Tous Ensemble?

COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR SMALLHOLDER PRODUCTION:

Achievements, Limitations, Patterns and Determinants of Farmer Based Organizations in the Senegalese Rice Sector

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Abstract

Senegalese smallholders up to date face high constraints regarding their generation of livelihoods from agriculture. Restricted access to productive resources and participation in finance, input and output markets are root causes for these constraints.

While the potential of collective action to address institutional constraints of smallholder agriculture has been widely acknowledged, success stories in Africa remain dim. So far, development research has largely neglected organizational factors as a key determinant for successful collective action in Africa. Therefore, the study explored organizational patterns of collective action within Farmer Based Organizations in the Senegalese rice sector. It found that conceptualizations of Cooperative Lifecycles from American based research were relevant in the studied case. As a recurring pattern, organizational crisis impeded the continuity of smallholder promotion through collective action. The study, further, argued that deficits of organizational design needed to be addressed and investments into collective human, social and financial capital needed to be made in order for studied FBOs to overcome crisis. To this end, internal mobilization of resources and external facilitation were identified as important factors. On the basis of these findings, the study suggested an amended Three Dimensional Cooperative Life Cycle Model.

Keywords: Farmer Based Organizations, Agricultural Cooperatives, African smallholders, Cooperative Life-Cycles, Collective Action
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Abbreviations

ANSD: *Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie* (National Agency for Statistics and Demography)

BOAD: *Banque Ouest-Africaine du Développement* (West-African Development Bank)

CIP: Collective Input Purchasing

CNCAS: *Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal* (Senegalese public agricultural bank)

FBO: Farmer Based Organization

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization

FPA: *Fédération des Périmètres Autogérés* (Federation of FBO-managed irrigation schemes)

ICA: International Cooperative Alliance

IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute

ISRA: *Institut Sénégalais de Recherche Agricole* (Senegalese Agricultural Research Institute)

GA: *Grand Aménagement* (Publicly installed rice irrigation schemes in the SRV)

GIE: Groupement d’Intérêt Economique (Legal status: “Economic Interest Group”)

GoS: Government of the Republic of Senegal

GOANA: *Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance* (Agricultural Policy for increasing national food supply)

HC: “Hors-casier” (irrigated production parcels outside the GA, mostly improvised)

LUB: Local Union, village B (Secondary Level FBO in village B)

NIE: Neo-Institutional Economics

PNAR: *Programme National d’Autosuffisance en Riz* (Senegalese policy for rice self-sufficiency)

PSAOP: *Programme d’Appui aux Services Agricoles et des Organisations des Producteurs* (Policy to support agricultural services and FBOs)


SRV: Senegalese River Valley

TA: Transaction Costs

UA: Union, village A (Secondary Level FBO in village A)
1. INTRODUCTION

Despite sustained economic growth rates over the last years, poverty is still a widespread phenomenon in Senegal. A low capacity of the economy in general to generate jobs, and a low productivity in the agricultural sector in particular, contribute to insecure and vulnerable livelihoods of large shares of the population (FAO 2011). It is estimated that out of 54% of the population that live in poverty three quarters are situated in rural areas (FAO 2011:2). In recent years, the importance of agriculture for African development has regained national and international recognition. This is especially due to its continued importance for employment and income generation, food supply, as well as the multiplier effects\(^1\) it is observed to have on other economic sectors (Worldbank 2007; Kirsten et.al. 2009). In Senegal, agriculture also continues to play a key role for development as nearly 69.9% of the economically active population – the large majority of them smallholders - is estimated to be employed in agriculture (Worldbank 2006; UNDP 2012:161).

Rice in Senegal – Urban mouths, rural livelihoods and international competition

As the second most produced and the most preferred staple crop in urban areas, rice is highly important in Senegal – both for food security and livelihood generation of 1.5 million people or 200,000 to 300,000 households (FAO 2011). From a consumption perspective, rice has become the most popular food staple for most households\(^2\) (Colen& Demont 2012; GRET 2012) - a demand which has longtime been largely satisfied through imports from Asia. In 2007/ 2008 the international rice price temporarily multiplied by six, putting at risk national food security (Colen& Demont 2012). With new agricultural policies between 2006 and 2008\(^3\), the Senegalese government put an additional emphasis on increasing food self-sufficiency (GRET 2012:4). Through greater production incentives and important area expansions the share of Senegalese rice in satisfying domestic demand has importantly increased - from an estimated 15 % in 2007 to 48 % in 2010 (Colen& Demont 2012; GRET 2012:4). However, while Senegalese rice is traditionally almost exclusively produced by smallholders (Colen & Demont 2012), critics claim that the new agricultural policies paved the way for large land appropriations by private domestic and international investors – thus compromising smallholders’ access to land in favor of urban elites and international investors (Faye et.al.2011).

Despite the production enhancements, Senegal still imports around 50% of its rice. The immense urban demand combined with political will to increase production and naturally favorable conditions for high productivity present a great potential for additional growth in the domestic rice sector and increased food security (Colen& Demont 2012). It has been estimated that if Senegal was producing the rice it is consuming, the trade balance deficit could be reduced by 16% and 200,000 additional

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\(^1\) “Agricultural multiplier effects” refer to the empirically confirmed observation that agricultural growth tends to “enhance growth in other sectors through consumption and production links” (The Worldbank 2008:34), e.g. through additional income from agriculture that is spent on domestically produced goods and services and an increased demand for services and products that serve agricultural input provision, as well as agroprocessing and marketing (Worldbank 2008:34, Kay 2005:331)

\(^2\) Estimated average consumption in 2005: 68 kg/ person/ year. In 1975, the rice consumption had still been 42.3 kg per capita per annum (Colen& Demont 2012)

\(^3\) (1) REVA = Retour vers l’Agriculture, (2) GOANA = Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance, (3) Programme Biocarburant
people could be employed in the rice sector (FNPRS 2010; GRET 2012). Poverty reduction effects from increased domestic rice production can, however, only be expected if smallholders are enabled to access land, increase productivity, participate in markets and compete with international rice producers that are linked to few large and powerful Senegalese urban traders who are dominating the import market\(^4\) (GRET 2012:6; Colen&Demont 2012; USDA 2013).

**Research Problem: Smallholder competitiveness constraints and the potential of collective action**

On the basis of smallholder production and marketing constraints, some scholars argue in favor of land liberalization and large scale investments into agriculture as a means to promote efficiency and growth of domestic agriculture (Bartra 1975 in Kay 2005). This paper, however, situates itself within an academic tradition which argues that constraints which smallholders are facing can and should be addressed through the right policy choices – and that academic research can make contributions in this regard (Kirsten et.al.2009; Kay 2005).

Over the past decade, institutional scholars made significant progress in raising awareness about the potential of collective action and coordination to address factors which typically constrain intensification, market participation and livelihood generation of African smallholders and which also apply in the case of Senegal. Thus, through collective action, smallholders can achieve scale effects, reduce their costs and risks of participating in markets and gain increased access to productive resources. (Kirsten et al. 2009; World Bank 2006; Dieng 2006:19; Colen& Demont 2012). Moreover, collective action can increase countervailing power for smallholders. Arguably, the generation of countervailing power has become increasingly important during the last two decades of progressive economic and political globalization during which trends towards the exclusion of smallholders from policy processes and market opportunities have been enhanced (Kay 2005). On these grounds, policy makers and development agents have been showing a renewed interest in organizational forms based on collective action, such as agricultural cooperatives, as a means to overcome smallholder constraints (Francesconi and Heerink 2010; Bernard et al. 2010; Wanyama et al. 2008; Bernard et al, 2008; World Bank 2007). This increased attention recently became evident when the United Nations declared 2012 as the International Year of Cooperatives (IYC), thereby highlighting the contributions of cooperatives to socioeconomic development, poverty reduction, employment generation, and social integration.

Despite this widespread acknowledgement of the potential of collective action, the record of cooperative success stories in Africa remains dim (Francesconi and Heerink 2010; Bernard et al. 2008a; Collion and Rondot 2011). Difficult historical legacies, the role of external governmental and non-governmental involvement, as well as typical intra-group collective action and governance problems have impeded the emergence of effective agricultural cooperatives. After independence, extensive state interference and politicization characterized cooperative sectors in many African countries and compromised the autonomy and efficiency of the sector. Since market liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, national cooperative systems in many African countries collapsed, leaving behind gaps especially regarding service delivery and access to inputs in the context of market failures (Wanyama et.al. 2008; World Bank 2007).

\(^4\) According to USDA (2013), thirteen private companies share Senegal’s rice import market, the largest holding 24%
Over the past few years, governments and donors throughout Sub-Saharan Africa have expressed a renewed interest in collective action as a means to promote market integration of smallholders. (Francesconi and Heerink 2010; Bernard et al. 2010; Bernard et al. 2008). This return to collective action generated a new wave of cooperative organizations, commonly referred to as Farmer Based Organizations (FBOs). According to Wanyama et.al. (2008) FBOs have been showing consistent growth over the past decade and are very much present in most rural development programs in Africa. Empirical evidence (Bernard et al. 2008a; Bernard et al. 2010; Bernard et al. 2008b; Hill et al. 2008) shows that FBOs can be found in every other village in selected West African countries, involving up to 75 percent of farm households in a given village (Bernard et.al. 2010).

In Senegal, cooperative reforms started as early as the late 1980s, partly increasing the autonomy of FBOs which had formerly been strongly controlled by state bodies. At the time, the promotion of an autonomous cooperative sector which would effectively represent and respond to its members’ needs became a deliberate policy objective that was supported by the Worldbank and FAO (Dieng 2006; Sagna 2011; Gueye 2011). In the Senegalese rice sector, the rehabilitation and transfer of management functions for irrigation schemes to FBOs and the simultaneous introduction of group lending systems between 1989 and the early 1990s marked this policy shift (FNPRS 2010, Gueye 2011, Collion 2011). A foundation for collective action was thus provided at the time. Yet, comprehensive analyses remain to be undertaken with regards to organizational effectiveness to achieve its goals – namely the promotion of smallholder agriculture.


1.1. Purpose of the Study and Research Questions

The paper is embedded into theoretical and empirical analytical works which explore the potential and conditions of collective action to generate countervailing power for smallholders. While the analysis is deliberately case-specific, the paper is intended to contribute to a larger set of knowledge generation from which lessons for the functioning and the promotion of FBOs in Africa can be drawn.

The study, thus, seeks to fulfill the following purposes:

A. Explore the achievements and limitations of FBOs in the Senegalese rice sector for facilitating smallholder agriculture in terms of accessing critical resources, participating in markets and generating countervailing power

B. Identify and analyze patterns and determinants of FBOs’ evolution in the Senegalese rice sector taking into account dynamic organizational factors

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5 See Appendix 1 for a review on agricultural cooperative history in Senegal by the author
C. Contribute to the generation of knowledge on how and under which conditions FBOs can facilitate smallholder agriculture

The research questions to be answered are:

How have dynamic organizational factors affected the ability of Farmer Based Organizations to facilitate smallholder agriculture in the Senegalese rice sector?

1. How has Collective Action in the Senegalese rice sector facilitated smallholder agriculture through Farmer Based Organizations?

2. How have organizational evolutionary patterns affected the ability of Farmer Based Organizations to achieve their aims?

1.2. Disposition

The thesis contains 6 chapters. The Introduction (Chapter 1) contextualized the problem of Senegalese smallholder agriculture and introduced the potential assigned to FBOs. The diagnosis of the limited success that FBOs have had in this regard in African contexts served as a basis for presenting the focus of the study by formulating the study purpose and research questions. Chapter 2 embeds the study into a theoretical framework regarding multiple roles of collective action for smallholder agriculture, as well as determinants for successful FBOs. Special focus is accorded to Cook’s (2009, 2012) cooperative lifecycle framework. Chapter 4 presents and discusses methodological choices and describes the case. Subsequently, the analysis discusses (I) how FBOs have facilitated smallholder agriculture in the studied case in Chapter 5 and (II) how organizational patterns of FBOs have affected their ability to fulfill their objective of promoting smallholders (Chapter 6). In an attempt to develop further Cook’s framework, the paper presents a modified cooperative lifecycle model which is applied to the findings of the study. The last chapter 7 comprises the conclusions of the study.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Perspectives on collective action for overcoming smallholder constraints

Over the past decade, scholars and policy makers have been showing a renewed interest in how organizational forms based on collective action, such as agricultural cooperatives can help to address specific smallholder developmental constraints (Francesconi and Heerink 2010; Bernard et al. 2010; Wanyama et al. 2008b; World Bank 2007; Kirsten et al. 2009). The potential of collective action for this ends can be conceptualized in relation to how different theoretical schools explain the manifestation of smallholder constraints in the first place. In the following, these schools and their assumption about the potential of collective action are briefly outlined. Figure 2.1 additionally illustrates the theoretical framework.

(i) Sustainable Livelihoods Perspectives

From a sustainable livelihood perspective, agricultural intensification is one out of three rural livelihood strategies which can be a means to achieving sustainable livelihood outcomes, such as reducing poverty, increasing well-being and decreasing vulnerability. The success of a livelihood strategy depends on an individual’s access to crucial tangible and intangible livelihood resources. These resources comprise different “capitals”, such as natural capital (e.g. soil, air, or hydrological cycle), financial capital, physical capital (e.g. production equipment and inputs), human capital (e.g. knowledge, skills and health) and social capital (networks, affiliations, relationships) (Scoones 1998).

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6 Collective Action can be understood as a collaboration of people on “joint action and decisions to accomplish an outcome that involves their interests or well-being” (Sandler 1992 in Kerstin et al. 2009:50)
7 While there are different conceptualizations of sustainable rural livelihoods, the here employed terms and conceptualizations attempts to present a simplified version of some key assumptions in their relation to collective action
8 Scoones (1998) differentiates between intensification (more output per area unit through capital investment or increases in labour inputs) and extensification (more land under cultivation).
9 The other two livelihood strategies which are not discussed here are livelihood diversification (e.g. adding activities in services and manufacturing to the pool of economic activities) or migration (Scoones 1998:9)
Institutions are in this framework the “rules of the game” which mediate people’s access to resources. Organizations, such as agricultural cooperatives, in turn, can be understood as the “players of the game”, and thus a crucial element within the process of mediating access to resources (North 1990 in Scoones 1998).

(ii) Inequality and Power Perspectives

According to power and inequality sensitive perspectives inherent in Marxist, Political Economy and Dependency Theories, poverty is a consequence of power systems at national and international levels. Inequality is characterized by a secured access to resources by the rich, while the access of the poor to such resources is restricted. In that line of thought, political and economic power structures are intertwined and mutually perpetuate the production and reproduction of wealth on the one side and poverty on the other (Kay 2005, Bebbington 1999, Scoones 2009). On the basis of access to resources, the adoption of modern farming techniques, becomes a privilege of capitalist farmers who become in turn, more competitive than peasants, thereby limiting the “survival of the peasant producers and perpetuating rural poverty” (Kay 2005: 339).

From this perspective, collective action has the potential to improve smallholders’ bargaining and advocacy power vis-à-vis private and public agents (“countervailing power”), increase their voice in decision making arenas in order to make policies more responsive to smallholders and “regulate and govern the market for the benefit of the majority” (Kay 2005:339).

(iii) Markets, Transaction Costs and Economies of Scale

As opposed to more classical economics, Neo-Institutional Economics (NIE) argue that market participation is associated with risks and costs related to obtaining information about products and market participants as a basis for decision making, as well as costs and risks related to transactions with other market participants. Due to scale effects, smallholders in the economy face higher transaction costs and risks than larger participants and, thus, have competitive disadvantages (Kirsten et.al 2009).

These smallholder developmental constraints, in turn, are interrelated and mutually reinforce each other with a number of other factors which generate an institutional environment that is argued to

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10 Scoones employs a definition by Giddens (1979) of institutions as “regularized practices (or patterns of behaviors) structured by rules and norms of society which have persistent and widespread use” (Scoones 1998:12)

11 Within NIE, institutions can be defined as frameworks of formal and informal constraints, and enforcement mechanisms which shape costs, risks and benefits of specific actions. They, thus generate incentive structures for specific behaviors (combined definition of North (1994) and Ostrom (1990, 1998, 2005)).
be typical for African economies: Thus, factors such as a low population density, infrastructural constraints, a lack of legal security and means to enforce contracts, and climatic variations increase risks and costs (Hayami and Otsuka 1992, Kirstin et.al 2009). Combined with scale effects and little coordination among actors, these factors lead to generally thin markets and mutually reinforcing constraints that can be qualified as a “Low Level Equilibrium Trap” (Kirsten et.al 2009, see Fig 2.2.)

NIE argues that these constraints can be overcome through institutional innovation. While there could possibly be different contractual and organizational solutions to overcome the low level equilibrium trap, solutions based on collective action are argued to be promising for integrating smallholders (Kirsten et al. 2009; Worldbank 2008, Markelova et.al 2009, Wanyama et.al 2008a). By pooling resources and coordinating their actions through their organizations, farmers can reduce transaction costs and risks of exchanging goods and services with financial, input and output markets. Investments into common assets can decrease costs spent on service provision and can contribute to adding value to products (Kirsten et.al 2009:164).

2.2. Functioning and Effectiveness of Collective Action Organizations

While there is as shown above relatively wide-spread agreement on the potential of farmer based organizations to facilitate smallholder agriculture and development through collective action, the overall empirical success remains highly controversial (Francesconi and Heerink 2010; Bernard et al. 2008a). In fact many African FBOs appear to be dormant, much like empty shells, or to serve exclusively for reinforcing rural elites (Meinzen-Dick 2009; Hoff and Stiglitz 1993).

Reasons for these mixed results can on the one hand be found in historic patterns of state interference in cooperatives and bad governance which inhibited effective collective action in many parts of Africa (Wanyama et.al 2008b, Worldbank 2007). On the other hand, specific collective action problems and internal organizational dynamics within FBOs need to be taken into consideration (Bernard&Wouterse 2012). Acting collectively bears participation costs and risks which also have to be considered (Markelova et.al.2009, Berdégüé 2001). Empirical studies found that multiple external (contextual) as well as internal (organizational) factors affect the way that cooperative organizations can function (Hellin et.al. 2008, Berdegué 2001, Markelova et.al.2009). Inter alia, the role of external governmental and non-governmental influences seems to be a highly controversial issue12 (Berdégué 2001, Markelova et.al.2009, Ostrom 1996, Münkner 2012).

Some critics claim that development studies have often neglected organizational aspects of development (Cook, Francesconi and Rolle 2013). Mixed trends have, thus, been observed in relation to effects of group size, heterogeneity of members regarding resource endowments as well as the impacts of internal trust and internal social capital (Markelova et.al.2009, Berdegué 2001, De Janvry&Sadoulet 2010). In turn, widespread agreement among scholars can be found regarding the

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12 See Markelova (2009) and Berdegué (2001) for discussion of how state, market and non-profit agents can all have facilitating, as well as inhibiting roles for effective collective action organizations.
importance of leadership and effective rules and sanctions in order to respond to typical collective action problems (Cook 1994, Bernard&Woutourse 2012, Ostrom 1990, 1999).

Moreover, although organizational scholars have advocated for the inclusion of evolutionary trends of change into organizational analysis (Lusthaus 2002, Hatch&Cunliffe 2012), these processes of change are oftentimes neglected when examining organizations and their contributions to development (Cook, Francesconi and Rolle 2013). With regards to cooperatives, some scholars have explored organizational pathways of agricultural cooperatives in order to better understand determinants of their evolution for the North American and the Chilean context. Thus, agricultural cooperatives can follow different development paths depending on their ability to solve internal conflicts (Cook et.al.2013; Berdegué 2001). For African countries, such studies are still missing although they could provide valuable insights into the conditions and mechanisms of cooperative success, not at least for the promotion of their members’ livelihoods as argued above.

2.2.1. The Cooperative Life Cycle Theory

According to Cook (in Cook, Francesconi, Rolle 2013, Cook&Burress 2009), cooperative agricultural organizations in the United States tend to pass through different life cycles. Due to specific characteristics of these organizations, crisis, problems and conflicts occur periodically. Consequently, the way the cooperative organization succeeds to respond to these crises determines whether and how new cooperative life cycles will occur – and thereby how survival will be secured (Fig 2.3 and Fig. 2.4.).

In order to portray the fact that cooperative organizations possess a greater variety of objective functions than conventional firms, Cook refers to the “health of a cooperative” as a concept embracing financial, as well as non-financial success and well-being dimensions (Cook et.al.2013). According to Cook, the most important indicator for cooperative health is the degree to which members engage themselves in the organization by investing resources into it (ibid). Within one lifecycle, Cook defined five phases (see Appendix 10 for an overview by the author) (Cook et.al 2009; 2013): (1) Economic Justification, (2) Organisational Design, (3) Growth, Glory and Heterogeneity, (4) Recognition and Introspection and (5) Choice: Tinker, Reinvent or Exit.

13 Non-financial indicators can include multiple aspects such as member satisfaction or the degree of objective achievement.
Cook argues that during the first phase, the reason why a cooperative should be formed, and whether there are “credible economic opportunities” for acting collectively, need to be identified (box 2.1.). He argues that in order to become sustainable businesses, economic reasons for their establishment need to be viable. Oftentimes, agricultural cooperatives are formed with the help of external facilitators. Despite of the role such external facilitation has often played for the formation of cooperatives, there is a danger that external facilitation can compromise the economic viability or the ownership or of the cooperative by its members.

During the second phase, the rules of the new organization are established, including regulations about who can join the organization under which conditions, how residual claim and control rights are allocated, and which sanctions one can expect when violating organizational laws. The second phase is crucial to the prospects of the organization to become a long-living entity since established rules will affect the way the organization will be able to later-on respond to arising problems.

The third life cycle phase is characterized by success of the cooperative. However, Cook argues that cooperatives tend to “over-celebrate”, including more members into the cooperative triggering increased heterogeneity of members’ socio-economic preferences. Investment constraints can arise when collectively beneficial investments are not made to a satisfactory degree. This occurs for example when some members exploit benefits without contributing to the costs (free-riding).

During the fourth phase entitled “recognition and introspection”, the problems caused by increased heterogeneity become visible through different manifestations of health crisis, such as the formation of factions among members, member apathy, inactiveness, conflicts over residual distribution, or a disincentive to invest into the organization.

In the fifth and last phase, the cooperative organization acts upon the internal conflicts it is confronted with by either “exiting”, “tinkering” or “reinventing” (table 2.1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Exit”</th>
<th>dissolution of the coop., completely or into other non-cooperative forms of organization</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Tinkering”</td>
<td>- collective decision making costs are reduced</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- incentives for investing into the coop. are realigned with more heterogeneous membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>through operational (improving efficiency and strategy) or constitutional changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Reinventing”</td>
<td>- individuals’ claim and control rights are changed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- can modify the cooperative principle of “one member – one vote” in order to increase the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representation (and control) of members who are more invested into the cooperative</td>
</tr>
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</table>

14 Residual claim and control rights are the rights of members to claim their share of equity capital and decide how it should be used. Typically, cooperatives are based on the principle “one member one vote” meaning that independent from the amount invested into the collective enterprise, all members have the same control rights.
3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Approach to Reality and Knowledge

The study is based on an understanding of reality and knowledge that has been shaped by critical realism. Thus, the study grounds on the understanding that there is an external reality which provides structure for individuals’ actions (ontologically realist position). However, this reality can only be grasped and understood to a limited extent (epistemologically relativist position) (Bhaskar 1975 in Bryman 2008:14). Knowledge generation is, thus, a recurrent process of testing theories, adapting theories and thereby making contributions to generating knowledge about reality (Niemann 2004).

3.2. Design of the Study

The study departs from existing theoretical and empirical studies on agricultural cooperatives, their roles, and their evolutionary trends based on collective action problems and external influencing factors. It assumes according to the theory that collective action problems arise in agricultural cooperatives and tests this hypothesis for the studied cooperatives as well as whether and how typical factors play a role. However, since the employed theoretical literature majorly stems from non-African contexts, the study also employs exploratory elements. The study, therefore, combines deductive and inductive elements (see also Bryman 2004:11). In order to analyzef influencing factors in depth, a qualitative case study design was chosen (Mikkelsen 2005, Yin 2003).

3.3. Study Area and Case Description

3.3.1. Study Area

In Senegal, approximately 20% of the surface is suitable for cultivation. Out of these 3.8 million ha, 8% are situated in the Senegalese River Valley in Northern Senegal (SRV) (FAO 2011). The SRV is situated in the region of St. Louis and is home to the two villages that form the case of this study (Img. 3.1. and Appendix 3). Since the 1960s when large populations were moved to the SRV due to the introduction of irrigated rice cultivation by GoS, economic activities in this area have been largely dominated by rice cultivation (Bélières&Touré 1999). The SRV is one out of two major rice producing areas in Senegal, the other one being situated in the politically instable Southern region Casamance. In contrast to Casamance, the SRV
has been benefiting from major public investments into irrigation infrastructure which have, inter alia, contributed to significantly higher yields\(^\text{15}\) and have allowed for two cropping seasons: The rainy season\(^\text{16}\) and the dry hot season\(^\text{17}\). While the produce in Casamance is almost exclusively used for subsistence, around two thirds of the production in the SRV is usually marketed (Colen&Demont 2012).

### 3.3.2. Selection of the Case and Case Description

Key informants were identified through the snowball method (Creswell 2007). In order to select the case and the units of analysis, “purposeful maximal sampling” was employed while taking into consideration the accessibility of respondents (Mikkelsen 2005:92): In cooperation with key informants, two out of a total of five farmer unions were identified. Selection criteria were 1) Having a record of collective activities and 2) Having differing experiences in order to grasp a greater heterogeneity within the case (“purposeful maximal sampling”, Creswell 2007): Although the distance between the two villages was only 5 km, they showed quite different characteristics, especially with regards to village size, ethnic composition as well as road access, and thus market integration. The small distance between the villages allowed for the simultaneous data collection in both villages. In both villages, rice production is the primary economic activity.

**FBOs as units of analysis**

Fig. 3.1 shows the units of analysis of the study: Farmer based organizations (FBOs) from the two villages (villages A and B). In each village, three primary level FBOs (FBO1 to FBO6) and one secondary level FBO (“Union A” (UA) and “Local Union B” (LUB))\(^\text{18}\) were included into the study. FBO1 to FBO6 are members of their respective unions. The two unions differ from each other in relation to their origins and activities. UA emerged through external governmental facilitation whose original purpose was externally provided: namely the management of the publicly funded, large-scale irrigation schemes “Grand Aménagement” (GA). Since these irrigation schemes were transferred to unions from 1989 onwards, access to the land irrigated by these schemes is only provided to members of FBOs. Due to this institutional linkage between FBOs and the GA and the incentives attached to cultivation within the GA, the paper refers to the **GA/ FBO system** when characteristics or benefits generated are analyzed from the combined perspective of FBO membership and access to

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\(^{15}\) Average yield in the study area: 5 to 6 tons per ha with peaks of 8 – 9 ha, Average yield in the Southern Region Casamance: 1 to 2 tons/ ha (FAO 2011, Colen & Demont 2012)

\(^{16}\) “hivernage”

\(^{17}\) “contre-saison chaude”

\(^{18}\) Subsequently called „unions“ in order to distinguish them from the primary level FBOs. “UA” refers to the secondary level FBO in village A. “LUB” refers to the secondary level FBO in village B.
irrigated land. While village B also possesses a Union B which manages the GA, this organization could not be included into the study since its leaders were not available at the time. The Local Union B, in turn, emerged through a bottom-up initiative. Its major economic activity is the management of Collective Input Purchases (CIP) for its member FBOs. In turn, FBO’s major objective has been collective accessing of credit for production activities at the agricultural bank CNCAS.

Due to land allocation rules in the area, farmers are usually male and consequently FBOs mainly consist of male members. However, in both villages, specific female organizations were founded which among other activities – engage in rice production activities. These FBOs were included into the study as a means to grasp a greater heterogeneity (maximal purposeful sampling, Creswell 2007) and to consider a gender perspective (Fig 3.1. FO3 and FO6).

3.3.3. Characterization of FBO members

In the absence of a universal definition of “smallholder”, the classification of FBO members in the SRV as smallholders was based on interviews with key informants and secondary literature (FAO 2011, Colen&Demont 2012). Fall (2006) mentions a prevailing restricted access to productive resources, and income below the national poverty line for 75% of producers which can be understood as indicators for the prevailing small scale character. However, as has been observed by Fall (2006) for the entire SRV, participants in the study still possessed relatively heterogeneous socio-economic features.

According to calculations by the author, the average household plot size across FBOs within the study case was 1.26 ha within the GA. The range of cultivated land by FBO members differed between 0.3 and 4 ha within the GA. Moreover, the leasing of plots on provisional irrigation schemes outside the GA - subsequently referred to as HC - was a relatively frequent phenomenon. Respondents stated that plot sizes cultivated HC varied importantly from one cropping season to the other depending on the endowment with productive resources. Conditions for cultivation differ significantly between the GA and HC as risks and costs of producing HC are much higher than in the GA (see analysis).

3.4. Data Sources and Methods of Data Collection

The analysis is primarily based on data collected by the author of the study. Secondary data complements the analysis. In order to gain multiple perspectives on the research questions and to cross-validate and triangulate findings, multiple sources of primary data collection were included into the study (see also Yin 2003). Primary data documents were collected to a small degree due to their limited availability (Appendix 2). The large majority of primary data stems from interviews conducted between December 2012 and April 2013. 15 semi-structured interviews and additional informal conversations with key informants from 12 different governmental and non-governmental

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19 In Fall’s sample, plot sizes ranged from 1.37 ha for the poorest households to between 2.3. and 2.7 ha for the “moderate” and “relatively well-off” households. The average household size was 13 people.

20 The plots had been allocated to households according to the number of “actives” in the household when the irrigation schemes were originally transferred to unions.

21 “Hors-Casier” (HC) refers to the fact that these provisional irrigated plots are situated outside the publicly installed irrigation scheme GA

22 An indicator for the extent of HC production is the fact that for Village A, around 700 ha were cultivated HC while 427 ha were cultivated within the GA
organizations were held helping to contextualize the problem within historical, economic, political and social boundaries in Senegal and providing access to additional literature. Furthermore, key informants worked as gate keepers and facilitated the access to the field area and the selection of the case. 29 individuals from 8 farmer organizations were interviewed, out of which 25 held leadership positions within the FBOs and four were ordinary members. Additionally, one interview was conducted with two young farmers who were not members of FBOs. All names of respondents and organizations mentioned in this study have been changed for confidentiality purposes as respondents did disclose critical and personal information about their organizations and themselves.

3.4.1. Presenting the methods of data collection

Semi-structured interviews were the major method of data collection. Partly, these interviews were conducted in a participatory way. The flexible character of the semi-structured interview format allowed the author to derive from the prepared structure when respondents brought up interesting and relevant additional information, interpretations and opinion (see also Bryman 2004:321). Most interviews were conducted in French. Interviews in Wolof and Toutcouleur were translated by an assistant.

Interviews with each unit of analysis (FBO) followed a certain scheme: First, an introductory semi-structured interview with one or two leaders of the organizations was conducted. Afterwards, a second interview session during the participatory method “diagramming”, (timeline discussions) was employed, in accordance with Mikkelsen (2005:92,93).

During timeline discussions lasting 1.5 to 2 hours, organizational leaders discussed and assessed the organizational health on a scale of 0 (very sick) to 100% (completely healthy) along the timeline (example: IMG3.2.). The participatory character of these discussions helped to render interviews more interesting and facilitated the fact that participants’ own opinions and interpretations of events and the research topic were taken into account (see also Mikkelsen 2005). Furthermore, by employing the timeline, the evolutionary character of the theoretical framework and the research question could be translated into a method.

23 Appendix 4 gives an overview over the number of key informants interviewed, and their organizational background. Appendix 5 presents the FBO members and leaders that participated as respondents, and details with regards to the data collection methods, recording and the length of interviews.

24 Translated Interview Guides are attached in Appendix 6 – 9
3.5. **Research and Analytical Process**

Fig. 3.2 illustrates the iterative process of data collection and analysis that was employed during this study involving several stages: first, the research design was developed and modified based on secondary sources and initial interviews with key informants. Preliminary interviews with a first group of FBO members facilitated the adaptation of the research design which was then employed during the main phase of data collection. Memoing was used as a means to note down reflections in relation to theory and observations made in the field (Johnson 2007). The recorded data collected in the field was transcribed and then structured and systematized according to a combination of a-priori coding (deduced from theory) and inductive coding (drawn from the transcripts and memos) (Johnson 2007). The textual markup tool “Catma” facilitated the process of coding the data. Based on the codes and transcripts, patterns were observed and categories and relationships established\(^{25}\) which were then, in a last step, interpreted, presented and discussed in relation to assumptions and stipulations from the theory (Johnson 2007, Yin 2003).

> See appendices 11-14 for selected quotes that the analysis refers to
3.6. Quality of Research

Throughout the research process, the documentation of data and interpretations by the researcher was undertaken in a coherent and rigorous way as a means to guarantee transparency. The application of the “timeline” discussion facilitated the validation of findings by the participants themselves being able to correct the researcher’s interpretations.

The analysis is based on individual perspectives about collective units of analysis. In order to increase validity and address potential individual as well as leader biases (Yin 2003, Mikkelsen 2005:96), all 8 units of analysis are based on at least two individual members of the respective FBO. Moreover, members of FBOs were asked to compare their organization to other organizations of the case allowing for the triangulation of data. Since the FBOs were all part of bounded systems within their villages and farmer unions, monitoring other FBOs’ progress was quite frequent. Furthermore, the integration of two farmers into the research who were excluded from the FBO system provided very valuable and diverging perspectives on the FBO system as a whole.

Despite of these efforts, a certain leader bias cannot be completely disqualified. In this regards, time constraints triggered a certain trade-off between generalizability and the consideration of heterogeneity. Thus, by including 8 organizational units of analysis and replicating the research design for each of them, triangulation could be conducted across units of analysis and the generalizability could be increased (Yin 2003). In turn, the number of units of analysis also limited the number of sources that could be considered per respective FBO. As argued by Mikkelsen (2005:139), the choice for “establishing trends” was taken at the expense of portraying “differences, heterogeneity and imbalances”.

3.6.1. Limitations

The above mentioned choice for “establishing trends” affected the way that concerns of specific groups along differentials such as gender and age could be taken into account within the findings. Although the data does convey the picture that these differentials were highly relevant and, thus, should have been increasingly included into the findings, the scope and focus of this study limited their inclusion.

In the same line, the research design and theory choice involved a focus on internal dynamics of FBOs. While the data suggests that external influences from the macro-environment and interactions with specific actors were highly influential as well, these factors could only be considered in the analysis to a limited degree in relation to specific events that occurred within FBOs.

3.7. Ethical considerations

At the beginning of each interview, the researcher or the translator presented themselves and their background, as well as the purpose and the scope of the study. On these grounds, respondents gave their consent to participate in the study (Scheyvens&Storey 2003).
Awareness of potential power dimensions of the research process did shape the research design (Scheyvens & Story 2003). Despite of probable socio-economic differences, the researcher deliberately aimed to encounter respondents in a highly respectful way which would allow for the valuing and appreciation of respondents’ experiences and perspectives. Respondents seemed to notice and value this approach, expressed their acceptance of the research topic and appreciated the fact that they could share their expertise regarding their organizations. Since at least two interviews of 1 to 2 hours each were conducted per FBO, time requirements for participation in the research were at the limit of the bearable, especially since the research was conducted during a busy period of the cropping season. Upon request from the researcher, gate keepers stated that financial rewards were not common and would affect how others could conduct their research in the future. However, they did agree that small gifts could be given to respondents. In order to express the gratitude, the researcher, thus, provided small gifts for household utilization as well as pictures of the research process at the end of the field period which respondents seemed to appreciate highly (Mikkelsen 2005).
4. ANALYSIS PART I – FBOs’ ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

Chapter 4 presents and discusses findings in relation to the first research sub-question. To this end, the chapter addresses FBOs’ contributions to (1) the generation of livelihoods and wellbeing, (2) access to productive resources and markets, as well as (3) limitation and conditions of FBOs for smallholder promotion.

4.1. Generation of Livelihoods and Wellbeing

Despite of limitations of and conditions for the functioning of the GA/FBO, all respondents agreed that production within this system had major advantages as compared to production outside of it. As will be shown in the following, it has contributed importantly to the ability of farmers to gain livelihoods and increase wellbeing. As theoretical assumptions stipulated, collective action has mediated and facilitated an improved access to productive capitals (Bebbington 1999, Scoones 1998), reduced transaction costs and risks and increased market access (Kirsten et.al 2009). Arguably, collective action has also generated countervailing power for members – at least within specific boundaries and in relation to specific problems (Kay 2005, Scoones 2009).

FBO members have benefited from reliable access to irrigation, coordination and conflict reduction (Q.1b., Q.4.10, Q.4.12), increased and more timely access to key quality inputs and machinery (Q.1f., Q.1g.), increased access to finance (Q.1e.) and improved technical expertise (Q.1d). Reduced transaction risks and costs related to input and output markets have facilitated their market access (Q.2a., Q.2b.). Production and marketing advantages within FBOs have triggered lower risks, and enhanced productivity and agricultural intensification. Members of FBOs have been able to increase their incomes, and utilize surpluses for increasing wellbeing and investing into other income generating activities. Thus, individual leaders and members observed that generated surplus has enabled FBO members to improve housing conditions, educate their children, cover health expenses and invest into income generating activities beyond the GA/FBO system (Q.4.1., Q.4.2., Q.4.13, Q.4.12., Q.4.9., Q.4.3., Q.4.4.). When asked to compare production within the GA/FBO system with production outside of this system, a young man who is excluded from the system stated:

“I will try to be objective while knowing that the advantages lie in the self-managed irrigation (GA) scheme. Everything is better there!!! Everything is better!!” (Q.1a.2.)

4.2. Access to productive resources and participation in markets

(i) Reduced conflicts of interest, coordination and access to irrigation

Several respondents observed clear advantages of the GA/FBO system regarding access to irrigation. On the one hand, these advantages can be attributed to the mere quality of the Large Public

26 Abbreviations such as (Q.1b.) are numbers for selected quotes which can be found in Appendices 11-14 and which the text specifically refers to.
Irrigation Schemes (GA) as compared to private and village schemes. The well evened soil, and functioning canals and drainage systems guarantee that the water inflow and outflow can be regulated according to the needs of the plant, thus contributing importantly to the productivity of the parcels and reducing the production risk (Q.1b.3., Q.1c.3.). On the other hand the coordinated and regulated character of water access through collective action plays a central role for the reliable access to irrigation. Thus, central irrigation points and canals, and clear distribution mechanisms which are facilitated by the unions and their “irrigation appointees” within FBOs (“responsible d’irrigation”) prevent and mediate conflicts of interest and reduce opportunistic behavior:

“It is with the FBOs that we can work peacefully. If there was no FBO, everybody would do what he wants. And that does not work. There needs to be something that regulates things [...]” (Q.1b.2)

In turn, outside the GA, irrigation is not coordinated and individual producers need to spend significant amounts of time to supervise their parcels and prevent others from deriving water away from one’s own field (Q.1b.1, Q.1b.2.). Moreover, through the coordinated irrigation system, water is pumped by electricity from the grid which is relatively cheaper and more reliable than motor pumps (Q.1b.3). The additional costs and risks seem to affect some groups more than others: Thus, especially producers with low financial means such as younger producers have difficulties to afford these higher costs for fuel and purchasing motor pumps outside the GA (Q.1b.3). Moreover, a female producer indicated that as a woman it was much more difficult to supervise fields during nighttime, thus making her more vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by others (Q.1b.1.).

(ii) Human and Social Capital Enhancements

Human capital development should generally be understood in the context of improving national trends, as illustrated by the human development index\(^\text{27}\). More specifically, several FBO members and leaders describe missing technical expertise and consequently low technology adoption as one of the major reasons for low productivity in earlier years. In line with several other interviews, one respondent stated:

“(…) The vision that we have for agriculture…. Respecting the cultivation calendar…. the utilization of fertilizer…. all of this was very difficult for farmers to admit before…. The fertilizer was rotting in the stock. People did not use it. We did not accept the seeds. So for having people accept this idea of modernity, it was very difficult.” (Q.1d.6).

\(^{27}\) Between 1980 and 2012, human development indicators in Senegal have shown constant slight improvements: The Human Development Index (HDI) which combines income, health and education indicators improved from 0.322 in 1980 to 0.470 in 2012, thus exhibiting improvements which are very close to the general trend in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP 2013).
On the one hand, increased technical expertise was attributed to a greater access of FBO members to technical trainings organized by FBOs/ unions in partnership with governmental and non-governmental actors (Q.1d.3., Q.1d.4., Q.1d.6., Q.1d.7.)

On the other hand, mutual learning within the FBO system has played a crucial role for the development of human capital. Thus, respondents stated multiple examples where their monitoring of other FBOs’ techniques and progress and their interaction with other FBOs within or outside the same union has changed and improved their practices and has contributed positively to their yields.

(iii) Finance, securities and collective insurance

Financing agriculture in African countries is subject to high risks. If financial institutions offer agricultural finance they usually compensate these risks with very high interest rates. Smallholders therefore typically face high access barriers because of a lack of securities, transaction costs and high interest rates (Kirsten et.al 2009).

Through the GA/FBO system, producers have been able to partly overcome these access barriers. On the one hand, deliberate policy decisions, especially the establishment of the agricultural bank CNCAS have facilitated the comparatively good access to affordable credit for FBO members. FBOs remain privileged in their access to CNCAS loans and only larger individual producers with significant means have been accepted as individual borrowers (Q.1e.1). For smaller producers and youngsters excluded from the FBO system, accessing affordable loans outside the GA/FBO system is much more difficult due to the constraints they face by the CNCAS, as well as from credit unions (Q.1e.4).

Moreover, while successful investments outside the FBO have enriched some producers, a majority has collected serious debts due to higher risks that have to be borne individually in case of failed production (Q.1e.3.).

Besides production loans, credit lines for commercialization and equipment for FBOs and unions had been recently introduced by the CNCAS and its partners, thus addressing a long felt need for such finance (Q.2b.7., Q.1f.2., Fall 2006).

On the one hand, increased access of finance to FBOs was a deliberate policy decision which one respondent perceived as the favoring of collective action over individual development (Q.1e.1.). However, it can also be argued that through collective action, the FBO provides securities that individual small producers have difficulties to provide. In the absence of individual land property rights, land cannot serve as a security for individual loans. However, FBO internal sanctioning mechanisms practically work in a similar way: Thus, FBO members who do not reimburse are excluded from land access and other FBO members can cultivate their parcels provided that they reimburse the debt. Thereby, FBO members provide mutual insurance to each other and especially to the bank. As long as the described sanctioning mechanism is effective, members of the FBO are, thus, relatively certain to access loans even when individual members do not pay their debts. Failure

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28 As compared to local credit unions and private financiers as alternative financing solutions, almost all respondents valued CNCAS finance to FBOs because they did not require securities, and because of the lower interest rates and 9-months reimbursement plans (Q.1e.4., Q.1e.1.).

29 Credit unions require securities and deposits, and still charge high interest rates.
to effectively implement these sanctions, however, has been contributing to periods of difficulties regarding credit access and will be discussed in the second part of the analysis.

(iv) Inputs and machinery, transaction costs and reliability of access

FBOs and unions in conjunction with their partners could improve their members’ timely access to quality inputs and services. In line with theories on horizontal and vertical coordination in contexts of “thin markets” (Kirsten 2009), collective action has contributed importantly to this increased accessibility by employing economies of scale, reducing transaction costs and risks, and enhancing the availability of market information.

On the one hand, partnerships between unions and the state agencies SAED (extension) and ISRA (research) led to the development of adapted quality rice varieties, their certification, and their continued quality control. Unions have been multiplying these seeds and thus contributed to the local availability of quality seeds. According to respondents, these continued efforts for quality control and local availability have positively impacted productivity (Q.1g.3., Q.4.12.).

Collective Input Purchasing (CIP), on the other hand, has been practiced by the Local Union B since the introduction of FBOs in the beginning of the 1990s. By aggregating their demand for pesticides, herbicides, seeds and fertilizer, unions made use of scale effects. The president of Union A reported that through external NGO-facilitation, tenders could be organized which helped to increase the information and facilitated decision-making for union and FPA leaders. Respondents valued CIP for the resulting reduction of prices for inputs while unions also benefitted financially as “new intermediaries” (Q.2b.8., Q.1g.4., Q.2b.2.).

Both union presidents stated that through CIP the timeliness of inputs had increased because of coordination advantages, local availability of inputs in the village, and reduced information searching costs for farmers (Q.1g.4, Q.2b.6.).

Moreover, respondents had high expectations that the newly purchased tractors at the union and local union levels would address the long term problem of delayed production and harvesting due to insufficient access to agricultural equipment because of thin markets and only few private service providers. The fact that the CNCAS had recently introduced a credit line for the purchase of agricultural material was, interestingly, partly attributed to lobbying efforts by FBOs (Q.2b.7., Q.1f.2., Q.1f.4, Q.1f.5., Q.1f.6.)

(v) Commercialization

Similarly to CIP, the recent innovation of contracting between FBOs, CNCAS and the rice trader Vital was perceived as a means to increase the certainty of farmers to sell the share of their produce which was dedicated to the reimbursement of the debt early and access subsequent credit early. (Q.2a.1., Q.2a.2., Q.2a.3, Q.2a.9.). The large scale of operations of Vital was considered to positively affect the price that it could pay to farmers (Q.2a.4., Q.2a.5., Q.2a.8.).

30 The timeliness of inputs at the beginning of the growing season is highly important, especially during the dry season. When cultivation and harvesting is delayed, producers risk losing shares of their production when the rain starts at the end of the season.
4.3. Limitations and conditions of FBOs

While the previous sections convey the picture that FBOs have indeed facilitated their members’ production, market access and livelihood generation in various and important ways, the fulfillment of these ascribed functions had several limitations and conditions.

(i) Insufficient land access

The fact that farmers who could afford to do so have increasingly invested themselves outside of the FBO/GA system in recent years was portrayed in an ambiguous way by respondents: On the one hand, respondents stated that surplus and technical expertise generated within the FBO/GA system had enabled them to expand their production outside of the system and thus their livelihood generation (Q.4.3., Q.4.5., Q.1c.1.). Some respondents - especially those who seemed better-off – described this “external investment” of theirs as favorable since they were freer and depended less on other people. Most respondents, however, perceived HC-investment as a necessity rather than a choice given the limited scope of land access within the GA/FBO system. This necessity was increasing due to population growth trends and resulting high dependency ratios while the land accessible through the GA/FBO system was not further increasing (Q.4.6.). Thus, these respondents stated that they would clearly prefer to access more land within the GA instead of having to produce outside of it where risks and costs were much higher and productivity was lower (Q.4.13, Q.4.3., Q.4.4., Q.1c.3., Q.1e.4., Q.1g.1.). However, most respondents stated that only relatively larger producers had the means to successfully produce in the HC system due to the associated costs and risks (Q.1c.3., Q.1c.2., Q.1e.3.)

(ii) Voice and empowerment for whom? - Issues of exclusion and marginalization

It can be argued that through their FBO and union membership, farmers have indeed gained increased voice and countervailing power towards market and political players. Bargaining with business partners or the CNCAS had become a quite common phenomenon, especially since shared information across FBOs had increased their knowledge about different possible buying partners (Q.3.2., Q.3.5., Q.3.8.). The introduction of CIP at the supa-union level had even enhanced this market power. Moreover, the lobbying function of unions had at times, but not always, facilitated greater responsiveness of public officials and the GoS to farmers’ needs (Q.3.1., Q.3.3., Q.3.4., Q.3.6., Q.3.7.).

However, when talking about power, FBO – internal power dynamics and exclusion and marginalization trends should be mentioned as well. Since parcels were assigned to the parent generation in the beginning of the 1990s, upcoming generations now face great difficulties to access land within the GA system and become members of FBOs (Q.3.12.). Moreover, attribution to female organizations had such a limited scope that their ability and incentive to produce was highly limited (Q.1a.1., see also analysis part II). Accordingly, representation of interests and voice can also be seen as being restricted to middle aged and older men.

(iii) Instability of organizations
Importantly, organizational constraints also limited the facilitation of their members’ agricultural production and livelihood generation. Thus, FBOs frequently exhibited crises during which the organizational functions that were presented above could not be performed or only to a very limited degree. Thus, respondents only attributed FBOs facilitating impacts for production and livelihoods during periods of organizational activeness and success (Q.4a.1., Q.4a.3., Q.4a.4., Q.4a.5., Q.4.2.).

In the following, part II of the analysis will go into depth with regards to how organizational patterns and evolutionary trends have affected ability and effectiveness of FBOs to operate and thus fulfill their assigned functions.
5. ANALYSIS PART II - ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS AND EVOLUTIONARY TRENDS OF OBJECTIVE ATTAINMENT

This section presents and discusses findings regarding the second research sub-question - the evolution of FBOs in the study case in relation to cooperative life cycles as suggested by Cook (2009; 2013) and in relation to other determinants for organizational success as presented in the theoretical framework. Thus, the section discusses (1) economic justification and organizational design (2) the occurrence and characteristics of crisis, (3) causes of crisis, (4) recognition of crisis and (5) choices and strategies regarding crisis. Finally, the section concludes with a (6) summary of findings in relation to Cook’s framework and suggests a modified Three Dimensional Cooperative Life Cycle Model.

5.1. Initial justification and organizational design of FBOs

Cook’s framework (Cook et.al. 2009, 2013) puts great emphasis on the two initial phases of a cooperative lifecycle: (1) the economic justification phase and (2) the organizational design phase. He stresses that credible economic opportunities need to be at the origin of FBOs in order for them to become sustainable organizations and that their design will determine later on how FBOs can react to upcoming conflicts and problems.

(i) Transition from state-led to autonomous FBOs

It has to be considered that Cook’s framework seems to assume the creation of FBOs in an environment which is mostly characterized by free market principles. In this study case, however, the creation of FBOs and unions was embedded into a transitory period of agricultural liberalization. In liberal market contexts, farmers might be more probable to establish FBOs in their own initiative for purposes described by Cook (2013) as offensive or defensive - and thus inherently market oriented. In the case of the Senegalese rice sector, however, FBOs were transformed from state-led input distribution entities to autonomous FBOs in a process that was strongly facilitated by the government.

When employing Cook’s (2013) conceptualization of “credible economic opportunities”, the initial governmental economic justification was on the one hand to provide missing services – namely access to an irrigation system that had just been rehabilitated and financial services. On the other hand, the GA/FBO system served to reduce risks for farmers by providing a sort of mutual insurance regarding credits and by providing an irrigation infrastructure which was reliable and which promised relatively secured prospects for productivity.

Organizational design principles such as the ways individuals can become members, the contributions they should make, the distribution of benefits and sanctions in case of rule violation (Cook 2013, Ostrom 1990, 1999) were also majorly set through government facilitation. The newly introduced legal form of GIE provided the regulatory grounds. Members were village inhabitants who were assigned to FBOs by local public officials. Sanctioning of free-riding, in this case non-payment of
individual debts, was prescribed to happen through the temporary revocation of land access rights and the reallocation to others until the debts were paid.

As prescribed by Cook (2009; 2013) external facilitation was, as shown above, crucial to the emergence, initial justification and design of FBOs. At the same time, later sections will show that theoretical assumptions regarding the controversial character of such external influence also apply in this case – especially regarding autonomy, the ownership and implications of externally induced organizational design.

(ii) The special case of the Local Union

As opposed to the general way FBOs emerged as portrayed above, the Local Union (LUB) was created through the initiative of local farmers as a response to the disadvantaged situation of the village with regards to the GA-rehabilitation, three years of continued deprivation from land and serious livelihood problems in the village. In retrospective, the LUB president justifies:

“We told ourselves that we cannot just lean back and not do anything. The others start producing [in other villages], they start to conduct their meetings and so forth. So we told ourselves that we would form a local union.”

The original justification for forming the LUB was, thus, at least as much a political as an economic one. After the political role the LUB had successfully played in negotiating the installation of a temporary irrigation scheme on land outside the GA, it also facilitated credit access and started to collectively purchase inputs. Thereby, the LUB succeeded to establish an economic justification for its own existence which was indeed crucial for the later survival of the LUB as will be shown in later sections.

5.2. Occurrence and Qualification of Crisis

While Cook (2013) does not employ this notion one can argue that “crisis” is an inherent and recurring element in his framework. Thus, he outlines that due to typical problems of FBOs, difficult times during which the existence and functioning of the organization might be questioned occur periodically. Arguably, phases 3, 4 and 5 of his framework can all be understood as elements of this crisis – phase 3 entailing the crisis triggers, phase 4 being the manifestation of the crisis, and phase 5 encompassing the strategies to address the crisis. The application of Cook’s framework to the study case shows on the one hand that the assumption of crisis occurring periodically seems to hold. On the other hand, his stipulations regarding the triggers,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBO</th>
<th>No. of crises (phases 4 and 5)</th>
<th>No. of years in crisis acc. (phases 4 and 5)</th>
<th>Yrs. of existence</th>
<th>Crisis Year Ratio (crisis yrs/ yrs of existence)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>23</td>
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</tr>
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<td>FBO5</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.24</td>
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Table 5.1. - Occurrence of FBO Crises
characteristics and approaches to crisis are also very relevant to the case, but have been amended and complemented.

Table 5.1 presents the extent to which crisis has occurred in the study case FBOs since 1990. The figures are based on subjective assessments of leaders and members about their experiences with organizational downturns – more specifically the periods where crises manifested themselves (phase 4) and when struggles to overcome crisis were undertaken (phase 5)\(^{31}\). From these narrations, this author has calculated approximations of crises frequencies and lengths. Although these figures are only approximations\(^{32}\), they convey the clear message that crisis has indeed occurred frequently as FBOs have so far gone through one to three crises and spent at least a fifth and at most nearly three quarters of their existence in periods of crisis and overcoming crisis. Notably, both female FBOs exhibit even longer times of crisis than the conventional male dominated FBOs.

**Qualification of Crisis**

In conventional performance assessments of business organizations, financial results are a key indicator (if not the only indicator). Due to the fact that FBOs typically have multiple objective functions and “health” indicators (Cook 2013), success or - as in this case - crisis tends to be multidimensional. FBO assessments should thus integrate financial and non-financial indicators (Cook 2013). According to Cook (2013), non-financial characteristics of FBO crisis typically include inactiveness of the FBO, member apathy, the emergence of factions, conflicts over residual distribution and disincentives to invest. In the interviews, respondents were asked to also qualify and ascribe characteristics to their observed crises. Table 5.2 presents a classification of crisis indicators compiled by the author through a content analysis of respondents’ replies.

The author did not have access to a coherent set of financial statements. However, respondents did assess financial health from their own perceptions. Indeed, respondents’ observations about financial health were the most important determinant for their performance assessments. Thus, not accessing credits collectively - mostly a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBO</th>
<th>Economic/ Financial dimensions</th>
<th>Social Dimensions</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No collective credit (*inability to service loan(^{33}))</td>
<td>Excessive debt(^{33})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO2</td>
<td>2*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBO1</td>
<td>1*, 1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBO3</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>UA</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBO4</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBO5</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBO6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUB</td>
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\(^{31}\) Phase 3 was not included into these calculations due to the difficulties to indicate starting points for “triggers of crisis” and due to the multiplicity of such triggers

\(^{32}\) Respondents’ statements about years were not perfectly coherent at times. Moreover, sometimes the question was whether to define difficult periods as one large crisis with different internal phases and overlaps or as two separate crises.
consequence of the inability to service yearly debts or excessive debt was the single crisis characteristic that nearly all respondents mentioned. As such, respondents qualified crisis as the inability of the FBO to attain its objective in relation to the economic justification—the provision of finance, and thereby, inputs. All respondents agreed that these economic objectives had given sense to and provided incentives for their membership.

Within the classification of crisis, two non-financial crisis characteristics ascribed by Cook (2013) also seemed to hold: Thus, **FBO inactiveness in terms of conducting meetings** such as Board meetings and General Assemblies was identified by several respondents as an indicator for crisis. Partly, this inactiveness was justified with the crisis of the economic purpose indicating again that FBOs’ overall health depended to a large degree on the financial health. Secondly, the **formation of factions within the FBO** which often immobilized the decision making of FBOs was mentioned by several respondents.

### 5.3. Causes of crisis

Within Cook’s framework (2013), the root causes of crisis are inherent in the phase of organizational success (phase 3). Thus, while the FBO generally exhibits growth and achieves its objectives in economic terms, the membership growth increases internal heterogeneity of preferences. Common collective action problems occur increasingly often, namely the utilization of FBO benefits without making appropriate contributions (free-riding) linked with over-celebration and underinvestment.

Respondents usually described causes of crisis as intertwined problems which mutually influenced each other and contributed to the occurrence of crisis. Problems were looked at from a retrospective position—having the crisis in mind. In order to better understand the root problems and the ways they were addressed later-on, the author classified the problems into a category system. As opposed to Cook, it was found that **three dimensions were the root causes and mutually affected each other for the occurrence of crisis**, namely:

1. Deficits of the organizational design to generate investment incentives for members into the FBO,
2. Deficits of human, financial and social capital
3. External influences

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33 Two different degrees of debt crisis have to be distinguished in the context of this case study. Thus, a “simple debt crisis” describes a situation in which the FBO cannot service the debts of the year. It has the option to negotiate a moratorium in order to delay the reimbursement of outstanding debts. In this case, the production usually only stops for one cropping season. In turn, in case of “excessive debt”, the FBO already holds other moratoriums which—in sum—exceed the allowed maximum amount that can be negotiated at the bank for a moratorium. The production stop usually takes longer, only individuals with substantive individual means will produce in the GA and additional efforts have to be undertaken in order to return to the bank.
5.3.1. Deficits of Organizational Design

One major finding of the study is that features of the organizational design have indeed played a major role for the occurrence, characteristics and pathways out of crisis (Cook 2013). More specifically, the crucial question was whether the organizational design generated continuous incentives for FBO members to invest into their FBO’s. While the question of incentives for investment is mentioned by Cook (“amount of skin put into the game”) he does, however, not place them at the center of discussion about the adequacy of organizational design.

Fig. 5.1 shows the study findings in relation to the identification of key determinants of organizational design. As opposed to Cook, the economic justification of the FBO has been integrated into the organizational design since it is understood as a key determinant for the objectives and activities of the FBOs and since the study has shown that it has also been subject to change along the way. The figure illustrates that economic justification, the design of control and claim rights, the way free riding is addressed through effective sanctions and the handling of size and heterogeneity have determined the generation of incentives for investment into the FBO.

In the following, the individual elements of the figure will be presented and discussed. It will also be shown how their deficits, on the one hand, were triggered by the original organizational design. On the other hand, the deficits were caused by changes in contextual conditions that the organizational design had not adapted to.

(ii) Limits of the GA/ FBO system and growing socio-economic heterogeneity

As discussed earlier, the incentive for investing one’s time and resources into the FBO system was originally importantly enhanced through the linkage between FBO membership and land access within the GA. Due to population growth trends, the relative economic sufficiency of producing on the land allocated within the GA has, however, decreased (C.1.d.2.). **Due to a lack of growth opportunities within the system, the incentive of investing oneself into the FBO was reduced. This is, however, only the case for those who have the means to bear the higher costs and risks of producing outside the GA system.** This trend seems to align with Cook’s (2013) assumptions on growing heterogeneity among members and their preferences as a reason for crisis. While most respondents still accorded major importance to the health of FBOs, some respondents also expressed their relative independence from the GA/FBO system (C.1.c.2., C.1.c.S.2.). One FBO president who holds less than one ha in the GA system and over 10 ha outside of it, even perceived collective credit crisis as a minor problem:

“And do you know why this is not that serious? Because all members of the FBO also produce outside the GA.” (C.1.c.2.)
Indicating the heterogeneity in preferences, a member of the same FBO, however, criticized:

“Our problem is actually that we do not meet. I think that our president does not have the time because of his other occupations and his projects [outside the GA].” (C.1.c.1.)

In this case, a lack of the leader’s incentive to invest himself, thus, seems to have contributed to the continued crisis of the FBO.

(ii) Free riding and the role of effective sanctions

Free-riding is one of the most frequently observed problems of collective action. It occurs when members make use of collective resources and extract benefits without making adequate contributions leading to reduced incentives for others, and thus underinvestment in general. Free riding can be addressed through effective sanctions in case of rule violations (Ostrom 1990, 1999, Cook 2013).

Free-riding was found to be a major reason for crisis in the study. Several respondents justified their past periods of success with a great discipline regarding debt reimbursement (C.1.a.1., C.1.a.8.). In turn, the accumulation of yearly debts and smaller moratoriums over the years had triggered severe debt crises for several of the FBOs (C.1.a.3., C.1.a.10.) Members’ non-payment of debts was sometimes caused by external shocks such as weather conditions. However, several statements also indicate that free-riding was the root cause for crisis or the deepening of crisis (C.1.a.5., C.1.a.5.5.). Thus, the president of the UA justified FBO’s crises by stating:

“For example, someone tells you to bring 40 paddy sacks. You do have 50 paddy sacks but you only bring 30. Next time, it will be accumulated. It becomes very heavy, that is the problem.” (C.1.a.9.)

As stipulated by official rules, non-payment of debts is sanctioned with the temporary removal and re-assignment of land access rights to other FBO members who could fill the financial gap. Some respondents stated that this rule was rigorously applied in their FBOs (C.1.a.12., C.1.a.3.3.). However, on the basis of several respondents’ statements, it can be argued that sanctions for individual and organizational violation of this rule had not been effective in the lead up to crises (C.1.a.5., C.1.a.6.). The UA president, moreover, admitted that ineffective sanctions of the union and the CNCAS had provided the wrong incentives:

“[…] if I am in an FBO which pays 100% every year but I see other FBOs which do not completely reimburse but still get their loan… I will also do the same then. (C.1.a.9.)

34
The design of property rights plays a key role in determining whether and how farmers have an incentive to invest their resources into cultivating the land. When there is no clarity how individuals can draw benefits, their incentive to invest is generally low (Kirsten et al. 2009). With regards to collective action and FBOs, there should be rules which regulate individuals’ (1) access, (2) provisions/contributions and (3) claims/appropriations of benefits (Ostrom 1990, 1999, Cook 2013). Since their introduction, male dominated FBOs had assigned rights to their members to cultivate and draw income individually from their assigned parcels. Female FBOs’ land assignments to members and production rules, however, were less clear about the role of the individual and the group. In relation to their enormous membership base, the land allocated to female FBOs was only a tiny share of the land allocated to conventional FBOs. This internal member-land ratio\(^{34}\) certainly contributed to the fact that parcels were not allocated individually. In turn, the rotating production schemes female FBOs employed seems to have contributed importantly to continued crises by not providing individual incentives for taking care of the parcels (C.1.b.S.1.).

5.3.2. Deficits of human, social and financial capital

While Cook (2009; 2013) argues that underinvestment is a root cause of crisis, he does not specify the character of assets that the FBO needs to invest into within the lifecycle framework. In the study, it was found that a mixture of low and decreasing endowments with human, social and financial capital was a root cause of crisis.

(i) Human capital deficits triggering decreasing financial capital

As argued by Schulz (2005:49), individual members’ skills determine the way that individuals can contribute to an organization’s achievement of goals. Moreover, cooperative members usually carry cooperative-specific and disproportionally important roles since members take as diverse functions as users of services, owners, controllers and beneficiaries of their FBOs (Nilsson 1999, Cook & Burress 2009). Cook (1994), further, formulates specific roles for cooperative leaders: He argues that in addition to conventional managerial requirements, cooperative managers need to fulfill a set of decisional, informational and interpersonal roles in order to respond to specific ownership and decision making requirements of FBOs.

Different types of capacity deficits seem to have importantly contributed to the occurrence of crises. According to the UA president, the illiteracy of the first board leaders led to unnecessary expenses which were at the origin of later union debt crises (C.2.a.6.). One respondent stated that coordination deficits at the union level had led to a delay in the provision of inputs, which in turn contributed to production delays, product losses due to the starting rain, reimbursement issues and FBO debt crisis (C.2.a.7.).

\(^{34}\) While in male dominated FBOs, the ratio between land area and number of members varies between 0.76 and 1.72 (ha per person), this ratio is 0.04 for one female FBO and 0.12 for the other female FBO (ha per person)
Besides these deficits regarding basic skills (reading and writing) and “ordinary management roles” (timely provision of production inputs), Cook’s (1994) observation about specific decisional, informational and interpersonal roles of cooperative managers seem to hold as well: Thus, one respondent criticized that instead of providing information and facilitating dialogue among members for the solution of crisis, the FBO’s president had been inactive and had thus contributed to the deepening of the crisis (C.2.a.8., C.1.c.3.).

Deficits in members’ technical production skills were, moreover, identified as key problems which had triggered low productivity, and thus chronic debts (C.2.a.S.5.). In particular, one female FBO seemed to be highly affected. Its members’ lack of technical production capacities, thus, seemed to be one out of two key causes for this female FBOs’ “chronic crisis” of 14 years (C.2.a.S.4.). As such, the study confirms the manifold role played by members for organizational success and failure (Nilsson 1999, Cook&Burress 2009). In this case, members are not only members, but also producers of value within the FBO.

(ii) Social and financial capital

A low initial endowment with social capital paired with decreasing social capital in some cases was a cause for crisis and the deepening of crisis. Thus, several respondents argued that - since they had not been able to self-select fellow members - mutual identification had been restricted. As a consequence, several respondents stated that organizations tended to be dormant once there was no collective credit (C.1.d.3., C.1.d.4.). One respondent even concluded:

“What’s keeping people together here is the credit. If everybody looks for credit elsewhere, it becomes difficult to hold FBO meetings.”
(C.1.d.4.).

Thus, the deficits of the organizational design also affected the way that members identified with each other and took ownership of the FBO, as also argued by Cook (2013).

Besides, accountability deficits were also a major reason for crisis within two FBOs. Thus, the misuse and misappropriation of funds had on the one hand contributed importantly to excessive debts with these FBOs (C.2.b.1., C.2.b.3.). Moreover, it had led to trust issues and factions which in turn contributed to the arousal of crisis (C.2.b.3.). Thereby, it can be argued that accountability deficits led to a further reduction of social capital.

5.3.3. External influences

As opposed to Cook et.al.’s framework (2009, 2013) where external influences are excluded, they have played a part here. These influences regard on the one hand macro-factors. On the other hand, concrete interactions with external actors were crucial for the evolution of FBOs (Markelova et.al. 2009, Münkner 2012, Berdégué 2001, Hellin et.al. 2008). Due to the limited scope of this paper, external factors could not be analyzed in depth. Yet, some of them are mentioned within other sections in relation to their concrete role. Moreover, three important external factors should still be mentioned here:
Thus, external environmental shocks, such as weather shocks or government induced flooding did contribute importantly to the loss of harvest and the arousal of crisis in several cases (C.3.b.1., C.3.b.4., C.3.b.5.). The lack of insurance, legal enforcement mechanisms and some degree of arbitrary political responses regarding cut debts in cases of externally induced shocks have increased the contributions of these shocks to FBO crisis (C.3.b.7, C.3.b.5.). Moreover, respondents described a trend towards yield reductions during the rainy season in recent years. There was no consensus about the reason for these productivity concerns. Climate change, but also soil deterioration or technical deficits of inputs were mentioned as possible factors (C.3.a.4., C.3.a.5., C.3.b.2.). Lastly, price fluctuations have played a role. In early years, price declines had contributed to the occurrence of crisis (C.3.a.9.). For recent years, however, respondents stated that price rises had contributed positively to the number of traders in the market, and had even increased the incentive for members of FBOs to overcome crises (C.3.a.6., C.3.a.7., Q.2a.7.).

5.4. Meeting the crisis: Recognition and Introspection

While Cook’s framework is not explicit about the characteristics of this phase, it suggests that “the end of [the recognition] phase draws near when cooperative leadership presents or membership demands explicit action to remedy perceived and real challenges” (Cook & Burress 2009:13). In the subsequent phase “choice”, FBOs will then select one out of three options to either overcome the crisis or dissolve the organization (ibid). The framework does suggest that this phase involves collective decision making costs for conflict resolution. However, it presents the transition from crisis to “choice” without referring to determinants or conditions for the identification and selection of “choices”.

Yet, the analysis of the study case suggests that “recognition and introspection” does not occur in a vacuum and that the selection and implementation of “coping strategies” depends on and is shaped by several factors:

As discussed earlier, crisis mostly occurred in the form of collective credit crisis which was either triggered by underinvestment/ rent extraction by the FBO members due to a number of wrong incentives or by external shocks. Either way, it can be argued that the underinvestment or rent extraction led to a reduction in the “collective capital endowment” of the FBO: Thus, depending on the specific FBO, collective financial capital was negative due to increased or extensive debts; collective social capital was reduced due to internal conflicts, factions and fewer or no meetings conducted anymore. Due to crisis-induced member and leader inactiveness or the above mentioned capacity and accountability deficit, human capital also seemed to be less accessible in several cases.

As a consequence of the collective capital reduction, the scope of action of FBOs seemed to be reduced in a number of ways. Moreover, respondents perceived crisis as an exhausting period which demanded extra efforts in several ways (R.1.c., R.1.b.). The UA-president stated:

“The only thing we found [when we entered office at the Union] was credit to be paid. […] So, the person [- the union-] was sick. It had to be healed. […] But when we came in 2003, we were also sick. Our sickness was [the question] about how to pay the debts.” (R.1.c.)
Thus, the crucial question in many cases seemed to be how to mobilize the resources needed for developing coping strategies and implementing these. Depending on the specific FBO, human capital needed to be mobilized in order to conduct the “recognition and introspection process” and identify options. Social capital needed to be mobilized in order to gain support for the implementation of a strategy and to regain trust for members’ investment into the FBO. Financial capital, in turn, was needed to reestablish the economic cause of the organization – above all the provision of credit for the purchase of inputs.

In some cases, the mobilization of these capitals was organized internally, within the FBO (R.1.e.). However, in many cases, external help also facilitated this process importantly (R.1.d., C.1.d.s.6.). In the following section, different “choices and coping strategies” are presented while highlighting the role internal and external capital mobilization have played.

5.5. **Choices and Strategies**

According to Cook et.al. (2009, 2013), “choices” after recognition and introspection either regard exiting, tinkering or reinventing which are selected depending on how costly the crisis is as compared to the respective “choice” (see theoretical framework).

While these categories were found to be relevant within the case as well, they were amended into the three coping strategies: (1) Exit, (2) Adapting organizational design and (3) Developing capitals. Cook’s strategies tinkering and reinventing were, thus, integrated into the second strategy of organizational design adaptation.

5.5.1. **Exit Option**

(i) **Temporary exit and continued crisis**

In the study case, liquidating the FBO did not seem an option which might be explained by the FBO-land access linkage. However, some FBOs did experience crisis periods of several years without relevant attempts to overcome crisis. This could be qualified as at least a temporary exit. As mentioned earlier, members who could afford it focused their activities on extra-GA production schemes during times of extended crisis (C.1.c.S.2., C.1.c.2., C.1.d.S.8.). Others worked as seasonal workers (R.1.a.). Producers with lower resource endowment were, thus, more affected by extended crises (C.1.d.S.9.).

However, the “temporary exit” seems to be a double-edged sword: Those who could afford to produce outside the GA perceived this “diversification” as a means to increase the certainty of

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35 Tinkering = reducing costs of collective decision making and increasing incentives for investment in relation to more heterogeneous membership through operational changes (see also theory section)

36 Reinventing = changing claim and contribution rights (see also theory section)
producing and gaining livelihoods (C.1.c.S.2., C.1.c.2.). Yet, those who could not afford it criticized that resources necessary for reviving the FBO were not mobilized because not everyone was making the same effort to overcome crisis (C.1.c.1., C.1.d.S.8.).

5.5.2. Adapting organizational design for realigning incentives

(ii) Division into smaller FBOs

Two respondents assessed positively the division of their FBOs and the foundation of new FBOs whether because of conflict or the manageability of size. In both cases, respondents valued the fact that members could this time decide with whom they wanted to be in a new FBO as a means to increase understanding and thus social capital within the FBO (S.1.c., S.1.d.). In one FBO, however, the attempt to divide the organization to resolve the problem of factions was not successful: The bank did not agree to the separation because of outstanding debts (R.1.d.).

(iii) Restoring economic justification/ purpose

In accordance with the importance assigned to the economic objective discussed earlier, all respondents described the restoration of the economic function as a key strategy for overcoming crisis. Therefore, human, financial and social capital mobilization seemed to be crucial:

Some respondents reported that their FBOs had been able to internally mobilize social and financial capital for making contributions at the bank to negotiate a moratorium (C.1.d.S.2.). One respondent stated that the change in leadership had contributed to members’ trust and thus to their willingness to mobilize their own funds (S.1.b.). Interestingly, a female FBO seemed to have a comparative advantage regarding the mobilization of social and financial capital due to a greater “common identity”, financial resources from other collective activities, and no individual claim rights which could have impeded shifting funds from one activity (bird breeding) to the other (rice debt reimbursement).

For others, however, the mobilization of capitals for restoring the economic purpose was more complex. The following statements describes how human capital (leaders’ reflection) helped to realize that financial capital (external funds) were needed for providing a provisional economic purpose and income to members (through input provision) in order for them to be able and agree to again invest into the FBO:

“Generally it is the executive which reflects. I think, in 2006 it was me and two others who were thinking [about the situation]. We realized: It had been quite a while that we were asking members to pay at least something every seasons to the bank. But without result. So we realized that the problem goes deeper because the people do not have the money […]. In order for us to impose on people to bring something we need to facilitate their access to inputs. That is when we told ourselves that we could maybe go and see somebody who would give us the inputs.” (R.1.e.)
Over the years, several FBOs followed this FBO’s example of contracting private external input providers as a means to step out of crisis. The mobilization of social capital across FBOs, thus, helped FBOs in crisis to identify contracting as an option and to gain access to the input providers (R.1.e., C.1.d.S.1., C.1.d.S.2., C.1.d.S.3.). Several FBOs also benefited from external support namely a partial debt reduction and a one time-input donation, that they combined with their own efforts for mobilizing resources (S.1.a., C.1.d.S.13.).

(iv) Introducing new economic functions

Beyond simply restoring the economic function, some attempts to extend or to introduce new economic functions could also be identified. However, mindsets among respondents differed: Thus, some expressed skepticism regarding the general innovative potential of the system and saw the future of rice production outside the system (C.2.a.3.). Another respondent did value the potential of collective action within FBOs and wished for additional innovation for the members’ benefits. Yet, he still saw the major obstacle for introducing entrepreneurial activities in the fact that members had been put together and their vision and preferences differed importantly (C.2.a.2.). Others, however, did believe in the potential of collective innovation and developed strategies in that regard:

An innovative strategy was the UA’s attempt to extend the irrigation infrastructure to HC-parcels – and to thereby integrate those production schemes into the union. This option was under discussion with SAED (C.1.d.S.7.). Moreover, one group of FBO leaders expressed passion for the FBO system and planned to invest into purchasing processing equipment together (C.2.a.5.), something which could be qualified as “collective entrepreneurship” in the sense of Cook (1999, 2013).

The introduction of collective input purchasing by the LUB was on the one hand a means to economically re-justify its existence and secure its survival after having lost the credit function for its members (C.1.d.S.4., C.1.d.S.10). Interestingly, partners got inspired by this bottom-up collective innovation and replicated it: Since 2010, the Federation of Unions (FPA) in collaboration with the NGO Bey Dundé has facilitated the introduction of CIP in all other unions (including the UA) (C.1.d.S.12.). This bottom-up innovation of CIP, thus, seems to be a success story. However, it is still interesting that it took nearly 20 years and the facilitation of an external NGO to translate it from one union to the other.

Again another innovation by FBOs was institutionalized and developed further through external facilitation - Contracting with external input providers (see section above): The CNCAS and a private rice company (Vital) with the facilitation of USAid recently introduced an arrangement whereby the CNCAS provides the credit for inputs to FBOs, and FBOs reimburse in kind to Vital which then pays the loan at the CNCAS. Respondents did appreciate this arrangement as a means to increase the certainty of acquiring the loan for the subsequent season and decrease the probability of crisis.

(v) Increasing sanctions and addressing free-riding

All respondents agreed that more effective sanctioning for rule violation was crucial for addressing crisis. Changes in sanctioning mechanisms regarded on the one hand the sanctioning of FBOs by the bank (C.1.a.6., C.1.a.9., C.1.a.12.) and on the other hand individuals within FBOs by the FBO (C.1.a.5., C.1.a.S.4., C.1.a.S.1.). One respondent stated:
In addition to more effectively applying existing sanctions, several FBOs introduced “credit recovery committees” which directly collect the paddy for collective credit reimbursement in the field. Thereby, they improved their credit reimbursement rate up to 100% (C.1.a.S.4.). One FBO had introduced this practice when they contracted an external input supplier – a situation in which they did not have many options left and thus felt the need for increasing sanctions. Interestingly, now, that they had returned to the bank, the maintenance of this control system was again subject to discussion within the General Assembly. Free-riding, in this regard, seemed to be a practice which was to some degree accepted by this leader – possibly due to his stance that household needs were so great that non-reimbursement was comprehensible from an empathic perspective (C.1.a.S.4., R.1.e.)

As other strategies, identifying and implementing increased sanctioning were externally influenced: a union leader expressed how dialogues with other union’s leaders had facilitated the tackling of the problem (C.1.a.12).

(vi) Changing land access rights

In relation to the female FBO specific problem of claim and appropriation rights, respondents of that particular FBO expressed hopes for the future. Through the facilitation of a study visit by the NGO Bey Dundé, they had learnt from another female FBO about others’ internal rules. Thus, they had decided to maintain the rotating principle due their limited number of ha under cultivation. However, they had decided to assign 0.25 ha and the respective output individually for an entire cropping season (C.1.b.S.1., C.1.b.S.2.). One respondent explained:

“‘For fighting this [free-riding] we are obliged to do it differently now: The one who pays will produce, the one who does not pay will not produce. Thereby, we will encourage the good payers.”’ (C.1.a.9.)

5.5.3. Developing capitals

One the one hand, the mobilization of “short-term capitals” facilitated the identification, selection and implementation of different coping strategies targeting the adaptation of organizational design and the restoration of incentives as discussed above. On the other hand, investments into developing the “collective capital base” were also undertaken by some FBOs:

(vii) Developing human, social and financial capital

Respondents described different elements of human capital development as a means to overcome capacity deficits. Several respondents emphasized the role of experience, mutual learning and
comparison with others as important elements of capacity development (C.2.a.S.7.). One president stated that when members had compared their FBO to others, they had felt an increased need to overcome factions in order to regain activities (R.1.d.). Training provided by external facilitators was considered key for improving technical and management skills (C.2.a.1., C.2.a.S.4., C.2.a.S.5., C.2.a.S.6., C.2.a.S.7.). One leader, as well as one member interviewed stated that trainings on roles and functions of FBO members and leaders had been very important to enable them to better contribute to their organizations (C.2.a.1., C.2.a.S.1.). When asked what the training had changed, one FBO president stated:

“I didn’t know where my limits were. [...] I thought that I was maybe the owner of the FBO. [Today I know] that it is the members who have put me there [laughing].”  
(C.2.a.1.)

For several respondents, joining a management consultancy (“Centre de Gestion”) which conducts regular audits was a means for improving their own controlling and management skills and the certainty for members that leaders’ actions were appropriate (C.2.a.S.2., C.2.b.S.2., C.2.b.S.6.). In several cases, respondents also stated that a change in leadership had been necessary to address capacity and accountability deficits (C.2.a.S.3., C.2.b.S.1., C.2.b.S.1.). Two respondents mentioned outside mediation and a certain external pressure exercised by SAED as facilitating factors for leadership change after years of continued crisis (C.2.b.S.3., S.Ex.a.). Moreover, one respondent also emphasized that the integration of young people had increased request for accountability from leadership and that they, thus, had to be integrated increasingly (C.2.b.S.5.).

Respondents’ assessments regarding skill and knowledge development through trainings, experience, and mutual learning were, thus, mostly positive. These human capital and social capital achievements were, however, accompanied by mixed assessments regarding mutual trust and willingness to invest into FBOs: Some respondents stated that measures taken for developing social capital had been successful (C.2.b.2., C.2.b.S.4, C.2.b.S.5.). Yet, others argued that persisting mistrust was an important factor that hampered investments and collective innovations (C.2.a.1.).

5.6. Proposing a three dimensional Cooperative Life Cycle Model – Summary of Findings Part II

In order to relate the case study findings in an illustrative way to Cook’s lifecycle framework, the author developed a modified case specific three dimensional lifecycle model (Fig. 5.2. next page).

The model presents one FBO lifecycle (h) as a function of two dimensions: Namely the evolution of the organizational design (d) and the evolution of the FBO’s stock of capitals (c). External factors can influence every phase of the lifecycle – either positively or negatively. Since Cook’s two first phases of (1) Economic Justification and (2) Organisational Design were externally induced in the case, they have been included into the model as parts of an “initial organizational design” which is the starting point for the evolution of d. In the model, the stock of capital (c) integrates the FBO’s
capitals which were found crucial for cooperative health in the case, namely financial capital ($fc$), social capital ($sc$) and human capital ($hc$).

The FBO’s lifecycle thus evolves over three phases, namely (1) Crisis Lead Up, (2) Crisis Recognition and Introspection and (3) Choices and Strategies. During Phase 1, the deficits of the organizational design as discussed earlier (economic justification, free-riding & sanctions, heterogeneity, appropriation and contribution rules) provide a low incentive for investment ($d$). This low incentive in combination with low human capital (skills, knowledge, accountability) and decreasing social capital (mistrust/ factions) leads to underinvestment or even extensive extraction of resources which, in turn, reduces the stock of capitals even more (financial, human and social). External shocks can contribute additionally to the occurrence of crisis. During Phase 2 (Recognition and Introspection), the effects of the misaligned incentives, underinvestment, extraction of resources and the reduced capital stock become evident: The purpose for which the organization was created is not fulfilled anymore (here: above all: access to collective credit and inputs). Indicators of crisis described by Cook (2009, 2013) such as member inactiveness and factions characterize this phase. In order to understand the core of the problem and develop coping strategies, external and internal resources need to be mobilized.

Depending on the outcomes of Phase 4, choices and strategies contribute to the recovery of the FBO in Phase 5: Depending on the specific justification of crisis, the reform of the organizational design may involve increasing the effectiveness of sanctions against the violation of rules and addressing free-riding, modifying claim and contribution rules, and restoring or renewing the economic purpose of the FBO. Thereby, the economic incentive to invest oneself may be increased ($D'$). At the same time, investments into social, human and financial capital are needed in order to restore and develop the accumulated collective capital stock ($C'$) which the FBOs needs for its ability to act and fulfill its purposes. External influences do, again, affect how the FBO can reform its organizational design, increase incentives and develop its collective accumulated capital stock.

At the end of the lifecycle, FBO’s health may have improved dramatically if both tasks, capital stock development and reform of organizational design have been successfully completed ($H1$). More probably, these tasks have only been tackled partially restoring the FBO’s ability to fulfill its economic functions while still being affected by the continued deficits of organizational design and capital endowment (any point below $H1$, for example $H2a$ or $H2b$). In case efforts to address the low levels of $c$ and $d$ were insufficient or unsuccessful, the health of the FBO may also further stagnate or deteriorate (continued crisis). In the study case, this continued crisis is represented by a partial exit from FBOs in the sense that members increasingly invest themselves outside the FBO ($H3$).
Fig. 5.2 – Three Dimensional Cooperative Life Cycle Model, Author’s adaption of Cook (2009, 2013)
6. CONCLUSION

The study was designed to contribute to the academic discourse which deliberately examines institutional and organizational factors for successful smallholder production and their participation in markets. While large shares of the Senegalese population continue to depend on small-scale agriculture, their livelihood generation keeps being compromised by their competitiveness constraints, restricted access to productive resources, services and markets, as well as – especially in recent years – large scale land appropriations. FBOs are widely recognized for having the potential to address some of these specific smallholder constraints through coordination and collective action. However, their actual contributions fall short of their assigned potential in most African contexts. As organizational factors are often neglected in that regard, the paper aimed, more specifically at understanding and explaining organizational patterns and determinants for FBOs objective attainment in the Senegalese rice sector. To this end, field data from 6 primary level and two secondary level FBOs in two villages in the Senegalese River Valley was collected and analyzed as part of a case study research.

1. Facilitation of Smallholder Agriculture

Indeed, FBOs in the case study were found to have contributed importantly to the facilitation of smallholder agriculture - and consequently to the livelihood and wellbeing generation of FBO members through increased and more secured incomes. Through their organizations, members of FBOs have reduced conflicts of interest amongst themselves, as well as risks and costs of participating in input, output and finance markets. Producers could enhance their productivity by accessing key resources and by adopting production technologies.

These achievements were on the one hand possible due to coordination advantages, scale effects and the generation of countervailing power through collective action. On the other hand, they were triggered by governmental and non-governmental promotion and incentive mechanisms which were linked to the FBO system from its inception—most importantly the publicly funded and FBO managed irrigation schemes. These externally induced incentive mechanisms have enabled the emergence of the FBO system in the first place and contributed to the recurring revival of the system in times of crisis.

However, the facilitation of smallholder agriculture through FBOs also faced conditions and limits. Thus, scope limits regarding land access were inherited from the original design. Due to population growth trends, the initial attribution of irrigated land has become insufficient to satisfy household needs. Accordingly, access for upcoming generations and women is highly limited. Furthermore, it was found that the discontinuity of FBO organizational objective attainment importantly compromised the facilitation of smallholder agriculture.

2. Patterns of Organisational Evolution and Objective attainment

The analysis of FBO’s organizational evolution showed that a number of factors have determined patterns of FBO’s success and recurrent crisis.
In order to understand and explore the reasons and patterns of these crises and ways out of crisis, the cooperative lifecycle framework by Cook et.al. was applied (2009, 2013). Based on the findings, the author suggests a modified case-specific Three dimensional cooperative lifecycle model. On the basis of Cook’s framework, the suggested model conceptualizes organizational design deficits and dynamic trends of collective capital reduction as root causes for the occurrence of crisis in the case. Thus, the occurrence, frequency and depth of crises across FBOs in the study case seemed to have majorly depended on the way deficits of the organizational design failed to generate investment incentives. These deficits, in turn, contributed to the reduction of financial, social and human capital. The low stock of capitals, in turn, seemed to immobilize the FBO and thus oftentimes freeze the attainment of its organizational goals. The FBOs which most successfully overcame crisis did so by (1) mobilizing internal and external short term capital in order to develop coping strategies, (2) reforming their organizational design in order to restore investment incentives and (3) developing their collective accumulated capital stock.

Up to date, studied FBOs seem to carry the burden of externally induced organizational design and incentive mechanisms. However, organizational learning was clearly present in various ways in the study. On the basis of long term experience of stakeholders with collective action, there might be potential to collectively innovate, and even move beyond the admittedly restricted system currently in place. Thus, signs of collective entrepreneurship could already be observed – e.g. regarding a newly founded marketing cooperative and emerging collective action structures outside the FBO system. For the future, it remains to be observed how the various experiences that stakeholders in the area have with collective action can be mobilized for further empowerment of smallholder farmers.
7. References


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Images:


8. Appendices

1. Appendix – Policies and Agricultural Cooperative History in Senegal – A Review

As in most African countries, Senegalese agriculture, the rice sector, as well as cooperative structures, have been subject to major historical and political shifts from pre-colonial times up to today. These shifts concerned amongst others, the respective roles accorded to different actors within public and private domains. FBOs have thus been subject to different policy shifts which have affected their evolution and their development. While this paper cannot provide an in-depth analysis of these developments, major trends will be briefly outlined in the following section.

Traditionally, in pre-colonial times, associative structures were rooted in lineage principles and were often organized in hierarchical ways along “lines” of gender, age and ethnicity. During colonial times, Senegalese agricultural cooperatives were organs within an agricultural economy that was oriented towards international trade which satisfied the objectives and needs of French colonial rule. Cooperatives were, thus “neither autonomous, nor indigenous” (Ndiaye 2010:197).

During the first two decades after independence (1960-1980), the agricultural market – including productive activities and imports - was strongly regulated by the Senegalese state. The state administered all sectoral activities, and performed major functions through parastatal organisations, including input supply, collection, processing and the commercialization of rice production (GRET 2012:5). In order to decrease the trade balance deficit inherited from colonial production and consumption patterns and to attain self-sufficiency, the Senegalese government put a strong focus on staple production from 1977 onwards and large investments into irrigation infrastructure for rice cultivation were undertaken (GRET 2012:5). In order to promote rice cultivation, the state facilitated the migration of populations into rice cultivation areas. Among those are the two study villages. During this period of state domination, the number of cooperatives increased as a means to facilitate input distribution and the collection of output and membership grew importantly. However, in a context of nation building and centralized governance structures, cooperatives were strongly controlled and oftentimes politicized, which again strongly compromised their autonomy. (Ndiaye 2010, Bernard&Wouteurse 2012).

Decreasing export prices, debt crises, heavy bureaucracies and severe droughts affected Senegal starting in the 1970s. As a response to the crisis of the developmental state, rural dwellers started to organize in more autonomous organisations (Bernard&Wouteurse 2012). As a consequence to the crises, international financial institutions pushed African governments to implement “Structural Adjustment Programs” in the 1980s. Senegal was one of the most affected countries and was the first country in the region to sign the agreements with IMF and The Worldbank (Dieng 2006:31). Amongst others, these programs liberalized economies and reduced the role of the state in agricultural development. In Senegal, the agricultural policy shift was institutionalized through the “Nouvelle Politique Agricole (NPA) in 1985 and “Programmes, Lettres, et Déclarations de Politique de Développement Agricole” (PLDPA) between 1995 and 2003 (Dieng 2006:9). During this period, the agricultural bank CNCAS was created (1984), the state disengaged from processing and marketing
activities (1994), abolished the state monopoly on rice imports (1995), and disengaged from price setting for rice (1995). The parastatal agency SAED which had performed rice commercialization activities before was transformed into an agency for technical assistance (Dieng 2006:49, Colen&Demont 2012:4).

During this period of market liberalization, a trend towards more autonomous and effective producer organisations could be observed. On the one hand, state withdrawal and market liberalization put pressure on smallholders and thus facilitated their organization with “unprecedented dynamism” (Fall 2005:15, FNPRS 2010). Associative structures increasingly attempted to fill in the gaps left by the government retreat and respond to individuals’ and communities (service) needs (Ndiaye 2010). On the other hand, the political environment was also in favour of smallholder agriculture through the promotion of producer organisations (Dieng 2006:43, Bernard&Wouteurse 2012). Robert Sagna, minister of agriculture under the former president Abdou Diouf37, stated that at the time, the Senegalese government understood farmer organisations as key actors for promoting the autonomy of farmers in the context of structural adjustment (Sagna 2011). Accordingly, both policies, the NPA and the PLDPA, state producer organisations as important actors and target promoting producer organisations to effectively represent and respond to their members’ needs and interests (Dieng 2006:53, GoS 2009). The introduction of GIE38 in 1984, as “hybrid organizational forms” between market oriented and community based forms of organization marked a shift towards a kind of “communal entrepreneurship” according to Ndiaye (2010:198). The number of GIEs, which were more flexible and could be created by at least two people started to grow very quickly due to preference they were given by the agricultural bank CNCAS (Bernard&Wouteurse 2012).

Moreover, in partnership with the Worldbank and the FAO, the Senegalese government launched a programme in 1995 which was deliberately aimed at responding to farmers service demands and facilitating market access through the development of autonomous farmer organisations: The PSAOP39 (Dieng 2006:55, Gueye 2011). According to Collion from The Worldbank and Gueye, representative from the Senegalese cooperative movement, the PSAOP was an example of “bottom-up institutional building” (Collion 2011) which “materialized into public investments” for and facilitated the capacity development of farmer organisations (Gueye 2011).

In contrast, from 2005 onwards, boosting national rice production and decreasing international dependency became a major policy objective. Spurred and motivated by the international rice price peaks, the government thus launched GOANA and PNAR, aiming for rice self-sufficiency by 2012 (FAO 2011:2). These objectives are to be reached through large investments, “notably by irrigating and cultivating unused land in the Senegalese River Valley and intensifying production of rice through double cropping” (Colen&Demont:4). Input subsidies, the provision of certified seeds, the financing of production and post-harvest machinery, as well as the creation of a private processing and marketing agency also form part of the policy initiatives (Colen&Demont 2012). With a planned investment volume of 174 billion FCFA, the Senegalese government aimed to increase domestic

37 Abdou Diouf was president of Senegal between 1981 and 2000. Abdoulaye Wade followed him as president and ruled from 2000 to 2012. In 2012, the new president, Macky Salle, was elected.
38 GIE = Groupement d’Intérêt Économique (Economic Interest Group)
39 Programme de Services Agricoles et Organisations Paysannes (PSAOP)
production from 500,000 tons in 2008 to 1,000,000 tons in 2012, thus reaching self sufficiency (GoS 2009).

While the promotion of smallholder agriculture through producer organisations had been a focus until the early 2000s, GOANA and PNAR moved to some degree away from the smallholder focus. In the policy text, PNAR, thus, acknowledges that besides the domination of rice production systems by smallholders, a commercial agriculture based on an investment and profit logic is emerging and states “the creation of an environment that creates incentives for the private sector to get involved” as one of the major challenges for economic growth and poverty eradication (GoS 2009:vi). The program, therefore, states that it aims at improving the conditions for private investments (GoS 2009).

While the PNAR document especially emphasizes the role of private sector development especially in relation to processing and commercialization of rice (GoS 2009), it has been argued that GOANA and other new agricultural policies have opened up the land market, and thus invited private investors to engage in production activities (Faye et.al:2011). Originally, the “Law on the National Domain” from 1964 stipulated that agricultural land, managed by rural communities, should be allocated to people residing in the respective rural areas – thus protecting rural communities from land appropriations. Contrarily to this law, estimations say that over 400,000 ha have been assigned to large private investors since 2006 which sums up to almost 30% of the arable land which had not yet been under cultivation. Out of these 400,000 ha, 294,000 ha are estimated to lie in the Senegalese River Valley, which is the study area of this paper (Faye et.al.2011). It is thus argued that the new agricultural policies have eased land allocation to “those who have the necessary productive means”, privileging urban elites and foreign investors. In the affected areas, a transition from independent rural producers to agricultural workers could be observed. The study suggests that these smallholders have difficulties to maintain their economic autonomy due to limited productive means, as well as limited access to (irrigated) land, both resulting in competitiveness constraints with bigger investors (Faye et.al. 2011). One could thus argue that until the early ’00s, the policy focus was put on supporting smallholder rice production through the promotion of producer organisations. Since the introduction of GOANA and PNAR, such a smallholder focus is not evident anymore. Instead, the emphasis has been put on the achievement of national food sovereignty by promoting the production of rice by “whoever has the means to produce”.

Despite of these less favorable conditions for producer organisations, it has been argued that established institutions remain influential and represent a large segment of the rural population (IFPRI, FAO, The Worldbank 2011). Moreover, the focus of the new presidency that took office in 2012 remains to be assessed.

40 Text in French: « Les systèmes de production rizicole au Sénégal sont largement dominés par les exploitations de petite taille de type familiale. À côté de cette agriculture familiale, émerge une agriculture de type commercial fondée sur une logique d’investissement et de recherche de rentabilité. »

41 (1) REVA = Retour vers l’Agriculture, (2) Programme Biocarburant (years ?)
2. Appendix – List of Primary Sources – Reviewed Documents

1. Title: “Projet Bey Dundé. Fonds de Relance de la production rizicole. Prix de cession des intrants aux producteurs et productrices. Campagne de contre-saison chaude 2013”, [description: Table comparing prices payed individually with prices payed through collective inputs purchasing], 1 page


4. Title: “REDEV 01, HIV 2009/2010, jeudi 17 décembre 2009”, [description: Input distribution and individual credit reimbursement statement for one of the FBOs showing details about who ordered what for what prices and how much has to be reimbursed (debts of the years and moratorium)], 2 pages
3. Appendix - Maps of the Study Area
## 4. Appendix – Overview key informants and experts interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organisation, Interview Partner</th>
<th>Description of Organization</th>
<th>Data source, date</th>
<th>length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>GRET – Professionals for Fair Development, Dakar</td>
<td>French NGO which works with FBOs</td>
<td>2.1.2013 semi-structured interview, notes</td>
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<td>Initiative Prospective Agricole (IPAR), Dakar</td>
<td>Senegalese NGO</td>
<td>21.12.2013, semi-structured interview, notes</td>
<td>50 min.</td>
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<td>Institut Sénégalais de Recherche Agricole (ISRA), Dakar and St. Louis</td>
<td>Senegalese Research Institute</td>
<td>26.12.2013, semi-structured interview, notes, access to secondary literature</td>
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<td>21.01.2013, semi-structured interview, notes, access to secondary literature</td>
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<td>24.01.2013, semi-structured interview, audio record, transcription</td>
<td>86 min</td>
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<td>AfricaRice, St. Louis</td>
<td>International Rice Research Institute</td>
<td>14.01.2013, semistructured phone interview</td>
<td>15 min.</td>
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<td>18.01. – 28.01.2013, informal conversations</td>
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<td>Bey Dundé, Projet de l’Appui à la Filière Riz, St. Louis</td>
<td>Project to support rice sector</td>
<td>14.01.2013, phone interview, notes</td>
<td>20 min.</td>
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<td>22.01.2013, semi-structured interview, audio record, notes</td>
<td>65 min</td>
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<td>21.03.2013, informal conversations, notes, gate keeper for field access</td>
<td>30 min</td>
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<td>Femmes Productrices du Delta du Sénégal (Feprodes), St. Louis</td>
<td>Female Mutual Lending Society in the Study Region</td>
<td>21.01.2013, semi-structured interview, notes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>23.01.2013, semi-structured interview, notes</td>
<td>45 min</td>
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<td>Plateforme des Initiatives du Nord (PINORD), St. Louis</td>
<td>Senegalese NGO formed by several FBOs</td>
<td>28.01.2013, semi-structured interview, audio record</td>
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<td></td>
<td>19.03.2013, informal conversations, notes, gate keeper for field access</td>
<td>50 min</td>
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<td>Développement Internationale Desjardins,</td>
<td>Canadian NGO which supports cooperative development</td>
<td>14.03.2013, semi-structured interview, audio record</td>
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<td>Société Nationale d’Aménagement</td>
<td>Governmental Technical Service</td>
<td>19.03.2013, semi-structured interview, audio record</td>
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<td>Date of Visit</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.03.2013, semi-structured interview, audio record, notes on calculation of loan amounts</td>
<td>Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCAS), Ross Béthio</td>
<td>Senegalese Agricultural Bank</td>
<td>50 min</td>
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<td>21.03./ 22.03., participation in seminar, presentations and discussions, notes, access to secondary literature</td>
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<td>Public University in study area</td>
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<td>23.03.2013, semi-structured interview, audio record, gate keeper for field access</td>
<td>ASPRODEB, Ross Béthio</td>
<td>Senegalese NGO for the support of agricultural development, advocacy</td>
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<td>24.03., 25.03. informal conversations</td>
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## 5. Appendix – Overview FBO respondents (leaders and members)

### Overview of units of analysis, FBO members and leaders interviewed

#### Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>FBO</th>
<th>Description, no. of leaders, no. of members, sex</th>
<th>Date of interviews, interview participants</th>
<th>Length</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>GIE C</td>
<td>2 leaders interviewed (f), village C was excluded from analysis</td>
<td>24.03.2013, president, treasurer</td>
<td>108 min</td>
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<td>28.03.2012, president</td>
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<td>6.4.2013 timeline discussion 1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>president, administrative secretary</td>
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<td>10.4. timeline discussion 2</td>
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<td>5 leaders interviewed (all f)</td>
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<td>29.03.2013, president and treasurer, timeline discussion 1</td>
<td>45 min</td>
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<td>30.03.2013 treasurer and ordinary member, timeline discussion 2</td>
<td>38 min</td>
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<td>10.04.2013 timeline discussion 3, president of sub-group 1, president of subgroup 2, deputy secretary, treasurer</td>
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<td>10.04.2013, timeline discussion, president and accounting secretary</td>
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<td>31.03.2013, president and person appointed for input distribution</td>
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<td>06.04.2013, accounting secretary</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>UB</td>
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<td>11.4. interview, general secretary</td>
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<td>07.04.2013, timeline discussion, president, accounting secretary, treasurer</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>1 local resident (m), several key positions in local union and FBOs, cross-validation with what others said</td>
<td>6.4.2013 interview</td>
<td>52 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.4.2013 interview 2</td>
<td>46 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>None, exclusion from FBOs (“JH” in quotes)</td>
<td>2 young men (m)</td>
<td>9.4.2013 interview, informal dialogues</td>
<td>66 min</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Interviewees (name, organization, position in the organization)
- Date of interview

A - Potential and relevance of collective action for smallholders in the rice sector

1. In your opinion, what are the most important constraints that arise for producers when it comes to generating a livelihood out of their involvement in the rice sector?
   a. To which extent is having access to output markets important?

2. What is the potential of collective action to address/deal with/handle these limitations?

3. In how far does collective action realize its potential to address its constraints (for example: regarding access to irrigation, access to agricultural input and output markets, processing, credit facilities, insurance, product enhancement, securing contracts)?

B – Market characteristics that influence the potential of collective action

4. Pricing mechanisms and price volatility
   a. How are the prices set? (Formerly: by the government, today: by the market? How does it work?)
   b. What role does price fluctuation play? Does it prevent collective action initiatives relating to marketing?
   c. Differences in 2008 and their implications for today?
   d. Are the prices generally transparent? Do producers know the price levels in urban areas?

5. Product and market differentiation

   In your opinion, is Senegalese rice a product with a homogeneous or rather differentiated structure of demand, depending on the quality of the rice?
   a. What is the price difference between a high-quality product and a product of mediocre quality?
   b. Are the margins that producers can achieve by entering high quality markets high enough to justify the additional costs of collective action?

6. Transformation costs and transportation
   a. What are the costs of transformation and transportation? Who normally bears these costs?
b. I understand that the use of industrial mills is a condition in order to enhance product value and that the fixed price of such a mill is rather high?
c. Why is it that the majority of producers do not use these mills?
d. Why is it that the majority of FBOs do not own mills and are not involved in the transformation process?

7. **Risks associated with not selling in both markets**
   a. What are the risks associated with not selling in the rural /urban market? What does this depend on and who covers that risk?
   b. Could collective action help in addressing the risk?

8. **Contract enforcement costs**
   a. What are the costs of contract execution in the two markets?
   b. Who covers the risk in the two markets?
   c. What consequences do these costs entail with regards to collective action?

9. **Credit access**
   a. Which are the benefits, costs and risks ...

10. **Professional Services**
    a. How can producers access professional services individually or as a collective?

11. **Input**
    a. **How can** producers gain individual or collective access to agricultural inputs?

**C - Characteristics, rules and organisational learning of the groups**

12. **What are the typical characteristics of a group regarding:**
    a. Size
    b. Socio-economic heterogeneity

13. **What activities do the groups perform regularly?**
    a. Facilitating access to credit agreements
    b. Facilitating access to agricultural inputs
    c. Collective sale
    d. Insurance
    e. Transformation
    f. Others

14. **Out of the following factors, which ones are crucial for the effectiveness of collective action?**
    a. Characteristics of the groups
    b. Leadership and effective ground rules in groups
    c. Market conditions
d. Public policy framework
e. Networks of agents who work to foster collective action

15. **Group conflict**
   a. What are the types of conflicts that often occur in the groups?

16. **Conflict response - survival strategies**
   a. How do the groups react to these conflicts? Do they develop capabilities to resolve them?
   b. Which factors influence the development of such capabilities?
   c. What role do rules that the groups set for themselves and the type of group leadership play in the occurrence of and solution to a conflict? i. (Can you think of any model case?)

17. **Perceptions of OPs from the producers’ point of view**
   a. How do members often perceive their organizations? (as an NGO? / as government entities / as their own economic organizations that can be adjusted according to their needs?)

D - **External Agents**

18. How do external agents facilitate or impede the success of collective action?

19. In what way do incentives provided to the groups by external agents contradict or complement each other?

**E – Policy Characteristics**

20. **Basic service**
   a. How does access to basic services such as education and health care affect the potential of collective action?

21. **Legal certainty**
   a. How does legal certainty influence the potential of collective action?

22. **Legislation on collective action**
   a. How did legislation evolve?
   i. What are the differences between SV, Economic Interest Groupings and cooperatives?
   ii. What are the implications for collective action?
   iii. Comparison between legislation and reality – are these laws effective?
7. Appendix – Interview Guide 2 – Leaders of FBOs, Introductory Interview

------------------------------------
- Name of the group
- Interview partners (name, age, position in the group, educational background)
- Date of interview

A. Origins and identity of the group
A.1 Can you tell me a little bit about the group?
(A1a) When was the group formed (year)?
(1.b) Who initiated the formation of the group?
(A.1.c) What was the objective behind forming the group?
(A.1.d) What is the group’s objective today?

B. Composition of the group
B.1. Total number of members
B.2. Total number of women
B.3. Total number of men
B.4. Total number of members younger than 35 years
B.5. What are the characteristics of the members? (local/foreign, access to other farmland, the poorest/richest?)

B.6. What economic activities do the group members pursue (individually and collectively)?
- Production, processing and marketing?
- Which products? (Rice and others)

C. Membership terms and conditions
C.1. Is it possible for any villager to become a member of the group? What are the membership criteria?
C.1.a. Are there any other criteria that need to be met in order to become a part of the group? (Economic activities, participation in group activities, origin, educational background)
C.2.a. Do people have to pay membership fees and if so, how much?
C.2.b. After having become a member of the group, are there any other contributions that the new member has to make? (Such as paying annual fees, payment in kind)
C.3. What is the justification for these membership criteria and the contributions made to the group?

D. Collective activities
D. Which are/were collective activities that took place in production, processing and marketing?
D.1. Which are/were collective activities that took place in production, processing and marketing processes?
D.2. To specify:
- For example, with regard to production: Facilitating access to land, preparing the soil, collective work on the fields, promoting agricultural techniques, financing production / collective credit facilities, access to seeds, access to irrigation, access to machinery, access to fertilizer, access to other agricultural inputs, storage, transportation
- For example, with regard to processing: admission and storage, cleaning, ..., sorting, grinding and packing, transportation, loans to finance processing, vertical integration and contracting
- For example, with regard to marketing: Vertical integration and working with contractors, financing marketing activities, creating a label and brand, advertisements, distribution, transportation

D.3. How do you organize these activities collectively?
D.4. Why did you start these collective activities? Who initiated them?
- Are you still carrying out these collective activities until today? Why / why not?

D.5 Rules and penalties
- What actions does a member have to undertake in order for these activities to be carried out successfully?
- Which kinds of contributions does he/she have to make?
- What happens when a member does not contribute his/her part? (Sanctions)
- How are the resulting profits distributed?

E. Collective Properties
E. What are the properties belonging to the collective?
E.1. Do you own any joint properties? What are they? Since when do you have them?
E.2. How did you acquire these properties?
E.3. Terms of Use
- How is the use of these resources organized?
- Who can use the resources?
- Who are the beneficiaries?
- How do you manage the contributions and drawing of the benefits in relation to the use of the resource?
- Are there any specific rules regarding the use of the resource?

F. Credit and foreign aid, partnerships
F.1. Have you received any foreign aid to create the group? (What kind of aid was it?)
F.2. Do you currently maintain any partnerships? With whom?
F.3. What are/were the objective and terms of the partnership?
F.4. How did you benefit from these partnerships?
- Donations?
- Credit facilities?
- Training?

G. Legal status
G.1. Is the group legally recognized?
G.1.a If so, when did it receive legal recognition (year)?
8. Appendix – Interview Guide 3 – Leaders of FBOs, Timeline Interview

- Name of organisation
- Person interviewed (name, age, position within the organisation, education)
- Date of interview

A. Introduction :
- Description of the organisation’s evolution with regards to the accomplishments of the objectives/ the health of the organization and problems which the group had to face and their explanation:

“I will now ask you to draw a line together which represents the health of the organization in the flow of to time. The vertical axis represents the health of the organisation. On the bottom, a sad face is drawn meaning that the organisation is ‘sick’ (0% of health). On top there is a happy face meaning that the organization is healthy (100%). Between those two extremes, you can choose between different degrees of health: 10% or 25% or 50% or 75%. The horizontal axis represents time. I therefore suggest that you start with the year within which the organisation was founded. Then, we will analyse for each following year how and why the organisation’s health has evolved. Shall we start? With which year should we start?

B. In the following, different aspects of the organisation’s evolution can be considered (the elements considered to be the most important are marked in grey with stars)

1. Adhesion and members (/heterogeneity)*:
   a. How has the number of members changed?
   b. What characteristics had the first members (age, sex, education, socioeconomic status)? Did these characteristics changed?
   c. Who left the group? Are there people who do not engage /not anymore as a member? Why?
   d. Who joined the group?
   e. Did the membership conditions change? Why?
   f. How have the members themselves evolved?
   g. Has the membership helped members to develop? How?
   h. At what point were members satisfied with the group?
   i. Are there any differences in preferences among members? On what basis? When did it become obvious? How does the group face these differences?

2. Formulation of objectives and activities
a. How did the objectives evolve? Why?
b. What was the justification to collaborate in the beginning? Is this justification still existent?
c. How did the experiences that you made influence the expectations you have with respect to group activities and to the group itself?
d. How have the activities evolve? (origin, justification, intensification, operation, evaluation)

3. Terms of use and ownership, making profit, debts *
   a. How were the costs, benefits and risks distributed at the beginning? Who developed these rules?
   b. How did you enforce the rules?
   c. How have the rules have changed since then? Who changed the rules?
   d. What works about these rules? What does not work? (For whom does it work?)
   e. Who makes profit?
   f. What have you learned about the benefits, risks and costs of collective activities? (What were the expectations at the beginning? Today?)
   g. What have you learned about debts? Has your perception of debts changed?

4. Interaction with external actors*
   a. Who were the actors with whom you were interacting during the evolution of the group?
   b. Has the way you interact with these actors changed? On what basis?
   c. Who took the initiative to interact with external actors? (you or the external actors?)
   d. Who was the most important actor in the evolution of the group? How?
   e. How do these actors influence collective action? (have proposed collective activities, funding of collective action, participation in .....)
   f. Are there any players without whom the group could no longer exist / would have difficulties to exist?
   g. What are the prospects with regards to its stakeholders?

5. Leadership*
   a. How has the leadership changed during this period?
   b. How has the change in leadership affected the evolution of the group?
   c. What would have changed if one had changed the leaders?

6. Collective possessions
   a. When have you acquired your collective possessions?

7. Group behaviour during ups:
   a. Has the group used the ups to invest in the group? How and why? Why not?
   b. What could you have done? Why didn’t you do it?
8. **Group behaviour during downs:**
   a. Which conclusions did you draw from the downs?
   b. Did you change something after this down?

9. **Evaluation of the organisation***
   a. Has the group made progress since its creation? What kind of progress?
   b. Has the standard of living of members changed? How?
   c. Did the group make any contributions to this change? How? Why?
9. **Appendix – Interview Guide 4 – Interviews with Individual members of FBOs**

Name:
Age:
Sex:
Place:
Education:
Producer Organisation/ Union:
Telephone number:

---------------------------------------------

**A : INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS, PRODUCTION OF LIVELIHOOD, MOTIVATION, ADHESION**

**Economic activities**

1. How do you earn your living?
2. To what extent is rice important for the production of livelihood for you? (the relative importance of the production and marketing of rice compared to the production of other livelihood)

**Challenges in the production of livelihood**

3. What are the challenges you are experiencing in your work?
4. Among these problems, what is the role of access issues to agricultural working funds, means of production, credit and markets?
5. How do these challenges affect you? What are the consequences of these challenges for you?

**Adhesion and expectations towards the group**

6. How and when did you become a member of the group?
7. Why did you join the group at the beginning? (Individual objectives at the beginning, importance attributed to the economic needs)
8. Why did you become a member of this group and not another group?
9. What are the goals of the group?
10. Why are you still a member?
    a. Objectives met ...?
    b. Objectives adapted...?

**Collective action within the group**

11. Which are the collective activities of the group?
    a. (for example: purchase of agricultural working funds, taking out loans, production, processing, sale)
12. How often does the group perform these activities? (always, often, sometimes, never)
13. How do you conduct these activities together?
14. Which are the activities that you do not conduct together? Why?
15. Why is it that you do not conduct other activities together?

Challenges of collective action
16. Which are the most severe problems of the group?

B. EVOLUTION AND CHANGEMENT

Satisfaction with implemented collective activities
17. How has your satisfaction with the group evolved within the last years since you became a member? Explain (Draw an image)

Adhesion and members (/heterogeneity)* (Number 1):
18. What kind of characteristics did the first members have (age, sex, education, poorer / rich, number of acres, locals / foreigners, access to land)? Did these characteristics change?
19. Are there people who do not engage / not anymore as a member? Why? Who?
20. Who joined the group?
21. How have the members themselves evolved?
   a. Did the membership help the members to develop? How?
22. Are there any differences in preferences among members?
   a. With regards to what?
   b. When does it become obvious?
   c. How does the group face these differences?

Terms of use and ownership, making profit, debt (Number 3)
23. How do individual members contribute to and benefit from the group?
24. What happens if a member does not perform its task? Did this already happen?
25. Have there been any changes with regards to contributions, penalties and drawing benefits?

Interaction with external actors (Number 4)
26. Which are the most important actors for the group? Why?
27. How do you interact with them? Evolution?

Leadership (Number 5)
28. Do you think that in an organization there must be a change in leadership? Why / why not?
29. Have there been changes in leadership (president, administrative board, treasurer ...)? Why / why not?
30. How did this change affect the evolution of the group?
31. What would have changed if you had changed the leaders?

Evaluation of the group (Number 9)
32. Did the group make any progress since its creation? What kind of progress?
33. Did the objectives of the group change?
34. Did your standard of living change? How?
35. Has the standard of living of other members changed? How?
36. Did the group make any contributions to these changes? (Relative importance of the group)
37. What have you learned about collaboration in EIGs?
### Appendix – The Cooperative Life-Cycle (Cook et al. 2009, 2013), overview by Schüppler

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
<th>Phase 2</th>
<th>Phase 3</th>
<th>Phase 4</th>
<th>Phase 5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Justification</td>
<td>Organizational Design</td>
<td>Growth – Glory – Heterogeneity</td>
<td>Recognition and Introspection</td>
<td>Choices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Characteristics/Description
- cost – benefit analysis of acting collectively
- established for defensive (e.g. risk reduction, bargaining, scope and coordination) or offensive purposes
- top-down vs. bottom – up
- important but ambiguous role of external agents in establishment of coop

- Rules of the organization are defined
- Too often, not enough time is spent to define enforceable rules of the game
- Rules cannot be easily changed once the “game” has started
- external facilitation plays a central role

- Tendency to “overcelebrate”
- growing membership base
- growing heterogeneity in members’ socio-economic preferences causes internal problems:
  - investment constraints (free-rider, horizon, portfolio)
  - control constraints (agency, influence and collective decision making costs)

Cooperative realizes that it has problems
- high degree of internal heterogeneity
- internal conflicts/fragmented membership
- overdiversification
- apathy
- disincentive to invest
- crises
- introspection and identification of problems

#### Crucial questions
- Why shall we form a coop?
- Are there credible economic opportunities which drive collective action or is the organization mainly established for farmers to extract rent from public agencies?
- Who can be a member?
- Who has residual claim and control rights?
- How are sanctions and enforcement rules designed?
- How is risk capital acquired?
- To which degree will organizational design be able to address typical collective action problems and reduce costs of acting collectively (e.g. free riding and collective decision making costs)?
- How has growing membership heterogeneity been affecting socio-economic preferences, as well as investment into and control of the cooperative?

All coops have problems of free-riding, horizon, portfolio, etc. Are these problems more costly than the solution?
## 11. Appendix – Quotes from Transcripts – 1. Assessment of Collective Action (Quotes Q)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access to capitals</th>
<th>Table Q.1 – Assessments of Collective Action - Access to capitals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q</strong></td>
<td>Assessments (Quotes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q.1a.</strong></td>
<td>(R-FB-1, traduction) Son objectif, c’est d’avoir plus de terres. Mais ensuite, d’avoir aussi des matériels comme des machines. Les décortiqueuses. Les tracteurs. Et ensuite, de disposer des magasins de stockage pour pouvoir rentrer leur récolte dans ces magasins de stockage. C’est ça son objectif actuellement. (22 :53)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Q.1a.2.</strong></td>
<td>(R-JH1) Je vais essayer d’être objectif tout en sachant que les avantages se trouvent du côté du périmètre autogéré. Tout est mieux là bas !!! Tout est mieux !!</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Q.1b.</strong></td>
<td>Access to capitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q.1b.1.</strong></td>
<td>(R-FBO2-Z) « La différence dans l’union c’est que l’union assure l’hydraulique. (...) Même moi, il y avait des années où je cultivais dans le privé mais maintenant, j’ai abandonné. Je n’ai jamais eu des rendements dans le privé. Tout les temps, j’ai eu des problèmes. Des fois, il y a eu des manques d’eau. Le gazole est très cher. C’est dans la brousse, les animaux... Il y a beaucoup de problèmes. [...] La dernière fois que j’ai cultivé dans le privé j’avais un problème d’eau : Lorsque les gens ont fini de moissonner, c’est quand mon champ a commencé de faire des [fleuraisons].</td>
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</table>
Finalement, les animaux sont tombés dessus parce que l’herbe est verte et les animaux veulent de l’herbe. Le jour je suis en garde, la nuit je ne suis pas en garde…
(R-FBO2-2) « Parce que dans le privé, il y a Moussa qui est là, il y a Laura qui est là, on se tirelle l’eau. Moi, je suis une femme. Le jour, je suis là, la nuit les gens peuvent aller prendre l’eau. Je serais fatiguée mais j’aurais toujours le terrain sec.
(Q) Donc c’est la bataille avec les autres ?
(R-FBO2-2) Oui. Ceux qui peuvent aller la nuit pour prendre de l’eau lorsqu’ils récoltent, moi, ca sera le temps quand mon riz germe, commence à produire. Si les animaux passent, ils sont attirés et ils mangent. Donc je suis obligé d’aller à la mutuelle pour payer la dette.
(Q) Et donc dans le casier c’est comment ?
(R-FBO2-2) Dans le casier, il y a le canal. L’union a pris un gars qui s’occupe de l’eau. Il y a des parties « Aujourd’hui, c’est nous qui prenons de l’eau, on irrigue. » On barre. Il y a des places où on peut fermer. C’est organisé dans l’union.
(Q) C’est l’union qui organise ?
(R-FBO2-2) Oui, l’union et les gens du GIE, du même secteur. »

Coordination and rules are a necessary means to address individual opportunistic behavior

Q.1b.2. (R-FBO4-2) Si, si. Parce que c’est avec ça [FBO] qu’on peut travailler tranquillement. S’il n’y a pas la section, chacun fera ce qu’il veut. Et ça ne marche pas. Il faut qu’il y ait quelque chose quand même qui règle le reste. « Ca, c’est le bon chemin, il faut passer par là-bas ; ca c’est le mauvais chemin, si tu passes par là-bas… [Hoppe] » - voilà. Sinon, ça ne marchera pas.
(Q) Un peu d’ordre ?
(R-FBO4-2) Voilà.

HC more important than GA because of insufficient land within GA.

Q.1b.3. (Q) Pour vous personnellement, le fait de ne pas être membre de l’union locale, qu’est ce que ça a comme effet pour vous ?
(R-JH1) Des fois, on n’a pas eu des terres de qualité qu’on a voulues. Dans le périmètre, ce sont des terres bien aménagées qui ont la disponibilité de l’eau. Mais pour les privés, il faut acheter du gazole pour l’irrigation, le litre vous revient à 800 franc, et il faudra 100 litres de gazole pour un ha pour toute la campagne.

Exclusion from the union to us means that we have less access to quality soil that has been evened/leveled and where irrigation is available at a low cost. Cultivating outside the GA, we have to pay 800 CFA per litre for the motor pomp.

Q.1b.4. (Q) Donc, dans le casier, c’est plus sécurisé ?
(R-JH1) Même dans le casier les troupeaux s’attaquent. Mais, dans le privé, c’est plus exposé. (-46 :23).
(Q) Parce que c’est moins dense ?
(R-JH1) Voilà, effectivement. Vous avez très bien compris. Les privés, c’est dans les coins très éloignés et ça prend du temps jusqu’à ce qu’on sache qu’il y a des troupeaux. (-46 :50).

Cattle invading the paddy fields is more frequent outside the GA because the parcels are less dense and further away from the village. Cattle invasions therefore often remain unnoticed outside the GA.

Access to assets
1c. – Productive Land

Q.1c.1. « (Q) Donc, pour la production de moyens de vie, les champs privés sont plus importants que le groupement ? (55 :15)
(R-FBO2-P) Oui, le travail individuel est plus important que le travail dans le groupement. Dans le casier de l’union le membre peut avoir de 0,5 à maximum 3 ha. Dans les casiers privés, on peut avoir de 5 à 10 ou même 20 ha. »

HC more important than GA because of insufficient land within GA.
Q.1c.2. (R-FBO2-2) Mais à chaque fois, je gagne la même chose, je ne peux pas gagner quelque chose de plus. Peut-être que j’ai d’autre moyens pour rendre ma vie un peu supportable. Mais pas au niveau de la culture du riz. Parce que je n’ai pas un grand terrain et je n’ai pas beaucoup de rendement.

No livelihood improvements due to limited land access and low productivity.

Q.1c.3. (Q) Donc, c’est l'accès aux ressources qui est la fonction la plus importante des sections villageoises ? (-1 :48)
(R-LUB-1) Oui, parce que ceux qui n’ont pas de champs au niveau des sections villageoises, ils ont vraiment des grandes difficultés.
(Q) Vous parlez des petits exploitants hors-casiers ?
(R-LUB-1) Non, les petits exploitants hors-casiers, il n'y en a presque pas. (-2 :03). Ce sont des exploitations qui nécessitent beaucoup plus de moyens. Quand tu as un hectare dans le casier et un hectare hors- casier – ce n’est pas comparable. Dans le casier, c’est beaucoup plus facile, c’est beaucoup plus crédible. (-2 :27). Parce que les bailleurs de fonds sont beaucoup plus favorables aussi. L'eau est parfaitement maîtrisée.
(Q) Il y’a moins de risque quoi ? (-2 :39)
(R-LUB-1) Moins de risque. Bon, sur le plan travail, il est beaucoup plus facile de travailler aussi parce que les terres sont bien planées. Les rendements ne sont pas les mêmes, ils sont plus élevés dans le casier que dans le hors-casier. (-2 :55)

Due to the well-mastered irrigation system (irrigation and drainage) and the leveled soil, production in FBOs is much more productive and less risky than outside the FBOs.

Access to assets
1d. – Human Capital

Q.1d.1. (R-FBO2-P, traduction) « (...) dans le groupement, ils ont reçu beaucoup de formations, en gestion administrative, gestion des terres, leadership. […] Les membres ont quand même évolué du côté intellectuel grâce aux formations. »

Increased human capital due to trainings.

Q.1d.2. « (Q) Donc, vous trouvez que cette formation était très importante ?
(R-FBO2-2) Oui, très importante. […]
(Q) Donc, avant il n’y avait pas de formation ?
(R-FBO2-2) Il y avait des formations. Mais formation de filière riz, pour moi, c’est la première fois que j’ai eu une telle formation. Depuis l’aménagement, c’est la première fois pour moi. Comment mettre l’eau, comment irriguer, le temps qu’il faut pour mettre l’engrais, tout ça !! »
[…]« (Q) Donc vous croyez que le problème, c’étaient aussi les techniques ?
(R-FBO2-2) Les techniques aussi, il y en a. Le problème, la majeure partie, aussi c’est les techniques. L’utilisation de semences. Le nivelage d’eau, l’utilisation de l’engrais. Le temps qu’il faut utiliser l’engrais…. Tout ca. C’est un grand facteur pour le rendement. »

Increased access to technical knowledge as a major factor for achievements regarding productivity, role of facilitating external actors (trainings).

Q.1d.3. (R-FBO3-1) Oui. Comment on travaille, comment on gère les intrants. Ca, on nous a dit. Maintenant, on gère nos intrants. La date qu’on a dit qu’on va semer, on va semer. La date où il faut mettre l’engrais, on lui donne ca.
(Q) Donc, entre 1998 et 2012, vous ne saviez pas comment il faut faire ca ?
(R-FBO3-1) Oui ! Les techniques du projet Bey Dundé nous ont renforcées beaucoup! (-min 46 :20).
(Q) C’était quand, la formation ?
(R-FBO3-1) En 2013.
(Q) C’était la première formation en techniques agricoles ?
(R-FBO3-1) Oui. Pour nous, les femmes, c’était la première formation.

Achievements in terms of increased access to technical knowledge as a major factor for productivity, facilitating role of external actors (trainings)

Q.1d.4. (Q) Et après quand on aura adhéré avec son GIE privé à l’union locale, c’est quel service dont on pourra bénéficier ?
(R-MbSa) (...) On peut participer dans des formations. Parce que l’union locale demande des formations au niveau de la SAED, au niveau de l’ISRA pour les techniques culturelles.

Local Union is proactive in organizing trainings in partnership with public and non-profit partners which only
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 1d.5.</th>
<th>(Q) On ne peut pas accéder ses services si on est individu. (R-MbSa) Non, si on est individu privé, tu peux poser ta demande là-bas (ISRA et SAED) individuellement. Mais au niveau de l’union locale ils ne forment que ceux qui sont membres. (3:45). (R-MbSa) Donc tu as des bénéfices. Beaucoup de bénéfices. Beaucoup de formations.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question 1d.6.</td>
<td>(Q) Et est-ce que quelqu’un qui est hors-casier aura la formation ? (R-FBO5-P) Parfois, mais pas beaucoup. Il y a des formations en hors-casier mais ce n’est pas comme dans le casier. C’est rare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 1d.7.</td>
<td>(Q) Donc, même avec les engrais on a commencé dans les années ‘60 ? (R-FBO4-2) Oui, on avait commencé, mais on ne l’utilisait pas parce qu’on ne savait pas la valeur. On nous donnait l’engrais mais on ne l’utilisait pas, on le déposait ici. C’est la SAED qui le donnait. C’était presque gratuit. Mais on n’utilisait pas parce qu’on ne savait pas la valeur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 1e.1</td>
<td>(R-FBO2-P) « L’état a aménagé les terres pour les groupements. Les stations de pompage et tout l’équipement ont été amenés pour que les populations s’activent autour du groupement. Les groupements sont aussi favorisés par la CNCAS. Avec mon GIE de famille, c’est plus difficile d’accéder les crédits de la CNCAS. On favorise l’action collective. » (R-FBO2-P) Il n’y a pas beaucoup de GIES familiales qui peuvent accéder les crédits de la CNCAS. Juste quelques-uns. Sinon, on peut prendre des crédits auprès des mutuelles. Aux mutuelles, tu payes 15,000 Francs ou 20,000 Francs comme frais. L’intérêt ca sera 10 % par six mois. Pour la CNCAS, c’est 5, 625 % pour 9 mois. (1:01).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 1e.2</td>
<td>(R-MbSa) Bon, il y a aussi des difficultés. C’est les difficultés de crédit. Parce que vraiment, ça ne sont pas des crédits adaptés. Parce qu’un crédit de 20 millions que tu payes à neuf mois, vraiment, ça n’est pas acceptable. (6:24). Vraiment, ce n’était pas adapté. Parce qu’une ligne de crédit de 20 millions on peut le faire pour deux ans, au moins. Mais, sur neuf mois, ça n’est pas adapté. Avec les taux d’intérêt de 7%. Vraiment, ce n’est pas adapté. Aussi, il n’y avait pas de crédit de commercialisation. C’est peut être depuis l’année dernière qu’il y a ça. Il n’y avait que le paquet technique : l’obsétage, l’engrais, l’herbicide, les semences et le cout hydraulique. C’était tout. Mais avec Bey...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dundé, on arrive maintenant à avoir des crédits de commercialisation, c'est-à-dire la récolte, le battage, la sacherie, le transport, c'est ça. Et à partir de ça, on arrive à avoir un client comme Vital pour acheter le riz quoi. (7 :31). Donc faire des contrats avec des autres pour acheter le riz.

**Q.1e.3.** Tu sais, il y a des gens qui n’avaient peut-être pas autant accès au crédit, mais maintenant ils ont accès. Et il y en a d’autres qui avaient l’accès mais maintenant, ils ne l’ont plus à cause de leur endettement.
(Q) Donc, il y a quelques-uns qui sortent et d’autres qui viennent ?
(R-MbSa) Oui. Surtout les privés-là. La plupart des gens qui ont eu des crédits sont endettés.
(Q) A travers les mutuelles ?
(R-MbSa) Les mutuelles et la CNCAS même.
(Q) Pourquoi c’est surtout les privés ?
(R-MbSa) Parce que c’était l’année 2006, je crois. Le problème des oiseaux. A partir de cette année-là, tout le monde a eu des problèmes.

The access to finance is not secured due to the frequency of remaining debts within and outside the FBO system. However, indebtedness outside the FBO system due to external shocks is perceived to be more severe than within FBOs.

**Q.1e.4.** (Q) Du côté crédit ?
(R-JH1) C’est aussi beaucoup plus difficile dans le privé que dans le périmètre. Parce que là, dans le périmètre, vous bénéficiez directement d’une ligne de crédit assuré par la CNCAS. Donc, tant que vous êtes en règle (vous remboursez ?), vous aurez accès au crédit. Dans le privé vous êtes censé chercher votre propre ligne de crédit. Et des fois, ça pose problèmes. Parce que si vous êtes un débutant comme moi, ça sera très difficile de trouver une ligne de crédit. Parce qu’à chaque fois que vous venez à la banque on vous demandera un apport. Et quelqu’un qui débute n’est pas censé trouver un apport. Ça c’est un problème. Un problème majeur.

Accessing production credits individually for someone who has no own financial capital is very difficult. Young people are disadvantaged in that regard because they do not have the means to make a contribution to the credit.

**Q.1e.5.** (Q) Donc, ca n’existe pas qu’on ne puisse pas produire parce que les autres membres n’ont pas payé leurs dettes ?
(R-JH1) Mmh, non, ça n’arrive pas. Parce que l’union mère, elle a ses fonds. Même si les paysans tardent à payer, elle va mettre la main dans la poche. On est protégé dans l’union. Même s’ils refusent de l’admettre, il y a quelque chose dans les caisses.
(Q) Parce qu’il y a des règlements qui sont appliqué. Quand on ne rembourse pas, l’union se saisit de ton champ. C’est clair.

The stipulation that accessing credit collectively makes the individual more vulnerable to free riding of the others, and thus to credit default and subsequently to credit access problems does not apply. This is because the union has funds to support FBOs on the short term to reimburse and to thus access the following loan. Individual defaulters will be excluded.

**Access to assets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1f. – Physical capital – Agricultural machinery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Q.1f.1.** (Q) 2013, ça aurait pu être bien, si la pluie ne serait pas venue ?
(R-FBO3-4) Si on avait une machine batteuse... [...] |
(R-FBO3-1) Si on avait une moissonneuse batteuse, on ne sera pas en retard. On va récolter notre riz. Mais c’est à cause de ca. C’est un problème. |
Insufficient and delayed access to machinery (here: harvester) continues to make production more risky due to rainfalls at the end of the season.

| **Q.1f.2.** (Q) Et du côté équipement ? Est-ce que l’union locale possède de l’équipement ?
(R-FBO4-P) Avant, on n’en possédait pas [d’équipement]. C’est cette année qu’on en possède. L’équipement dont tu parles... des tracteurs, des moissonneuses batteuses... on faisait appel aux prestataires. |
Through a new credit line with CNCAS that the FBOs and unions had lobbied for, unions could purchase tractors in 2013. Thereby, the quality of production improved.
### TOUS ENSEMBLE? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production

Laura Schüppler

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#### Q.1f.3.

**Q.** Et les tracteurs, on ne peut pas les accéder si on n’est pas membre de l’union locale ?

**R.** Oui, il faut payer 25,000 franc pour l’ha. Il y a une gestion autonome. Même si tu n’es pas membre de l’union locale, tu payes ce prix.

**R.** Comparé aux autres prestataires de services, c’est comment le prix ?

**R.** C’est le même prix. Ce qu’on peut dire peut être c’est le bon travail. Les autres prestataires font des travaux qui ne sont pas bons du tout.

FBO membership entails a priority access to the newly acquired machinery of the local union for members.

#### Q.1f.4.

**Q.** Les tracteurs de l’union vous pouvez les utiliser aussi ? Ca fonctionne comme un prestataire de service ?

**R.** Oui. Il faut payer 25,000 franc pour l’ha. Il y a une gestion autonome. Même si tu n’es pas membre de l’union locale, tu payes ce prix.

**R.** Comparé aux autres prestataires de services, c’est comment le prix ?

**R.** C’est le même prix. Ce qu’on peut dire peut être c’est le bon travail. Les autres prestataires font des travaux qui ne sont pas bons du tout.

Newly acquired tractors by the local union increase access to quality services.

#### Q.1f.5.


The newly acquired tractor has the potential to address problems that were faced in earlier years. However, the management of the machine will determine whether these “machinery access issues” can be overcome.

#### Q.1f.6.

**R.** L’union a commencé à s’investir dans la mécanique cette année-ci. Ils ont maintenant deux tracteurs. […] Et vraiment, ça nous a préte une main forte. Parce qu’avant la culture, il faut passer à [l’obstetage]. Ce sont les tracteurs qui le font avec le offset et autres. Ca pose problèmes. Parce que ça nous revient à 25,000 francs à l’ha. Et en plus, malgré ce prix, on trouvait à peine quelqu’un qui faisait ce boulot convenablement.

Accessing tractors on the private market was difficult before the union bought the tractor even though the service costs 25,000 CFA per ha.

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#### Access to assets

1g. – Physical capital – Inputs

**Q.1g.1.** Dans le casier, parce que les rendements, on ne peut pas les obtenir en hors-casier. Parce que les conditions, les possibilités ne sont pas les mêmes, avec les intrants et tout. Dans le grand casier, la banque nous fournit suffisamment d’intrants, alors que ce n’est pas le cas dans le hors-casier. Semences, engrais, produits de traitements...

**R.** Par contre, dans le hors casier, il arrive des moments, je vais irriguer une parcelle, il me manque de gazole, je mets un petit peu…. Ca pose des problèmes. 

(Q) Il y a plus de risque ?

**R.** Voilà

Through the CNCAS loan, the sufficient supply of inputs is more secured in the GA/ FBO system. In combination with reliable access to irrigation, the yields achieved in the GA/ FBO system cannot be achieved outside this system and production is more risky.

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“façon culturale” has importantly increased.
### Q.1g.2.  
(Q) Et ca marche comme ca aussi pour les engrais et les herbicides ?  
(R-FBO5-P) Ouah, ca marche pas très bien (il rigole), mais… parfois l’engrais vient un peu tard. Le DAP devrait venir plus tôt, mais des fois il arrive avec l’Uré. Donc, je ne peux pas dire que c’est bien.  
(Q) Donc, c’est au niveau de l’union [locale] que ça arrive tard ?  
(R-FBO5-P) Et la CNCAS. Parce que si la CNCAS sait qu’il y a un client auquel elle va donner le crédit, elle devrait débloquer ça pour la première tranche.  
(Q) Donc, l’union [locale] ne peut pas acheter parce que…  
(R-FBO5-P) Elle n’a pas l’argent disponible. (-26 :07).  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Access to fertilizer is sometimes delayed because of coordination inefficiencies at the CNCAS (access to finance). The delays have negative impacts on productivity.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Q.1g.3.  
(R-LUB-1) En multipliant les semences, l’union locale a joué un grand rôle parce qu’avant les semences n’étaient pas de bonne qualité. Donc, maintenant, avec les bonnes semences, il y a aussi les meilleurs rendements qui sont finalement moins cher. (21 :19).  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>The accessibility of quality seeds has increased importantly since the LUB has engaged in seed multiplication. Thereby, productivity could be increased.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Q.1g.4.  
(Q) Donc, le fait que vous avez amené l’achat groupé des intrants au niveau de l’union locale, ça permet aussi maintenant à l’union locale d’être la sécurité des sections villageoises ?  
(R-LUB-1) Bien sur. Parce que la banque, elle ne te remet pas de l’argent, mais ce sont des bons. Ce sont des bons que tu va déposer au niveau de l’union locale. Maintenant, l’union locale se charge de trouver des intrants, etc. Mais, c’est une opération qu’on fait d’avance. Parce que comme on gère les sections – on sait d’avance qui aura le crédit et qui ne l’aura pas – même avant que la banque [ne le sache]. Qui rembourse aura son crédit, qui ne rembourse pas ne l’aura pas. Donc, à peu près, on fait une commande.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Since the LUB enjoys credibility among input providers it can order inputs even before the credit to pay these purchases is given by the bank to the FBOs. Therefore, the inputs arrive in time for the next season. Moreover, due to scale effects, LUB enjoys price advantages.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| **Access to assets**  
1h. – Social Capital  
---  
(Q-FBO6-P, traduction) Ce que sa grand-mère voulait, on peut dire que c’est ok. Parce que sa grand-mère voulait une entente entre les femmes. La solidarité entre les femmes. Les femmes, qui s’activent autour d’une activité. Pour ça, c’est déjà acquis. Ca reste un peu, du côté financier. Mais la fraternité et tout ca, c’est ok.  
(Q) Elle a des bonnes relations aussi avec les fournisseurs…?  
(R-LUB-1) Des très bonnes relations. (-00 :36). Parce que souvent, [deux/des] fournisseurs même amènent le produit, on va, après on les paye. Parfois même sans crédit, les fournisseurs avaient amené le produit ici.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Social capital has been strengthened for the second female FBO, but financial revenues have not been relevant.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Access to assets  
1l. – Public Assets  
---  
(Q-FBO4-P) C’est à la fois les deux. Tous les besoins sociaux que l’union locale pouvait satisfaire… quand il y avait l’insécurité dans le village - le gardiennage, c’est l’union locale qui paye. (-40 :45).  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Parts of the benefits of the local union have been invested into social infrastructure (e.g. education and health), as well as local security thereby contributing to public assets</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
TOUS ENSEMBLE ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production

Laura Schüppler

Table Q.2 – Assessments of Collective Action – Participation in markets, TA costs and risks and market development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessments (Quotes)</th>
<th>Interpretations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Q) C’est un sorte d’assurance quoi ?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R-FBO4-P) Non, bon, on avait pris deux équipes qui montaient la nuit. Quand il y avait beaucoup de vols. C’est l’union locale qui payait ça.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.1.2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R-FBO6-1, traduction) Elles ont participé à la construction de la maternité sanitaire. Ce sont ce genre de choses qui les intéressent. Donc, des infrastructures sanitaires, l’éducation ou [hydrauliques], elles participent. (-31 :28)</td>
<td>Female FBO has invested benefits into social infrastructure (health, education and sanitary infrastructure).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Participation in markets, TA costs and risks and market development                |                                                                                                            |
| 2a – Output Markets                                                                 |                                                                                                            |
| Q.2a.1.                                                                            |                                                                                                            |
| (R-FBO2-2) « Ainsi, on n’a plus le problème de la commercialisation du riz qui est dédié au remboursement. Avant, on courait après les bananeras pour être payé pour pourvoir rembourser le crédit. Avec Vital, on n’a plus ce problème. » | Contractualisation as a means to overcome TA costs and risks with output markets                            |
| Q.2a.2.                                                                            |                                                                                                            |
| (Q) Ok. Qu’est-ce que vous pensez de ce partenariat entre la CNCAS et Vital ? C’est bien pour vous ? | Contractualisation as a means to overcome TA costs and risks with output markets                            |
| (R-FBO1-P) C’est bon ! (-1 :17 :16) Parce qu’on avait des problèmes de vente de riz ! Même l’hivernage, c’est difficile !! Contre-saison, c’est plus difficile ( ?). ( ... les temps de pluies). C’est difficile parce qu’il n’y a aucun magasin là. Des mls tonnes de riz ! |                                                                                                            |
| (Q) Donc, est-ce que Vital est un bon partenaire aussi ?                            |                                                                                                            |
| (R-FBO1-P) Oui, Vital est un bon partenaire ! (-1 :17 :53) Parce qu’on a un problème de vente de riz. |                                                                                                            |
| Q.2a.3.                                                                            |                                                                                                            |
| (Q) Mais est-ce que j’ai bien compris que c’est un contrat entre la CNCAS et Vital qui fait que vous donnez le paddly à Vital? (-55 :22) | Contractualisation with Vital and CNCAS has led to more secured credit reimbursement in time which in turn leads to more secured credit access for subsequent season |
| (R-FBO4-P) Oui, la CNCAS s’est mêlée parce qu’il y avait des problèmes de sécurité. Parce que quand tu veux produire et ton banquier sait qu’il y a un preneur. Un preneur qui est près à signer un contrat pour prendre la récolte. Je crois que c’est très intéressant. |                                                                                                            |
| (Q) Pour le banquier ?                                                             |                                                                                                            |
| (R-FBO4-P) Oui.                                                                   |                                                                                                            |
| (Q) Plus que pour vous ?                                                           |                                                                                                            |
| (R-FBO4-P) Pour nous aussi. Parce que c’est nous qui fixons le prix. Mais si on a conclu un contrat, par exemple avec un preneur à 125 francs. Donc, pour toi c’est fini, c’est comme si tu m’avais remboursé. |                                                                                                            |
| Q.2a.4.                                                                            |                                                                                                            |
| (Q) Donc, c’est cette année-ci que vous allez faire ces négociations avec Vital ? (-1 :00 :27) | Market development and increased number of larger buyers that exploit economies of scale leads to interesting contractual solutions |
| (R-FBO4-P) Personne ne sait. Peut être avec un autre aussi. Parce que cette campagne-ci, il y a le banquier qui est venu avec le rizier aussi, il a dit que vous pouvez lui vendre aussi.... |                                                                                                            |
| (R-FBO4-P) Mais c’est que Vital a aussi les meilleures conditions. Parce qu’ils ont une usine qui fait 200 tonnes par jour. Donc 10 fois plus |                                                                                                            |
**Tous Ensemble ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production**
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| Q.2a.5. | (Q) Comparé aux banabanas, c’est comment ?  
(R-MbSa) Non, c’est mieux avec Vital. Parce qu’avec les banabanas, ils achètent par sac. Si le marché n’est pas... Ils vont acheter ca à 7500 ou 8000. Mais avec Vital, si tu as un bon riz, tu vas avoir même 10,000 minimum. Tu peux avoir 11,000 parce que le sac fait 90kg. (-min 5:02) Avec les banabanas, ce n’est pas encourageant. | Price advantages due to contracting larger trader. |
| Q.2a.7. | (Q) Donc, de 2003 à 2006, vous avez toujours vendu le paddy aux banabanas ?  
(R-FBO4-P) Oui, mais à partir de 2006, il y a eu d’autres rizières qui se sont intéressés. | General market development (linked to increased prices) has increased opportunities for producers to engage with market |
| Q.2a.8. | (Q) Est-ce que vous, ca vous intéresse si vous vendez à Vital ou pas ?  
(R-FBOS-P) A Vital, c’est bon. Vital a des moyens pour déposer le riz. Moi, je n’ai pas ces moyens. Si tu donnes à Vital, il trouve des moyens pour garder son riz. Et puis, le prix, c’est bon, par rapport aux banabanas. Les banabanas sont même obligés d’augmenter leurs prix.  
(Q) A cause de Vital ?  
(R-FBOS-P) Bien sur. | Contracting larger traders is interesting because they have the means to store and thereby gain better prices. These price advantages have been transferred to the producer. The emergence of larger traders has made the market more competitive. |
| Q.2a.9. | (R-UA-P) En ce qui concerne la commercialisation, on fait ça ensemble. Mais avant, on a fait ça à part. On a trouvé des gens, comme le Vital, on fait des contrats pour acheter le riz. Avant, on avait des problèmes. Pour trouver des gens qui achètent tu peux attendre jusqu’à l’autre campagne. C’est le retard encore du remboursement du crédit de la CNCAS. Mais maintenant, il y a plus de problème de commercialisation depuis 2010, 2011, 2012 comme ca. | Contracting and collective marketing has increased the certainty of getting a loan for the subsequent season. Before, marketing of paddy had been a problem and had led to delays in starting subsequent seasons. |
| Q.2a.10 | (R-UA-P) Les contrats, ca concerne surtout les OPs. Parce que si on est obligé de faire des contrats, c’est pour le crédit. Si une fois le GIE a signé le contrat, son crédit ne sera plus en retard. Parce qu’il y a Vital qui a signé un contrat avec la CNCAS pour prendre la production. (- 21 :25)  
(...) | Contracting is especially interesting for the share of the production that is used for the reimbursement. Thereby, TA costs and risks of selling this share are overcome and the certainty of receiving the subsequent credit is increased. |
| Q.2a.11 | (Q) Et si on n’a pas de contrat, on peut vendre à 8000... ?  
(R-UA-P) Si tu n’a pas de contrat tu peux vendre à 11,000 ou 12,000 ou alors à 6000.... Ca dépend. Mais avec le contrat tu es sûr qu’après la campagne tu vas vendre. Mais il y a d’autres marchands aussi qui viennent acheter. Parfois, c’est eux – les banabanas – qui cassent les prix. Parce que tu signes un contrat avec quelqu’un à 10,000. Il y a un banabana qui vient et il achète à 12,000..... ca pose problème. Ca joue toujours. (-13 :58) Surtout au niveau individuel [il y a des producteurs qui vendent individuellement alors que le GIE a conclu un contrat avec quelqu’un].  
(Q) C’est déjà arrivé ?  
(R-UA-P) Oui, ça arrive à chaque fois. Il y a des problèmes entre nous.  
(...) | Contracting decreases the price risk and the volatility of prices. Side-selling has, however, been an issue. While there is a possibility of producers to achieve better prices through side-selling, increased sensitization made them understand that it is in their interest to fulfill the contract in order to start early the next season. |
Q.2a.12.  (R-FBO4-P) Non, c’est l’expérience aussi des fois qui nous montre… Que si tu pars individuellement, l’acheteur ne fait pas de cadeau – qu’il fait beaucoup plus de cadeau quand c’est collectif. L’union fait la force aussi. Pour constituer un lobby.

Countervailing power because of collective action towards market participants.

Participation in markets, TA costs and risks and market development
2b – Input Markets

Assessments (Quotes)  Interpretations

Q.2b.1.  (R-FBO2-2, traduction) : « Bon, il a dit que il ne préfère pas le financement de Bey Dundé parce qu’eux ils proposent des intrants, comme des semences et des produits, que parfois tu ne connais pas. (R-FBO2-2) Ils amènent ça ici. Tu ne connais pas le prix. Je préfère les bons, parce que tu cherche un fournisseur, et tu vas discuter avec lui le prix. Il faut discuter. Il y en a qui vendent plus cher ou moins cher. »

Criticism of collective input purchases due to missing transparency regarding prices and due to a loss of quality choice.

Q.2b.2.  (Q) Qu’est-ce que vous pensez à propos de l’achat groupé ? (35 :19) (R-FBO2-P) Oui. C’est bon.
(Q) Vous recevez toujours vos intrants à temps ? (R-FBO2-P) Oui.
(Q) Pourquoi est-ce que c’est mieux ? (R-FBO2-P) C’est mieux parce que c’est moins cher. Les fournisseurs individuels vendent un kilo à 180 ou 175, la FPA vend à 165 ou 170 le kilo. C’est parce qu’on achète des grandes quantités maintenant.

Economies of Scale allow for reduced input prices.

Q.2b.3.  (R-FBO1-P) L’achat groupé, c’est bon. (Q) Il n’y a pas de problèmes avec ça ? (R-FBO1-P) Non. C’est bien. C’est mieux comme ca. Chaque GIE un seul fournisseur, ce n’est pas bon. Ce sont des grandes difficultés. (Q) C’est plus cher ? (R-FBO1-P) C’est plus cher.
(Q) Il n’y a pas de problèmes avec ça ? (R-FBO1-P) Non, non.

Economies of Scale allow for reduced input prices.

Q.2b.4.  (Q) Vous faites l’achat groupé depuis quand ? (R-FBO5-P) Depuis que Bey Dundé est venu ici (il rigole). Ca fait trois ans. (Q) Comment est-ce que ça a changé ? Est-ce que c’est mieux ? (R-FBO5-P) C’est mieux. Parce qu’on peut avoir le moins cher.
(Q) Mais, on attend plus longtemps ? (R-FBO5-P) Bien sur. Non, mais ce n’est pas lié à l’achat groupé. Ce sont les bons de la CNCAS qui ne viennent pas à temps.

Collective input purchasing reduces the prices for inputs. The delay of inputs is not due to the collective input purchasing but due to delays at the CNCAS.

Q.2b.5.  (R-LUB-1) Bon, encore, tout le monde sait que l’union locale, ce sont toutes les sections villageoises. Donc, dés que tu gagne le marché, tu gagne le marché entier.

The local union covers a very large market which makes them an important trade.
Through collective input purchases, TA costs for inputs have been reduced and inputs have directly become available in the village much earlier than before. The partnership with Bey Dundé contributed positively to identifying the need for collective input purchasing and its implementation.

Through a new credit line for agricultural material the union has been able to invest into a tractor which now helps them to address the thin market regarding the availability of leasing agricultural equipment. Before, TA costs for this service were very high because of the geographical distance to service providers and the low existing investment capacity.

Through collective input purchases, the price for buying paddy sacs could be reduced by 25% for the producer. The Farmer Union still gains 10 CFA on this price.

### 12. Appendix – Quotes from Transcripts – 2. Reasons for Crisis (Quotes C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote number</th>
<th>Quote (french)</th>
<th>Translation/ interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C – Crisis, 1. Organisational Design, a.Freeriding</td>
<td>(R-UA-P) Maintenant, on fait des achats groupés, on peut avoir un bon prix. L'engrais vient même avant le semis. La semence vient sur place, les produits sont maintenant dans les magasins. Depuis qu'on travaille avec Bey Dundé, on a fait des formations, on a fait des diagnostiques pour voir nos problèmes, c'est pour ça qu'on fait l'achat groupé. Les intrants viennent et on paye sur place. Through collective input purchases, TA costs for inputs have been reduced and inputs have directly become available in the village much earlier than before. The partnership with Bey Dundé contributed positively to identifying the need for collective input purchasing and its implementation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C.1.a.1.

(R-FBO1-P) A notre départ, on a connu qu’il faut payer ses dettes pour être en bonne santé. Celui qui ne paye pas ses dettes n’est pas en bonne santé. On s’est préparé chaque année. [On a même pris d’autres dettes pour payer les dettes de la CNCAS]. On a eu des problèmes, mais… [on va résoudre ces problèmes]. (R-SB-P)  

**Earlier succes is justified with reimbursement discipline**

### C.1.a.3.

(Q) Et vous avez commencé à payer le moratoire de 2011 ?  
(R-FBO1-1) Oui. Le moratoire de 2011 plus les moratoires qu’on avait avant. On avait beaucoup de moratoires même avant 2011. C’était gonflé. C’est ça qui nous a …. [tué ?]. (R-FBO1-1)  

**Accumulation of debts cause problems**

### C.1.a.5.

(Q) Est-ce que c’est arrivé souvent ?  
(R-FBO1-1) Oui. C’est arrivé souvent. (R-FBO1-1) Même entre 2009 et 2013, c’est souvent arrivé ?  
(R-FBO1-1) Oui. C’est arrivé ? Pourquoi tout ça ? Parce qu’entre 2010 et 2011, on avait laissé ca. C’était ça la raison pour laquelle on n’a pas payé notre crédit. (-1 :04 :59). Parce qu’il y a des gens qui ont payé et il y a encore des gens qui n’ont pas payé. Et parce qu’on a laissé faire ca, c’est ça ce qui nous a handicapés. (Q) Donc, vous avez appris en fait qu’il faut… ?  
(R-FBO1-1) Il faut reprendre ça. (Q) Enlever les champs de ceux qui ne remboursent pas… ?  
(R-FBO1-1) Voilà, il faut enlever ca. [On a pris cette décision quoi]. Avant l’intersaison 2013. (Q) Donc, vous avez enlevé combien de personnes ?  
(R-FBO1-1) Bon, on a prévu ca seulement. On n’a pas encore terminé ca. C’est avant la fin du mois d’avril qu’on doit réaliser ca.  

**Freeriding because of ineffective sanctioning, plan to increase sanctioning**

### C.1.a.6.

(Q) On a vu que depuis plusieurs campagnes, les GIEs prennent les crédits, mais que les remboursements ne viennent pas régulièrement. Il faut que l’union les appuie ou alors on va chercher un fournisseur pour aller en campagne. Donc, s’ils savent maintenant que s’ils ne remboursent pas ils ne vont peut être pas partir en campagne, peut-être ils vont se débrouiller pour rembourser. »  

**Low incentive to reimburse because union used to pay debts for them.**

**Author’s note: It seems like not paying the debts entirely is also a “principle”**

### C.1.a.7.

(Q) Donc, vous n’avez pas appliqué les règles de la SAED [qu’on va définitivement saisir les champs et les realloquer ?]?  
Non. Ce n’est pas encore venu. (-1 :23 :49). C’est un processus, la SAED a vu qu’il y a un problème donc elle essaye de voir comment régler ca.  

[…]  

Donc, c’est quoi la recommandation de la SAED ?  
Il y avait bcp de réclamations sur ces terres-là. Des gens qui disent : « Mon père avait 2,05 ha… Je veux récupérer le champ de mon père ». Or que, si ton père avait laissé du crédit là bas, ou il est décédé en court de route… L’essentiel, c’est qu’au niveau de la SAED, on dit que c’est une affectation par section, mais pas individuellement. (-1 :19 :07)  

Cette décision a été prise récemment ?  
Non, ça fait longtemps, mais on n’a pas appliqué ca. Mais maintenant, la SAED a dit qu’elle va faire appliquer ca aux sections. (R-FBOS-P) Il y a le gars qui cultive son champ. En cultivant, il a pris tout le produit et amener ca. Et puis, il attend 10 ans, il revient pour dire qu’il veut avoir son champ. Mais, c’est pas bon ! [il rigole]  

**Freeriding not only as not paying back the loan entirely but also as using the inputs elsewhere and letting the FBO deal with the debts.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.1.a.8.</th>
<th>(R-FBO2-2)</th>
<th>Mais, nous, dans le groupement, quand le crédit venait, on faisait tout pour être à jours avec la banque. S'il y avait des [manquants] c’était entre nous. Mais tous ceux qui nous finançaient, on n’avait pas de problèmes avec eux.</th>
<th>Before they got problems they used to be stricter in reimbursing loans.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.1.a.9.</td>
<td>(Q) Et les trois qui ont eu le crédit, comment ils ont fait ? C’est quoi leur différence ? (R-UA-P) Sur leur remboursement. Ils remboursent intégralement à chaque campagne. Ce sont des groupements qui travaillent bien. Ils ont un comité de recouvrement aussi qui ne dépend pas de l’union. Ils recouvrent eux-mêmes.</td>
<td>Strategy: Therefore, we are currently increasing sanctions, meaning that people will not produce if they do not pay back entirely.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(R-UA-P) Donc, en fait, entre les groupements, il y a des différences d’activités. Il y a des groupements où il y a des gens très actifs, ils travaillent très bien. (R-UA-P) Il y a d’autres groupements qui travaillent mais ce n’est pas vraiment….</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(R-UA-P) Tu vois quelqu’un qui va prendre toooooooouuuut sa récolte pour rembourser intégralement son crédit même s’il ne lui reste rien pour manger (-19 :21). (R-UA-P) Mais d’autres personnes ne font pas ça. Par exemple, on te dit d’amener 40 sacs, tu en a 50, mais tu n’amène que 30 sacs. La prochaine fois, ça sera accumulé. Ça devient très lourd, c’est ça le problème. (Q) Donc, il y a des cultures différentes entre les différents GIEs ? (R-UA-P) [il rigole] Non, mais c’est seulement la volonté. (Q) Mais si moi, je sais que toi, tu ne vas pas tout rembourser, moi, je ne vais pas tout rembourser non plus… (R-UA-P) C’est ca. (Q) Mais si je sais que toi, tu vas tout rembourser, je vais essayer de tout rembourser aussi. (R-UA-P) Voilà. Tu sais qu’avant, dans les GIEs-là, c’est des gens qui trichent. (-20 :12) Parce que si je suis dans un GIE qui rembourse à 100 % chaque année mais je vois d’autres GIEs qui ne remboursent pas intégralement mais qui vont quand même avoir leurs crédits. Moi aussi je fais comme ça alors. C’est ça le problème. Pour combattre ça, on est obligé comment on fait maintenant : Celui qui paye part en campagne, celui qui ne paye pas ne va pas partir en campagne. Comme ça, on encourage les bons payeurs. (-20 :48) Tu as compris ? [Il rigole].</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.1.a.10.</td>
<td>(Q) Donc, est-ce que j’ai bien compris que le problème c’était qu’on avait des dettes dans deux campagne des suite – qu’on avait déjà les moratoires et qu’on n’a pas pu payer les moratoires PLUS les dettes de l’année ? (R-UA-P) Oui. Il y avait les moratoires de la contre saison. Il y avait le reste du remboursement de la campagne hivernale qu’on a accumulé plus les dettes de l’année. Donc, ils ont remboursé les moratoires, mais il restait les dettes de l’année à rembourser. C’est pour ça que la banque a dit que maintenant elle ne peut plus…. Il faut que les gens se débrouillent pour rembourser… Et ils ne pouvaient plus rembourser parce qu’ils n’avaient plus rien à rembourser. C’est pour cela qu’ils ne sont pas partis en campagne. (-44 :52).</td>
<td>After multiple cropping seasons with moratoriums the bank has finally decided to not give another moratorium. First time that they do not get a loan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.a.11.</td>
<td>(R-FBO4-2) Si quelqu’un ne paye pas la dette, il va avoir dans la tête qu’on va retirer la parcelle. (-45 :23) Purement et simplement. Il n’y a même pas de discussion. (Q) Tout de suite, à a fin de la campagne ?’ (R-FBO4-2) Oui, à la fin de la campagne. Il ne travaillera pas la prochaine campagne. (Q) Est-ce que ça a toujours été aussi strict que ça ? (R-FBO4-2) Oui. Oui. On ne badine pas. C’est une condition qui marche dans toute l’union, les sept villages.</td>
<td>Sanctions against free-riding are effective within this FBO.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### C.1.a.12. Also Strategy

**R-UA-P** Tu sais qu’il y a huit unions dans la FPA. Il y a d’autres unions qui ont commencé à faire ca. Nous, avant, s’il y avait même seulement un GIE dans l’union qui n’avait pas remboursé, on l’attendait. On a vu que chaque année ça retardait le début de campagne. On commence tardivement, ca baisse les rendements, et on n’arrivait plus à rembourser.

(Q) Pourquoi vous les attendiez ?
(R-UA-P) Parce qu’ils n’avaient pas eu leurs crédits, il fallait qu’on parte à gauche et à droite pour négocier. (-5:59).

(...) (R-UA-P) On voulait aller en campagne ensemble seulement. Pour faire la solidarité. Le même village – [donc on voulait aller ensemble]. Mais on a vu que chaque année, ca amenait des problèmes. Donc on voulait changer de programme. On a demandé à [une autre union] pour savoir comment ils font, donc ils font comme ca seulement les groupements [GIEs] qui ont remboursé – on allume les stations de pompage et ils vont partir en campagne. Les autres unions aussi font comme ca. Donc on a vu que c’est une bonne méthode. Comme ca, on va aller en campagne très tôt – et le membre sait que s’il ne rembourse pas il ne va pas aller en campagne. (-min 7:00). Donc il va se débrouiller pour rembourser.

Before the FBOs of the union always had to start the cropping season together. Everybody had to have the loan in order for the irrigation plant to start. So there was no incentive to reimburse early. Now, we learnt from the other unions that the individual FBOs there can start irrigating individually. We are changing this here as well now.

So the incentive to reimburse has been increased since the sanction now applies to the FBO and not the entire union.

### STRATEGIES

#### C.1.a.5.1.

**R-FB03-1** On a dit que le chef du sous groupement est le responsable. Chaque 15 jours on va visiter les champ. Si on voit que le champ n’est pas bien, on te donne 5 jours. Si on voit que vous ne préparez RIEN, on fait des amendements.

(Q) Vous avez déjà fait ca ?
(R-FB03-1) Oui, on a commencé à faire ca. Dans un premier temps, on a semer. Mais on va faire ca.

(Q) Donc, vous donnez des punitions ? La police ?
(R-FB03-1) Oui. (Elle rigole).

[...] (Q) Est-ce que c’était Bey Dundé qui a dit qu’il faut avoir la police ?
(R-FB03-1) Non, pas Bey Dundé. Mais c’est notre expérience en nous échangeant avec des autres unions. (1:01:43). Nous aussi, [on faisait des polices], mais on n’exercisait pas trop. Mais, maintenant, on va le faire.

Applying sanctions due to learning from other unions

#### C.1.a.5.2.

(Q) Donc, la décision de prendre le crédit pour les groupements, ce n’était pas une bonne décision ?
(R-UA-P) Non, parce que le mandat de l’union, ce n’est pas de prendre des crédits. Elle n’a pas le droit de prendre des crédits. Mais lorsque la CNCAS a vu que les GIEs ne pouvaient plus aller, elle a dit que maintenant il faut que l’union le prenne.

(Q) Donc, c’était l’initiative de la CNCAS ?
(R-UA-P) Oui. Parce qu’il n’y avait pas de moyens. On donnait aux groupements, ils ne payaient pas. (-26:33) Maintenant, on était obligé de dire à l’union de donner une garantie et de prendre un crédit pour les groupements et donc c’est l’union qui fait le recouvrement et qui paye les dettes directement à la CNCAS.

Failed strategy to address free riding in the past. Instead of increasing sanctions for the FBOs, the union had to give guarantees for the FBOs. This was an initiative of CNCAS. But since the union was not accountable either, debts increased even more.
Bien compris que la commission qui allait sur les champs, c'est la ?

Parfois 10,000, parfois 20,000, ce qu'on a amené à la banque. […] Parce qu'on s'

maintenant c'est comme ça ces à ca. Quand tu récolte, on te dit de on va t'enlever le ? plus de police

Laura Schüppler «– la priorité, c'est d'abord le crédit. (Q) La commission vient sur ton champ quoi ? Vous avez introduit ce système ou c'est un autre qui l'a introduit ?


? quand tu ne payes pas, on retien ton champ souvent ils ont la p (Q) Donc, est ? à la récolte. Une commission vient d'abord, retire les sacs pour le remboursement, on te laisse après avec les sacs qui restent. […] (Q) Vous avez eu cette idée... Comment est-ce que vous êtes parvenu à cette décision ?

(R-FB04-P) On a vu que les gens – souvent ils ont la production. Mais le surendettement hors-crédit fait qu'ils ne payent pas. _ (- R-FB04-P) Donc, les dettes, qu'ils ont hors-casier, par exemple auprès des mutuelles... ?

(R-FB04-P) Oui, pour manger etc. Donc, ils payent ca d'abord. Avant de payer nos dettes. Mais maintenant on ne te laisse plus avec ca. On vient, on rembourse après.

(Q) Comment on-ils réagit, les membres ?

(R-FB04-P) Positivement. On sait que c'est anormal. Mais souvent, il y a beaucoup de pression. Maintenant, les gens commencent à comprendre que la priorité, c'est d'abord le crédit. (-20 :S8)

 […] (Q) La commission vient sur ton champ quoi ?

(R-FB04-P) Oui, oui. (-22 :48)

(R-FB04-P) Non, il ya a un peu plus de contrôle ? Plus de police ?

(R-FB04-P) Plus de police, oui.

(R-FB04-P) Non, bien sûr. Parce que les trois dernières années avec le privé, on a remboursé à 100 %. _ (-23 :01).

(R-FB04-P) Ce qu'on a fait aussi [de plus] : Parfois 10,000, parfois 20,000, ce qu'on a amené à la banque. […] Parce qu'on s’est dit que c’était la dernière ligne droite – il fallait être très très sévère quoi. (Que si on avait raté ca, ca aurait été fini pour la section. C'est pourquoi on a pris ces mesures drastiques. (-23 :49)

 […] (Q) Donc, maintenant, avec la CNCAS, vous allez continuer comme ca ?

(R-FB04-P) Non, on ne va pas continuer.

(Q) Vous n’allez pas aller sur les champs pour récupérer... ?

(R-FB04-P) Non, parce qu’il ya a un autre système maintenant. Maintenant, c’est facile : quand tu ne payes pas, on retient ton champ. […]

(R-FB04-P) Non, c'était comme ca. Avec le privé, c'était une mesure exceptionnelle. Mais d’habitude on fait comme ça (retirer le champ). (-25 :00).

(R-FB04-P) Mais on pourrait continuer de le faire. Moi, quand je le faisais d’abord au niveau de la famille, les gens, d’abord me critiquaient. Mais je leur disais que pourquoi je le faisais d’abord au niveau de la famille, c'est difficile, mais au moins t'es sûr que tu auras un crédit l'année prochaine. (-25 :33) Et que tu va continuer, même si ce n'est que 2 ou 3 sacs. […] (Q) Donc, est-ce que j'ai bien compris que la commission qui allait sur les champs, c'est la « commission de remboursement », n'est –ce pas ?

Vos l'avez aboli maintenant ?

(R-FB04-P) Bon, je ne sais pas si on l’a aboli ou pas. Au niveau de l’assemblée générale, avant la récolte, la décision peut-être reconduite. (26 :22)

(Q) La décision n’est pas encore prise alors ?

(R-FB04-P) Voilà.

The CNCAS put pressure on the FBO to not continue to
toujours financés. On a travaillé avec lui jusqu’en 2012. Mais finalement la banque a dit qu’on ne peut pas continuer à travailler avec ce monsieur alors qu’on n’a toujours pas remboursé à la banque. (-21 :00). [...] Elle risque de nous faire des problèmes. Donc, il faut tout faire pour négocier des moratoires.

(Q) (r) Donc, la banque elle a mis de la pression sur vous ?
(R-FBO4-2) Oui. Oui.

[...] (Q) Est-ce que tout le monde dans la SV était d’accord avec cette approche?
(R-FBO4-2) Oui, oui. On n’a pas de choix. Il faut le faire. Sinon, ça ne marche pas.

(Q) Et comment avez-vous fait en sorte que tout le monde payait ?
(R-FBO4-2) On s’est réuni chez le président. On a parlé entre les membres en disant que c’est la condition de la banque que chacun fasse le maximum et remplir les conditions, sinon on n’ira pas en campagne. A partir de là, les gens ont dit que c’est fatiguant parce qu’actuellement, ils n’ont pas d’argent mais on a appuyé sur l’accélérateur en disant qu’il faut le faire, et finalement.

(Q) Donc, il a fallu quand-même les pousser un peu ?
(R-FBO4-2) Voilà. (-23 :30). Il fallait les pousser et puis ils étaient tous d’accord. Quelques-uns qui voulaient résister, on leur a fait comprendre que si vous résistez – nous on va essayer de trouver des fonds à votre place, on va mettre ca, quand les intrants vont arriver, celui qui ne paye pas [qui n’a pas payé ?] n’aura pas d’intrants. Quand on leur a dit ça, ils étaient d’accord. Et finalement, c’est la même méthode qu’on a utilisée. [...] Il y a aussi le problème de retissance. Parce que les gens ont compris, même avec l’eau, qui circule dans le village et qu’on consomme, les gens veulent utiliser mais ils ne veulent pas payer. Avec la Sénélec, comme elle tape dure, ils payent. Mais l’eau puisque ça concerne le village, ils essayent de dire « non, il faut attendre le fin de campagne....

External pressure (CNCAS) facilitated internal pressure among members.

C. – Crisis, 1. Organisational Design, b. Claim and Control rights

STRATEGIES

C.1.b.5.1. (Q) Donc, vous travaillez sur 15 ha maintenant ?
(R-FBO3-1) Oui. On travaille individuellement, mais le GIE gère le travail. (-min 52 :07) 15 ha, chaque femmes a 0,25 mètres. Donc, chacune a sa propre parcelle.

(Q) Pourquoi vous avez fait ça ?
(R-FBO3-1) Ca donne chacune.... Ca va responsabiliser le champ.... Et va travailler.... Pour puisse rembourser.... Et faire une autre campagne.

(Q) C’était l’idée de qui ?
(R-FBO3-1) C’est notre idée. Avec Bey Dundé. On a fait des voyages d’étude avec Bey Dundé. On a regardé les autres unions de femmes comment elles travaillent à Diawar. On a regardé leurs champs. On a vu que les femmes [...] individuellement. Si tu as remboursé tu as as...... [...] pour ta famille. Le bénéfice, c’est pour toi-même.

(R-FBO3-4) Si on te dit que les 0,25 ha c’est pour toi, tu vas les travailler ! (-min 53 :41) Et tu auras ton bénéfice. Tu auras des rendements. Tu vas
travailler.
(Q) Donc, c'est la première saison que vous faites ça ?
(R-FBO3-1) Oui, c'est la première saison. Maintenant on dit que si on a récolté, chaque ha va verser 50,000 dans le GIE des femmes. Ca va payer les dettes passées à la banque. On a vu ça en voyage d'étude. Nous essayons de faire la même chose. On va voir ce que ça donne.
(Q) Donc, vous avez appris beaucoup de choses des autres groupements ?
(R-FBO3-1) Oui.
(Q) Donc, maintenant chaque membre du GIE a sa propre parcelle ?
(R-FBO3-1) Oui, mais les terres ne suffisent pas pour toutes les femmes. Donc en fait, pour les 15 ha, on dit à chaque sous-groupement d'amener 7 personnes. Avec ses 7 personnes on va faire la campagne contre saison. Si on a réussi, on paye les dettes et on va les laisser. On va prendre les autres dans la prochaine saison.

[...] (poulard)
(R-FBO3-1) 7 femmes par sous-groupe. Donc, 7 fois 8. 8 sous-groupements. Donc 56 femmes.

C.1.b.5.1. (R-FBO3-P) Auparavant on n'avait pas de bénéfices. C'est que aujourd'hui qu'on a des bénéfices à se partager (- 24 :00).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote number</th>
<th>Quote (french)</th>
<th>Translation/ interpretation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.1.c.1.</td>
<td>Q) Donc, pour résoudre ça, qu'est-ce que le groupement a déjà fait ? Est-ce qu'il y a eu des réunions pour parler ... ? (R-FBO2-2) Notre problème, c'est qu'on ne se réunit pas tout le temps. Je crois que notre président, il n'a pas le temps parce qu'il est dans ces occupations, ces projets... (Q) Avant, vous vous réunissiez plus souvent ? (R-FBO2-2) Avant, chaque campagne, on se réunissait trois ou quatre fois. (-52 :10) (Q) Jusqu'en 2012 ? (R-FBO2-2) Oui. Mais maintenant on ne le fait plus souvent.</td>
<td>President is perceived to not have time because he is busy outside the FBO with his non-GA production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.c.2.</td>
<td>(R-FBO2-P) Et tu sais pourquoi ce n'est pas grave ? Parce que tous les membres du GIE cultivent aussi hors-casier. _Comme moi, je cultive dans le hors-casier. C'est tout le GIE qui va cultiver dans le privé.</td>
<td>President does not see non production of FBO as a problem because he thinks that « everyone » is also producing outside GA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.c.3.</td>
<td>(R-FBO2-2)</td>
<td>Some have the means to</td>
</tr>
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TOUS ENSEMBLE ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production  
Laura Schüppler

| (Q) Donc, en fait le GIE [...], en ce moment, il ne produit pas ?  
Oui, il ne produit pas. (-58 :59)  
(Q) Ok. Est-ce que c’est la première fois que vous ne produisez pas ?  
[...]  
Mais eux, ils sont partis cultiver [et le président aussi]. Maintenant tu vois un champ cultivé, un champ n’est pas cultivé... (-25 :20). Ce que je peux dire, peut-être c’est un conflit.  
[...]
| purchase inputs and produce individually in the GA.  
Expectation that the ones who are financially able « lend » to those who are not able and that the collective loan can thereby be paid. Justification of conflict because of some producing and others not.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIES</th>
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</table>
| C.1.c.S.2.  
(Q) Donc, ca veut dire qu’on a plusieurs option quoi ? Soit le casier marche, on cultive dans le casier. Si ca ne marche pas et on a des problèmes avec la CNCAS, on cultive ailleurs ?  
(R-FBO1-P) Même si le casier marche, on cultive toujours ailleurs. (-1 :22 :31) On cultive ici et là bas .  
(Q) Donc, on travaille toujours quoi ?  
(R-FBO1-P) Toujours !  
| Diversification into HC as a “common” strategy, not only during crisis.  
Crisis, 1. Organisational Design,  
C.1.d.2.  
(R-FBO4-P) Je crois, en fait que c’est ca ce qui pose problème au niveau des remboursements. Parce que tu vois quelqu’un qui a une grande famille…. Un ha, par exemple. Techniquement, il a eu la production pour pouvoir rembourser. Mais socialement, les charges sont telles que... il emprunte tellement pour manger que pour rembourser le crédit, ca pose problème.  
| High dependency rate as a cause for individual non-reimbursement of debts  
C.1.d.3.  
(R-FBO4-2) Rarement, les réunions, c’est souvent avec la banque. Mais quand il n’y a pas la banque, c’est chacun de son côté. (-36 :25)  
| Inactiveness during credit crisis (no meetings of FBO)  
C.1.d.4.  
(R-FBO5-P) Parce que ce qui reliait les gens, c’était le crédit. Si tout le monde cherche le crédit à part, c’est difficile de faire des réunions.  
| “What’s keeping people together here is the credit. If everybody
### Strategies and Choices

**C.1.d.S.1.** (R-FBO2-P)  
(Q) Le GIE, c’est mort quoi ?  
Non, ce n’est pas mort. (-12 :05). Il y a des préparations. Il y a d’autres partenaires là-bas. Chercher d’autres partenaires là bas. Dans trois mois, si ce n’est pas possible avec Bey Dundé et la CNCAS, on va chercher d’autres partenaires pour qu’ils nous donnent du crédit. Il y a des mutuelles, il y a des gens comme Iba Salle, Vital, il y a un toubab, un gars blanc là « Paule ». Il est venu avec bcp d’argent. Il a des tracteurs, du matériel de prestation de service.  

Possibility of contractualisation to overcome crisis.

**C.1.d.S.2.** (R-FBO1-P)  
En 2000, on a fait l’assemblée générale. On avait dit que chacun devait amener 20,000 par ha pour qu’on puisse avoir les 50%. Tous les membres sont venus, quelques-uns avec leur 20,000, d’autres avec rien, parce qu’ils n’avaient rien. On a collecté 1,500,000. Avec la somme collecté on est allé vers un fournisseur, il nous a donné 500,000 pour donner 2 millions à la CNCAS. (-9 :47) pour aller en campagne entre 2000 et 2004.  

Making collections for reestablishing economic justification.

**C.1.d.S.3.** (R-FBO5-P)  
Donc, il est venu au village pour voir toutes les sections villageoises…. ?  
Non. C’est nous qui sommes allé vers un fournisseur, il nous a donné 500,000 pour donner 2 millions à la CNCAS. (-17 :16) Il est venu avec bcp d’argent. Il a des tracteurs, du matériel de prestation de service.  

Concluding contract with private financier and input provider in order to get loan collectively (reestablish economic justification). The FBO was inspired by others who had done this before.

**C.1.d.S.4.** (Q) Mais en 1994, tout de suite, on a commencé avec l’achat groupé des intrants ? (-4 :35)  
(R-LUB-P) Oui.  
(Q) Donc, est-ce qu’on s’est cherché une activité pour justifier l’existence de l’union locale ?  
(R-LUB-P) Oui, c’est comme ca. (-4 :50)  

Introducing CIP as a means to generate a meaning for the local union (economic justification).

**C.1.d.S.5.** (R-LUB-P) Le problème c’était que tout le monde s’est consacré à l’union mère, je t’ai expliqué ça.  
(Q) Donc est-ce que c’était un désavantage pour les SVs ?  
(R-LUB-P) Mais bien sûr. Quand ils ont senti que c’était leur désavantage ils sont revenus ?  

Regaining economic activity for LUB by convincing people that it is in their interest. Helping them
(Q) Comment est-ce que c’était un désavantage ?

(R-LUB-P) Le revenu qu’on avait avec l’union locale, on a construit trois classes à l’école. On a réfectionné une partie de la mosquée. Même les volontaires qu’on prenait, on les prenait en charge à travers ces revenus. (-15 :20). Pour le dispensaire on a participé à la réfection de 170,000 – jusqu’à aujourd’hui que les gens n’ont pas remboursé [ ?]. (-15 :32)

(Q) Donc c’était surtout pour des activités sociales ?

(R-LUB-P) Les revenus étaient consacrés aux activités sociales.

(Q) Ce n’est pas du côté production ?

(R-LUB-P) Non. Pour la production, on a des crédits. Quand les section ont accès aux crédits, ils ont du crédit. (-15 :46).

[....]

(Q) Et qu’est-ce qu’elle faisait avec les bénéfices ?


[....]

(Q) Donc, les producteurs ont réalisé qu’il fallait avoir des fonds plus locaux ? Qui vont être comme une sécurité locale?

(R-LUB-P) Sécurité locale. Mais, les sections qui ont des problèmes, on les appuie aussi. Par exemple, pour l’accès au crédit, on les accompagne les sections ou les groupements féminins pour essayer de négocier le crédit. (-18 :20). S’ils n’ont pas les fonds pour faire ses apports, l’union locale lui donne l’argent pour faire ses apports.

(Q) Apports – c’est-à-dire ?

(R-LUB-P) C’est la contre-participation. Ce qu’il faut déposer. Comme caution, et ainsi de suite. (-18 :35)

C.1.d.S.6. (R-UA-P) Avant, aussi, si chaque GIE avait ses bons, il part payer son fournisseur à gauche et à droite. Il amène les intrants. Mais les années là, on commence à changer. (-9 :14) Maintenant, on fait des achats groupés, on peut avoir un bon prix. L’engrais vient même avant la semis. La semence vient sur place, les produits sont maintenant dans les magasins. Depuis qu’on travaille avec Bey Dundé, on a fait des formations, on a fait des diagnostiques pour voir nos problèmes, c’est pour ça qu’on fait l’achat groupé. Les intrants viennent et on paye sur place. (-10 :00)

Advantages of CIP (price, time, local availability), importance of external facilitation to install CIP

C.1.d.S.7. (Q) Dans l’union locale, les hors-casier peuvent être membre aussi. Est-ce que ça serait possible ici aussi ? Est-ce que ça pourrait aider quelque chose ou ca n’a pas de sens ? (-40 :40)

(R-UA-P) Les hors-casiers sont très loin du casier. On avait parlé avec la SAED pour voir comment joindre les projets aux stations de pompage. Pour pouvoir irriguer les hors-casier. On était en train d’étudier avec la SAED, mais on n’a pas encore fini. Même pour le drainage on était en train de voir si on peut joindre ca au grand casier. C’est en cours aussi.

(Q) Donc, on veut les intégrer ?

(R-UA-P) Oui.

(Q) Pour qu’ils soient vraiment membres de l’union ?

(R-UA-P) Non, tu sais ils sont déjà membres de l’union. Mais tu sais, tout le monde du village est membre de l’union. Les gens qui cultivent dans innovation of integrating production schemes outside of GA into union through new irrigation channels is currently being discussed with SAED

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<tr>
<th>C.1.d.S.8.</th>
<th>(Q) Mais, ceux qui ont 10 ou 15 ha dans le hors-casier, ce n’est pas la majorité quand même ? (R-FBO4-2) Non. Quelques-uns seulement, à peine 15 ou 20 personnes dans tout le village.</th>
<th>Minority has plots outside GA.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.1.d.S.9.</td>
<td>(R-FBO4-2) Comme il n’y avait pas de remboursement, la banque n’a pas voulu donner du crédit. Les gens se débrouillaient pour cultiver. Les riches s’en sortaient, mais la majorité ne s’en sortait pas.</td>
<td>During crisis, only the rich had means to produce and could cope.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.d.S.10.</td>
<td>(R-FBO4-P) Je te donne un exemple. Avant tu payais le litre à […] à 500 francs. Maintenant, avec l’union locale, c’est à 400 francs. On te dit 400 francs, mais on paye ça peut être à 390. Donc on te dit d’augmenter 10 franc pour l’union locale. C’est avec ça qu’on va payer nos magasiniens, d’autre frais de fonctionnement… (Q) Donc, avant vous n’aviez pas de revenu pour payer les magasiniens par exemple. (R-FBO4-P) Non, c’est après qu’on a pensé à ça. Avant, on n’avait pas de magasiniens.</td>
<td>Income generation for LUB through CIP. This income facilitates the functioning of the LUB (e.g. by employing staff).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.d.S.11.</td>
<td>(Q) Et l’union locale c’est différent aussi parce que comme vous avez dit – les sections villageoises étaient installées par l’état alors que l’union locale, c’est vous… (R-FBO4-P) Nous qui l’avons… (Q) Est-ce que c’est pour cela aussi qu’elle vous appartient plus ? (R-FBO4-P) (r) Voilà !!! Voilà !!!!!! Parce que c’est nous qui l’avons crée !!! (-44 :26) Parce que avant de créer cela on a d’abord eu des objectifs quoi ! Il y avait des problèmes et c’est à partir de ces problèmes qu’on a pensé qu’il fallait se réunir pour former l’union locale. (r) Il y a des questions que le casier ne prenait pas en charge et qui intéressaient le village.</td>
<td>Greater ownership of LUB by members than FBOs because LUB was created by the members as a means to address concrete problems and not through government facilitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1.d.S.13.</td>
<td>(R-FBO3-2) Quand je suis arrivée j’ai proposé d’aller demander de l’aide aux hommes. Les GIEs d’hommes ne nous ont pas aidé, mais le président de n’union nous a aidé en nous donnant la récolte d’un ha des ses propres champs, c’est-à-dire 90 sacs. On a vendu chaque sac à 12.500 F. Ainsi, on a pu commencer à rembourser le crédit. Quand on a parlé avec les gens de la CNCAS ils nous ont proposé un moratoire, c’est-à-dire qu’on allait rembourser toujours une partie chaque année et qu’on allait avoir des nouveaux crédits en même temps pour la production du riz.</td>
<td>Mobilizing social and financial capital across FBOs and within union to overcome crisis (female)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOUS ENSEMBLE ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production
Laura Schüppler

Jusqu’à aujourd’hui, le crédit n’est pas encore remboursé (- min 13 :45). Chaque année on entre quelque chose à partir des autres activités, cette année on a enlevé 200,000 F. du bénéfice de l’aviculture pour verser à la CNCAS. Ainsi on a pu prendre un autre crédit pour la riziculture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote number</th>
<th>Quote (french)</th>
<th>Translation/ interpretation</th>
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<tr>
<td>C. – Crisis, 2. Personal Features, a. Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.2.a.1.</td>
<td>(R-FBO5-P) Ca a changé quelque chose, cette formation ? Oui. Bien sûr. Qu’est-ce que ça a changé ? Moi, je ne connaissais pas là où arrêter. Le secrétaire là et là. Le trésorier là et là. [il rigole] Avant, je croyais que c’était moi, le propriétaire de la section. Or que ce sont les membres qui m’ont mis là-bas. [il rigole]. (-43 :16)</td>
<td>After training president knows his role and that he has to be accountable to the members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.2.a.2.</td>
<td>(R-FBO5-P) Seulement, c’est sur les façons de faire. Mais, quand on avait démarré on n’avait rien. On est parti jusqu’à acheter une bascule. Ca montre, qu’il y a quelque chose dans la caisse. Avant, s’il y a quelque chose dans la caisse, on est obligé de partager ça. Maintenant, on sait qu’une section qui n’a rien dans la caisse, ce n’est pas bon. Maintenant, on ne partage plus l’argent comme ça. [...] Et comment vous êtes arrivé à cette conclusion ? Le bureau s’est réuni en réfléchissant, chacun donne son avis, vraiment c’est là où on trouve des points vraiment excellents. Des points, des objectifs pour un travail excellent. (-45 :36) Donc le fait de réaliser qu’il fallait garder quelque chose dans la caisse, il n’y avait pas d’influence externe qui vous a poussé à faire ça ? Des autres SVs…. Le président de l’union locale…. [...] (R-FBO5-1) C’est nous qui avons réfléchi. [...] (R-FBO5-1) Comme je viens de dire. On a trouvé qu’il y a des problèmes au sein de la section qu’il faut régler. Donc, là on a décidé que, chaque campagne, on va mettre une somme dans la caisse. [...] Donc, 2012 et 2013, ce sont les produits phytosanitaires qu’on a pu acheter. Donc, on va continuer à augmenter cette somme. (-47 :53)</td>
<td>Organizational learning and role of leaders’ reflection for keeping funds within FBO for operationality of FBO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.2.a.4.</td>
<td>(R-FBO2-2) En 2012, le président du GIE avait décédé et c’est en ce moment que le nouveau président a pris le GIE. Depuis 2012 jusqu’à maintenant nous avons des problèmes.</td>
<td>Individual responsibility of leader for crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.2.a.5.</td>
<td>Q) Donc, il y avait plusieurs années où vous n’avez pas pu payer le crédit ? (R-FBO3-1) Oui.</td>
<td>Production loss due to missing technical equipment as a reason</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TOUS ENSEMBLE ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production

**Laura Schüppler**

| (Q) Pourquoi ? | (R-FBO3-1) Les rendements étaient des échecs. | for continued crisis. |
| (Q) Est-ce que c’étaient des problèmes techniques ? | (R-FBO3-1) Oui. Il y avait des campagnes en retard. Avant que tu récoltes, la pluie vient et gâte tout comme l’année passée là. |
| (Q) Pourquoi vous étiez en retard ? | (R-FBO3-1) Des problèmes de tracteurs. Des problèmes de financement. La campagne démarre avant que tu aies le financement. Si tu démarre en retard, tu vas récolter en retard. |

#### C.2.a.6.

- (R-UA-P) C’était le premier bureau qui avait décidé ça. Parce que c’était des [analphabètes], ils n’écrivaient pas. Ni le président, ni les membres du bureau ne savait écrire. (-5:26). Donc ils ont pris une autre personne qui écrivait qui faisait presque tout.

- (R-UA-P) Donc on a vu que peut-être ça va être un problème.

#### C.2.a.7.

- (R-FBO1-1) Oui. Voilà. On a pris le crédit de Bey Dundé pour l’hivernage. Mais on a eu des arriérés. C’est pour ça qu’on ne peut pas partir en contre saison. Parce que l’hivernage, ce n’était pas bon.

- (Q) Pourquoi ce n’était pas bon?

- (R-FBO1-1) On avait un retard de campagne.

- (Q) Pourquoi ?

- (R-FBO1-1) Bon, nous on dit que c’est Bey Dundé. Mais eux, ils disent que ce n’est pas eux mais que c’est notre responsabilité au niveau de l’union. Nous encore, on a constaté que c’est la faute de l’union qui a retardé la campagne. (-50:51)

- (Q) Donc, ce n’est pas la faute de Bey Dundé ?

- (R-FBO1-1) Nous, c’est au niveau de l’union.

#### C.2.a.8.

- (Q) Et la dernière réunion s’est passée comment ?

- [...] (R-FBO2-2) Le président nous a laissé savoir que la CNCAS nous demande 70%. Et puis on se parlait, on disait comment on va faire pour boucler ce trou ? On n’est pas revenu sur place pour voir on a fait ceci ou cela ou comment faire.... C’est pendant la réunion du CA – du Conseil d’Administration qu’on nous a fait savoir que nous, on ne va partir en campagne, mais qu’il y aura deux groupements qui vont partir – [...].

- [...] Mais nous, notre président n’est pas revenu pour nous dire « on a eu ceci, ou on n’a pas eu ceci. » Après la réunion où il nous a dit qu’on nous demande 70%, on n’a pas fait une autre réunion. On s’est réuni nous tous pendant le CA.

### STRATEGIES

#### C.2.a.5.1.

- (QM) : Mais, c’est votre faute aussi. Il faut choisir un président qui est disponible à tout moment, qui accepte la critique et qui respecte les gens.

- (R-FBO2-2) Et pouvoir plaidoyer aussi. Mais tu sais, qu’ici au village, il y a une habitude : Quand il s’agit de choisir de président [tout le monde crie : Moi, moi !]. [Alors qu’un président,] il faut être intellectuel, c’est-à-dire savoir écrire et lire dans une langue. Etre compétent. Il faut écouter les gens. Il faut plaidoyer. Il faut avoir le temps. Etre calme. Ce qu’il a dit, c’est vrai. Mais, nous on n’a pas ça [on ne choisit pas ce genre de président]. (-1:02:06) On a fait une formation sur ça.

- (Q) Quand est-ce que ?

- (R-FBO2-2) Ca ne fait même pas deux mois. On a fait le rôle des membres, le rôle des dirigeants, on a tout fait.

- (Q) C’est avec Bey Dundé aussi ?

### Capacity deficit of leaders (illiteracy)

### Capacity deficit at union which led to delay in input provision.

### Criticizing leader for not informing members about current situation of FBO.
**Tous Ensemble ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production**

**Laura Schüppler**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C.2.a.S.2.</th>
<th><strong>(R-UA-P) On a un autre partenaire très important : C’est le centre de gestion. Ils travaillent avec nous. On est affilié depuis 2004. C’est eux qui nous fournissent les documents, les factures, les bons d’engrais et les bons de [sortu ?]. C’est eux qui nous font les bilans, on présente les bilans ensemble. Ils nous aident à faire le budget. Les plan trésorier ensemble. Et comme ils font avec l’union, ils font comme ca aussi avec les GIEs. […]</strong> <em>(Q) Vous avez réalisé ce problème vous-mêmes ? (R-UA-P) Oui, on a vu ca parce qu’on vit ca ! On s’est mobilisé nous tous ! Vraiment tous – pour aller travailler avec le centre de gestion – pour avoir des situations claires. (-26 :36) […] (R-UA-P) Non ! Nous, on était les premiers à adhérer. On a adhéré très tôt, en 2004, parce qu’on avait des problèmes de gestion. Avant, même aujourd’hui, il y a des groupements où les responsables sont illétrés. Ils ne savent ni lire, ni écrire. […] Avant l’arrivée du centre de gestion, les gens n’avaient pas confiance dans les dirigeants.</em>*</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>C.2.a.S.3.</strong></td>
<td><strong>(Q) Donc, on a convoqué une AG ? On a rendu transparent ce qui était le problème ? On a élu un nouveau bureau et un nouveau président ? (R-UA-P) Oui. (Q) Est-ce que c’étaient maintenant des gens qui savaient lire ? (-8 :50) (R-UA-P) Le président savait écrire en poulard. Le secrétaire savait écrire en française. Le comptable aussi en français. Et ils travaillaient volontairement.</strong></td>
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**Becoming member of centre de gestion for increasing control and thereby also addressing capacity deficit. Members can trust their leaders more when there is the control from the center.**

**Change in leadership in order to have leaders with greater capacity.**

**Serious production capacity deficits contributed to the continued crisis between 1998 and 2012. Thanks to trainings from a NGO, the women now feel that they have the necessary skills to generate benefits.**
### C.2.a.S.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Technical capacity deficit</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(R-FBO2-2)</td>
<td>Le problème, la majeure partie, aussi c’est les techniques. L’utilisation de semences. Le nivelage d’eau, l’utilisation de l’engrais. Le temps qu’il faut utiliser l’engrais…. Tout ca. C’est un grand facteur pour le rendement. […] Donc, les formations, c’est bons.</td>
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### C.2.a.S.6.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Importance of technical training for productivity</th>
</tr>
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### C.2.a.S.7.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Citation</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Increased human capital because of training as a basis for progress within FBO.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(R-FBO5-1)</td>
<td>Si vous regardez maintenant l’ensemble de cette image… Est-ce que vous trouvez que la FBO a fait du progrès ?</td>
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### C. – Crisis, 2. Personal Features, b. Accountability

- **C.2.b.1.** (R-UA-P) Non, non. (-14 :23). On commençait à gérer. Donc c’est maintenant que nous, on était intégré. On a vu que dans les gestions il y avait des problèmes. Parce que pendant la campagne, c’est les groupements qui donnent de l’argent à l’union pour réfectionner les aménagements et pour donner l’eau. L’eau, on paye ça chaque mois. Mais on a vu que l’union n’utilisait pas cet argent pour payer les factures d’électricité, ni les maintenances de la SAED, et elle a des problèmes de crédit. | Money intended for paying water bills is used for other purposes (union) |

- **C.2.b.2.** (Q) C’est quoi votre secret de succès ? (R-LUB-P) Le secret, c’est d’être démocratique, parler franchement avec les gens. Si moi, je commets des erreurs, on me corrige. Si d’autres aussi commettent des erreurs, on les corrige, ils acceptent. (Q) C’est déjà arrivé quelque chose comme ça ? (R-LUB-P) On discute franchement dans les réunions. (-25 :17). Il y a eu des moments où des gens ont détourné des productions. Mais on les a fait payer. Voilà la raison. Il faut se dire la vérité. | Importance of accountability and transparency. This local union has not had a crisis of accountability and emphasizes the importance of transparency and accountability. |

- **C.2.b.3.** (R-FBO4-2) C’est parce que, parce que, parce que, parce que…. Les dirigeants qui étaient là, il y en a eu parmi eux qui n’étaient pas du tout normales. Qui ne travaillent pas clairement. (Q) Ils contournait des choses… ? (R-FBO4-2) Oui, voilà. Et c’est pourquoi il y avait des gens qui disaient qu’il fallait enlever ces gens-là. (-28 :21). D’autres n’étaient pas d’accord. Voilà ce qui a poussé la section en deux parties. […] | Missing accountability led to a divide in the FBO |
### STRATEGIES

| 
| --- |
| **C.2.b.S.1.** (R-FBO2-2) Mais si on arrive à changer de dirigeant, peut être avec le renforcement de capacité si on applique, peut être qu’on va reprendre notre place. Et nous allons nous battre pour que [notre organisation] reprenne sa place. | Change in leadership is necessary in order to regain hope for the FBO. |
| **Q** Vous avez réalisé ce problème vous-mêmes ? | Joining centre de gestion for increasing accountability (after changed leadership). |
| **R-UA-P** Oui, on a vu ca parce qu’on vit ca ! On s’est mobilisé nous tous ! Vraiment tous – pour aller travailler avec le centre de gestion – pour avoir des situations claires. | |
| **Q** C’est comme au Kenya et au Zimbabwe ? | Complete change in leadership was not possible because there was so much support for the old president (two factions). Therefore, there was another period of a “coalition” and thus endured crisis until finally, the entire leadership was changed. |
| **(R-UA-P)** Il y a la SAED qui est venu faire l’arbitrage. Ils ont dit que comme il y a deux parties, il faut faire le consensus. Vous prenez des gens de l’autre partie, et vous les intégrez dans le bureau. C’est en ce temps-là qu’on m’a nommé vice-président. | |
| **Q** En 1998 ? | Importance of transparency and regular meetings for accountability and trust |
| **(R-UA-P)** Oui. | |
| **(R-UA-P)** On a pris un autre, on l’a nommé le secrétaire générale. On a pris quelqu’un dans l’ancien bureau pour être le comptable. On a pris dans le nouveau un autre qui était le trésorier. On a pris un ancien pour être le trésorier adjoint. | |
| **Q** On mélange l’opposition et le gouvernement. | |
| **(R-UA-P)** Voilà. On commence à gérer ensemble. | |
| **C.2.b.S.4.** Mon FBO n’a pas de problèmes mais la FBO4 a beaucoup de problèmes. | Accountability increases, especially due to young people coming in |
| **Q** Quels problèmes ? | |
| **(R-MbSa)** Il y a beaucoup des arriérés. Peut être des arriérés où on ne sait pas à qui les adresser. | |
| **Q** Des dettes ? | |
| **(R-MbSa)** Oui. | |
| **(R-MbSa)** Au niveau de la FBO4, tel n’est pas le cas. Parce que nous, on se réunit peut être plusieurs fois dans la campagne. Avant de faire l’expression de besoins à la banque, on fait la réunion. On fait une réunion de bureau et puis l’assemblée générale. Ensuite, quand on a un accord de crédit on va se réunir pour dire qu’on a le crédit. Et si on arrive à avoir un crédit c’est comme ca qu’on fait, on distribue ça devant tout le monde. Chacun prend ce qu’il doit. Et c’est en ce moment qu’on fait les exigibles. D’ailleurs, la section a adhéré au centre de gestion. |
(R-FBO4-2) Voilà. Surtout les membres les plus jeunes, ils ne dorment pas… Tout le temps, ils sont là à poser des questions… voilà pourquoi on ne peut pas travailler un travail qui n’est pas clair. (-35 :20)
(R-FBO4-2) Bon, des progrès, pas tellement. Vraiment. Peut être … Non.
(Q) C’est toujours la même chose ?
(R-FBO4-2) C’est toujours la même chose…. Peut être actuellement avec le nouveau président, ça va s’améliorer. A mon avis. J’espère beaucoup. (-54 :38)
(R-FBO4-2) Parce qu’avant, comme je disais, il n’y avait que des vieux, qui faisaient du n’importe quoi. Et qui imposaient… alors là ça ne va pas.
(R-FBO4-2) On travaille de façon claire et puis, démocratiquement, chacun donne son point de vue…. On discute et peut-être on trouvera un terrain commun. Que quelqu’un décide … « voilà ce qu’on va faire ! », et c’est tout. Ca va pas.

C.2.b.5.6. (R-FBO4-P) Maintenant, c’est à partir de ces 3 dernières années qu’on a commencé au niveau des GIEs et des sections d’avoir cette transparence-là. (1 :06 :04). (r) Adhérer au centre de gestion qui va te permettre de savoir ce que tu as dépensé, ce que tu as gagné réellement… Avant, ça ne se faisait pas.
(Q) Donc, si je viendrai dans dix, ça se peut je verrai ….

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote number</th>
<th>Quote (french)</th>
<th>Translation/interpretation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. – Crisis, 2. Capital Development, a. assessing investments into capitals/ assessing prospects and innovation potential</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| C.2.a.1. | (Q) OK. Est-ce qu’au niveau de la SV vous avez un compte où vous gardez un peu de bénéfices ?
(R-FBO4-P) Non, on mange tout simplement. Quand on a un bénéfice, on se le partage. (1 :01 :21)
(Q) Par rapport aux autres SVs, est-ce que c’est différent ?
(R-FBO4-P) (r) C’est la même chose. C’est là où le bras blesse. Ce sont ces bénéfices-là qui pourraient générer d’autres activités. Mais il y a ce manque de confiance-là. Pour certains. C’est pourquoi il faut re-crédibiliser les sections. Les gens se disent qu’il y a cette culture de [mange-mil]. C’est-à-dire, tout ce qu’on a, les leaders mangent ca. Donc il ne faut pas garder l’argent. Donc il y a cette culture là de ne jamais réaliser quelque chose ensemble parce que personne n’a confiance dans l’autre. Ca, c’est un aspect très très très important. | No trust in each other and in leaders which is why there is no investment into the FBO. |
| C.2.a.2. | (Q) Est-ce qu’il y a d’autres entités, sections villageoises qui ont un peu plus cet esprit d’entrepreneuriat ? (33 :26).
(R-FBO4-P) Non, il n’y en a pas. Tout ca, c’est pour mettre en valeur tout simplement le casier.
(Q) Donc s’il n’y avait pas ce casier, il n’y aurait pas de sections. Tout le monde se débrouillerait seul…
(R-FBO4-P) Oui. Parce que tu sais… (r) le problème, c’est que les sections villageoises ne sont pas sorties de la tête de ses membres ! C’est une entité qui a été | Lack of ownership triggers lack of innovation. Wish that there could be |
imposée. On avait crée les aménagements, et on a crée des SVs avec ces aménagements. L’adhésion n’est pas volontaire. C’est parce que nous irriguons d’un même périmètre hydraulique que nous sommes unis dans un groupement. (-34:16). Donc, c’est à partir de ca qu’on a crée des sections avec des objectifs bien définis : de mettre en valeur .... Mais c’est pas l’épanouissement de ... 

... 

(R-FBO4-P) (r) Bon, c’est une question très intéressante, parce que c’est une question que je me posais tout le temps : A quoi sert la section villageoise ? C’est pour mettre en valeur uniquement le casier, tout simplement. Mais, elle ne s’intéresse pas à la vie des ses membres, à l’épanouissement du membre. 

(Q) Ok. Et pourquoi vous vous posez cette question ? (-35:06)  

(R-FBO4-P) (r) Parce que j’ai fait le constat quand je suis venu ici. Parce que je vois que c’est la même chose qu’on fait depuis des années. Est-ce qu’on tient compte si le membre se développe ? S’il y a une augmentation du revenu ? Est-ce que ce qu’on lui a donné lui permet de s’épanouir ? Un gars qui a 1 ha ou 0,50 ha, même si le ha donne 100 sacs, ca a des limites. L’ha a sorti ce qu’il devait sortir. Mais est-ce que ca satisfait les problèmes de...... ? C’est ca l’épanouissement. C’est ce qui pose problème. 

... 

(Q) Donc, vous regrettez un peu le format ? Vous aimeriez que ca soit une vrai coopérative ? ..... Qui intègre les hors-casiers ? ..... Ou comment est-ce que ca pourrait marcher ? (-36:04)  

(R-FBO4-P) Oui. « Comment est-ce qu’on pourrait, en dehors de ce qui nous uni ici, éteindre les activités .... » 

(Q) Parce que vous aimez quand même le concept de travailler ensemble. Est-ce que je vous ai bien compris ?  

(R-FBO4-P) (r) Non, ça pose problème, bien sûr. Ce ne sont pas des gens qui se sont choisi. Ils se sont retrouvés hasardeusement. Qui n’ont pas le même niveau, la même vision, parfois ça pose problème. 

(R-FBO4-P) (r) Contrairement, par exemple, si on crée un GIE, on peut appeler certains avec qui on s’entend bien, avec qui on partage la même vision pour créer quelque chose, mais malheureusement tu te retrouves avec quelqu’un qui ne partage pas la même vision.... (-36:50)  

C.2.a.3. 

(Q) Donc, si je viendrai dans dix ans, ca se peut je verrai .... 

(R-FBO4-P) Mmmh, je te dis de venir dans 3 ou 4 ans. Ca va être autre chose. Différent, très différent. 

(Q) Est-ce que ca sera surtout dans le grand casier ou hors-casier d’après vous ? 

(R-FBO4-P) Hors-casier, je crois. 

(Q) Le développement se passera dans le hors casier ? 

(R-FBO4-P) Oui. Parce que ... 

(Q) Ce sont les privés. Ce n’est pas le mouvement associatif ? 

(R-FBO4-P) L’avenir appartient aux privés. Le mouvement associatif ne pourra jamais... (1:06:46)  

Parce que, si tu regardes bien, même les aménagements, les derniers aménagements, les plus petites superficie, c’est 5 ha. 

... 

C.2.a.4. 

(Q) (r) Est-ce qu’il y a aussi des initiatives pour s’organiser dans le hors-casier ? Je veux dire, plusieurs personnes, et pas seulement pour les GIes familiales. 

(R-FBO4-P) Ah, bien sûr, il y a eu des [auto/ autres] organisations. 

(R-FBO4-P) (r) Il y a l’union des groupements d’intérêts économiques du Delta qui regroupe presque 7 zones allant de St.Louis jusqu’à Richard Toll. C’est d’ailleurs l’aménagement qu’on fait actuellement , au niveau de la zone des trois [Pères D ??]. Partenariat Privé Rizicole quoi. C’est les [trois PRD]. Mais justement, ce ne sont pas seulement des GIes familiales quoi. (-1:07:50)  

(Q) Et, qu’est-ce qu’ils font ensemble ? Qu’est-ce que c’est leur but de se mettre ensemble ?  

(R-FBO4-P) Le but de se mettre ensemble, c’était pour avoir la terre, d’abord. Ils ont eu 7000 ha. 

more collective action

Growth is going to happen outside the GA

Initiatives for collective action outside GA
**TOUS ENSEMBLE ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production**

Laura Schüppler

### C.2.a.5.  

| (R-FBOS-P) Vraiment, la vie quand même, c’est l’union qui fait la force... Sinon, personne ne peut aller sans l’autre. | Collective action important as a solidarity system.  
Strong identification |
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Q) Pourquoi c’est la bonne façon ? (1 :07 :38)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(R-FBOS-P) Parce qu’on est organisé. Chacun a son rôle à faire. Il faut faire ce que tu as à faire, l’autre fait ce qu’il a à faire. En ce moment, on aura un grand ensemble. Tout va marcher. Le premier pose le premier pied. Le deuxième pose le deuxième pied. Et le troisième pose le troisième pied. Petit à petit on va grimper pour aller à un niveau très élevé.</td>
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</table>

### C.2.a.6.  

| Mais tout récemment, en 2010, on a crée une coopérative de commercialisation de riz de paddy du département de Dagana. (-11 :49). Les problèmes qu’on avait, avec les contre-saisons, avec la pluie, tout ça que ca comportait - avec le paddy qui ne se vendait pas. On a jugé nécessaire en décembre 2009, on a fait des diagnostiques au niveau de la chambre de commerce, avec l’appui d’Asprodeb et PCE (Programme de Croissance Économique, USAid) – avec tous les acteurs de la vallée, de St.Louis jusqu’à Baké (?). On a fait trois jours en séminaires, en évaluant. On était d’accord de créer des coopératives. C’est en ce moment, que l’Asprodeb a pris son baton [de ... ?] est allé à l’extérieur chercher un financement pour monter les coopératives. Il y a eu trois coopératives de commercialisation de riz paddy. (-12 :39), celles de Dagana, Podor et Matam. Donc, on l’a crée en 2010. Mais ces coopératives, malheureusement, étaient constituées juridiquement, ont ouvert leurs comptes, mais par manque de moyens de garantie au niveau du crédit agricole, le problème a pu [détériorer] pour le fonctionnement de la commercialisation (-13 :02). | New initiative of marketing cooperative but there are difficulties of financing these activities, no support from CNCAS. |
| (R-LUB-P) Heureusement, il y a des gens comme Vital - des gros commerçants – qui sont venus s’installer. C’est avec ces commerçants là que le riz de la contre saison reste dans le magasin jusqu’à aujourd’hui. (-13 :21). |  |
| (Q) L’initiative des coopératives de commercialisation, vous faisiez partie ?  
(R-LUB-P)Oui ! L’union locale est membre. Et moi, mon GIE privé est membre. Et je suis le président de cette coopérative aussi [il rigole]. (-13 :49). |  |
| (Q) Donc, quel était le problème avec la coopérative ?  
(R-LUB-P) Le problème, c’est d’avoir de l’argent pour la commercialisation. La coopérative devait avoir beaucoup d’argent pour pouvoir récolter auprès du producteur. Si le producteur fait sa récolte, il fait son battage, on lui donne son argent. Là, il s’est [désintéressé de la production]. Il va aller produire. Voilà pourquoi on a crée les coopératives. (-14 :18). |  |
| (R-LUB-P) Malheureusement, pour le riz, il faut avoir beaucoup d’argent. Il faut avoir des garanties solides. Par contre, les GIEs, on n’a que les garanties [conscience solidaire]. Mais avec la coopérative, la CNCAS a dit qu’il ne faut pas financer deux opérations pour un seul produit. C'est la CNCAS qui finance la production, mais la commercialisation, elle ne peut pas la financer. Ça va être très lourd pour elle. Donc on a eu quelques problèmes sur ça. (R-LUB-P) Et au niveau national on a crée une société de promotion de la commercialisation du riz Sénégalais. Aujourd’hui, cette société est en train de faire son assemblée générale. (-15 :03). Et la coopérative est membre. Elle a pris des parties ...[?] |  |
| (Q) C’est la société dans laquelle les importateurs sont aussi membres ?  
(R-LUB-P) Oui, ce sont eux qui sont les gros [bonets] de cette société. D’ailleurs, ils voulaient nous faire écarter [éclater ?]. Malheureusement, on y tient quand même. |  |
## C. – Crisis, 3. External Triggers, a. External Overall Trends

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<tr>
<th>Quote number</th>
<th>Quote (french)</th>
<th>Translation/ interpretation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.3.a.1.</td>
<td>On a eu des problèmes. L’état a fait le désengagement de la commercialisation en 1993/1994. On a donc eu des problèmes avec la commercialisation. Avant, l’état achetait directement les sacs. Les frais des camions, tout ca, c’était un problème. C’est pourquoi, on s’est retrouvé avec un succès de 80% (c’est-à-dire qu’on a remboursé que 80% du crédit). (R-FBO2-P)</td>
<td>Liberalisation of commercialisation as problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.3.a.2.</td>
<td>(Q) Vous avez eu des partenaires qui achetaient ou bien? (- 22 :00) (Wolof 22 :00 - 22 :25) Oui, on a eu un mauritanien qui a acheté du riz à un bon prix. 14,000 ou 13,500 pour le sac de paddy. Il était venu au village et il a acheté ici. Il est venu avec sa voiture jusqu’au magasin. Donc pendant cette année, on a travaillé sur deux casiers, il y avait plus de superficie. L’union a ajouté au casier de 184 ha le deuxième casier de 150 ha. (R-FBO2-P)</td>
<td>Market development, extension of land as positive external factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.3.a.4.</td>
<td>(R-UA-P) Donc, pendant la contre saison, ca va on peut payer les deux dettes. Mais pendant l’hivernale, toujours il y a des baisses de rendements.</td>
<td>Reduced yields during rainy season in recent years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.3.a.5.</td>
<td>(Q) Pourquoi est-ce qu’il y avait cette baisse ? (R-UA-P) Ah, bon. On ne sait pas. Il y a les techniciens qui disent que c’est les intrants. D’autres qui disent que c’est le climat. D’autres disent l’eau ou la façon culturale. (Q) Donc on ne sait pas ? (R-UA-P) On ne sait pas. Mais avant, c’était l’hivernale qui faisait plus de rendements. Il y avait des années où on ne faisait même pas la contre-saison. On la faisait peut être. (-40 :16). Maintenant, on a plus de rendements pendant la contre saison. (Q) C’est la même chose pour les autres unions ? (R-UA-P) Oui, nous avons le même climat !</td>
<td>Increasingly problems with productivity without being sure about the reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.3.a.6.</td>
<td>(R-FBO4-P) Et un autre facteur favorable, c’était aussi le fait que le prix du riz augmentait à l’époque sur le marché mondial. Donc, en ce moment, il était beaucoup plus opportun de rembourser en ce moment. [...] (R-FBO4-P) Parce que les gens avaient encore plus envie de cultiver, donc ça signifie que c’était plus encore... (Q) Pourquoi avaient ils les gens plus envie ? Parce que le prix était meilleur ? (R-FBO4-P) Oui, le prix est meilleur. Un prix beaucoup plus incitatif maintenant. (Q) Donc combien de pourcents ? (R-FBO4-P) 95%. Parce que les décisions étaient prises très vite parce que les gens veulent exploiter quoi. Ce qui a, d’ailleurs, faciliter la réconciliation de la section.</td>
<td>Price advantages have contributed to FBO crisis resolution due to better incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.3.a.7.</td>
<td>A partir de 1996, le prix de 8500, ça a toujours augmenté. D’accord. (8 :38) Donc, en fait [la situation s’est améliorée entre 1996 et 2013 puisque le prix a augmenté] ? (R-FB05-P) (…) Mais pour le remboursement de la section... Mais attention ! Le riz a monté mais le prix des intrants aussi a augmenté. C’est trop monté. Avant, le sac d’engrais il coûtait 4000. Aujourd’hui, c’est 7500, ou parfois 9,500 ou 10,000. Donc si les intrants montent [...] que le riz monte. Donc il n’y a pas vraiment... Il y a un petit changement, mais vraiment.... Parce que maintenant il y a plus de gens qui aiment le riz de la vallée qu’avant. (-9 :31).</td>
<td>Inflation compromises price gains. Profitability has only increased to a small degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.3.a.8.</td>
<td>(R-UA-P) Non, parce que ce n’est pas nous qui discutons le prix. C’est avec l’état. Parce que chaque campagne, on fait un forum à Ndiaye.</td>
<td>Price setting, fluctuations</td>
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</table>
TOUS ENSEMBLE ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production

Laura Schüppler

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote number</th>
<th>Quote (french)</th>
<th>Translation/ interpretation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.3.a.9.</td>
<td>(Q) Donc, pour 1991 et 1992, on donne combien de pourcentage de santé pour la production de riz? (-14 :33) (A, (B ou C) poulard, wolof – 15 :08) (Q) 75 ? Parce qu’il y avait une bonne production ? (R-FBO3-4) Oui, mais mauvais prix. (Q) Donc, il y avait la production, mais le prix n’était pas bon ? (R-FBO3-4) Oui, mauvais prix.</td>
<td>Bad price as a factor for unsuccessful year</td>
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<tr>
<th>C. – Crisis, 3. External Triggers, b. Specific External Shocks</th>
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<tr>
<td>C.3.b.1.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(R-FBO2-P)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.3.b.2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(QM) : Ok. Et vous avez dit que la FPA et Bey Dundé, les semences sont venus tardivement en 2012 ? (R-FBO2-2) Les semences n’étaient pas bons. (QM) : C’était quelle variété ? C’était le NERICA. (QM) : Ils vous on proposé le NERICA ? Non, il n’y a personne qui nous a proposé. [Ils sont venus avec qu’une variété].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**C.3.b.3.**

(Q) Qu’est-ce que vous pensez de cette variété ?

(R-FBO1-1) Bon, c’est Nerica qui nous a donné beaucoup de catastrophique quoi. (-1:06:12). Il y a bcp de problèmes de germination. Ça ne germe pas bien. Il y a bcp de problèmes dans ca. Il y a du Nerica qui est un peu bon, mais d’autre qui ne germe pas bien.

**Introduction of new variety NERICA as a reason for crisis**

**C.3.b.4.**

(Q) Et est-ce que vous avez essayé… Est-ce qu’il y a un moyen pour reclamer à l’état que c’était leur responsabilité ?

Oui. Nous nous sommes organisé avec des [manifestations]. Tu prends des journalistes, la télévision, tu parles partout…. Mais le gouvernement ne répond pas. Même les débuté qui était ici… Avec les journalistes qui ont filmé. Tu as envoyé partout, même l’Europe. Mais vraiment, le gouvernement ne réagit pas.

**Government is not accountable to pay loss that it had caused.**

**C.3.b.5.**

(R-FBO1-1) Bon…. […] Tous les champs étaient inondés.

(Q) Tous les GIEs ?

(R-FBO1-1) Oui.

(Q) C’était la faute de qui ?

(R-FBO1-1) C’était la faute de la SAED. On avait fait une lettre pour amener ça à la SAED. On a fait venir un enquêteur pour qu’il puisse voir ca. ….Mais…. jusqu’à présent on a des difficultés à cause des inondations. Parce que le crédit qu’on a pris en 2011, jusqu’à présent c’est le crédit qui joue dans notre moratoire. (-48 :00).

**Government is not accountable to pay loss that was caused by it. Collective debt**
13. **Appendix – Quotes from Transcripts – 3. Recognition and Introspection (Quotes R)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote number</th>
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<th>Translation/interpretation</th>
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<tr>
<td>R.1.a</td>
<td>(Q) Donc, c’était pendant combien de campagnes que vous n’avez pas eu de crédit? (R-FBO1-P) Deux campagnes. (Q) Donc, pendant une année à peu près on n’a pas pu régler ce problème ? (R-FBO1-P) Oui. (Q) Donc, comment vous avez fait pour manger ? (-20:05) (R-FBO1-P) Aller [aux autres villages]. (Q) Vous avez travaillé autre part ? (R-FBO1-P) Oui. (Q) Les sols se sont reposés ? (R-FBO1-P) Oui [il rigole]. (Q) Vous n’avez pas essayé d’avoir des crédits aux mutuelles... ? (R-FBO1-P) Non, non. (-20 :32)</td>
<td>Letting the FBO sleep while members are cultivating elsewhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.1.b</td>
<td>(Q) Et la dernière réunion s’est passée comment ? (R-FBO2-2) Il n’y avait pas beaucoup de personnes. Seulement cinq personnes. Le président, le trésorier, le chargé de la distribution des intrants, moi la comptable et un membre. Bon, lorsque j’ai vu quelques autres membres du groupement, ils n’étaient pas au courant de cette réunion. (Q) Ah bon ? (R-FBO2-2) Il y avait d’autres qui étaient partis ne voyage et d’autres qui ne s’étaient pas renseignés. (-53 :36). Le président nous a laissé savoir que la CNCAS nous demande 70%. Et puis on se parlait, on disait comment on va faire pour boucler ce trou ? On n’est pas revenu sur place pour voir on a fait ceci ou cela ou comment faire... C’est pendant la réunion du CA – du Conseil d’Administration qu’on nous a fait savoir que nous, on ne va partir en campagne, mais qu’il y aura deux groupements qui vont partir.</td>
<td>Inactiveness during crisis, little interest from members to get informed about meetings. Low incentives for solving crisis?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.1.c</td>
<td>(Q) Donc, de 1998 à 2003, c’est combien de pourcentage ? La personne était complètement malade. (Q) Donc, 0%? (R-UA-P) Oui. Parce qu’on a seulement trouvé du crédit à rembourser. C’est comme ca : Tu arrives à la tête d’une organisation et tous les années que tu travailles tu ne fais que payer des dettes. (-17 :29). Tu n’as rien à garder, rien dans la caisse. Tu ce qui rentre, après les factures de la Sénélec, tu payes ca pour les dettes. Donc, la personne est malade. Il faut la soigner. (Q) Est-ce que les GIÉs produisaient pendant cette période là ? (R-UA-P) Ils sont restés je crois deux saisons sans aller en campagne parce qu’ils étaient endettés. [...] (R-UA-P) C’est comme ca. Mais nous aussi quand on est venu en 2003, nous aussi on était malade. (-19 :33). Notre maladie, c’était comment payer les...</td>
<td>Description of hard situation for new leader to realise how bad the situation actually is. Years of just paying back the debts. Author’s note: sounds like a personal sacrifice.</td>
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</table>
**Tous Ensemble ? – Collective Action for Smallholder Production**
Laura Schüppler

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>endettements.</th>
<th>(Q) Il y avait combien de dettes ?</th>
<th>(R-UA-P) On a trouvé 37 millions à la CNCAS. A la Sénélec, on a trouvé 17 millions. Au niveau de la [Damset] qui fait les entretiens on a trouvé 4 millions. Donc, c’était beaucoup.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.1.d.</td>
<td>(Q) Ok. Et comment avez pu rejoindre les forces ensemble ? (-10 :05).</td>
<td>Comparison with others as a motivation to exit crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(R-FB04-P) On a vu que les conflits n’étaient pas vraiment objectifs. C’étaient des problèmes de personnes. On avait élu un président que d’autres ne voulaient pas. C’étaient des problèmes de famille parce que les deux étaient de la même famille. Ce n’étaient pas des problèmes objectifs. Ni des problèmes de gestion, ni de fonctionnement etc.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(R-FB04-P) Les gens ont vraiment vu la nécessité... D’abord, on avait pris le crédit ensemble. La banque avait dit que « même si vous voulez vous séparer il faut que vous remboursiez entièrement le crédit. » (-11 :25)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(R-FB04-P) Deuxièmement, bon, ..., ce qui nous a, ..., bon, on en a conclu qu’on ne peut pas nous séparer.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(R-FB04-P) (r) De deux, on a vu aussi – par rapport aux autres section on était les moins endettés. Donc, ce n’était que les problèmes intérieurs. On devrait être les premiers à retourner à la banque. Donc, quand les sections retournaient, on devait aussi retourner parce qu’on était les moins endettés.</td>
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<tr>
<td>R.1.e.</td>
<td>(Q) Moi, ce que je me suis demandé : Parce que de 2006 à 2008, il y a l’action individuelle - Qui a pris l’initiative en 2008 d’aller chercher le privé ? (R-FB04-P) Voilà, voilà. En général, c’est la direction qui réfléchit quoi ! Je crois, qu’en 2006/ 2008, c’était lui [B], moi, un autre, c’est-à-dire on était en train de réfléchir. On a fait le constat : Ca faisait longtemps que depuis chaque campagne on avait dit aux gens qu’il fallait amener quelque chose pour rembourser à la banque. Mais sans résultat.</td>
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<td>(Q) Ils ne le faisaient pas. (-38 :06)</td>
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<td>(R-FB04-P) Donc, quand on a causé on a dit que le mal est plus profond que ça, parce que les gens n’ont pas d’argent. Quand tu n’as pas d’argent, tu n’as pas les moyens d’acheter les intrants. Quand tu veux avoir quelque chose, il faut bien investir. Donc, on a dit que pour qu’on puisse imposer aux gens d’amener quelque chose, il faut qu’on facilite le fait qu’ils aient accès aux intrants. Donc, en ce moment, on s’est dit qu’il y a d’autres qu’on peut aller voir et qui vont nous donner les intrants.</td>
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<td>(R-FB04-P) Donc, c’est notre section qui avait pris l’initiative, après il y a d’autres sections qui nous ont suivi.</td>
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|               | (R-FB04-P) Donc, nous, on était les premiers avec lui. 
[...] |
|               | (R-FB04-P) Mais, quand on est parti le voir, on a aussi posé une condition aux gens : Si on amène le crédit, il faut (1) rembourser le crédit intégralement bord champs, et (2) accepter d’amener quelque chose à la CNCAS. |
|               | (Q) C’était la condition pour les membres ? (-40 :11) |
|               | [...] (R-FB04-P) (r) Et bord-champs aussi quoi. Ca veut dire qu’on ne laissait plus amener le gars sa production... Parce qu’avant, on te disait « Tu dois rembourser tant », tu récolte, tu l’amène. Maintenant, on a constitué des commissions, qui viennent à la récolte prendre le remboursement de la CNCAS, et le remboursement d’Iba Salle. Après, ils te laissent avec le reste de ta production. (-41 :05) |
|               | [...] |
|               | (R-FB04-P) Parce qu’on s’était dit que tant que les gens n’ont pas de crédit, les champs n’auront pas de rendements. Donc, quand il n’y a pas de rendements, tu ne peux pas exiger à quelqu’un de payer un moratoire. Donc, [de notre propre initiative] sans que la banque nous le dise, nous, on prenaient à chaque campagne [...] 20,000 franc par ha en contre-saison – en saison normale et 10,000 francs [...]. |

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<td>S.1.a</td>
<td>(R-UA-P) Mais on a négocié avec la Sénélec. Ils ont dit que sur les 17 millions il faut qu'on ne donne que 9 millions. [-20:11]. Le reste il nous on fait ça en moratoire. Chaque fin de mois, on paye les moratoires. Et pour les groupements, la CNCAS nous a fait des moratoires aussi. C'étaient des moratoires de 5 ou 4 ans selon les groupements. Après les groupements ont recommencé pour aller en campagne. (…) (R-UA-P) Maintenant, aujourd'hui, l'union n'a plus de dettes. Maintenant, la CNCAS nous fait confiance et elle nous a donné un crédit pour un tracteur cette année-ci. (-21:19). Elle nous a fait des crédits de semences - on fait la multiplication de semences. Elle a commencé à avoir confiance à la gestion.</td>
<td>Overcoming crisis needs major efforts to pay debts, parts of the debts were cut by the electricity company. External partners have now regained trust into the union. The credit for a tractor is an indicator for this trust.</td>
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<td>S.1.b</td>
<td>(Q) Ok, mais c’est le succès de toute la section ? (R-FBO4-2) Oui, on peut dire ca. Parce que si tout le monde n'avait pas accepté de faire un effort, jusqu'à présent, on restera là où on était. (-38:46). Mais quand on a parlé à tout le monde, tout le monde finalement a su que c'est un chemin qu'il faut faire… (R-FBO4-2) Voilà, de communication et de confiance entre vous… (Q) Et le fait que vous avez élu un nouveau président a aussi contribué ? (39:19) (R-FBO4-2) Oui, oui. Ca a beaucoup contribué. Parce qu'on sait que tout le monde a confiance en lui. (Q) Donc, en 2013, il y a un comble de pourcent de santé ? (R-FBO4-2) Ben, nous ne sommes qu'au début. Mais j‘espère qu'à la fin, la santé sera à 100%.</td>
<td>Everybody made an effort for overcoming crisis. New president also played an important role because members can trust him now (as opposed to the ine before).</td>
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<td>S.1.c</td>
<td>(R-FBO1-P) On avait 100 et quelques personnes. C’est difficile de gérer 100 et quelques personnes. On a des familles. Après, l’assemblée générale a dit qu’on va séparer le GIEs en deux GIEs. <a href="Q">…</a> Ok. Donc, le problème que le GIE était trop grand pour être bien géré vous avez réalisé ca quand ? Déjà en 2004 ou plus tard ? (R-FBO1-P) Parce que la CNCAS donnait 25 millions chaque campagne [pour l’organisation entière quand on n’était pas encore séparé]. Avec 25 millions de crédit par année, même s’il y a un petit problème, le problème va devenir grand ! C’est toute suite un problème de 7 millions ou de 10 millions ! Mais si on est petit, on a un financement de 9 millions. [Si on rembourse, ca reste peut être 1 million et demie qu’on ne rembourse pas]. 44 personnes, c’est plus facile que 80 ou 90 personnes. […] Il faut faire l’assemblée générale. Chaque personne dit si elle veut aller là bas ou là bas. Vous choisissez le président : Il y en a un là et un là […] (-30:23). Chaque membre choisit. Il n’y a aucun problème. C’est comme ça qu’on a fait. Le GIE, c’est un GIE familiale.</td>
<td>Management difficulties due to size of FBO, division into smaller entities was a good means to address this issue.</td>
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<td>S.Ex.a</td>
<td>(Q) Donc, comment ca s’est passé après ? (R-FBO1-P) En 2007, le chef du village a appelé tous les membres de l’union. D’abord, il a parlé aux GIEs. Les GIEs ont dit qu’ils attendent le renouvellement de l’union. Le chef du village appelle l’union. Comme il y a deux camps dans l’union – un qui est pour l’union et un qui est contre l’union – il met des deux camps en place. « Qu’est qu’on fait pour résoudre le problème? » (-21 :45). - L’ancien président prend son poste. Le deuxième camp, qui est contre l’union, prend le trésorier général qui s’occupe de l’argent. (Q) Donc, c’est le chef du village qui a proposé cette solution ? (R-FBO1-P) C’est ca. On a réglé ca. On a continué. Mais il y a toujours le camp dans l’union qui veut que le président sorte. Donc, ils sont allés deux campagnes comme ca : 2007 et 2008. Après ça redevient difficile comme avant. (-23 :16). (Q) Donc, on a fait deux années avec cette nouvelle équipe mélangée ? (R-FBO1-P) Oui. (Q) Après, les mêmes problèmes ont recommencé ? (R-FBO1-P) Les mêmes problèmes ! Parce que c’est le président qui dirige ! Ce n’est pas le trésorier qui dirige ! Si le président n’est pas bon il n’y a aucune équipe qui peut résoudre ca ! C’est le président qui est un grand problème ! [...] (Q) Même ceux qui l’ont soutenu avant, ils ne le veulent plus maintenant ? (R-FBO1-P) Oui. (-24 :02) Donc on a fait deux campagnes... Il y avait des problèmes. Des problèmes. [Donc, les présidents des GIEs ont dit qu’il faut qu’on fasse le renouvellement.] Donc la SAED a dit « Dès que la campagne se termine, on fait le renouvellement. 2009. ’(-24 :33). (Q) Donc, c’est la SAED qui a dit ça ? (R-FBO1-P) « Quand la campagne se fini il faut prendre une décision pour changer l’union ! »</td>
<td>Important role of SAED in facilitating change of leadership (taking one side from the factions)</td>
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