Egypt:

Military vs. Revolutionary

Why Structures are Stronger than Individuals

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The aim of this thesis has been to provide explanations on why Egypt’s democratization process has failed. The central question has thus been: Why has the democratic transition failed in Egypt after a popular revolution and democratic elections secured the country’s first ever civilian government in the summer of 2012? By using the relevant theories on transitology we have sought to answer our question by analyzing the actions of the main political actors in Egypt. With focus on mainly the events after the Egyptian revolution, we have used various sources made up of personal interviews, scientific articles and recent news reports.

Our findings show that two main political actors, the Muslim Brotherhood and the military, to this day act under authoritarian tactics. Thus, Egypt has only succeeded in taking a shape of an “authoritarian-democratic hybrid” regime where political elites manipulate democratic institutions to serve their own self-interests. Until the authoritarian core of Egypt is crushed, democracy cannot and will not prevail.

*Keywords:* Egypt, democratization, transitology, Muslim Brotherhood, SCAF, military coup, revolution.
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1 Introduction

It is widely believed that democracy is the “least bad” form of government. It is the only form of government which has been able to achieve close to complete equality, welfare and freedom. The authors of this paper believe that democracy is the best system in which resources are equally distributed to a population. We therefore also believe that in countries that lack democratic features, democratization is a necessary process to achieve the goal of a functioning democracy. After this “goal” is reached, a country should continue striving for better and more equal freedoms and general welfare, and the means to do so will be in place much more than in a non-democracy.

Egypt is considered a non-democracy, and after centuries of foreign rule, it succumbed to a modern military-state established in the 1952 military coup by the Egyptian officer Gamal Abdel Nasser (Rogan, 2009, p.284). In 2011, the country experienced a popular revolution which toppled ex-President Hosni Mubarak. This revolution called for an end to corruption, police brutality, freedom of expression, and greater equality and resource distribution. It had no clear leader or ideology; it simply demanded basic human rights (Ahram Online, 2013b). Since then, five nation-wide elections have taken place, two governments have been ousted, and one military coup has brought the entire process full circle; back to the authoritarian, military rule that sparked the revolutionary reaction in the first place (Brown, 2013, p.46). The authors of this paper believe that Egypt’s democratic process has been abruptly hindered by a military structure bent on preserving themselves. Egypt’s democratic transition has not failed permanently, but for now, any hope of a democratic consolidation between the terrorist-labeled Muslim Brotherhood (BBC, 2013a) and the military, will be close to impossible in the near future. For this reason, we consider the process as “temporarily” failed. Therefore, the difficult, but equally interesting question we ask ourselves in this essay is:

Why has the democratic transition failed in Egypt after a popular revolution and democratic elections secured the country’s first ever civilian government in the summer of 2012?

Egypt is undergoing a phase of democratization and therefore the relevant theories for our analysis are those provided in the field of democratization. In this field of study we found the theories on transitology especially interesting and relevant. These theories focus mainly on political actors in the process of democratization and are further explained in the third chapter. Our methodological approach is defined in the forthcoming section and the fourth chapter is dedicated to the historical background of Egypt. The analysis, that provides an answer to our question, is presented in the fifth chapter and followed up by our conclusions in the sixth and final chapter.
2 Methodology

We have made several choices in order to define our methodological approach. The main purpose of the paper is to explain what led to Egypt’s “failed” democratization and therefore we chose to apply a theory-consuming qualitative case study. In the following sections lies explanations to the case-study approach, and a more substantial explanation of our methodological framework.

2.1 Empirical case study

There are different types of empirical studies; one with the ambition to explain the chosen outcomes of a case, and the other with the ambition to describe the outcomes of a case. In our research, we have used the empirical case study method to explain the outcomes with the help of given theories, in our case the transitology theories (Esaiasson et.al., 2012, p.89-90). By combining historical and contemporary research with a relevant theory, the case study has proven to be a good analyzing tool that increases the understandings of a certain case (Teorell and Svensson, 2007, p.236). By implementing this method, our intentions are not to draw conclusions on the development in other Arab countries in general, but instead focus on Egypt and investigate whether the chosen theories apply to our specific case. In this aspect, we hope to achieve a great amount of internal validity (Esaiasson et.al., 2012, p.89-90).

2.2 Material

The material we have used consists of both primary and secondary sources. Our primary sources are made up of several interviews with people that, in different ways, are connected to the Egyptian democratization process (see Appendix 1). By applying this method, we have a greater capability to provide unexpected and widely explanatory answers (Esaiasson et.al., 2012, p.251). Also, it is of great importance that the people interviewed hold great centrality because they are expected to possess specific knowledge that is important to explain a certain event or concept (ibid. 2012, p.262). The people we have interviewed represent different actors of the democratization process and have a profession that allows them to be considered as experts in their fields. Due to these facts, these interviews have indeed contributed in widening our knowledge of the situation in Egypt (for more information on the interviews, check Appendix 1 and 2).
Furthermore, we have used a great deal of secondary sources such as books, scientific articles and news stories that are related to Egypt’s democratization and to the transitology theories. In our theory section we have mainly practiced O’Donnell and Schmitter’s book *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* and Stepan and Linz article *Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’*. During our analysis, we have looked for recent research articles such as Brown’s *Egypt’s Failed Transition*; Taher’s *The New Egyptian Constitution: An Outcome of a Complex Political Process*; Said’s *The Paradox of Transition to ‘Democracy’ under Military Rule* and many more. For the historical context we have chosen the critically acclaimed book *The Arabs* by the director of the Middle East Center at Oxford University, Eugene Rogan. We also find it of great importance to be up-to-date with the democratization process which resulted in the usage of a variety of sources found in reliable newspapers such as: the BBC, Al Jazeera, The Guardian etc. The Egyptian democratization process is still ongoing and thus these news articles have provided information on the development in the country according as it happened.
3 Theoretical framework

In order to explain and analyze democratization in Egypt, we have primarily used theories about transitology first developed by Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Stepan and Linz, 1978), and further developed by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Since O'Donnell and Schmitter’s definitions of central concepts such as liberalization and transition have come to be standard definitions in transitology theory, it is these we have used during our research (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.103). Furthermore, Stepan and Linz have recently developed additional theories to include cases of the “Arab Spring” in *Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’*, which have proven useful to us (Stepan and Linz, 2013).

3.1 Transitology

The modern transitology theories emerged in the context of the third democratic wave during the 1980’s. As the theories grew; they put an emphasis on different actors’ strategies and choices in changing political processes. By focusing on political conditions, transitology explained democratization in a purely political context. Therefore, democratization came to be seen as a political process, where democratic development went through analytically distinct phases of transition and consolidation (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.101). The most powerful thought within transitology is that the transition itself, explains why some states reach democracy while others fail to do so (Karvonen, 1996, p.75).

3.1.1 O’Donnell and Schmitter on transitology

The transition, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, represents the interval between one political regime to another. During the transition the political game-rules are not defined, and the included actors struggle to satisfy their self-interests and the interests of those they are trying to represent. The authors argue that during these transitions, the framework tends to be in the hands of authoritarian rulers. These rulers tend to retain power which in a stable democracy would be protected by the constitution and various other institutions (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.6)
In order to reach democracy, O’Donnell and Schmitter claim that liberalization is the starting process when certain rights are created to protect both individuals and social groups from illegal acts committed primarily by the state. These rights include: guarantee of private home and correspondence; the right to be defended in trial according to preestablished laws; freedom of movement, speech and petition etc. On a collective level they include freedom from punishment for expressions against the government, freedom from censorship of means of communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens. If these “liberal” rights are not overtly threatening to the government, they eventually become institutionalized and form a relation between liberalization and democratization (ibid. 1986, p.7).

When these rights are truly respected, the liberalization process is complete and the democratization process kicks in. This process holds citizenship as the guiding principle, a principle that involves the right to be treated equally by fellow humans, while at the same time respect is paid to the outcome of collective choices. The obligation of those implementing such choices should be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the polity. Citizenship stands, in other words, for a mutual respect between the rulers and the ruled. To embody the citizenship principle there are multiple approaches but no single set of specific institutions or rules that by themselves define democracy and embrace citizenship. On the other hand, O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that there are necessary elements to reach minimal political democracy and these are: secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability (ibid. 1986, p.7-8). Democratization is therefore seen as an extension of liberalization and includes the political sphere (Karvonen, 1996, p.76-77).

It is also important to note that democratization and liberalization do not always go hand in hand. Authoritarian rulers may promote liberalization because of the belief that by opening up limited spaces for individual and group action, they can relieve pressures and obtain needed information and support without jeopardizing the structure of authority. Liberalization and democratization are thus not synonymous, and a democracy cannot prevail if the principle of citizenship is not respected (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.8-9).

3.1.2 Importance and the framework of the political elites

In The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, a project led by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, the authors came to the conclusion that a lack of efficiency together with popular disapproval could result in a rise of the anti-democratic opposition. In a situation like that, the democratic forces’ strategies have a resolving role. The most efficient way to avoid a failed democratization is therefore to strengthen the executive powers, and show a united front against the anti-democratic forces. The main conclusion of the project is that the actions of political elites determine if democracy succeeds or fails (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.101-103).
These elites, that could be referred to as the democratic architects, need to deal with five conditions during the transition process, according to a German scientist Manfred Schmidt. Firstly, the elites should create new game-rules; work as contact ties between opposing groups; form new institutions and take care of economic issues. Second, they need to bear in mind how to handle the representatives of the former government. The third issue deals with the problematic fact that transition processes often go hand in hand with greater economic crises while there often occurs an increased demand for better living standards from the population. The fourth issue is that the political instability creates cautiousness when it comes to economic activity and investments, which in turn creates even wider cleavages between economic expectations and economic realities. Finally, Schmidt argues, religious and national conflicts are often activated in relation to transition processes (Karvonen, 1996, p.76-78). Schmidt’s theories derive, one could argue, from O’Donnell and Schmitter’s where they consider that the political development during the transition period is characterized by uncertainty because the political game-rules are not yet defined. Therefore transitology deals, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, above all with what game-rules should be applied. In other words, transitology deals with the question of how political institutions should be designed and which actors should get access to them (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.103-104).

Another theory developed by O’Donnell and Schmitter, concerns the relationship between the non-democratic government and the growing democratic opposition that provides a solution to the issues presented above. They argue that the transition represents a negotiation, or settlement, between the weakened regime and the growing pro-democratic forces (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.105). These kinds of negotiations are included in the concept of “pacts”, defined as: “an explicit agreement among a select set of actors which seek to define rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those entering into it.” The pacts are often seen as temporary solutions in order to avoid worrying outcomes, but could lead the way to a more permanent agreement for resolution of the conflict (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.37).

3.2 Transitology and the “Arab Spring”

In an article Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz have furthered their democratization theories to include the special cases of the Arab countries. They included new perspectives needed to shed light on the events during the “Arab spring”, and these have proven relevant to our case study by providing an important analyzing tool. The most important one concerns a hybrid form of regime that resembles O’Donnell and Schmitter’s theory on regimes that have endorsed a limited liberalization process but not necessarily the democratization process (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.15).
3.2.1 Authoritarian-democratic hybrids

Often when a country lacks good structural prerequisites for democracy, which results in a bad transition. Therefore, it is of great importance to study what characteristics the regime used to have before it started its transition (Karvonen, 1996, p.90). Since Egypt’s regime was and is regarded as authoritarian, it is important to present some characteristics of these regimes. Often, these regimes are led by one person or a smaller group that exercise power within fuzzy but relatively predictable lines. Some of the regimes have been military regimes that have taken hold of political power by force and afterwards kept it by implementing fear or, if needed, by use of force. In addition, they sought legitimacy with the population by different reform and developing programs (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.111-116).

These regimes quite often become, as Stepan and Linz call it, “authoritarian-democratic hybrids”. In these regimes the most important political actors believe they will lose legitimacy and support if they fail to embrace core features of democracy such as elections, while at the same time believe they must keep authoritarian controls on key aspects of the emerging polity in hope to further their goals and retain their supporters. This phenomenon is seen as a “situation” because it will most likely fail to become institutionalized. Ideally it should develop into a transition to democracy, but most usually, the ruling apparatus will not find democracy appealing, and will turn the country back to fully-fledged authoritarianism (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.20-21).

It is specific events that trigger these situations and start the liberalization process, such as the protests on Tahrir Square. In Egypt, this was caused by a growing sense of individual dignity, people seeing themselves as citizens rather than subjects, and a feeling that democracy is something that should be expected. (ibid. 2013, p.20-21).

In order for this regime type to make fulfill a transition to democracy, the authors argue that not only civil society, but also political society play important roles. The civil society plays a vital role in order to destroy an authoritarian regime, but political society is crucial for the construction and consolidation of a new democracy. The argument is that there must be organized groups of political activists that can resist dictatorship, and also peacefully debate amongst them on how they can reach consensus and a democratic alternative. A democratic political society demands that the different actors have political engagements with each other in order to reach an agreement. In this respect, the drafting of the constitution comes to play a significant role (ibid. 2013, p.22-23).
4 Historical Context

4.1 Background on Egyptian politics

On the 23rd of July 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser and a group of army officers - “The Free Officers” - organized a military coup against the monarchy which, under a British colonial system, ruled Egypt at the time (Rogan, 2009, p.284). Together with his co-conspirators, Nasser established Egypt’s first socialist republic with its first president, officer Mohammed Naguib. After two years in office, Naguib was ousted by Nasser and put under house arrest during a Nasserist purge of his rivals, which included the arrest of thousands of Muslim Brothers (ibid. 2009, p.288). Nasser, along with the other Free Officers, drafted a new constitution for the Egyptian Republic. The constitution was not finalized until 1956 and lasted for only two years (El Masry, 2012). Nasser and the military cracked down on any political dissent such as Muslim Brothers, communists, and former regime loyalists. Nasser also established a one-party system and by censoring and restricting, held a tight grasp around the media (Rogan, 2009, p.288).

What made these seemingly Stalinist purges possible for Nasser was his immense popular support. Poverty and unemployment were rising during King Farouq (whom Nasser ousted), and the monarchy was seen as a colonial puppet, whose strings were pulled by the British Empire (ibid. 2009, p.277). Nasser represented many things which were in stark contrast to Farouq: his family was not a part of the “high society” in Cairo, the society which dominated Egyptian government and politics. He called for social reforms to redistribute Egypt’s wealth to its people in the most equal way possible (ibid. 2009, p.286). Perhaps most important of all was the fact that he was a strong Egyptian military leader, perceived to be able to crush Western powers who attempted to colonize Egypt and exploit the Suez Canal, while he also dared to stand up against Israel. He and the Arab coalition however suffered immense losses during the 1967 war with Israel where Egypt’s entire air-force was destroyed in a matter of hours, and the Sinai peninsula got occupied by Israel (ibid. 2009, p.337). Nasser was heartbroken, and probably angry with himself at this grave miscalculation and attempted to resign. Due to popular support and outcry for him to stay, he remained in office until he died of a heart-attack three years later, in 1970 (ibid. 2009, p.340).

1 King Farouq was in fact not Egyptian. He was a direct descendant of Muahmed Ali, an ethnic albanian ruler who established his family’s dynasty in 1805 (Rogan, 2009, p. 83).
When Nasser died, his vice-president Anwar Sadat (also a member of the Free-Officer military coup in 1952) took over the presidency (ibid. 2009, p.365). The most striking event during his mandate was the signing of a peace-treaty with Israel in 1979. Ever since that treaty, the US has supported Egypt with annual military aid (ibid. 2009, p.392). In 1981, during a military exhibition, Sadat was gunned down by Islamist militants disguised as government troops and died immediately. The Assassin cried out: “I have killed Pharaoh, and I do not fear death.” (ibid. 2009, p.398).

4.2 Recent political development

This is when the vice-president Hosni Mubarak came to power. According to the Al Jazeera documentary, The Family, Mubarak suspended the constitution, established the “emergency law”, and banned the Muslim Brotherhood once again (The Family, 2012). Mubarak’s early rule attempted (on the surface) to promote democracy and other liberal freedoms, but with the help of the emergency law his rule quickly turned authoritarian when he expanded the secret police’ and his own powers. His government did nothing to reform the economic policies that were, and still are crippling the Egyptian economy. His refusal to institute any real reforms was partly what led to the January 25 revolution of 2011 (ibid, 2012). The revolution was started by a call for mass protests by different youth organizations such as the April 6th and Kefaya (“enough”) movements. These youth protests quickly (and unexpectedly) exploded in nation-wide demonstrations including several millions of people (Masoud, 2011, p.21). This revolution had no clear ideology and no single leader; but however it did have clear demands: the people wanted Mubarak and his government to resign; corruption to end and democratic equality to be instated. Eighteen days after the first wave of big protests Mubarak finally resigned, and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took over the process (Brown, 2013, p.45-46).

The following winter of ‘11/12, the first parliamentary elections were held where the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafies\(^2\) won a clear majority. The summer of 2012 Presidential elections were held when the Muslim Brotherhood’s representative Mohammed Morsi won and became Egypt’s first democratically elected president (Brown, 2013, p.48). Though Morsi won the democratic elections he did not act accordingly, and added a constitutional amendment that granted him “God-like” powers, unquestionable by the judiciary or legislature (Naguib, 2013). Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government failed to

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\(^2\) Salafies are hard-line islamists who represent a much more rigid form of islamism than the Muslim Brotherhood does. They believe in returning to the core principles of Islam, and to a society in which the founder of the religion, Prophet Muhammad, lived in ca 1400 years ago (Rogan, 2009, p.141). Due to an increased popularity of political islam, the Salafies are popular among many poor and marginalized Egyptians (Kirkpatrick, 2011).
consolidate the democracy, and many Egyptians feared they would gradually ‘islamize’ the country turning it into a Muslim caliphate. Whether this was Morsi’s plan or not, the country experienced extreme polarization during his rule pitting his supporters against his opponents (Brown, 2013, p.50-51).

This culminated in demonstrations against his rule in the tens of millions on June 30th, 2013. In the midst of this popular revolt the SCAF gave Morsi an ultimatum: reverse Egypt’s polarization and stabilize the country, or resign. Morsi was unable to do this within the required 48 hours, and refused to resign, why the SCAF decided to oust him through a military coup. The SCAF then instituted an interim government, and cracked down on Muslim Brotherhood demonstrations and sit-ins, at one point killing over one thousand protesters after demanding they disperse (Whitson, 2013). The interim government has now drafted and passed a new protest law which has been criticized by the UN, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International among others (Human Rights Watch, 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood have been labeled as an illegal terrorist organization, and have been forced underground. Mohammed Morsi and many other Muslim Brothers in high positions are in court under criminal trials and investigations (BBC, 2013a).
5 Analysis

In the wake of Mubarak’s overthrow, most observers believed that the initiative for restructuring the societal and political systems would lie in the hands of the young pro-revolutionary forces. However, it soon became obvious that there was, and still is, a growing opposition to the revolution and its increasingly fragmented revolutionary forces. The opposition to the youth-activists was made up of the “old regime”, opportunistic Islamists and the SCAF, all of whom are considered to be political elite\(^3\) (Armbrust, 2013, p.834-835). Furthermore, in the upsetting political and societal landscape, new pacts and unlikely alliances have emerged and deepened the cleavages in the society. The army shifted from being allied to the old regime, to being an uneasy partner to the Muslim Brotherhood and then once again an ally of non-Islamists and protectors of the “popular will”. The loosely aligned liberals, leftists and nationalists (representing ‘liberal’ and secular parties), shifted from supporting democratic elections to backing a “democratic” coup out of the fear that the elected Islamists might monopolize and never give up power in a new regime. The Brotherhood’s strategy also shifted from “participation not domination” to a strategy where they came to control the legislature and the presidency (Tabaar, 2013, p.727).

Precisely which actors played the biggest role in the process and how they shifted their strategies in order to serve their own self-interests is what we have sought to clarify in our analysis. Furthermore, during a democratization process, the “democratic” elections and constitution-drafting play an important role in defining the game-rules. Therefore we have analyzed the outcomes of these processes as well. Finally, we are well aware that many other factors than those mentioned above affect the democratization process and therefore we have dedicated a section to analyze the Egyptian economy and the abuse of the human rights.

\(^3\) One must note that the Muslim Brotherhood’s position has changed in the past three years from being a semi-illegal sort of NGO, to a part of the political elite, to the ruling party, and now a terrorist organization with the decree on the 25th of December 2013 (BBC, 2013a).
5.1 Transitional actors

5.1.1 The military

There is no doubt that the military played an important role in shaping the post-Mubarak political landscape in Egypt. In fact, a wide range of people believe that the military contributed a great deal in Egypt’s failed democratization. Atef Said, a human rights researcher, argues that the military has been in charge during the transition period which brings about a dual paradox: the first is that the SCAF continues to constitute a central apparatus in Egyptian political society - the army leaders are a part of the ruling regime that was overthrown in 2011 and are thus not neutral. The second factor relates to the fact that an institution such as the military, that is based on hierarchy, strict regulation, and obedience has been leading the transition to democracy (Said, 2012, p.397). With these paradoxes in mind, Said seeks to provide explanation to two questions: first, why the army decided to side with the revolution in January 2011, and second, following the revolution why the Egyptian military leaders resisted major political reforms (ibid. 2012, p.398).

An argumentation to the first question is that the military was involved in a set of complex economic, social-demographic, historical/cultural, and international geopolitical factors that altogether have influenced military’s actions and more or less forced them to side with the people in order to preserve their own self-interests. These factors are: the army’s economic empire; its social base; the army’s constructed image as the founder of the modern Egypt state (established after the Free Officer’s military coup 1952); and the army’s ties to the United States. A combination of these factors contributed to the army taking a stand against the National Democratic Party’s (NDP4) government during the revolution (ibid. 2012, p.398-400). The army leaders were not prepared to hold power, but did so on the condition that they could retain their position in the Egyptian economy and also to keep receiving the annual $1.3 billion in US military aid. Since then, the army leaders have continued to navigate between contradictory goals, aiming to establish a conditional democracy that would allow them to maintain their privileges (Dahshan, 2014).

Leaving the state apparatus to the military has been one of the most problematic issues in the transitional period. Tamer Wagieh argues that:

“...It is expected that any ruling class against which any revolution took place will fight back. But the most ironic and unfortunate story of our revolution is that we gave our corrupt ruling class a golden opportunity to destroy the revolution and shatter its

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4 The National Democratic Party was Mubarak’s political party whose headquarters were burned down during the revolution in 2011. In addition to that, the party has been restricted from free participation in the political context, though individual members may run for office (Shenker, 2011).
revolutionaries. It is a golden opportunity because they control the most important and influential posts in the state.” (ibid. 2012, p.419).

The crisis of legitimacy of military rule in Egypt will play a significant role in influencing the military’s actions and affect the power relations in Egypt for years to come (ibid. 2012, p.425).

5.1.2 The Muslim Brotherhood

Another actor that was expected to play a big role, and certainly did, was the Muslim Brotherhood – an Islamist political organization founded in 1928. While, as mentioned earlier, many expected the Egyptians who demonstrated on Tahrir Square would form the core of new parties that would take the lead in a reformed democratic Egypt, the military and the old rooted Muslim Brotherhood ensured that no new groups would hold power in the post-Mubarak era (Day, 2011, p.6).

On the contrary, the revolution provided the Muslim Brotherhood with a window of opportunity to quickly grab a hold of the power through democratic elections. The organization was technically illegal during Mubarak’s rule, partly because of the fact that the US provided the military with 1.3$ million in aid per year with a tacit understanding that the Brotherhood would be kept away from power. However, during the revolution the US tactics shifted and President Obama stated that the Egyptian Islamists should have a “seat at the table”, and the military took him by his word (ibid. 2011, p.6-7).

5.2 Post-Mubarak politics

There were two specific issues that played a certain role in shaping Egypt after the revolution. The first one concerned strong civil society and the revolution fever, and the second concerned the duality in power in Egypt - the Muslim Brotherhood on one hand, and the military on the other (Said, 2012, p.426-427). These issues are also touched on by Stepan and Linz in their recent article, *Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’*. They also argue that a healthy political society is crucial for the consolidation of a new democracy, and that there must be organized groups of political activists that can resist dictatorship and reach consensus between them (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.22-23). While the “democratic” process after Mubarak’s ouster should have ensured that such an ideal political society took form, representing the civil society as well as the political elite, things took a different turn in Egypt.
5.2.1 Elections framework

Before analyzing the recent elections, it is important to explain how elections have been managed in the past. Both the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood used corrupt tactics for several decades before the revolution to increase their electorate. Naguib claims that the Brotherhood handed out rice, oil, and other subsidiaries to poor and rural communities in Egypt, in return for votes. He also claims that the NDP used similar tactics but instead of offering commodities, they threatened to take them away. They threatened to stop the flow of water and refused handing out subsidized fertilizer to Egyptian agricultural communities if they chose not to vote for them (Naguib, 2013). These tactics are those of “authoritarian-democratic hybrids” where people may have been given the right to vote but no emphasis is put on civic freedoms and political rights. At the same time the presence of violence against opposition groups, the media and the civilian organizations is high. In such regimes, the government uses its dominance and economic resources to counter the opposition by making it harder for people in certain areas to vote while making it easier to vote where they hold great support, exactly as it is going on in Egypt. These tactics contribute to the difficulties these regimes will face during their democratic consolidation (Linde and Ekman, 2006, p.117-118). It is these kinds of regimes that O’Donnell and Schmitter argue include limited liberalization but fail to present a full democracy (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.8-9).

These corrupt tactics are what the youth revolutionaries were initially revolting against. This is also why the January 2011 revolution is seen by many analysts, including our interviewees, as simply a “revolt” rather than a revolution because it did not manage to change these manipulative structures and tactics in the country (Beinin, 2013).

5.2.2 Post-Mubarak elections

In the aftermath of Mubarak’s overthrow, Egyptians were called to the polls over and over, for a total of five national elections, but every vote seemed to increase political/societal polarization rather than manage or resolve the problems (Brown, 2013, p.46). Partly, this was because of the timing of the first parliamentary elections in September 2011. The SCAF, who dominated the election process, gave insufficient time for new parties to organize properly and on top of that, designed extreme requirements for registration of any new parties (Day, 2011, p.6). In a democratization process, elites and the masses must trust their political parties to be the ones to facilitate the transition by providing choices for voters and by acting as guardians of democracy (Fish and Wittenberg, 2012, p.194). But because of the prevailing circumstances, Egypt’s revolutionary secular youths lacked equivalently strong political parties to represent them and were left disappointed (Said, 2012, p.427).

According to Brown, two things were needed in order for Egypt to manage a successful transition that goes hand in hand with transitology theories: a
broad agreement among elites on the game-rules of the transition, and a process that would allow the people to express their will without the government ruling over it. The problem was not the elections, but the fact that elections’ losers would not accept the result outcomes delegitimizing them and deepening the polarization (Brown, 2013, p.46) (Karvonen, 1996, p.77).

The polarization, together with the political elite’s failure to cooperate, started already when the Egyptians first were called to the polls in March 2011 to approve a series of constitutional amendments that presented an option on how to build a new constitutional order. According to Brown, with support of our interviewees, the Islamists and the deep-rooted Muslim Brotherhood embraced the referendum that promised a quick transition process and called for a rapid voting of a new president and parliament via elections. Embracing these referendums were clearly in the Brotherhood’s best interest since they would be the most popular contestants and experience minimal threats from revolutionary forces. Non-islamists on the other hand, wished for the constitution to be drafted first but failed to provide an alternative plan for a transition (Brown, 2013, p.47). Youth revolutionaries, according to activist Mina Naguib, also called for a new constitution to be drafted before elections took place, otherwise, as Naguib points out: “How can we vote on a new President when we don’t know what powers he/she will have?” (Naguib, 2013). Many liberals pointed out that the military should “at the very least appoint a committee of experts to draft the constitution” (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.21). The main problem was that the authoritarian military structure was, and still is, so deep-rooted in Egypt that insight and inclusion in this process was not required, and the SCAF could make their own rules for the transitional framework (Hassan, 2013). The approval of the constitutional amendments was later on dismissed by the military, under what they called “revolutionary legitimacy”. Instead of the people deciding, the generals wrote a new constitution on how the state should be run during a transition and this fact brought proof that the constitution was whatever the political elites said it was (Brown, 2013, p.47). When the military further decided to draft 6 new articles to the constitution it deepened the polarization and split the revolutionary movement down the middle. According to Mina Naguib, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists supported the idea of voting yes for these new articles knowing that if elections were to be held sooner rather than later, they would win much popular support. The secular youth revolutionaries on the other hand, opposed the idea of voting for new articles to a constitution that they were not a part of drafting. At this point, the Brotherhood stood for “stability” and promoted reform from within the system⁵ (Naguib, 2013).

The next two elections came in 2011 and 2012 as Egyptians voted for the lower and upper houses of parliament. The Islamists won a majority but it meant little because of two reasons: First, the military had taken care in the constitutional

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⁵ It is important to note here that the Brotherhood acted as a populist party when promoting stability, knowing that many of their voters were suffering from the lack of tourism and continuous SCAF-imposed curfews which hurt their businesses (The Tower, 2013).
declaration to ensure that the parliament would not have the power to pass legislation without the generals’ approval. The military soon realized itself that it engineered a plan that gave it an oversight role but only temporarily; once the new President was sworn in, the military would lose its powers (Brown, 2013, p.47-48). Therefore, the military needed the Brotherhood to act as an ally in drafting a constitution that retained the military’s interests, and the Brotherhood was not a partner that was willing to give in for the military’s demands (Said, 2012, p.426-427). Second, as Mina Naguib puts it, the outcomes of the first parliamentary election were so dissatisfying to many, that very few people went to vote on the elections for the second parliamentary election, taking away from the second election results’ legitimacy (Naguib, 2013).

5.2.3 Drafting the constitution

A new constitution is without a doubt a fundamental point in Egypt’s effort to build a democratic policy that would ensure the rule of law, and maximize the core values of any democracy. Many hoped that the writing of the constitution would embrace the democratic values and was therefore supposed to manifest a consensus across the political spectrum following the disposal of authoritarian rule (Taher, 2013, p.25).

However, as mentioned earlier, the referendum revealed a quite different picture than was first imagined. The writing of the constitution that started in March 2011 led to a polarized political landscape, divided into two contradictory visions where each party had its own priorities, ambitions and understandings of national interests (ibid. 2013, p.26). According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan the polarization was a consequence of Egypt’s lack of political society:

“Although Egypt arguably had a more creative civil society than did Tunisia, the former’s specifically political society was and is woefully underdeveloped. As late as four months after Mubarak’s February 2011 ouster, the two key social groups that had opposed him—secular liberals and the Muslim Brotherhood—still had not held a single joint meeting to discuss democratic governing alternatives.”

Without the ability to reach any form of collaboration early in the process, the polarization would only be intensified (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.23). Egypt’s leading political forces simply failed to design a settlement, a sort of pact, which would define the rules on the basis of mutual guarantees of those entering into it—a pact that probably would lead to a different outcome (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.37).

Egypt’s mistakes are a consequence of all Egyptian politicians, argues Ahmed Taher, and comes to the conclusion that the political actors should bear the responsibility for errors that have been made even before the country’s first civilian presidential election (Taher, 2013, p.26). One of these errors occurred during November 2011 with the “El-Selmi Document”. The document represented a set of principles regarding the prospective constitution that gave the military
immunity from civilian oversight and intended to establish a National Defense Council as the only body allowed to discuss military-related matters. This document sparked a demonstration of more than one million people on Cairo’s streets that demanded the document’s annulment. Predictably, this led to the security forces attacking protesters and the clashes resulted in deaths of dozens of people and wounds of hundreds (ibid. 2013, p.27).

The clashes continued between different parties after the elections for Egypt’s parliament (ibid. 2013, p.27). The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafies won a clear majority of the seats which angered the “rest” of Egyptian society greatly. Many secular activists, including Mina Naguib himself, felt that the Brotherhood had hijacked the revolution and used their deep-rooted organization to quickly earn seats in parliament before any kind of political society had been established (Naguib, 2013).

The chosen houses of parliament were then supposed to choose one hundred Egyptians who would draft a new document during the course of 6 months. The Parliament had no guidance on who should serve among the constitution-writers, and here the involved parts failed to reach consensus. The result was that the Islamists selected a body that was half made up of parliament-members (dominated by islamists), and half was drawn from various social groups and official bodies. Many non-islamists disliked the process and by the help of an administrative court, stopped it altogether claiming that the assembly was unrepresentative. The result could have been beneficial if it had led to an agreement among Egypt’s rivaling political groups, but instead it led to the Parliament once again failing to reach consensus. It ended up with the Islamist majority later selecting a similar body to replace the former constitution-writing committee (Brown, 2013, p.47-48). The Islamist majority in the both chambers resulted in manifested society-wide divisions which deepened the polarization. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court declared the people’s Assembly unconstitutional, which led to the dissolution of the Parliament right before the Presidential elections, an act which widened the gap between the two sides - both feeling betrayed by democratic manipulations (Taher, 2013, p.27-28).

Later on, in May 2012, Egyptians were once again called out to the polls to vote, now on a new President. Not only was the parliament disbanded, but the military also sprang another constitutional declaration that stripped the President of significant power, and created a continuously strong role for the military in the constitution-drafting (Brown, 2013, p.48-49).

5.2.4 Presidential elections

Regardless of the events that occurred before the elections, many revolutionaries were relieved that the representative of the old regime and prime minister during Mubarak’s rule, Ahmed Shafiq, was defeated. Instead Muhammad Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, won a marginal victory (Taher, 2013, p.28). This was seen as a democratic victory as it was the first democratically elected civilian government in Egypt’s entire political history. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and
secular activists across Egypt rejoiced as Morsi defeated Ahmed Shafiq, and many thought Egypt was on its way to a more successful transition (Naguib, 2013). To many people’s disappointment, the political battle between the Brotherhood and the military was soon on again. Morsi removed the top leaders of the SCAF and announced their Constitutional Declaration invalid. He took a major step in attempting to end the long-standing military rule and started a new era in the revolutionary process that included a new constitution to restructure government institutions, reform the country’s political system, and regulate the relationship between government authorities. Most important, the new constitution was to cherish human rights and freedoms (Taher, 2013, p.28). Opponents of the Brotherhood felt that although Morsi was voted into power through democratic elections, and spoke of democratic reforms, he did not act democratically. The “alarms”, argues Naguib, became clear quite early in Morsi’s presidency. The major alarm came about when Morsi announced a constitutional decree that granted him “God-Like” powers over the judiciary and the legislature (Naguib, 2013). The decree exempted “all of Morsi’s decisions from legal challenge until a new parliament is elected”. Although Morsi claimed this was to protect the goals of the revolution, it enhanced his own authority and the people of Egypt felt their initial empowerment crumble (Godfrey & Beaumont, 2012).

Both Mina Naguib and freelance journalist Helena Hägglund agree with the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood adopted the same tactics and behavior as the authoritarian regimes before them. They allude to the fact that the revolution did not manage to dismantle the authoritarian political structures, and until that happens, any regime that takes power will be forced to work within an authoritarian framework. This framework embodies: no dialogue with political opponents, harsh tactics against political dissidents, intolerance for critical journalists and other undemocratic features (Naguib, 2013) (Hägglund, 2013). In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to achieve what both Linz & Stepan, and O’Donnell & Schmitter persistently argued for in their theories: the importance of creating new and functional game-rules.

5.3 The military coup

5.3.1 Morsi’s ouster

The Muslim Brotherhood’s rule of Egypt was indeed problematic. Hamdi Hassan, former regional advisor to international IDEA’s MENA program, claims:

“When this man Morsi came in, he didn’t understand. I mean he did not understand anything. I mean he was just working, taking orders from the Muslim Brotherhood. This is a deep, totalitarian, tyrannical state, and if you are the supreme commander, you must understand what this military is about!” (Hassan, 2013)
In many ways, Mohammed Morsi gravely underestimated the SCAF and their ability to shape and intervene in Egyptian politics in the name of state security. When Morsi attempted to weaken the SCAF’s power, he removed several generals from the head of the SCAF. The Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi was replaced by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, along with several other high-positioned generals. This however did not bring about a major change since it did not change the military’s core structure, but only replaced old faces with new ones (Ahram Online, 2012).

Morsi’s ouster was started by a civil movement called Tamarod, which started to collect signatures in early 2013 from supporters in favor of ending Morsi’s rule. The movement managed to collect 22 million signatures before the first anniversary of his presidency and gathered in the tens of millions in the streets of Egypt to demand that Morsi step down and new elections to be held. The immense numbers of demonstrators on June 30th 2013 gave the military a mandate to demand Morsi’s resignation (Kingsley, 2013). A popular rumor in Egypt today is that the Tamarod movement was in fact funded by the military in secret, and human rights defender Mariam Kirollos indeed regrets signing their petition (Kirollos, 2013).

5.3.2 Implications of the coup

An important aspect of transitology that Stepan and Linz bring forth is about “authoritarian-democratic hybrids”, where the leaders embrace core democratic values to gain legitimacy, but keep authoritarian controls in order to keep power. In these “situations”, the ruling apparatus is dissatisfied with democracy, and will most likely turn the country back to fully-fledged authoritarianism through a military coup (Stepan and Linz, 2013, p.20-21). This is how the situation is developing in Egypt. The military started to feel undermined and saw their country crumble under a democracy that would strip them of their powers. Even though the revolution did not manage to change the authoritarian structure, it has brought the military under a “legitimacy crisis” for years to come (Said, 2012, p.422-423). Also the people we have interviewed are in agreement and argue that the Egyptian authoritarian military structure is one of the biggest obstacles to Egypt’s democracy.

Instead of the military having a marginalized role in the process, they have been given mandate to expand their powers, and thus decide where Egypt’s democracy will head. One of the most striking implications of the coup was the blatant massacre over one thousand protesters outside the Rabaa al Adawiya square, in the Cairo suburb of Nasr City (Whitson, 2013). On August 14th, 2013, several thousand protesters were taking part in a sit-in which had been maintained on the Rabaa al Adawiya square since the July 3rd ouster of Mohammed Morsi. The military had informed the protesters that on this day they would “disperse” and demanded they leave the square. Afterwards, they proceeded to storm the protest camp and fired tear gas and live ammunition into the crowds, killing over
one thousand people, including the 17 year old daughter of a Muslim Brotherhood leader and a Sky-News cameraman (BBC, 2013b).

5.4 Other influential factors

5.4.1 Egyptian economy

Another important aspect of the democratization process is the economy. Transition processes often go hand in hand with greater economic crises and it is of great importance that those who govern are able to tackle these crises (Karvonen, 1996, p.77). It was the economic circumstances that sparked the initial Arab Spring protests in Tunisia. Also in Egypt, the economy is the reason for the widespread disillusionment and anger seen during the revolution. According to economist Mohamed Dahshan, prior to the revolution there were about 4.5 million people employed in the public sector. Not only were these people underemployed (not paid enough to support their families and forced to take other jobs as well) but they were used inefficiently because one person could do the job that three employees were paid to do (Dahshan, 2013).

Another huge issue in Egypt is that of government subsidies. The government subsidized basic commodities, and have been doing so since the Second World War. Dr. Hafez Salmawy, during the latest “Cairo Climate Talks”, claims that subsidies take up roughly 27% of Egypt’s budget (Cairo Climate Talks, 2013). Mohamed Dahshan says that no political leader in Egypt has the courage to speak publically about tackling these issues because it will inevitably lead to lifting the subsidies. Former president Anwar Sadat attempted this kind of reform when he lifted bread-subsidies but was soon met with an immense wave of protests and riots which forced him to reinstate the subsidy. However, Dahshan points out that the leaders should be persistent. He speaks about the need for leaders to level with the people of Egypt, explaining to them that if they want to achieve economic reform, and improve on both social and democratic institutions in the country, they need to be ready to sacrifice. He speaks of the “J-Curve” that suggests that things will get slightly worse before they get better, but provides the only sustainable option in the long-run (Dahshan, 2013).

The January 2011 revolution called for improved welfare institutions as well as democratic ones. This meant improved public education, improved public health care, infrastructure and other aspects of a “modernized” society. Dahshan claims that with the increased revenue from gradually cutting the subsidies, the government will have the resources it needs to improve on all these institutions, including democratic ones such as elections (ibid. 2013). But with the Muslim Brotherhood’s inability to improve on the economic issues during their rule, it led to even deeper economic and financial problems (growing poverty and mass-unemployment) in early months of 2013. These factors contributed to mass dissatisfaction and eventually to bringing the country into chaos (Tabaar, 2013, p.727).
5.4.2 Human rights abuses

Another important issue in transitology is the principle of human rights and citizenship. (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.7-8) In Egypt, the government used sexual harassment to eradicate the protest movements and the calls for democratic reform, and in that way disrespected the basic human rights. Mariam Kirollos, Egyptian defender of Human Rights, has under many years documented sexual harassment in Egypt. Mariam claims one can trace this tactic back to May 25th, 2005, known as “Black Wednesday”. Female journalists were protesting in front of the Journalist Syndicate against a constitutional declaration by Hosni Mubarak which marks the first time in Egypt’s history when sexual violence was used by the state as a tool to marginalize and exclude women from the political sphere (Kirollos, 2013).

It is through sexual harassment tactics the SCAF wanted to scare away women from the protest movements. On March 9th in 2011, women who were attending a sit-in on the Tahrir Square were forced to take part in “virginity tests” so that they would not be able to claim that they have been raped by security officials while spending the night in the square. Not only were these women humiliated, but bearing in mind that sexual exposure is taboo in Egyptian society, these women would find themselves alienated from their communities (ibid. 2013).

Although the Muslim Brotherhood may not be responsible for committing crimes of sexual harassment themselves, they did nothing to investigate the crimes of the former regime and hold them accountable, which is an important issue in a country’s transition period (Amnesty International, 2013). Kirollos asserts that the use of women’s bodies as a political battlefield continues, both by the Brotherhood and the secular opposition. Kirollos means that the politicians are evading the issues which actually should be discussed, namely that the state should provide better security for females in Egypt in public, and create a mindset that sexual harassment is both a female as well as a male issue. By using women only as bargaining chips in the political arena, and thereby neglecting the true problems, the politicians are as guilty as the ones committing the harassments and rapes (Kirollos, 2013).

Another issue neglected by the Morsi administration is that of torture and cruel treatment. According to Amnesty International, one NGO recorded “88 cases of torture or other ill-treatment by police during President Morsi’s first 100 days in office” (Amnesty International, 2013). Furthermore, under Morsi’s rule the military was given constitutional right to try civilians for crimes in a military court. Thus, the government has failed to provide one of the core democratic rights: the right to be tried by a fair civilian jury. According to Amnesty International, over 1,000 people have been imprisoned through military trials during and after Morsi’s rule (ibid. 2013).

During Morsi’s rule and in the aftermath of his ouster, the most human rights abuses have been those against freedom of expression. Several constitutional amendments implemented by Morsi’s government banned ‘insulting of religion’ and ‘insulting of the president’. As a consequence, many
Egyptians were arrested and given prison sentences because of public statements against Islam or the president (ibid, 2013). Also, after Morsi’s ouster, many human rights activists and revolutionaries have been harassed, arrested, and effectively silenced. Ahmed Maher who is the founder of the April 6th movement, a movement that was targeted responsible for the initial January 2011 protests, now faces a 3 year prison sentence for “organizing an unauthorized protest” (Guerin, 2013). Another two activists who were symbols of Mubarak’s opposition, Alaa Abdel Fattah and Mona Seif, today face a 1 year sentence each for ‘thuggery’, ‘assault’, and taking part in illegal protests (Ahram Online, 2013c). These are just some examples from a nationwide crackdown on the opposition. Many of the people being jailed now served jail-terms during Mubarak accused of similar falsified crimes, which shows the true irony of today’s Egypt. The current military-appointed government has hijacked the revolutionary movement and used it as legitimacy when arresting the same people who truly started the revolution (Jones, 2013). The reason this kind of “silencing” is the worst form of human rights abuse is because without people actively speaking out against crimes against humanity, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organizations would not have the information they need, and an authoritarian entity like the SCAF would be able to run Egypt like the army they command.

5.5 Situation today

Today, the political polarization in Egypt is clear. Whether the conflict is seen as a clash between secular and religious actors, or between non-liberal democrats or undemocratic liberals, the polarization has never been this deep (Tabaar, 2013, p.728). Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood feel undermined because the political leaders they voted into the parliament and government are being tried in court for “inciting to the killing of protesters” (Nasralla et.al., 2013). The political party they belong to has been deemed illegal (Al Jazeera, 2013a). In the aftermath of the military coup which ended the year-long rule of the Brotherhood in Egypt, the military structure (through the military-appointed interim government) has drafted and passed a new ‘protest-law’. This law has given the government the right to crack down on, not only on the illegal Muslim Brotherhood organization, but also the secular youth activists who started the 2011 revolution that ousted President Hosni Mubarak, sentencing many to long jail terms (Kholaf, 2013).

Another important development is the Muslim Brotherhood’s new legal status in Egypt. Not only are they banned as an organization and political party, they are now also labeled as a ‘terrorist organization’ (BBC, 2013a). The government has also seized over one hundred schools across Egypt that were run by Brotherhood leaders. (Ahram Online, 2013a) Mahmoud Taha, former deputy governor to the city of Minya in Upper Egypt during the Brotherhood’s rein, met with us and reinforced these facts about the Brotherhood’s situation today. He
himself feels very scared, and is relieved that his identity as former deputy governor is not widely-known as he was never the face of the governorate of Minya. He claims that the Muslim Brotherhood will keep fighting against the totalitarian regime imposed by the SCAF, by protesting, creating awareness, and boycotting the upcoming elections on the drafting of the constitution which widely supports the army’s strongly influencing role in Egyptian politics (Taha, 2014). Although Taha’s claims of human-rights abuses against the Brotherhood are questionable, the state does not want international journalists to get a hold of this information. In fact, on the 29th of December, a group of Al-Jazeera journalists were arrested in Egypt for having “illegal meetings” with the Muslim Brotherhood after interviewing a Brotherhood representative (Al Jazeera, 2013b).

Meanwhile, the military is using the revolution for gaining legitimacy as Egypt’s ruling authority. Their propaganda is widespread and successful, and today all over Cairo one cannot miss the billboards and signs with the slogan: “Say yes to the constitution!”. 
6 Conclusion

In any democracy, the people must look to their representative political parties and leaders to lead the way in the democratic process. As pointed out earlier, the transition represents a negotiation that sets the game-rules, and it is of vital importance that the political actors are able to compromise and share mutual understanding for each other in order for the transition to succeed. If they refuse to do so, the core values of democracy are ultimately lost. Mohamed Dahshan writes about this phenomenon in his article entitled “Egypt’s Compassion Deficit”, where he outlines Egypt’s lack of political society. In our interview with him, he compares Egypt’s political society to Sweden’s:

“In other parts of the world different political leaders yell at each other and call each other idiots, and claim that their opponents will destroy the country, but then at the end of the day they can all go to Almedalen and get drunk together. We don’t really have that here. It’s almost like if we disagree with you, we’re going to want to hurt you and your entire family. There’s something very violent about how we perceive politics in Egypt.”
(Dahshan, 2013)

In the end, this kind of political and societal polarization played directly into the hands of the military structure, which used these cleavages in society as a legitimate reason to implement their military coup and establish the anti-democratic protest law.

As presented in our theory it is the actions of the political elites that determine in which direction democracy turns. Had the different political parties and organizations formed a united pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian coalition they could have greatly undermined the military’s authority and power. They could have been the ones deciding on the framework for how the constitution should be written, and who should write it. Instead the classic “divide and conquer” mechanisms were able to be implemented by an authoritarian entity like the SCAF. As presented in our theories and proved in our analysis, much of Egypt’s failure depends on its structural authoritarian past and because of this, Egypt has only succeeded in becoming an “authoritarian-democratic hybrid”. This hybrid form of regime is only temporary because this “situation” does not prevail and often fails to become institutionalized. What remains for Egypt is to move beyond its former authoritarian structure, and convert the ongoing “situation” into a purer democratic outcome, which in the long run, becomes institutionalized and protected by the constitution.

Another problematic fact for the transition process been Egypt’s failing economy. The ongoing economic crisis also played into the hands of SCAF as the population is more concerned to put food on their tables than to engage in pro-
democratic movements. Furthermore, the high number of human rights abuses against the Brotherhood and the secular opposition constitutes additional obstacles for the democracy. However, the opposition remained headstrong and showed no signs of ending their protests or dissent from the authoritarian government and military structure. This continues to undermine the military’s legitimacy and thus provides hope for an Egyptian democracy.
7 References

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Dahshan, Mohammed, economist and writer in Egypt, telephone interview, 2013-12-08.
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Hägglund, Helena, freelance journalist living in Cairo since 2011, telephone interview, 2013-12-08.
Naguib, Mina, blogger and political activist in Egypt, telephone interview, 2013-12-05.
Taha, Mahmoud, former Muslim Brotherhood deputy governor in Minya, Egypt, interview, 2014-01-1.

Literature


Internet sources


Appendix 1:

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>Mohamed Dahshan</td>
<td>Harvard University <a href="http://eldahshan.com/">http://eldahshan.com/</a></td>
<td>December 8th, 2013</td>
<td>34 minutes</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
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<td>December 21st, 2013</td>
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<td>17 minutes</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
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<td>December 15th, 2013</td>
<td>16 minutes</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
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<td>Mina Naguib</td>
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<td>Mahmoud Taha</td>
<td>Former deputy-Governor within Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>January 1st, 2014</td>
<td>32 minutes</td>
<td>Minya, Egypt</td>
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Appendix 2:

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<th>Mohammed Dahshan</th>
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<th>Mariam Kirollos</th>
<th>Mina Naguib</th>
<th>Mahmoud Taha</th>
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<td>What was the biggest factor in Egypt’s failed transition?</td>
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<td>Was the democratic process rushed?</td>
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<td>Should there have been a constitution before an election?</td>
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<td>What kind of insight does the legislature have into the SCAF?</td>
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<td>What kind of human rights abuses were committed during Morsi? During SCAF?</td>
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<td>How could so many people in Egypt blindly support the military coup of 2013?</td>
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<td>What needs to be amended in the constitution?</td>
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<td>How many people are illiterate in Egypt?</td>
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<td>Which Egyptians do subsidies affect?</td>
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<td>How many people are publicly employed in Egypt?</td>
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<td>What is the Brotherhood’s plan for the future?</td>
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<td>How is the Brotherhood operating under current conditions?</td>
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<td>Did the Brotherhood support the initial constitutional referendum presented by the SCAF?</td>
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