea to get changed.”

Like this, rashii can be used to avoid emotional conflict when turning down advice and so forth. Martin also states that rashii is “sometimes used as a modest reply to questions, even though the speaker is quite sure of his facts” (1988:988). Hence, rashii can be used as a pragmatic strategy, allowing the speaker to shrink his own territory of information to appear more uncertain or less responsible. Next, let’s take a look at cases where only yooda, and not rashii, is thought to be usable according to Kusumoto (2008):
3.1.3. Expressing a situation occurring before the speaker’s eyes

One use of *yooda* is to express an obvious situation that should not require any sort of inference at all. For instance, imagine that it starts raining and the following sentence is uttered:

39. Ame ga futte kita yooda ne.
   (Kusumoto 2008:292)
   It seems [*yooda*] to have started raining.

In examples like this, there should be no need for using neither *yooda* nor *rashii*, as the situation presents no uncertainty or margin for inference. However, according to Kusumoto, *yooda* is used when the speaker notices the occurrence of a situation and thinks over what do because of that, or in order to evoke something in the listener. It suggests that some kind of feeling wells up as a reaction to the situation (2008:289). Therefore, it goes without saying that *yooda* is used pragmatically here, in order to show inclusion or to look for agreement et cetera. Again, this is reinforced further by the inclusion of the particle *ne*.

Also, it may be anecdotal, but in my observation the same phenomenon seems to exist in English as well. One of the fundamental principles of conversation is to coax your conversational partner into replying in order to keep the conversation going. This can easily be accomplished with questions for example, since they directly solicit a response. In contrast, the worst possible strategy to keep a conversation going is a blunt statement, such as “it is raining”. This makes it difficult for the partner to come up with an appropriate response. However, “it seems to be raining” indirectly invites the partner for a response, and thus the conversation doesn’t reach a standstill. I estimate that this function of *yooda* serves a similar pragmatic function.

3.1.4. Expressing the speaker’s internal sensations

*Yooda* can also be used when expressing the speaker’s own internal sensations, such as:

40. Chotto ohara ga itai yoona node, hokenshitsu e ittemo ii desu ka.
   (Kusumoto 2008:292)
   My stomach hurts a little it seems [*yooda*], so may I go to the school infirmary?

   (Matsumoto 1983, as cited in Kusumoto 2008:292)
   Yamada. Call the car. Somehow I seem to [*yooda*] have the shivers so I’m going home.

This is also a case where there is no apparent need for *yooda*. Instead, it has a pragmatic function. Kusumoto states that in situations like this *yooda* is used to explain the situation, or
express the speaker’s feelings or wants (2008:292). Again, the speaker is looking for some kind of reaction from the listener, such as permission, in the first example, or something akin to understanding or forgiveness in the second example. In the same way as previously seen above, the speaker chooses to include the listener by expanding his territory.

However, Kusumoto also says that while rashii cannot be used in examples like the two above, it can be used for things like colds, fever and drunkenness, because they can be measured from the outside as well (2008:292). For example, a speaker might for instance find out that he is running a fever by using a thermometer, without having felt feverish prior. Hence it would be unexpected information and fall within the guidelines of using rashii. However, my informant still finds such examples with rashii unnatural when speaking about oneself, but says that such an example is possible if someone else reads the thermometer and uses rashii.

3.1.5. Making a euphemistic inquiry
Naturally, the internal sensations of the listener are in the listener’s territory. Therefore the speaker can only speak speculatively, and does so by using yooda to make a euphemistic inference:

42. Daibu otsukare no yoodesu ne.
   (Kusumoto 2008:292)
   You seem [yooda] very tired.

As with expressing something occurring before the speaker’s eyes, yooda is used to solicit a response from the listener by making a euphemistic inquiry.

3.1.6. Expressing an opinion conservatively
Lastly, yooda can be used to soften a statement. Similar to using rashii to avoid responsibility, yooda can be used when one is quite certain of something but finds it more suitable to speak conservatively. It can also be used to present a personal opinion more empathically:

43. Sono fuku wa chotto hadena yoodesu ne.
   (Kusumoto 2008:293)
   Those clothes seem [yooda] a little showy, don’t they?

The listener’s information territory is expanded to include the speaker’s in this case as well. These four uses demonstrate how yooda differs from rashii and how they are divided pragmatically. It should also be noted that overlap can be seen between the different uses of
3.1.7. Making an inference

Many theories claim that there is no big difference between *yooda* and *rashii* when making an inference (Adachi et al. 2003, Teramura 1984), but the theory presented here argues that there is an underlying pragmatic implication in the speaker’s choice of one over the other. Adachi et al. for instance state that *rashii* takes something that has been observed as evidence and makes an assumption about an unknown matter:

44. *Pasokon no dengen ga hairanai. Kowarete shimatta rashii.*

(Adachi et al. 2003:168)

The computer won’t power on. It seems [*rashii*] to be broken.

45. *Tanaka no heya no dentoo ga kieteiru. Dooyara neteiru rashii.*

(Adachi et al. 2003:168)

The light is turned off in Tanaka’s room. It seems [*rashii*] like he is sleeping.

However, they later state that the same sentences can be used with *yooda* without any apparent difference. But I argue that in these sentences, the difference between *yooda* and *rashii* is the perceived territory of information. For example, if it is unexpected by the speaker that the computer in the first sentence won’t start, *rashii* is used because it is outside of his information territory. However, if he is trying to implicitly inquire the opinion of the listener on the matter, or he is a computer repairman for example, he would use *yooda*. Likewise, in the second example, if the fact that Tanaka is sleeping validates some pre-existing expectation, such as knowing that Tanaka was up all night the night before and should therefore be dead tired, *yooda* would be used. According to my informant, in examples like this, *rashii* has the feeling of the speaker being more distant, as if he doesn’t really know. This agrees with what Adachi et al. said above about *rashii* making an inference on an unknown matter. *Yooda* on the other hand sounds more subdued. This could be taken to mean that the information isn’t as surprising to the speaker, such as when confirming a prior assumption, or that he is speaking euphemistically. As such, both of these remarks seem to coincide with the proposed theory.

Teramura also brings up the following example where *yooda* is used in what he calls a general tendency guess:

46. *Kono suika wa oishii yooda.*

(Teramura 1984:245)

This watermelon seems [*yooda*] delicious.
She goes on to say that the inference is based on the general tendency of watermelons with a certain shape, color, or even the sound they make when struck to be delicious (1984:245). In other words, the speaker’s expectations. However, not all examples are as straightforward as these, as we will take a look at next.

3.1.8. Examples that are problematic and loose ends

As with the theories analyzed in the previous chapter, there are situations where the use of rashii or yooda may seem unclear. Take this previously mentioned example for instance:

   Chittomo hanashi no tsuzuki janai node, watashi wa bikkuri shite Yuichi o mita.
   “Boku datte, Eriko-san mitai ni omoitsuki de ikiteru tte kimi wa omotteiru rashii kedo, kimi o ie ni yobu no wa, chanto kangaete kimeta koto dakara…”
   (Yoshimoto 1988:58, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:166)
   “To continue what we were talking about,” said Yuichi. “Are you planning to move out from our place, too? Don’t.”
   I looked at him, puzzled. It wasn’t a continuation of anything we had been talking about.
   “You SEEM [rashii] to think that I live on impulse, like Eriko, but inviting you was something I thought over very carefully…”
   (Trans. Megan Backus, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:166)

In this sentence, it could be argued that rashii is used solely because of the unexpected information, as the speaker is clearly depicted as being quite dumbfounded by her friend’s utterance. However, you would then have to overlook the fact that the speaker’s proposition has to do with the listener’s internal thoughts – clearly falling into the listener’s territory. But using yooda in cases like this would seem quite odd. Not only is the information unexpected in this situation, but the speaker strongly disagrees with it. If she used yooda here, it would sound as though she was speaking euphemistically or agreeing with the listener. My informant agrees, saying that making an inference about what someone thinks with rashii and then stating your agreement definitely sound strange, whilst on the other hand, stating a disagreeing opinion after rashii sounds completely natural. She adds that both are possible with yooda, but that it sounds more natural when you are stating an agreeing opinion. Because of this pragmatic constraint, it might be best to add a stipulation that rashii is also used when stating an inference that is expected to conflict with the listener. It might be possible to consider this as an extension of the avoidance of responsibility of rashii, used here to avoid emotional conflict.

The next example was also mentioned previously:
48. Watashi wa honsho o kakioeta toki, dooshite kono mono o kaitan daroo to jimon shita. Omoo ni dooyara watashi wa, konnichi no genjitsu, toku ni mata nihon oyobi nihonjin no mondai ni tsuite, watashi nari no teikyoo shitakatta rashii.
After I finished writing I asked myself why I wrote such a thing. It seems \[rashii\] that I wanted to provide my own opinion about present reality, specifically, about problems in Japanese society and Japanese people.
(Doi 1991, as cited by Sugi Riggs 2004:54)

Since this example requires the speaker’s introspection and careful consideration, dismissing it as the information as being outside of the speaker’s territory of information simply based on it being unexpected seems insufficient. A more reasonable explanation comes from Martin, who states that \(rashii\) is sometimes used in first-person propositions “when ‘oneself’ is looked at as if from the outside” (1988:988). In other words, it is a pragmatic strategy by the speaker to make the statement appear to be more objective. If looked at this way, it falls very much in line with the theory of the speaker’s own pragmatic involvement.

This example that was brought up earlier was pointed out as problematic by a reviewer:

49. Doobutsu ya nyoo no shuuki ga hana o tsuita. Iki o koraete Mitsuko wa kensoo ga tsutawatteiru kookoo no oku ni nita kono uramichi o susunda. Ashi ni nanika furete omowazu koe o dashita.
“Doo shimashita.”
“Nanika funda rashii no.”
(Endoo 1986:172, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:157-158)
The alley smelled of animals and urine. Holding her breath, Mitsuko walked along the back street, which reminded her of the inside of a mouth, while the sounds of revelry continued to echo from behind.
Something brushed against her leg, and she yelped. “What is it?”
“I THINK \([rashii]\) I stepped on something.”
(Trans. Van C. Gessel, as cited in Asano-Cavanagh 2010:157-158)

Here, again, one can argue that because the information is unexpected – it certainly seems surprising to the speaker who involuntarily lets out a yelp – \(rashii\) is used. However, solely relying on it being unexpected is a bit questionable as it is wholly possible, albeit rare, for information to be unexpected but still fall into the speaker’s territory, or the listener’s territory for that matter. Adhering to the maxim of cooperation, one must suppose that whatever came into contact with the speaker’s leg is something worth mentioning to the listener. In this scenario, it is not unlikely to consider it being a rat, or some other animal that is regarded as unpleasant. Following this line of reasoning, the speaker’s inference is not whether or not something touched her leg, but rather what it was that touched it. In this case, it would be an inference based on an unknown matter, outside of the speaker’s territory, and thus \(rashii\) would be appropriate.
Moreover, another reviewer suggests that it might in fact be a case of the speaker distancing herself psychologically from the tactile sensation, because of the perceived unpleasantness of the situation. This sort of phenomenon might be what is happening in this example as well:

50. Tera no mae no gakeppuchi de, kunzuhoguretsu no hageshii kakutoo ga okonaware, ottekita nakama no monotachi ga tome ni iku aida mo naku, futari wa tokku miatta mama fukai tanima ni tenraku shiteitta. Nawa o oroshite yonin no mono ga tanima ni orita.
“Koko ni hitori taoreteiru zo.”
“Kurakute docchi da ka wakaranee ga, shindeiru rashii.”
(Nanjoo 1999)
They were locked in a violent struggle at the edge of the cliff in front of the temple, and before the group that came chasing after them had time to stop them, they had, with their eyes locked, fallen into the deep chasm. Throwing down a rope, four people climbed down the chasm.
“One of them landed here.”
“It’s too dark to tell who it is, but he seems [rashii] to be dead.”

Here, it is hardly unexpected that someone would be dead after falling from a cliff. But because it is something that the speaker is probably not used to dealing with, and because of the rather gruesome situation, it is reasonable to assume that some sort of psychological distancing is taking place, and therefore rashii is used. Rather than being a strategy, this is most likely a subconscious reaction in the speaker. However, it is plausible that rashii could also be used as a strategy to distance the speaker from information that the speaker would rather not be associated with. And moreover, it might even be possible to use rashii as a strategy to distance the listener from information that the speaker perceives as something the listener would rather not be associated with, out of social grace.

Moving on, the following example illustrates an important point about the pragmatic workings of yooda and rashii:

51. Vikkutorika wa shibaraku henji mo sezu, shomotsu o yomisumeteita ga, yooyaku Kazuya no kotoba ga noo ni tootatsu shita rashiku, “aa” to unazuita.
(Sakuraba 2003:30)
Without answering for a while, Victorique continued reading her books. Finally, Kazuya’s words seemed [rashii] to reach her brain, and she nodded in assent.

In this example, rashii is used despite the fact that the information without a doubt belongs to the territory of the referent. Moreover, the information itself is highly questionable – the inference that the words reached her brain is a simile that doesn’t completely conform to the norm of reality and the known workings of the brain. However, another set of examples from Sugi Riggs (2004:60) manages to shed some light on this mystery:
52. Speaker’s mental inference:
Kono hito wa netsu ga aru rashii.
She seems [rashii] to have a fever.

Speaker’s actual utterance:
Netsu ga aru yooda kedo. Daijoobu?
You look [yooda] feverish. Are you alright?
(Natsuki 1992:68 as cited by Sugi Riggs 2004:60)

These excerpts are referring to the same person, making the same inference, but vary between yooda and rashii. This points to the fact that the pragmatic requirements of face-to-face conversation are not present when thinking to oneself. Consequently, the same must be true in narrative contexts, such as example 51.¹² In summary, rashii can be used without taking the referent’s territory of information into regard, but only in circumstances where the referent remains unaware. But when a proposition is spoken, the listener has to be taken into consideration. Let’s take another look at the example from Shirota:

(Shirota 1998:351)
Her expression seemed to [yooda] darken for an instant. It seems [rashii] she recalled something unpleasant.

As you recall, earlier we relied on Shirota’s the notion of being inside (yooda) versus outside (rashii) the speaker’s territory for this example. However, this only works in case the subject and listener are different. If the subject was also the listener, yooda would have to be used instead of rashii. The information is still outside the speaker’s territory, but it is inside the listener’s territory, and as such yooda is preferable.

Finally, there is the following example:

(Ibuse 1964, as cited by Sugi Riggs 2006:250)
Well, it’s a minor operation. Because the fetus seems [rashii] to be dead. It will be alright if I clean up the womb.
(Trans. Edward Seidensticker, as cited by Sugi Riggs 2006:250)

In this example, an obstetrician examines his patient and finds “the fetus carried by his patient to be dead. Despite his certainty based on extensive observation and clinical expertise he uses rashii” (Sugi Riggs 2006:250). This example seems to be at odds with the avoidance of

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¹² It is also feasible that some creative freedom is allowed as to what kind of information is expressed in narration.
responsibility associated with rashii. Sugi Riggs simply explains it by stating that the information is judged to be new and unexpected by the patient, and therefore the obstetrician uses rashii. However, it is hard to overlook the fact that this gives the impression of the obstetrician shirking responsibility – unless of course that was the intended effect. The drawback with a pragmatic approach like this is that sometimes the speaker’s intended meaning can only be insinuated, and sometimes arbitrary interpretations can be seen. Nevertheless, my informant confirms my suspicions, asserting that the obstetrician in this example indeed conveys a sense of irresponsibility, as if it has nothing to do with him, and moreover, sounds very cold and detached. As such, this example also conforms to the proposed theory.

4. CONCLUSION

4.1. DISCUSSION

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, yooda is used when the information falls into the speaker’s territory, the listener’s territory, or both. This is represented visually by the figures below.

For instance, when making an inference based on a preconceived notion, such as in example 46, the information is inside the speaker’s territory (figure 1) and is therefore expressed with yooda. Regarding information that the speaker perceives as being inside the listener’s territory
(figure 2), *yooda* is used to speak euphemistically, while information inside both the speaker’s and listener’s territories (figure 3) show a sense of inclusion when *yooda* is used.

*Yooda* is also used in cases where an evidential marking should not be necessary, such as when the speaker is expressing his internal sensations, which was shown in 3.1.4. Cases like these can be seen as a pragmatic strategy, where the speaker creates a sense of inclusion by expanding the listener’s territory to include his own, demonstrated by figure 4:

![Figure 4](image)

*Figure 4.* Information inside the speaker’s territory, but listener’s territory is expanded to also encompass the information.

*Rashii* on the other hand is used when the information is perceived as being outside of both the speaker’s and listener’s territories, as demonstrated by figure 5:

![Figure 5](image)

*Figure 5.* Information outside both the speaker’s and listener’s territories.

*Rashii* can also be used as a pragmatic strategy to make an information territory appear to be smaller than it actually is so that information inside of the territory appears to be outside of it instead. This strategy can be employed to distance the speaker from the information so that he appears to be less responsible for it (figure 6) in order to avoid emotional conflict when contradicting the listener for example. Also, as seen in example 47, when the speaker contradicts or disagrees with something that falls into the listener’s territory, the listener’s territory can be pragmatically contracted (figure 7) to avoid contradicting the listener directly.
It therefore follows that if the information falls into both territories, then both territories can be contracted (figure 8) as well.

**Figure 6.** Information inside the speaker’s territory, but the territory is contracted to make the information appear to be outside.

**Figure 7.** Information inside the listener’s territory, but the territory is contracted to make the information appear to be outside.

**Figure 8.** Information inside both the speaker’s and listener’s territories, but both territories are contracted to make the information appear to be outside.

Along the same lines, the sort of distancing seen above may have other functions as well, besides being employed as a pragmatic strategy. In example 49 and 50, the speakers might be subconsciously distancing themselves from the information because it is unpleasant or psychologically taxing, rather than showing consideration towards the listeners.

Some of the uses of *yooda* and *rashii* presented here seem somewhat at odds with the notion of evidentiality, such as using *rashii* with a fact the speaker is quite certain of as a means to avoid emotional conflict, or using *yooda* to express one’s own internal sensations. However, these might possibly be likened to what Aikhenvald refers to as ‘evidential manipulation’ in discourse. This use is described as the speaker strategically using evidential markings to either accentuate or mask the information or the speaker’s own involvement, such as when the speaker wants to distance himself from what he is saying for instance (2004:315-316). I argue that this pragmatic distancing is exactly what is happening with *rashii*.

In a similar vein, *yooda* and *rashii* can be seen as hedges, being used in a mitigating or softening sense. Japanese being very listener sensitive, it is not difficult to draw parallels to
Brown & Levinson’s ‘Politeness Theory’ (1987), and that they can be used as politeness strategies to minimize the damage to the listener’s so called ‘face’. As they put it: “In general, people cooperate (and assume each other's cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerability of face” (1987:61). Rashii for instance is used as a ‘positive politeness strategy’ to avoid disagreement with the listener, and in turn avoid damage to the listener’s ‘positive face’. This could be observed in example 38 for instance:

   Daughter-in-law: “Demo, amari atsugi o saseru to ase o kaitari ugokinikukattari de kaete yokunai rashii desu yo.”
   (Hayatsu 1988, as cited in Kusumoto 2008:291)
   Mother-in-law: “Don’t you feel cold in such light clothes, you poor thing? Please put on something more.”
   Daughter-in-law: “But since I’d start sweating and it would be hard to move around if I put on more clothes, it doesn’t seem like [rashii] a good idea to get changed.”

Here, rashii is used as a hedging device to avoid directly contradicting and disagreeing with the listener, and therefore minimizing damage to the listener’s ‘positive face’. The same usage can be seen in example 47.

On the other hand, yooda can be seen as a ‘negative politeness strategy’, being used in a euphemistic sense to avoid imposing on the listener and thus preserving the listener’s ‘negative face’. This can be seen in example 43, among others:

43. Sono fuku wa chotto hadena yoodesu ne.
   (Kusumoto 2008:293)
   Those clothes seem [yooda] a little showy, don’t they?

Like this, yooda is used to present suggestions and opinions euphemistically, and ask questions indirectly in order to minimize the damage to the listener’s ‘negative face’.

Trent’s conclusions are along the same lines, stating that showing indirectness and inclusion are examples of traditional politeness strategies (1997:327). Furthermore, she says that “Japanese society is, as is well-known, homogeneous, thus, for an individual, to expect (or pretend to expect) that other people share the same information functions very effectively to create a mood of homogeneity” (1997:421). In this sense, yooda is used to insinuate a sort

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13 ‘Face’ is the public self-image of participants in social interaction. ‘Negative face’ refers to freedom of action, and the desire to not be impeded upon. ‘Positive face’ on the other hand refers to one’s positive self-image; the desire to be approved of, as well as having one’s own wants regarded as desirable by others. For more information see Brown & Levinson (1987).
of ‘sharedness of information’ between the speaker and listener. Sugi Riggs also comments on the euphemistic connotations of *yooda*, saying that it reflects the Japanese social value of being unassertive, and serves to confirm the belief that equivocal mannerisms are regarded favorably (2004:60). But as we have shown, *rashii* is also used in this manner, such as when presenting a statement that contradicts the listener as uncertain in order to distance the speaker from it.

As such, I argue that *yooda* and *rashii* are mostly concerned with the relationship between speaker and listener (or writer and reader and so on) and how the speaker chooses to present information based on pragmatic motivations, commonly pertaining to politeness. This takes presidency over so-called ‘grammatical evidentiality’, or accurately marking the source of information, which according to the findings presented here is a secondary consideration compared to the pragmatic implications.

### 4.2. FINAL WORDS

When I started on this paper, my aim was to try to make sense of and create a system to understand the difference between *yooda* and *rashii*, and what causes a speaker to choose one over the other. A native speaker of Japanese is, obviously, able to choose between the two subconsciously – knowing perfectly well when one is more appropriate than the other. But I found that the available research was not always able to properly explain this. How do you actually know when one of them is more appropriate than the other? This is what I wanted to decipher.

As I have demonstrated in this paper, *yooda* and *rashii* are not merely concerned with the basis for an assumption, or even merely making an assumption per se. Instead, they are deeply related to the intricacies of social interaction – of politeness and what is seen as socially acceptable discourse. Perceivable perhaps as unfortunate to some, this is an area full of vagueness, and thus the rules governing the use of *yooda* and *rashii* depend more on the speaker’s personal judgment than any fixed grammatical rules. Considering that they are not easy to define, my aim became to try to outline the factors that influence their use as concisely as possible.

Although the use of *yooda* and *rashii* in narrative context was briefly touched upon, this theory is mainly concerned with the pragmatics of interpersonal communication, where the relationship between speaker and listener plays a large role. Therefore, this theory is not perfectly suited to contexts where this relationship is not present, such as in narration. Also, while the distancing seen with *rashii* is easily explainable within the framework of this theory,
what causes it is not adequately defined beyond politeness. These are areas where I believe more research is needed.

Also, while it was not the main purpose of this paper, I also stumbled upon some uses of the *adjectival rashii* that are inconsistent with current research. While further investigation wasn’t feasible within the scope of this paper, it is something that deserves future consideration.
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